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A Secure and Efcient Message Authentication Protocol for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks with Privacy Preservation(MAPWPP)

Subhashree Behera , Bharati Mishra , Priyadarshini Nayak and Debasish Jena Department of Computer Science and Engineering International Institute of Information Technology Bhubaneswar, India Email: mikibehera@gmail.com Email: bmbharati@gmail.com Email: priya0306nayak@gmail.com Email: debasish@gmail.com
AbstractReliability, efcient bandwidth utilisation, consistency and authenticity are some of the required applications that are required for proper implementation of vehicular adhoc networks(VANETs). As vehicular Ad hoc Networks are expected to greatly inuence and improve road safety as well as driving conditions, they are attracting much attention these days. But along with all the benets that it offers, there is more chance of giving way to frequent and severe malicious attacks. Due to this reason much attention is being given to the security and privacy issues in VANETs. A lot of research work is being performed to improve the standards of this network. In this paper we present a security protocol for VANET for message authentication which also promises privacy for its users. Privacy is a big issue in todays information age. Information is abundant but getting the authentic information at appropriate time and place is very crucial. Keywords-Vehicular network; security; privacy preservation; vehicular communication; ECDSA.
Figure 1. 802.11p based vehicular communications in cities.[15]

I. I NTRODUCTION Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are special kind of mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) where the vehicles and the road side units (RSUs) are the network nodes and they communicate using wireless technologies such as Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC)[1].They are different from MANET in that the nodes are moving with very high speed obeying some trafc rules and constrained by the road topology. The RSUs provide the xed infrastructure which help in packet forwarding. VANETs are deployed to improve road safety, trafc management and driver comfort. But to achieve this, there are many security challenges like message authentication, privacy preservation, message nonrepudiation, entity authentication, access control, message condentiality, availability, liability identication etc[2]-[6]. Researchers have published a number of papers addressing one or more such challenges. There are a numbers security attacks like denial of service attack, grey hole attack. Some of the publications have addressed a couple of such attacks. Before deploying VANET in real life scenario extensive analysis and performance evaluation of the proposed protocols should be carried out. The proposed

protocols should conform to the security standards and should incorporate all possible scenarios. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe some of the related works. In section III we introduce the preliminaries required for our proposed protocol. In section IV, the proposed protocol is dened. Section V is about security analysis of our proposed model. In section VI, performabce analysis of our work is described. Then nally, in section VII we provide the conclusion and future work. II. RELATED WORK Jonathan Petit and Toulouse introduced the overhead of ECDSA and focus the analysis on the time complexity of this algorithm[10]. They analyze the impact of the authentication processing on the braking distance. Giorgio Calandriello et al. proposed a scheme to achieve efcient and robust pseudonym-based authentication[11]. Their proposal enables vehicle on-board units to generate their own pseudonyms without affecting the system security. ChunTa Li et al. scheme uses blind signature techniques to enable vehicles to anonymously interact with the services

