Mathematics as an Objective Science Author(s): Nicolas D. Goodman Source: The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 86, No. 7 (Aug.

- Sep., 1979), pp. 540-551 Published by: Mathematical Association of America Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2320581 Accessed: 15/08/2010 23:00
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7. W. Heisenberg, The PhysicalPrinciples theQuantumTheory, of of University Chicago Press,Chicago, Ill., 1930,Chap. 2. 8. B. 0. Koopman, Search and Screening, O.E.G. ReportNo. 56, Washington, D.C., 1946. , Fallacies in operationsresearch, 9. OperationsRes., 4 (1956) 425. 10. , The theory search,Part 3, OperationsRes., 5 (1957) 613-623. of , Search and Screening, 11. 2nd ed., PergamonPress,Elmsford, N.Y., Jan. 1980,Chaps. 3 and 6. , An operationalcritiqueof detection 12. laws, OperationsRes., 27, no. 1 (1979). 13. L. D. Stone,Theoryof OptimalSearch,Academic Press,New York, 1975. 14. D. V. Widder,The Laplace Transform, Princeton University Press,Princeton, N.J., 1941. RANDOLPH HILL RoAD, RANDoLPH, NH 03570.

MATHEMATICS AS AN OBJECITVE SCIENCE

NICOLAS D. GOODMAN

1. Introduction. MorrisKline has written "mathematics a body of knowledge. it that is But containsno truths." [13, p. 9] Views of thisgeneralkind,whichdeny thatmathematics has objective scientific content,are widely held by mathematicians and are disseminated in classrooms and in popularbooks such as Kline's. I believethatsuch viewsare falseand that their dissemination does no good forour own or others' respect our subject.Below I shall for examinefourviewswhich,thoughtheydo not exhaustthe current range of opinionin the philosophy mathematics, nevertheless of are sufficiently representative raisewhatseemto me to to be themainissuesabout theobjectivity mathematics.shallarguethateach of these of I views arisesfrom oversimplificationwhathappenswhenwe do mathematics. an of 2. Surfacism. orderto bringout some of thefeatures In whichtheviewsI wantto oppose have in common, me beginwithan imaginary let analogousviewin thephilosophy physics. of Manyof thequalities associatewith we material objects-such as definite shape,hardness, color -can be thought as qualities their of of surfaces. Considera philosopher who is misledby this simpleobservation and believes that all qualitiesof materialobjects are qualitiesof their surfaces. holds,let us say, thatmaterial He objectsare not solid,as we usuallysuppose,but insteadare infinitely surfaces. is meaningless, his view,to speak of the insideof a thin It on materialobject. Since no one would referto his own positionas "superficialism," may we imagine thatourphilosopher calls his view"surfacism." Askedto explainthefactthatwhenwe cutintoan objectwe do notjust finda void,oursurfacist thattheedgeof theknife says pullson the surfaceto whichit is applied,thereby stretching surfaceso as to create two new that surfaces. Askedto givean accountof a quality which difficult treat is to as consistently a quality of surfaces, such as weight, asserts he thatthequality illusory. is Whatis actually goingon,he claims,is thatcertain qualitiesof thesurfaces our bodies,or of our interactions other of with surfaces, beingprojected are intotheexternal world.For example, the supposewe consider case of weight morecarefully. weight an objectis really The of just thedifficulty I have in lifting it. That difficulty must,strictly speaking, locatedin thosepointsat whichthe object and my be bodyinteract. Hence theweight mustresidein thecommon surface theobjectand mybody. of It is a gratuitous oversimplificationthink theweight a quality thematerial to of as of objectin and of itself.
NicolasD. Goodman received Stanford his Ph.D.under Dana Scott 1968. all butoneyear in For since then he has beenat theStateUniversity New Yorkat Buffalo, of where is nowAssociate he Professor. research His has beenin mathematical particularly logic, combinatory and intuitionism.-Editors logic

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philosopher always on the defensive. may is He We need not suppose thatour surfacist of by viewfirst violatestheprinciple parsimony thatthe conventional maintain, instance, for an unnecessary entity-theinsideof theobject-and thengoes on to givethat creating entirely but invisible. is entity absurdqualities.The inside,forone example, supposedto be material Whencethisasymmetry? therereallyis fromoutsides? If Whyshouldinsidesbe so different like the space objects,would it not be morereasonableto supposethat, space insidematerial we withair? Occasionally, maysuppose,our outsidematerial objects,thespace insideis filled views. of and character his opponents' about theunscientific superstitious surfacist complains of is object,he asserts, a remnant beliefin theimmortal Beliefin thesolidinsideof a material of the soul,whichwas the"solid" insideof a humanbeing.As a matter fact,he argues, usual Who objectexcept visualizing by its a accountis simply incomprehensible. can visualize material in a surface? Who, when visualizing materialobject,can visualizeanything additionto its surface? that It seemsto me thatthe viewsabout the natureof mathematics I wishto discussare how one for of Hence it willbe useful me to consider forms, moreor less disguised, surfacism. in just described. might refute surfacism thepureform of objectsis to orderourexperiences a The purpose having viewaboutthenature material of of thoseobjectsin a way whichis usefulin our dealingswiththem.Such a view is a social public in Materialobjectsare themselves of artifact whichservesa variety social functions. or environment directly indirectly, are, with character, mostof myinteractions mymaterial and which function thatthemostimportant also interactions mysocial environment. follows It with with objectswhich boththoseof ourinteractions material sucha viewmustserveis to facilitate by witheach otherwhichare mediated and have publicsignificance thoseof our interactions material material objects.Hence a viewabout thenatureof material objectsor whichconcern the objectswhichis intendedto be more than a debatingpositionshould satisfy following real. be real Anything which practically should takenas objectively is of Objectivity: Principle real,I mean is like WhenI say thatan attribute weight practically Let me makethisclearer. does exists consensus a thattheattribute playa role thattheattribute playsa role,and thatthere It with and shouldplay a role,in our interactions theobjectsthathave theattribute. willfollow in of thatthere at least a roughconsensus thedegreeor kindof presence theattribute a on is withobjectsare generally particular object.For, to repeatwhatI said above, our interactions is also interactions each other.On the otherhand,whenI say thatan attribute takenas with than in the objectively real, I mean thatit is takento residein the observedobject rather and the between observer relationship of or subjective experience theobserver in thesubjective the observedobject.A theory objects,then,is onlyseriousif it about the natureof material acceptedrole in our ordinary whichhave a commonly acceptsas its data all thoseattributes account, intoa coherent socialdealings withtheobjects.It musttakethosedata and unitethem any away.In particular, but somein terms others doubt, notexplaining ofthem of no explaining if attributes a theory undermine ordinary them, it treats will rather thansupport our activities, illusion.Of course one can find in as whichare important those activities mere subjective were activities in appearedto play a rolein our practical that examples whichentities formerly of reality something about theobjective in latershownnot to exist.Nevertheless, an argument of of is the whosepractical reality evident, wholeburden proofshouldfallon theproponent the of practical importance an for After thesimplest all, explanation theapparent negative position. In is playsa rolein ourpractice. theabsenceof actually exists and actually entity thattheentity real a strong mustbe thatanything practically to the then, presumption argument thecontrary, is objectively real. of To avoid possible misunderstandings, me considera case in which the principle let is hearsagainsttaking literally that physics is. An one objectivity satisfied. argument sometimes it in theworldof thephysicist as there no such thing yellow.if thatweretrue, would be a is it Fortunately, is not true. powerful argument.

