doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2009.01795.

CONVERGING UNDER PRESSURE? COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES
DANIEL NOHRSTEDT AND DAN HANSEN
This article analyses counterterrorism policy convergence among the 27 European Union (EU) member states between 2000 and 2006. While considerable academic interest has been devoted to the common European Union policy in response to terrorism after September 11, few studies have compared counterterrorism policy-making at the member state level. This gap raises the question whether the institutional framework of European counterterrorism policy-making has stimulated convergence of national policies. Data on ve policy instruments for counterterrorism show that the aggregated implementation rate increased by almost 55 per cent in this period, which indicates a trend towards policy divergence within the EU as a whole. However, the ndings also reveal signicant variation in the level and pace of policy instrument implementation. One potentially important variable explaining national policy developments is the degree of political pressure from the EU on member states, while EU membership accession and national counterterrorism policy legacies were less important factors.

INTRODUCTION Heads of states and governments in the European Union acted swiftly and jointly after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. The result was an action plan to ght terrorism. The EUs police ofce Europol was given additional resources to assess and spread knowledge about risks and threats, and in 2002 the EU set up Eurojust with the aim of facilitating interaction between judicial authorities. Many more initiatives have followed, and counterterrorism momentum, rather than fading, has continued to be invigorated as attacks on European soil have occurred. Step by step, European leaders have collectively striven to pave the way towards a continent that is safer from terrorism. While the joint EU counterterrorism response has been subject to considerable academic attention in recent years, comparative analyses of counterterrorism policy developments at the member state level remain sparse. In fact, aside from a few exceptions (see van de Linde et al. 2002; van Leeuwen 2003; von Hippel 2004; Spencer 2006; den Boer 2007), few scholarly studies have systematically compared implementation of national counterterrorism policies after 9/11. Observers are thus left to wonder whether national counterterrorism policy changes at the member state level reect the consolidated commitment of the European Union. This paper describes counterterrorism policy developments in the 27 EU member states between 2000 and 2006. The point of departure is the observation that international efforts to deal with the terrorism problem within the framework of the European Union, United Nations and other international arrangements have created a set of conditions that in theory would facilitate gradual convergence of national counterterrorism policies. Policy convergence theory suggests, for instance, that joint recognition of a common problem and the establishment of institutions to deal with it will increase the likelihood for national policies to become more similar over time (see, for example, DiMaggio and Powell 1983;
Daniel Nohrstedt and Dan Hans n are Associate Professors in Political Science at the National Center for Crisis e Management Research and Training (CRISMART) at the Swedish National Defence College. Public Administration Vol. 88, No. 1, 2010 (190210) 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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Bennett 1991; Bulmer and Padgett 2004; Knill 2005). Meanwhile, previous comparative work indicates considerable variation in the ways EU member states have responded to the terrorism problem (see van de Linde et al. 2002; van Leeuwen 2003; von Hippel 2004; den Boer 2007). This observation nds additional support in neo-institutional theory and public policy theory, both of which generally emphasize longitudinal policy stability. In comparison, these perspectives provide contradictory predictions regarding the alleged patterns of counterterrorism policy-making among the members of the European Union. Has the trend moved towards more policy convergence or have national differences prevailed? Conning itself to implementation of national counterterrorism policy instruments, this paper develops an analytical framework to assess the level of policy convergence in the area of counterterrorism. Borrowing a general conception from the literature, what we mean by policy instrument is the means governments have at their disposal for achieving their public policy goals (Hood 1984; Linder and Peters 1989; Howlett 1991). The analysis includes ve policy instruments for counterterrorism: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. codication of terrorist offence; prosecution procedures; freezing of nancial assets; inter-agency counterterrorism body; national counterterrorism strategy.