of roadside infrastructure (RSU)[12]. In Brijesh Kumar Chaurasia et als. [13] scheme, multiple temporary identities (pseudonyms) are assigned to each vehicle in the network. A vehicle changes its pseudonym after each transmission. For privacy preservation, distinct pseudonyms hide their relation from each other and to the users identity. The pseudonym change scheme can lead to a major problem called the Sybil Attack. Qianhong Wu et al. [14] paper presented a new primitive called the Message Linkable Group Signature (MLGS), in which a vehicle stays anonymous if it produces one signature on each message. However, if it produces two signatures on one message, then the attacker will be found by a trusted authority, which effectively prevents the Sybil attack in a privacy-preserving system. When a vehicle receives multiple signatures on the same message, it can distinguish by itself (with the help of the TA) whether the message was signed by the same cheating vehicle multiple times or by multiple honest vehicles. In this paper we propose a protocol which uses ECDSA signature generation and verication methods to achieve message authentication and conditional privacy preservation. Our paper is similar to one proposed by S. S. Manvi et al [8].But their protocol does not take care of privacy preservation. Our protocol achieves privacy preservation through the use of pseudonyms. But in contrast Giorgio Calandriello et al. [11] proposed scheme, we proposed that the vehicles shall take the help of RSUs to generate the pseudonyms. As RSUs have more powerful processing power, they can help in pseudonym generation and message transmission. III. P RELIMINARIES As a priliminary, we used some cryptographic techniques and basic tools in our scheme. The security of our scheme is based on Elliptic curve digital signature algorithm. A brief review of this is provided as follows. A. Elliptic Curve Cryptography ECC is a public key cryptography[17]. Public key cryptography, unlike private key cryptography, does not require any shared secret between the communicating parties but it is much slower than the private key cryptography. The mathematical operations of ECC is dened over the elliptic curve y 2 = x3 + ax + b,where 4a3 + 27b2 = 0. Each value of the a and b gives a different elliptic curve. All points (x,y) which satises the above equation plus a point at innity lies on the elliptic curve. The public key is a point in the curve and the private key is a random number. The public key is obtained by multiplying the private key with the generator point G in the curve. The generator point G, the curve parameters a and b, together with few more constants constitutes the domain parameter of ECC. One main advantage of ECC is its small key size. A 160-bit key in ECC is considered to be as secured as 1024-bit key in RSA algorithm.

B. ECDSA - Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm ECDSA is a variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) that operates on elliptic curve groups [18]. For sending a signed message from source to destination, both have to agree up on Elliptic Curve domain parameters. Sender have a key pair consisting of a private key di (a randomly selected integer less than n, where n is the order of the curve, an elliptic curve domain parameter) and a public key Qi = di G (G is the generator point, an elliptic curve domain parameter). C. ECDSA based message authentication in VANETs 1) Signature generation: For signing a message m by sender i, using is private key di . a) Calculate e = HASH(m). b) Select a random integer k from [1,n1]. c) Calculate r = x1 modn, where (x1 , y1 ) = kG. If r = 0, go to step 2. d) Calculate s = k 1 (e+di r) mod n. If s = 0, go to step 2. e) The signature is the pair (r, s). 2) Signature verication: For j to authenticate is signature, j must have is public key Qi . a)Verify that r and s are integers in [1, n 1]. If not, the signature is invalid. b) Calculate e = HASH(m), where HASH is the same function used in the signature generation. c) Calculate w = s1 mod n. d) Calculate u1 = ew mod n and u2 = rw mod n. e) Calculate (x1 , y1 ) = u1 G+u2 Qi . f) The signature is valid if x1 = r mod n, invalid otherwise. IV. D ESIGN G OALS The design goal of this paper is to develop a secure and efcient protocol for VANET that will provide mutual authentication with privacy preservation. In particular, it shall achieve following goals. Providing message authentication: Provide privacy preservation: Eliminate Gray hole attack: Eliminate Sybil attack: V. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL In this section we propose an RSU aided message authentication scheme which also provides conditional privacy preservation. When a vehicle come in the range of RSU, it requests the RSU for a temporary ID known as pseudoID which remain valid till the vehicle moves to another RSUs range. This pseudoID can be used by the sender vehicle for its identity instead of its actual identity. When the vehicle wants to send a message, the vehicle signs the message with its private key using ECDSA signature and append its temporary ID in place of sender address. The vehicle which receives the message, query the RSU for the public key of the sender vehicle and provides the senders pseudo ID in the request. The RSU nd out the actual ID from the pseudoID and broadcast the corresponding public key of the sender vehicle. The interested vehicles verify the sender vehicles signature and thus authenticate the message but the senders