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What from coloritself. the of to our Firstof all, it is important distinguish experience yellow or objectis nothowit appearsto thisobserver witha material is relevant ourpublicdealings to is Whatis relevant theactual colorof or thatobserver undertheseconditions thoseconditions. understandard conditions. how it appearsto a normalobserver theobject-roughlyspeaking, to as Thus it cannotbe the task of physics, opposed to psychology, give an account of our experience yellow. of of in does nottakecoloras an ingredient itsdescription the however, physics that It remains, of of the world.Nevertheless, usual accountin terms wave lengths lightdoes give objective away.Theyare notmadeto or Colorsare notdenigrated explained content talkaboutyellow. to to our residein our eyesor in our minds.On thecontrary, ability deal withcoloris enriched. of properties colors,but it makespossible Not onlydoes the theory accountforthe observed in have evenfoundnewcolors(forexample, the their in manipulation newways.The physicists infrared) whichwe cannotsee. private aspectsof The is of Thus in thiscase theprinciple objectivity amplysatisfied. merely on real The as our experience colorare dismissed subjective. practically coloritself, theother of content. withobjective hand,is supplied The of as surfacism follows. weight a then, maybe used to refute of The principle objectivity, to material object is proportional its volumeand not to its surfacearea. It is homogeneous through Hence thesurfacist it. of reasonable concludethattheweight theobjectis distributed to in is real. an is must holdthatweight merely illusion-not objectively Butsinceweight important in and sinceit can be measured a waywhichis interpersonour dealings withmaterial objects, his trivializes theory. thereby to who allyvalid,thesurfacist declaresweight be illusory we of In order to apply these ideas to the philosophy mathematics, must observethat and has social consequences. It is mathematics a public activity. occurs in a social context acts. are proving theorem none of themprivate a a formulating definition, Posinga problem, is mathematician social processwe call science.A functioning Theyare all partof thatlarger publisheshis own work,and expects other aware of the work of other mathematicians, is of to mathematicians take his workinto account.Thus a philosophy mathematics closely should be to analogous to a view about the natureof materialobjects. Its main function of philosophy It thata serious of socialprocess doingmathematics. follows facilitate ongoing the reality That is, it mustnot denyobjective of mustsatisfy principle objectivity. the mathematics reality. to any aspectsof mathematical activity whichhave practical can the of No 3. Formalism. one who observes behavior mathematicians fail to noticethat of at in attempt a philosophy symbols accordancewithrules.Thus our first theymanipulate of or manipulation is mathematics might to hold thatmathematics therule-governed,formal, be This of else" is themark thesurfacist.) view and else.(The phrase"and nothing symbols nothing [5], moreor less like thismay be foundin Haskell Curry is oftencalledformalism. Positions called often though AbrahamRobinson[17],and Paul Cohen [4]. (The viewsof David Hilbert, takesat we from here,sinceHilbert "formalism," quitedifferent theposition are discussing are and to part combinatorial of mathematics be meaningful true.See, forexample, leastthefinite, sort Hilbert[12] or Kreisel [15].) An exampleof a different is providedby some computer want to think thathumanintelliin They naturally scientists interested artificial intelligence. machinesare doing.Thus the fromwhat theircomputing different gence is not in principle is and to are theories assimilated programs, thought humanbrainis assimilated a computer, to whatelse could After saystheformalist, to of all, assimilated theoperation a Turingmachine. in be? Can you imagine a mathematician working any way other than by mathematics symbols? manipulating whathe takesto be a let moreconcrete, us imagine asking formalist To makethissomewhat he a If of arithmetic. he is really strict theorem formalist, must thecontent thefundamental of of at is, alone, it has no content all. The theorem afterall, just a string replythat,standing role is What makesus feelthatit has content onlythatit playsa definite in certain symbols.

