American Academy of Political and Social Science

Denazification in the United States Zone of Germany Author(s): William E. Griffith Reviewed work(s): Source: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 267, Military Government (Jan., 1950), pp. 68-76 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political and Social Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1026728 . Accessed: 04/11/2011 07:46
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Denazificationin the United States Zone of Germany

By WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH

Most United States field military government officers, haphazardly picked and insufficiently trained, were, in Aachen and elsewhere, excellent at remandastoring public utilities, but much less questionnaires (Fragebigen), tory removal categories, and an elabo- fitted for carrying out with understandrate "Special Branch" organization.2 ing-still less with enthusiasm-the In the early stages these categories were revolution which United States denazifithe decisive factor. They apparently cation policy implicitly involved. When assumed that the Third Reich had been forced to make political decisions, these controlled by a four-group coalition officers most naturally favored "stable" consisting of the Nazis plus the three political elements (the Catholic Church, the one organizationwhich had survived traditional authoritarian groups-mili3 the collapse, and the strongly conservatarists, industrialists, and bureaucrats -and expressed United States policy of tive former civil servants) and too often replacing them by anti-Nazi, antiau- failed to appoint actively anti-Nazi offithoritarian,and prodemocraticelements. cials. These officers were temperamentally Military Governmentwas committed to an experiment new to history: revolu- interested in "getting things done," not tion by decree. in tearing down; but it was just this This original program was, in retro- tearing down-and standing by-that the first United States postoccupation spect, moderate and-temporarilyworkable. But the impact of the Mor- basic directive, JCS 1067/6,5 required. This ordered the removal of all "more 1 The writer is now engaged in completing than nominal"' Nazis from all offices a doctoral dissertation on this subject.
2 SHAEF GCU Staff Study, May 28, 1944; SHAEF Public Safety Manual, 1st ed., Sept. 1944. 3 Cf. Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth (N. Y., 2nd ed., 1944), p. 632; and Eugene N. Anderson, "Freedom and Authoritarianism in German History," Chap. I, pp. 3-32 in Gabriel A. Almond (Ed.), The Struggle for Democracy in Germany (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1949). Neumann's coalition theory is subject to serious revision on the basis of our knowledge of the anti-Nazi resistance movement in Germany.

the rest of military governLIKE ment, denazification planning suffered from Washington indecision, Morgenthau plan influence, and Roosevelt's decision not to plan at all.' However, based on experience in purging Fascists in Italy, the Public Safety Branch of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces drew up a plan for immediate removal of top-level Nazis and militarists and for retention and later screening of the others, through

genthau plan, the increased American anti-German feeling as the war reached its conclusion, and United States public and press criticism of "undue laxity" in removing Nazis in Aachen led to intensification of the program.4
INITIAL ADMINISTRATION

4 In some areas, all Nazi Party members were automatically removed (see Hq 12th Army Group, G-5 Operational Instructions No. 11, March 11, 1945). For Aachen, cf. Saul K. Padover, Experiment in Germany (New York, 1946), a doctrinaire left-wing account. 5 April 26, 1945. For text of this and other basic military government policy directives, see The Axis in Defeat (Dept. of State Publication No. 2423) and Hajo Holborn, American Military Government (Washington, 1947). 68

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nazification, German Denazification Law and All Implementations and American Directives, compiled by Special Branch, Office of Military Government, Bavaria (Munich, 1st ed., 1946; 2nd ed., 1947; 3 supplements, 1947-48).

