Judicial+Review+21 3

ADMINISTRATIVEREVIEWCOUNCIL
THESCOPEOFJUDICIALREVIEW
DISCUSSIONPAPER
2003
Howtomakecommentsandsubmissions
Youareinvitedtomakecommentsandsubmissionsinresponsetothis discussionpaper.Theseshouldbesentto: TheExecutiveDirector AdministrativeReviewCouncil RobertGarranOffices NationalCircuit BARTONACT2600 Phone:(02)62505800 Facsimile:(02)62505980 Email:arc.can@ag.gov.au Internet:law.gov.au/arc Closingdate:4July2003 Itwouldbehelpfulifcommentsaddressedspecificdiscussionpointsor paragraphsinthediscussionpaper.
Confidentiality Ifyouwantyoursubmission,oranypartofit,tobetreatedasconfidential, pleaseindicatethisclearly. Arequestforaccesstoasubmissionmarked 'confidential' will be determined in accordance with the Freedom of InformationAct1982(Cth). TheCouncilmayincludeinitsfinalguidelinereportonthisproject,alistof submissionsreceivedinresponsetothisdiscussionpaper.Itmayalsorefer tothosesubmissionsinthetextofthereportandotherCouncilpublications. Ifyoudonotwishyoursubmissionoranypartofittobeusedinanyof theseways,pleaseindicatethisclearly.
CommonwealthofAustralia2003
ii
Thisworkiscopyright.ApartfromanyusepermittedundertheCopyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission. ISBN:0642211779 CoverdesignedbytheAttorneyGeneralsDepartment.
TABLEOFCONTENTS
iii
AdministrativeReviewCouncil ThemembersoftheAdministrativeReviewCouncilare: WayneMartinQC(President) JusticeGarryDownesAM RonMcLeodAM1 ProfessorDavidWeisbrot BillBlickPSM ChristineCharles RobertCornall ProfessorRobinCreyke StephenGagelerSC PatriciaRidley
The Council acknowledges the contribution to this project of the Scope of JudicialReviewsubcommittee:StephenGagelerSC(Chair),ProfessorRobin CreykeandWayneMartinQC. JusticeGarryDownesAMwasanobserver onthesubcommittee. The Council also acknowledges the particular contribution of Margaret HarrisonSmith, Acting Executive Director, Administrative Review Council Secretariattothedevelopmentofthediscussionpaper.
RonMcLeodAMwasanexofficiomemberoftheCounciluntil18February2003.
iv
CONTENTS
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW DISCUSSION PAPER EXECUTIVESUMMARY.........................................................................................1
Structureofdiscussionpaper..................................................................................1
PARTIINTRODUCTION.....................................................................................8 SECTIONI..............................................................................................................8
The Council The project Timingoftheproject................................................................................................8
SECTIONII............................................................................................................8
What is judicial review? Furtheraspectsofjudicialreview...........................................................................8
SECTIONIII...........................................................................................................8
Limitsonthescopeofjudicialreview....................................................................8
SECTIONIV...........................................................................................................8
PreviousCouncilinvolvementinconsiderationofthescopeofjudicialreview .....................................................................................................................................8
SECTIONI..............................................................................................................9
TheCouncil................................................................................................................9 Theproject.................................................................................................................9 Timingoftheproject................................................................................................9
SECTIONII..........................................................................................................10
Whatisjudicialreview?.........................................................................................10 Furtheraspectsofjudicialreview.........................................................................11
SECTIONIII.........................................................................................................15
Limitsonthescopeofjudicialreview..................................................................15
SECTIONIV.........................................................................................................20
PreviousCouncilinvolvementinconsiderationofthescopeofjudicialreview ...................................................................................................................................20
PART II THE SIGNIFICANCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL SCOPE OF JUDICIALREVIEW.................................................................................................26 SECTIONI............................................................................................................26

Thesignificanceofjudicialreview........................................................................26
SECTIONII..........................................................................................................26
TheConstitutionandthescopeofjudicialreview.............................................26
TABLEOFCONTENTS
SECTIONI............................................................................................................26
Thesignificanceofjudicialreview........................................................................26
SECTIONII..........................................................................................................31
TheConstitutionandthescopeofjudicialreview.............................................31
PARTIIIOTHERFACTORSRELEVANTTOTHESCOPEOFJUDICIAL REVIEW....................................................................................................................35 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................35

Reasonsforlimitingjudicialreview.....................................................................35 SECTIONI...............................................................................................................35 Thejudicialperspective..........................................................................................35
SECTIONII..........................................................................................................35
Theexecutiveperspective......................................................................................35
SECTIONIII.........................................................................................................35
Thepublicperspective...........................................................................................35
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................35
Reasonsforlimitingjudicialreview.....................................................................35
SECTIONI............................................................................................................37
Thejudicialperspective..........................................................................................37
SECTIONII..........................................................................................................47
Theexecutiveperspective......................................................................................47
SECTIONIII.........................................................................................................53
Thepublicperspective...........................................................................................53
PARTIVTHEGROUNDSOFREVIEWANDTHESCOPEOFJUDICIAL REVIEW.....................................................................................................................57 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................57 SECTIONI............................................................................................................57

Thegroundsofreview...........................................................................................57
SECTIONII..........................................................................................................57
Acloserlookatcertaingroundsofreview..........................................................57
Introduction.........................................................................................................57 SECTIONI............................................................................................................57
Thegroundsofreview...........................................................................................57
SECTIONII..........................................................................................................60
Acloserlookatcertaingroundsofreview..........................................................60
vi
PARTVPROPOSEDCONSIDERATIONSINDEVELOPINGAGUIDE TOTHESCOPEOFJUDICIALREVIEW..........................................................79 SECTIONi............................................................................................................79

Proposedconsiderations........................................................................................79
SECTIONII..........................................................................................................79
Consistency/predictability....................................................................................79 Abuseofreviewprocess........................................................................................79 Resourcerelatedissues..........................................................................................79
SECTIONIII.........................................................................................................79
Natureofthedecision............................................................................................79
SECTIONIV.........................................................................................................79
Natureofthedecisionmaker................................................................................79
SECTIONV..........................................................................................................80
Other.........................................................................................................................80
SECTIONI............................................................................................................80
Proposedconsiderations........................................................................................80
SECTIONII..........................................................................................................81
Consistency/predicability.....................................................................................81 Abuseofreviewprocess........................................................................................86 Resourcerelatedissues..........................................................................................91
SECTIONIII.........................................................................................................98
Thenatureofthedecision......................................................................................98
SECTIONIV.......................................................................................................126
Natureofthedecisionmaker..............................................................................126
SECTIONV........................................................................................................143
Other.......................................................................................................................143
PARTVITHEEXISTENCEOFADEQUATEALTERNATIVEREMEDIES ....................................................................................................................................146 Introduction.......................................................................................................146 SECTIONI..........................................................................................................146

Twoperspectives..................................................................................................146
SECTIONII........................................................................................................146
Whatisanadequatealternativeremedy............................................................146 Adequatealternativeremediestwocasestudies...........................................146
SECTIONIII.......................................................................................................146
Thegroundsofreview.........................................................................................146
TABLEOFCONTENTS
vii
SECTIONIV.......................................................................................................146
Meritsreview.........................................................................................................146
Introduction.......................................................................................................147 SECTIONI..........................................................................................................147
Twoperspectives..................................................................................................147
SECTIONII........................................................................................................151
Whatisanadequatealternativeremedy............................................................151 Adequatealternativeremedytwocasestudies.............................................158
SECTIONIII.......................................................................................................159
Thegroundsofreview.........................................................................................159
SECTIONIV.......................................................................................................161
Meritsreview.........................................................................................................161
PART VII HOW MIGHT JUDICIAL REVIEW APPROPRIATELY BE LIMITED..................................................................................................................170 Introduction.......................................................................................................170

SECTIONI.............................................................................................................170 The underlying constitutional framework The uncertain effect of privative clauses General principles relating to the legislative removal of rights Removal of rights and judicial review .................................................................................................................................170 Theneedforclarityandspecificity.....................................................................170
Introduction.......................................................................................................170 SECTIONI..........................................................................................................170
Theunderlyingconstitutionalframework.........................................................170 Theuncertaineffectofprivativeclauses............................................................171 Generalprinciplesrelatingtolegislativeremovalofrights.............................172 Removalofrightsandjudicialreview................................................................175
SECTIONII........................................................................................................177
Theneedforclarityandspecificity.....................................................................177
APPENDIX1...........................................................................................................180 ADMINISTRATIVEDECISIONS(JUDICIALREVIEW)ACT1977..........180 APPENDIX2...........................................................................................................183 LEGISLATIVELIMITATIONSONREVIEW................................................183

Otherwaysinwhichjudicialreviewmaybelimited.......................................185
viii
APPENDIX3..........................................................................................................192 ALTERNATIVEREMEDIES............................................................................192
Twocasestudies..................................................................................................192 Taxation..................................................................................................................192 WorkplaceRelationsAppealscheme.................................................................195
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
SCOPEOFJUDICIALREVIEWDISCUSSIONPAPER EXECUTIVESUMMARY
The purpose of the discussion paper is to explore the desirable balance betweentherightofanindividualtotestthelegalityofadministrativeaction by way of judicial review and the need to ensure that as a result of the exerciseofthisright,theworkofgovernmentisnotunreasonablyfrustrated.
Structureofdiscussionpaper
ThediscussionpaperconsistsofsevenPartsandthreeAppendices. Atkey points throughout the paper, discussion points are positioned (see further below).Atthesepoints,viewsonmattersunderconsiderationaresought. PARTI ofthediscussionpaperisintroductory,dealingwiththeobjectives andtimingoftheproject.ItdefinesjudicialreviewintheAustraliancontext, withparticularreferencetothecommonlawandtheAdministrativeDecisions (JudicialReview)Act1977. Legislativelimitationsonjudicialreviewandthe Councilspreviousinvolvementinconsideringthescopeofjudicialreview arealsocanvassed. PARTII focusesontheconstitutionalsignificanceofjudicialreview(tothe ruleoflaw,accountabilityandtheprotectionofindividualrights). Italso addresses constitutional considerations relevant to the scope of judicial review(includingtheseparationofpowersdoctrine,thedistinctionbetween meritsandjudicialreviewandtheextenttowhichparliamentmaylimitthe scopeofjudicialreviewofadministrativedecisions). PART III addresses judicial review from three different perspectives including: the judicial perspective justiciability (including legislative and polycentricdecisions)anddeference theexecutiveperspectiveconsiderationsraisedinthecontextof theCouncilsfirstreport, AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview) Act1977,ExclusionsUnderSection19,1978andothermorerecently expressedconsiderations;and thepublicperspectiveincludingspeed,costandaccessibility.
PART IV explores thegrounds ofreviewincludingananalysisofjudicial reviewoffactsandprocess. Ittheninvestigatesspecificgroundsofjudicial reviewincluding: unreasonableness relevantandirrelevantconsiderations erroroflaw,jurisdictionalerror;and proceduralfairness.
Considerationisalsogiventoboththeexecutiveandthejudicialperspectives onproceduralfairness. PART V identifies anumber ofsuggestedconsiderationswhichshouldbe takenintoaccountindevelopingtheCouncilsproposedguidetothescopeof judicialreview. Commentissoughtontheadequacy andcompletenessof theseconsiderations. PARTVIfocusesontheimpactuponthescopeofjudicialreviewofadequate alternativeremedies. ThePartcanvassestheexecutiveandjudicialperspectivesonthistopic(with referencetocaselaw);theissueofwhatconstitutesanadequatealternative remedy;theimpactuponadequacyofapplicationsforreviewonparticular groundsofreview;andtheadequacyofmeritsreviewhavingregardtoall thesefactors. PARTVII addressesthemeansoflimitingorexcludingjudicialreview. In doingthis,thepaperrefersto: theunderlyingconstitutionalframework theuncertaineffectofprivativeclauses generalprinciplesrelatingtothelegislativeremovalofrights removalofrightsandjudicialreview;and theneedforclarityandspecificity.
APPENDIX I sets out Schedule 1 to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review)Act1977.
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
APPENDIX 2 sets out examples of legislative clauses to be found in Commonwealthlegislationimposinglimitationsonjudicialreview. APPENDIX 3 provides details of the review schemes for administrative decisions developed in relation to income tax assessment and workplace relations.
Discussionpoints
Discussionpoint1 Aretherewaysinwhichjudicialreviewhasbeenlimitedbywayoflegislative provisionotherthantothosereferredtointhediscussionpaper?(page16) Discussionpoint2 Are there factors additional to justiciability, the legislative/administrative natureofadecision,polycentricityanddeferencewhicharerelevantwhen seekingtodefinethedesirablescopeofjudicialreview?(page40) Discussionpoint3 Aretherefactors(forinstance,resourceconsiderations,decisionsinvolving policy,existenceofadequatealternativeremedies)otherthanthosereferred tointhediscussionpaperthatarerelevanttothegovernmentperspectivein seekingtodefinethedesirablescopeofjudicialreview?(page45) Discussionpoint4 Aretherefactorsrelevanttothepublicperspectiveinseekingtodefinethe desirable scope of judicial review other than those referred to in the discussionpaper?(page48) Discussionpoint5 Is the nature of any ground of review in itself sufficient to justify the limitationorexclusionofjudicialreview?(page66) Discussionpoint6 Aretheremattersassociatedwiththegroundsofjudicialreviewwhichare relevanttothedeterminationoftheappropriatescopeofjudicialreviewother thanthosesetoutinthediscussionpaper?(page66) Discussionpoint7 Are there considerations that need to be taken into account in seeking to definetheappropriatescopeofjudicialreviewotherthantothosereferredto inthediscussionpaper?(page70) Discussionpoint8 Is the need for consistency/predicability in decisionmaking outcomes a sufficientreasonforseekingtolimitorexcludejudicialreview?(page73)
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
Discussionpoint9 Isabuseofthereviewprocessareasonforlimitingaccesstojudicialreview? Does such abuse exist? Can it be better identified by the courts or administrators? Howbestisitaddressedjudiciallyorlegislatively?(page 77) Discussionpoint10 Whatisthesignificanceofthevolume/costofcasesinseekingtolimitor exclude judicial review? Are there other factors, such as poor primary decisionmaking,areluctanceonthepartofthecourtstorefusereviewwhere there are other adequate alternative review mechanisms, or the ready availabilityoflegalaid,whichcontributetothehighvolumeofcases and whichshouldbefirstaddressed?(page82) Discussionpoint11 Aretherecircumstancesinwhichjudicialreviewshouldbelimited/excluded on thebasis ofthepolicynature ofadecision? Is justiciablity afactorin makingthisdetermination?Istheexecutive,orarethecourts,betterplacedto determine when review should be limited on this basis? Are particular groundsofreviewmoresusceptibletoexclusiononthebasisofthepolicy contentofadecisionthanothers?(page92) Discussionpoint12 Where alternative remedies exist in the criminal justice system, are there circumstances in which judicial review should nonetheless be permitted? (page99) Discussionpoint13 Istheexistenceofanongoingrelationship(anemploymentrelationshipfor instance)areasonforlimitingjudicialreviewonsomegrounds?Ifyes,which grounds?(page100) Discussionpoint14 Inseekingtoimposelimitationsondecisionsofalegislativenature,where thosedecisionsareofwideimport,isthisbetterdonebythecourtsorbyway oflegislation?(page106)
Discussionpoint15 Should there be limitations on judicial review in urgent or emergency situations?AresuchlimitationsbetterimposedbythecourtsorParliament? (page107) Discussionpoint16 What impact, if any, should the status of a decisionmaker have on the desirablescopeofjudicialreview?(page110) Discussionpoint17 Whatimpact,ifany,shouldtheexpertiseofadecisionmakerhaveonthe desirablescopeofjudicialreview? Arethereanygroundsofreviewmore susceptibletolimitation/exclusiononthisbasisthanothers?(page112) Discussionpoint18 Howshoulddecisionmakingbyoutsidecontractorsberegulated?(page114) Discussionpoint19 How should decisionmaking by government business enterprises be regulated?(page120) Discussionpoint20 How should decisionmaking by other government bodies be regulated? (page122) Discussionpoint21 Is it appropriate for the legislature to seek to limit judicial review in circumstanceswherethereisnoimpactonthefinaldecisionandnoinjustice? (page124) Discussionpoint22 Arethecourtssufficientlyproactiveinrefusingtoallowjudicialreviewin thefaceofalternativeremedies?(page130) Discussionpoint23 Aretherefactorsrelevanttothecircumstancesinwhichremedieswillpresent adequatealternatives tojudicial reviewotherthanthosereferred tointhe discussionpaper?(page135)
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
Discussionpoint24 Are there particular features of the tax and workplace relations review regimesthatreducetheimportanceofaccesstojudicialreview? Arethereotherregimesinwhich,inexcludingorlimitingjudicialreview, relianceisplacedonalternativeremediestojudicialreview?(page136) Discussionpoint25 Doyouagreewiththeassessmentinthediscussionpaperoftheimpactof particular grounds of judicial review in determining the existence or otherwiseofadequatealternativeremedies?(page138) Discussionpoint26 Inwhatcircumstances,ifany,shouldtheavailabilityoffullmeritsreviewbe sufficienttodisplaceanapplicationforjudicialreview?(page143) Discussionpoint27 Do you agree with the concluding comments in the discussion paper in relationtoalternativeremedies?Arethereanyotherrelevantconsiderations? (page145) Discussionpoint28 Doyouagreethatlegislativeclarityandspecificityareimportantelementsin seekingtolimitjudicialreview?Arethereotherrelevantfactors?(page153)
PARTIINTRODUCTION
SECTIONI TheCouncil Theproject Timingoftheproject
SECTIONII Whatisjudicialreview? Furtheraspectsofjudicialreview

JudicialreviewatcommonlawandundertheAdministrativeDecisions (JudicialReview)Act1977 Groundsofreview
SECTIONIII Limitsonthescopeofjudicialreview
Judiciallimits LegislativelimitstheAD(JR)Act Otherwaysinwhichjudicialreviewhasbeenlegislativelylimited Legislativeschemeswithcomprehensivealternativereviewschemes Nonlegislativemeansoflimitingjudicialreviewprivatisation/outsourcing
SECTIONIV PreviousCouncilinvolvementinconsiderationofthescopeof judicialreview
INTRODUCTION
SECTIONI TheCouncil
1.1 The Administrative Review Council was established under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 as an integral part of the Commonwealth system of administrative law. The Council advises the AttorneyGeneral onabroadrangeofadministrative lawissues related to Commonwealthadministration.
Theproject
1.2 In November 2000 the Administrative Review Council approved a projecttotheexploreoftheproperscopeofjudicialreviewhavingregardto theneedtoachieveanappropriatebalancebetween providingindividuals withameansoftestingthelegalityofadministrativeactionandpreventing litigationfromfrustratinggovernmentpolicies. 1.3 Theintentionofthisdiscussionpaperistoencouragedebateandinvite commentsandsubmissionsonrelevantissues,withaviewtoallowingthe Council to develop a set of principles to assist determination of the circumstancesinwhichjudicialreview,orvariousgroundsofreview,should (or should not) apply. It is anticipated that the ultimate outcome of the projectwillbethepublicationofasetofguidelinesforagencies,legislators andcommentators,exploringpolicyissuesrelevanttothescopeofjudicial review, including the desirable minimum scope of judicial review having regardtoconstitutionalconsiderations. 1.4 InJuly1999theAdministrativeReviewCouncilpublishedabooklet entitled WhatDecisionsShouldBeSubjecttoMeritsReview? Thatpublication containednonbindingguidelinesdesignedtoassistinthedevelopmentof legislativeproposalsinvolvingadministrativedecisionmakingpowers. The Councilhopesthatitsfinalpublicationonthescopeofjudicialreviewwillbe ausefulcomplementtoitsmeritsreviewbooklet.
Timingoftheproject
1.5 InviewoftheCouncil'scloseinvolvement,historically,withthescope of judicial review for the purposes of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review)Act1977 (theAD(JR)Act),andhaving regard to othersubsequent significant developments in the history of Australian judicial review, the
10
Councilconsidersitbothtimelyandhelpfultorevisitthescopeofjudicial review. 1.6 Asaconsequenceoftheincreasinguseofreviewmechanisms,other thantheAD(JR)Act,thescopeofanysuchconsiderationmustnecessarily extendbeyondthescopeofjudicialreviewforthepurposesofthatAct. 1.7 TheCouncilhopesthatthisdiscussionpaperwillmakeasignificant contribution to the debate in this area. It also hopes that the ultimate productionofguidelineswillassiststakeholderstoidentifythecircumstances inwhich,andtheareaofourConstitutionalsystembywhich,theexclusionof judicialreviewisappropriate.
SECTIONII Whatisjudicialreview?
1.8 Aclassicstatementofthescopeandnatureofjudicialreviewistobe foundinthejudgmentofBrennanJinAttorneyGeneral(NSW)vQuin:
Theessentialwarrantforjudicialinterventionisthedeclarationand enforcingofthelawaffectingtheextentandexerciseofpower:thatis thecharacteristicdutyofthejudicatureasthethirdbranchof governmentThedutyandjurisdictionofthecourttoreview administrativeactiondonotgobeyondthedeclarationandenforcingof thelawwhichdeterminesthelimitsandgovernstheexerciseofthe repositoryspower.If,insodoing,thecourtavoidsadministrative injusticeorerror,sobeit;butthecourthasnojurisdictionsimplytocure administrativeinjusticeorerror.
1
1.9 Judicialreviewisnottherehearingofthemeritsofaparticularcase. Rather,itiswhereacourtreviewsadecisiontomakesurethatthedecision maker used the correct legal reasoning or followed the correct legal procedures. 1.10 Onreview,ifacourtfindsthatadecisionhasbeenmadeunlawfully, thepowersofthecourtwillgenerallybeconfinedtosettingthedecisionaside andremittingthemattertothedecisionmakerforreconsiderationaccording
(1990)170CLR1,3536.
INTRODUCTION
11
to law.2 It follows from this that there will be circumstances in which althoughadecisionisnotthecorrectorpreferabledecisiononthefacts,itwill notbeopentojudicialreview.Conversely,theremaybesituationswherea decisionisthecorrectorpreferableone,butmaybesetasidebecauseitis subjecttolegalerror. 1.11 Judicialreviewisamorelimitedrightthanarightofappeal.Asnoted byMasonJ(ashethenwas)inMinisterforAboriginalAffairsvPekoWallsend Ltd:
Thelimitedroleofacourtreviewingtheexerciseofanadministrative discretionmustconstantlybeborneinmind.Itisnotthefunctionofthe courttosubstituteitsowndecisionforthatoftheadministratorby exercisingadiscretion,whichthelegislatorhasvestedinthe administrator.Itsroleistosetlimitsontheexerciseofthatdiscretion, andadecisionmadewithinthoseboundariescannotbeimpugned.
3
1.12 Whereas merits review isavailablein relationtodecisions specified undertheAdministrativeAppealsTribunalAct1975,judicialreviewisavailable foralldecisionsofanadministrativecharacter.
Furtheraspectsofjudicialreview
JudicialreviewatcommonlawandundertheAdministrativeDecisions (JudicialReview)Act1977
1.13 JudicialreviewremediesexistedinAustraliapriortotheintroduction oftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977(theAD(JR)Act)and havecoexistedwiththatActsinceitsintroduction.Thetraditionalcommon lawmeansofchallengingthevalidityofadministrativeactionisbywayofthe prerogativewrits ofprohibition,certiorari andmandamus ortheequitable remediesofinjunctionordeclaration. 1.14 Additionally,thereareactionsfordamagesformisfeasanceinpublic office,forrecoveryofmoneysexactedcoloreofficiiorpaidbymistake4andfor trespass,detinueandconversionwheretheplaintiffchallengesthevalidityof the authority relied upon by the defendant as an answer to the allegedly tortiousacts.Remediesincontractandnegligencemayalsobeavailable.
2 3 4
MinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairsvGuo(1997)191CLR559,578579,598600. (1986)162CLR24,4041citingWednesburyCorporation[1948]1KB,228. SeeforinstanceBeasleyJ,AerolineasArgentinas&OrsvFederalAirportsCorporation(1995)63FCR100.
12
1.15 JurisdictionundertheAD(JR)ActisconferredontheFederalCourt, and review under thatAct may beconsidered to be thatcourts principal judicial review jurisdiction. However, applications for review are not as significantasappealsunderthe AdministrativeAppealsTribunalAct1975 or otherlegislationpermittingappealsastothemeritsofthedecision. 1.16 FurtherjurisdictionalbasesforjudicialreviewinAustraliainclude: section75(iii)oftheConstitutionwhichconfersupontheHighCourt originaljurisdictioninallmattersinwhichtheCommonwealth,or apersonsuingorbeingsuedonbehalfoftheCommonwealth,isa party the High Court's power under section 75(v) of the Constitution to issuetheremediesofmandamus,prohibition,orinjunctionagainstan officeroftheCommonwealth5 section39B(1)oftheJudiciaryAct1903whichconferstheHighCourts Constitutional writ jurisdiction, as described above, on the Federal Court,andsection39B(1A)(c)whichhasgiventhecourtjurisdiction inrelationtoanymatterarisingunderthelawsoftheParliament, other than a matter in respect of which a criminal prosecution is institutedoranyothercriminalmatter;and section44oftheJudiciaryActwhichpermitstheHighCourttoremit matterstotheFederalCourt.Matterswhichmayberemittedinclude those in which mandamus or prohibition is sought against a Commonwealthofficerorinwhichapersonisbeingsuedorsuingon behalfoftheCommonwealthisaparty.
1.17 AtthetimeofthepassageoftheAD(JR)Acttheexpectationwasthat review of administrative decisions under that Act would become the predominantformofreviewinAustralia.Asaresultoflimitationsonreview
5
DescribedbytheHighCourtin ReRefugeeTribunal;ExparteAala (20002001)204CLR82,[20]per
GaudronandGummowJJ. TheCourthasindicatedonanumberofoccasionsthatcertiorariisnot available in the exercise of its jurisdiction under section 75(v) except as ancillary to the Courts jurisdictionandpowertograntoneormoreoftheremediestherementioned:perKirbyJinReMcBain; Ex parteAustralian Catholic BishopsConference;ReMcBain;ExparteAttorneyGeneral (2002)ALJR694, [176].
INTRODUCTION
13
by the Federal Court under the AD(JR) Act6 however, review by way of section 75(v) of the Constitution and section 39B of the Judiciary Act continuestorepresentsignificantalternativestoAD(JR)Actreview. 1.18 WhilesomedecisionsareexcludedfromreviewundertheAD(JR)Act, theFederal Courtcannonetheless deal withsuchmatters by virtueofthe jurisdictionbestowedonitbytheJudiciaryAct. TheHighCourtalsohas original jurisdiction in relation to such matters. Although noting these jurisdictional interfaces, itisnottheCouncils intention,in developing the discussionpaper,tofocusuponthem.
Groundsofreview
1.19 Whileithasbeensaidthatthegroundsofjudicialreviewdefyprecise definition,7mostifnotallareconcernedeitherwiththeprocessesbywhicha decision was made or the scope of the power of the decisionmaker. As noted,resultsoroutcomesofthedecisionmakingprocessarenotprimary concernsofjudicialreview. 1.20 Althoughthecommonlawgroundsarereflectedinlargepartinthe grounds ofreview set out in sections oftheAD(JR) Act,8 there are some differences.Forexample,undertheAD(JR)Act,thecommonlawdistinction betweenerrorsoflawonandofftherecordhasbeenabolished.Thereisalso thecatchallgroundofotherwisecontrarytolaw9 andthenoevidence ground,whichisdifferent fromconsidering whetheradecisionmakerhas wrongfullyincludedorexcludedevidenceorincludedirrelevantevidence.10 1.21 Commonlawjudicialreviewcoverssomeareasofadministrationnot coveredbytheAD(JR)Act,suchasdecisionsnotmadeunderanenactment.
6 7 8
IncludingasaresultofthelimitationsimposedonreviewbySchedule1oftheAD(JR)Actitself. MAronson,BDyer,JudicialReviewofAdministrativeAction,2000,p72. TheAD(JR)ActwastheresultoftherecommendationsmadebytheCommonwealthAdministrative
ReviewCommittee,ReportAugust1971,ParliamentaryPaperNo144,1971(theKerrCommitteereport); supportedbythePrerogativeWritProcedures,ReportofCommitteeofReview,ParliamentaryPaperNo 56,1973(theEllicottCommitteereport),andwasenactedwithaviewtorationalisingthecommonlaw groundsofreviewandprovidingasimplerprocedure.

