1

Question 1: Neo-Realism offers a structural explanation for international stability during the Cold War. What does this mean? How accurate is this structural explanation for the nature and end of the Cold War. Critically discuss.

Neo-Realism, which is based on Kenneth Waltzs Theory of International Politics (1979), is a deterministic theory which contends that the behaviour of states in the international system is shaped exclusively by the structure of the system itself and not by an individual states plans and motives (Nicholson, 2002: 97). States are seen as rational therefore in any given situation, only a single, rational course of action is available to them, this action is what all of us will interpret differently, in some instances, the actions are selfish and in others they are cooperative. Therefore in neorealism, the actors themselves are not seen as that important because the structure of the system compels them to act in a certain way (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003: 84). Hence when students of International Relations look at the Cold War from a neorealist perspective, they ought to focus on the make-up of the international system after the end of the Second World War and not on the individual drives of either the USA or the Soviet Union. Neorealism also attempts to predict the behaviour of states since state behaviour is shaped by the structure of the system; certain structures will only result in certain behaviour (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003: 88). Hence, the peace which occurred during the Cold War period was bound to occur because it was a product of the system, not a product of the lack of aggression by either power, even if we could have replaced any of the two super-powers with a different state, the result would have been largely similar. According to neorealism, the structure of the system can be defined by looking at three core elements, the first, anarchy, is the ordering system of the political structure and it compels states to act as they do (Nicholson, 2002: 92). Describing the system as anarchic simply means that there is no regulatory authority in the system and all states are equal to each other, at least on paper. The international system is also influenced by the distribution of capabilities, that is, power is not distributed equally thus the system is influenced by the number of superpowers which are present (Sutch and Elias, 2007: 51), the system can either be a unipolar, bipolar or multipolar system. The way in which power is distributed within the international system is what will influence state actions (Russett and Starr, 1992: 104-105). Therefore stability or conflict is dependent on the polarity of the system, neorealism contends that bipolar systems are the most stable and are least likely to produce conflict, despite the

tensions which might build up between the two adversaries (Russett and Starr, 1992: 110). A bipolar distribution of power is simply when there are two major centres of power (Sutch and Elias, 2007: 179). A bipolar system is seen as stable because there are fewer powers thus the chances of miscalculations happening between the two powers are lower and because the two states have approximately the same amount of military power, neither is likely to start a war against the other (Nicholson, 2002: 94). The Cold War period was characterised by peace and stability in the international system which was pretty unprecedented for such a long period of time especially considering the tension which graced this period. Viotti and Kauppi (1999: 15) point out that neorealism submits that, the general structure of the international system influences state conduct or at least the opinion of its decision makers, thus the stability which occurred during the Cold War can only be understood through a structural analysis of the international system during this period. Neorealism explains the stability of the international system between 1945 and 1990 due the bipolar nature of the system (Russett and Starr, 1992: 110), this stability came about as a result of the approximate military equality between the two super powers (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003: 90). Simply said, the Cold War remained cold because the structure of the international system made it unwise for any of the powers to consider attacking the other, the conflict might have turned out differently if there had been the rise of a third or even fourth military superpower to challenge the two hegemons. If such a situation had occurred, the mere structure of the system would have forced the powers to act differently, an alliance to weaken the other power might have taken place leaving one side in a far much stronger position compared to the other, making the threat of conflict even more likely. A multipolar system like the one which existed in 1939 would have probably led to a breakout of conflict. Michael Nicholson (2002: 98) suggests that, neorealism contends that, the Cold War and its nature were inevitable since both the USA and the Soviet Union were big and powerful thus hostilities were bound to occur. Even if the Russian revolution had gone differently and the Bolsheviks had not won, the post-World War II system would have been similar. John Gaddis (1989: 9-10) sums this up eloquently when he points out that a bipolar system induces in the major actors involved, a sense of caution and restraint and it discourages irresponsibility because of the high stakes involves. Thus, the ideological differences between the two powers are seen as having played little or no part in the development of the Cold War. The simple bipolar system which characterised the Cold

war meant that there were little or no insecurities between the powers (Gaddis, 1989: 10). Insecurities as Gaddis mentions often lead to war and multipolar systems are characterised by

insecurities as can be evidenced by the break out of the First World War were the multipolar nature of the system meant that the slightest of issues led to conflict. The simple bipolar

order also made it easier for the super powers to enter into stable alliances (ibid), in a multipolar system alliances can always shift which leads to some confusion and can cause war. As Gaddis (1989:10) points out, alliances can also be another source of insecurity and uncertainty, the dangers of complex alliance systems can be seen in the pre-1914 Europe where uncertainties caused by the alliance system led to various powers declaring war on each other. The bipolar make-up of the post 1945 international structure is however not enough

in explaining why the Cold War was a relatively stable period during which no major powers fought with each other. The structure of the system might have played a huge role in the maintenance of but Waltz and other structural realists underplayed the role of other factors in preserving stability during this era. Surely there were also other factors at play in keeping stability during this period. John Gaddis (1989) identifies other characteristics which contributed to the stability of the Cold War era. Firstly stability was helped by the fact that the two powers occupied different sides of the planet (Gaddis, 1989: 12), this lowered the chances of conflict breaking out over irredentist issues similar to the ones brought up by Hitler prior to the outbreak of World War II. Stability was also preserved by the fact that the two powers were not economically dependent on each other (ibid), this meant that the two adversaries could not frustrate each other economically and no power could ever force the other into a strangle hold forcing the other to use aggression. These factors had little to do with the structure of the system; these are factors which had always been existence even prior to the emergence of the post 1945 international structure. Cold War stability was also kept