Data obtained from the UN Security Council Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) and the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER) is combined in order to trace patterns of instrument implementation. To determine whether member states policies have converged over time, or whether they have diverged, the study employs the Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV). Based upon a comparison of implementation rates, the analysis ends in a discussion of three plausible explanations for spatial and temporal variations in national policy development. Policy convergence in European counterterrorism The literature on policy convergence provides an overview of the factors that explain why domestic policies become more similar over time. This rich body of work has identied a number of facilitating conditions, which in turn increase the likelihood for policy convergence. Developments indicate that, in Europe, many of these conditions have been fullled and one would therefore expect increased levels of counterterrorism policy convergence among the EU members. In organizational sociology, the logic of isomorphism postulates that the likelihood for greater homogeneity of organizational forms and practices increases when an institutional eld is established. An institutional eld exists when four necessary conditions are met: interaction among participants, emergence of sharply dened interorganizational structures, increase in the information load, and mutual awareness among participants that they are involved in a common enterprise (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Counterterrorism policy developments in the post-9/11 era suggest that this is precisely what has happened within the European Union. Following 9/11, the problem of international terrorism gradually gained prominence as an institutional eld. Above all, 9/11 underlined the need for improved cooperation and coordination among states in Europe. This insight, in turn, has increased interaction
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between the member states at different levels, from ministerial meetings to security agency collaboration. One way to facilitate exchange of information has been to establish new institutional forms for interorganizational cooperation. Two illustrative examples involve the appointment of an EU counterterrorism coordinator and the establishment of Eurojust to enhance coordination of investigations and prosecutions related to terrorist crimes. Other interorganizational bodies (Europol, Frontex, MIC, SitCen, the Berne group, the Counterterrorist Group) aim at facilitating cooperation between member states. In addition, there are now a greater number of informal networks of counterterrorism specialists (den Boer et al. 2008). Although sceptics emphasize problems of cooperation, these developments have increased the amount of information exchanged within Europe. Collaboration with the United States also contributes to an increase in the information load related to international terrorism. Overall, as an indicator of a common enterprise, these efforts have been guided by a shared understanding that cooperation is required to deal with the problem of international terrorism. Convergence is furthermore conditioned by the degree of resource dependency, uncertainty, and professionalization. The higher the degree of interorganizational dependency, the greater the uncertainty; the more intense the level of exchange through professional fora, the greater the extent of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, pp. 1546). These conditions also apply to European counterterrorism. Uncertainty ultimately prevails in this area because it is extremely difcult to predict future terrorist attacks, to foresee how the terrorism threat will develop in the future, and to estimate the efciency of existing and planned efforts to prevent terrorism. Similarly, due to the transnational character of the terrorism problem, the fact that all member states have recognized the necessity of close cooperation suggests that this domain is characterized by signicant interorganizational dependency. Lastly, the establishment of the aforementioned interorganizational bodies provides an indicator of professional exchange within Europe. On these grounds, all signs identied by isomorphism theorists would point towards policy convergence in this area. Convergence theory also stresses the role of intergovernmental organizations and supranational law. The promotion of international partnership constitutes one important dimension of the EUs work on counterterrorism, as expressed by the EU counterterrorism strategy (Council of the European Union 2005). From this perspective, counterterrorism policy-making at the member state level is embedded in a wider context of international organizations and regimes. These institutions impact on domestic policy-making via several mechanisms, ranging from coercion to the facilitation of voluntary exchange (Bulmer and Padgett 2004). Pressure from external forces is generally cited as an important factor facilitating policy convergence. In international relations, functionalist theory emphasizes transnational cooperation and the incremental building of a more integrated and interdependent world order (Bennett 1991). From this viewpoint, international regimes are often cited as a powerful determinant of policy change and convergence (Wison 2000). Upon closer inspection, there are many ways by which international pressure facilitates policy convergence. Essentially, theorists make a distinction between imposition where states are forced to adopt certain policies, and softer forms of harmonization as states adjust to common policy standards through voluntary exchange of ideas. Adjustment to international law belongs to the former category, while the establishment of various organizational solutions provides opportunities for voluntary exchange (Bennett 1991; Bulmer and Padgett 2004; Knill 2005). Counterterrorism is one area where both imposition and voluntary exchange have been important forces affecting domestic policy-making. The EU remains an intergovernmental
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organization with limited possibilities to inuence implementation power at the member state level. In effect, most instruments have taken the form of soft law that allow member states to make their own interpretation (Falkner et al. 2005). This is not to say that the EU does not impose pressure on member states to adopt certain policies. In terms of imposition, the United Nations has been another important international organization that has imposed certain obligations on its member states (related, for instance, to criminalization of terrorism, denial of funding and safe havens, and exchange of information). The establishment of the UN Counterterrorism Committee and the Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate has meant that the UN has also expanded its monitoring capabilities in this area (Bianchi 2006). EU institutions have had an important role in supporting member states in their efforts to develop their capacity for dealing with terrorism. A conglomerate of different institutional resources has been provided by the EU, offering opportunities for voluntary exchange between the member states. In addition, the exchange of ideas and information takes place both bilaterally and multilaterally through various other institutional arrangements, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Various European sub-regional institutions, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, and the South European Cooperative Initiative, have also taken steps to facilitate counterterrorism cooperation. In summary, policy convergence theory identies a number of facilitating conditions and these increase the likelihood that national policies will become more similar. This brief review suggests that there are strong indications that many of these conditions have in fact characterized European counterterrorism policy-making after 9/11. It is reasonable therefore to expect that the domestic policies of EU member states in this area have developed towards convergence. Inertia, crisis response and the prospects for divergence Other perspectives challenge the prediction advanced by policy convergence theory. To start with, theoretical frameworks addressing policy-making dynamics more generally emphasize powerful obstacles to policy change. One basic assumption shared by historical institutionalists, for instance, is that over time policy-making is characterized by continuity rather than change. According to this view, policy-makers are often constrained by the effects of earlier decisions (so-called policy legacies), inheritances, and persistent policy monopolies. Alone, or in combination, these factors reduce the prospects for policy change (Mahoney 2000; Peters et al. 2005). Similarly, scholars with an interest in the policy-making process have noted that the rigidity of policy-makers normative and instrumental beliefs contributes to the persistence of policy (Sabatier and Weible 2007). On this basis it can be argued that institutional inertia and belief system rigidities impose major hurdles for policy renewal and the implementation of new policy instruments. Such constraints would potentially reduce the likelihood that states policies become more similar over time. Although these theorists emphasize that policy change is infrequent, they recognize that it does occur in instances of punctuated equilibria, which are dened as short-lived periods of substantial change interrupting lengthy periods of policy stability (Baumgartner and Jones 1991). However, studies on the policy impacts of crisis events show that the relationship between major crises and policy change is not linear. Rather, outcomes of crisis events in terms of policy-oriented learning and change emanate from unpredictable societal and political processes (Dekker and Hans n 2004; Nohrstedt 2005; 2008; e