9
Seesections5(1)(j)and6(1)(j)oftheAD(JR)Act. Sections5(1)(h)and6(1)(h)oftheAD(JR)Act.
10
14
1.22 Forthepurposesofthisdiscussionpaper,theCouncilwilltakeaccount of the following grounds of judicial review.11 While the grounds are not mutuallyexclusive,theyprovideaframeworkfordiscussion: Failuretoobservenaturaljusticeincluding: therighttobeheard theruleagainstactualandapprehendedbias;and theprobativeevidencerule;12
Decisionswhicharenotauthorised,including:13 nosubstantivepower/failuretocomplywithprocedure; abuseofpowerincluding: badfaith14 powernotexercisedforpurposegiven15 unreasonablenessincludingdutytoinquire;16and taking into account irrelevant considerations in the exercise of a discretion or failing to take account of relevantconsiderations;
failuretoexercisediscretion,including: actingunderdictation;17
Excessofjurisdiction,including:
11
AnumberofthesegroundsofreviewareexaminedingreaterdetailinPartIII(I),ofthediscussion Adecisionmaybeheldtobeinvalidonthisgroundonthebasisthatthereisnoevidencetosupport
paper.
12
thedecisionorthatnoreasonablepersoncouldhavereachedthedecisionontheavailablefactsi.e.there isinsufficientevidencetojustifythedecisiontaken.
13
Thedoctrineofultraviresmaybenarroworextended.Thefirstformisthatapublicauthoritymay Anexerciseofdiscretionarypowerinbadfaithiswherethepowerhasbeenexercisedforanulterior Wherethepowerisnotexercisedforthepurposeforwhichithasbeengiven.Thepurposeofthe
notactbeyonditsstatutorypower:thesecondcoversabuseofpoweranddefectsinitsexercise.
14
purpose,thatis,forapurposeotherthanapurposeforwhichthepowerwasconferred.
15
discretionmaybedeterminedfromthetermsandsubjectmatterofthelegislationorthescopeofthe instrumentconferringit.
16 17
Whereadecisionissounreasonablethatnoreasonablepersoncouldeverhavearrivedatit. Whereanofficialexercisesadiscretionarypowerondirectionoratthebehestofsomeotherpersonor
body.Anofficialmayhaveregardtogovernmentpolicybutmustapplytheirmindtothequestionand thedecisionmustbetheirdecision.
INTRODUCTION
15
erroroflaw18/jurisdictionalerror;19and fraud.20
SECTIONIII Limitsonthescopeofjudicialreview
1.23 The nature of our constitutional system is such that the scope of judicialreviewofexecutivedecisionmakingisatopicguaranteedtooccupy themindsofcourtsandgovernment. 1.24 Itappearsalwaystohavebeenrecognised(byboththecourtsandthe executive)thatsomeareasofadministrativedecisionmakingaremoreorless amenabletojudicialreviewthanothers.Therearemanyimportantareasof government decisionmaking where attempts have been made to limit the scopeofjudicialreview.
Judiciallimits
1.25 Areaswherethecourtshaveshownthemselvesunwillingtointervene includeactsofahighgovernmentalorpoliticalnature,suchasthesigningof atreaty,theexistenceofwar,belligerenceandneutralityandtherecognition of foreign governments. Traditionally also,decisions within theindustrial relations area, and more recently, many decisions on personnel matters withinpublicadministration,andwithrespecttoincometaxassessmenthave beenconsideredbythecourtstobelessamenabletojudicialreview.
LegislativelimitstheAD(JR)Act
1.26 TheexceptionstojudicialreviewsetoutinSchedule1theAD(JR)Act 21 represent the largest single legislative consolidation of exemptions from judicial review. They were the subject of consideration in a number of Council publications, notably, the Council's first report, Administrative Decisions(JudicialReview)Act1997,ExclusionsunderSection191978.
18
Inarrivingattheirdecision,adecisionmakermustnotmisinterpretthelegislationunderwhichthey
areactingorinanywayindicateamisunderstandingofthelaw.Likeultravirestherefore,thisground involvespersonsorbodiesactingbeyondtheirlawfulauthority. Historicallythough, thetermwas applied tononjudicialbodiesexercisinglegislativeoradministrative powers,whereasjurisdictional errorwasusedinrelationtoinferiorcourtsortribunalsexercisingjudicialorquasijudicialpowers.

19
Underthisground,adecisionmakermusthavelegalauthoritytodealwiththematteruponwhich Inmostcases,thesortoffraudwhichoccursisthefalsificationorsuppressionofevidence. AcopyofSchedule1totheAD(JR)ActisincludedatAppendixItothediscussionpaper.
theyproposetomakeadecision.
20 21
16
1.27 Another example of a legislative limitation on judicial review is provided by the Migration Reform Act 1992, which replaced the Federal CourtsjurisdictioninrelationtomigrationmattersundertheAD(JR)Actand section39BoftheJudiciaryAct. 1.28 Fromthedateofthatlegislation,theMigrationActcontaineditsown statementofthepermissiblegroundsofreviewbytheFederalCourt.These groundsweremorelimitedthanthoseprovidedforundertheAD(JR)Actor atcommonlaw.22 1.29 WhiletheFederalCourtspowerundersection44oftheJudiciaryAct tohearcasesonremittalfromtheHighCourtremained,inreviewingsuch cases,theFederalCourtwaslimitedtothepowersitwouldhavehadifthe casehadbeencommencedintheFederalCourt.
Otherwaysinwhichjudicialreviewhasbeenlegislativelylimited
1.30 Governmenthasnotbeen contenttolimitjudicial reviewunder the AD(JR)Actalone.Otherbroadermeansoflimitingreview,notably,byway ofprivativeclause,directedatcommonlawreview,havealsobeenused. Privativeclauses 1.31 Typically, a privative clause provides that a decision should not be challenged,appealedagainst,quashedorcalledintoquestion,orbesubjectto prohibition, mandamus or injunction in any court or on any account whatever.23 Aclauseprescribingtimelimitsbeyondwhichtherecanbeno judicialreviewmayalsoberegardedasaprivativeclause.24 1.32 Onitsface,suchaclausewouldappeartobeunconstitutionalinsofar asitseekstodeprivetheHighCourtofitsjurisdictiontorequireofficersof theCommonwealthtoactwithinthelaw.Parliamentmayenactlawswithin
22
InAbebevCommonwealth(1999)197CLR510theHighCourtupheldthepowerofParliamenttodo Regulation17oftheNationalSecurity(CoalMiningIndustryEmployment)Regulations1941(Cth).This Providedtheyarereasonable,suchlimitshavebeenruledvalidbythecourts.SeeforinstanceYong
this.
23
regulationwasthesubjectofconsiderationinRvHickman;exparteFoxandClinton(1945)70CLR598.
24
JunQuinvMinisterforImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairs(1997)144ALR695andHongvMinisterfor ImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairs(1998)82FCR468.SeealsothejudgmentofCallinanJinS157/2002 v CommonwealthofAustralia[2003]HCA2,[164176]inrelationtosection486Aofthe MigrationAct 1985whichimposesatimelimitof35dayswithinwhichtobringproceedingsunderssection75(v)of theConstitutionintheHighCourt.
INTRODUCTION
17
the limits of its legislative capacity which must be conformed with, and 'create,anddefine,theduty,orthepower,orthejurisdiction,anddetermine thecontentofthelawtobeobeyed', 25 thoughit'cannotdeprivetheHigh Court'ofitsconstitutionaljurisdictiontoenforcethelawsoenacted'.26 1.33 Traditionally, such clauses (also known as Hickman clauses)27 have been construed by the courts so as to allow review on three apparently narrowgroundsthatthedecisionwasnotmadebonafide,thatitdidnot relate to the subject matter of the relevant statute and that it was not reasonablyreferrabletothepowerofthedecisionmaker. 1.34 ThisruleofconstructionisameansofreconcilingprovisionsinanAct which impose requirements on a decisionmaker to follow set statutory criteriawhenmakingadecisionwithprovisionswhichpurporttooustthe jurisdictionofthecourtstoreviewwhetherthosecriteriawerecompliedwith. 1.35 AsstatedbyDixonJinHickmanscase:
wherethelegislatureconfersauthoritysubjecttolimitations,andat thesametimeenactssuchaclauseitbecomesaquestionof interpretationofthewholelegislativeinstrumentwhethertransgression ofthelimits,solongasdonebonafideandbearingonitsfaceevery appearanceofanattempttopursuethepower,necessarilyspells invalidity.
28
1.36 AtthetimeofthepassageoftheAD(JR)Act,eightprivativeclauses existedunderfederallegislation.29Whileallwererepealedbysection4ofthat Act, four of the categories of decision covered by the clauses 30 were
25 26 27
SeeS157/2002vCommonwealthofAustralia[2003]HCA2,[5]perGleesonCJ. Id. RvHickman;ExparteFoxandClinton(1945)70CLR598.Thecaserelatedtothevalidityorotherwise
ofregulation17oftheNationalSecurity(CoalMiningIndustryEmployment)Regulations (1941 No. 251944 No. 48), which provided that decisions in relation to the settlement of industrial disputesbyLocalReferenceBoardscouldnotbechallenged,appealedagainst,quashedorcalledinto question,orbesubjecttoprohibition,mandamusorinjunctioninanycourtwhatever.
28
Ibid,616perDixonJ. Seealso DeputyCommissionerofTaxationoftheCommonwealthofAustraliav CoalIndustryAct1946,section44; ConciliationandArbitrationAct 1904, section60; CourtsMartials
RichardWalterPtyLimited(1995)183CLR168.
29
Appeals Act 1955, section 30; Customs Act 1901, section 119; Navigation Act 1935, section 325; Reestablishment and Employment Act 1945, section 28; Public Service Arbitration Act 1920, section 20; StevedoringIndustryAct1956,section22.
30
CoalIndustryAct1946,section44; ConciliationandArbitrationAct 1904, section60; CourtsMartials
AppealsAct1955,section30;CustomsAct1901,section119.
18
subsequently included in Schedule 1to the Act. The Act did notseek to precludefutureuseofprivativeclauses. 1.37 Privativeclauseshaveachievedpublicprominencerecentlyasaresult oftheinclusionofsuchaclauseintheMigrationActbytheMigration(Judicial Review)Act2001. Bymeansofthisclause,appearinginsection474ofthe MigrationAct,ithasbeensoughttolimitthetypesofreviewapplicationsthat canbemade,notonlytotheFederalCourtasformerly,butalsototheHigh Court. 1.38 Althoughthevalidityifnottheeffectiveness,31ofsuchclauseshasbeen largely upheld in cases subsequent to Hickman,32 the Council believes that ratherthanusingprivativeclausesandrelyingonthecourtstomaintaintheir jurisdiction by reading them down, consistent with accepted interpretive principles, it would be more appropriate to set out with precision the boundaries of decisionmaking power so that a persons rights and obligationsareapparentonthefaceofthelegislation. 1.39 Such an approach would also be more in keeping with underlying conceptsofgovernmentaccountabilityandtransparency. Thisissuewillbe returnedtoinmoredetailinthePartVIItothediscussionpaper. Otherlimits 1.40 Otherwaysinwhichjudicialreviewmayinpracticaltermsbelimited bywayoflegislativeprovisioninclude: 1. 2. 3. bygivingadecisionmakingbodyverywidejurisdiction byprovidingthataprovisionisnotintendedtoaffectthevalidityofa determination33 by providing that anything that the body shall have effect as if enactedbyparliament
31
Seeforinstance DarlingCasinoLtdvNewSouthWalesCasinoControlAuthority (1997)191CLR559; SeeparticularlythedecisionoftheHighCourtinS157/2002vCommonwealth[2003]HCA2. In ProjectBlueSkyvAustralianBroadcastingAuthority (1998)CLR355,[93]perMcHugh,Gummow,
HockeyvYelland(1984)157CLR124.
32 33
KirbyandHaneJJsaidthatratherthanseekingtomakeadistinctionbetweenmandatoryanddirectory provisions,thebetterapproachwas'toaskwhetheritwasapurposeofthelegislationthatanactdone inbreachoftheprovisionshouldbeinvalid'.
INTRODUCTION
19
4.
5. 6.
7. 8.
byincludingevidentiaryclausesdeemingallthingsdoneand,thata certain result has been achieved on production of a certificate, or otherformalproofofproperform by way of selfexecuting decision, that is, a decision where the decisionfollowsautomaticallyfromtheexistenceofobjectivefacts34 byprovidinginlegislationthatonlycertaindecisionsarereviewable, thereby excluding others, which may then only be challenged at commonlawonlimitedgrounds by amending the range and scope of the grounds of review themselves;and bymakingcertainaspectsofthedecisionmakingprocesslegislative ratherthanadministrativeincharacter.
1.41 Examples of clauses falling within these categories are set out in Appendix2tothediscussionpaper.
Discussionpoint1 Are there other ways in which judicial review has been limitedlegislatively? Pleaseelaborate.
Legislativeschemeswithcomprehensivealternativereviewschemes
1.42 Aswellasexclusionbywayoflegislativeprovision,somelegislative reviewschemes,asawhole,havetheeffectoflimitingordiscouragingmerits andjudicialreview. Theschemesofreviewdevelopedunderthe Workplace RelationsAct1996,the MigrationAct1958 andthe Income TaxAssessmentAct 1936 are significant examples of this. The comprehensive review process establishedunderthePublicServiceAct1999,withitslayeredreviewprocess anditsemphasisuponalternativeconciliatorymethodsofdisputesettlement isalsorelevant.
Nonlegislativemeansoflimitingreviewprivatisation/outsourcing
1.43 A significant development from the judicial review perspective has beenthegovernmentpolicyofprivatisationandoutsourcing,reflectedinthe
34
SeeGoldievCommonwealthofAustralia (2002)188ALR708involvingconsiderationofsection189of
theMigrationAct1958.
20
increaseinrecentyearsofcontractingoutofgovernmentservicesandinthe corporatisationofgovernmentbusinessenterprises. 1.44 While utilised in areas such as electricity and gas supply, garbage collection and street maintenance, contracting out and corporatisation also extend into areas thathavetraditionallybeen seen as theresponsibilityof government such as social and health services, aged care, housing, public transportandemploymentassistance.35 1.45 Although standards are often imposed on contractors under such schemes, responsibility for enforcing standards lies with the contracting agencies as opposed to service users,36 who do not have direct rights of recourseagainstproviders. 1.46 Such developments have the potential effectively to remove a wide range of government decisions and public functions from the scope of administrativereview,37andinsomecases,fromthescrutinyofparliament.38
SECTIONIV PreviousCouncilinvolvementinconsiderationofthescopeof judicialreview

1.47 Prior to the commencement of the AD(JR) Act, the Council was requested by the Government of the day to advise on the question of exclusionsfromtheapplicationofthatAct. ReportNo1,1978 1.48 Initsfirstreport, AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977 Exclusions Under Section 19 1978, the Council canvassed a range of
35
SeegenerallyAdministrativeReviewCouncil,TheContractingOutofGovernmentServices,ReportNo Forinstance,underthe AgedCareAct1997 (Pt4.4),theSecretaryoftheDepartmentmayimpose As a result of categorising certain activities of such bodies as commercial in confidence the See for instance Robin Creyke, Sunset for the Administrative Law Industry: Reflections on
42,1998.
36
sanctionsonanapprovedproviderfornotcomplyingwiththePrinciplesprescribedundertheAct.
37
accountabilityofsuchbodiesmaybefurtherlimited.
38
Developments under a Coalition Government, in John McMillan (ed) Administrative Law under the Coalition Government, Australian Institute of Administrative Law, 1997, 20. See also Administrative ReviewCouncil,TheContractingOutofGovernmentServices,ReportNo42,1998.
INTRODUCTION
21
arguments forandagainsttheexclusionofvarioussortsofdecisionsfrom reviewundertheAD(JR)Act.Theseincluded: thenumberofdecisionslikelytobebroughtforreview decisionsincludinghighlevelpolicy decisionswhereadequatealternativeavenuesofreviewexist decisions by public authorities in competition with private enterprise employmentdecisionsotherthanthoserelatingtoconciliationand arbitration;and decisionsrelatingtoconciliationandarbitration.
ReportNo9,1980 1.49 Subsequently,inits9threport,AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview) AmendmentBill1980,theCouncilcommentedontheAdministrativeDecisions (JudicialReview)AmendmentBill1980 whichinsertedSchedules1and2into theAD(JR)Act. Initsreport, theCouncilnotedthatanumberofdecisions includedintheSchedulesappearedtobeinconsistentwiththebasesofthe Council'spreviousrecommendationsbasedonthepreviousformoftheAct.39 ReportNo26,1986 1.50 Inits26threport,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview) Act1977StageOne,theCouncilproducedapreliminaryreport,inwhichit consideredwhetherexperienceoftheoperationoftheAD(JR)Acthad:
demonstrated,thatinthecourseofachievingitsprimaryaims,theAct ha[d]leftpublicauthoritiesopentounwarrantedlitigation.
40
1.51 TheCouncilobservedthat:
ItwouldbehighlyundesirableiftheActwerebeingusedundulyto frustrateorimpedelegitimateadministrativeactioninanattemptto obtainmeretacticaladvantage.
41
39
AdministrativeReviewCouncil,AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)AmendmentBill1980,Report AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977Stage Ibid,paragraph9.
No9,1980,paragraph9.
40
One,ReportNo26,1986,paragraph6.
41
22
1.52 Followingananalysisoftheareasinwhichithadbeenallegedthat therehadbeenabusesoftheAct,42 althoughfindingthattherehadbeenno suchabuses,theCouncilidentifiedtwoareasofdifficulty: possibleuseoftheActfordelayingpurposes;and problems of overlapping remedies both in general terms and in termsoflegislationwhichprovidesspecificavenuesforreviewor appealagainstadministrativeaction.
1.53 TheCouncilconsideredfouroptionsforreform: insertingaleaverequirementintheAD(JR)Act extending and clarifying the Federal Courts power to refuse an applicationforreview restrictingreviewofinterlocutorydecisions;and excludingparticularclassesofdecisionsfromAD(JR)Actreview.43
1.54 Apart from decisions taken in the course of committal proceedings involving Commonwealth officers,44 the Council didnotsupport exclusion fromreviewofparticularclassesofdecisionsinrelationtowhichconcerns aboutabuseoftheActhadbeenexpressed. 1.55 Relevantlyhowever,theCouncilrecommendedthattheFederalCourt shouldhaveadiscretiontostayorrefusetograntanapplicationforreview, amongstotherthings:
wheretheFederalCourtissatisfiedthatadequateprovisionismade byanylaw(otherthantheAD(JR)Act)underwhichtheapplicationis entitledtoseekreviewbytheFederalCourt,byanothercourtorby anothertribunal,authorityorperson,ofthatdecision,conductor failure,andthat,inallthecircumstancesofthecase,itwouldbe reasonable,orwouldhavebeenreasonabletoseekthatreview.
45
42
TherewasconcernaboutabuseoftheAD(JR)Actineightareasofcommonwealthadministration:
broadcasting, trade practices, migration, taxation, customs, committal proceedings, prosecution decisionsandextraditionproceedings.
43
AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977Stage Ibid,paragraph96,onconditionthatStatejurisdictiontoreviewsuchdecisionswasrevived. AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977Stage
OneReport,ReportNo26,1986,paragraph48.
44 45
1,ReportNo26,3.
INTRODUCTION
23
1.56 The Council recommended that the discretion should be capable of exerciseatanystageoftheproceedingsandshouldbeexercisedattheoutset ofproceedingswhereverappropriate.46 ReportNo32,1989 1.57 Inits32ndreport,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview) Act:TheAmbitoftheAct,havingregardtotheinclusionintheJudiciaryActof section39B,theCouncilrecommendedwideningthescopeofjudicialreview undertheAD(JR)Actcommensuratewiththatavailableundersection75of theConstitutionbywayoftheConstitutionalwrits. 1.58 In the report, the Council recommended the repeal of many of the paragraphs of Schedule 1 and the extension of the powers of the Federal Court to refuse to grant applications for review, especially where the applicanthadanalternativeremedyavailableandwherethedecisionsought tobechallengedwasnotjusticiable.TheCouncilnotedthat:
Totheextentthat,insomeareasoftheCommonwealthadministration, thereexistssidebysidewithrightsundertheAD(JR)Actarightof appeal,ortomakeotherapplicationtothecourtstheoperationofthe AD(JR)Actasoneforkofabifurcatedreviewpathneedstobe considered.47
1.59 Inconsideringthisissue,theCouncilrecommendedstrengtheningthe Courts discretion to refuse relief in circumstances where alternative relief wasavailable.48 Thisrecommendationwassaidtobeunderpinned bythe objectiveof:
eliminat[ing],asfaraspossible,theneedforlitigantstoconsiderdual avenuesofreviewintheFederalCourtwhich,again,detractfromthe simplicity,equityandefficiencyofthelawandthelegalprocess.49
46
Ibid,paragraphs47,92. OnthestrengthoftherecommendationsmadebytheCouncilinits26th
report, the government introduced amending legislation into the Parliament. The Bill, the Administrative Decisions (Amendment) Bill 1986/8, went further than had been recommended by the Council,byrequiringtheFederalCourttorefuseapplicationsundertheAD(JR)Actwheretheapplicant had analternativerighttoseekreviewunless theapplicant satisfiedtheCourtthattheinterestsof justicerequiredthatitshouldnotrefusetogranttheapplication.
47
AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:TheAmbit Ibid,seeRecommendation15. Ibid,paragraph218.
oftheAct,ReportNo32,1989,paragraph447.
48 49
24
1.60 Inits32nd report,theCouncilalsoconsideredthequestionofjudicial reviewundertheAD(JR)ActofdecisionsofofficersoftheCommonwealth undernonstatutoryschemes,recommendingthattheActshouldbeextended toincludeadecisionofanadministrativecharactermade,orproposedtobe madebyanofficerunderanonstatutoryschemeorprogram,thefundsfor whichwereauthorisedbyagovernmentappropriation.50 1.61 TheCouncilalsobrieflyexaminedtheissueoftheapplicationofthe AD(JR) Act to commercial decisions of government business enterprises (GBEs) that were not statutory authorities, concluding that review of decisions ofGBEs shouldcontinue to beavailableunder theAct,butthat commercialdecisionsofGBEsnotcreatedbystatutebutincorporatedunder companies legislation were subject to sufficient control under corporations law.51 ReportNo38,1995 1.62 In its 38th report, Government Business Enterprises and Commonwealth Administrative Law,theCouncil concluded that,as ageneral principle, the commercialactivitiesofaGBE,undertakeninamarketwherethereisreal competition,shouldbeexemptfromtheadministrativelawpackage.52 The Councilalsonotedhowever,thatactivitiesofaGBEthatwerenotcommercial activitiesconductedinacommercialmarket,shouldcontinuetobesubjectto administrative law.53 The Council again recommended extension of the scopeoftheAD(JR)Acttomakeitcommensuratetothatofsection75ofthe Constitution. 1.63 In its 42nd report, The Contracting Out of Government Services, the Council considered the application of administrative law in the context of servicescontractedouttoextragovernmentalbodies. Itconcludedthatthe contractingoutofgovernmentservicesshouldnotresultinadiminutionof government accountability orthe ability ofmembers of the public to seek
50
Ibid, see Recommendation 1. In its 42nd report, The Contracting Out of Government Services, the
Council repeated this Recommendation; see Administrative Review Council, The Contracting Out of GovernmentServices,ReportNo42,1998,Recommendation22.
51
AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:TheAmbit Ibid,paragraph421. Ibid,paragraph424.
oftheAct,ReportNo32,1989,paragraphs430438.
52 53
INTRODUCTION
25
redresswhereaffectedbytheactionsofacontractordeliveringagovernment service.54
54
AdministrativeReviewCouncil,TheContractingOutofGovernmentServices,ReportNo.42,1998,pvii.
26
PARTIITHESIGNIFICANCEANDCONSTITUTIONAL SCOPEOFJUDICIALREVIEW SECTIONI Thesignificanceofjudicialreview

Anelementoftheruleoflaw Anaidtoaccountability Consistencyandprecedent Anindividualright PreviousCouncilconsideration
SECTIONII TheConstitutionandthescopeofjudicialreview
Separationofpowers Thedistinctionbetweenmeritsandjudicialreview Otherconstitutionallimitsonthescopeofjudicialreview?
SECTIONI Thesignificanceofjudicialreview
2.1 In Australia, judicial review represents an important element in a comprehensiveadministrativejusticesystem.1Otherelementsofthissystem include: internaladministrativereviewbysuperiorofficers externaladministrativereviewbytribunals external scrutiny and recommendations by Ombudsmen and ParliamentaryCommissioners2
Asystemmorecomprehensivelyandspecificallydirectedthanthesystemofentrenchedcivilrightsof
theUnitedStates,theCanadian CharterofRightsandFreedomsortheUnitedKingdoms HumanRights Act1998.

