Levinas In My Face: A Causerie

Charlie Coil











PHIL 5983
Seminar in Continental Philosophy
Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity











Professor Irene McMullin
University of Arkansas
May 2012


2
Sren Kierkegaard famously wrote: You cannot get the truth by capturing it,
only by its capturing you.
1
A Levinasian modification might be You cannot get the
truth before being-for-the-Other gets you. This prior or primordial or precondition
embedded in the face-to-face encounter wherein I see that I have already been
captured, I have already been taken hostage, as one whose essence amounts to
being for the Other, indicates an irreducible relation says Emmanuel Levinas in
his landmark work, Totality and Infinity.
2
The face-to-face remains an ultimate
situation.
3
Levinas will say, To begin with the face as a source from which all
meaning appears, is to affirm that being is enacted in the relation between men,
that Desire rather than need commands acts.
4
[italics mine]
By human Desire Levinas means to posit an intersubjective metaphysics.
Here is, prior to all else, the very measure of the Infinite, or that is an infinite
desire for, or being for the Other which no satisfaction arrests.
5
For Levinas, [t]o
exist has a meaning in another dimension... in the pluralist relation, in the goodness
of being for the Other, in justice.
6
And so, from this radical claim Levinas can
famously say that [m]orality is not a branch of philosophy, but first philosophy.
7

This is what I mean by the equivoque title, Levinas in my face. To say that the
ethical somehow precedes the ontological (a situation that precedes proof
beyond vision and certitude
8
; that even my own rational agency must trail behind
this primality) is a radical, foundation-shaking claim! Here also is the reason for the
modest characterization of this paper as more of a causerie, since I hardly feel
qualified to write as a practiced phenomenologist.
3
While confining myself to the one work, Totality and Infinity, I want to
examine one unease that comes instinctively to mind when I hear such a claim as the
one Levinas makes above, in order to see whether I am either misapprehending or if
I might be discerning a real problem. One line can serve to represent this: The I as I
hence remains turned ethically to the face of the other.
9
Specifically, the worry
pertains to this core claim that the ethical onus, in itself exalts [my irreplaceable]
singularity.
10
Furthermore,
The truth of the will lies in its coming under judgment; but its coming
under judgment lies in a new orientation of the inner life, called to
infinite responsibilities. Justice would not be possible without the
singularity, the unicity of subjectivity.
11


How is it that, in light of how Levinas has presented his case, that this judging
summons involving my infinite responsibilities towards all others, can turn out to
be the thing that highlights my singularity and my subjectivity? It appears as though
the opposite might be the case. That is, that with the intersubjective nature of my
summons to infinite responsibilities in being for the Other, I find the deepest
meaning of plurality and intersubjectivity.
One reason for proposing this as a worry is the enrootedness claim, which
is so important in Levinas, yet which seems to require him to disregard the force of
the claim he subsequently makes about the Other. In the primordial preconnection
of enrootedness there is a break with participation that characterizes the I like
the Gyges myth of the ring of invisibilitythe knowing subject is not part of a
whole.
12
The related exclusivity notion of the ipseity of the I or the subjectivity of
the subject
13
is extremely important to the conceptual development of Levinass
declarations in Totality and Infinity. There is an egoism of enjoyment that is
4
necessary for the subsequent uprooting that occurs in the intersubjective
movement. So, it is egoist specifically at the instant when the summons of the Other
emerges as an opportunity for the subject to extricate itself from the good soup
from which we live
14
into the infinite soup of endless responsibility.
In enjoyment I am absolutely for myself. Egoist without reference to
the Other, I am alone without solitude, innocently egoist and alone.
Not against the Others, not as for mebut entirely deaf to the
Other, outside of all communication and all refusal to communicate
without ears.
15


Prior to our own egoism being called into question by the critical presence of the
Other
16
this state of separated enrootedness in our subjectivity is what Levinas will
later portray as the conatus essendi.
17
So, the I, we might say, is obliviously
preoccupied in its conatus essendi (effort, endeavor of living), which is commonly
taken in physics as the persistence of inertia, i.e. the tendency for a body in motion
to stay in motion. This is Heideggers essence opposed all along by Levinass
Otherwise than Being.
18
For Heidegger the isolated I without Others is just not
even proximally given but instead, the Others already are there with us [mit da
sind] in Being-in-the-World.
19
And so, Heidegger maintains that [o]ur task is to
make visible phenomenally the species to which this Dasein-with, in closest
everydayness, belongs.
20
Recall Spinozas famous proof in his Ethics, III, P6: Each
thing insofar as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being[indeed] it
opposes everything that can annul its existence.
21