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Birkland 2006; Boin et al. 2008). This insight is supported by national counterterrorism policy developments in Europe after the 9/11 attacks. In one comparative analysis (covering France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and Great Britain), Monica den Boer (2007, p. 296) concludes: while in some EU Member States, the catastrophic attacks in the US provided a political window of opportunity for drafting and adopting new anti-terrorism legislation, in some others these attacks did not seem to have the same transformative impact on the legislation, policy or institutional architecture. Similar ndings have been reported in other comparative studies (for example, van de Linde et al. 2002; van Leeuwen 2003; von Hippel 2004) suggesting that states respond quite differently to the same external stimuli. Other structural features of counterterrorism policy-making within the EU would provide additional support for policy divergence in this area. To start with, it has been argued repeatedly that the ultimate responsibility for developing a response to terrorism resides with the member states. The EU counterterrorism strategy is unmistakable on this point: Member States have the primary responsibility for combating terrorism, and the EU can add value (Council of the European Union 2005, p. 4). Accordingly, member states develop whatever policies and structures they consider necessary and the EU assists in strengthening national capabilities and facilitating European cooperation. Member states thereby retain considerable latitude to adopt counterterrorism policy instruments tailored to their specic interests, resources and needs. The fact that the member states set out from rather different terrorism threat assessments and domestic decision-making structures would in general reduce the prospects for policy convergence. Research on compliance with EU law gives additional support for this observation. As noted above, the legislative instruments introduced by EU institutions impose some pressure on the member states to adapt their policies. Compliance research provides an important source of ideas to evaluate the actual effects of this pressure and notes, for instance, that the perceived goodness of t between EU requirements and national policies has decisive inuence on compliance decisions by the member states. In addition, non-compliance may be explained by domestic administrative problems, political controversy, uncertainty about the interpretation of EU law, and inuential national veto-players (Falkner et al. 2004; Mastenbroek 2005). Member states implementation records related to EU legislative instruments in the area of counterterrorism provide one indicator of compliance in this area. In 2006, the European Council reported that out of the 12 most important instruments only two had been fully implemented by the member states (the arrest warrant and the decision to implement instruments for police and judicial cooperation). Although most other instruments had been implemented in about 9 out of 10 of the member states, others have lagged behind. For instance, the framework decision on the orders freezing property or evidence had only been implemented by ten member states (Council of the European Union 2006, p. 7). Among EU diplomats, it is well-known that this pattern has fuelled frustration. Thus, from the perspective of compliance, it seems reasonable to argue that different domestic factors, which slow the implementation of EU legislation in practice, counteract forces of policy convergence. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY To date, few studies have explicitly analysed counterterrorism within the framework of public policy (Spencer 2006; Crenshaw 2007). Much more common has been the use of
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more general albeit less precise terms such as national responses or actions to analyse state-level counterterrorism developments. The same limitation plagues terrorism studies, which often centre around a set of ideal types of counterterrorism responses, including the criminal justice model, the war model (Crelinsten 1987) and the expanded criminal justice model (Pedahzur and Ranstorp 2001). Utilizing these general terms might be inevitable since governmental actions related to counterterrorism are both diverse and comprehensive. Vaguely dened outcomes, however, undermine the ability to draw more general theoretical implications. It should be noted, however, that the problem of vague denitions of policy is not unique to counterterrorism. It has been argued that much policy convergence research generally lacks clear denitions of what policy actually refers to. There is a tendency in policy convergence research to compare policies in general without a clear idea how the different dimensions of policy should be distinguished; this in turn has hampered the quality and comparability of ndings (Heichel et al. 2005). The objective of this study is to analyse patterns of counterterrorism policy convergence, and it is therefore necessary to outline a clear-cut conceptualization of policy. Policy instruments Narrowing down the subject of policy convergence, the model introduced here focuses explicitly on implementation of a set of specic policy instruments for counterterrorism (compare Spencer 2006). Policy instruments are useful because they represent a specic policy category that is separated from other related categories. More generally, policy convergence research spans several general policy categories, including policy goals, content, instruments, outcomes, and style. Some studies isolate and study one of these categories while others analyse several categories (Heichel et al. 2005). Either way, Colin Bennett (1991, p. 218) argues it is crucial to be absolutely precise as to the aspects of policy being compared to ensure cross-national equivalence. Broadly dened, policy instruments include the means governments have at their disposal for achieving their public policy goals (Hood 1984; Linder and Peters 1989; Howlett 1991). Conceptually, policy instruments are clearly separated from policy goals, content, outcomes, and style. However, this represents a narrow denition of policy when compared to other denitions presented in the public policy literature (see Birkland 2005, pp. 1718). Even if this set of instruments paves the way for a parsimonious denition of policy enabling cross-case comparison, it automatically imposes limitations on the analysis of policy convergence. When limiting the analysis to one policy dimension, the outcome in terms of divergence or convergence is obviously strictly limited to that particular dimension. Furthermore, in the longer run, one-dimensional approaches are insufcient for identifying potential tensions or inconsistencies between different policy elements (for example, between instruments and goals) that can be studied with multidimensional approaches (see, for example, Castles and Pierson 1996; Coleman and Grant 1998; see also Rose 1991; Cashore and Howlett 2007). Patterns of policy development: transformation and dynamic-conservatism The specic arrangement of adopted policy instruments is one indicator of the development of counterterrorism policy at the national level. Hypothetically, if any given state deploys all policy instruments listed in this analysis, it would represent a commitment to a specic approach to deal with problems related to terrorism. This approach is phenomenologically separated from policy style (traditionally associated with national regime-type) and policy goals (long-term objectives) (see Richardson 1982; Freeman 1985; Rose 1991;
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Hall 1993). Instead, policy refers here to a specic selection of policy instruments to deal with terrorism-related problems. Typologically, states ambitions fall somewhere between two approaches to policy development. Borrowing from Donald Schon (1971) and Christopher Hood (1984), we make a distinction between two approaches to policy development: a transformational approach and a dynamic-conservative approach. In this dichotomy, transformation simply refers to a state of policy development where a set of new policy instruments has been implemented and thus added to the states collection of anti-terrorism resources. In contrast, in the dynamic-conservative approach, these instruments have not been implemented, which means that the state relies upon other means to deal with terrorism. Transformation and dynamic-conservatism therefore constitute two extremes in an instrument implementation continuum and both approaches represent change from the status quo, but differ with respect to the level of change. Analytically, we use the mean value to distinguish these two approaches (where implementation of three instruments or more equals transformation and implementation of two instruments or less equals dynamic-conservatism). Instrument implementation rates provide one indicator of the political weight that states attribute to counterterrorism but this could also be the result of technical or administrative considerations. In Anne Schneider and Helen Ingrams (1993) discursive approach to public policy, policy is revealed partly through practices and symbols (see also Elmore 1987). Correspondingly, policy transformation refers to an increase in the signicance of counterterrorism as an issue area while in dynamic-conservatism, nothing, or very little, is done to further advance counterterrorism as an issue area in its own right. However, it would be misleading to argue that the selection of policy instruments is exclusively the result of political considerations. Other motivations, such as beliefs concerning the problem-solving efciency of different instruments and practical considerations related to the level of t with preexisting institutional arrangements, would certainly also be important contributing factors explaining instrument choice (Hood 1984; Linder and Peters 1989; Howlett 1991). The method of using implementation of pre-selected policy instruments as an indicator of issue area development has two major drawbacks. First, the list of instruments identied here is not exhaustive and states have in practice taken major steps towards transformation by implementing instruments not listed in this analysis for instance, by adopting legal instruments listed by the EU Council. Second, implementation of policy instruments excludes the possibility of policy development through efforts to streamline pre-existing arrangements. Therefore, this analysis does not enable assessment of states efforts to invest additional resources (for example, budgetary, personnel, prioritization) to strengthen existing institutions, something which would also certainly be evidence for an increase in bureaucratic focus and effort. Hence, the set of policy instruments included in this analysis constitutes selected parts of the wide range of policy tools available to governments in the ght against terrorism. Variable descriptions and data This section presents ve policy instruments that capture evidence of counterterrorism policy developments in EU member states. Each of the instruments, or variables, formulates a dichotomy (a yes/no question), where afrmative responses indicate policy change, and responses in the negative reect a state of status quo in that variable. In terms of counterterrorism policy ambitions, what components must be discernible to assess development? Here, the selection of variables has been, by necessity, pragmatically