because of domestic factors, Gaddis (1989: 14-15) suggests that the American economy was linked to its foreign policy, because the U.S wanted to extend its economic system across the world and the way of doing this was by avoiding military confrontation, the stability of the Cold War allowed the USA to do this. Perhaps what was almost as important as the structure of the system in keeping stability during the Cold War was the existence of nuclear weapons (Gaddis, 1989: 18-20). Having seen the potential destruction that could result from a single hydrogen or atomic bomb during the 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the leaders of the two states treaded with a lot of caution in order to avoid this scenario. Because of the presence of these nuclear weapons, the same willingness to risk war as had existed in the past was absent (Gaddis, 1989: 18). The dangers of keen statesmen who are not hesitant in declaring war

were clearly seen in the pre-World War I Europe where a single assassination led to the whole of Europe going to war with each other. Nuclear weapons thus, were a major deterrent and played a large role in the maintenance of stability, the experiences of the two Great Wars also served to remind leaders of the realities of what conflict entails. The devastation which accompanied the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki meant that leaders involved themselves in a conscious effort to avoid the risk of war. The USA and the Soviet Union were involved in bilateral negotiations which led to an agreement to reduce strategic weapons during the 1970s. These negotiations known as SALT I and SALT II (Farnsworth, 1985:123126) are clear evidence of the effort that the two super powers put in in order to avoid conflict. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed in 1970 (Nicholson, 2002: 136) is also a sign of the sobriety that the presence of nuclear weapons brought into world politics. Perhaps, if nuclear weapons had been absent and only conventional arms were in existence, the Cold War might not have remained cold. The structural explanation offered by neorealism to explain the stability of the international system between 1945 and 1990 could not however predict the end of the Cold War. Like every other theory of International Relations, neorealism was entirely of the point when it came to predicting the end of the Cold War. A structural approach cannot explain the Soviet Unions decision to break up and cede power to the USA, when one looks at the structure of the system during this period; they will notice that it demanded that the Soviet Union remain as the other power in the bipolar system, the end of the Cold War therefore can only be explained through other means. Most contentions of neorealism were not supported by the end of the Cold War, firstly is the view that states are actors who always seek to maximise their expected utility (Nicholson, 2002: 95-96). The break of the Soviet Union did not leave any of the former Soviet states any stronger; in fact it weakened them and left them much more vulnerable. Even more significantly in weakening the neorealist case is the fact that they view domestic politics as playing no role whatsoever in what happens in international relations. As Michael Nicholson (2002: 63) shows, the end of the Cold War came about as a result of domestic political and economic reforms that were introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev who became leader of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985. The opening up of both the economic and political systems brought with chaos which led to the collapse of the communist order in Eastern Europe. These events were purely domestic occurrences and had little to do with overall make-up of the international system. Neorealist attempts to explain the structure of the system during the Cold War were accurate only to a limited extent. By ignoring various other factors influencing state

behaviour during the Cold War, neorealism was offering an explanation which provided only a limited understanding to the features of the Cold War. The role played by domestic politics in influencing the Cold War cannot be underestimated, so too should the past unpleasant experiences with war in general and nuclear war in particular not be undervalued. Both these factors were just as important as the overall structure of the system in determining the behaviour of the super powers. The liberal capitalist system of the USA also had a part to play in influencing the stability of the system. The spread of American style capitalism, which further entrenched U.S hegemony, required a stable and peaceful international structure thus war or even any threat of it, became highly unattractive for the economic system. Despite all these shortcomings, neorealism still, nonetheless, plays a huge role in helping unpack the complexities surrounding the Cold War especially with regards to why it remained cold. It is therefore a good starting point for those students of IR who seek to understand the events which occurred during the Cold War, for a much broader understanding though, one ought to look at much more than neorealism. Some of the factors stated above, and others, are important as well in explaining the nature of the Cold War and in understanding why it eventually came to an end. The end of the Cold War was one of the most unexpected events in political history especially as evidenced by the fact that only a few, if any, people were able to predict it. No theory of International relations was as off the mark as neorealism was, to neorealists, the end of the Cold War was as unexpected as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was to most Americans. The end of the Cold War took neorealists by complete surprise, this was due to the fact neorealism believes that state behaviour in world politics is only influenced by how the international system is set up. The utter disregard to domestic and other factors in influencing state action was one of the reasons why neorealism could not see the coming of the end of the Cold War. The weakening of the Soviet economy must have provided some sort of sign of the approaching demise of the old order. This failure also serves as a critic of the narrow lens through which theory often attempts to explain reality, it is extremely unusual for complex events like the Cold War to be explained through narrow based approaches, like the structural analysis approach favoured by neorealism. If all factors, some of them mentioned above, had been taken into account then it would have been extremely likely that the end of the Cold War could have been predicted and the nature of the Cold War itself, that is, its stable nature, could have been more easily understood. [Word Count: 2400]

Bibliography: Farnsworth, D., 1985, International Relations- An Introduction, Chicago: Nelson Hall. Gaddis, J., 1989, The Post-War International System: Elements of Stability and Instability in Russett, B. and Starr, H. (eds.), Choices in World Politics, New York: Freeman and Company. Jackson, R., and Sorensen, G., 2003, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nicholson, M., 2002, International Relations: A Concise Introduction, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Russett, B. and Starr, H., 1992, Choices in World Politics, New York: Freeman and Company. Sutch, P. and Elias, J., International Relations: the basics, New York: Routledge. Viotti, P.R. and Kauppi, M.V., 1999, International Relations Theory, Boston: Allyn and Bacon.