Casey 1 of 13

Megan Casey
4/23/2007
Eric LaRock, Ph.D.
PHL 465

Swinburne, Ross, and the Cosmological Argument

 Casey 2 of 13

One of the oldest and most common arguments for the

existence of god is the cosmological argument, and thus I will

review and critique the modern cosmological arguments posited by

Christian apologetic think-tank president Hugh Ross and the very

well qualified former Oxford University Professor Richard

Swinburne, as well as examine counter-arguments Swinburne’s

long-time rival by J.L. Mackie, biologist Richard Dawkins, and

universal theories by Stephen Hawking and Carl Sagan.

All cosmological arguments for the existence of God, since

St. Thomas Aquinas, follow the same basic structure: the

universe exists, thus something had to cause it to exist.

Something cannot be self-caused, nor can there be an infinite

chain of causation (infinite regress) so there had to be a first

cause, an “uncaused cause,” and this, to quote Aquinas is “what

we call god.” There are modern innovations concerning

probability and chance, but these do nothing to refute the basic

structural problems with the argument, namely that postulating a

“god of the gaps” has the same original problems. What caused

god to come in to existence? It would seem that this god, like

the universe, would be neither self-caused nor eternal (given

the premises of the original argument). Would this not require

there to be an infinite regress of gods?

Hugh Ross is President and Director of Research of “Reasons

to Believe,” the Christian apologetic think tank which he

 Casey 3 of 13

founded. This organization tries to reconcile science not only

with a concept of the divine, but with the exceedingly narrow

idea of the Christian god. It seems that if one’s method is

scientific, it would be logically inconsistent to present a

hypothesis and then try to make the evidence fit. It would be

more scientific to first gather evidence and then attempt to

divine (no pun intended) the most plausible explanation.

Superficially, Ross’s argument appears to do this. Upon further

examination, it fails.

Ross’s primary apologetic method in his book The Creator

and the Cosmos is evidentialist in nature; he attempts to show

that probability of the universe forming in such a way as to

allow life (as we know it) to exist is too vastly small to be

due to random chance, which he cites as the atheist argument.

This model, he argues, necessitates a creator who exists outside

of the space-time continuum, purposefully directing and guiding

the creation and evolution of the universe within a finely-tuned

range that would allow the creation of life. This appears to be

closer to the Deist concept of a creator-god, the divine

architect of the universe, a far cry from the Christian god with

all its omni-predicates. Even this “architect of the universe”

is unnecessary, however. The thing about evolution and natural

selection (not just biological), as Richard Dawkins points out

in The God Delusion, is that is requires no deity. “Guided

 Casey 4 of 13

evolution/natural selection” is an oxymoron. Given Ockham’s

Razor, why appeal to an extra component in ones hypothesis if it

is not necessary?

It seems to be true, under our current cosmology, that the

universe does have certain (perhaps finely-tuned) parameters

which, under the anthropic principle, cannot be significantly

altered without destroying the probability of life (wikipedia).

However, this far from proves the existence of a personal,

intervening deity. Upon further abstraction even the Deist

architect of the universe can be seen as allegorical of the

universe itself and those laws (even those unbeknownst to man)

which govern it.

It would be far more persuasive if physical laws did not

account for atoms being held together or planets remaining in

orbit or for the “fine tuning” of our universe. If our existence

was in defiance of observable natural phenomena then it would

require a binding supernatural force. However, even then the

“supernatural” force would no longer be supernatural, it would

be natural as well as the deity would be natural. Our universe,

however, is not one which necessitates a natural deity, or any

other kind besides the loose, allegorical gods which make

complex natural phenomena understandable by the laity.

The probabilities Ross uses in his argument depend on a

finite universe, or even a finite number of multiple universes.

 Casey 5 of 13

Either way, space-time must be finite, and thus all the physical

mass-energy existing in space time must be finite. This

contradicts one of the most basic physical laws, that mass-

energy can be neither created nor destroyed. To argue

“scientifically” by positing the notion of a being who

necessarily defies scientific law seems to be a shaky foundation

upon which to build an argument.

Ross cites the findings of NASA’s COBE Satellite in an

attempt to bolster his argument. He claims that COBE proves the

existence of a finite universe, and thus an important premise of

his argument. In reality, the COBE satellite did, in fact,

contribute greatly to our understanding of the cosmos, but it

does not by any stretch prove even a remote lean towards Theism,

though Ross claims that Theists everywhere have reason to

celebrate. The COBE satellite proved an expanding universe, and

thus disproved the Steady State Model, which was neither

explicitly theist nor atheist. It only stated that our universe

was static. By extrapolation, an expanding universe would have

started out very very small, expanding into the very very large.