Table I N OTATIONS USED THROUGH THE PROPOSED SCHEME Symbol Qi , di T IDi V IDi S D RSUP r HASH(m) TD TS a||b T IDS , T IDD D Mi ACKj Description Public and Private key of vehicle i Temporary ID of vehicle i Actual ID of ith vehicle Source Destination Private key of RSU A cryptographic hash function on message m Ex-Or operation Timestamp,which Dest. attaches Timestamp,which source attaches Concatenation of a and b Temporary ID of Source, Intermediate and Destination vehicle Elliptic curve domain parameter Message sent in ith iteration Acknowledgement in j th iteration

vehicle registered till date to the RSU. In turn the RSU also get registered with the TA and its public key is conveyed to all the registered vehicles. C. Temporary Identity Acquisition When a vehicles range reaches an RSU, the vehicle sends a request to the RSU to provide a temporary identity. It also sends its identity and public key certicate which it uses in further communication. The RSU validates the identity and the certicate for the public key. Then it generate a temporary identity for the vehicle and send it in the reply. T IDi = V IDi (RSUP r ) D. Message transfer The message transfer by the vehicle can be broadly categorized into two types. 1) Broadcast of message: Here the vehicle broadcasts the message to all the vehicles those come under its wireless range. This communication is mainly concern about the safety purpose of other vehicles. For example one vehicle can broadcast the message concerning about the crash happened in a certain place to all other vehicle in its wireless range so that all other vehicles can be aware of the incident. This process consists of the following steps. Signing the Messages When the vehicle wants to send a message,it signs the message with its private key corresponding to the public key it has conveyed to the RSU. It send its true identity. Instead it uses its temporary identity. Public Key Look up The vehicle which receives the message and signature enquires the nearby RSU for the public key corresponding to the T IDi . The RSU calculates V IDi from the T IDi . V IDi = T IDi (RSUP r ) Then it retrieves the public key for the V IDi and broadcast it. The interested vehicles use the public key for verication of the message received. Message Signature Verication The vehicles after receiving the public key verify the signature on the message using ECDSA signature verication method described above. 2) Personalized message transfer: Unlike the broadcast of message, here is the existence of only one destination vehicle. This personalized message transfer has two cases. In the 1st case, the destination vehicle is present in the range of both source and RSU. In the 2nd case, the destination vehicle is not present in the range of source but present in the range of RSU. Here prior to the communication the source vehicle should know the temporary ID of the destination vehicle. One assumption is taken i.e. the range of RSU is more than the range of vehicle. The whole process is divided into two steps.

T IDI ,

identity remains anonymous to the receiving vehicles. The details of the protocol shall be given in the following section. Notations used throughout this article are summarized in table 1 and the details of the proposed scheme are described as follows. A. Vehicle Registration with Trusted Authority Before VANET setup, interested vehicles register themselves with transport authorities. This will be an ofine process. The vehicle owner provides its identity, address and proof for the same. After verication, the transport authority ask the owner to provide the key pool to be registered. The vehicle owner generate a pool of ECDSA public-private key pairs using following algorithm. A vehicles key pair is associated with a particular set of elliptc curve domain parameters D = (q, FR, a, b, G, n, h). This association is assured cryptographically i.e. through certicates. 1. Select a random or pseudorandom integer d in the interval [1, n-1] 2. Compute Qi = di * G 3. As public key is Qi and private key is di . 4. For different value of di , different Qi values get generated which form the pool of public keys for vehicle i. Vehicle i register these public keys against its ID which is V IDi . These public keys have a validity period. After the validity period expires, A renew the public key pool by generating and registering a fresh set of public keys. The transport authority issue certicates authenticating the public keys. For this it sign the certicates with its private key. Any third party can validate these certicates using the public key of the trusted authority(TA). B. RSU Installation After vehicle registration, the transport authority deploys RSUs at each road section. It upload the details of the entire