2
ItmightbenotedthattheGovernmenthasrecentlyconsideredestablishinganofficeofInspector
GeneralofTaxationtostrengthentheadvicegiventothegovernmentonmattersoftaxadministration and process. The intention is that the InspectorGeneral will act as an advocate for all taxpayers. ComplaintsforindividualtaxpayerswouldcontinuetobeinvestigatedbytheOmbudsman.
THESIGNIFICANCEANDCONSTITUTIONALSCOPEOFJUDICIALREVIEW
27
2.2
accesstoinformationunderfreedomofinformationlegislationor statutoryrequirementsfortheprovisionofdocuments protectionofinformationunderprivacylegislation statutoryrightstoreasons;and protection against breaches of human rights or discriminatory conductbyhumanrightsandantidiscriminationlegislation Associatedaccountabilitymechanismsinclude: parliamentaryprocessesandcommitteesystems;and theroleofCommonwealthandStateauditorgeneralsinaddressing systemicissues.
2.3 Within this scheme, judicial review has a number of important functions.
Anelementoftheruleoflaw
2.4 As well as defining the constitutional limits of judicial review, the Constitutionunderscoresthesignificanceofjudicialreviewasanelementof theruleoflaw:
Judicialreviewisneithermorenorlessthantheenforcementoftherule oflawoverexecutiveaction;itisthemeansbywhichexecutiveactionis preventedfromexceedingthepowersandfunctionsassignedtothe executivebythelawandtheinterestsoftheindividualareprotected accordingly.3
2.5
Asalsonoted:
Thoseexercisingexecutiveandadministrativepowersareasmuch subjecttothelawasthosewhoareormaybeaffectedbytheexerciseof thosepowers.Itfollowsthat,withinthelimitsoftheirjurisdictionand consistentwiththeirobligationtoactjudicially,thecourtsshould providewhateverremediesareavailableandappropriatetoensurethat thosepossessedofexecutiveandadministrativepowersexercisethem onlyinaccordancewiththelawswhichgoverntheirexercise.Therule oflawrequiresnoless.4
2.6
3 4
Further:
ChurchofScientologyvWoodward(1982)154CLR25,71perBrennanJ. Corporationof theCity ofEnfield vDevelopmentAssessmentCommission (2000)199CLR135,157per
GaudronJ.
28
Totheextentthatthecourtsareimpededfromexercisingjudicialreview ofadministrativedecisions,theruleoflawisnegated.5
Anaidtoaccountability
2.7 Ithasbeensaidthatleavingasideconsiderationsflowingfromtherole ofthecourtsindeterminingthecontentandapplicationoftheruleoflaw, themostobviousbenefitbroughtbyjudicialreviewisthatitforcescarein administratorsandreviewersintheiradjudicativeprocess.6Further:
onebyproductofjudicialreviewasanaccountabilitymeasureisthat itcanencourageindependenceandintegrity.Adecisionmakerwhose rulingissubjecttocurialoversightislesslikelytotoeaparticularpolicy lineorsuccumbtopoliticalpressuretodecidecasesinaparticularway. Thecourtsoffersecuritytothosewhomakeabonafideattempttomake findingsonthefactsandthelawaspresentedandsanctionsforthose whochoosetoactonarbitraryorcapriciousconsiderations.7
Consistencyandprecedent
2.8 One of the important aspects of the jurisdiction of tribunals in our administrativesystemisthattheydonotestablishprecedent:eachcaseisto beexaminedonitsmerits.Incontrast,althoughthedecisiontolitigatecanbe quite ad hoc, the rulings of the courts are of precedential value and can provide direction on important elements of administrative law, especially obligationsimposedupondecisionmakersbyparticularstatutes. 2.9 As noted by the Law Council of Australia in the context of its submissionontheMigration(JudicialReview)Bill1998:
TheRefugeeReviewTribunaldealswithcomplexlegalissuesThe courtsprovideinterpretationoflegislativeprovisionsandonthe relationshipbetweenoldandnewlaws.BoththeRefugeeReview TribunalandtheImmigrationReviewTribunal,likemosttribunals, oftenseedifferencesofopinionarisebetweenthewayparticular membersinterprettherelevantlegislationcourtdecisionsare
5
The Hon Sir Gerald Brennan, The Mechanics of Responsibility in Government (1999) 58(3) Mary Crock, Privative Clauses and the Rule of Law: The Place of Judicial Review Within the
AustralianJournalofPublicAdministration3,9.
6
ConstructofAustralianDemocracy,inSKneebone(ed)AdministrativeLawandtheRuleofLaw:StillPart oftheSamePackage?,AustralianInstituteofAdministrativeLaw,1999,57,80.
7
Id.
29
normativeandbindingontribunalmembers.Thefosteringof consistencybetweenmembersandtheknowledgeofthecorrect interpretationofacertainprovisionarebenefitsforallthoseinvolvedin theimmigrationprocess,fromapplicants,departmentaldecision makersthroughtoreviewofficers.8
Anindividualright
2.10 Governmentisthesourceofmanybenefits,andanindividualsrightto reviewofdecisionsinrelationtotheadministrationofthosebenefits isas importantastheentitlementtobringanactioninthecourtstoenforcearight againstafellowcitizen.9 2.11 Sucharightisnotadequatelyprotectedbythedoctrineofministerial responsibility.10 ThatisreflectedinthecomprehensiveAustraliansystemof administrativelaw. 2.12 Insummary:
judicialreviewplaysanimportantpart,inahighlypublicway,of declaring,reassertingandsupportingimportantstandardsnecessaryto theruleoflawexpressedinthedeliveryofadministrativejusticeaswell asaddressingdeparturesfromthosestandardsinindividualcases.11
PreviousCouncilconsideration
2.13 Consistent with these views, in its Report No 32, Review of the AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:TheAmbitoftheAct,theCouncil notedthat:
Judicialreviewofadministrativedecisionsisanaspectoftheruleoflaw whichrequiresthatexecutiveactionisnotunfetteredorabsolutebutis subjecttolegalconstraints.Theavailabilityofjudicialscrutinyofthe legalityofadministrativeactionservesthetwofoldpurposeof
Submission of the Law Council of Australia to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
CommitteeInquiryintotheMigrationLegislationAmendmentBill(No2)1998,Migration(VisaApplication) ChargeAmendmentBill1998andMigration(JudicialReview)Bill1998,SubmissionNo5,18January1998, 12.

9
FormerChiefJusticeofAustralia,SirAnthonyMasonACKBE,TheImportanceofAdministrative RvToohey;ExparteNorthernLandCouncil(1981)151CLR170,222perMasonCJ. JusticeRSFrench,JudicialReviewRights(March2001)28AIALForum30,32.
ActionasaSafeguardofIndividualRights(December1994)1(1)AustralianJournalofHumanRights3.
10 11
30
protectingindividualrightsandinterestsfromunauthorisedactionand ensuringthatpublicpowersareexercisedwithintheirlegallimits.
12
2.14 Morerecently,initssubmissiontotheSenateLegalandConstitutional LegislationCommitteeontheMigration(JudicialReview)Bill1998,theCouncil observedthat:

IntheCommonwealthcontext,itisoffundamentalconstitutional importancethatadecisionmadeoractiontakenintheexerciseof authority,whateveritssource,issusceptibletoreviewbythecourts,if thedecisionmakeroractiontakerisanofficeroftheCommonwealthor apersonactingfororonbehalfoftheCommonwealthor Commonwealthauthorityandifthedecisionoractionaffectsaright, privilege,duty,obligationorlegitimateexpectationofaperson.
13
2.15 Additionally,theCouncilseesaroleforjudicialreviewin:
enhanc[ing]communityconfidenceaboutthestandardsthatwill generallybeappliedbytheCommonwealthadministrationinmaking decisionswhichaffecttheinterestsofindividualsinthecommunity.An essentialpartofjudicialreviewofadministrativeactionhasbeenthe progressivedevelopmentbyanindependentjudiciaryofprocedural standardsoffairnessandlawfulnessagainstwhichthepowersof governmentofficialsmaybemeasured.14
2.16 TheCouncilmaintainstheseviews,andconsidersthat,withoutgood reason,thescopeofjudicialreviewshouldnotbelimited:

Oustingofjudicialreviewisnotamattertobeundertakenlightlybythe ParliamentItisthecausefortheutmostcautionwhenonearmof government(inthiscasetheExecutive)seekstheapprovalofthesecond armofgovernment(theParliament)toexcludethethirdarmof government(theJudiciary)fromitslegitimaterolewhateverthealleged
12
AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:TheAmbit SubmissionoftheAdministrativeReviewCounciltotheSenateLegalandConstitutionalLegislation
13
CommitteeInquiryintotheMigrationLegislationAmendmentBill(No2)1998,Migration(VisaApplication) ChargeAmendmentBill1998andMigration(JudicialReview)Bill1998,SubmissionNo4,18January1998, at5.

14
AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:TheAmbit
oftheAct,ReportNo32,1989,6.
31
efficiency,expediencyorintegrityoftheprogramsisputforwardin justification.15
SECTIONII TheConstitutionandthescopeofjudicialreview
Separationofpowers
2.17 As recognised some thirty years ago by the Commonwealth Administrative ReviewCommittee (theKerr Committee), theshapeofour federal systemofadministrativelawis very much the consequence ofthe regimeestablishedbyPartsI,IIandIIIoftheConstitution,particularlythe conceptoftheseparationofpowers.16 Constitutionalconsiderationsdefine notonlythesignificanceofjudicialreview,butalsoitslimits. 2.18 A very important consequence of the separation of powers for the federal administrative review system is that whereas in the review of administrative decisions, the courts can exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth,administrativetribunalscannot.
Thedistinctionbetweenmeritsandjudicialreview
2.19 Thejudicialreviewpowersvestedinthecourtsarecomplementaryto butdistinctfromtheadministrativereviewpowersvestedinCommonwealth meritsreviewtribunals. Eventhoughinmakingdecisions,ameritsreview tribunalmayberequiredtoformopinionsonquestionsoflaw,someofwhich maybecomplexanduntestedbythecourts,ultimately,thedeterminationof suchquestionsisanexerciseoffederaljudicialpowerandmustbemadeby thecourts. Inreachingtheirdeterminations,thecourtsarenotrequiredto haveregardtotheinterpretationplacedonthelawbytribunals. 2.20 Thedifferencebetweenmeritsandjudicialreviewiscommonlystated in terms of merits review enabling the review of all aspects of a decision includingfindingsastofacts andtheexercise ofanydiscretions thatmay have been conferred on the decisionmaker, whereas judicial review is concernedonlywithwhetherornotthedecisionwaslawfullymade.
15
Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Consideration of Legislation Referred to the
Committee:MigrationLegislationAmendment(JudicialReview)Bill1998,April1999,27citingtheScrutiny ofBillsCommitteereportquotedinSubmissionNo.8,NationalCouncilofChurchesinAustralia,3.
16
TheKerrCommitteereport,1971,seeparticularlyChapter4,paragraphs5973.
32
2.21 Ameritsreviewbodywillstandintheshoesoftheprimarydecision makerandwillmakeafreshdecisionbasedonalltheinformationavailableto it.17 Whereas the object of merits review is to ensure that the correct or preferable decision is made on the material before the decisionmaker, 18 judicialreviewisdirectedtowardsensuringthatthedecisionmadebythe primary decisionmaker was properly made within the legal limits of the relevantpower. 2.22 Inresponsetotheconstitutionaldividebetweenjudicialandexecutive power,thecourtshaveshownthemselvesconcerned,onmanyoccasions,to acknowledge and to maintain the margins between judicial and merits review. 2.23 AsnotedbyBrennanJinQuinscase:
Ifthecourtsweretoassumeajurisdictiontoreviewadministrativeacts ordecisionswhichareunfairintheopinionofthecourtnotthe productofproceduralunfairness,butunfaironthemeritsthecourts wouldbeassumingajurisdictiontodotheverythingwhichistobe donebytherepositoryofanadministrativepower,namely,choosing amongthecoursesofactionuponwhichreasonablemindsmight differIfjudicialreviewweretotrespassontheexerciseof administrativepower,itwouldputitsownlegitimacyatrisk.19
2.24 SimilarviewsweresubsequentlyexpressedbyfourHighCourtjudges inMinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairsvWuShanLiangwhereitwasalso notedthat:

thereasonsofanadministrativedecisionmakeraremeanttoinform andnottobescrutinisedupon[by]overzealousjudicialreviewby seekingtodiscernwhethersomeinadequacymaybegleanedfromthe wayinwhichthereasonsareexpressed.
20
2.25 In aseparate judgmentin WuShanLiangs case,Kirby Jsaidthata decisionmakersreasonsmustbeconsideredfairlyandthat:

17
Administrative Review Council, Better Decisions: Review of Commonwealth Merits Review Tribunals,
Report No 39, 1995, paragraphs 2.2 2.3, 2.54 2.55, and for example, powers conferred on the AdministrativeAppealsTribunalbysubsection43(1)oftheAdministrativeAppealsTribunalAct1974.
18 19 20
ReDrakevMinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairs(1979)2ALD60,68. AttorneyGeneral(NSW)vQuin(1990)170CLR1,3738perBrennanJ. (1996)185CLR259,272perBrennanCJ,Toohey,McHughandGummowJJ.
33
Itiserroneoustoadoptanarrowapproach,combingthroughthewords ofthedecisionmakerwithafineappellatetoothcomb,againstthe prospectthataverbalslipwillbefoundwarrantingtheinferenceofan erroroflaw.21
2.26 Furthermore,ithasbeensaidthat:
Theprocessofadministrativedecisionmakingisoftenquitedifferent fromthesyllogisticprocessofjudicialdecisionmaking.Inthefirst place,judicialdecisionmakingusuallyhasonlytwobasicelements:law andfactIfthediscretionorevaluationplaysapart,thepartiswell confined.Nobroadpolicyelementsintrude.Butpolicyisoftenan integralpartofadministrativedecisionmaking,denyingtheapplication ofthesyllogisticmethod.Adecisionmakerwhohasmistakenafactor madeanerrorinlawmayneverthelessmakethecorrectorpreferable decisionifhelegitimatelyappliesapolicywideenoughtorequirethe samedecisionwhetherornottherebeamistakeoranerroroflaw. Someadministrativeactionisnotbasedupontheexistenceofafactbut ontheapprehensionofthepossibilitythatthefactexists.22
Otherconstitutionallimitsonthescopeofjudicialreview?
2.27 Fromaconstitutionalperspective,beyondtheissueofthedichotomy between judicialandlegislativepower,theCommonwealthParliamenthas considerable power to limit persons obtaining remedies prohibiting or enforcingadministrativeaction. 2.28 Consistentwiththisview,ithasbeensaidthat:
Theproperbalancebetweenmeritsandjudicialreviewisultimatelya matteroflegislativepolicy,subjectofcoursetoanyconstitutional restrictionsonthecompleteremovalofjudicialreview.Itisforthe governmenttodeterminewhethertohaveanymeritsreviewof administrativedecisions,andifso,theappropriatenumberoflevelsor tiersofmeritsreview(whetherinternalorexternal).Within constitutionallimits,itisalsoopenforthegovernmenttofindwaysto limittheavailabilityandscopeofjudicialreviewavenues,soastoplace moreemphasisonameritsreviewprocess.23
21 22 23
Ibid,291. JusticeBrennan,'ThePurposeandScopeofJudicialReview'(1986)2AustralianBarReview93,95. DavidBennettQC,CommonwealthSolicitorGeneral,BalancingJudicialReviewandMeritsReview
(September2002)53AdminReview22.
34
2.29 Suchlimitationsareofcoursesubjecttothewellrecognisedprinciple thatthesubjectsrightofrecoursetothecourtisnottobetakenawayexcept byclearwords.24 2.30 AssaidbyGleesonCJinS157/2002vCommonwealthofAustralia:

Section75(v)oftheConstitutionconfersuponthisCourt,aspartofits originaljurisdiction,jurisdictioninallmattersinwhichawritof mandamus,orprohibition,oraninjunction,issoughtagainstanofficer oftheCommonwealth.Itsecuresabasicelementoftheruleoflaw.The jurisdictionoftheCourttorequireofficersoftheCommonwealthtoact withinthelawcannotbetakenawaybyParliament.Withinthelimitsof itslegislativecapacity,whicharethemselvessetbytheConstitution, ParliamentmayenactthelawtowhichofficersoftheCommonwealth mustconform.Ifthelawimposesaduty,mandamusmayissueto compelperformanceofthatduty.Ifthelawconferspoweror jurisdiction,prohibitionmayissuetopreventexcessofpoweror jurisdiction.Aninjunctionmayissuetorestrainunlawfulbehaviour. Parliamentmaycreate,anddefine,theduty,orthepower,orthe jurisdiction,anddeterminethecontentofthelawtobeobeyed.Butit cannotdeprivethisCourtofitsconstitutionaljurisdictiontoenforcethe lawsoenacted.
25
24 25
HockeyvYelland(1984)157CLR124,130perGibbsCJ. [2003]HCA2,[5].
OTHERFACTORSRELEVANTTOTHESCOPEOFJUDICIALREVIEW
35
PARTIIIOTHERFACTORSRELEVANTTOTHESCOPEOF JUDICIALREVIEW INTRODUCTION Reasonsforlimitingjudicialreview SECTIONI Thejudicialperspective

Justiciability Legislativedecisions Polycentricdecisions Deference
SECTIONII Theexecutiveperspective
ConsiderationsinthecontextoftheCouncilsfirstreport Otherconsiderationsinseekingtolimitjudicialreview
SECTIONIII Thepublicperspective
INTRODUCTION Reasonsforlimitingjudicialreview
3.1 Policy considerations relevant to the scope of judicial review are generally not neatly set out anywhere. Nor are they necessarily always apparent through a process of logical deduction. For instance, where the impactofanadministrativedecisionuponthefreedomofanindividualmight beconsideredtobeanimportantconsiderationindeterminingwhetherornot thereshouldbearightofjudicialreview,theendfocusofjudicialreviewis notuponmeritsoutcomes.
36
3.2 Asnotedearlierinthediscussionpaper,inreviewingadministrative action,thecourtstaskdoesnotextendpastidentifyingandenforcingthelaw determinativeofthelimitsandgoverningtheexerciseofthedecisionmakers power. 3.3 It has been remarked by Brennan J in the case of AttorneyGeneral (NSW)vQuinthat:
If,insodoing,thecourtavoidsadministrativeinjusticeorerror,sobeit: butthecourthasnojurisdictionsimplytocureadministrativeinjustice orerror.Themeritsofadministrativeaction,totheextentthattheycan bedistinguishedfromlegality,arefortherepositoryoftherelevant powerand,subjecttopoliticalcontrol,fortherepositoryalone. Theconsequenceisthatthescopeofjudicialreviewmustbedefinednot intermsoftheprotectionofindividualinterests,butintermsofthe extentofthepowerandthelegalityofitsexercise.
1
3.4 So it is that in the criminal, extradition and migration areas for instance, all of them involving decisions concerning personal liberty, the applicationofjudicialreviewhasbeensubjecttostatutorylimitation. 3.5 As reflected in earlier discussion, it appears to be accepted by all elementsinvolvedinAustraliasadministrativelawsystem(theexecutive,the legislature and the judiciary), that in some circumstances, subject to constitutional limitations, there should be limits on the scope of judicial review. 3.6 In seeking to identify the relevant policy considerations underlying thisview,theCouncilwillbelookingatarangeofmaterials,includingwhat has been said by courts and individual judges, administrators and commentators (including the Council) in relation to the scope of judicial reviewundertheAD(JR)Act,otherlegislativeregimesandatcommonlaw. In so doing, however, it is not possible to dispense entirely with ConstitutionalconsiderationsdiscussedinPartIIofthediscussionpaper.
(1990)170CLR1,36.
37
SECTIONI Thejudicialperspective
3.7 There are at least four important areas in which the courts have imposedlimitationsuponthescopeoftheirownpowersinresponsetothe Constitutional boundaries to judicial review. These limitations are often articulated in terms of related, though less constitutionally directed considerations, and represent a valuable tool in determining the desirable scopeofjudicialreview.
Justiciability
3.8 Nowadays,justiciabilitymaybestbecategorisedasaconceptwhose purposeistoconfinethecourtstotheexerciseofjudicialpowerinrelationto issues notproperly assignable to other branches ofgovernment under the separation of powers doctrine and otherwise within the institutional competenceofthecourts.2Conversely,nonjusticiabilityisatermthatmay convenientlybeusedtodenotedecisionswherethecourtisoftheviewthat thedecisionmakingfunctionlieswithintheprovinceoftheexecutiveand thatitisinappropriatethatthecourtsshouldtrespassintothatpreserve.3 3.9 Historically,thereisarangeofdecisionsinwhichthecourtshavelong indicatedareluctancetointervene.Suchdecisionsmaybetracedbacktothe seventeenthcenturyandtherulesrelatingtotheimmunityoftheCrownfrom judicialreviewandforprotectingtheunboundeddiscretionoftheKings prerogatives.4 3.10 Recent developments in the concept of justiciability have coincided with the diminution of the prerogative powers,5 and a corresponding
2
The Hon Sir Anthony Mason AC KBE, The High Court as Gatekeeper (2000) 24(2) Melbourne
UniversityLawReview 784,788andTheImportanceofJudicialReviewofAdministrativeActionasa SafeguardofIndividualRights(December1994)1(1)AustralianJournalofHumanRights3,8.

3
TheHonSirAnthonyMasonACKBE,TheImportanceofJudicialReviewofAdministrativeActionas
aSafeguardofIndividualRights AnAddresstotheAustralianBarAssociationFifthBiennialConference, 4July1994,14.

4
R v Toohey ; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170, 218 per Mason J quoting from
WBlackstone, CommentariesontheLawsofEngland (1809)Bk1,p251. SeealsoMargaretAllars,The RightsofCitizensandtheLimitsofAdministrativeDecisions:TheContributionofSirAnthonyMason toAdministrativeLaw(2000)28(2)FederalLawReview187.

5
Theprerogativepowersinclude, interalia,thepowertoconductforeignaffairs,todeclarewaror
peace,toenterintointernationaltreaties,toprorogue,dissolveandsummontheparliament,toappoint Commonwealthofficers(CommonwealthConstitution,section64)andaprioritytodebts.
38
expansionoftherangeofexecutivepowersexercisedbyofficials.Therehas beenarelatedrecognitionthatthedoctrineofCrownimmunityhaslessforce inrelationtoexecutiveaction.ThisisreflectedinRvToohey:exparteNorthern LandCouncil,whereitwasnotedthatanexerciseofstatutorydiscretionary power by the Queens representative very often affects the right of the citizen6and:
theremaybeadutytoexercisethediscretiononewayoranother;the discretionmaybepreciselylimitedinscope;itmaybeconferredfora specificoranascertainablepurpose;anditwillbeexercisableby referencetocriteriaorconsiderationsexpressorimplied.
7
3.11 InthewakeofTooheyithasbeensaidthat:
[the]functionassociatedwithCrownimmunity[hasbeen]banished fromadministrativelaw.Theassumptionthatquestionsofjusticiability couldbeansweredonthebasisofsimpledistinctionsbetweenstatutory powersandprerogativepowers,orbetweenthestatusoftheQueens representativeandthatofaminister,[hasbeen]exploded.
8
3.12 Nonetheless,itissuggestedthattheconceptofjusticiabilityremainsan importantelementofouradministrativelawsystem. 3.13 Indeterminingwhetherornotadecisionisjusticiable,thenatureand effect of the decision have emerged as critical factors. Two elements are involved: whetherthedecisionhasconsequenceswhichaffectsomepersonor bodyotherthanthedecisionmakerbyeither: altering legal rights or obligations enforceable by or againstaperson;or deprivingapersonofsomebenefitswhichtheyhadin the past and which they can legitimately expect to continue or where an assurance has been given by the decisionmakerthattherightwillnotbewithdrawn,or deprivingapersonofsomebenefitoradvantageorbody otherthanthedecisionmaker;and
6 7 8
(1981)151CLR170,219. Id. MargaretAllars,'TheRightsofCitizensandtheLimitsofAdministrativeDecisions:theContribution
ofSirAnthonyMasontoAdministrativeLaw'(2000)28(2)FederalLawReview187,196.
39
whether there are special features of the decision which make judicialreviewinappropriate9 suchasissuesofhighlevelpolicy, polycentricity,10 and decisions of a legislative nature (discussed above).
3.14 ThefoundationforjusticiabilitywasdiscussedbyKirbyJ:
Th[e]foundation[ofjusticiability]liesintheseparationofpowers requiredbytheConstitution.Isthequestiontendered,ofitsnature,such asisapttoacourtperformingcourtlikefunctions?Ifitisnot,itmatters littleinpracticaltermswhetherthecourt,facinganobjection,rulesthat itlacksjurisdictionforwantofa"matter"engagingitspowers,orthatit saysthatanysuch"matter"wouldbenonjusticiable.Ineitherevent,the court'sdutyisplain.Itshouldstoptheproceedingsforthwith.Itwill therebysendthepartiestotheotherbranchesofgovernment,ortoother publicfora,inwhichtheycanmaketheircomplaint.
11
3.15 Withreferencetotheseconsiderations,althoughsomedecisionsareno longerimmunefromjudicialreviewonthebasisofprerogative,theyarestill treated with caution by the courts. Decisions affecting national security, foreignaffairs,decisions toprosecute ornottoprosecuteandthegrantof pardonstoconvictedpersonsareamongstsuchdecisions.However,itisnot sufficient to seek to identify cases that are nonjusticiable on the basis of subjectmatteralone.12 3.16 Thegrantofexecutivepowerundertheconstitutionnecessarilyentails the imposition of enforceable limitations on the exercise of that power.13 Althoughnonjusticiabilitymayexcludecertainaspectsofjudicialreview,it maynotexcludeothers. Someaspectsofdecisionsrelatingtointernational
SeeLordDiplockinCouncilofCivilServiceUnionsvMinisterfortheCivilService[1985]1AC374,4089.
SeealsoWilcoxJinMinisterforArts,HeritageandtheEnvironmentvPekoWallsend(1987)75ALR218,305 andKioavWest(1985)159CLR550,583perMasonJ.
10
Thatis,disputesrequiring accounttobetakenofalargenumberofinterlockingandinteracting
interests and considerations. See, forexample, LonFuller, TheFormsandLimits ofAdjudication (1979)92HarvardLawReview353.