So, we have this separated enrootedness condition of the singularity of the
subject absorbed in the conatus essendi until there is a disquieting visitation of the
Other. Then, [w]hen man truly approaches the other he is uprooted from history.
22

5
Just how this uprooting occurs is where the illustrious face-to-face encounter
somehow comes in. But all the while we are assured that the singular I stays intact
as a paradox of both enrootedness and uprootedness. However, the enigmatic
picture of this concurrent state of affairs at the moment of the face-to-face
encounter seems to inevitably lead to a downplaying of one or the other side of the
equation.
The visitation of the invisible Other [The exorbitant presence of the face
essentially hidden throws itself toward the light, without becoming signification.
23
]
is supposed to be the tripwire for an explosion of Infinity, which creates a kind of
moral space for establishing the primacy of the ethical, that is, of the
[intersubjective] relationship of man to mansignification[language], teaching
[rationality], and justicea primacy of an irreducible structure upon which all other
structures rest.
24
What happens then to the stark, cold representation of the face,
the imposition of the face above and beyond, or irreducible to, manifestation or
purely phenomenal form? In the very straightforwardness of the face-to-face
without the intermediary of any image, in ones nudity, that is, in ones destitution
25

and hunger,
26
there is neither form nor context, only function. Now, just here, there
emerges the problem in this destitute concept of the facea great chasm opens up
on the path from enrootedness [immanence of the finite] to uprootedness
[transcendence of Infinity] where one is forced to posit at least a footbridge of
coherence. But then, if some kind of concession is made for a more rooted form in
Levinass notion of face then the other side of the chasm, the totally separated I in
its conatus essendi, starts to disintegrate. Even Levinass correlative claims
6
regarding freedom, time and transcendence are called into question if this essential
core concept does not hold.
The Belgian philosopher, Rudi Visker has proposed a solution to this
perceived problem in appealing for a deeper original conception of the conatus
essendi and the meaning of singularity in which each person already carries within
herself a Foucaultian decentredness which entails the ethical dimension. The
summons of the Others face becomes a subsequent, additional ethical appeal along
with the morals of my own community amounting to a triumvirate of appealability
as Visker calls it.
27
In my view, Visker has either misapprehended or misconstrued
the conceptual epicenter in the ontic expression of the face-to-face encounter,
which Levinas wants to propose as constituting, of itself, the ground-clearing
detonation which calls all else into question. How the subject can persist, while
confronting alterity as an intersubjective encounter, is the question. But, the answer,
per Levinas, is to be found neither in trying to protect the idea of conatus nor in
defending the notion of a supernatural deity. Rather the choice is between totality
and infinity. But, what Levinas discovered is that you cannot conceptualize, much
less write about, totality and infinity using the language of ontology. Levinas opts
instead for the expressions of ethical language and the transcendence of infinity,
phenomenally epitomized in the face-to-face. There is just no getting around the
magnitude of what Levinas wants us to realize. His is a new way of seeing reality!
[E]thics is an optics. It is not limited to preparing for the theoretical exercise of
thought, which would monopolize transcendence.
28
The claim is that the embedded
ethicality of the face-to-face is pre-rational and even becomes the groundwork for
7
rationality itself. The immediate preface for this statement is the even more startling
introductory claim that, the essential of ethics is in its transcendent intention.
29

This is also precisely why the Totality and Infinity volume is subtitled, An Essay on
Exteriority. Transcendence as such is conscience. Conscience accomplishes
metaphysics, if metaphysics consists in transcending. In all that precedes we have
sought to expose the epiphany of the face as the origin of exteriority.
30
So, this
aspiration of Levinas to radical exteriority actually proposes a new metaphysics and
the epiphany of the face to face event is the invisible hypocenter, the ancient Greek
utokcvtov, literally below the center from whence the earth quakes or the
volcano erupts. In fact, says Levinas, even [t]he traditional opposition between
theory and practice will disappear before the metaphysical transcendence by which
a relation with the absolutely other, or truth, is established, and of which ethics is
the royal road.
31