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encountered position chess.If we givea more in activities engagein. It is like a frequently we which say a formal system precisedescription our symbolic of activities, by giving particular codifies some partof mathematics, we can also give a preciseaccountof therole of the then specify or moreformal one proofs thetheorem of fundamental theorem arithmetic. might of We in oursystem, we might of and givesomeexamples uses of thetheorem formal of in proofs other has apartfrom role in our its theorems. the formalist, For however, theorem no meaning the about the does not make any assertion symbolic activities. For the strict formalist, theorem natural numbers, sinceforhimno suchobjectsexist. I the manipulation symbols. of Now I agreethatmathematics almostalwaysinvolves formal This insidesome formal system. agreethata mathematician usuallybe viewedas working can is logicwhosesubject just seemsto me an important insight. Thereis a branchof mathematical has thisaspectof mathematical of functions. That theory activity. mean thetheory recursive I of logicto ourunderstanding theinherent contributed morethananyother partofmathematical this I limitations mathematics. me state quitestrongly.do notbelievethatmathematicians of Let or willevercompute nonrecursive solvea recursively unsolvable problem, workin a a function, But all of thatis not to concede thathuman theory whichis not recursively axiomatizable. function theory. Rather, is analogousto it minds algorithmic are devicesin thesenseofrecursive object that theharmless concession might we maketo surfacism no one willeversee a material without surface. a might who neveractually did any mathematics It is easy to understand how a philosopher After whatis there himto see but theouter all, for hold a formalistic of its foundations. view as when, to playof symbols? theother On hand,I mustadmitthatI findit difficult understand is Introspection showsthatwhenI happensoccasionally, creative a mathematician a formalist. am actually thatI do notknowhowto with doingmathematics, whenI am wrestling a problem at withideas and constructions. solve,thenI am hardlydealingwithsymbols all, but rather does occurswhenhe has an idea but is, forthe Some of the hardestworka mathematician themselves manifest way.Oftensuchideas first moment, unableto express thatidea in a formal becomes clearerabout them,as they as visual or kinesthetic images.As the mathematician which manifest considerable internal structure becomemoreformal, maydiscover he thatthey is,so to speak,notyetsymbolically encoded.Thispointis hardto discussin a waywhichavoids to relevant theepistemological to pointI am trying purely psychological categories directly not make. Still,mathematicians talk and customarily about ideas, constructions, proofsin a way whichmakesit clear thatthey otherthanthesymbols theyuse. Thus have in mindsomething two papersembodythe same idea, whether mathematicians discusswhether distinct may two lectures distinct or two distinct strings symbolsexpressthe same construction, whether of can knowsthatthesameconstruction be usedin expoundthesameproof. Every mathematician you if quitedifferent partsof mathematics that, you finda new proofof an old theorem, and had better checkthatit is notjust an old proofin a new form. to As has beencustomary generically let sinceBrouwer, me use theword"construction" refer writes and whichgive to all of theseentities the whichlie behindthe symbols mathematician are thosesymbols and content. think I there can be no doubtthatconstructions practically life real in the sense I introduced discussthemconstantly, agree on their above. Mathematicians It in creation. follows and are general properties, agreethatthey whatis important mathematical as that an adequate philosophy mathematics of cannotjust treatconstructions subjective at either notmention do them all or else dismiss illusion. Most formalist philosophers, however, them without giving any accountthatwouldexplainthe undersome suchname as "heuristics" cannotgive a have. Indeed,the formalist properties thatmathematicians agree constructions theory constructions, of since he denies theyexist.For example,even if therecould be a of or embodythe whichcould recursively whether not two strings symbols program recognize sameidea, theformalist does. Whatcould iteven couldnotadmitthatthatis whattheprogram mean to say that a computing machinehad an idea for a proofbut was having trouble it? formalizing

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In the let morecarefully, me introduce word"intuitive." the In orderto statethisargument Thus an withthe word "formal." is here,"intuitive" used to contrast sense thatis relevant the This is roughly sensein and easy to follow. if maybe called intuitive it is natural argument proof,in that Thus an intuitive seemsto be used in intuitionism. whichtheword "intuitive" and of independent symbols, perhapsnot even entirely context, one whichis unformalized, is in whichare intuitive, the sense are At communicable. any rate,therecertainly constructions do structure, enableus to do but and thatthey notformal notsymbolic, which have internal are proofs. so see newfacts, and can be formalized as to givecorrect real. are constructions practically Intuitive Now myargument be summarized follows. as may that It of Theyare vitalto thepractice mathematics. is of theessenceofformalism it deniestheir cannotbe an adequate formalism of by Therefore, the principle objectivity, objectivereality. of philosophy mathematics. the content of because it neglects intuitive If mustbe rejected 4. Intuitionism. formalism of as at then mathematics, it is naturalto make a second attempt a philosophy mathematics of mathematics consists intuitive of constructions, theformal manipulaLet follows. us hold that and else. This seemsto me to be external expression, of nothing whichis their tionof symbols out and It theessenceof theviewusuallycalled intuitionism.was worked by L. E. J. Brouwer is introduction Dummett [61. is [11].A morerecent A ArendHeyting. good introduction Heyting but is himself his [3]. A related, definitely by generalstatement Brouwer Perhapsthe clearest Bishop[2]. I shouldsay thatveryfewof my remarks distinct, pointof view is thatof Errett of sinceBishophas little to aboutintuitionism applydirectly Bishop'sphilosophy mathematics, tendency. of Brouwer's subjectivistic reality of that of It is characteristic intuitionism it denies the existence any mathematical beyondwhatthemathematitruth or external themathematician evenof any mathematical to objectsexistforme onlyas the prove.Mathematical provedor could actually cian has actually are as factsare trueforme onlyinsofar they the and of results myconstructions, mathematical and beinginfinite numbers, I conclusions arguments can make.Thus thesequenceof natural of proved which have so farbeen neither real. is hencenotsurveyable, onlypotentially Statements The truth-value. logical law of the have no definite nor refuted, like Fermat'sconjecture, is excluded middle,which assertsthat everystatement eithertrue or false, is rejectedas are proofs suchstatements rejected of sets, aboutinfinite and indirect to inapplicable statements as invalid. The of theorem arithmetic. To take an example,let us again considerthe fundamental The theorem of does intuitionist, unliketheformalist, not takethisto be a merestring symbols. aboutan externally to he Nevertheless, also does nottakethetheorem be a truth has a meaning. that we ability a of Rather thinks it as expressing certain he numbers. existing domainofnatural and to see, given intoprimes naturalnumber an to have-namely, our ability factor arbitrary Like withthesamemultiplicities. twosuchdecompositions, they consist thesameprimes of that not to of theformalist, intuitionist takesthemeaning thetheorem residein our practice, in the might refer. reality whichthestatement to any external moreclosely. somewhat middle of Let us examine rejection thelaw of theexcluded Brouwer's or whichcouldbe used tojustify, evento Brouwer does nothave availableanyconceptof truth it for Moreover, Brouwer of interpretation the logical connectives. explain,a truth-functional But of proof. as statement theconclusion an intuitive a onlymakessenseto assert mathematical as a proofthateither is trueor B is trueoughtto containan indication to whichof thetwo A n of we is alternatives beingproved.Otherwise could asserttheexistence a number suchthatif Surely, n= 0 thenA, and ifn= 1 thenB; butwe wouldnotknowthevalueof anysuchnumber. Thus we would be we however, know the value of a number have actuallyconstructed. we it. havingconstructed Hence a proof thatthe the of asserting existence a numberwithout of a trueor falsewouldhave to containeither proofor a refutation is Fermat conjecture either