11 12
ThorpevCommonwealthofAustralia(No3)144ALR677,692. SirAnthony MasonACKBE,TheScopeofJudicialReview,Lecture2, NationalLectureSerieson ReDitfort;exparteDeputyCommissionerofTaxation(NSW)(1998)19FCR347,369.
AdministrativeLaw(November2001)AIALForumNo3121,24.
13
40
relations,nationalsecurityandevenpolitics,maybejusticiable.14Irrespective ofsubjectmatter,decisionswillbesubjecttojudicialreviewiftheyareillegal orultravires.15 3.17 Regardmayalsobehadtothenatureofthedecisionunderreview, includingthewayitisarrivedat,ratherthanthegeneralsubjectarea.Inone case for example, where a decision to remove someones positive security vetting due to sexual preference was based on national security considerationsandwasnotreviewableonsubstantivegrounds,itwasheld thatthedecisionwasreviewableforbreachofproceduralfairness.16 3.18 Atitsbroadest,justiciabilityhasbeensaidtocovermatterssuchasthe availabilityofalternativeandmoreconvenientremedies,politicalquestions, questionsconcerningthedistributionofscarceresourcesandfuturerights.17 3.19 Justiciability in the broadsense is whatasignificantportion ofthis discussionpaperisabout.
Legislativedecisions
3.20 InPartIIofthediscussionpaper,'Thesignificanceandconstitutional scopeofjudicialreview',broadconstitutionallimitsontheexerciseofjudicial review have been canvassed. Arising from one of these limitations, the doctrine of the separation of powers, is the accepted categorisation of governmentfunctionsaslegislative,administrativeandjudicial. 3.21 Althoughdecisionsarerarelyheldtobeinvalidonthebasisofthese distinctions, apart from those reflecting an exercise of judicial power, the legislativeoradministrativecharacterofadecisionhasbeenanaspectwhich both the courts and government have taken into account in determining whichhaspreeminence. 3.22 ThedistinctionishighlightedintheAD(JR)Act,whichislimitedinits applicationtoadministrativedecisions.18 However,ithaslostmuchofits
14
PeterCane,MeritsReviewandJudicialReview:TheAATasTrojanHorse(2000)28 FederalLaw SirAnthonyMason,TheImportanceofJudicialReviewofAdministrativeActionasaSafeguardof RvDirectorofGovernmentCommunicationsHeadquarters;ExParteHodges[1988]COD123. PeterCane,TheFunctionofStandingRulesinAdministrativeLaw(1980)PublicLaw303,312. Seethedefinitionofdecisioninsubsection3(1)oftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act
Review213,2167.
15
IndividualRights(December1994)1(1)AustralianJournalofHumanRights3,8.
16 17 18
41
significanceasaresultoftheinclusionintheJudiciaryActofsection39B(1A) (c),whichconfersjurisdictionontheFederalCourtinmatters'arisingunder anylawmadebyParliament'.19 3.23 Recentcaselawseekstoaddresstheissueofwhetherornotadecision islegislativeintermsofwhetherornottherightsofparticularindividuals are affected. In Kioa v West for instance, three of the majority judges emphasised the need for persons to be affected as individuals if natural justiceistoapply.20 3.24 This topic is explored in more detail in Section III of Part V of the discussionpaper,'Natureofthedecision'.
Polycentricdecisions
3.25 Ithasbeensaidthat:
Thenotionoflegalpolycentricityisbestunderstoodasreferringto matterswhicharemarkedbythenumerous,complexandintertwined natureoftheissues,oftherepercussions,andoftheinterestsandpeople affected.Forexample,anydecisionrequiringtheallocationofeconomic resourcesissignificantlypolycentric,aseverycompetingclaimon governmentresourcesisarelevantfactor.21
3.26 Apolycentricdecisionmaythereforebeadecisioninvolvingcomplex policyissuesrelatingtotheeconomic,politicalandsocialconsequencesofa proposed mining project, as occurred in Minister for Arts, Heritage and EnvironmentvPekoWallsend.22Aresultisthatthecasemaynotbeappropriate forjudicialreview. 3.27 Apolycentricdecisionmayalsobeonewherethelimitednature of availablegovernmentfundingwillconstantlymeanthatthegovernmentwill havetobalanceitspriorities.Thereisauthorityfortheviewthatthecourts may intervene in such circumstances where an allocation of resources is beyondpoweror'capriciousandirrationalsuchthatnoreasonableperson
1997.
19
ForfurtherdiscussionseeAustralianLawReformCommissionReport92,October2001,TheJudicial KioavWest(1985)159CLR550,584perMasonJ,61921perBrennanJand632perDeaneJ. JeremyKirk,Rights,ReviewandReasonsforRestraint(March2001)23(1)SydneyLawReview19,26. (1987)75ALR218.
PoweroftheCommonwealth,AReviewoftheJudiciaryAct1903andRelatedLegislation,136.
20 21 22
42
couldhavedevisedit':however,thecourtsshouldnotintervenetodevisea fairermethodofallocation.23 3.28 Caselawindicates thatthecourts willretreat fromreviewthatwill haveanimpactontheallocationofresources.AsnotedbyoneBritishjudge:

Iwouldstresstheabsoluteundesirabilityofthecourtmakinganorder whichmayhavetheeffectofcompellingadoctororhealthauthorityto makeavailablescarceresources(bothhumanandmaterial)toa particularchild,withoutknowingwhetherornotthereareother patientstowhomthoseresourcesmightmoreadvantageouslybe devoted.
24
3.29 On one view, polycentric disputes are inappropriate for judicial resolutiononthebasisthatnotallaffectedpartiesmaybeidentifiableorable to be brought before the court and that there may be too many possible permutations of results for the parties and judges to be able to provide reasonsforthemakingofadecision.25 However,ithasalsobeenobserved that:
Alljudicialdecisionsarepolycentrictotheextentthattheyhave precedentialvalueandthosedecisionscoverinterestsandmattersnot directlybeforethecourt.
26
3.30 Itisnoted27thattheCanadianSupremeCourtiswillingtopermitthe intervention of affected parties,28 whilst the US Supreme Court has long permitted written submissions from interested parties as amici curiae.29 In Australian cases such as Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority30 involvingachallengetothevalidityofAustralian Broadcasting
23
MinisterforPrimaryIndustriesvAustralFishing (1993)112ALR211,221and230perBeaumontand ReJ(AMinor)(MedicalTreatment)[1992]4AllER614,625perLeggatJ. LonFuller,TheFormsandLimitsofAdjudication(1979)92 HarvardLawReview 353,3945and JeremyKirk,Rights,ReviewandReasonsforRestraint(March2001)23(1)SydneyLawReview19,26. Id. FLMortonandIBrodie,TheUseofExtrinsicEvidenceinCharterLitigationbeforetheSupreme USSupremeCourtRules,Rule37. (1998)194CLR355.
HillJJ.
24 25
4023.
26 27 28
CourtofCanada(1993)3NationalJournalofConstitutionalLaw1,10.
29 30
43
Authoritystandardsregulations,atendencyinthisregardisnoted,although whetheritwillcrystalliseremainsuncertain.31 3.31 Ithasbeensaidthat:

neitherpolycentricityinparticular,norcapabilityingeneral,isavalid perseobjectiontojudicialreviewofconstitutionalrights.However,they maybefactorssupportingjudicialrestraintinparticularcases,andthey mayrequireextensionsoftraditionalproceduresrelatingtoevidence andtherepresentationofwiderinterests.32
3.32 Althoughunlikelytobereviewablegenerally,suchdecisionswould nonethelessbereviewableforultravires.Further,ithasbeenobservedwith referencetotheTampacase33thatthecourtsmustbesatisfiedthatamatteris nonjusticiablebeforetheydeclinetodealwiththematter.34 3.33 Inthatcase,itwasnotedthat:

Itisnotaninterferencewiththeexerciseofexecutivepowerto determinewhetheritexistsinrelationtothesubjectmattertowhichitis appliedandwhetherwhatisdoneiswithinitsscope.EvenintheUnited Kingdom,unencumberedbyawrittenconstitution,thethreshold questionwhetheranactisdoneunderprerogativepowerisjusticiable.35
Deference
3.34 Theroleofthecourtswithrespecttojudicialreviewmaybelimitedif thereisaprincipleofdeferenceapplied. 3.35 ThefocusofdeferenceinAustraliaisprimarilyuponfindingsoffact andverbalslipsinstatementsofreasonsandistobecontrastedwiththefocus oftheUnitedStatesChevrondoctrine36andtoanextent,theCanadianpublic
31
See AttorneyGeneralvBreckler (1999)197CLR83. Thejudgmentsin ReMcBain;ExparteAustralian JeremyKirk,Rights,ReviewandReasonsforRestraint(March2001)23(1) SydneyLawReview 19, RuddockvVadarlis(2001)183ALR1. SirAnthonyMasonACKBE,TheScopeofJudicialReview,Lecture2,NationalLectureSerieson RuddockvVardalis(2001)183ALR1,[30]perBlackCJandFrenchJ. TheChevrondoctrineappliesintheUnitedStateswherethestatuteadministeredbyafederalagency
CatholicBishopsConference;ReMcBain;ExparteAttorneyGeneral(2002)76ALJR694wouldsuggestnot.
32
2728.
33 34
AdministrativeLaw(November2001)AIALForumNo3121,26.
35 36
or regulatory authority is susceptible of several constructions, each of which may be seen to be a reasonable representation of Congressional intent. As noted by Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and
44
intereststandard,37 onagencyinterpretationoflegislation. Contrarytothe position in those two countries, in Corporation of the City of Enfield v DevelopmentAssessmentCommission,theHighCourthasemphasisedthatthe approachisnot:
theproductofanydoctrineofdeference,butofbasicprinciplesof administrativelawrespectingtheexerciseofdiscretionarypowers.38
3.36 Insupportofthisview,theCourtadvertedtothedistinctionbetween the merits and the legality of administrative action, and to comments of BrennanJinWaterfordvCommonwealth39totheeffectthatthereisnoerrorof lawsimplyinmakingawrongfindingoffact. 3.37 However,wherethelegalityofexecutiveadministrativeactiontaken pursuanttoadecisiondependsontheexistenceofaparticularfactorfactual situation,andthequestioniswhetherthetribunalactedwithinjurisdiction, their Honours held that the court must make its own independent determination.Thisobligationwouldarisenotwithstandingthefactthatthe courtmightattachgreaterweighttothedecisionofaprimarydecisionmaker withparticularknowledgeofanindustryorotherwisespeciallyequippedto makethedecision.40 3.38 TheCourtacknowledgedhoweverthatwhileitmustcometoitsown answeronthequestionofjurisdiction,ifinsodoingitwereindoubtastoany factualmatter,itwouldbeopentoit'toresolvethatdoubtbygivingweight toanydeterminationuponitbytheprimarydecisionmaker.41
HayneJJinCorporationoftheCityofEnfieldvDevelopmentAssessmentCommission(2000)199CLR135,151 Itisamatter ofdebateintheUSwhether thedoctrineappliestotheinterpretationbyagenciesof statuteswhichdefinetheirjurisdiction.
37
This arises from a generalrequirement in Canada that administrative agencies take into account
publicinterestintheirdecisionmaking. ThereisalsoanotherdeferencedoctrineinCanadaarising fromthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtofCanadain NewBrunswickLiquorCorpvCUPELocal963 ((1979) SCR227) restricting courts abilitytoreviewadministrators interpretation oftheir statutory charter, including jurisdictional facts, unless the decision was patently unreasonable. See further, Robin Creyke, The Criteria and Standards for Merits Review by Administrative Tribunals, CommonwealthTribunals:TheAmbitofReview,LawandPolicyPapers,PaperNo9,CentreforInternational andPublicLaw,1,pp1516.
38
Ibid,153,perGleesonCJ,Gummow,KirbyandHayneJJ. SeealsojudgmentbyGaudronJinthe (1978)71ALR673. (2000)199CLR135,155. (2000)199CLR135,151,perGleesonCJ,Gummow,KirbyandHayneJJ.Seealsothejudgmentof
samecase.
39 40 41
45
3.39 The doctrine is also relevant to certain decisions made within jurisdiction.InEnfield,42theHighCourthassaidthatwherequestionsarise, within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, upon a settled construction of the applicable legislation and where little mightbe gained from a detailed examination of previous decisions, in a proceeding in the original jurisdiction of a court on "appeal" from that tribunal, the 'court shouldattachgreatweighttotheopinionofthe[tribunal]'. 3.40 Referenceismadetoacase43wherethecourtsaidthatit'shouldattach greatweighttotheopinionofthetribunal'inconsideringwhetheraproposed trademarkwasdistinctiveandoughttohavebeenregistered.44 TheCourt alsonoted45approvalbyDixonCJ,WilliamsandKittoJJinanothercase46ofa passagefromajudgmentofLloydJacobJstatingthat:
Byreasonofhisfamiliaritywithtradeusagesinthiscountry,a familiaritywhichstemsnotonlyfromanexaminationofmarksapplied forandofthemanytradejournalswhichhesees,butfromtheperusal andconsiderationoftradedeclarationsandthehearingofapplications oroppositions,theRegistrarispeculiarlywellfittedtoassessthe standardsbywhichthetradeandpublicmustbeexpectedtoestimate theuniquenessofparticularindicationsoftradeorigin.
47
3.41 AsnotedbyGleesonCJ,Gummow,KirbyandHayneJJ,48theweightto be given to the opinion of the tribunal in each case will depend on the circumstances.AccordingtotheirHonours,suchmattersasthefieldinwhich thetribunaloperates,criteriaforappointmentofitsmembers,thematerials onwhichitactsinexercisingitsfunctionsandtheextenttowhichdecisions are supported by disclosed processes of reasoning, would be relevant considerations.
GaudronJ158159.
42 43 44 45
Ibid,154,perGleesonCJ,Gummow,KirbyandHayneJJ. Id. RegistrarofTrademarksvMuller(1980)144CLR37,41. CorporationoftheCityofEnfieldvDevelopmentAssessmentCommission (2000)199CLR135,154per InEclipseSleepProductsIncvTheRegistrarofTradeMarks(1957)99CLR300,3212. IntheMatterofFordWerkeAGsApplicationsforaTradeMark(1955)72RPC191,194. CorporationoftheCityofEnfieldvDevelopmentAssessmentCommission(2000)199CLR135,154155.
GleesonCJ,Gummow,KirbyandHayneJJ.
46 47 48
46
3.42 Wherethequestioniswhetherthetribunalactedwithinjurisdiction, the court must make its own independent determination, although itmay attach greater weight to the decision of a primary decisionmaker with particularknowledgeofanindustryorotherwisespeciallyequippedtomake thedecision.49 3.43 Thisapproachmayalsoinfluencetheshapeoftheobligationstobe assumedbydecisionmakers inrelationtothegroundsofreview,notably, procedural fairness. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Jia for example,HayneJsaidasfollows:
Theproceduresfordecisionmakingbythatbody[theRefugeeReview Tribunal]aremuchlessformalthanthoseofacourt.Thereisno provisionforanycontradictorandtheproceduresare,therefore,not adversarial.Thedecisionmakerhaslittlesecurityoftenureand,atleast tothatextent,maybethoughttohavesomerealstakeintheoutcome. Thedecisionmaker,inabodyliketheRefugeeReviewTribunal,will bringtothetaskofdecidinganindividual'sapplicationagreatdealof informationandideaswhichhavebeenaccumulatedorformedinthe courseofdecidingotherapplications.AbodyliketheRefugeeReview Tribunal,unlikeacourt,isexpectedtobuildup"expertise"inmatters suchascountryinformation.Ofteninformationofthatkindiscriticalin decidingthefateofanindividual'sapplication,butitisnotsuggested thattotakeitintoaccountamountstoawantofproceduralfairnessby reasonofprejudgment. Theanalogywithcurialprocessesbecomesevenlessappositeasthe natureofthedecisionmakingprocess,andtheidentityofthedecision maker,divergesfurtherfromthejudicialparadigm.Itistritetosaythat thecontentoftherulesofproceduralfairnessmustbe"appropriateand adaptedtothecircumstancesoftheparticularcase".Whatisappropriate whenadecisionofadisputedquestioniscommittedtoatribunalwhose statutorilydefinedprocesseshavesomeorallofthefeaturesofacourt willdifferfromwhatisappropriatewhenthedecisioniscommittedto aninvestigatingbody.Ministerialdecisionmakingisdifferentagain.
50
Discussionpoint2
3.44 Thesecasessuggestadegreeofdeferencetotheinherentknowledgeor expertiseoftheoriginaldecisionmakerortribunalonthepartofthecourt.
49 50
Ibid,155. (2001)205CLR507,[180181].
47
Thisinherentknowledgeorexpertisemayalsoberelevanttotheshapeofthe obligationsofthedecisionmakeronissuesofproceduralfairness. 3.45 However, it is another thing altogether to suggest that that the expertise or inherent knowledge of the decisionmaker (or the tribunal) is suchastoformthebasisforexcludingjudicialreview;theadversarialprocess hasthecapacitytoallowsupplementationofthetechnicalinadequaciesofthe courts.
Are there other factors relevant to the judicial perspective in seekingtodefinethedesirablescopeofjudicialreview? Pleaseelaborate.
SECTIONII Theexecutiveperspective
3.46 The most comprehensive indication of the executive view of the desirablescopeofjudicialreview(atleastforthepurposesoftheAD(JR)Act), occurredinthelate1970swhen,attherequestofthegovernment,exclusions fromtheapplicationofthatActsoughtbyagencieswereunderconsideration bytheCouncil.
ConsiderationsraisedinthecontextoftheCouncilsfirstreport
3.47 TheCouncilsfirstreport,AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act 1977:ExclusionsunderSection19,1978,setsoutarangeofargumentsforand against the exclusion of various sorts of decisions from review under the AD(JR)Act. 3.48 Inthereport,theCouncilrejectedargumentsbygovernmentagencies for the exclusion of judicial review on the basis of the following considerations:
51
the high number of decisions likely to be brought forward for review51
AdministrativeReviewCouncil, AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977:Exclusionsunder
Section19,ReportNo.1,1977,paragraph49.
48
decisionsinvolvinglargeelementsofpolicy52 theexistenceofadequatealternativeremedies53 theurgencyofthedecision54 thatthedecisionwasmadebyanintergovernmentalauthority55 thatthepowerswereexercisedbyStateofficials56 that the decision was made by a consultative or an advisory authorityorauthoritynotdealingdirectlywiththepublic57 ingeneral,thattheActwouldbeusedtofrustrateanddelaythe administrativeprocess thatthedecisionwasageneralmanagementdeterminationunder the Public Service Act (such as decisions as to age limits, appropriate qualifications and the creation, abolition and classificationofpositions)58 decisions in the Public Service employment area (including decisionsrelating torecruitment andappointment,discipline,re integration and appointment of First Division and Statutory officers)otherthanpromotionsandpromotionappealswhichwere recommended for exclusion for 12 months from the date of commencementoftheAD(JR)Act)59 thedifficultyinproducingreasons60 thepossibilityofparliamentarydisallowance61 the status of the decisionmaker and the person subject to the decision62 absence of review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal/exclusion from the application of the Ombudsman Act 197663
52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
Ibid,paragraph50. Ibid,paragraphs5255. Ibid,paragraphs5658. Ibid,paragraph59. Ibid,paragraph60. Ibid,paragraph61. Ibid,paragraph94. Ibid,paragraphs85,86. Ibid,paragraphs2042and129A(a). Ibid,paragraph129A(b). Ibid,paragraphs129(e)and129A(d). Ibid,paragraphs70and129(b).
49
potentialabuseofrighttoreview;64and thatnoncitizensshouldnotbeabletogettherightsandprivileges oftheAct;65 3.49 TheCouncilwasdividedastotheapplicationoftheAD(JR)Actto commerciallycompetitivestatutoryauthorities,recommendingbyanarrow majorityagainstexemption.66 3.50 The Council also recommended that the following decisions be excludedfromtheoperationoftheAD(JR)Act: decisionsrelatingtotheadministrationofjustice67 decisionsoftheConciliationandArbitrationCommission(onthe basis,inpart,ofthehistoricaldevelopmentoftheroleoftheHigh Court in judicial review of decisions of the Commission and analogousbodies)68 decisionsoftheCommonwealthGrantsCommissionrelatingtothe grantingoffundsrelatingtotheallocationoffunds69 decisions made by ASIO under the Australian Security and IntelligenceOrganisationActandtheTelephonicInterceptionAct (onthebasisthatsuchdecisionsrelatedtonationalsecurity.Inthe case of ASIO employment decisions, review was not considered appropriate)70 decisions relating to armed forces discipline (on the basis of the detrimentaleffectonthecommandrelationshipwhichisimportant intheoperationsofadisciplinedforce)71 certain decisions to withdraw monies in accordance with governmentappropriations(onthebasisthatsuchdecisionsrelated tointernalfinancialarrangementsmadewithingovernment)72
64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72
Ibid,paragraphs171172. Ibid,paragraph171. Ibid,paragraphs6873. Ibid,paragraphs7480.Seemoredetaileddiscussionlaterinthediscussionpaper. Ibid,paragraph124. Ibid,paragraph128. Ibid,paragraphs136138. Ibid,paragraph150. Ibid,paragraph154.
50
variousforeignaffairsdecisions(onthebasisthatthosedecisions relate to Australias relations with foreign countries and internationalorganisations)73 decisionsoftheAdvisoryCouncilforInterGovernmentalRelations (onthebasisthatitdealtonlywiththerelationships interse the organsofgovernmentifnecessary,suchanorganisationshould onlybesubjecttojudicialreviewintheHighCourt,whichstandsat theapexofbothCommonwealthandStatejudicialsystems)74 decisionsrelatingtotaxassessment(onthebasisoftheexistenceof alongestablishedandwelldevelopedsystemofjudicialreviewof taxation decisions,involvingStateandTerritory Supreme Courts [although notwith respect toSales Tax]theFederal Court [with respecttoincometaxonly]andultimatelytheHighCourt,inthe appellatestructure.Itwasnotedthat[t]hesecourtshavepowerto substitutetheirassessmentforthatoftheCommissioner,whichis notapoweravailabletotheFederalCourtunderthe[AD(JR]Act. TheCouncilalsonotedthat[u]ndertheexistinglaw,taxbecomes payable immediately upon the issue of the assessment and the obligation to pay is not deferred pending appeal. Accordingly, there could be strong incentive to challenge the validity of the assessment under the Act, thereby circumventing the existing appellate processes and possibly deferring payment of the tax.);75and certain migration decisions relating to diplomatic and consular representatives(assuchdecisionsweremadeonthebasisofforeign relationsconsiderations).76
Otherconsiderationsinseekingtolimitjudicialreview
3.51 More recently, amendments to the Migration Act by the Migration ReformAct1992,the Migration (Judicial Review)Act2001 andthe Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002 have heightened discussion, from both a constitutional and a policy perspective, on the desirablescopeofjudicialreview.Argumentsraisedforlimitingthescopeof judicial review in the context of amendments to the Migration Act have included:
73 74 75 76
Ibid,paragraphs157and158. Ibid,paragraph217. Ibid,paragraph223. Ibid,paragraph170.
51
abuseofprocess; thehighvolumeofapplications; theneedforconsistency;and cost.
3.52 AsemphasisedinPartIofthediscussionpaper,manyenactmentsand decisionmakingschemes reflectadesireonthepartofthegovernmentto limit judicial review. However, in many instances, extrinsic evidence associatedwiththeseenactments(includingtheSchedule1amendmenttothe AD(JR)Act),provideslittleindicationofthereasonsforsuchlimitations. 3.53 Inthetaxationarea,theexistenceofalternateremediesappearstohave been an importantconsideration. In the explanatory memorandum to the AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)AmendmentBill1980itissaidthat:
Thepurposeofthisexclusion[ofdecisionsaffectingtheassessmentor calculationoftaxation,includingcustomsandexciseduties]istoleave thesematterssubjectonlytotheordinaryproceduresforreviewor appealprovidedintherelevantlegislationunderwhichthetaxorduty isassessedorcalculated,andtopreventtheseproceduresbeingshort circuitedbyapplicationtotheFederalCourtforjudicialreview.
3.54 In its submission in response to draft Council report 32,77 the AustralianTaxationOfficesaidthat:
RecoursetotheAD(JR)Actisoflimitedbenefittoataxpayergenuinely seekingreviewofanassessmentastheFederalCourtmayonlyconsider whetheradecisionismadeaccordingtolawandcannotreviewthe meritsofadecision.IfreviewwereavailableundertheAD(JR)Actthis wouldundoubtedlybeusedtodelayandfrustratetheassessment processandtoexploretheinformationtheCommissionerpossessedin relationtothetaxpayer.Perhapsoffundamentalimportancetoallow reviewofdecisionsaffectingassessmentswouldradicallydisturbthe onusofproofwhich,asanintegralpartofthetaxationsystem,quite properlylieswiththepayer.Itisthetaxpayer,nottheCommissioner, whoisbestawareofthetaxpayersownaffairs.78
77
AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:TheAmbit Itmightberemarkedthatthisisaprincipleofgeneralapplicationsinceitwouldincludeallthose
78
whoseektogainbenefit/advantagefromthegovernment.
52
3.55 Theconclusiveevidenceprovisioninsection177ofthe IncomeTax AssessmentAct1936 reflectsadesiretolimitandstreamlinetheassessment andreviewprocess.Bystatingthattheproductionofanoticeofassessment isconclusiveevidenceofitsexistence,thelegislationseekstoavoidlitigation bytaxpayersdelayingtheassessmentprocessbyrequiringtheCommissioner ineachcasetoprovethevalidityoftheassessmentorjustifyingtheprocess underwhichtheassessmentwasraised.Thepolicyunderlyingsection177is to promote efficient tax administration by restricting appeals against assessmentstothespecialisttaxlawappealprocesses.79 3.56 Inits32ndreport,theCouncilalsonotesasareasonfortheinclusionof paragraphs (e) and (g) (decisions relating to taxation assessment and calculation and decisions under the Taxation Administration Act 1953)80 in Schedule1totheAD(JR)Act,thelongestablishedandwelldevelopedsystem for appeals against taxation decisions.81 In its first report, Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, Exclusions under section 19, 1978, the Councilalsopaidcognisancetothehistoricaldevelopmentoftheroleofthe High Court in judicial review of decisions of the [then, Conciliation and Arbitration]Commissionandanalogousbodies.82Anypotentialtodelaythe collectionofrevenuewouldalsobeofsignificance. 3.57 Similarly with the Jurisdiction of Courts (Legislation Amendment) Act 2000inrelationtoexemptionfromtheapplicationoftheAD(JR)Actofcertain decisions in the criminal justice area. There too, related arguments were raisedinrelationtoabuseofprocess,frustrationofthecriminaljusticesystem andprolongationofthecriminaljusticesystem. 3.58 Other restrictions on judicial review, such as those relating to the validity of appointments, though unstated, would also seem to arise from concernsfortheefficacyoftheadministrativesystemasawhole,concerns apparently considered in those cases to outweigh the benefits of judicial review for the individual. Similar considerations emerge in the area of workplacerelationsandpublicsectoremployment,wherethereisastrong
79 80 81
SeecommentstothiseffectbytheCourtinKordanPtyLtdvCommissionerofTaxation46ATR191. SeeAppendixIofthispaper. AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:TheAmbit Ibid,paragraph124.
82
53
emphasis on harmonious working relationships and effective dispute resolution.Thisisaparticularlyimportantconsiderationwherepeoplemay havetocontinuetoworkalongsideeachother. 3.59 Regulation5.1ofthe PublicServiceRegulations1999 whichcontainsa statementofgeneralpolicyconcerningreviewofactions,indicatingthatitis the policy of the Australian Government that Australian Public Service Agenciesshouldachieveandmaintainworkplacesthatencourageproductive andharmoniousworkingenvironments.TheintentionofPart5issaidtobe to provideforafairsystemofreview ofAPSactions anditisnotedthat nothinginPart5isintendedtopreventanapplicationforreviewfrombeing resolvedbyconciliationorothermeansatanytimebeforethereviewprocess iscompleted.
Discussionpoint3 Are there other factors relevant to the executive perspective in seekingtodefinethedesirablescopeofjudicialreview? Pleaseelaborate.
SECTIONIII Thepublicperspective
3.60 In seeking to determine the appropriate scope of judicial review in givensituations,itisnotonlytheviewsandinterestsofthecourtsandthe executivethatneedtobetakenintoaccount.Thebestinterestsofthegeneral publicneedalwaystobetakenintoconsideration. 3.61 The concept of administrative justice is relevant to any such consideration,holding,asitdoes,implicationsforboththequalityandthe proceduralstandardsadoptedinthemakingofadecision. 3.62 Elementssuchas: lawfulness
54
rationality;and fairness
havebeensaidtoberelevanttothequalityofthedecision,whileconceptsof: accessibility affordability costtothegeneralpublic83 timeliness;84and discerniblereasonsforthedecision85
havebeensaidtoberelevanttotheproceduralsideofadministrativejustice.86 3.63 As stated elsewhere in this discussion paper, while encompassing considerationofquestionsoflawfulness,proceduralfairness,andinextreme situations,therationalityofadecision,judicialreviewdoesnotprovidefor thesubstitutionofoneadministrativedecisionforanother. 3.64 Thecourthasnojurisdictionsimplytocureadministrativeinjusticeor error.Ithasthereforebeenobservedthat'theextentofthesupportabletobe given by judicial review processes toadministrativejusticeis considerably circumscribed'.87 3.65 Additionally, there is a tension between judicial review and considerationsofcost,timelinessandaccessibility,allofwhicharedesirable from the point of view of the individual applicant and the general community. 3.66 Judicialreviewisoftenmoreexpensiveforthepartieschallenginga decisionthanmeritsreview,anditisarguablethatanexternalreviewonthe
83
At an individual level, few persons affected by administrative decisions have the capacity to
undertakeanextensivereviewprocess.Theveteransreviewarea,wherelegalaidfundingisavailable forreview,providesanexceptioninthisregard.
84
Asnotedelsewhereinthispaper,thepositionwithrespecttomigrationandtaxationdiffersinthat,in Reflectedinsection13oftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977. JusticeRSFrench,AdministrativeJusticeinAustralianAdministrativeLaw,inRobinCreykeand
thosecasestheremaybeadvantagestotheapplicantinseekingtodelaythedecisionmakingprocess.
85 86
John McMillan (eds), Administrative Justice the Core and the Fringe, Australian Institute of AdministrativeLawInc,9,14.
87
Ibid,22.
55
meritswillachievethesameoutcomeandresultnotonlyinthesettingaside ofthedecisionbutthemakingofthecorrectorpreferabledecisioninitsplace. 3.67 Ithasbeensaidinthisrespectthat:

(I)tisoftengoodpolicytocommitcertainprimarydecisionmaking,and thegrievanceproceduresinrelationtothoseprimarydecisions,toa relativelyjudgeproofenvironment.Questionsofaccessibility (includingcost,effectivenessandefficiency)mustberelevanttothe designofrelationshipsbetweenbodieswithinaregulatorystructure andtotheirindividualandoverallrelationshipinthecourts.
88
3.68 Ithasalsobeensaidthatadecisionmakingsystemthat:
guaranteesultimatecorrectnessoraccuracyindecisionmakingis likelytoruncountertothesedesirableessentialsofthedecisionmaking process.Detailedfactfinding,carefulbalancingofissues,willbeslow. Somepersonsaffectedbygovernmentdecisionscanaffordtohavethis occurbuttheywillbefewinnumber.
89
3.69 In response to such arguments it may be countered that there are significant rights going to the scope of decisionmaking power and the mannerinwhichitisexercisedrecognisedinthegroundsofjudicialreview, whicharenotfullyreplicatedinthemeritsreviewprocess. 3.70 As noted in Part II of the discussion paper, 'The Significance and Constitutional Scope of Judicial Review', judicial review is an essential elementoftheruleoflawandasignificantaidtoexecutiveaccountability, consistency and precedent. All these things are of ultimate benefit to membersofthepublicwhoexperienceadministrativedecisionmaking.
88 89
MAronson,BDyer,JudicialReviewofAdministrativeAction,2000,p10. DennisPearce,IsThereTooMuchNaturalJustice(1992)121994AIALForum9.SeealsoJusticeRS Judicial Review Rights (March 2001) 28 AIAL Forum
French, 30,31.
56
Discussionpoint4 Arethereotherfactorsrelevanttothepublicperspectiveinseeking todefinethedesirablescopeofjudicialreview? Pleaseelaborate.
THEGROUNDSOFREVIEWANDTHESCOPEOFJUDICIALREVIEW
57
PARTIVTHEGROUNDSOFREVIEWANDTHESCOPEOF JUDICIALREVIEW INTRODUCTION SECTIONI Thegroundsofreview

Reviewoffacts Reviewofprocess
SECTIONII Acloserlookatcertaingroundsofreview
Unreasonableness Relevant/irrelevantconsiderations Erroroflaw Jurisdictionalerror Proceduralfairness(includingprobativeevidence)
INTRODUCTION
4.1 InthisPart,theCouncilwillexaminethereasonswhy,incertainareas, thenatureofthegroundsofreviewthemselvesmightencouragelimitations onthescopeofjudicialreview.
SECTIONI Thegroundsofreview
4.2 Notwithstanding the measures taken by the courts to maintain a boundarybetweenmeritsandjudicialreview,itisonewhichisnotalways easytomaintain.Thenatureofparticulargroundsofreviewhighlightsthis tension. As a result, a number of the grounds of review have become a significantfactorforgovernmentandcourtsinseekingtopermit,excludeor limitthescopeofjudicialreview.
58
4.3 The Council considers that it would be useful to undertake a brief analysisofthosegrounds.Theresponseofcourts,administratorsandothers totheissuesraisedinrelationtosuchgroundsmaywellbeofassistance,ina broadsense,inidentifyingpolicyguidelinesforthescopeofjudicialreview and, more narrowly, to the determination of the extent to which those groundsshouldapplyinparticularsituations.
Reviewoffacts
4.4 Acontroversialaspect,recognisedbyboththecourts,administrators andothersistheopentextureofanumberofthegroundsofreviewandthe extent to which they provide courts with the potential to engage in a subjectivereconsiderationofthefacts(i.e.themerits)ofacase.1 4.5 As stated, the tension between fact and law is a key factor in determiningthemarginsofjudicialandmeritsreview. 4.6 Ontheroleofprimarydecisionmakersandtribunals,ithasbeensaid that:
Findingsoffactaretraditionallythedomainwhereadecidingauthority ortribunalismasterinitsownhouse.Providedonlythatitstayswithin itsjurisdiction,itsfindingsareingeneralexemptfromreviewbythe courts,whichwillinanycaserespectthedecisionofthebodythatsaw andheardthewitnessortookevidencedirectly.
2
4.7 However, there is a strong perception that with the assistance of certaingroundsofreview,theFederalCourthasengagedinmeritsreview, particularlyinitsresponsetoapplicationsforjudicialreviewonthebasisof erroroflaw:3
SeediscussionbyJMcMillan,FederalCourtvMinisterforImmigration(December1999)22 AIAL HWRWadeandCFForsyth, AdministrativeLaw,1994,p312. SeealsoJMcMillan,FederalCourtv
Forum1.
2
MinisterforImmigrationibid,andJMcMillan,RecentThemesinJudicialReviewofFederalExecutive Action(1996)24FederalLawReview347.
3
Sir Anthony Mason, Life in Administrative Law Outside the AD(JR) Act, Australian Institute of
Administrative Law (NSW Chapter), Seminar, 17 July 1996. See also J McMillan, Recent Themes in JudicialReviewofFederalExecutiveActionibid.
THEGROUNDSOFREVIEWANDTHESCOPEOFJUDICIALREVIEW Judicialreviewsprofessedindifferencetothesubstantivemeritsofthe impugneddecisionisnotalwaysconvincing,andnotultimately reconcilablewithsomeofthegroundsofreview.

4
59
4.8 Insofarastheyfocustheattentionofthecourtsonsignificanterrorsof factorreasoningrelieduponbyadecisionmakerinsupportofadecision, suchgrounds:

haveagreatertendencythanotherstoblurthelinebetweenthe legalityandthemeritsofadecision,andprovidetoolsbywhichacourt canreexamineaspectsofthemeritsofadecision.
5
4.9
Groundswiththispotentialinclude: unreasonableness; thenoevidencerule; failure to take into account relevant considerations and taking accountofirrelevantconsiderations; jurisdictionalerror; thejurisdictionalfactdoctrine;and proceduralfairness(includingtheprobativeevidencerule,adverse factualmaterial).6
Reviewofprocess
4.10 Anotheraspectofthegroundsofreviewwhichhasprovokedcomment has been the extent to which judicial review may frustrate principles of simplicity,costandtimeefficiencybyfocussingtoogreatlyontheprocedures bywhichameritsreviewdecisionisarrivedat. 4.11 Thegroundofproceduralfairnessisassubjective,andarguablymore so,thanthegroundsofreviewreferredtoabove.Wasanapplicantprovided
4
MarkAronson,APublicLawyersResponsetoPrivatisationandOutsourcinginTaggart(ed), The
ProvinceofAdministrativeLaw,1997,40,4748.Inthefootnotetothisremark,itissaidthatreviewfor unreasonableness:clearlyinvolvesanexaminationoftheimpugneddecisionsmerits,albeitfromthe perspectiveofalargedegreeofdeference.SeealsocommentsbyRSackville,Commentaryonapaper presentedbySirAnthonyAMason,LifeinAdministrativeLawOutsidetheAD(JR)Act, Australian InstituteofAdministrativeLaw(NSWChapter),Seminar,17July1996.

5
DavidBennettQC,CommonwealthSolicitorGeneral,BalancingJudicialReviewandMeritsReview InAustralianBroadcastingTribunalvBond(1990)170CLR321,356whereMasonCJsubmittedthatcare
(September2002)53AdminReview5.
6
shouldbetakentoensurethatgroundsofjudicialreviewlikenoevidence,probativeevidenceand erroroflawdonotbecomevehiclesforconvertingjudicialreviewintoasearchforerrorsoffact.
60
with asufficientopportunitytopresenttheircase? Wasadecisionmaker actually prejudiced or, in the case of apprehended bias, has there been conductorsomeeventinvolvingthedecisionmakerthatmightundermine publicconfidenceintheadministrativeprocess? 4.12 Although:
Theauthoritiesshowthatnaturaljusticedoesnotrequiretheinflexible applicationofafixedbodyofrules;itrequiresfairnessinallthe circumstances,whichincludethenatureofthejurisdictionorpower exercisedandthestatutoryprovisionsgoverningitsexercise.
7
and:
Thereare...nowordswhichareofuniversalapplicationtoeverykindof enquiryandeverykindofdomestictribunal.Therequirementsof naturaljusticemustdependonthecircumstancesofthecase,thenature oftheinquiry,therulesunderwhichthetribunalisacting,andthe subjectmatterbeingdealtwith.
8
4.13 FollowingthedecisionoftheHighCourtin KioavWest,9 inwhichit washeldthatwheretherulesofproceduralfairnessoperate,applicantsare entitledtobeheardinrespectofallmattersthatarecrucialorcriticaltothe decisionmaking process, the ground presented administrators with significantresourceandlogisticaldifficulties.10
SECTIONII Acloserlookatcertaingroundsofreview
4.14 TheCouncilbelievesthatanappreciationofthescopeandpurposeof eachofthefollowinggroundsofreviewisusefulinmeasuringtheiroperation inthecontextofmeritsandjudicialreview.
National Companies and Securities Commission v News Corporation Ltd (1984) 156 CLR 296, 312 per LordJusticeTuckerinRussellvDutiesofNorfolk[1949]1AllER109,118(CA). (1985)159CLR550. SeeDennisPearce,'IsTheretoomuchNaturalJustice?]1994AIALForum94.
GibbsCJ.
8 9
10
61
Unreasonableness11
4.15 Thisgroundrestsonthepremisethat:
whenadiscretionarypowerisstatutorilyconferredonarepository, thepowermustbeexercisedreasonably,forthelegislatureistakento intendthatthediscretionbesoexercised.
12
4.16 Categoriesofunreasonablenessinclude: thatthedecisionwasdevoidofplausiblejustification13 thegivingofexcessiveorinadequateweighttoaconsideration14 makinganerroneousfindingoffactonapointofimportance15 failure to have proper regard to departmental policy or representation16 theunnecessarilyharsheffectofthedecision17 failure to give genuine, proper and realistic consideration to a matterincludingmakingadequateinquiryastofacts18 demonstrableinconsistencywithotherdecisions;19and discriminationwithoutarationaldistinction.20
4.17 Unreasonableness is, accordingly, a broad head of judicial review, with the potential to stem executive excess by filling gaps notcovered by morespecificallystatedgrounds.21
11 12
Thecommonlawpositionhasbeenentrenchedinparagraphs5(2)(g)and6(2)(g)oftheAD(JR)Act. KrugervTheCommonwealth (1997)190CLR1,36perBrennanJ. AdoptedalsobyGummowJin ChanvMinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairs(1989)169CLR379. MinisterforAboriginalAffairsvPekoWallsendLtd(1986)162CLR24. GTE(Australia)vBrown(1986)14FLR309. NikacvMinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairs(1988)20FCR65. EdelstenvWilcoxandFCT(1988)83ALR99. Although according toWilcoxJin PrasadvMinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairs (1985)159
MinisterforImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairsvEshetu(1999)197CLR611,650.
13 14 15 16 17 18
CLR550,570,[t]hecircumstancesinwhichadecisionwillbeinvalidforfailuretoinquirearestrictly limited.
19 20 21
KrusevJohnston[1898]2QB91;FaresRuralMeatandLivestockCoPtyLtd(1990)96ALR153. TheCounciloftheCityofParramattavPestell(1972)128CLR305. Empiricalresearchsuggeststhatthisgroundisoneofthemostfrequentlyreliedonbyapplicants,and
thatitisupheldinthecourtsin21.1%ofcases,RobinCreykeandJohnMcMillan,'SuccessinJudicial ReviewAnEmpiricalStudy',forthcomingAIAL.
62
4.18 The ground crystallised from the decision of Lord Greene MR in AssociatedProvisionalPictureHousesLtdvWednesburyCorporation.22 Thereit was restricted to capturing decisions so unreasonable that no reasonable personcouldeverhavecometothem.23 Theintentionwasnottocapture administrativedecisionsregardedaslessreasonablethanthosewhichthe reviewermighthavemade. 4.19 In Australia, the essentially circular language of the Wednesbury unreasonablenesstestwasrephrasedinanumberofcases.24 Indeed,inthe contextofmigrationdecisionmaking,ithasbeenremarkedthatbytheendof the1980s:
Somejudgeswereverycautious,stressingthatameredifferencein opinionorapreferenceforadifferentresultcouldnotjustifyafinding ofunreasonableness.Howeverotherstookamoreinterventionistand criticalapproach
25
4.20 By way of response to the expansive interpretation adopted by the courtsinsomecases,unreasonablenesswasexcludedasagroundofreview underformerPart8oftheMigrationActonthebasisthat:26
Ithaslongbeenrecognisedthatthisgroundofreview,ifnotinterpreted withgreatcareandprecision,willcomeclosetoareviewofadecision onthemerits,especiallywherereviewonthemeritsisnotavailable.
27
22 23 24
[1948]1KB223. Ibid,233,234 InAttorneyGeneral(NSW)vQuin(1989)170CLR1,36itwassaidbyBrennanJthatthedecisionmust
amounttoanabuseofpower;inMinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairsvTeoh(1995)183CLR273, 290, Mason CJ and DeaneJ used the words so devoidofplausible justification that no reasonable person could have taken that course. For a full discussion of this topic see Rossana Panetta, Wednesbury Unreasonableness: Judicial or Merits Review? (2002) 9(4) Australian Journal of AdministrativeLaw191.
25
Mary Crock, Judicial Review and Part 8 of the Migration Act: Necessary Reform or Overkill? Section476(2).ThisprovisionwaschallengedandupheldinAbebevCommonwealth;ReMinisterfor ExplanatoryMemorandumtotheMigrationReformBill1992,paragraph415.Further,aspointedoutby
(September1996)18SydneyLawReview267.
26
ImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairs(1999)162ALR1.
27
MasonJinMinisterforAboriginalAffairsvPekoWallsendLtd(1986)162CLR24,42,whenthegroundof assertedunreasonablenessisgiventoomuchortoolittleweighttooneconsiderationoranother:a courtshouldproceedwithcautionlestitexceeditssupervisoryrolebyreviewingthedecisiononits merits.
63
4.21 Whereunreasonablenessremainsavailableasagroundofreview,both the High Court and the Federal Court have held that its scope must be limited.Forinstance,theFederalCourthassaidthat:
Wemustagainstressthelimitednatureofjudicialreviewontheground ofunreasonableness.Thatgroundisnotavailableasavehicletoobtain thejudgmentofthecourtonmattersthatintheendarenotconcerned withthelegalityofadecisionbutwithcontestedviewsaboutits wisdomorsubstantivefairnessjudgmentsaboutmattersofthatnature aretobemadeelsewherebythecommunityanditspolitical representatives;theconcernofthecourtisonlywiththelegalityof decisions.
28
4.22 Additionally, the High Court has indicated that unreasonableness shouldnotbeequatedwithirrationalityandindeed,anunreasonabledecision can be valid notwithstanding that the underlying reasoning process was logicallyflawed.29 4.23 Further:
Someonewhodisagreesstronglywithsomeoneelsesprocessof reasoningonanissueoffactmayexpresssuchdisagreementby describingthereasoningasillogicalorunreasonableorevenso unreasonablethatnoreasonablepersoncouldadoptit.Iftheseare merelyemphaticwaysofsayingthatthereasoningiswrong,thenthey havenoparticularlegalconsequence.
30
4.24 Inthiscase,itwasalsonotedthat:
thefactthatadecisioninvolvesanerroroflawdoesnotmeanthatit isunreasonable.31
and
anunreasonabledecisionisoneforwhichnologicalbasiscanbe discerned.
28 32
CityofBotanyBayCouncilvMinisterforTransportandRegionalDevelopment(1999)58ALD628,637per AustralianBroadcastingTribunalvBond(1990)170CLR321. MinisterforImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairsvEshetu(1999)197CLR611,626perGleesonCJand Ibid,640perKirbyandGaudronJJ. Id.
BlackCJ,LeeandWeinbergJJ.
29 30
McHughJ.
31 32
64
4.25 Nonetheless, there is always the potential for expansion. The obligation has expanded over time to become more onerous and open ended.33 4.26 Thishasoccurredforinstanceinrelationtotheduty toconductan adequate inquiry, whereby a decisionmaker may act unlawfully by not attemptingtoobtaininformationwhenitisobviousthatmaterialisreadily availablewhichiscentrallyrelevanttothedecisiontobemade 34orwherethe availablematerialcontainssomeobviousomissionorobscuritythatneedsto beresolvedbeforeadecisionismade.35
Relevant/irrelevantconsiderations36
4.27 During the 1980s, one of the bases frequently used for invalidating migrationdecisionswastheprinciplethattheobligationofadecisionmaker to give consideration to relevant matters is an obligation to give proper, genuineandrealistic considerationtothemeritsofthecase.37 Directedat discouragingthemakingofperfunctorydeclarationsthatallrelevantmatters havebeen takenintoaccount,incircumstances whereadecisionappeared harshorunwarranted,thisrulingprovidedscopeforcourtstobepersuaded thatthemeritsofthecasehadnotbeengivenappropriateconsideration.38 4.28 While it could be construed as providing an unfettered discretion, wherethestatuteorgrantofpowerissilentonthematterstobetakeninto account,thenatureofthestatutemaysuggestsomelimitsandithasbeen heldthat:
Inacasewhererelevantconsiderationsarenotspecified,itislargely forthedecisionmaker,inlightofmattersplacedbeforehimbythe parties,todeterminewhichmattersheregardsasrelevantandthe
33
SeediscussionbyJMcMillan,RecentThemesinJudicialReviewofFederalExecutiveAction(1996)
24 Federal Law Review 347, 3812; R Creyke, The Impact of Judicial Review on Tribunals: Recent Developments,paperpresentedattheAIJATribunalsConference,Melbourne,6June2002.
34 35 36
PrasadvMinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairs(1985)65ALR549,563perWilcoxJ. VidetovMinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairs(19867)69ALR342,353perTooheyJ. Thisgroundalsoappearsinsection5(2)(b)oftheAD(JR)Actwhich,inthisregard,issubstantially KhanvMinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairs(1987)14ALD292,292perGummowJ. SeeJMcMillan,FederalCourtvMinisterforImmigration(December1999)22AIALForum1,4.This
declaratoryofthecommonlaw.
37 38
approachtojudicialreviewwassubsequentlycloseddownin1992bytheomissionfromPart8ofthe MigrationActofthefailuretoconsiderrelevantmattersasagroundforjudicialreview.
THEGROUNDSOFREVIEWANDTHESCOPEOFJUDICIALREVIEW comparativeimportancetobeaccordedtomatterswhichhesoregards. Thegroundoffailuretotakeintoaccountarelevantconsiderationwill onlybemadegoodifitisshownthatthedecisionmakerhasfailedto takeintoaccountaconsiderationwhichhewas,inthecircumstances boundtotakeintoaccountfortheretobeavalidexerciseofthepower todecide.

39
65
4.29 InMinisterforAboriginalAffairsvPekoWallsendLtd,40MasonJnotedthe following features of this and the related ground of taking into account irrelevantconsiderations: thegroundoffailuretotakeintoaccountarelevantconsideration canonlybemadeoutifadecisionmakerfailstotakeintoaccounta consideration which he or she is bound to take into account in makingthatdecision;and whatfactorsadecisionmakerisboundtoconsiderinmakingthe decisionisdeterminedbyconstructionofthestatuteconferringthe discretion. Ifthestatuteexpresslystatestheconsiderationstobe takenintoaccount,itwilloftenbenecessaryforthecourttodecide whether those enumerated factors are exhaustive or merely inclusive.Iftherelevantfactorsarenotexpresslystated,theymust bedeterminedbyimplicationfromthesubjectmatter,scopeand purposeoftheAct.
4.30 Althoughboththesedecisionsleaveopenthequestionastowhatthe decisionmakerwasboundtodoandwhataretheindicationsofobligation, therebyaffordingthegroundthecapacityforuseasabasisfordefactomerits review,41Australiancourtshavetroddenacarefulpathinthisregard.Asalso notedbyMasonJinPekoWallsendLtd:
39 40 41
SeanInvestmentsvMcKellar(1981)38ALR363,375perDeaneJ. (1986)162CLR24,4041. Seeforinstancethecaseof RobertsvHopwood [1925]AC578, nowlargelydiscreditedinAustralia,
involvingastatuteempoweringtheCounciltopayitsemployeessuchsalariesasitmayseefit.See alsoMinisterforImmigration,LocalGovernmentandEthnicAffairsvPashmforoosh(1989)18ALD77,80per Davies,BurchettandLee,whereitwasheldthattheconsiderationofanirrelevantmatterwilloccurby [t]hetakingintoaccountofafactfoundunreasonably,orproceedinguponanerroneouspremiseona fundamentalmatter.SeealsoAkersvMinisterforImmigration,LocalGovernmentandEthnicAffairs(1988) 16ALD688,694perLeeJ.
66
Thelimitedroleofacourtreviewingtheexerciseofanadministrative discretionmustconstantlybeborneinmind.Itisnotthefunctionofthe courttosubstituteitsowndecisionforthatoftheadministratorby exercisingadiscretionwhichthelegislaturehasvestedinthe administrator.Itsroleistosetlimitsontheexerciseofthatdiscretion, andadecisionmadewithinthoseboundariescannotbeimpugned. Itfollowsthatintheabsenceofanystatutoryindicationoftheweightto begiventovariousconsiderations,itisgenerallyforthedecisionmaker andnotthecourttodeterminetheappropriateweighttobegiventothe matterswhicharerequiredtobetakenintoaccountinexercisingthe statutorypower.
42
4.31 ThisapproachwassupportedbytheHighCourtmajorityin Minister forImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairsvYusuf,43 whereitwaspointedout thatquestionsoffactmaterialtotheultimatedecisionaredeterminableby way of the subjective thought processes of the decisionmaker, not the objectiveorexternalassessmentofthecourt.
Erroroflaw
4.32 Atcommonlaw,errorsoflawmustgotojurisdictionexceptinthecase ofapplicationsunderthewritofcertiorari,whichcoversnonjurisdictional errorsoflawonthefaceoftherecord.Atcommonlaw,thegroundoferrorof lawonthefaceoftherecordhasbeenseverelyrestricted.However,empirical workonthisprojecthasunderlinedhowoftenthecourtsusethisground.44 4.33 Thedistinctionbetweenerrorsoflawonandofftherecorddoesnot exist under theAD(JR) Act, with both jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional errorsbeingreviewableonorofftherecord.45 Theonlypreconditionstothe statutory grounds are that the error goes to jurisdiction and must have affectedorpossiblyaffectedtheoutcome:
42 43 44
(1986)162CLR24,4041. (2001)206CLR323,[68]perMcHugh,GummowandHayneJJ. R Creyke, J McMillan, Litigants Perception of Administrative Law An Empirical Study,
forthcoming,2003.Thisstudysuggeststhat'erroroflaw'isthegroundofreviewmostfrequentlyrelied uponbyapplicants,withasuccessrateof42.3%.'Relevantconsideration'isthesecondmostfrequently reliedonground,withasuccessrateof35.3%.