The Big Bang Theory, which did in fact receive more support

after the COBE Satellite findings, does not favor a god, as Ross

purports. He sees god as that which made the Big Bang occur. The

COBE Satellite, Ross’s perceived Holy Grail, does not rule out,

or even decrease the possibility of the (perpetually)

 Casey 6 of 13

oscillating universe model, which is adhered to by Stephen

Hawking as well as the late Carl Sagan. Ross cites certain

thermodynamic principles, in his “Cosmic Oven” example, to

explain why, though multiple oscillations may be possible,

infinite oscillations are not. He explains that as the universe

expands, it cools, and “runs out” of energy. It appears he

missed when Einstein combined the principles of constant mass

and constant energy into the principle of the constant of mass-

energy, which are really the same at certain states.

It seems that a certain critical point would have to be

reached in order for the universe to either expand in a “Big

Bang” or condense in a “Big Crunch.” Presumably, the laws of

physics which dictate at which point this would happen remain

constant, and the mass-energy present in the universe would

remain constant. Imagine a teapot, heating on a stove. The

boiling point is always the same. Certain other factors, like

the heat of the burner, the amount of water in the pot, the

temperature of the water before being placed on the burner,

among others, could affect at which spatial-temporal point the

water actually begins to boil, yet the boiling point of water

remains constant, as do the “Big Bang” and “Big Crunch” points

of our universe. Moreover, the nature of everything within our

universe appears to be cyclical, rather than linear, from the

life cycle to the seasons to the rotations and orbits of the

 Casey 7 of 13

tiniest moons to the largest galaxies. It would only make sense

that the universe as a whole mimics this structure rather than

adopting the opposite (linear) nature.

Even discounting the very feasible perpetually oscillating

universe, the emergence of our universe from an infinitely, or

near infinitely small singularity via the Big Bang still does

not prove, or even support the notion of a supernatural deity.

This postulation merely transfers the original “problems” of the

origins of our universe to the origins of this deity. If god

causes itself, why can’t the universe cause itself? Ross’s

arguments against the concept of an actual infinite appear to be

closer to sophistry than logic. Mathematically, he argues, an

actual infinite is impossible to comprehend. Yet, isn’t his god

purported to be eternal?

Mathematically, we cannot even measure the curvature of the

circular rim of a coffee cup without appealing to infinity,

though we can see with our eyes the apparent finite nature of

the rim of the coffee cup. Our mathematics are clearly flawed,

especially with regards to the very large or very small. They

are based on human scale and are useful and operative on that

scale. Thus, to understand the very large and very small,

geometry and thus a system of proportions must be employed. That

finite human beings find it easier to comprehend finite

measurements is not surprising. However, we must refrain from

 Casey 8 of 13

the arrogance that leads us to believe that our scales and

measurements are applicable outside the environment in which

they evolved.

Richard Swinburne presents a slightly more advanced

argument than Ross, though it still retains the same problems

common to all forms of the cosmological argument. In his essay,

“Justification of Theism,” Swinburne argues:

“Some phenomenon E, which we can all observe, is

considered. It is claimed that E is puzzling, strange, not to be

expected in the ordinary course of things; But that E is to be

expected if there is a God; for God has the power to bring about

E and He might well choose to do so. Hence the occurrence of E

is reason for supposing that there is a God…

That there is a Universe and that there are laws of nature

are phenomena so general and pervasive that we tend to ignore

them. But there might so easily not have been a universe at all,

ever. Or the Universe might so easily have been a chaotic mess.

That there is an orderly Universe is something very striking,

yet beyond the capacity of science ever to explain” (3).

J.L. Mackie, Swinburne’s long-time intellectual rival,

provides counter-arguments. The existence of the universe as the

said E in Swinburne’s argument is to be expected in an atheist

 Casey 9 of 13

universe as well as in a theistic one. Swinburne’s logic appears

to be as circular and ad hoc as Ross’s. Who is to say that the

Universe is not a chaotic mess? Yes, it is ruled by certain

laws, but the term “chaotic mess” is subjective. Surely the

massive hurricane on Jupiter appears to be a chaotic mess, as do

phenomena more familiar like war and suicide and the busied

lives of overworked college students, as well as the less

familiar phenomena like black holes. The existence of natural

law does not prove, or even support the theistic hypothesis; in

fact, it appears in some cases to argue against the theistic

hypothesis which requires defiance of natural law. Swinburne

makes the mistake of equating naturalism with chaos and random

chance.