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pointof viewthatI am not from Brouwer's it neither, follows SinceI can supply theconjecture. trueor false.Thus thelaw of theexcluded is in a positionto assertthattheconjecture either an demand.An but a possibility by making additional not middleis "refuted" by finding third can construction be suppliedwhich if justified an intuitive is assertion only to be considered it. justifies like mathematical intuitionism similarto otherpositions, is movement, As an intellectual whichemphasize our isolationfromeach otherand whichconcludefromthat existentialism, resources. That is to say,it is reducedto our own individual thatwe are epistemically isolation as hold thatour innerexperience, such,is theonly of characteristic all of theseviewsthatthey essentially experience available to us and thattheydenythatour imner sourceof knowledge theseviewstendto collapseinto to In reality whichit refers. consequence, entailsan external of the When Brouwer emphasizes absolutefreedom the creative and irrationalism solipsism. the a to emphasizing in he subject mathematics, is taking stancerelated thatof theexistentialist or in of subjectin aesthetics, ethics, in politics. absolutefreedom thatsame creative Its typicalformof surfacism. is intuitionism a fairly however, Looked at in our context, have access to could possibly is gesture to ask whata mathematician rhetorical characteristic thanone ofyour other something try Put thanhis own constructions. differently, to think other thanone of yourimages. other to thoughts, try visualizesomething or that the not it As in thecase of formalism, seemsto me important to overlook contributions of The of of has intuitionism made to our understanding thepractice mathematics. writings the Here creation. processof mathematical are intuitionists a richsourceofideas about theinternal and develop the to logic devotedto trying extract again thereis a branchof mathematical interpretations, functional notions, The variousrealizability of precisecontent theseinsights. theory, perhaps of and Kripkestructures, thelike,seem to me to givepromise a mathematical of yetto come,of theexperience doingmathematics. in come to see that, the But by I myself have been attracted intuitionism. I have gradually By one's actuallydoing mathematics. undermine convictions intuitionistic strong long term, for motivation his up is the intuitionism mathematician giving the mostpowerful embracing all, after is a partof science.The Mathematics, validatedtruth. work-the searchforpublicly is If newtruths. thatconception givenup,as it is mainpurpose doingmathematics to discover of art is then is in intuitionism, mathematics reducedto an esoteric form-to a kindof play.There for it overlookswhat is is is a sense in which intuitionism inadequate in its own terms, own sake butfor not in obvious:thatI am interested myconstructions fortheir introspectively fromtheir derivetheirsignificance the new truths theyenable me to find.The constructions Justas the nothing? in role. Who would be interested a proof that established epistemic so and meaning, thereis constructions behindthe symbolsand give themtheirinterest lie truth. behindtheconstructions-mathematical something often A gives argument is creation notat all free. mathematical In thisrespect mathematical whichplays such a greatrole in the matheThe a feeling inevitability. conceptof rigor, of whichhe accepts on is abouthis work, a restriction hisfreedom and talking thinking matician's establish may maybe trueand in orderthathis arguments genuinely in orderthathis theorems their truth. I is construction, not something can hope to find truth, unlikea mathematical Mathematical scientific like theory, any other It by introspection. does not existin mymind.A mathematical of theory, a social product.It is createdand developedby the dialecticalinterplay many is we of not minds, just one mind.Whenwe studythehistory mathematics, do not finda mere we Instead, finda repeated and new accumulation newdefinitions, techniques, newtheorems. of of standard rising a and old formulations,gradually of and refinement sharpening old concepts of Each generation mathematiin and increase generality depth. secular and rigor, an impressive what was faddishor discarding of cians rethinks mathematics the previousgeneration, the forms. What guides intonew and sharper whatis stillfertile or superficial false and recasting