At first, in spite of Special Branch protests, these men were not discouraged by Military Government. But the outcry in the United States press, and General Patton's off-the-cuff comparison of Nazis and anti-Nazis to Republicans and Democrats, led to Eisenhower's ordering Patton's removal and brought the matter to a head. Denazification was greatly intensified. The hurriedly drafted 7 and extremely ill-advised Military Government Law No. 8 extended denazification in its most severe form (limitation to ordinary labor) to all Nazi Party membersin business and industry.8 These moves, opposed by the military government denazification staff, went too far. They brought unnecessary inINTENSIFICATION ference with Germaneconomicrecovery, But in spite of Special Branch efforts, concentration on small fry and statismany active Nazis remained in officetics, and consequent neglect of general a fact which United States press corre- political objectives. Few positive steps spondents, their appetites sharpened at were taken, then or later, to appoint Aachen, reported, and which United sincere anti-Nazis to high German poStates left-wing opinion exploited. The sitions. Worst of all, there began just crisis finally broke in Munich in the what the SHAEF denazification plansummer and autumn of 1945. There ners had warned against in 1944: the Military Government had been instru- establishment of a "community of sufmental in forming a Bavarian govern- fering" among all Nazis, large and ment controlled by leaders of the pre- small, and of sympathy for them by 1933 Bavarian People's Party (an ultra- the rest of the population. The far too wide scope of the proconservative, provincial version of the Catholic Center Party), who-like the gram, the lack of any workable scheme majority of Germans-frankly admitted for remedying the individual injustices their opposition to the social revolution of the mandatory removal categories, involved in a large-scale purge of Nazi the failure to use anti-Nazi Germanperand authoritarian elements and the sonnel sufficiently, and the necessity of transfer of power to a prodemocratic some final solution permitting eventual ruling group. reintegration of most lesser Nazis into Germansociety made change inevitable. 6 Directive, Hq USFET, July 7, 1945. Texts But much had been accomplished: of this and other United States and German denazification documents are in the only Special Branches had handled over printed documentary source in English on de1,500,000 cases and removed or exand positions of importance, and provided that no such persons "shall be retained . . . because of administrative necessity, convenience or expediency. . . ." It also contained large-scale provisions for the arrest and internment of top Nazis. This directive was probably the best obtainable at the time. Its postoccupation implementation of July 7, 1945 at least replaced the previous patchwork of regulations with uniform denazification procedures. The latter's establishment of May 1, 1937 as the earliest "nonremovable" date for Nazi Party membership was at least less impractical than the previous hastily issued orders.6
7 Reportedly in a few hours, at Clay's order, by Charles Fahy, his legal adviser. 8 Issued Sept. 26, 1945. The July 7 directive had already been intensified on August 15.

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cluded almost 375,000.9 The clearingaway work for a new, democratic German society had been temporarily accomplished. And in spite of much justified criticism of the category system, considering the necessity for speed and the lack of knowledge and training of United States field personnel no other system could have accomplished as much. Criticism should be directed not so much against the planning, the system, or the top denazification staff as against the largely untrained, often incompetent, and sometimes corrupt United States personnel who carried it out in the field, the lack of consistent policy, the all too ready bowing of policy makers before the storms of press criticism, the much too broad extension of denazification, and the delay in finding a permanent solution.
THE GERMANS TAKE OVER

In late 1945 General Lucius D. Clay established a Denazification Policy Board, headed by Charles Fahy, to investigate the program and recommend a permanent solution. Its Report, submitted on January 15, 1946, stated as the three basic objectives of denazification (1) the removal of political and economic authority from those who
dominated Nazi Germany as a means of assisting in changing the governing element; (2) the rapid punishment of those responsible for Nazi wrongs and

injustices, while (3) avoiding the future social instability arising from a large mass of permanent outcasts. The latter two were new and of great significance. Further, the Report stated that German public opinion must be taken into account, that "substantial elements" in Germany must support the
9 For denazification statistics, see OMGUS Public Safety Branch, Monthly Denazifica-

program, and that active German participation was essential. These principles-opposed by most Special Branch personnel-became officialUnited States policy. The Report proposed individual trials by local German tribunals, with presumptive, rebuttable guilt of categorically incriminatedrespondentsand with sentences ranging from confinement to fines and from permanent to temporary reduction to ordinary labor. The Germanshad also framed draft denazification laws, stressing the judicial rather than the political aspect (punishment for crimes instead of exclusion from influence), with no trials for "nominal" Nazis. But they were forced by Special Branch pressure (aided by the adoption of Allied Control Council Directive No. 24, a near-replica of the July 7 directive) to include in the final Law the registration and processing of questionnaires for all adults, a great widening of persons subject to trial, hearings before local, lay tribunals (Spruchkammern),and presumptive,rebuttable guilt arising from substantially the old Military Government mandatory removalcategories.10 Furthermore, most persons with Nazi affiliationswere reduced to ordinary labor pending trial. But the Germans did win judicial independence for the tribunals; irrespective of presumptive categories, they could classify respondents at their discretion. And those declared followers (Mitliufer), after paying a small fine, regained all their civil rights. The result, the Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism, was promulgatedfor the U. S. zone on March 5, 1946. Lack of space prevents any detailed analysis of its pro10 Classifications were also sharpened; they finally included: Major Offenders (Class I), Offenders (Class II), Lesser Offenders (Class III), Followers (Class IV), and Exonerated (Class V).

tion Report, and OMGUS, Statistical Annex to the Monthly Report of the Military Governor, 1945-49.