I. Checking of the presence of destination vehicle in the range of RSU: In this step the source vehicle checks whether the destination vehicle is present in the range of RSU or not. The detail process is described in the following steps. Step 1: The source vehicle sends the temporary id of his own (T IDS ) and temporary id of destination vehicle (T IDD ) to RSU. Step 2: After getting the temporary ids, RSU checks his own database that whether the destination vehicle is present in the range or not. Step 3: If the destination vehicle is present in the range of RSU, then RSU sends a positive acknowledgement to the source vehicle otherwise it sends a negative acknowledgement. Step 4: If negative acknowledgement comes from RSU, then the communication process stops. If there is positive acknowledgement from RSU, then the communication process starts. II. Communication process Prior communication process starts, there are some computations done by source vehicle. Source vehicle rst selects a random number a. It computes C = (QD 2 )HASH(TS )dS where QD is the public key of destination and dS is the private key of the source. Then it computes C a. According to the position of presence of destination vehicle there are two cases. a) Destination is in the range of both source and RSU In this case the destination vehicle is present in the range of both source and RSU. Step 5: The source vehicle sends the T IDS , T IDD , TS , C a to destination vehicle. The C is calculated by the source vehicle before. Step 6: At rst the destination vehicle checks whether the received temporary destination id is his own or not. If it doesnot match then the message is dropped. If it matches then the destination vehicle computes C 1 = (QS 2 )HASH(TS )dD where QS and dD are public key of source and private key of destination respectively. After computing C , it recovers the random number a by computing C a C 1 . Then it will select a random no. b. Then it computes K = HASH(a||b||0). Step 7: The destination vehicle sends T IDD , T IDS , TD , C (b||k) to the source vehicle. Step 8: The source vehicle has previously computed C. Now the source vehicle recovers b and k by computing C (b||k) C. Then the source vehicle compute k 1 = H(a||b||0). Then it compare k with k 1 . If both are equal to each other then the destination vehicle is proved as authenticated and mutual authentication get established between source and destination. Step 9: After authenticating each other message transfer starts between source and destination.The source vehicle sends T IDS , T IDD , TS , C Mi to the destination vehicle where Mi is the message transferred at ith iteration. The

destination vehicle recovers the message Mi by computing C Mi C . Step 10: After recovering the message the destination vehicle send an acknowledgement to the source vehicle. So it sends T IDS , T IDD , TD , C ACKj to the source vehicle. The source vehicle recovers ACKj by computing C ACKj C. b) Destination is not in the range of source but in the range of RSU: In this case the destination vehicle is not present in the range of source but it is present in the range of RSU. The detail process is explained in various steps. Step 5 : As the destination vehicle is not present in the range of source vehicle, the source vehicle sends T IDS , T IDD , TS , C a to all the vehicles that are present in the range of source . The C is calculated by the source vehicle before. Step 6: In this step, all the intermediate vehicles who got the message from the source vehicle checks that whether the destination vehicle is present in their range. Any of them who nds the destination in his range, forwards T IDS , T IDV , T IDD , TS , C a to the destination vehicle. Step 7: At rst the destination vehicle checks whether the received temporary destination id is his own or not. If it doesnt match then the message is dropped. If it matches then the destination vehicle computes C = (QS 2 )HASH(TS )dD where QS and dD are public key of source and private key of destination respectively. After computing C , it recovers the random number a by computing C a C . Then it will select a random no. b. Then it computes K = HASH(a||b||0). Step 8: The destination vehicle sends T IDD , T IDI , T IDS , TD , C (b||k) to the intermediate vehicle. Step 9: The intermediate vehicle forwards T IDD , T IDI , T IDS , TD , C (b||k) to the source vehicle. Step 10: The source vehicle has previously computed C. Now the source vehicle recovers b and k by computing C (b||k) C. Then the source vehicle compute k 1 = HASH(a||b||0). Then it compare k with k 1 . If both are equal to each other then the destination vehicle is proved as authenticated and mutual authentication get established between source and destination. Step 11: After authenticating each other message transfer starts between source and destination. The source vehicle sends T IDS , T IDD , TS , C Mi to the destination vehicle where Mi is the message transferred at ith iteration. Step 12: The intermediate vehicle forwards T IDS , T IDI , T IDD , TS , C Mi to the source vehicle. The destination vehicle recovers the message Mi by computing C Mi C . Step 13: After recovering the message the destination vehicle send an acknowledgement to the intermediate vehicle. So it sends T IDD , T IDI , T IDS , TD , C ACKj to the destination vehicle. Step 14: The intermediate vehicle forwards T IDD ,