There is another more perfunctory example of how Levinas might be in my
face through my analytic bent of mind. Below, for example, is a flawed analytic
syllogism [affirming the consequent] which I do not introduce merely as a straw
man but which could fairly represent the resistance of phenomenology to analytic
approaches. Since written language is my only tool in this paper I must resort to it.
32

P1: If there is intersubjectivity (P) then this entails ethical responsibility for
the other. (Q). [If P then Q.]
P2: The intersubjective phenomenon of a face-to-face encounter lays claim
on or in some way or another summons the I to obligation or Being for
the other. (Q1)
8
P3: The intersubjective ethical summons of the face-to-face encounter
occurs prior to any consideration of the phenomenology of existence
itself. [Q2]
P4: If the intersubjective is prior to the existent [If P then Q] then the ethical
is prior to the ontological [Q].
C: Therefore, intersubjective ethics is prior to ontology or that is, ethics is
first philosophy. [Therefore P]
Of course, the flaw in this logical invalidity charge lies in the alleged nature of
intersubjectivity as being prior to logic itself. Further, the Levinasian claim is that
intersubjectivity is somehow ineluctably revealed in the infinity of a presence
represented by a face and phenomenally by a face-to-face encounter. But, the very
act of putting forward a syllogism posits and even presumes the intersubjective. The
very language of logic itself presumes intersubjectivity. The nature and specifics of
obligation within the intersubjective can be debated but what cannot be questioned
is intersubjectivity itself as a phenomenon. While not resisting logic, per se,
phenomenology does ask us to accept this brute fact or else we are left with the
unsatisfactory conclusion of solipsism. Here is one instructive insight on how
Levinas takes the matter a step further.
Although it might be said that while Levinas is appealing to the reader
to feel the truth of the face to face encounter, the phenomenological
method involves a certain logic which invites the reader to act on their
acknowledgment of the ethical relation to the Other. Nevertheless,
Levinas does resist formal or logical conceptions of the I-Other
relation, and this is why ones responsibility to the Other gains
normative force in Totality and Infinity.
33


9
Still my analytic genes make me reluctant. Here is perhaps a statement that
betrays my own misapprehension of Levinas but represents the reason for my
vacillation. A philosophy which is paradigmatically represented by the phenomenal
event of a distinct feeling at the sensing of an others presence, (the face-to-face
encounter) not as a modality of coexistence but as a primordial production of being,
an ineluctable revelation in the face
34
which in turn entails a summons of endless
obligation toward the other, strikes me as either a fantastical or at least a flimsy
foundation for that which I am to accept as first philosophy. But, if I accept the
Kantian precursor underpinnings of phenomenology (which I am inclined towards),
then I am instinctively drawn in the direction of Sein fr den anderen over mere
Dasein; that is, Being for the Other over merely Being in the World; verpflichtet
(Levinasian obligation) over opfertod (Heideggerian death) naturally because the
latter is famously a Being unto Death while the former very much insists on a
Being unto Life. Having confessed the nature of my hesitance (and perhaps my
ignorance), I want to go ahead and briefly comment on two other themes in Totality
and Infinity, namely language and intentionality.
The consideration of language and signification is, of course, a huge theme in
Totality and Infinity. Two notations suffice to introduce the direction I want to go.
Language, far from presupposing universality and generality, first
makes them possible. Language presupposes interlocutors, a
plurality. Their commerce is not a representation of the one by the
other, nor a participation in universality, on the common plane of
language. Their commerce, as we shall show shortly, is ethical.
35