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visions; the flood of regulations, orders, and commentaries soon made it into an almost impenetrably complex legal system." Trials began in the summer of 1946. Already many Germans were impatient with denazification delays; soon Military Government joined them. The very wideness of the Law's provisions 12 delayed, confused, and effectively sabotaged its operations.

Local, lay tribunal chairmen and public prosecutors were responsive to Nazi pressure and public apathy. Special Branch personnel saw no reason why a former Nazi should be reinstated in an influential position because a local German tribunal had "cleared" him. But the initial Denazification Policy Board Plan that Military Government would retain approval power over key positions in German government had been abandoned in the tide of turning over responsibility to the Germans.l4 MILITARY GOVERNMENT CONTROL Now the only recourse for Special Special Branch personnel, from the Branch was to prevent such "whitefirst opposed to the Law, had insisted washing" Follower decisions. Now its upon closely supervising its operations. political ends could be achieved only They were far more interested in its through judicial means. A system of removal and exclusion aspects than its supervision of tribunals and of Special punishment aspects. Determined to try Branch objections to their decisions the biggest Nazis first and to assure (the "Delinquency and Error System") that they were barred from influential was established, culminating in the positions, they were seriously concerned power of Land Special Branches to orwhen the first trials were almost exclu- der decisions vacated and new trials sively of small fry. Actually, this was held.l5 inevitable. Denazification was now But tribunal leniency continued,16 headed by political ministers,13respon- and in November 1946 General Clay sible to the Landtage, to their parties, threatened to resume direct Military and to public pressure. The severity Government denazification operations, of the pretrial employment restrictions gave the German authorities sixty days made minor Nazis press for rapid clear- to improve tribunal decisions, and anance; major Nazis had every interest in nounced that "clearing" decisions of postponing their trials. persons previously removed by Special The first tribunal decisions were, Branch to which Military Government even to German opinion, very lenient. objected would not become effective 11 The until these objections were settled.17 standard commentary is Erich Schullze, Gesetz zur Befreiung von NationalAlthough only minor, temporary imsozialismus und Militarismus (3rd ed., Munich, provement resulted, Clay soon an1948); it contains the Law's text, implement14 In OMGUS directives of Aug. 23 and Sept. 21, 1946. 15OMG Bavaria directive, Sept. 20, 1946; Change 11 to Part 8, Title 9, Military Government Regulations, Nov. 22, 1946. Military Government also instituted strict supervision of German-operated internment and labor camps. 16 Appeal tribunal decisions were consistently more lenient than those in the first instance. 17 Speech to the Linderrat, Stuttgart, Nov. 5, 1946.

ing regulations, orders, and so forth. See also the Mitteilungs- or Amtsbldtter of the Laender Ministries. 12 Some 28 per cent of all German adults in the United States zone were affected (betroffen) by it. 13 They varied from Binder in Hesse, who (with Knappstein, his deputy) was probably the best, to the near-psychopathic demagogue Loritz in Bavaria. Kamm in WiirttembergBaden was sincere but contentious. The Bavarian Ministry was torn with political strife until Hagenauer replaced Loritz in June 1947.