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thisentire process a common is conception truth a common of and faith that, as we clarified just and corrected workof our teachers, our students clarify correct work. the so will and our In orderto formulate morecareful a argument,need to say a fewwordsabout theconcept I ofrigor. is widely It believedthatthisnotionchanges. Arguments seemedrigorous Euler that to seemedinadequate Cauchy.Arguments seemedrigorous Cauchyseemto us to contain to that to obviousgaps. But it is not reallythe case thatthe conceptof rigorhas changed-only the standard rigor. of That is to say,a rigorous argument alwaysan argument is whichsuffices to establishthe truth its conclusion. our insight of As grows,we see thatmore is requiredto establish truth, therefore and arguments once seemedrigorous now seen to have gaps. that are But theconceptof rigor itself not changedsinceat least thetimeof Euclid. has when More is truethanthattheconceptof rigor presupposes conceptof truth. the Actually, we evaluatea mathematical argument, do not checkto see whether accordswithsomeset we it of rulestaken, us say,from logic text.Rather, tryto determine let a we whether argument the works-thatis,whether convinces and oughtto convince of thetruth itsconclusion. it us, us, of Thus the conceptof mathematical truth directly is involvedin the practiceof mathematical rigor. functions an indispensible It as ingredient theverycriterion rigor. in of Now I may formulate argument my againstintuitionism follows. as Mathematical truth is practically real. Indeed,without practical the reality mathematical of truth, there wouldbe no such thingas mathematical rigor.But it is of the essenceof intuitionism it denies the that objective reality mathematical of truth. Therefore, theprinciple objectivity, by of intuitionism cannotbe an adequatephilosophy mathematics. of we 5. Logicism.If we reject intuitionism becauseit neglects mathematical truth, then maybe led to make a thirdattempt a philosophy mathematics follows.Let us hold that at of as mathematics consistsof certaintruths, the arguments of that establishthese truths, the of of thatexpresses constructions underlying thosearguments, theformal of manipulation symbols thrust of thosearguments truths, of nothing and and else. It seemsto me thatthisis thecentral what has traditionally been called logicism. Views of this sort have been advocated most prominently GottlobFregeand by Bertrand by Russell.Classicalstatements logicism of maybe is in statement in Hempel found, example, Frege[7] or Russell[18].A somewhat for morerecent [9]. A logicist, theorem of unlikea formalist an intuitionist, or would take the fundamental of For the logicist, arithmetic a truth as whose contentis quite independent our activity. however, there no natural are numbers whichexistas independent entities which and happento have the property on expressed the theorem. by Instead,the theorem to be understood the is basis of a long sequence of definitions. are When all the expressions used in the theorem the expandedout in accordancewiththesedefinitions, then, according thelogicist, theorem to willturn to be merely very theorem arithmetic, of out a complex logicaltruth. fundamental The fora logicist, on a par withan assertion is like,"ifall A's are bothB's and C's, thenall A's are C's." for truths be to deniesis thatthereis any subjectmatter mathematical What the logicist do It for about. Mathematical terms, thelogicist, not refer-or at leastdo not refer uniquely. of truths nottrue virtue successfully are follows thatmathematical by describing actualstate any truths mustbe truesolely content. Hence mathematical of affairs. of Theyare empty factual by relations one another. to That is theway in structure of their and of own internal virtue their is whichlogical truths true: Hence the logicistthesisthatmathematics merely are logic. In have tendedto use the term"logic" ratherloosely,sometimes of practice, course,logicists includingall of set theoryunder that name. But the basic idea is always to deny that on truth rests anything content-that to denythattheir assertions have factual mathematical is, That is presumably also of statements themselves. outsideof the structure the mathematical of whatKline meansto denyby thewordsquotedat thebeginning thisessay.(For an explicit statement Kline's views,see [13, pp. 424-431]. For moredetails,see Kline [14, pp. 1028of 1039].)

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has thatlogicism logic.I think muchof theearlyworkin mathematical motivated Logicism not to of philosophy mathematics ourunderstanding, than contributions anyother made greater The desireto reduceall of but so much of the practiceof mathematics, of its foundations. to mathematics "logic"-that is, to merelyconceptualreasoning-has provideda strong the and to findand makeexplicit notions the and to impetus simplify unify basic mathematical is logicism stillmaking is upon whichmathematics based. Moreover, principles fundamental to can today.Much of whatis now called prooftheory be seen as an effort suchcontributions the by of as view largerand largerpartsof mathematics consisting logical truths extending years the onlyone example, past twenty-five To conceptof logicin variousdirections. mention and proofsso as to give a long of of have seen the development a theory infinitely formulas analyof fragments mathematical extensive and of "logical"analysis arithmetic of increasingly sis. an does provide adequateaccountof a significant or logicism Unlikeformalism intuitionism, is really just logic.We reasonfrom Much of mathematics practice. partof actualmathematical that will settle some previously to trying find an argument premises, clearly formulated deep can wouldconsider that however, anyworka mathematician I formulated question. doubt, knowsthathis best would accept.Everymathematician the be accountedforin terms logicist kind of insighthe calls work is based not on mere reasoningbut on the characteristic is by to refers a faculty whichthemathematician thissense,theword"intuition" In "intuition." to he at which, thetime, is not in a position deduce. of properties a structure able to perceive to whentrying work quitereliable.Sometimes, and it is often can This perception be trained, roomin thedark. to deductively, feelslikea man trying findhis wayaroundan unfamiliar one or But then,eithergradually The mind is fullof detailsthatfail to cohereinto a pattern. one how theroomis arranged, knows suddenly, one's eyesadjustto the dark,one sees dimly It about chairsone has not yetbumpedinto,and one is able to get about comfortably. is an that "knowsintuitively" thusand so mustbe thecase that everyday occurrence a mathematician he But of it. idea how to go aboutproving Often, course, is wrong. butdoes nothave thevaguest and mathematician ifhe if a Certainly, I respect particular farmoreoften thannot he is right. to I structure,willbe willing relyon hisintuitions witha particular experience has had extensive but about thestructure evenin theabsence of a proof-not absolutely, to a verylargeextent. we whereby have of the Let me say at once thatI am not urging existence an occultfaculty is intuition a of directknowledge platonicobjects.Rather,I thinkthat the mathematician's to special case of the general human abilityto recognizepatternsor, more specifically, intuition the cues. Thus I think mathematician's from scattered complexstructures synthesize It withthatstructure. is not of the is about a particular structure simply result longexperience are "feel"forhiswood.The factis thatmathematicians able a in different kindfrom carpenter's havingto objectswithout about mathematical to arriveat more or less reliableconclusions of is creativity muchmorea matter intuition Indeed,mathematical deduce thoseconclusions. thata [19]or Resnik[16].)It follows see thanit is oflogic.(For essentially sameview, Wilder the cannotbe adequate. accountof mathematics logicist is thatare not holds thatmathematics a body of truths But whatis missing? The logicist not of of internal logicalstructure, by virtue about anything. just by virtue their Theyare true of objects to which theyrefer.But if that were true,then the phenomenon any external are is thenthere no For wouldbe incomprehensible. ifthelogicist right, intuition mathematical into. withor to haveinsight for to structures themathematician becomefamiliar a from logicist pointof view,of is An interesting specialcase of thisdifficulty theproblem, antecedently nor a whichis neither logicaltruth deducedfrom of thestatus axioms.A principle therefore, of Logicists, by is acceptedprinciples not being acceptedmerely virtue reasoning. of are often denythatsuchprinciples beingacceptedat all. Thus theytendto think geometry, the If space satisfies axioms,thenit satisfies forexample, a hypothetical discipline. physical as to thetheorems. (For thisopinionsee thereferences Kline above,or see Hempel[10].)But,as a of of matter fact,we have a clear intuition Euclidean space, and the theorems Euclidean of