Is not the presence of the Other already language and transcendence?
36


10
Levinass claim here, that language makes possible the ethical by means of a general
and universal commerce of interlocution, shows the importance of language in his
overall project. He will later say that [l]anguage conditions the functioning of
rational thought.
37
Whats more, the Other faces me and puts me in question and
obliges me by his essence qua infinity. That something we call signification arises
in being with language because the essence of language is the relation with the
Other.
38
On the other hand, Levinas resists assimilating language and activity: The
thesis we present here separates radically language and activity, expression and
labor, in spite of all the practical side of language, whose importance we must not
underestimate.
39
This view of language presents it as a powerful ethical tool either
for good or evil. Certainly Levinas had experienced firsthand the sick
propagandizing of the Nazi regime and saw the raw political power of language. But,
presumably one of the reasons he chose to write philosophy was to take up this tool
and use it to at least try and express another vision of how exteriority might go.
One might be inclined to think that a culture speaking a Levinas-influenced
language might be more prone to accept his theses of the value-laden, face-to-face
encounter and ethics as first philosophy. There is certainly empirical evidence from
new cognitive research suggesting that language profoundly influences the way
people see the world. A Stanford psychology professor and editor of the journal,
Frontiers in Cultural Psychology reports on some interesting research that seems to
contradict the Noam Chomsky theory that languages dont really differ in any
significant ways:

11
One of the key advances in recent years has been the demonstration
of precisely this causal link. [between language and thought] It turns
out that if you change how people talk, that changes how they think. If
people learn another language, they inadvertently also learn a new
way of looking at the world.
40


This is an intriguing possibility to my mind, that we might have a kind of real-life
test case where a culture grows up speaking the language of Levinas-influenced
thought. Would such a language not be more conditioned to non-violence than say
a Nietsche-influenced language? Well, there does exist a large language pool, which
seems to have some of Levinass ideas built into the language itself. For example,
Ubuntu is a word in the Zulu language used to describe the traditional South
African concept of humanity deriving personal identity and worth through the
identity and worth of others. Archbishop Desmond Tutu has described it in terms of
a person who is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel
threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance
that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished
when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed.
41

Whats even more remarkable is not only that Zulu is the first language used by over
15 million people
42
but that a whole host of other African languages have a similar if
not identical word/concept endemic to their language. In the Tswana language
(Botswana) the word is botho; in Malawi, uMunthu; in the Kinyarwanda and Kirundi
languages spoken in Rwanda and Burundi the word is (similar to Zulu) gira-ubuntu;
in the dialect cluster of Kitara it is obuntu; in the Ganda language of central Uganda it
is obuntu bulamu; in the Kiswahili language spoken in Kenya and large portions of
east Africa, it is simply utu; in the Shona language of Zimbabwe it is unhu.
43

12
Additionally, one of the most striking examples of a language expression that
looks like something Levinas would love to hear is the common Zulu greeting,
Sawubona which means "I see you" and the response "Ngikhona" (or Ndibona)
means "I am here". Of course, as in any language translation, critical subtleties can
be lost. But the inherent meaning in this Zulu greeting and its sympathetic response,
is the sense that until you saw me, I did not exist! By recognizing me, you brought me
into existence! A Zulu folk saying further clarifies: Umuntu ngumuntu nagabantu,
meaning, A person is a person because of other people.
44
How could Levinas have
said it any better?
But, for all of these wonderfully peaceful and humane-sounding words,
expressions and concepts, there is the horrific, violent and murderous history,
which is Africa, to go along beside it. This is obviously not to say that other
continents and peoples have not experienced a similar history. It is only to illustrate
the point that even a language filled with such moral responsibility expressions does
not guarantee (or is not a sufficient condition for) a culture of people owning these
values. I imagine that Levinas would assure us that this simply reinforces his point
about language, in Totality and Infinity and elsewhere. Despite even the most lofty
expressions humans can conceive, it is still the widespread prior recognition that it
is in the face-to-face encounter wherein we hear the ethical call of being for the
Other which must to take hold within a culture, not merely the words it uses.
Finally, I want to say a word or two about intentionality and Levinas
another massive theme. Here is an interesting segue from the ideas above to this
13
one about intentionality in Totality and Infinity where Levinas is discussing
Subjectivity and Pluralism under the heading of The Ethical Relation and Time
The face, whose ethical epiphany consists in soliciting a response
(which the violence of war and its murderous negation alone can
seek to reduce to silence), is not satisfied with a good intention and
a benevolence wholly Platonic. The good intention and the
benevolence wholly Platonic are only the residue of an attitude
assumed where one enjoys things, where one can divest oneself of
them and offer them.
45