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oriented. Given the number of countries and measurement points, data that are both accessible and comparable are required. For that reason, this analysis uses data obtained from two primary sources: the UN Security Council Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) and the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER). The major advantage of these sources is that they provide primary data on national counterterrorism policy developments as reported by the member states themselves. Additionally, these documents are largely organized according to a common structure, which facilitates systematic cross-country analysis. Using data that convey UN policies broadens the empirical and theoretical scope of EU member states potential choice, beyond the implementation of EU instruments and notions of Europeanization. Obviously, the main drawback is that the country reports have been written as public documents that seek to display national policies in the most favourable light. This bias partly derives from the explicit ambition of the CTC and CODEXTER to facilitate international sharing of best practices. It is also important to keep in mind that the results of the study depend on how transparent member states have been in their accounts of counterterrorism developments. After 9/11, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373, which established the CTC to monitor implementation of the obligations imposed by the Resolution. Accordingly, states were obliged to report to the CTC all actions taken and contemplated related to implementation of the Resolution. These country reports provide a useful source of information for this analysis, which draws upon them. To complement UN CTC country reports, the analysis also draws upon country proles on counterterrorism capacity provided by the Council of Europe. These documents have been produced regularly since the 25th Conference of European Ministers of Justice in 2003, which recognized the need for a common European register on national counterterrorism standards. CODEXTER reports overlap considerably with the CTC reports but we have found several instances where these sources also complement each other. In addition, since these documents have been published for different audiences, it has also been possible to check for possible biases. In a few cases when these reports have been incomplete, we have turned to complementary (mostly secondary) sources. Both the UN CTC and the Council of Europe inuence national policy agendas in the sense that they recommend or urge member states to address certain policy problems and solutions. Member states also have other counterterrorism policy instruments at their disposal beyond the ve listed above that are used in this analysis. But variable selection has followed a pragmatic choice. Even so, we argue that the chosen variables reveal the position in the dichotomized ideal typical policy developments. They deal with procedural and organizational issues that touch core values and preferences of member states. One could argue that that is the most compelling reason for these supra-national bodies to set the agenda, even though the degree of compulsion ranges from binding commitments to looser recommendations. Codication of terrorist offence Some countries choose to legislate for a special terrorism offence whereas others prefer to try people either for plotting or committing crimes (for example, arson or murder) within the provisions of the existing general criminal statutes. The penalties are not automatically more or less severe in either of these options (even though a special terrorism law is normally a way of rendering harsher consequences for the perpetrator without changing the scales by which other criminal offences are measured). Some countries (for example, Germany) have chosen not to have a specic terrorism offence
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but, rather, a counterterrorism law that prescribes extraordinary measures to be taken by competent authorities (CODEXTER Germany 2004). Such extraordinary measures are, in other cases, detailed in laws that codify terrorism offences (CODEXTER Sweden 2006). One of the fundamental ideas behind the EUs framework decision on combating terrorism (Council of the European Union 2002) was that terrorists would not face different punishments in different member states. Policy transformation is therefore limited here to the concept of a codication, specically, of terrorist offence. Prosecution procedures Are suspected terrorists subjected to particular prosecution procedures? Adoption of specic prosecution procedures is independent of the existence of a terrorism offence, even if the two are related. Since the EU framework decision does not recommend a particular posture on the issue, there is not much pressure on member states to choose a particular strategy. Prosecution procedures entail appointed judges, certain venues and contact points between police investigations and the judicial proceedings. The formation of an inner circle of players within the security sector is demonstrative of the commitment to deal with the policy issue and is hence of interest to us in this compilation of instruments. This variable excludes either special investigative measures and techniques or other provisions occasionally regulated in the same contexts as those providing prosecution procedures. Freezing of nancial assets Does the state freeze nancial assets on the basis of afliation? Taking legal measures against the nancing of terrorism activities became one of the more salient issues after 9/11. UN Resolution 1373 stipulates that states take far-reaching measures to combat the nancing of terrorism. The mission is to prevent any money transfer that, directly or indirectly, can contribute to terrorism. Measures taken have been controversial in many European states, not least the freezing of assets, the effectiveness of which has been questioned in the overall aim to ght terrorism (see, for example, Lum et al. 2006; Talsma and Ouchan 2007). The actual purpose of some purported charities has been questioned, as have some states justications for freezing assets, which has led to personal tragedies. Just how certain and how transparent can state actors be on this issue? For the individual member states, measures to freeze assets will only be taken when an organization or a person is put on the sanction lists of the EU or the UN. There are two EU sanction lists: the rst was drawn up in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999), related to the situation in Afghanistan, and the second was drafted in response to UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001). The UN and the EU lists are binding: member states have to freeze the assets of persons or organizations as soon as these persons or organizations are put on the EU or UN sanction lists (Talsma and Ouchan 2007). Here, then, the degree of choice is extremely limited. Inter-agency counterterrorism body Does the state maintain an interagency counterterrorism body? A failure that is widely perceived to have enabled terrorists to commit outrages is related to states intelligence communities. The purpose of creating interagency counterterrorism bodies has been to facilitate cross-fertilization within the intelligence community and to share intelligence and analyses more broadly. The Council of the European Union (2005, p. 9) identied inter-agency cooperation as a best practice and recommended that member states consider this policy instrument.
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National counterterrorism strategy Has the state established an overt, publicly available counterterrorism strategy? The establishment of a public, comprehensive plan for ghting terrorism is intimately related to the management of intelligence and information (Spencer 2006, p. 106). This policy instrument has also been recommended by the Council of the European Union (2005, p. 7), which identied cooperation and coordination, in particular at the level of government ministers/ministries, as of crucial importance. METHODS Policy convergence commonly refers to the development of policy similarity over time (Kerr 1983; Bennett 1991). Thus, the most basic approach to assess convergence is to establish the degree of similarity between measurements among observed units (in this case EU member states) in t1 , and compare it to measurements in t2 (Heichel et al. 2005, p. 829). The policy convergence literature lists at least four methodological approaches to convergence (Heichel et al. 2005). Sigma-convergence utilizes decreasing coefcients of variance to assess convergence. Beta-convergence assesses how laggard countries (for example, poor economies) catch up with frontrunner countries (for example, rich economies). A third type is gamma-convergence, in which country rankings are used to assess the mobility of countries. Finally, delta-convergence assesses convergence by comparing states policy distance in relation to an exemplary model promoted, for instance, by an international organization or a frontrunner country. Convergence is conceptualized in this study as a process where countries become more similar over time. This analysis therefore utilizes a combination of sigma- and delta-convergence. The main advantage with sigma convergence is that it focuses explicitly on the temporal dimension of policy development and also eliminates some of the difculties involved with the other approaches (such as the identication of laggards and frontrunners). Sigma-convergence has been utilized primarily in studies of nancial policy, although it has been applied in other areas as well. In addition, it has been employed in studies measuring the similarity and diffusion of policy instruments (Montanari 2001), which suggests it is appropriate for the purpose of the present analysis. To be meaningful, variance coefcients must be related to some kind of ideal policy model. The set of policy instruments outlined above provides one such model and hence sigma and delta convergence are combined. Yet, these instruments do not form a normative policy model in terms of its problem-solving efciency. In other words, these instruments are neither necessary nor sufcient conditions for an efcient state response to terrorism. Instead, these instruments have been selected to illustrate the variability of instruments employed by states to ght terrorism, which in turn will enable comparative analysis of potential differences in terms of implementation. Time frame In sigma-convergence, decreasing coefcients of variance (obtained through a dispersion index) from t1 to t2 provide evidence for convergence. However, according to Robert Seeliger (1996), the analysis of convergence requires selection of a time frame that is capable of capturing gradual policy developments through a series of changes. Generally, time frame selection must be guided by data availability and the length of the typical policy cycle characterizing the policy issue under investigation to be able to cover longer-term processes of lesson drawing, policy learning, and implementation (Seeliger 1996, p. 299;
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see also Cashore and Howlett 2007; Sabatier and Weible 2007). From this it follows that, ideally, the time frame is divided into multiple measurement points in order to allow for the identication of the underlying processes of policy change. The present analysis compares EU member states counterterrorism policies between 2000 and 2006. Obviously, this period is limited when compared to studies of convergence in macro-level policies (such as industrialization), which often set frames of a decade or more. However, given the relatively rapid pace of EU counterterrorism policy-making after September 11, this period is sufciently extended to discern patterns of policy convergence. This period has been divided into seven measurement periods (one for each year respectively), which enable comparison of patterns of policy convergence over time. By analysing convergence in these separate periods it will also be possible to identify plausible tipping points in which countries have grown more alike. Index of qualitative variation This study employs the index of qualitative variation (IQV) to assess the degree of dispersion since this is the only measure of dispersion available for nominal-level variables (Healey 2005, pp. 979; Frankfort-Nachmias and Leon-Guerrero 2006, pp. 13845). The IQV is calculated by the formula IQV = 1
k 2 j=1 pj