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geometry outright about thatstructure. is generally are true It held thattheearliest geometrical knowledge arrived empirically. so, thenthatknowledge was at If does not have a hypothetical character. The non-Eucidean geometries only show the logical consistency denying of the parallelpostulate. They do not showthattheparallelpostulate false.The generaltheory is of relativity showsthatcertain esoteric observations welldescribed treating are by space-time a as four-dimensional manifold non-constant of curvature. mayfollow It from this, though am not I surethatit does,thatthespace of ourintuition does notcorrespond perfectly physical to space. It certainly does not followthatwe do not have a clear spatialintuition. Moreover, Euclidean geometry remainsan excellentdescription the space we actuallylive in and actually of experience. is not as though use of figures geometrical It the in demonstrations derivative were from purely logicalproofs based on theaxioms.On thecontrary, some of theaxioms,suchas theaxiomsof order, so evident theintuition theneed forthem are to that was notnoticed until the nineteenth century. seemsimplausible It thatall the geometers beforeMoritzPasch were of guilty thesamesystematic logicalerrors. seemsmuchmorelikely It thatthey wereengaged in someactivity other thandeducing logicalconsequences a setof axioms.I think the of they were studying space. Let me summarize the argument. Mathematicalintuition practically is real. It is only comprehensible a non-deductive as insight into structures external the mathematics to itself. Hence such external mathematical structures practically are real. But it is essential logicism to that it denies the objectiverealityof any such structure. Therefore, the principleof by objectivity, logicism cannotbe an adequatephilosophy mathematics. of in of 6. Platonism. Logicism, otherwords,mustbe rejectedas an incomplete philosophy is mathematics becauseit omits objectsthatmathematics about.Thuswe maymakea fourth the of as consistsof truths at about attempt a philosophy mathematics follows:Mathematics of thatestablish abstract structures existing independently us, of the logical arguments those of thosearguments, theformal of of truths, theconstructions underlying manipulation symbols that expresses and truths, and of nothing else. This is the philosophy those arguments of Its to mathematics I think that oughtproperly be calledplatonism. mostdistinguished contemin was porary proponent KurtGodel. (For example his [8].) A platonist the theorem arithmetic of For wouldinterpret fundamental literally. theplatonist there suchthings natural of are as numbers of existing independently us, and it is as a matter facttruethatthey all uniquely are intoprime factors. decomposable The mostcharacteristic of within mathematical expression platonism logic is model theory. This disciplineis the studyof the semanticcontentof mathematical theories.Of course all theories havesemantic and content. formalism, intuitionism, logicism denythatmathematical is of can The central problem model theory the questionof what properties structures be of in Thisquestion are and expressed particular languages. onlyarisesifstructures assumedto exist to have properties of independently their description. offers. thatplatonism Let me tryto summarize of quickly picture mathematical the activity which structures of The mathematician, thisview,is confronted a wide variety abstract on by them. he thesestructures; finds He themselves precede mathematical his activity. does notcreate and refines he an In the course of his training, thenas he developshis powers, forms and intosome he of intuition about thesestructures. Typically, course, willhave muchmoreinsight world about the mathematical of themthanintoothers. His intuition formed the truths is by in and thenhis intuition, thathave been discovered his predecessors by his colleagues, and by about theold structures. and turn, enableshimto findnewstructures to makenew conjectures In orderto verify to theseconjectures, answerthe questionsthatoccur to him,he performs in definesnew concepts.These constructions, turn,get exmakes arguments, constructions, and are in are pressed mathematical English, bolstered computations, made rigorous formal. by social and accessibleand verifiable becomepartof thelarger Thereby theyare made publicly dialectic whichmathematics through develops.