T IDI , T IDS , TD , C ACKj to the source vehicle. The source vehicle recovers ACKj by computing C ACKj C. VI. S ECURITY A NALYSIS In this section, we discuss security issues of the proposed MAPWPP scheme A. Theorem 6.1: MAPWPP ensures authentication, message integrity and non repudiation. Proof: In MAPWPP the vehicles register with the TA before participating in the VANET. This ensures the vehicles communicating through VANET are authentic. The vehicles generate the private and public keys using elliptic curve cryptography which is based on ECDLP problem. Hence deriving the private keys from the public keys is infeasible. As a result impersonation attack is not possible. Before communication starts, a vehicle rst requests for temporaryID to the RSU in range.The RSU veries that the requesting vehicle is an authentic VANET user by comparing the registered Vehicles list. This ensures the entity authentication. B. Theorem 6.2: MAPWPP is able to satisfy conditional privacy preservation property. Proof: In the temporary ID acquisition phase the vehicle obtain a TID from the RSU. T IDi = V IDi XORRSUP r . The vehicle does not expose its true identity. The source vehicle broadcast its TID with the message and the signature. As a result, the recipient vehicles are unaware of the true identity of the sender vehicle. In the public key look up phase the vehicle which receives the message and the signature enquire the nearby RSU for the public key corresponding to the T IDi . The RSU calculate V IDi from the T IDi . V IDI = T IDi XORRSUP r .Then it retrieve the public key for the VIDA and broadcast it. The interested vehicles use the public key for verication of the message received. The receiving vehicle is unaware about the exact ID of the source vehicle. Again as the temporary identity as well as the public key changes when the vehicle moves from the range of an RSU to other, no one can track the public key with the temporaryID. So the protocol maintains the privacy preservation property of the vehicle. C. Theorem 6.3: MAPWPP is safe against Sybil attacks. Proof: In VANET most messages are broadcast messages about the trafc conditions of the neighbourhood. A vehicle gets condence about a message when same message arrives from a large number of sources. Let us assume, there are 50 vehicles in the range of an RSU. Each vehicle have their temporary identities TIDi acquired from the RSU and their corresponding public certicates Certi registered. Suppose vehicle T ID1 broadcasts a message M . Let the vehicles in

the range of T ID1 are T ID2 to T ID6 . Thus the vehicles T ID2 to T ID6 shall receive a single instance of M through one hop communication because though the vehicle T ID1 has a set of public-private key pairs, it is assigned a single temporary identity at a time, also this identity changes once the vehicle enters the range of another RSU. Therefore at any point of time T ID1 can have a single ID (pseudonym) and so can put only one signature on M using the private key corresponding to public key certicate Cert1. Sybil attack is possible if the vehicle can put different signatures on the different instances of the same message. But in our case the signature will be same because both the message and the public key is same. D. Theorem 6.4: MAPWPP detects black and grey hole attacks. Proof: The vehicles are monitored by their one hop neighbors to detect their behavior. If they are found misbehaving, the same is reported to the RSU. The RSU moves the vehicles to blacklist according to the majority opinion rule and eliminates them from VANET. Thus if a vehicle drops all the packets sent to it the black hole attack is detected. If it selectively forwards some packets then a grey hole attack is detected. VII. P ERFORMANCE ANALYSIS In this subsection, we compared our proposed scheme with other similar works that are intended to ensure anonymous interactions. In [21], He et al. proposed an authorized anonymous ID-based scheme. The security of their scheme is based on blind signature and RSA cryptosystem. Later, in [22], Yang et al. proposed a secure scheme for providing anonymous communications in wireless systems without using asymmetric cryptosystems. In [12], Chun-Ta Li proposed a non interactive ID-based scheme for vehicle to vehicle communications. The results of a comparison of efciency between our scheme, Chun-Ta Lis scheme, Yang et al.s scheme and He et al.s scheme are shown in Table. For evaluation of performance, we dened some computational parameters as follows.

Texp denotes the time for the modular exponentiation Thash denotes the time for the hashing operation. Tsym denotes the time for the symmetric encryption/decryption operation. Tasym denotes the time for the asymmetric encryption/decryption operation. Txor denotes the time for the XOR operation.

For instance, a symmetric encryption/decryption is at least 100 times faster than an asymmetric encryption/decryption in software and an exponential operation is approximately equal to 60 symmetric encryptions/decryptions [24].