(k 1)/k

where k is the number of categories (variable values) and pj is the total number of cases in category j. The index varies from 0 when all cases are in one category (minimum variance) to 1 when cases are evenly distributed across the categories (maximum variance). Accordingly, if one half (50 per cent) of the member states adopt any given instrument and the other half do not, the IQV value would be 1 (corresponding to maximum dispersion, that is, lack of convergence). Conversely, if all states adopt the instrument or, alternatively, if none did, the value would be 0 (corresponding to minimum dispersion, that is, full convergence). One IQV value is received for each variable at each measurement period. The IQV index thus provides a useful means to assess sigma convergence through decreasing coefcients of variance. IQV values are consistent with the theoretical denition of convergence as being a matter of relative policy development. In this study, convergence is estimated by analysing policy instrument implementation from t1 to t2 ; it is thus the movement from t1 to t2 that denes the direction of policy development. The logical structure underpinning the theoretical denition of convergence is therefore based upon the assumption that similarity is (1) relative to the number of units (that is, states); and (2) independent of policy position (that is, policy instrument implemented or not implemented). This assumption explains why 50 per cent is the tipping point separating divergence and convergence. When the total number of states adopting an instrument is below 50 per cent, additional implementation will increase the relative difference (total dispersion) within the population as a whole. According to this logic (see gure 1), instrument adoption between 0 and 50 per cent is logically dened as divergence, while instrument adoption above 50 per cent is dened as convergence. Following Seeligers (1996) classication of relative policy developments, the comparative analysis enables three plausible outcomes: divergence (states develop dissimilar
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IQV