45
Under former Part 8 of the Migration Act there was error of law in the event of an incorrect
applicationofthelawtothefactsasfoundbythepersonwhomadethedecision,whetherornotthe errorappearedonthefaceoftherecord.
THEGROUNDSOFREVIEWANDTHESCOPEOFJUDICIALREVIEW Adecisiondoesnotinvolveanerroroflawunlesstheerrorismaterial tothedecisioninthesensethatitcontributestoitsothat,butforthe error,thedecisionwouldhavebeen,ormighthavebeen,different.

46
67
4.34 Thereisnoerroroflawinmakingawrongfindingoffact.47However, totheextentthatthecourtsdrawdistinctionsbetweenmattersoflawand fact, both the statutory and the common law grounds of review have the potential to allow courts to move into areas of merits review that are, arguably,moreappropriatelydealtwithbytribunals. 4.35 Determiningwhatconstitutesanerroroflawcanbedifficult:
Nomatterwhattheabstractdefinitionsmightbe,practitioners appreciatethatwhatcountsforanerroroflawinonefield,orevenin oneperiod,mightnotbesocountedinadifferentfieldorperiod Lyingbehindanydefinitionoferroroflawareassumptionsthatthereis adifferencebetweentheprimaryfacts,materials,judicialnoticeand experientialknowledgeofthedecisionmakerontheonehandandthe applicationtothosefactsasfoundoflegaltermsandstandardsonthe otherhand.
48
Jurisdictionalerror
4.36 Erroroflawgoingtojurisdiction,orjurisdictionalerror,hasbecomea key ground of review in cases in which there has been recourse to the Constitutionalwritsofprohibitionandmandamus.49 Nodistinctionismade forthepurposesofjurisdictionalerrorbetweenerrorsoflawanderrorsof fact. 4.37 CraigvSouthAustralia50isauthorityfortheviewthatwhatconstitutesa jurisdictionalerroroflawismuchwiderforanadministratorortribunalthan foracourt.
46
AustralianBroadcastingTribunalvBond(1990)170CLR321,353perMasonCJ.Seealsocommentsby WaterfordvCommonwealth(1987)163CLR54,77. MAronson,BDyer,JudicialReviewofAdministrativeAction,2000,p159. SeegeneraldiscussionoftheConstitutionalwritsandsection75(v)oftheConstitutionin Plaintiff
TooheyandGaudronJJat384.
47 48 49
S157/2002vCommonwealthofAustralia [2003]HCA2,[7983]perGaudron,McHugh,Gummowand HayneJJ.

50
(1995)184CLR163,179.
68
4.38 Despiteconcernthatjudicialreviewengagethepracticalrealitiesof decisionmakingandbearwitnesstoatoleranceofnoncriticalerroroflaw,51 inCraigscase,itwasheldthatjurisdictionalerrorexistswhere:

anadministrativetribunalfallsintoerroroflawwhichcausesitto identifyawrongissue,toaskitselfawrongquestion,toignorerelevant material,torelyonirrelevantmaterialor,atleastinsomecircumstances, tomakeanerroneousfindingorreachamistakenconclusion,andthe tribunalsexerciseorpurportedofpoweristherebyaffected,itexceeds itsauthorityorpowers.
52
4.39 Morerecently, in Yusuf,McHugh,GummowandHayneJJwiththe concurrenceofGleesonCJandGaudronJhavesaidthat:

Jurisdictionalerrorcanthusbeseentoembraceanumberofdifferent kindsoferror,thelistofwhich,inthepassagecitedfromCraig,isnot exhaustive.Thosedifferentkindsoferrormaywelloverlap.The circumstancesofaparticularcasemaypermitmorethanone characterisationoftheerroridentified,forexample,asthedecision makerbothaskingthewrongquestionandignoringrelevantmaterial. Whatisimportant,however,isthatidentifyingawrongissue,askinga wrongquestion,ignoringrelevantmaterialorrelyingonirrelevant materialinawaythataffectstheexerciseofpoweristomakeanerrorof law.Further,doingsoresultsinthedecisionmakerexceedingthe authorityorpowersgivenbytherelevantstatute.Inotherwords,ifan errorofthosetypesismade,thedecisionmakerdidnothaveauthority tomakethedecisionthatwasmade;heorshedidnothavejurisdiction tomakeit.
53
4.40 Thereareothercaseswheregroundsofreviewhavebeenlinkedtoan excessofjurisdiction. In ReRefugeeTribunal;exparteAala,54itwasheldthat theConstitutionalwritswouldapplywhereadecisionwasmadeinbreachof therulesofproceduralfairness,assuchabreachwouldrepresentanexcessof jurisdiction.AsnotedbyGaudronandGummowJJinthatcase:
51
JusticeRSFrench,JudicialReviewRights(March2001)28AIALForum30.Somedecisionssupport
anovertdeferencetotheopinionofthedecisionmakeronquestionsoflaw:seeforinstance,comments perKirbyJinAustralianBroadcastingCommissionvBonner(1984)54ALR653,6689.
52 53 54
CraigvSouthAustralia(1995)184CLR163,179. MinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairsvYusuf(2001)206CLR323,[80]. (20002001)204CLR82.
THEGROUNDSOFREVIEWANDTHESCOPEOFJUDICIALREVIEW IfanofficeroftheCommonwealthexercisingpowerconferredby statutedoesnotaccordproceduralfairnessandifthatstatutehasnoton itsproperconstruction,relevantly(andvalidly)limitedorextinguished anyobligationtoaccordproceduralfairness,theofficerexceeds jurisdictioninasensenecessarytoattractprohibitionundersection 75(v)oftheConstitution.

55
69
4.41 Sotoo,in MinisterforImmigration andMulticulturalAffairsvEshetu, Gummow J expressly linked unreasonableness to section 75(v) of the Constitution.56 4.42 These recent decisions indicate a tendency to adopt a wider not a narrowerviewofjurisdictionalerrorwithacommensurateriskofbecoming involvedinmeritsreview. 4.43 Ithasbeenremarked,havingregardtothisapproach,that:
Thelegalrulesgivingrisetothetraditionalgroundsofjudicialreview areinthiswaylinkedbyacommontheme.Theyarenotdiscreteand freestanding.Theyareallaspectsofjurisdiction.Theyservetoidentify thescopeofadecisionmakerspowerandtheconditionsofitsvalid exercise.
57
4.44 Anelementoftheerroroflawandjurisdictionalerrorgroundsisthat an error of fact which goes to jurisdiction will be a ground of relief. Jurisdictionalfactreviewproceedsonthebasisthatitisagroundofinvalidity foranofficialtoexercisediscretionaryexecutivepowerintheabsenceofa jurisdictionalfact.58 4.45 Ithasbeennotedthat,althoughoncerareandconfinedlargelytothe reviewofconstitutionalfacts,reviewonthisgroundisontheincreaseand that:
55 56
Ibid,101.SeealsoPlaintiffS157/2002vCommonwealthofAustralia[2003]HCA2. (1999)197CLR611,[126].Hisviewdoesnotappeartohaveattractedanysupportfromthepresent StephenGageler, TheLegitimateScopeofJudicialReview(November2001)21(3) AustralianBar CorporationoftheCityofEnfieldvDevelopmentAssessmentCommission(2000)199CLR135.
majorityofHighCourtjudges.
57
Review279,291.
58
70
thereisanobviousriskofdivergentoutcomeswhentherearetwo separateinvestigationsofajurisdictionalfact.59
4.46 Factorscontributingtothisriskaresaidtoinclude: differentevidencebeforethetribunalandthecourt thefactthatthetribunalisnotboundbytherulesofevidence the extent to which tribunal decisionmakers may draw on their ownknowledgeinreachingadecision thesusceptibilityofmaterialgenerallytodifferentinterpretations; and thetimegapbetweenthereachingoftherespectivedecisions.
Proceduralfairness(includingprobativeevidence)
4.47 Thedoctrineofproceduralfairnessrepresentsanimportantaspectof goodadministration.Waysinwhichitdoesthisincludeby: appealingtoafundamentalsenseofjustice ensuring that all the necessary information is obtained from the parties ensuringhighqualityimpartialdecisions;and fostering public confidence in the fairness of the administrative system.
4.48 Traditionally,thedoctrinehadtwoelements: thatadecisionmakermustaffordanopportunitytobeheardtoa personwhoseinterestswillbeadverselyaffectedbyadecision;and thatadecisionmaker mustbe impartial anddisinterested inthe mattertobedecided.
4.49 Theprobativeevidence rule,tobeconsidered inmoredetail below, mayberegardedasafurtheraspectofproceduralfairnessrule. 4.50 Therearetwostepsindicatingwhethertherehasbeenabreachofthis ground:isthereanimplicationthatproceduralfairnessapplies. Ifso,what fairprocessshouldhavebeenapplied(content). Itisonlywhenapositive answerisgiventothefirstquestionandanegativeanswertothesecondthat
59
MarkAronson,ResurgenceofJurisdictionalFact(March2001)12(21)PublicLawReview17,27.
71
a breach of the ground of review is made out. The no bias rule and the probativeevidenceruleonlyapplytothesecondofthesequestions. Righttobeheard 4.51 TherelevantprinciplesarestatedasfollowsinthejudgmentofMason JinKioavWest:
Itisafundamentalruleofthecommonlawdoctrineofnaturaljustice expressedintraditionaltermsthat,generallyspeaking,whenanorderis tobemadewhichwilldepriveapersonofsomerightorinterestorthe legitimateexpectationofabenefit,heisentitledtoknowthecasesought tobemadeagainsthimandtobegivenanopportunityofreplyingto it...Thereferenceto`rightorinterest'inthisformulationmustbe understoodasrelatingtopersonalliberty,status,preservationof livelihoodandreputation,aswellastoproprietaryrightsand interests.
60
4.52 Atthesametimethecourtshavemaintainedtheviewthatprocedural fairnessisnotauniversallyavailableright. Certainfactorsmustbepresent before it will be implied as a principle of common law. Further, the implicationcanbeexcluded. 4.53 In Mahon v. Air New Zealand, Lord Diplock said in delivering the judgmentofthePrivyCouncilthattherepositoryofapowertoinquireand makefindingsandwhocontemplatesmakinganunfavourablefinding:
mustlistenfairlytoanyrelevantevidenceconflictingwiththefinding andanyrationalargumentagainstthefindingthatapersonrepresented attheinquiry,whoseinterests(includinginthattermcareeror reputation)maybeadverselyaffectedbyit,maywishtoplacebefore himorwouldhavesowishedifhehadbeenawareoftheriskofthe findingbeingmade.
61
4.54 AsalsonotedbyBrennanJinAnnettsvMcCann:
Thisisageneralprinciplewhich,subjecttoanycontraryintention expressedorimpliedinthestatute,appliestostatutoryinquiriesin
60 61
(1985)159CLR550,583. (1984)AC808,820.
72
whichtheinquisitorisauthorizedtopublishfindingsthatmightreflect unfavourablyonaperson'sconduct.
62
4.55 Howeversuchexclusionmustbeinspecificterms. Morerecentlyin MinisterforImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairs;ExparteMiahithasbeensaid that:

Itisnowsettledthat,whenastatuteconfersonapublicofficialthe powertodosomethingwhichaffectsaperson'srights,interestsor expectations,therulesofnaturaljusticeregulatetheexerciseofthat power"unlesstheyareexcludedbyplainwordsofnecessary intendment".
63
4.56 Itwasalsoargued,64amongstotherthings,thatbecausetheMigration Actestablishedamandatorydutytoinformapplicantsaboutcertainkindsof information,Parliamentcouldnothaveintendedthatasimilardutyshould beimposedinrelationtoothertypesofinformation. 4.57 Inrejectingthisargument,McHughJsaidthat:

Anintentiononthepartofthelegislaturetoexcludetherulesofnatural justiceisnottobeassumednorspelledoutfrom"indirectreferences, uncertaininferencesorequivocalconsiderations".Norissuchan intentiontobeinferredfromthepresenceinthestatuteofrightswhich arecommensuratewithsomeoftherulesofnaturaljustice.
65
sotoargueistofallintotheerrorofinferringfromthepresenceof somemattersconcernedwithnaturaljusticethatParliamentintendedto excludenaturaljusticeinallotherrespects.

62 66
(1990)170CLR596,609perBrennanJ.SirAnthonyMasonhassaid,subsequently,that'[I]tmaybe
thatthissuggestionfallsshortofprovidingatestwhichisinstructiveandhelpful',TheBrennanLegacy, Blowingthewindsoflegalorthodoxy,2002,p53.
63 64 65
(2001)206CLR57,[126]perMcHughJ. Ibid,[139]. Ibid,[126]perMcHughJ. Seealso S157/2002vCommonwealthofAustralia [2003]HCA2,[30]per
Gleeson CJ and Re Refugee Tribunal; Ex parteAala (2000 2001)204 CLR82, [41] per Gaudron and GummowJJ.
66
Ibid, per McHugh J [126], [139]. In response tothis decision, inlate December 2001, aBill was
introducedintotheParliament,the MigrationLegislation(ProceduralFairness)Bill2001,whichseeksto provideclearlegislativeintentionthatthecodestheBillspecifiesaretobetakentobeanexhaustive statementofthecommonlawnaturaljusticehearingrule;seetheExplanatoryMemorandumtothe Bill,paragraph4. reportontheBillby theSenateLegalandConstitutionalCommitteeforinquiry,. tableditsreporton5June2002,recommended(withonedissentor)thattheBillproceed.TheBillwas assentedtoon3July2002.
73
Bias 4.58 Bias may be actual or apprehended and may manifest itself in the decisionmakers personal associations, interests or in the structure of the decisionmakingprocess.67 4.59 Subject to the need to accommodate differences between court proceedingsandproceedingsbeforeotherkindsoftribunals,theHighCourt hassaidthattheruleagainstbiaswouldbeasapplicabletoatribunalastoa court.68 4.60 In MinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairsvJia's case,however,itis suggestedthatwhatmightconstituteabreachofproceduralfairnessdepends toadegreeonthenatureofthedecisionmakingbody,thatis,whetherthe bodyisacourt,tribunaloraMinister.Asaresult,whatwouldbecategorised asprejudgmentinacourt,willnotnecessarilybesoclassifiedinrelationtoa tribunal,whichisexpectedtobuildupexpertiseinmatterssuchascountry information(forinstancetheRefugeeReviewTribunal).69 Probativeevidence 70 4.61 Thisrulehaslinkswithunreasonablenessandwitherroroflawonthe faceoftherecord71althoughitwouldseemthat,inAustraliaatleast,itshould notbeequatedtoerroroflaw.72Itisbestregarded,however,inthecontextof the ground of procedural fairness. In R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commission,exparteMoore,DiplockLJnotedthatnaturaljusticerequiresthat tribunalsdecisionsarebasedonsomeevidenceofprobativevalue,thatis:
Therequirementthatapersonexercisingquasijudicialfunctions,must basehisdecisiononevidencemeansnomorethanitmustbebased uponmaterialwhichtendslogicallytoshowtheexistenceornon
67
Seeforinstance WebbvTheQueen (1994)181CLR41,74,referredtointhemajorityjudgmentof
GleesonCJ,McHugh,GummowandHayneJJinEbnervtheOfficialTrusteeinBankruptcy;ClenaePtyLtd vANZBankingGroup(2000)176ALR644.
68 69
SeeEbnervtheOfficialTrusteeinBankruptcy;ClenaePtyLtdvANZBankingGroup(2000)176ALR644.
(2001) 205 CLR 507, [180][181] per Hayne J. See also Kirby J in this case to the effect that
notwithstandingdifferencesbetweentherolesofjudicialofficersandtribunalmembers,thestandards forapprehendedbiasareinbothcasesrigorous,[115].
70
Sections 5and6oftheAD(JR)Actexpresslyauthorisereviewonthegroundthattherewasno RvNorthumberlandCompensationAppealTribunal;ExparteShaw[1952]1KB338. See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Epeabaka (1998) 84 FCR 411 per Black CJ,
evidenceorothermaterialtojustifythedecisionwhensomeparticularfactistobeestablished.'
71 72
vonDoussaandCarrJJ.
74
existenceoffactsrelevanttotheissuestobedetermined,ortoshowthe likelihoodorunlikelihoodoftheoccurrenceofsomefutureeventthe occurrenceofwhichwouldberelevant.

73
4.62 What is substantive or adequate is inevitably affected by ones perceptionofthejusticeorinjusticeoftheparticulardecision. Incommon with the extended ultra vires grounds of unreasonableness, irrelevant/relevant considerations and error of law, this ground could provide recourse to reexamination of the facts of a case. As with those grounds,however,thecourtshavetroddenwarily. 4.63 AccordingtoLordDiplock,theobligationensuingfromtheprobative evidencerule:
meansthat[thedecisionmaker]mustnotspinacoinorconsultan astrologer,buthemaytakeintoaccountanymaterialwhich,asamatter ofreason,hassomeprobativevalueinthesensementionedabove.Ifit iscapableofhavinganyprobativevalue,theweighttobeattachedtoit isamatterforthepersontowhomtheParliamenthasentrustedthe responsibilityofdecidingtheissue.Thesupervisoryjurisdictionofthe HighCourtdoesnotentitleittousurpthisresponsibilityandto substituteitsownviewsforhis.
74
4.64 Becauseofitstendencytoblurthemerits/judicialreviewboundary, theHighCourthasalsocautionedagainsttooheavyarelianceonthisrule.75 Contentofproceduralfairness 4.65 As intimated earlier in this Part, identification of what constitutes proceduralfairnessinaparticularcasecanvary:
Thedefinitionoffairprocedurestogovernthemakingofevery determinationaffectingtheinterestsofanindividualisaformidable task.Indeed,thealmostinfiniterangeoffactorsprecludeanapriori definitionofpreciseprocedurestoguideeveryadministratorinthe exerciseofhispowerineverycase.Someagencieshavepowerto summonwitnesses,somedonot.Somecancompeltheproductionof documents,somecannot.Someareboundbytheconstraintsof confidentiality,somearenot.Someadministrativedecisionsdependon
73 74 75
(1965)1QB456,488.SeealsothePrivyCouncilinMahonvAirNewZealand[1984]AC808. RvDeputyIndustrialInjuriesCommission,exparteMoore(1965)1QB456,488perDiplockLJ. MinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairsvPochi(1980)31ALR666,690.
THEGROUNDSOFREVIEWANDTHESCOPEOFJUDICIALREVIEW clearlydefinedfacts,somerequirearatherdiffuseinquiry.Some decisionsowelittletopolicy,someowealot.Someadministrative decisionsaremadeatleisure,somemustbemadeonthemoment. Acrossthebroadspectrumofadministrativedecisionmaking,the principlesofnaturaljusticerequirethattheprocedurebefairinallthe circumstances.

76
75
4.66 In some cases where the rules relating to the right to be heard are applicable:
nothinglessthanafullandunbiasedhearingofeachaffected individualscasewillsatisfythem.Inothercircumstances,something lessmaysuffice.Thus,thecircumstancesofaparticularcasemaybe suchthatproceduralfairnessdoesnotrequirethateachpersonaffected beaccordedaneffectiveopportunityofbeingpersonallyheardbeforea decisionismadebutnonethelessrequiresthatthedecisionsmakerbe andappeartobe,personallyunbiased.
77
Thejudicialperspective 4.67 Thecourtshaveregardedthisruleasoneoffundamentalimportance andonethatmayonlybedisplacedintheeventofaclearstatutoryintention tothateffect.ThisisreflectedinthedecisionoftheHighCourtinKioavWest, whereitwassaidthat:

Thelawhasnowdevelopedtoapointwhereitmaybeacceptedthat thereisacommonlawdutytoactfairly,inthesenseofaccording proceduralfairness,inthemakingofadministrativedecisionswhich affectrights,interestsandlegitimateexpectations,subjectonlytothe clearmanifestationofacontrarystatutoryintention.
78
4.68 Althoughconcernhasbeenexpressedthatproceduralfairnessshould notbepursuedinflexiblytothedetrimentofefficientdecisionmaking79ithas beensaidthat:

76
Justice Brennan, The Purpose and Scope of Judicial Review (1986) 2 Australian Bar Review 73, HaouchervMinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairs(1990)169CLR648,652perDeaneJ. Seealso KioavWest,ibid,584. SeealsothejudgmentsofWilcoxJandFrenchJin NAAVvMinisterfor
1045.
77
KioavWest(1985)159CLR550,6323perDeaneJ.
78
Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2002) 69 ALD 1 and of the Court in S157/2002 v CommonwealthofAustralia[2003]HCA2.
79
McInnesvOnslowFane(1978)1WLR1520.
76
Itisnotthepurposeofsection75(v)oftheConstitutiontoengagethe jurisdictionoftheCourtthroughthedecisionsofadministrative decisionmakerstodecidewhetherornotsomeminoror inappropriatelywordedreferencetothematerialuponwhichthe decisionmakerrelieshasnotbeenbroughttotheattentionoftheperson affected.Somethingmoreisrequiredtodemonstrateanarguable breachoftherulesofnaturaljustice.

80
Theexecutiveperspective 4.69 As a result of the decision in Kioa v West81 migration officials were obligedtoaffordapplicantsanadequateopportunitytopresentallmatters relevanttotheircase,82althoughnojudgewentsofarastorequireformalor informaloralhearings. 4.70 In areas with many elements to the decisionmaking process, it has been suggested that this requirement can become both onerous and unnecessary.83Inthesecircumstances,thecourtshaveadoptedtheviewthat theoverallprocessmustbefair.84 4.71 Ithasbeennotedinthisregardthat:
Proceduralfairnessisthegreatprotectionagainstbureaucratic unfairness.Thequestionisnotwhetherwehavetoomuchnatural justicetheprincipleofnaturaljusticemustdrivedecisionmaking.The realissueisthatthosewhoarecreatingmodelsfortheproceduretobe followed,whethertheybepublicservantsorjudges,needtobeaware thatanexcessofprocedurecanbecounterproductive.Itcannotbe
80
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Brian Gerald James Goldie, 3/9/01, (1985)159CLR550. SomaghivMinisterforImmigration,LocalGovernmentandEthnicAffairs(1991)31FCR100. IntheMigrationReformBill1992,theGovernmentsoughttoaddressthesedifficulties.
KirbyJ(Chambers).
81 82 83
AsnotedbytheHonGerryHand,formerMinisterforImmigration: Under the reforms, the decisionmaking procedures will becodified. This will providea fair and certainprocesswithwhichbothapplicantanddecisionmakercanbeconfident.Decisionmakerswill beabletofocusonthemeritsofeachcaseknowingpreciselywhatproceduralrequirementsaretobe followed. Theseprocedureswillreplacethesomewhatopenendeddoctrinesofnaturaljusticeand unreasonableness Asthecodifiedprocedureswillallowanapplicantafairopportunitytopresenthisorherclaims,failure toobservetherulesofnaturaljusticeandunreasonablenesswillnotbegroundsofreview. See Hon Gerry Hand, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Second Reading Speech to the MigrationReformBill1992,Hansard,4November1992.
84
HaouchervMinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairs(1990)169CLR648.
THEGROUNDSOFREVIEWANDTHESCOPEOFJUDICIALREVIEW assumedthattheprovisionofadditionalproceduralchallengeswill necessarilybetotheadvantageofpersonsaffectedbythedecisionin question.