Tasym Tsym Texp Thash Txor Total costs

Our Scheme 2 0 0 4 9 200 Tsym

ChunTas[12] 5 0 0 9 9 500 Tsym

Yang et al.s 0 8 17 0 4 1028 Tsym

He et al.s 6 2 0 5 0 602 Tsym

[10] Jonathan Petit, Toulouse ,Analysis of ECDSA Authentication Processing in VANETs [11] Giorgio Calandriello, Panos Papadimitratos, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Antonio Lioy, Efcient and Robust Pseudonymous Authentication in VANET [12] Chun-Ta Li , Min-Shiang Hwang , Yen-Ping Chu, A secure and efcient communication scheme with authenticated key establishment and privacy preserving for vehicular ad hoc networks, Computer Communications 31 (2008) 2803-2814. [13] Brijesh Kumar Chauras ia, Shekhar Verma, G. S. Tomar, and Ajith Araham, Optimizing Pseudonym Updation in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks, Comput. Sci. IV, LNCS 5430, pp. 136-148, 2009. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009. [14] Qianhong Wu, Josep Domingo-Ferrer, Senior Member, IEEE, and rsula Gonzalez-Nicolas, Balanced Trustworthiness, Safety, and Privacy in Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communications, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, Vol. 59, No. 2. Feb 2010. [15] Xiaodong Lin , Hsiao-Hwa Chen, A secure and efcient RSUaided bundle forwarding protocol for vehicular delay tolerant networks, Wirel. Commun. Mob. Comput. (2010)Copyright 2010 John Wiley and Sons, Ltd. [16] P. Papadimitratos, L. Buttyan, J. P. Hubaux, F. Kargl, A. Kung, M. Raya, Architecture for Secure and Private Vehicular Communications, 2007 IEEE. [17] Adam D. Woodbury, Daniel V. Bailey, Christof Paar, Elliptic curve cryptography on smart cards without coprocessors,The Fourth Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications (CARDIS 2000) Conference, September 20-22, 2000, Bristol,UK [18] Istvan Zsolt BERTA, and Zoltan Adam Mann, Implementing elliptic curve cryptography on PC and smart card, Periodica polytechnica ser. El. Eng., Vol. 46, No. 1-2, pp. 4773, 2002. [19] Poonam, K. Garg, M. Misra, Eliminating Misbehaving nodes by opinion based Trust Evaluation Model in MANETS, ICCS11, Februrary, 12-14. Rourkela, Odisha, India. [20] M. Gerlach, A. Festag, T. Leinmuller, G. Goldacker, C. Harsch, Security Architecture for Vehicular Communication, 5th International Workshop on Intelligent Transportation (WIT). Hamburg, Germany, March 2007. [21] Q. He, D. Wu, P. Khosla, The quest for personal control over mobile location privacy, IEEE Communications Magazine 42 (5) (2004) 130-136. [22] C. C. Yang, Y. L. Tang, R. C. Wang, H. W. Yang, A secure and efcient authentication protocol for anonymous channel in wireless communications, Applied Mathematics and Computation 169 (2) (2005) 1431-1439. [23] J. S. Lee, C. C. Chang, Secure communications for clusterbased ad hoc networks using node identities, Journal of Network and Computer Applications 30 (4) (2007) 1377-1396. [24] B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography Protocols Algorithms and Source Code in C, second ed., John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1996

VIII. C ONCLUSION In this article, a secure and efcient communication scheme for vehicular ad hoc networks is proposed. By comparison with other related schemes, the proposed scheme not only maintains good and sought after properties (e.g. low computational costs, mutual authentication) but also provides the advantage of user privacy preservation. Hence, a vehicular node can anonymously interact with other vehicular node and nobody can know information about the user (e.g. location/user identication/transaction privacy). Moreover, in comparison with chun Tas scheme, Yang et al.s and He et al.s schemes, the computational costs of involved nodes in our scheme are lower. As a result, our proposed scheme is suitable for various ad hoc networks. R EFERENCES
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