0 0 100 50 Percentage of instrument adoption

FIGURE 1 Policy instrument implementation relative to IQV value development

policies in aggregate over time), convergence (states policies become more similar over time), and synchronous policy development (states policies do not change over time). Thus, this analysis allows for three outcomes with the following underlying logical structures (Seeliger 1996, pp. 2913): t1 < t1 > t1 = 0; t2 = 0; t1 = t2 divergence t2 convergence

t2 = 0 synchronous policy development

It should be noted that in the present analysis, the scope for divergence is limited resulting from the abolition of policy instruments. In practice, since this study employs dichotomous measures, this specic form of divergence would require that some states abolish counterterrorism policy instruments. Given the strong emphasis on counterterrorism within the EU, a movement from policy transformation to dynamic-conservatism by abolishing policy instruments seems politically unrealistic. ANALYSIS Patterns of counterterrorism policy development Have domestic counterterrorism policies become more similar after 9/11 and is the overall trend pointing towards policy transformation in this area? Afrmative answers to these questions would be consistent with the prediction of the policy convergence literature. The dataset analysed here contains observations of the ve variables in 27 member states over seven measurement points. Table 1 displays IQV values for each year and each policy instrument, respectively. Actual instrument counts are presented in parenthesis. Table 1 shows that European Union member states prior to 2001 were characterized by dynamic-conservatism. Out of 27 countries and ve variables, only 13 were adopted before 2001 (that is, 13 out of a potential 135, or almost 10 per cent). In 2006, the number of implemented instruments had grown to 74 in total (or almost 55 per cent). The overall trend is therefore that the EU member states are increasingly moving towards policy transformation in counterterrorism affairs, which also means that the issue has been subject to policy divergence. All variables in table 1 are closer to 1.0 (maximum
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TABLE 1 Patterns of convergence of national counterterrorism policy instruments: IQV values (number of countries in brackets)
2000 Terrorist offense Prosecution procedures Freezing of assets Inter-agency CT body Counterterrorism strategy instruments implemented .64 (6) .28 (2) .44 (3) .28 (2) .00 (0) (13) 2001 .84 (8) .60 (4) 1.0 (14) .52 (5) .40 (3) (34) 2002 .96 (11) .72 (5) .84 (16) .52 (5) .52 (5) (42) 2003 .92 (17) .80 (6) .64 (20) .84 (8) .76 (7) (58) 2004 .88 (18) .80 (6) .64 (20) .96 (11) .84 (8) (63) 2005 .84 (19) .84 (7) .52 (21) 1.0 (14) .92 (10) (71) 2006 .84 (19) .84 (7) .52 (21) .96 (16) .96 (11) (74)

dispersion) in 2006 compared to 2000. The EU as a whole, in other words, has, since 9/11, become polarized on the issue of counterterrorism. One could however argue that with a timeline stretched into the future, a new point of homogeneity is feasible, but then one characterized by further policy convergence. Nevertheless, the fact is that the different variables used here have developed somewhat differently. The codication of terrorism offence variable was afrmed in six of 27 member states before 2001, which makes it the most adopted instrument. In the year that followed the 9/11 attacks, many states adopted particular terrorism offences and, in 2002, 11 member states had a particular terrorism offence in their legislative framework. This means that the development moved towards policy divergence. In the three following years additional countries adopted this policy instrument (19 of 27 in 2005 and 2006), which indicates a movement towards policy convergence in aggregate. The prosecution procedure variable has not been widely adopted within the EU: from two countries before 2001 to seven countries in 2005. The development has therefore moved in the direction of divergence. Most countries have speedily adopted the EU and UN sanction lists regulating the freezing of assets. There was pressure from UNSC Resolution 1267 to adopt this policy instrument before 2001, but only three EU member states reported they had done so. In 2001, however, 14 member states had adopted this policy; this equals a maximum dispersion and hence a movement in the direction of policy divergence. In the following years more countries followed the trend (21 of 27 in 2006), which indicates a movement towards policy convergence. The inter-agency counterterrorism body instrument existed prior to 9/11, in two member states, France and Luxembourg. In the years that followed 2001, the instrument spread across the continent and reached a maximum dispersion in 2005, when 14 of 27 countries had installed inter-agency counterterrorism bodies. Until then, therefore, the movement had been in the direction of policy divergence. Only in 2006, when two more countries adopted this instrument, can a somewhat feeble movement towards policy convergence be discerned. Lastly, before 2001, none of the EU countries had deployed a publicly displayed counterterrorism strategy. Gradually one or a few countries per year this policy instrument has been implemented. In 2006, 11 member states had a counterterrorism strategy, which means that the movement throughout the study period has been in the direction of policy divergence. When implementation rates are measured from year to year (table 2), it is possible to discern when different variables reach tipping points: that is, when more than one-half of the member states have adopted a certain policy instrument. Each additional country
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COUNTERTERRORISM IN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES TABLE 2 Interval classication of policy developments
20002001 Terrorist offense Prosecution procedures Freezing of assets Inter-agency C-T body C-T strategy 20012002 20022003 20032004 20042005