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is accountof what the pure mathematician doing. satisfactory This seemsto me a fairly to even if theyhave not bothered mathematicians, Indeed, I thinkthatmost contemporary of is wouldacceptsomevariant thisview.So satisfactory platonism articulate forthemselves, it have feltany need to go or of mathematicians philosophers mathematics thatveryfewrecent To however, there have been signsof discontent. indicate beyondit. Just thepast fewyears, in historical remarks. their source, me pause forsomebrief let from a was In theeighteenth century, mathematics considered sciencedistinguished theother was thelaws Its and morefundamental. special province sciencesonlyin beingmorecertain of this century, conception the In governing space and quantity. the courseof the nineteenth wereused undermined. Firstthenon-Eucideangeometries was nature mathematics strongly of to for of to denytheexistence a uniquespatialstructure our intuitions be about.Then analytic of was an intuition space at all apartfrom the geometry used to undercut viewthatthere was is of The continuum. end product thisdevelopment thecontemour intuition thenumerical of Euclidean that students by three-dimensional who porary mathematician tellshisundergraduate Obviously, is notwhatEuclid that triples real numbers. of space he meansthesetof all ordered or of conception quantity century, even theintuitive meant.Towardtheend of thenineteenth introduced by structures by at magnitude was replaced, least officially, the purelyconceptual is mathematician likelyto tellhis Weierstrass, Dedekind,and Cantor.Again,a contemporary thatis not whatEuler he students thatby a real number meansa Dedekindcut. Obviously, meant. vacuum-a be One effect thesechanges was to producewhatmight calleda foundational of accountof the natureof the in werewithout any systematic situation whichmathematicians structures they were dealing with. Axiomaticset theoryrushedin to fill this void. The form. in reductionistic however, platonism itsmostnarrowly is view set-theoretic offoundations, are Even ifindividuals allowed,and they All theobjectsof theset-theorist's worldare abstract. nor internal structure intenare usuallyexcluded,theseindividuals takento have neither are to of Thus thereduction all of mathematics points. Theyare mereabstract sionalrelationships. so of set theory entailsa narrowing the subjectmatter mathematics as to excludeall of of concrete reality. there be little can was set For abouttwogenerations axiomatic theory a greatsuccess.I think whichto do pure within doubtthatset theory framework provides elegantand convenient an getsin thewayof mathematiin almostnever It simple conception, mathematics. is wonderfully like really?" cal practice, to answers questions "Butwhatare numbers, reassuring givessmoothly and providesa wealthof interesting of structures whichno one beforeCantor could have dreamed. in In thepast decade,however, theory been undermined roughly thesame way that set has results,the about a hundredyears earlier.The independence geometry was undermined modelsforset of bizarre of and theconstruction increasingly axioms, proliferation largecardinal is. intuition actually In realizehow weak theirset-theoretic theory have made mathematicians in Cantor Some stillfollow theabsenceof newinsight, viewsofset-theorists to diverge. begin the moreand the plausible,but othersfollowGodel in believing hypothesis thinking continuum one that morestrongly itmustbe false.It is becoming truistic we need a newconcept, more that whereto look forsuch a no fundamental thanthatof a set. Unfortunately, one can imagine concept. one Increasingly hearsthe witha sufficiently liberalplatonism. None of thisis incompatible but is universe, many.You workin a worldin suggestion there notjust one set-theoretic that whichthecontinuum holds,and I willworkin one in whichMartin'saxiomholds hypothesis in a cardinal, butthecontinuum fails.He willwork a universe containing measurable hypothesis and she will workin one in which,since all sets are constructible, measurable a cardinalis all to interesting structures, equallyentitled be considered Theseare alljust different impossible. and worthy study. Whereis theproblem? of structures The problem, course,is the same as it was in 1890. How do thesedifferent of

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if the universe a whole, as interact? Whatare they? Whatare thelaws thatgovern mathematical all can any longerbe regardedas including of the none of these, set-theoretic "universes" with?None of thesequestionshave generally concernthemselves structures mathematicians I it at that retreat to acceptedanswers. think is out ofdespair thissituation somemathematicians from whichsuch questions cannotarise. or formalism, intuitionism, logicism-positions if It seemsto me that mathematics onlyflourish there can Let me puttheproblem differently. that the different of is a commonconception what we are about, if thereis an agreement Without foundational a consensus, seemsto me, it we are structures study aspectsof one reality. will mathematics tendto breakapartintoschools. platonism itself not tending splitintopieces,butmathematical to Actually, onlyis settheory view of the natureof of is the result a splitin the largerstructure science.The traditional of and only in was thatthere onlyone reality therefore is science, example thetimeof Newton, for physics, chemistry, biology one science.On thisviewtheseveralspecialsciences-mathematics, methods to -share a commonreality questionsabout it and use different but ask different aspectof the world;it studyit. Of course,each special sciencewill revealits own particular of conceivedthat these various remainsa fundamental assumption science as traditionally of mutually illuminating aspectsof one world.As a matter fact, aspectsare complementary, cast lightfairly directly some part of nature.Geometry on most branchesof mathematics us Grouptheory illuminates concerns theory teaches aboutrandom processes. space.Probability Many partsof analysiswere createdto study symmetry. Logic describesrationalinference. and are stillindispensable thestudy thoseprocesses. for of The list particular physical processes Fromthepointof view of theplatonist, however, only could be extended almostindefinitely. is mathematics. according platonism, objectswhichmatheto the For, puremathematics really How can the theory finite of maticsstudiesare necessarily abstract. groupstell us about the if we are structure crystals theonlygroups consider builtup out of setsof setsof sets? of became completely abstractand ceased to have When the foundations mathematics of the between mathematics theother and anything do withtheworldof thesenses, connection to mathematicians to sciencesbecameobscure.Recently, economiccircumstances as have forced from other the sciences has this of look aroundfornewmeansof support, divorce mathematics of ceased to be a matter prideand becomea matter concern. theory, for Set however, provides no clue as to how a reconciliation therestof scienceis to be effected. with of It is that reality Thus I think mathematical platonism againa form surfacism. is a practical world.It is a practical that about the concrete reality thatour best theorems giveinformation Thereis onlyone science.It between is there no clearboundary pureand appliedmathematics. of would thatan adequate philosophy mathematics of followsfromthe principle objectivity of wouldbe only of Such a philosophy mathematics the identify objectivecontent thesefacts. Thatphilosophy wouldmakeit clearin whatsense of in one chapter a larger philosophy science. worldand how it is thattheobjectsstudiedby themathematician, is there onlyone objective be can in are reality, nevertheless seenas partofthatworld. manyofwhich notrealized physical has that Unfortunately, philosophy yetto be formulated.
on to An early of waspresented theBuffalo LogicColloquium February paper Acknowledgments. version this led in which meto clarify ideason my to who 15,1977.I am grateful mycolleagues participated thediscussion, Susan John Goodman, Josephson, several A Corcoran, Emily Hartshorne issues. later version readbyJohn was to I and grateful John each of whommadeuseful suggestions.am particularly Josephson, JaneTerry Nutter, of addedappreciably thecoherence myargument. to whose Corcoran, perceptive criticisms References of Selected Readings, Prentice-Hall, Putnam, eds.,Philosophy Mathematics: 1. Paul Benacerraf Hilary and Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,1964. New Analysis, McGraw-Hill, York,1967. 2. Errett Bishop, Foundations Constructive of in trans. and [1, Intuitionism formalism, by A. Dresden, Benacerraf Putnam pp. and 3. L. E. J.Brouwer, 66-77].