85
77
4.72 For ordinary people, considerations of cost, speed, finality and accessibilitywillalsobeimportantelements. 4.73 Atthesametime,notetheproceduralstandardsimposedonthepublic sector,particularlyproceduralfairness,haveledtoageneralimprovementin primarydecisionmaking.86
Discussionpoints5and6
4.74 AsremarkedbytheCouncilin1989inits32nd report,Reviewofthe AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:theAmbitoftheAct:
intheCouncilsview,judicialreviewcasesinAustraliahavegenerally shownthecourtstobecarefultoensurethattheadministrative processesbywhichgovernmentiscarriedondoesnotbecomeaseries ofjusticiablecontroversies.
87
4.75 Discussionofthegroundsofreviewintheprecedingsectionofthis paperhasnotdislodgedthisview. 4.76 However,thescopeofcertaingroundsofreviewisnotfixed.Grounds mayexpandorcontractinresponsetoarangeofconsiderations,andthereis not always a congruence between the perceptions of the courts and the executiveatanygivenpointintimeastohowmuchandwhy.Inevitably, this will render the relationship between the courts and the executive an uneasyone. 4.77 Havingregardtothenatureofthegroundsofreviewexaminedinthis discussion paper, and to the way in which the courts have generally addressedthosegrounds,theviewmightreasonablybetakenthatnoground, initself,withoutmore,warrantstheexclusionofjudicialreview. However, there are clearly other significant factors, such as cost, consistency and
85 86
DennisPearce,IsThereTooMuchNaturalJustice?(1992)1AIALForum,94. SeerecentcommentsbyAnthonyBlunnAO,'AdministrativeDecisionMakingAnOutsiderTells'to AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:TheAmbit
bepublishedinAIALForumin2003.
87
oftheAct,ReportNo32,1989,paragraph24.6.
78
predicabilitywhichmayneedtobeaddressed. Itistheotherandtheby whomelementsthattheCouncilproposestoaddressinthefollowingParts ofthisdiscussionpaper.
(5)
Doyouagree/notagreewiththeseviews? Pleaseexplainwhy/whynot.
(6)
Arethereothermattersassociatedwiththegroundsofjudicial review discussed above or of any other grounds of review which are of relevance/concern in seeking to determine the appropriatescopeofjudicialreview? Pleaseelaborate.
PROPOSEDCONSIDERATIONSINDEVELOPINGAGUIDETOTHESCOPEOFJR
79
PARTVPROPOSEDCONSIDERATIONSINDEVELOPING AGUIDETOTHESCOPEOFJUDICIALREVIEW SECTIONI Proposedconsiderations SECTIONII Consistency/predictability

Acasestudy Themigrationexperience
Abuseofreviewprocess
Resourcerelatedissues
Theexecutiveperspective Thejudicialperspective PreviousCouncilconsideration Contributingfactorsandresponses
SECTIONIII Natureofthedecision
PolicyandpolicydecisionsDecisionsrelatedtotheadministrationofjustice Decisionswherethereareongoingrelationships Legislativedecisions Decisionsmadeinurgentoremergencycontexts
SECTIONIV Natureofthedecisionmaker
Statusofthedecisionmaker Expertdecisionmakers Outsidecontractors
80
Governmentbusinessenterprises Decisionsbycertainothergovernmentbodies
SECTIONV Other
Noimpactonfinaldecision Noinjustice
SECTIONI Proposedconsiderations
5.1 Having regard to issues discussed in the preceding Parts of the discussion paper, the following considerations have been identified as relevanttothescopeofjudicialreview: Consistency/predictability Resourcerelatedissues: cost/volume; abuseofprocess; Natureofthedecision: policyandpolycentricissues wherethereareongoingrelationships legislativematters mattersrelatingtotheadministrationofjustice;and theurgencyoremergencyofthecircumstances.
Natureofthedecisionmaker: status expertise beinganoutsidecontractor governmentbusinessenterprises intergovernmentalbodies;and consultative and advisory authorities dealing directly withthepublic.
81
Other: noimpactonfinaldecision/noinjustice.
Alternativeremediesavailable.
Discussionpoint7 Doyouagreewiththeitemsincludedinthislist? Arethereitemsthatshouldbeaddedtoorremovedfromthe list? Pleaseelaborate.
SECTIONII Consistency/predicability
5.2 Ithasbeenacceptedthatanunderlyingvalueofadministrativejustice isconsistencyinadministrativedecisionmaking1andthatthereisapotential forinconsistenciestodevelopiflimitsareplacedonreview. 5.3 Inconsistencyandunpredictabilityindecisionmakingoutcomesmay suggestunfairness,sometimesgraphically,wheretherearefiscalimplications associatedwithdecisions. 5.4 It has been said in that respect that the courts had a role in the developmentof:
coherentandexplicablelegalprincipleswhichprovideadministrators,the public,andtheirlegaladvisers,withclearguidelineswhilstatthesametime retainingsufficient flexibility to allow an appropriate balance between the public and private aspects of the public interest in the infinite variety of circumstancesthatcomebeforethecourts.
1 2 2
ReDrakeandMinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairs(No2)(1979)2ALD634,645. JusticevonDoussa,'NaturalJusticeinFederalAdministrativeLaw',paperpresentedataseminarby
theAustralianInstituteofAdministrativeLaw,Darwin,7July2000,3.
82
Acasestudy
5.5 Parts XIA (The Repatriation Medical Authority) and XIB (Specialist MedicalReviewCouncil)3wereincludedintheVeteransEntitlementsAct1986 (theVEA)inresponsetoconcernsthattheinterpretationgiventosection120 oftheAct(reasonablehypothesislinkingaveteransinjury,diseaseordeath withservice)resultedinunmeritoriouspensionclaimsandlackofconsistency indecisionmaking. 5.6 ImpetuswasaffordedfortheamendmentstotheVEAbythedecision oftheHighCourtin BushellvRepatriationCommission whereinconsidering what medicalscientific evidence would support a reasonable hypothesis connectingaveteransmedicalconditionwithservice,MasonCJ,Deaneand McHughJJsaidinteralia:
thecasemustberarewhereitcanbesaidthatahypothesis,basedon theraisedfacts,isunreasonablewhenitisputforwardbyamedical practitionerwhoiseminentintherelevantfieldofknowledge.Conflict withothermedicalopinionsisnotsufficienttorejectahypothesisas unreasonableButitisvitalthattheCommissionkeepinmindthatthat hypothesismaystillbereasonablealthoughitisunprovedandopposed totheweightofinformedopinion.
4
5.7 InanAuditReporthandeddownin1992bytheAustralianNational AuditOffice,itwasobservedthattheapproachadoptedinBushellwouldlead to the great majority of claims being accepted.5 The Audit Report recommendedareviewofthecompensationschemeforveteransandtheir dependents. This review was subsequently undertaken by the Veterans CompensationReviewCommitteechairedbyPeterBaume. 5.8 Inits1994report, AFairGo,ReportonCompensationforVeteransand WarWidows,theCommitteerecommended,amongstotherthings,that:
Anindependent,ExpertMedicalCommitteebeestablishedtoresolve generalmedicalissuesandtoformulateStatementsofPrinciplefor applicationtoalldecisionmaking.
3 4 5 6 6
InsertedbytheVeteransAffairs(199495BudgetMeasures)LegislationAmendmentAct1995. (1992)175CLR,414415. AustralianNationalAuditOffice,AuditReport1992,1992,paragraph1.1.10. TheHonourableEmeritusProfessorPeterBaumeAO, AFairGo,ReportonCompensationforVeterans
andWarWidows,1994,paragraph3.9.
83
5.9 TheRepatriationMedicalAuthority(theRMA)haditsoriginsinthis recommendation. It was proposed in the report that the Statements of Principle would have legislative authority, would guide the process of determiningwhetheraninjurywaspredominantlywarcausedandwould ensureconsistentstandardsindecisionmaking.7 5.10 Followingthisreport,in1994,substantialamendmentstotheVeterans Entitlements Act were presented to Parliament, including the inclusion of PartsXIAandXIB.8Intheexplanatorymemorandumtothelegislation9itwas statedthatinprovidingfortheestablishmentoftheRMA,theintentionofthe new Part XIA was to ensure a more equitable and consistent system of determiningclaimsfordisabilitypensionsforveteransandtheirdependents. 5.11 TheroleoftheRMAistodetermineStatementsofPrinciples(SoPs) withrespecttoinjury,diseaseordeathifitisoftheviewthatsoundmedical scientificevidenceexistsindicatingalinkeligibleAustralianDefenceForce service. TheSoPsystemisfoundedonthebasisthataconnectionbetween service and medical condition should be supported by established epidemiological evidence accepted by the RMA, rather than by the expert medicalevidenceproducedinanindividualapplicationforpension.10 5.12 PursuanttoanundertakinggivenbytheGovernmentofthedayatthe timeofthepassageofthe1994legislation,andreiteratedbythesuccessorto thatGovernment,areviewwassubsequentlyundertakenoftheRMAandthe SMRC. In the Report of the Review Committee11 it was said of the SOP systemthat:
7 8
Ibid,paragraphs3.7and5.6.20. For a comprehensive record and analysis of these amendments, see Robin Creyke and TheVeteransAffairs(19945BudgetMeasures)LegislationAmendmentAct1994. PartXIBwasinsertedduringdebateontheBillintheSenatetoprovideameansofappealfrom
PeterSutherland,VeteransEntitlementsLaw,2000,pp521524.
9 10
determinations of the RMA to a body titled the Specialist Medical Review Council. For further informationinrelationtothisbodyseeRobinCreykeandPeterSutherland,VeteransEntitlementsLaw, 2000,pp531536.
11
Emeritus Professor Dennis Pearce was appointed to conduct the review. He was assisted by
ProfessorDArcyHolmanwhoprovidedatechnicalreportrelatingtotheworkoftheRMA:DPearce,D Holman,ReportoftheReviewCommittee,PartTwo,1997.
84
Itprovidesadegreeofcertaintythatisotherwiseabsent.Itprovidesa cleardirectiontoclaimantsortheirrepresentativesastotheevidence thatmustbegatheredforthepurposeofmakingaclaim. Itovercomestheneedtosearchforsupportingmedicalopinion. Itreducestherangeofmattersthatareopentobeappealedwhichis overallbeneficialnotonlyinthepublicinterestbutintheinterestof individuals.

12
5.13 Indeed, the success of the Statement of Principles Scheme has been such that it is used as a reference framework in other compensation jurisdictionsincludinginsomeoverseasveteransadministrations.
Themigrationexperience
5.14 Consistencyandpredicabilityhavealsobeenimportantfactorsinthe migrationarea.Inrelationtothatlegislation,therehasbeenaparticularfocus onuncertaintiesarisingfromtheopenendednatureofthegroundsofreview. In his second reading speech to the Migration Reform Act 1992, the then Immigration Minister, the Hon Gerry Hand, stated that the Government wishestomaketheapplicationofthelegalconceptsofmigrationdecision makingpredictable. 5.15 Morerecently,inhissecondreadingspeechtotheMigrationLegislation Amendment(ProceduralFairness)Bill2002,theMinisterforImmigrationand MulticulturalandIndigenousAffairs,theHonPhilipRuddockMP,notedthat oneofthereasonsfortheinclusionintheMigrationActbythe Migration ReformAct1992ofthecodeofproceduralfairnesswasto:
replacetheuncertaincommonlawrequirementsofthenaturaljustice 'hearingrule',inparticular,whichhadpreviouslyappliedtodecision makers.
13
5.16 TheMinisternotedthattheBill,madeitexpresslyclearthatcodesin the Migration Act 'do exhaustively state the requirements of the natural justiceorproceduralfairnesshearingrule'.14 Thisrepresentedaresponseto thedecisionoftheHighCourtinMiah,15whereitwasfoundthatthecodeof
12 13 14 15
Ibid,p524. SecondReadingSpeech,Hansard,13March2002,1106. Id. MinisterforImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairs:ExparteMiah(2001)206CLR57.
85
procedurerelatingtovisaapplicationshadnotclearlyandexplicitlyexcluded commonlawnaturaljusticerequirements. 5.17 AsaresultofthedecisioninMiah16,evenwherethecodewasfollowed ineveryrespecttherecouldstillbe'uncertaintyaboutthelegalprocedures whichdecisionmakersarerequiredtofollowtomakealawfuldecision'. 5.18 Suchdevelopmentsareconsistentwithmovesgenerallyencouragedby theProductivityCommissionforthedevelopmentofperformanceindicators whicharespecific,clearandeasilyapplied. Thisisseenasanaidtobetter decisionmakingacrosspublicadministration.17
Discussionpoint8
5.19 Theforegoingdiscussionnotwithstanding,theviewmaybetakenthat arguments for legislative limitation of judicial review on the basis of considerationsofconsistencyandpredicability indecisionmakingwillnot alwaysbeconvincing. 5.20 As noted by Brennan Jin Re Drake andMinister for Immigration and EthnicAffairs,consistencyisnotpreferabletojustice.18Itmightalsobesaid that consistency is not necessarily synonymous with justice. In some instances, the desire for consistency and predicability can override considerationoftheimplicationsofadecisioninaparticularcase,andleadto decisionsthatareunjust. 5.21 Where practical technical expertise resides in a primary decision makingbody,claimsforlegislativelimitationsonjudicialreviewmayhave some basis. Indeed, in some situations, review inhibitors such as those utilisedintheveteransaffairsarea,maybethoughttopresentanacceptable limiting and limited solution both in the context of merits and judicial reviewespeciallyinhighvolumecases.
16 17
Id. SeefurtherProfessorMNeave,IntheEyeoftheBeholderMeasuringAdministrativeJustice,inR
CreykeandJMcMillan, AdministrativeJusticetheCoreandtheFringe,1999,p124andLMcDonald, MeasuringAdministrativeJusticeLessonsfromtheReportonGovernmentServices,inRCreykeand JMcMillan,AdministrativeJusticetheCoreandtheFringe,1999,p138.

18
(No2)(1979)2ALD634,645.
86
5.22 Asnoted,establishmentoftheVeteransAffairsSoPsystemhasbeen concludedtobeinthepublicinterest.19InsofarastheSoPsrelatetotechnical medicalissuesandtheirepidemiologicalconnectionwitheventsofservice, often many years previously, however, they do not represent the usual evidentiaryissuesassociatedwithadministrativedecisionmaking. 5.23 Nevertheless, the fact that consistency and predicability are values underlying judicial review should not be overlooked. Courts have an important part to play in maintaining consistency in the interpretation of legislativeprovisions,particularlynewprovisions,andinthedevelopmentof precedent. 5.24 In thefaceofinconsistency andunpredictability, thecostofjudicial review both to government and the individual may also be a factor for consideration.Thisisexploredinmoredetailbelow.
Doyouagree/notagreewiththeseviews? Arethereotherrelevantconsiderations? Pleaseelaborate.
Abuseofreviewprocess
5.25 In recenttimes,governmenthastendedtoplaceparticular focus on abuseasareasonforlimitingjudicialreview. However,whatconstitutes abusemaybedifficulttoidentify. 5.26 In his second reading speech to the Jurisdiction of Courts Legislation AmendmentAct2000,theAttorneyGeneralsaid:
Theobjectistoavoidtheuseofunmeritoriousdelayingtacticsinthe criminaljusticeprocessbyremovingthecollateralaccessofdefendants tofederaladministrativelawproceduresandremedies.
20
19 20
DPearce,DHolman,ReportoftheReviewCommittee,PartTwo,1997. TheDarylWilliams, AttorneyGeneral, SecondReadingSpeech,JurisdictionofCourtsLegislation
AmendmentBill2000,Hansard,8March2000.
87
5.27 Therewerealsoreferencesinthedebateofthislegislationtotheeffect that:

Collateralattacks[lack]meritsandareinvariablyonlyusedby defendantswithdeeppockets.
21
5.28 In the migration area, it has been remarked by the Minister for ImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairs,theHonPhilipRuddockMP,that:
litigationcanbeanendinitself.Giventheimportanceattachedto permanentresidenceinAustralia,thereisahighincentiveforrefused applicantstodelayremovalfromAustraliaaslongaspossible.This maybedonetogivetimeforthemtoestablishtieswithinthe communitywhichtheymayhopewillyieldentitlementtoavisa throughanotherpathway.Theincentivetodelayremovalfrom Australiaisincreasediftherefusedapplicantsareenjoyingprivileges suchasworkrightsandaccesstoMedicare.
22
5.29 Further:
OneofthedifficultiesthatweexperienceinthisareaIthinktheonly otherareathathasbeenlikenedtoitistheareainrelationtotax decisionsisthatgenerallyspeakingwhenpeopleaccessjudicialreview oradministrativereviewtheydonotachievetheirimmediateoutcome. whatifyourprincipalintentionistoenterAustraliaandworkhere temporarilyinotherwords,ifpeopleareseekingaccesstoAustralia merelyasaguestworker?Ihavetosaythepeoplewholodgeasylum claimsorwhousetheappealsystemareveryoftenpeoplewhose principalintentionistobeaguestworker,whohaspermissiontowork. iftheycandelaydeterminationofdecisionsinrelationtotheirstatus theycanachievewhatisinfacttheirprincipalobjectivetheobjectiveof beinghereandbeingabletoworkforaperiodoftime.
23
5.30 Again in the migration area, one of the arguments used to support passageoftheMigrationLegislationAmendmentAct(No2)2001,limitingclass actions in the migration jurisdiction, was said to be to combat the recent
21 22
Australia,HouseofRepresentatives,Debates,14109. The Hon Philip Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Second Reading Id.
Speech,MigrationLegislationAmendmentBill(No4)1997,Hansard,25June1997.
23
88
increaseintheuseofclassactionsforpeoplewithnolawfulauthorityto remaininAustraliatoprolongtheirstayandfrustrateremovalaction.24 5.31 Assuggestedelsewhereinthispaper,similarconcernscouldwellhave beenattherootofthelimitationsonjudicialreviewexistinginrelationtothe reviewofincometaxassessments.
5.32 In1986,inits26threport,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(Judicial Review)Act1977StageOne,theCouncilconcludedthat:
itisgenerallyonlycorrecttodescribeasabusesoftheActthose proceedingswhicharedesignedtodelayorfrustrateCommonwealth administration(inabroadsense)merelyinordertogainatactical advantageratherthantoestablishagenuinelegalrightorinterest.
25
5.33 Insayingthis,theCouncildidnotconsidertheexistenceofalternative remediesinthefaceofhighvolumesofapplicationsforjudicialreviewtobe indicative,inthemselves,ofabuseoftheadministrativesystem. 5.34 TheCouncilnotedfurtherthatabuseisnotevidencedbythemerefact thatanapplicationforanorderofreviewhasbeen refused. TheCouncil notedinthisregardthatevenunsuccessfulproceedingsundertheActmay involve real questions, whether of fact or law or both, which justifiably requireadjudicationanddeterminationbyacourtinrelationtowhichitis reasonabletomakeanapplicationundertheAct.26 5.35 TheCouncilalsoconsideredthatthefactthatproceedingsunderthe AD(JR)Actmayhavetheconsequenceofdelayingotherproceedingsalready intraindoesnot,initself,indicateanabuseofprocess. 5.36 In Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 StageOne,whilenotingthat:
24
The Hon Phillip Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Second Reading AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977Stage Ibid,paragraph8.
Speech,MigrationLegislationAmendmentBill(No2)1999[2000],Hansard,14March2000.
25
One,ReportNo26,1986,paragraph38.
26
PROPOSEDCONSIDERATIONSINDEVELOPINGAGUIDETOTHESCOPEOFJR ItwouldbehighlyundesirableiftheActwerebeingusedundulyto frustrateorimpedelegitimateadministrativeactioninanattemptto obtainmeretacticaladvantage

27
89
theCouncilconcludedthatmanyoftheallegationsaboutabuseshadbeen exaggerated.28 5.37 Althoughitfoundlittleevidenceofsuchabuse,theCouncilconsidered thatthepossibilityofusingtheAD(JR)Actforthepurposeofdelayexistedin relation to the ongoing proceedings of tribunals such as the Australian BroadcastingTribunalandinanareasuchastaxation.However,intheend result,theCouncilrecommendedamendmenttotheActtoextendandclarify theFederalCourtspowertostay,ortorefusetograntanapplicationunder theAD(JR)Actasthemechanismtocontrolabuseofpower.29 5.38 The Councils findings were subsequently endorsed by the Senate LegalandConstitutionalAffairsCommitteeinitsconsiderationofthe1986 AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)AmendmentBill1986.30 5.39 TheCommitteealsoacknowledgedtheviewoftheNSWLawSociety thattherewas:
greatdifficultyinappreciatingthejustificationforpenalising individualswhoaregenuinelyaggrievedbyCommonwealth administrativeactionbymakingitmoredifficultandexpensivefor themtobringreviewproceedingsbecauseofperceivedabuseofthe AD(JR)Actincircumstanceswhichareunlikelytorecur.The injusticeiscompound[ed]bythefactthatindividualsorcorporations withvastresources[willstillbeabletouseothermethodsofjudicial review].
31
Discussionpoint9
5.40 Having regard to the preceding discussion it would seem that identification of abuse remains difficult and subjective. For instance, in relation to the Jurisdiction of Courts Legislation Amendment Act 2000, the
27 28 29 30
Ibid,paragraph3. Ibid,paragraph9. Ibid,paragraphs3848. Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Administrative Decisions (Judicial Ibid,paragraph3.41.
Review)Bill1987,ParliamentaryPaperNo212,1987.
31
90
Governmentusednostatisticsorexamplestobackupitsclaimsthatjudicial reviewwasbeingusedincollateralattacksonthecriminaljusticeprocess.32 5.41 Obviously,identificationofwhatconstitutesanabuseofprocessisnot necessarily reflected in the number of applications for review or in the numbersofsuccessful(orunsuccessful)applications. 5.42 Similarly,highwithdrawalratesforapplicationsmightbeindicativeof adesiretoensurethattimelimitsforapplicationsaremetratherthanadesire toabusethesystem. 5.43 Insomeareas,taxandmigrationforinstance,itmaybethatthereare timeadvantagesinlodginganapplicationforjudicialreview.Moreover,as stated elsewhere in this paper, the constitutional separation of powers principlemakesjudicialreviewimperativeinrelationtocertainissues. 5.44 Undoubtedly, although there are circumstances where some people maybeattemptingtodelayorfrustrateadministrativeprocesses,thereare otherswheretheyarenot.Insuchcircumstances,applicantsmayberesorting tojudicialreviewbecausetheygenuinelybelievethattheyhaveagrievance that they were not afforded procedural fairness or that there was a substantiveerroroflawmadeintheircase,whichisbestdealtwithbythe courts. 5.45 Accordingly,theviewmaybetakenthatabuseshouldnotreadilybe reliedonbygovernmentasareasonforlimitingreviewinaparticulararea. Byvirtueofthemethodstheyemployandtheirnecessaryfocusonthecaseat hand, arguably, courts are better placed to identify abuses in particular cases. 5.46 Ifsuchabuseispresentedintheformofhighvolumesofcasesand relatedstrainsonfinancialandhumanresources,itmaybesomethingwhich governmentshouldrespondto.
32
SeecommentsintheBillsDigest tothe JurisdictionofCourtsLegislationAmendmentAct2000, Bills
DigestNo149,19992000,p15whichcanbefoundontheDepartmentoftheParliamentaryLibraryat http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/199920002000BD149.htm; and Sean Brennan, Judicial ReviewandthePretrialProcess(2000)AIALForumNo2633,41.
91
5.47 In view, however, of the fact that many applications may well be genuine,itissuggestedthatifitdecidestolimitjudicialreviewonthisbasis, itisincumbentthattherebeanadequatealternativetojudicialreview.
Doyouagree/notagreewiththeseviews? Arethereanyotherrelevantconsiderations? Pleaseelaborate.
Resourcerelatedissues
Theexecutiveperspective
5.48 Resourcerelatedissuescoverbothfinancialcostandcostintermsof theuseofpersonnel,timeandotherresources.Concernsastoresourcesare often inextricably linked to claims of abuse of process and may also frequentlyunderlieconcernsastoconsistencyandpredicability. 5.49 Concerninthisareahastendedtofocusonthecosttogovernment and, through government, to the public in general rather than to the individual.Overallhowever,abalancemustbeachievedbetween:
ontheonehand,theneedtoprovideindividualswithameansby whichtheymayeffectivelyobtainjudicialreviewofthelegalityof administrativeactionand,ontheotherhand,theneedtorationaliseand ensuretheproperuseofexistingreviewmechanisms,tokeepcoststoa minimumandtoprotectpublicauthoritiesfromunwarrantedlegal action.
33
5.50 Ata1987administrativelawseminar,thethenMinisterforFinance, SenatorWalsh,commentedthattheAustraliansystemofadministrativelaw isbaseduponthebeliefthatperfectlegislationbackedupbyalegalsystem candeliveraperfectworldandthatthis:
33
SubmissionoftheAttorneyGeneralsDepartmenttotheSenateStandingCommitteeonLegaland
ConstitutionalAffairsInquiryintothe AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)AmendmentBill1987, ParliamentaryPaperNo212,1987,26.
92
implicitlyassumesaworldofunlimitedresourcesinwhichthecostof sustainingtheperfectlegalsystemneednotbe,orevenshouldnotbe, takenintoaccount.

34
5.51 TheMinisteralsoobservedthatequityisprovidedforthosewhofeel aggrievedbydecisionsbutatconsiderablecosttotaxpayerswhomustpay for much more complex and cumbersome administrative procedures than wouldotherwisebethecase.35 5.52 Resourcerelated issues were a factor alluded to by the current AttorneyGeneral in the context of the Jurisdiction of Courts Legislation AmendmentBill2000:
withoutreducingfairnessoraccesstojustice,theexpectationisthat thetransferofjurisdiction[fromtheFederalCourt]willcontributeto increasedefficiency,andreductionofcostlydelayswhichmay otherwiseresultfromaccesstocourtsystems.
36
5.53 Suchconsiderationsalsofeaturedintheshapingofthereviewregime provided for in the Public Service Act 1999. In a paper preceding the developmentofthescheme,itwasnotedthat:
Atpresenttherearetoomanyavenuesofappeal,resultingin complicatedandconvolutedprocesses.Theresponsibilitytoafford publicservantsarightofreviewofemploymentdecisionsneedstobe balancedagainsttheneedtoreducethecostsassociatedwithanappeals culture.
37
5.54 In relation to migration decisions, resource concerns have attracted bipartisansupport. InasubmissiontotheSenateLegalandConstitutional Legislation Committee in its consideration of the Migration Legislation Amendment(JudicialReview)Bill1998,formerImmigrationMinister,MrGerry Hand,saidthat:
34
Minister for Finance, Senator Walsh, Address to Seminar on Administrative Law Retrospect and Ibid,at5. The Hon Daryl Williams MP, AttorneyGeneral, Second Reading Speech, Jurisdiction of Courts ThePublicServiceMeritProtectionandtheDepartmentofEmployment,WorkplaceRelationsand
ProspectattheAustralianNationalUniversity,Canberra,15March1987,3.
35 36
LegislationAmendmentBill2000,Hansard,8March2000.
37
SmallBusiness,AccountabilityinaDevolvedManagementFramework,May1997.
PROPOSEDCONSIDERATIONSINDEVELOPINGAGUIDETOTHESCOPEOFJR ThroughoutmytimeasMinisterIwasconcernedwiththeamountof publicresourcesconsumedinjudicialreviewprocesseswhich ultimatelydidnotalterthesituationthatthepersonwasnotentitledto remaininAustralia.Theseresourcesnotonlyincludedthecoststothe Department.Theyalsoincludedtheuseof[scarce]legalaidfundson personswithnolinktoAustraliawhenAustraliancitizensand permanentresidentswerebeingdeniedlegalaidforlegitimate grievances.

38
93
5.55 IntheExplanatoryMemorandumtotheMigrationAmendment(Judicial Review)Bill2001,itisobservedthat,iftheyweretooperateaspredicted,the amendmentseffectedbytheBilltotheMigrationActwould,byreducingthe issuestobeaddressedandallowingcasestoberesolvedmorequickly,deliver substantialsavings.[emphasisadded] 5.56 In providing evidence in support of the earlier version of this legislation,theMigrationLegislation(JudicialReview)Bill1998,theDepartment provided evidence that the reforms were expected to deliver significant savingsofupto50%intheDepartmentslegalcosts,oncethebacklogand initialchallengestotheprivativeclauseweredealtwith.
Thejudicialperspective
5.57 Although the evaluation of resource issues is a matter of particular concerntotheexecutive,thecourtshavenotbeenoblivioustothepressures on primary decisionmakers to deal with large numbers of cases with the attendantcoststhatthatinvolves.Judicialconsiderationofsuchissuesarises, inevitably,however,inthecontextofindividualhearings,particularlyinthe contextofthegroundofproceduralfairness. 5.58 Asdiscussedearlier,thenatureandextentofcostconsiderationsisnot generally amenable to assessment on a case by case basis. In one case, however, the High Court was prepared, having regard to the size of the administrationandthevolumeofdecisionmaking,torelaxtherequirement thatdecisionsshouldbemadebystatutoryofficeholders.39 Inanothercase, inconcludingthattherewasnouniversalmandateforanoralhearingbythe
38
SubmissionofMrGerryHandtotheSenateStandingCommitteeonLegalandConstitutionalAffairs
Inquiryintothe AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)AmendmentBill1987, Parliamentary PaperNo 212,1987,4.