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nounced that German administration hoped that quadripartite negotiations would continue. The net result was would produce results.20 Military Government control over the Already in July 1946 the "Youth reinstatement of "cleared" former Amnesty" had freed some 900,000 inNazis.18 criminated persons born after January 1, 1919 from almost all penalties. In CHANGES IN THE LAW December 1946 the "Christmas AmCase processing was still too slow. nesty" freed 1,000,000 more nominally German sympathy was becoming so- incriminated low-income and disabled lidified behind the "poor, persecuted persons. But still 1,400,000 cases reNazis," because of the delays, the rela- mained for trial, many only because tively harsh punishment of tte small they involved pre-1937 Nazi Party fry, and the failure to bring the big members-presumptive Offenders. Some Nazis to trial. German agitation for accelerated procedure was clearly necsubstantial revisions in the Law grew essary. more insistent. Germanauthorities had Now the change in United States pubnever concealed their dislike for the lic opinion began to take effect. AmeriLaw; the churches had always opposed can hatred of a conquered Reich had it; and the political parties were gen- given way to fear of the imperial Sovierally unfavorable, the Christian Demo- ets, and Americans had learned-too crats and the Liberal Democrats par- often in an exaggerated form-of the ticularly so, while the Social Democrats slowness and arbitrariness of much of and (at first) the Communists voiced the denazification program. The New some support.l9 Deal had been replaced by an aggresMilitary Government faced two al- sively conservativeRepublicanEightieth ternatives: large-scale amnesties or basic Congress. And-for economy-minded changes in the Law. The denazification members of Congress the most decisive staff, split within itself, finally agreed -the yawning German dollar deficit that the accent must be shifted from made any interference with economic trials of small fry to trials of top cases recovery (such as the Germans proonly, plus exclusion of active Nazis claimed denazification to be) look like from influential positions only, instead a deliberate drain on the United States of confinement to ordinary labor. But taxpayer.21 General Clay chose amnesities; he did In the summer of 1947, for the first not want to admit that his denazifica- time, a large group of members of Contion policy had been mistaken, and still gress visited Germany. They saw the
18 There were many other such orders: e.g., that persons sentenced to labor camps must be confined immediately (the Law provided for confinement only after appeal proceedings). The Germans bitterly criticized them as an attack on the rule of law (Rechtsstaat). 19 For the best summary of the German viewpoint, and a brilliant analysis of the whole denazification problem, see Karl Heinrich Knappstein, "Die versaumte Revolution," Die Wandlung, Jg. 2, Heft 8 (Nov. 1947), pp. 663-77, 748. See also Eugen Kogon, "Das Recht auf den politischen Irrtum," Frankfurter Hefte, Jg. 2, Heft 7 (July 1947), pp. 641-55. 20 These negotiations had previously produced Control Council Directives No. 24 and 38; neither they nor any other multizonal agreements seriously affected denazification in the United States zone, except for Special Branch's use of the former to make the Law for Liberation more severe. 21 See, e.g., Lewis A. Brown, A Report on Germany (New York, 1947); Gustav Stolper, German Realities (New York, 1948); and Percy Bidwell, "What Is Happening in Germany," Harper's, Vol. CLXLVI (Feb. 1948), pp. 173-79. For the Eightieth Congress' effect on Japan, see Owen Lattimore, The Situation in Asia (Boston, 1949), pp. 115-17.

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delays and injustices of the Law and the politics and favoritism which too often characterized its operations. Most of them became convinced that denazification was unwisely planned and administered and an impediment to German recovery, and should be concluded as soon as possible.22 GeneralClay's hopes for quadripartite denazification agreement, strengthened in April 1947 by the Moscow Conference decisions,23were shattered on August 17 by their unilateral Soviet implementation, stressing German responsibility and leniency and rapidity of procedures for nominal Nazis. Amendments to the Law were now inevitable. the Promulgated in October,24 amendments permitted the declaration as Followers, in accelerated proceedings, of the more nominally incriminated presumptive Offenders. The Germanswere relatively well satisfied, especially after initial Military Government restrictions in Wiirttemberg-Badenand Hesse were removed by order of the Office of Military Government (US)-which made it clear that only very rapid disposition of the remaining cases could prevent complete abandonment of the program.