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Set in ed., on of Comments thefoundations settheory, Dana S. Scott, Axiomatic Theory, 4. PaulJ.Cohen, Providence, 1971, R.I., Mathematical Society, 13, of in Proceedings Symposia PureMathematics PartI, American pp. 9-15. of Amsterdam, 1958. B. Outlines a Formalist of North-Holland, Philosophy Mathematics, 5. Haskell Curry, Clarendon 1977. Elements Intuitionism, of Press, Oxford, 6. Michael Dummett, in [1, and The of Frege, concept number, Benacerraf Putnam pp. 85-112]. 7. Gottlob in and 8. KurtGodel, Whatis Cantor's continuum problem?, Benacerraf Putnam pp. 258-273]. [1, [1, and of truth, On 9. CarlG. Hempel, thenature mathematical in Benacerraf Putnam pp. 366-381]. this 52 science, MONTHLY, (1945)7-17. and 10. __, Geometry empirical An Amsterdam, 1966. Intuitionism: Introduction, rev.ed.,North-Holland, 2nd. Heyting, 1L Arend in and On 12. David Hilbert, theinfinite, Benacerraf Putnam pp. 134-151]. [1, in Oxford University NewYork,1953. Press, Culture, Mathematics Western Kline, 13. Morris from to New York, , Mathematical University Press, Ancient Modern Times,Oxford Thought 14. 1972. in and [1, Hilbert's programme,Benacerraf Putnam pp. 157-180]. Kreisel, 15. Georg 5 and Canad.J.Philos., (1975)25-39. D. cognition, knowledge pattern Mathematical 16. Michael Resnik, of and Formalism in Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, Logic,Methodology Philosophy ed., 64, Robinson, 17. Abraham 1965, Amsterdam, pp. 228-246. Science, North-Holland, in to and [1, from IntroductionMathematical Philosophy, Benacerraf Putnam Selections Russell, 18. Bertrand pp. 113-133]. 156 The Science, (1967)605-610. 19. R. L. Wilder, roleofintuition,
NY 14214. STATE OF UNiVERsITY NEW YoRK ATBuP,ALo, BUFFALo, oF DEPARTMENT MATHEMATICS,

WHAT IS MATHEMATICS?
ERNST SNAPPER

in mathematical by saying, way 1. Introduction. Mathematics sometimes is defined a strictly and "Mathematics consistsof everything whichcan be formulated provedby means of the languageand axiomsof ZF." Here, ZF standsforZermeloand Fraenkel;any otheraxiom system set theory of wouldof coursehave donejust as well. In for except perhaps How good is thisdefinition? thesensethatall of classicalmathematics, in of of can somematerial thefringes category on theory, be developed terms ZF, thedefinition of to is pretty good. But how usefulis it? We would like,fromany definition mathematics, answerthe question,"Why is mathematics of free obtain at least a hintof how one might turns thisquestioninto: "Whyis ZF freeof contradicThe contradictions?" above definition of of tions?"Since no one knowshow to prove the consistency ZF, the above definition from serious defect. But thisdefinition suffers a useful. worse, is Namely, mathematics notvery The authordoes not accept the is it flatlydenies that intuitionism part of mathematics. and that anything that is not is intuitionistic thesisthat intuitionism all of mathematics that is intuitionism meaningless Section6). On the otherhand, he feels equally strongly (see and that is intuitionism partof mathematics thatany definition deniesthisis wrong. of definition three necessary criteria useful a Fromtheabove discussion emerge following the all as (2) mathematics mustsatisfy. It mustrecognize of classicalmathematics mathematics. (1) is (3) It mustgive some hintas to whymathematics freeof contradictions. It mustrecognize possible? intuitionism a branchof mathematics. sucha definition as Is
in and his Ph.D.in 1941 Professor Snapper studied theUniversityAmsterdam Holland received Princeton at of J. University, University Southern the of California, under H. M. Wedderburn. has heldpositions Princeton He at College.He was an NSF postdoctoral MiamiUniversity Ohio,IndianaUniversity, is nowat Dartmouth of and fellow Harvard has lectured numerous institutes. publications in algebra, His are geometry and at and at summer of (Academic Press). His algebraic geometry he is theco-author Robert Troyer MetricAffine and with J. Geometry present interest thephilosophy mathematics.-Editors is of