203

20052006

divergence divergence convergence convergence convergence status quo divergence divergence divergence status quo divergence status quo divergence convergence convergence status quo convergence status quo divergence status quo divergence divergence divergence convergence divergence divergence divergence divergence divergence divergence

adopting an instrument from then on means a movement towards convergence. Only three variables have reached such tipping points. For the variables prosecution procedures and counterterrorism strategy, it has not yet happened, even if they are moving in that direction. For codication of terrorism offence, it happened in 2002; for freezing of assets it happened in 2001; and for inter-agency counterterrorism body, in 2005. The fact that there is no unambiguous trend when it comes to these policy instruments reaching tipping points is interesting in its own right. It should encourage researchers to further ponder the impact of crises in policy-making processes (compare Dekker and Hans n 2004; Nohrstedt 2005, 2008; Birkland 2006; Boin et al. 2008). Without a doubt, e the policy change patterns observed here suggest that the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 had substantial effect on European counterterrorism policy-making. But subsequent attacks in Bali, Istanbul, Madrid and London have left no imprint in this dataset. This nding underlines the importance of separating crises with frame breaking quality from crises that do not have the same impacts on policy agendas (t Hart and Boin 2001, p. 35). National policy change patterns The next step towards an explanation for these developments would be to shift attention to national policy developments. One obvious necessary condition for policy convergence between states is that policies change within states; state A approximates the policy position of state B by changing policy in the same direction as state Bs policy. Yet, one limitation with the approach adopted in this study is that it includes only the spatial dimension of policy change, that is, it focuses on what is changed while ignoring the pace or tempo of policy development (see Durrant and Diehl 1989; Schneider and Ingram 1990; Radaelli 2000; Cashore and Howlett 2007). This is unsatisfactory given the long-term objective of explaining policy change at the national level, which necessitates identication of crucial tipping-points when policies are changed. Figure 2 combines the number of instruments implemented by the member states with the pace of policy development. Pace has been dened here as a trichotomy with three outcomes: (1) status quo (more than three (mean value) of the policy instruments implemented prior to 2001 or, alternatively, not at all); (2), episodic policy change (majority of policy instruments implemented within a relatively short time-frame, between 2000 and 2002); and (3) incremental policy change (instruments implemented gradually over time). In terms of separating episodic change from incremental change, the year 2003 is selected as the turning-point because it represents a tipping point where the total number of instruments increased (by 10 per cent) on average; thereafter, the implementation rate slowed down. The number of policy instruments adopted provides an indicator of policy development (transformation and dynamic-conservatism) at the national level.
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FIGURE 2 Typology of policy change patterns (member state level)