In The Miracle of Theism, Mackie points out that

Swinburne’s new take on the old cosmological argument does not

get rid of the original problems of an uncaused cause (i.e. a

personal deity outside of space-time. “What is common to the

many versions of this argument is that they start from the very

fact that there is a world or from such general features of it

as change or motion or causation… and argue to God as the

uncaused cause of the world or of those general features, or as

its creator, or as the reason for its existence” (81).

Swinburne presents a strong counter-argument, however, to

opponents of this “god of the gaps.” Though he concedes that a

 Casey 10 of 13

god is postulated to fill in the gaps in cosmology (which seem

to have become smaller with the advancement of human science),

“we postulate electrons and protons, neutrons and quarks to

explain the miscellaneous data of physics and chemistry”

(“Mackie, Induction, and God” pg3). However, it is easy to

counter this argument by stating that electrons, protons,

neutrons and quarks are necessary to explain certain phenomena.

Again, given Ockham’s Razor, if the Universe could (as Carl

Sagan, Stephen Hawking, and J.L. Mackie, among others, contend)

be explained without postulating a supernatural deity, the

concept of this deity, as well as Swinburne’s aforementioned

example, would be erroneous and irrelevant; electrons, etcetera,

fitting the criteria Ockham’s razor while Swinburne’s definition

of god would not.

It appears that despite any modern interpretations of the

cosmological argument, the most credible and advanced of which I

have described in the preceding paragraphs, the same key

problems arise. Namely, that the universe could likely be

eternal (or any of the other attributes ascribed to it’s

theoretical creator), that “scientifically” postulating a deity

that exists outside of space-time is vastly unscientific, that

the argument itself appears to be circular (the only possible

entity to fit the presented criteria being god, the original

hypothesis), that the postulated god fails when held to the same
 Casey 11 of 13

standard as the universe it is postulated to explain, that

Stephen Hawking’s Quantum Cosmology as well as the existence of

dark matter (which, according to NASA, could account for an

overwhelming majority of mass in our universe) refutes many of

the modern premises, and that even if the premises are true, god

(especially the Christian god or any god other than a deist

creator) does not necessarily follow from these premises.

To me, admittedly less educated (thus far) then Swinburne

and Ross (both Ph.D.s), and especially less qualified then

Swinburne, and atop my mountainous eighteen years of existence

and observation, it appears that there is a far more likely

conclusion.

Atheist reductionism seems at least as arrogant as theism,

though it does seem to have slightly more credible (scientific)

methods. Given the small amount of knowledge I have of

psychology, history, and anthropology, I am not surprised at the

evolution of religion to explain what cannot be explained

otherwise. This does, to an extent, refute some of religion’s

“scientific” claims. However, I am not so arrogant in my

humanism to believe that our current science can explain

everything. Chaotic or not, the universe and its components

exist in some form or another, and presumably what mass-energy

exists now always has in some form or another, whether in a

perpetually oscillating universe (which, as I previously stated,

 Casey 12 of 13

would inductively make sense given what is known about the

nature of the components of the universe) or in an infinitely,

or near infinitely, small singularity that at some point burst

forth into creation as we know it. A god that exists outside of

space-time doesn’t seem to be logically consistent with the

methods used to postulate the said god. Science deals with the

natural, so it does not make sense to use “scientific” methods

to prove the possibility of the existence of a supernatural

being. I do not believe this sort of apologeticism should be

taken seriously in an academic environment.

What makes supernaturalism so much more “divine” than

naturalism? Could there not exist some sort of binding force in

full compliance with natural law? When we die, our mass-energy

is recycled and reused just the same as any mass-energy in the

universe. The most ancient gods were merely representative of

human psychological archetypes. Perhaps the human concept of

“god” is in fact a natural manifestation of the laws of the

universe, not a distinct and personal being outside of it.

 Casey 13 of 13

Works Cited:

The Creator and the Cosmos, Hugh Ross, NavPress, Colorado

Springs, 1993

The Existence of God, Richard Swinburne, Clarendon Press,

Oxford, 2004

“Mackie, Induction, and God,” Richard Swinburne, Religious

Studies 19, 1983: p.385-391

The God Delusion, Richard Dawkins

Cosmos, Carl Sagan

The Existence of God, J.L. Mackie

The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the

Existence of God, J.L. Mackie, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1982

http://www.wikipedia.com

Encyclopedia Britannica Online

http:://www.reasonstobelieve.org