What we have in the above is the priority of the ethical epiphany over the ethical
intention. But, there seems to be something missing in this simple depiction,
namely the power of sentiment, that is, affectivity wherein the egoism of the I
pulsates.
46
But, we have already seen that the singular I does not disappear in that
face-to-face ethical epiphany. Levinas says a few pages earlier, Life is affectivity and
sentiment. To live is to enjoy life.
47
But, why need there be such a disquieting break
between the enjoyment of life of the I and the ethical epiphany of the we? In fact, it
appears to me that affectivity and sentiment can be deeply tied to morality to such a
profound extent that person A with an X temperament can be far more affected by
the face-to-face encounter or ethical epiphany than person B with Y temperament.
In other words, if we must posit the being for the other thesis then we ought also
to recognize that a prior affective temperament can regulate to some extent ones
openness to the ethical epiphany of a face-to-face encounter. Ethical intentionality
or sentiment toward may be far more important than Levinas wants to admit.
After all, as was noted earlier, Levinas can be said to be appealing to his readers to
feel the truth of the face to face encounter via the phenomenological method
which invites us to act on our acknowledgment of the ethical relation to the Other.
48

14
But, as soon as we inject the notion of feeling, emotion, sentiment, affectivity,
and temperament we need to give account for this aspect of the concept. Along these
lines, it may be that the young painter-philosopher Megan Craig (Stony Brook Univ.)
has mined a rich vein with her explorations of the philosophical intersections
between Levinasian ethical encounter and the pragmatism of William James. In a
powerful chapter on Emotion she outlines the possibility of an ethic based on
Jamess intuitions and Levinass moral perfectionism as seen by Hilary Putnam.
49

Personally, I am drawn even more to the American essayist and transcendentalist
who influenced James, the poet Ralph Waldo Emerson. His Essay #14 on
Experience is beautifully suggestive along these same lines of the mystical aspects
of human singularity as it applies to how we view and behave toward the other.
Temperament is the iron wire on which the beads are strung.
Temperament also enters fully into the system of illusions, and shuts
us in a prison of glass which we cannot see. There is an optical illusion
about every person we meet. In truth they are all creatures of given
temperament[and] that temper prevails over everything of time,
place, and condition, and is inconsumable in the flames of religion.
Some modifications the moral sentiment avails to impose, but the
individual texture holds its dominion, if not to bias the moral
judgments, yet to fix the measure of activity and of enjoyment.
50


Could a measure of what Emerson expresses be seen as a latent intentionality
within phenomenology? Horgan and Tienson argue for an inseparability thesis here
between the two, which is pervasive and fundamental.
51
Levinass primordial
structure of intentionality may present a far greater driving force in the
intersubjective relation than he seems to argue for in Totality and Infinity. The
phenomenology of emotional feelings at least seems to capture something profound
that might even be seen as intrinsic to the face-to-face ethical encounter.
52

15
I think the famous line from Dostoevskys The Brothers Karamazov best
captures the metaethical philosophy of Levinas: Mother, heart of my heart, truly
each of us is guilty before everyone and for everyone, only people do not know it,
and if they knew it, the world would at once become a paradise.
53
But, not to
mislead, Levinas is clearly not calling for a life of guilt but a life of giving wherein our
own happiness is shared with the other. So, in this little causerie I have offered a
worry concerning a possible internal inconsistency in Totality and Infinity and tried
to propose a Levinasian answer for it. And then I looked briefly at two themes,
language and intentionality, within the same volume and tried to offer some
insightful comments. The former bit about language was intended to reinforce
Levinass own view about language while offering some empirical examples. The
latter pointed up a possible complementary pragmatist philosophy regarding
sentiment, affectivity, temperament and emotions that might provide some fruitful
collaborative philosophical effort in the future.
While I may not have attempted to derive a Levinasian ought from a
Humean is in this paper [though John Searle certainly thinks this can be done,
Hume to the contrary
54
] I think Monsieur Levinas might agree that this following
statement could summarize whatever ethical conclusion we may draw from his
work: Whatever there is cannot be prior to the ought of the face. And so, I think
that I can honestly say, after this seminar and this writing that the title for this
paper, Levinas In My Face: A Causerie is a good thing and not a bad thing!