23The CFM denazification decision, although outwardly similar to the United States proposal, was really an adoption of the Soviet position. The Soviets consistently used denazification as an implement in bringing about a social revolution and a police state. 24 Approved by OMGUS Oct. 7, 1947.

ficiency appropriation bill unless denazification were stopped. Secretary Royall agreed, but General Clay insisted that cancellation just at the time when only the most severely incriminated cases remained for trial would be a serious error. He succeeded in retaining only the most highly incriminated for trial-which he defined as 30,000 cases (including 3,000 to remain in internment), about one-tenth of those pending. The other nine-tenths were to be declared Followers-during April! It is a striking example of the political reality of military government control behind the front of German quasijudicial denazification operations that this task was quite easily accomplished.25 However, United States denazification staffs only worked themselves out of jobs; on May 28, 1948 OMGUS withdrew almost all military government supervision over the denazification program, and the Germans attained their desired independence. But three years had passed since the Nazi collapse, and the German people were unutterably weary of the crimes, errors, and memories of the past. With military government psychological pressure removed, tribunal sentences beFINAL FIASCO came ever more lenient; and-the final But these First Amendmentswere too irony-in the autumn of 1948 only limited and too late. Congress was not strong resistance by German denazificasatisfied, and cancellation of the whole tion authorities frustrated further miliprogramwas narrowly averted in March tary governmentattempts to close down 1948. The House AppropriationsCom- the program. mittee refused to approve an Army deAnd so, in 1949, the last trials and appeals dragged out to their dreary and 22 The "Herter Committee" was the most disillusioning conclusion. Some 950,000 thorough and influential. See House Select trials had been held; 1,600 had been Committee on Foreign Aid, Final Report judged Class I and 21,600 Class II Of(80th Cong., 2d sess., H. R. 1824), pp. 127-29.
25 The Germans passed the necessary Second Amendments to the Law on March 31, 1948. Military government denazification staffs set up secret quotas for each Kreis of cases to be retained for trial, personally selected these cases, and had the Germans declare all the others Followers. Fiat justitia . ..

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fenders. Only 22,700 were still ineligible to hold public office.26 The very top Nazis were-temporarily-immobilized, but otherwise, Nazis, militarists, industrialists, and bureaucrats were free to re-enter society. And they re-entered in thousands; the flood of "renazification"ran full tide. From 40 to 80 per cent of the officials in many branches of public administration are now reinstated former Nazis. More pertinent, many of them are presentday authoritarians. And with the rising tide of German neo-nationalismand the competition for the ex-Nazi vote by all German parties, German (and United States) criticism of and action against this trend have been more vocal than effective.
ANALYSIS OF THE FAILURE

Abandoned by the Americans and universally denounced by the disgusted Germans, denazification had failedfailed to come near achieving any objective ever set forth for it, by Americans or Germans. And the effort to construct democratic foundations for German society, and thus prevent a recrystallization of its traditional authoritarian social structure, had probably failed with it.27 But why did it fail? Was-failure inevitable, or could it have been averted or ameliorated? External factors There is no simple or conclusive answer. The failure arose from both external and internal causes. Among external ones-factors relatively beyond the control of any of the United States or German participants in the pro26 From an OMGUS report, "A Summary of Denazification: The Year 1948 and 1 January to 30 June 1949," released in August 1949. 27 Cf. the penetrating essay of Carl E. Schorske, "The Dilemma in Germany," Virginia Quarterly Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (Winter 1948), pp. 29-42.

gram-were the war passions, the difficulty of using a military occupation for political ends, the Germandollar deficit, and the growing East-West tension and the consequent competition for German support. The German people never really favored the implications of denazification-of penetrating behind Nazism to revolutionize the authoritarian society which they still passively accepted. Its operations were staffed by German officials who felt no sharp social or class cleavage with the Nazis appearing before them, and who, with them, had no desire for the social revolution that severe denazification would bring.28 Then there are other, more controversial factors: Marxists and economic determinists would say that United States capitalist democracywould never have destroyed the German industrial capitalism which-they maintain-produced Hitler; a wider group would say that United States policy makers became, consciously or unconsciously, reluctant to conduct a thorough purge of German groups so similar to themselves.29 Of these last two, the writer does not accept the former, and considers the latter-if true at all-to be based on a similarity far more apparent than real. All of these factors were more or less predictable, more or less inevitable, and little subject to control by military government or German denazification authorities.30
28 See Hans Meyerhoff, "The Reconstruction of Government and Administration," Chap. V, p. 201 in Almond, op. cit. note 3 supra. 29 See Franz L. Neumann, "Military Government and the Revival of Democracy in Germany," Columbia Journal of International Affairs, Vol. II, No. 1 (Winter 1948), pp. 3-20. 30For the above factors and for the last stages of the program, see John H. Herz, "The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXIII, No. 4 (Dec. 1948), pp. 569-94.