Member states are distributed relatively evenly in the spatial (vertical) dimension across the transformation-conservatism dichotomy; this is quite obvious since the mean value is used to separate these categories. Nevertheless, these patterns indicate that 9/11 did not punctuate policy agendas at a Europe-wide scale. Most EU members did indeed carry out encompassing policy reforms, but one relatively large group of states desisted from crafting new and special institutional arrangements to deal with the terrorism problem. This observation is inconsistent with the perception that 9/11 provided a major watershed event that fundamentally (and fairly quickly) changed national counterterrorism policies across Europe. It should be noted here, however, that time-order is a weak criterion to assess the causal impact of 9/11 on the adoption of policy instruments since the pace of implementation might show considerable variation. The distribution of cases is different in the temporal (horizontal) dimension, where about half the states changed their policies incrementally. Thus, in a cross-national comparison, the dominating pattern is that counterterrorism policies have developed gradually over time. This is further supported by the fact that ve member states (France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia) had implemented the majority of their instruments prior to 2001. One interesting category in this dimension is the group of states that have changed their policies quite dramatically (states placed in the episodic-transformation trajectory). These states, including Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary and Romania, implemented several policy instruments within a relatively short time-frame following 9/11.
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Explaining national policy variations The objective of this analysis is to provide a descriptive account of policy instrument adoption in the area of counterterrorism. From there, it is a major step to develop a general theoretical explanation for national variations in policy development. Policy convergence theory (for example, Borzel and Risse 2000; Holzinger and Knill 2005) as well as implementation theory (for example, Hood 1984; Linder and Peters 1989; Howlett 1991) list a host of factors explaining why states steer towards different trajectories of policy development. While these factors (for instance, national policy styles and political culture) certainly warrant close examination in the context of counterterrorism policy-making, we nd it necessary given data constraints to end this analysis in an inductive manner by turning to three plausible explanatory factors. EU membership duration The rst potentially important explanatory variable for these patterns of policy development is EU membership duration. Research on the EU accession process suggests that mechanisms of Europeanization have operated in applicant countries as well, providing incentives and pressure for adaptation in anticipation of EU membership (Lippert et al. 2001; Grabbe 2002; Manning 2004). Thus, in theory, one would have expected the newest member states either at the stage of EU candidacy or as newly admitted members to move in the direction of policy transformation at a fairly quick pace, in order to demonstrate decisiveness in the area of counterterrorism at a time when it was at the top of the European policy agenda. Contrary to these expectations, gure 2 shows that the newcomers Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary (members from 2004), Bulgaria and Romania (members from 2007) are scattered across the policy change typology. With respect to pace, most new member states are situated in the incremental category and have thus implemented policy instruments gradually. These states are distributed evenly across transformation and dynamic-conservatism, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis that EU candidacy would speed up the implementation of policy instruments. This nding is further inconsistent with the observation that crisis-induced institutional volatility is a contingent phenomenon within transitional democracies (Stern et al. 2002). Level of external pressure As discussed above, the policy instruments included in this analysis differ with respect to the level of external pressure, which provides a second plausible explanation for national policy change variations (for example, Doern 1981; H ritier et al. 2001). Some instruments e are implemented on a voluntary basis, while others are accompanied by a certain degree of political pressure. Returning briey to table 1, the numbers indicate that the level of pressure correlates with the implementation record. While codication of terrorist offence and freezing of assets (associated with high levels of political pressure) have been implemented by most states up to 2003, the remaining three instruments (lower levels of political pressure) have been implemented less frequently and generally at a slower pace. These observations underscore the importance of the level of external pressure as an underlying explanation for national policy change patterns. For instance, all states whose policies have changed according to the episodic-transformation trajectory have implemented codication of terrorist offence and freezing of assets (Cyprus excluded). Conversely, states in the incremental-conservatism category have only implemented one of these instruments and in some instances (Latvia and Poland) none of them. It is
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interesting to note that while prosecution procedures and counterterrorism strategy have been implemented relatively sparsely, the introduction of interagency counterterrorism bodies has grown steadily since 2001. The inuence of path dependency The third explanation of these variations is to use a path dependency logic (for example, Hood 1984; Linder and Peters 1989; Peters et al. 2005). According to this explanation, countries with previous (pre-9/11) experience of domestic terrorism would be expected to have implemented counterterrorism policy instruments prior to 2001. Path dependency might explain the position of France and Ireland shown in gure 2 (transformation-status quo), but it does not seem to hold for other cases. For instance, Spain and Italy, which have a history of dealing with domestic terrorism, are both in the dynamic-conservatism category. A more ne-tuned analysis of the pace of instrument adoption raises additional doubts about the importance of previous experience of terrorism in explaining instrument implementation. Among the states that rst introduced inter-agency counterterrorism bodies and publicly displayed counterterrorism strategies, only France is known to have had a history of domestic terrorism. The other states that took the lead in implementing these instruments, including Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, Romania, and Slovakia, do not share similar experiences of domestic terrorism. Instead, with respect to these states (Luxembourg excluded), it can be hypothesized that their upcoming candidacy for EU membership (possibly also, in the case of Estonia, Romania, and Slovakia, NATO membership accession) provided momentum for swift policy change. CONCLUSION This analysis conrms the general view in the literature that fundamental counterterrorism policy reforms have been carried out in European Union member states after 9/11. Nevertheless, different theoretical perspectives and previous research ndings provide conicting expectations regarding the impact of these reforms on policy developments within the EU as a whole. One view holds that these changes would have led to policy convergence among the member states, while other perspectives would have expected divergence. Inspired by this debate, the question posed in this paper is whether or not changes in the member states implementation of policy instruments have contributed to counterterrorism policy convergence within the European Union as a whole. The empirical analysis of implementation rates of ve policy instruments allows for a nuanced account of policy developments, and the results display signicant variation in the level and pace of the development of policy instruments. Two policy instruments codication of terrorist offence and freezing of assets passed the stage of convergence relatively quickly following 9/11. States policies concerning prosecution procedures and national counterterrorism strategies remained divergent for the entire measurement period, while the establishment of interagency counterterrorism bodies resulted in convergence between 2005 and 2006. These patterns suggest that the level of political pressure might be one explanation for convergence; instruments associated with high levels of political pressure (for example, codication of terrorism offence and freezing of assets) are implemented relatively swiftly compared to instruments that are implemented voluntarily. One methodological implication emerging from this observation is that the selection of policy elements might have signicant effects upon the results. Further, the ndings indicate that the scope and pace of policy instrument implementation do not
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correlate with EU membership duration. Many new EU members have indeed carried out relatively encompassing policy reforms at a quick pace, but the pattern is not clear enough to suggest that EU candidacy provided momentum to demonstrate decisiveness in the area of counterterrorism. Path dependency also seems insufcient to explain policy developments in this area, as indicated by the observation that patterns of policy instrument implementation did not correlate with previous national experiences of terrorism. From the perspective of Europeanization theory and the inuence of EU institutions on national policies, ndings reported in this article give reason to further ponder the mechanisms of governance within the European Union. National counterterrorism policymaking takes place in the nexus between international organizations and regulations on the one hand, and national structures, ideas, and perceptions on the other. In this context, EU institutions take on different transfer roles contributing to policy convergence by exerting different levels of coercion (Jordan et al. 2003). Although data utilized for this analysis does not enable close examination of EU governance in counterterrorism, the results point to an interesting tension between the prevalence of sovereignty and national interests and the role(s) of EU institutions in fostering counterterrorism policy transfer. The institutional framework for counterterrorism within the EU has become a platform adjacent to a facilitating arena enabling diffusion and transfer of policy ideas and experience through networks of EU and member state actors (Jordan et al. 2003; Bulmer and Padgett 2004). However, it can be additionally hypothesized that even if the level of formal pressure remains limited in Justice and Home Affairs, the aggregation of agenda-setting powers, policy recommendations, and monitoring capacities provided through EU institutions has pushed member states into innovation and adaptation of new policy instruments. One interesting topic for future research is therefore to analyse in greater depth the nature of voluntary policy transfer and national capacities (political and administrative) to absorb or resist new policy initiatives (see Bugdahn 2007). In this study we have observed strong indications of signicant diffusion of voluntary policy instruments among the EU members; this might suggest that some member states feel politically obliged to engage in voluntary transfer even if the level of formal pressure remains limited. A potentially important underlying explanation is the perception of counterterrorism as a joint venture, which in turn raises the political costs for policy inaction (compare DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Meanwhile, Europeanization scholars claim that adaptational pressure from EU institutions is an insufcient condition for policy convergence. It has been noted that national agents and structures (for example, multiple veto-points, supporting institutions, norm entrepreneurs and political culture) ultimately determine if EU rules and regulations will have any decisive inuence on national policies. Due to these mediating factors, it has been postulated that pressures of adaptation might result in convergence around similar outcomes but rarely so with respect to policy instruments (Borzel and Risse 2000). It is therefore counterintuitive that the gradual diffusion of counterterrorism instruments within the European Union has been so distinct in the last decade. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This paper is based on research funded by The Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA). An early version of this paper was presented at the International Studies Associations (ISA) annual meeting, San Francisco, March 2008. We are grateful for comments from Fredrik Bynander, Arjen Boin, Magnus Ekengren, Charles Parker, Eric
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Date received 02 May 2008. Date accepted 09 November 2008.

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