16
Endnotes

1
Sren Kierkegaard, Sren Kierkegaards Journals and Papers, Vol. IV, Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press 1967:503.
2
Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis,
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 1969: 79.
3
Ibid: 80.
4
Ibid: 299.
5
Ibid: 304.
6
Ibid: 301.
7
Ibid: 304.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid: 279.
10
Ibid: 244.
11
Ibid: 246.
12
Ibid: 61.
13
Ibid: 277.
14
Ibid: 110.
15
Ibid: 134.
16
Ibid: 119.
17
Emmanuel Levinas, The Paradox of Morality (An Interview with Emmanuel Levinas by
Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes, Alison Ainley), translated by Andrew Benjamin and Tamra
Wright, ch. 11 in The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, eds. Robert Bernasconi
and David Wood, New York: Routledge 1988: 173.
18
Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, New York: Springer 2010.
19
Martin Heidegger, Being And Time, New York: Harper & Row 1962:BT, 152/ SZ, 116.
20
Ibid.
21
Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, Bk III, Proof #6, Spinoza: Complete Works, trans. Samuel Shirley,
ed. Michael L. Morgan, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 2002: 283.
22
Levinas,Totality and Infinity: 52.
23
Ibid:256.
24
Ibid: 79. Words italicized by me; also bracketed words are mine.
25
Destitution is a favorite word Levinas uses over and over in Totality and Infinity to
describe his enigmatic notion of face.
26
Ibid: 200.
27
Rudi Visker, The Core of My Opposition to Levinas: A Clarification for Richard Rorty,
Ethical Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1997: 154-170.
28
Totality and Infinity: 29.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid: 261.
31
Ibid: 29.
32
In fact, Levinas says that the whole idea of perceiving alterity cannot be conceived of in
this way from the start. Absolute difference, inconceivable in terms of formal logic, is
established only by language. Totality and Infinity: 195.
33
Simon Lumsden, Absolute Difference and Social Ontology: Levinas Face to Face with
Buber and Fichte, Human Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3, Jul., 2000: 232
34
Totality and Infinity: 305.
35
Ibid: 73.
17

36
Ibid: 155.
37
Ibid: 204.
38
Ibid:207.
39
Ibid: 205.
40
Lera Boroditsky Lost In Translation, Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2010
41
Desmond Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness, New York: Image/Doubleday 2000: 32.
Augustine Shutte, a white South African philosopher, cites a phenomenological example
of Ubuntu through John Herons research on the phenomenon of mutual gazing. Shutte
describes me gazing at you gazing at me. In meeting your gaze it is not the physical
properties of your eyes that I fix on, as say, an eye-specialist would. The experimental
work dealt with by Heron shows in fact that when I pick up your gaze my eyes actually
either simply oscillate back and forth between your eyes, or else fixate on a point
equidistant between them. What I pick up is the gaze, and in the gaze the presence of a
person actively present to me. And the same is simultaneously true of you. --Augustine
Shutte, Philosophy for Africa, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 1995:90. See also,
Augustine Shutte, Ubuntu: an ethic for a new South Africa, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa:
Cluster Publications 2001.
42
See http://www.ethnologue.org/show_language.asp?code=zul
43
Dion Forster. Identity in relationship: The ethics of ubuntu as an answer to the impasse
of individual consciousness, (Paper presented at the South African Science and Religion
Forum) in The Impact of Knowledge Systems on Human Development in Africa, CW du Toit,
ed., Pretoria: Research institute for Religion and Theology University of South Africa,
2007:245289.
44
See http://africaknows.com/mu/blog/2010/02/i-see-you/
45
Levinas, Totality and Infinity: 226
46
Ibid: 135.
47
Ibid: 115.
48
Lumsden: 232.
49
Megan Craig, Levinas and James: Toward a Pragmatic Phenomenology, Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press 2010:96-129.
50
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, Lectures and Poems, New
York: Classic Books International: 219,220.
51
Terence Horgan and John Tienson, The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the
Phenomenology of Intentionality Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume: 84, Issue: 4,
2002: 413-431
52
Peter Goldie, Emotions, feelings and intentionality, Phenomenology and the Cognitive
Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 3, (2002), 235-254.
53
Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa
Volokhonsky, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2002: 298.
54
John Searle, How to Derive Ought From Is, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 73, No. 1, Jan
1964: 43-58.







18



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New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2002.
Emerson, Ralph Waldo. Ralph Waldo Emerson: Selected Essays, Lectures and Poems, New York:
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Forster, Dion. Identity in relationship: The ethics of ubuntu as an answer to the impasse of
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