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See Knappstein and Kogon, op. cit. note 19 supra. The British did separate them, but they were slower in turning over denazification responsibility to the Germans.

only reflected the same qualities found in the Germanpeople as a whole. True. But these deterministic explanations, But, like the German democratic poliwhile illuminating much of denazifica- ticians of 1930-33, their conduct boded tion's lack of success, do not account ill for the future, and their failure was for the completeness of its failure. not only a symptom but also a cause of Complete success was never possible. the shaky and insecure basis upon which But internal factors must also be con- the copybook structure of present-day sidered. German policy was weak, western German democracy rests, and dilatory, and often insincere; United of the neo-nationalistn now beating States policy was vacillating and self- against it. defeating. The original United States planning, in retrospect,seems sound and Shortsighted policy reasonable. Certainly United States Most United States denazification Government devoted more personnel were technically competent, Military (perhaps too much) attention to de- hard-working, and sincere; but their nazification than the other powers; for crusade for "real" denazification rested this very reason, its mistakes-although upon a faulty analysis of Germany and probably no greater than those of the of Nazism, and-most important-of others-loom higher. United States policy development. AlExtension of denazification (symbol- though they, more than the rest of Miliized by Law No. 8) was not inevitable; tary Government,glimpsed the problem its adoption and stubborn retention, op- of the overthrow of authoritarianism posed by Special Branchpersonnel,must (militarists, industrialists, and bureaube charged to General Clay. Because crats) behind that of the overthrow of of unwise Special Branch pressure, the Nazism, they dissipated their efforts on Law for Liberation, unlike all success- the small fry, and never grasped the ful revolutions, did not hit squarely at exigencies of time and numbers. By the previous governing elite. Its far the time they accepted the prevailing too extensive, rigid presumptive guilt German standpoint that only Nazis categories and employment restrictions should be attacked, it was too late made speed impossible and injustice even for that. certain. It attempted to penalize poThe delay in approving amendments litical errors and punish Nazi crimesto the Law, the distrust of all German to combine political and judicial aims; denazification efforts, and the failure it succeeded in attaining neither, but to recognize the turning tide of United rather in resolidifying the sundered au- States public opinion (a tide caused thoritarian (if not the Nazi) block. largely by their own mistakes) must be The followers of the Nazi Party be- ascribed to the indecision, shortsightedcame the party of the Followers, and ness, and refusal to admit mistakes, not Germans came to doubt if democracy only of Military Government policy could be democratic,or justice be just.31 makers but even more of most United German denazification officials could States denazification personnel. They plead that in their indecision, ineffi- forgot that politics is the science of the ciency, and lack of enthusiasm they possible, and they failed to cut their losses enough and in time.32 31 Internal factors
32 For their attitude, see Joseph F. Napoli, "Denazification from an American's Viewpoint," The Annals of the American Academy

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And finally, the United States volteface in 1948, just when only the most serious cases were left to try, and prevented from becoming a complete rout at first by General Clay personally and later by German anti-Nazi officials, must be ascribed to too long delayed and uninformed congressional pressure, and to United States public indifference.

These were individual, specific decisions. Had they been otherwise, the failure today would not be so great, or the fiasco so obvious. Although it is too early to anticipate the verdict of history, the writer feels that it will probably be that this attempt at a "revolution by decree" was a disastrous failure, to a considerable extent an unof Political and Social Science,Vol. 264 (July necessary one, and one for which the 1949), pp. 115-23; for criticismof their lack responsibility must rest at least as of humility, Reinhold Niebuhr, "Germany: on the shoulders of the conVengeance or Justice," The Nation, Vol. heavily querors as on those of the conquered. CLXIX, No. 4 (July 23, 1949), p. 90.
William E. Griffith, Cambridge, Massachusetts, is Teaching Fellow in History and General Education at Harvard University. He served during and after World War II as Special Branch Officer, Regierungsbezirk Unterfranken, Bavaria; as Secretary, Denazification Review Board, and Deputy Chief, Special Branch, Office of Military Government for Bavaria; and during 1947-48 as Chief, Special (later Denazification) Branch and Denazification Adviser, Office of Military Government for Bavaria.