39
OReillyvCommissionerofStateBankofVictoria(1983)153CLR1.
94
delegate, theFederal Court hadregard to the practical implications ofthe prescriptionofparticularprocedures:

Thecourthasnodirectknowledgeoftheresourceimplicationsof particularprocedures,noroftheresourcesavailabletotheDepartment toimplementthem.Oralhearingsbytheultimatedecisionmakers couldbeprovidedforallapplicantsusingthesimpleartificeof increasingthenumberofpersonwithappropriatedelegations. However,itmaybesuchasolutionwouldalsoputthefinaldecision makingresponsibilityinthehandsofmorejuniorandlessexperienced officersthanthosewhocurrentlyholddelegations.Inmyopinion, courtsshouldbereluctanttoimposeinthenameofproceduralfairness detailedrulesofpractice,particularlyintheareaofhighvolume decisionmakinginvolvingsignificantuseofpublicresources.
40
5.59 Therearelimitshowevertotheextenttowhichsuchconsiderations can supplant considerations going to the substance and quality of the decisionmakingprocess. 5.60 WhileKirbyPinJohnsvReleaseonLicenceBoard41lookedatthefinancial costsinvolvedinincreasingthecontentofthehearingrulefortheReleaseon LicenceBoard,henotedthatpracticalissues,suchasthestaffshortagesand accommodation, should not be factors limiting the requirements of proceduralfairness. 5.61 AlthoughnotingtheintentionoftheCodeundertheMigrationActto assistdelegatesintheefficientandspeedyresolutionofthethousandsofvisa applications with which they must deal each year, Kirby J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs: Ex parte Miah,42 for example, was not preparedtoconstruetheActsoastoexcludetherulesofproceduralfairness. Insuchcircumstances,courtsareboundtohaveregardtotherightsofthe individualratherthanbroadbasedissuesoffinancialpolicy.
5.62 Incommentingonthevolumeofapplications,initsfirstreportin1977, AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977,ExclusionsunderSection19
40
ZhangDeYongvMinisterforImmigration,LocalGovernmentandEthnicAffairs(1997)151ALR515,551 (1987)9NSWLR103. (2001)206CLR57,[178].
perWilcoxJ.
41 42
95
1978,theCouncilrespondedtoclaimsbysomeagenciesthattheAD(JR)Act wouldleadtoanopeningofthe'floodgates'forreviewbynotingthatifthere wasadramaticincreaseinthenumberofreviewapplicationsanexclusionof thatareacouldbemadequickly. 5.63 TheCouncilalsonotedthatahighvolumeoflitigationmightbeseen as evidence that the Act was having a salutary effect in checking the lawfulnesswhichmaynototherwisebeexposed. 5.64 In some areas, the Council noted that new legislation could raise difficult questions for decision, resulting in an upsurge in the number of AD(JR)Actchallenges.TheCouncilnotedthatthiswasfollowedfrequently byaslackeningoffoncetheFederalCourtsapproachtothelegislationbegins toemerge.43
Discussionpoint10
5.65 Undoubtedly, resource considerations are a legitimate concern of government and as such, may have an important impact on the desirable scopeofjudicialreview. 5.66 Itseemsapparent,moreover,thattheexecutiveisbestplacedtoassess the level of resources it can allocate to a particular area of government decisionmaking.Incontrast,judgesarenotinapositiontodeterminewhere resources should be provided or how they should be apportioned. Such decisionsinvolvearangeofissuesandofknowledge. 5.67 Inthissense,suchissuesarepolycentric,44 involvingconsiderationof mattersofwhichacourtisunlikelytohaveknowledgeortobeequippedto actuponifitdid.Astheroleofacourtistoexaminecasesonanindividual basis,itwouldseemgenerallyinappropriateforittoinvolveitselfinsuch broadbasedconsiderations.
Contributingfactorsandresponses
5.68 Whathasemergedfromthisdiscussionanddiscussionoftherelated issue of abuse of process is that there is a range of factors which may contributetohighreviewcostsinparticularareas.
43
AdministrativeReviewCouncil, AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977,Exclusionsunder SeediscussionofthisconceptinSectionIIofthispaper.
Section19,ReportNo.1,1978,paragraph8.
44
96
5.69 IntheCouncil'sview,thereareanumberofwaysthatsuchconcerns could be responded to other than through a reduction of judicial review rights. Newlegislation 5.70 As noted by the Council in its first report,45 the passage of new legislation or amendments to existing legislation may encourage an initial rashofcasestestingoutthewaters. Thiswillundoubtedlylessenasthe parametersoftheneworamendinglegislationareestablishedandtraining andproceduresareputinplace. 5.71 Insuchcircumstances,itmaybeconsideredthatthecourtshavean importantinterpretativeroletoplayandaroleinachievingtheconsistencyof approachreferredtointheprecedingsection:onlyacourtcanofferafinal andauthoritativeinterpretationofapieceoflegislation.Attemptstoreduce litigation by legislative means may be regarded as both unnecessary and inappropriate. Referralofcasesbythecourt 5.72 FailureoftheFederalCourtinmanyinstancestomakeadequateuseof its discretionary power under paragraph 10(2)(b)(ii) of the AD(JR) Act to refuseanapplicationwhereotheradequateavenuesofreviewexistcan,for instance,placepressuresonthesystem.46 Standardsofprimarydecisionmaking 5.73 Poor quality decisionmaking may also, of course, encourage applicantstocircumventinternalortribunalreviewproceduresinfavourof judicialreview.Again,theanswerisclearlynottolimitthescopeofjudicial review, but to address decisionmaking problems at agency and tribunal levels. 5.74 Insomecases,strategiesmightbeneededtoimprovethestandardof primarydecisionmaking.Inotherareas,extendedandimprovedalternative reviewmechanismsmightneedtobedeveloped.
45 46
AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977,ExclusionsunderSection19,ReportNo.1,1978. StatisticsarenotavailablefromtheFederalCourtinrelationtonumbersofcasesreferredbythe
Courtundersection10(2)(b)(ii)oftheAD(JR)Act.
97
Adequatealternatives 5.75 Whereadequatealternativeremediesarenotinplace,theymightneed tobeestablished.Wheresuchremediesareinplace,thecourtsmightneedto beencouragedtorefercasestothem.Insomecases,acombinationofallor someoftheseoptionsmightapply. 5.76 Where an adequate alternative review structure is provided, it is arguable that legislative limits on judicial review are justified. However, where the provision of adequate alternative remedies is accompanied by activereferral bythecourts ofappropriatecasestothealternativesystem, then it is equally arguable that legislative limitation of judicial review is unnecessary. 5.77 In thecontextofadequate alternative remedies however,oneofthe featuresoftheconstitutionalseparationofpowersdoctrineisthattribunals cannotmakefinalbindingandauthoritativedecisions. Whilethissystem prevails,useofthecourtsforjudicialreviewisinevitable(andofdiscernible value). Accesstolegalaid/avoidanceofundesirableconsequences 5.78 Other factors contributing to large volumes of judicial review cases mightincludeeasyaccesstolegalaidasintheveteransentitlementsarea,or thedesiretoexploitthelegalprocesstoavoidanundesirableconsequence, suchasdeportation,inthemigrationorcriminalareas. 5.79 Thefirstoftheseexamples,highlevelsoflegalaid,isanissuewhich thegovernmentisbestplacedtoaddress,thoughnot,itissubmitted,through limitationsonthescopeofjudicialreview. 5.80 Responsetothesecondexamplemightincludeseekingtoreducethe opentextured nature of some legislative decisionmaking provisions and (withgreaterdifficulty),internationalconventions. 5.81 Relevantly,inthetaxationareawheretheremightalsobeadvantagein delay,measureshavebeentakenlegislativelytoreplacethejudicialreview regime with a comprehensive tiered review scheme capped ultimately, in mostcases,witharightofappeal.
98
5.82 Iftheconclusionisreachedthatthereisnootherwaytobringcosts intolinethanbyimposingrestrictionsonjudicialreview,inaddressingthe issue, the preferable approach may be for parliament to use a finetuned legislative instrument, for example, by specifically identifying which decisionsarereviewable. 5.83 Ifitispossibletoretainsomeelementsofreviewhavingregardtothe potential ofsomegrounds ofreviewto attractgreater costresponses than others,47 then,arguably,thisdistinction shouldbe made. In anyevent,to maintain government accountability and to ensure the protection of individual rights, judicial review should only be replaced if there is an adequatealternativereviewmechanism:therightsoftheindividualapplicant shouldnotbemanifestlyreduced.Considerationlaterinthediscussionpaper withregardtoadequatealternativeremediesisrelevantinthisregard.
SECTIONIII Thenatureofthedecision
Policyandpolicydecisions
5.84 Policy has been described as the process by which governments translate their political vision into programs and actions to deliver outcomesthedesiredoutcomesintherealworld.48 Suchpolicy,often referredtoasgovernmentpolicy,maybeexpressed,thoughnotalways,by wayofgovernmentorministerialstatement,andhasanexpansiveratherthan alimitedapplication.49
47
Fullcompliancewiththerulesrelatingtotherighttobeheardisacaseinpoint.Asnotedearlierin United Kingdom Prime Minister and Minister for Cabinet Office, White Paper, Modernising LeppingtonPastoralvDepartmentofAdministrativeServices(1990)94ALR67,76.Inthiscase,theFull
thediscussionpaper.
48
Government,presentedtotheEnglishParliamentinMarch1999.
49
99
5.85 At another level, policy may be employed as a rule or guide for decidingwhenandwhatactionmayormaynotbetakenintheexerciseofa statutorydiscretion.50 Thissortofpolicymaytakeavarietyofformsfrom official departmental publications providing statements of objectives to detailed guidelines or instructions to unofficial expressions of opinion by publicservants. Intheabsenceofanysuchstatementorpolicy,acourseof actionmayalsobedevelopedandfollowedoveraperiodoftime.Manysuch policiesdonothaveministerialorgovernmentendorsement,maynotbe readily categorised in terms of broadbased government policy and may amount to little more than statements of objective, or opinions offered by individualagencyofficialsastowhatlegislationmeans.51 Theimportanceofpolicyingovernmentdecisionmaking 5.86 Development of government policy is commonly regarded as a functionofgovernmentforwhichitispubliclyandpoliticallyaccountable, and an elected government can rightfully expect that its policies will be carriedintoeffectbytheexecutivearmofgovernment.52 5.87 The importance attached by the government to the awareness and responsiveness of administrators to government policy is reflected in the AustralianPublicServiceValuessetoutinthePublicServiceAct1999,which requirethat:
theAPS[be]responsivetotheGovernmentinprovidingfrank,honest, comprehensive,accurateandtimelyadviceandinimplementingthe Governmentspoliciesandprograms.
53
5.88 Theprominenceaffordedtopolicyisalsoreflectedintheimpositionon directors of statutory authorities and government companies by the CommonwealthAuthoritiesandCompaniesAct1997 ofanobligationtoensure
Court contrasted the statement that Xs property was required for use as an airport pursuant to a governmentpolicyofacquiringXspropertyforanairport,withastatementreferringtoapolicythat thereshouldbeasecondairportintheSydneyregion.Althoughthelattercouldberegardedasapolicy statement,theformer,accordingtothecourt,couldnot.
50
DennisOBrien,TribunalsandPublicPolicy.WhatDecisionsareSuitableforReview?(April1989) John McMillan, Review of Government Policy by Administrative Tribunals Law andPolicyPaper Ibid,33. Setoutinsection10ofthePublicServiceAct1999,paragraph10(1)(f)ofthatAct
58CanberraBulletinofPublicAdministration86.
51
No9,CentreforInternationalandPublicLaw1998,33,34.
52 53
100
that any general policies of the Commonwealth Government notified in writing by a Minister to the directors are carried out in relation to the authorityorcompany.54 5.89 A number of other Commonwealth statutes also encourage administrativeregardtogovernmentpolicy,someprovidingforMinisterial direction where in the performance ofits functions andthe exercise ofits powers, a body is in conflict with major government policies.55 Other legislation requires compliance with policies of the Commonwealth Governmentofwhichwrittennoticeisgiven.56 5.90 Under section 78AB of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, in consideringwhethertogiveadirectionfortheregistrationofacertifiedbody on theRegister ofEnvironmental Organisations,theEnvironmentMinister and the Treasurer are required to take into account the policies and budgetary priorities of the Commonwealth Government. Similarly, in makingadecisionunderDivision396(LandTransportFacilitiesBorrowing), theMinisterforTransportandRegionalDevelopmentistotakeaccountof, amongst other things, the extent to which the project conforms to CommonwealthandStategovernmentpoliciesandplanningrequirements.57 5.91 The way in which they handle policy in their decisionmaking processes represents a fundamental distinction between primary decision makers,tribunalsandcourts.Policyisoftenanintegralpartofadministrative decisionmaking. Itmaymeanthatadecisioniscorrectnotwithstandinga mistakeoffactoranapprehensionofthepossibilityofafactexisting.Even thoughnotincludedinastatuteorregulation,itmaydictatewhatismaterial inaparticularcase.Itmayalsoreversetheonusofproofforexample.58 Policydecisions 5.92 Most administrative decisions will have at their root some policy pronouncementofgovernment. Suchelements usually overlapwithother matters such astheviewtakenby thedecisionmakerofthelaworupon factualmattersortheconductofthedecisionmakervisvistheapplicant.
54 55
Sections28,43oftheCommonwealthandCompaniesAct1997. Seeforexample,AustralianTouristCommissionAct1987section29(1),DairyProduceAct1986section Seeforinstancesection11oftheAustralianResearchCouncilAct2001. Sections39675,IncomeTaxAssessmentAct1936. SeeJusticeBrennan,'ThePurposeandScopeofJudicialReview'(1986)2AustralianBarReview93,95.
8(1),FisheriesAdministrationAct1991section91(1).
56 57 58
101
Inpracticeitwouldbeextremelydifficultforthecourtstoisolateandto ignorepolicyelementswhilstotherwiseexaminingdecisionsfor substantiveunfairnessandunreasonableness.

59
5.93 Therearesomedecisions,however,wherepolicyisacriticalelement, eitherbecausethereisnopreexistingpolicy,orwherethesubjectmatterof thedecisionis,initself,reflectiveofhighgovernmentpolicy.Somedecisions, suchasthoserelatingtointernationalrelationsandnationalsecuritymay,by virtue of their nature, be considered to relate to higher policy issues than others.60 Exceptionstojudicialreviewofcertainsortsofpolicydecisions 5.94 InthereportsofboththeKerr61 andEllicott62 Committees,exceptions tothejurisdictionoftheproposedAdministrativeCourtwerecontemplated. Bothcommitteesrecommendedthatpolicydecisionsofgovernmentministers beexcludedfromjudicialreview,63theEllicottCommitteeobservingthat:
TheremaybesomediscretionsexercisedbyMinisterswhichoughtnot besubjectedtoageneralsystemofjudicialreviewbecausetheirpolicy contentorotherspecialreasonsmakethisundesirableinthepublic interest.Insomecasesitwillbefoundthatproceduresforreviewand perhapsjudicialreview,arealreadyavailable.Discretionswhich,inour view,mightbeexcludedwouldincludesomerelatingtodefence, nationalsecurity,relationswithothercountries,criminalinvestigation, theadministrationofjusticeandthepublicservice.
64
5.95 ThelimitationsreferredtobytheCommitteeappeartoreflectthose formerlyassociatedwiththeexerciseofprerogativepowerandmorerecently, withcourtconsiderationofwhetherornotamatterbeforeitisjusticiable,that istosay,whetherornotitisamatteruponwhichthecourtcan,orconsiders itappropriatethatitshouldadjudicate.

59
Murray Wilcox, Judicial Review and Public Policy (April 1989) 58 Canberra Bulletin of Public Although,asnotedinthediscussionofjusticiability,thenatureoftheparticulardecisionratherthan TheKerrCommitteereport,1971. TheEllicottCommitteereport,1973. TheKerrCommitteereport,paragraph265;TheEllicottCommitteereport,1973,paragraph2.7. Ibid, the Ellicott Committee report, at paragraph 26. A similar approach was adopted by the
Administration70,71.
60
ofthebroadsubjectareaisamoreaccurategaugeofreviewability.
61 62 63 64
Committeeinrelationtopublicservants,authoritiesandtribunalsatparagraph30.
102
5.96 The words ofBrennan Jofthe United States Supreme Court in the decisionofBakervCarrarepertinentinthisregard:
thecourtsarenotfitinstrumentsofdecisionswherewhatis essentiallyatstakeisthecompositionofthoselargecontestsofpolicy traditionallyfoughtoutinnonjudicialforums,bywhichgovernments andtheactionsofgovernmentsaremadeandunmade.
65
5.97 Insummary,suchdecisionscommonlyinclude: decisions relating to foreign affairs66 (such as a decision to implement67ortoenterintoatreaty)68 decisionsrelatingtonationalsecurity decisionstoprosecuteornottoprosecute decisions relating to granting pardons to convicted persons;69 and decisionstoappointjudicialofficers.70 5.98 Inits1999publicationWhatDecisionsShouldbeSubjecttoMeritsReview? the Council also added to this grouping decisions affecting the Australian economy. Included in this category were decisions of such fundamental significance as determining interest rates; floating the dollar; allocation of
65
BakervCarr369US186(1962),quotedbyMcTiernanJ(dissenting)inVictoriavCommonwealth(1975) InThorpevCommonwealthofAustralia(No3)(1997)144ALR677,690KirbyJstated:
134CLR81,135.
66
theissuespresentedbythedeclarationslacked"judiciallydiscoverableandmanageablestandardsfor resolving"ajusticiableissue.Traditionallyinthiscountry,asunderlikeconstitutionalprovisionsinthe United States, the courts have been extremely reluctant to pass upon the conduct of international relations.
67 68 69
MinisterforArts,HeritageandEnvironmentvPekoWallsendLtd(1987)75ALR218. KoowartavBjelkePetersen(1982)153CLR168,229. ItmightbenotedhoweverthatintheBritishdecision,RvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment;
exparteBentley [1993]4AllER442,itwasheldthattheSecretarysdecisionnottorecommendthe grantingofaposthumouspardonwassusceptibletojudicialreview.

70
Forexample,inAttorneyGeneral(NSW)vQuin(1990)170CLR1,18,acaseconcerningtheexerciseof
astatutorypowertoappointmagistrates,MasonJpointedoutthatthecourtisreluctanttointervenein thejudiciarystraditionalroleofappointingjudicialofficers.
103
money to one program over another; and, setting foreign exchange rates. However,itwasconsideredthatadecisionofaMinistertoapproveabody corporateasastockexchangemaynotbeofsufficientlyhighpoliticalcontent towarrantexclusionfromjudicialreview.71 5.99 Similarlywithdecisionsinrelationtomattersofdefence.In1989inits 32nd report, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: The AmbitoftheAct,theCounciltooktheviewthatthoughtheymightwellbe susceptible to review under the AD(JR) Act, decisions deriving from the command power in section 7 of the Defence Act 1908 might well not be justiciable. 5.100 Ithasbeensaidthattheunderlyingrationalefortheexemptionfrom review of decisions in these areas rests with essentially practical considerations, such as the importance of speaking with a single voice in relationtomattersofinternationalrelations, 72 andinachievingfinalityand immediateobedienceinrelationtothedeclarationorcessationofwarorthe deploymentofforces.73 5.101 Under Schedule I to the AD(JR) Act there are also exclusions from review of a range of legislation coming broadly within these subject groupings. 5.102 Policy may also be political in the sense of being controversial: however,asobservedbyKirbyJ:
themereinvolvementofapoliticalorcontroversialquestiondoesnot meanthatacourtlacksjurisdiction,thatacontroversyisnotamatter forthepurposeoftheConstitution,thatacauseofactionlacksviability orthattheissuetenderedisnonjusticiable.
74
5.103 Adistinctionmayalsobedrawnbetweenadecisionthatisessentially politicalandonethatispolicydriven.75

71
AdministrativeReviewCouncil, WhatDecisionsShouldbeSubjecttoMeritsReview?1999,paragraphs SeecommentsperBrennanJoftheUSSupremeCourtindeliveringthejudgmentofthecourtin Ibid,quotingMartinvMott,12Wheat,19,30. ThorpevCommonwealthofAustralia(No3)(1997)144ALR677,692perKirbyJ. SirAnthony MasonACKBE,Lecture2ScopeofJudicialReview(November2001) AIALForum
4.2,4.23and4.24.
72
BakervCarr(1961)369USR186,213.
73 74 75
104
5.104 As also noted by Dixon J at a somewhat earlier date, noting that exemptionsforpolicycanbeoverstated:
TheConstitutionisapoliticalinstrument.Itdealswithgovernmentand governmentalpowers.Thestatementis,therefore,easytomakethough ithasspecialplausibility.Butitisreallymeaningless.Itisnota questionwhethertheconsiderationsarepolitical,fornearlyevery considerationarisingfromtheConstitutioncanbesodescribed.
76
Exceptionstotheexemption 5.105 Thedecisionin RvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment,exparte Bentley,77 is authority for the proposition that the courts cannot simply be oustedbythehighpolicynatureofadecision:
Thequestionissimplywhetherthenatureandsubjectmatterofthe decisionisamenabletothejudicialprocess.Arethecourtsqualifiedto dealwiththematterordoesthedecisioninvolvesuchquestionsof policythattheyshouldnotintrudebecausetheyareillequippedtodo so?If,forexample,itwasclearthattheHomeSecretaryhadrefusedto pardonsomeonesolelyonthegroundsoftheirsex,raceorreligion,the courtswouldbeexpectedtointerfereand,inourjudgment,wouldbe entitledtodoso.
78
5.106 Ithasalsobeenrecognisedthat:
Thequestioninaparticularcasemaynotseriouslyimplicate considerationsoffinalitye.g.apublicprogramofimportance(rent control)yetnotcentraltotheemergencyeffort.Further,clearly definablecriteriafordecision[sic]maybeavailable.Insuchcasethe politicalquestionbarrierfallsaway:[A]Courtisnotatlibertytoshutits eyestoanobviousmistake,whenthevalidityofthelawdependsupon thetruthofwhatisdeclared[Itcan]inquireintowhethertheexigency stillexisteduponwhichthecontinuedoperationofthelawdepended.
79
No3121,2425.
76 77 78 79
MelbourneCorporationvTheCommonwealth(1947)74CLR31,82. [1993]4AllER442,QBDperWatkins,NeillLJJandTuckeyJ. Ibid,4533. BakervCarr(1961)369USR186,213214quotingChastletonCorpvSinclair264US543,5478.
105
5.107 ThisapproachappearsequallyapplicableinAustralia. In ReDitfort80 forexample,GummowJreachedtheconclusionthatitisincorrecttoassume thateverycasetouchingonforeignaffairsliesbeyondjudicialconsideration. 5.108 Moreover, where government is administrating schemes within statutory limits set by parliament, the courts will enquire whether governmentisdoingproperlywhatithasauthoritytodo.81 Circumstancesoftheindividual 5.109 Insomesituations,policydecisionsmayhaveaparticularimportfor certainindividuals.Inthosesituations:
Despitethecourtsgeneralreluctancetoreviewpolicy,particularlyatan abstractlevel,therearecaseswherethecriticalquestioniswhetherthe establishedpolicyshouldbeappliedtoanindividualinparticular circumstancesorwhatweightshouldbegiventopolicy,alongwith otherrelevantfactors.Judicialreviewmaybeavailableinsomeofthese cases.Insomeinstanceswherethecriticalquestionrelatestothe applicationofpolicy,itispossiblenottoapplythepolicywithout prejudicingtheobjectswhichthepolicyisdesignedtoachieve.
82
5.110 Pronouncements oftheCourtinrelationtothetreatmentofcabinet decisionsarealsorelevantandtaketheconceptofexceptionadegreefurther. For instance, in OSheas case, while basing his decision on procedural fairness,MasonCJrecognisedthatcabinetmaybeinvolvedintwodifferent typesofdecisionspoliticalpolicydecisionsnotopentojudicialreviewand decisionsmorecloselyrelatedtojusticetotheindividualthanwithpolitical, socialandeconomicconcerns.83 5.111 AccordingtoSirAnthonyMasoninhisreasoninginthiscase:
80 81
(1988)19FCR347,373. MinisterforArts,HeritageandEnvironmentvPekoWallsend(1987)75ALR218,280perSheppardJand TheHonJusticeSirAnthonyMason,TheImportanceofJudicialReviewofAdministrativeActionas SouthAustraliavOShea(1987)163CLR378,387.InhisBlackburnlecture,SirAnthonysubsequently
302perWilcoxJ.
82
aSafeguardofIndividualRights(December1994)1(1)AustralianJournalofHumanRights10.
83
reiteratedthatinexceptionalcases,judicialreviewmayconceivablyextendtoacabinetdecisionsee SirAnthony MasonBlackburnLecture,AdministrativeReviewtheExperienceoftheFirstTwelve Years(1989)18FederalLawReview122.InOSheaDeaneJat417alsosuggestedthat: common law rules of procedural fairness extend in the absence of a clear contrary legislative intention,tocontrolanyadministrativedecisionwhichismadepursuanttoastatutoryprocessand whichdirectlyaffectstherights,interest,statusorlegitimateexpectationsofanotherinhisindividual capacity.
106
IthoughtthatalthoughCabinetisprimarilyapoliticalinstitution concernedwithpolitical,economicandsocialconcerns,itmightbe calledupontodecidequestionsmorecloselyconcernedwithjusticeto theindividualwhenadutytoactfairlycouldarise.

84
5.112 The courts have also sought to identify cases in which there is a legitimate expectation of some form of redress. In FAI v Winneke85 for example, it was held that the decision of the government, including the GovernoractingontheadviceofMinistersconcerningaparticularcompany, was reviewable where it dealt with matters that might be subject to a legitimateexpectation. Suchanexpectationwouldarisefromthenatureof thedecision:itmightalsoarisefromtheexistenceofaregularpracticewhich theaffectedpersonmightreasonablyexpecttocontinue.86 5.113 However:
Theconsiderationsbyreferencetowhichthereasonablenessofapolicy maybedeterminedarerarelyjudiciallymanageable.Forthisreason, thecourtisslowtointervenewheninjusticehasbeendonetoindividual rightsbywhatmayappeartobeanunjustpolicy.
87
5.114 Inconclusion,ithasbeensaidthat:
Ontheauthorities,thetruetestmaywellbe:istheparticularfunction appropriateforacourtinthesensethattheissuescanberesolvedbythe applicationoflegalprinciplesandjudiciallymanageablecriteriaand standards?Ifso,somefunctionsinvolvingpolicymaybeinappropriate, othersnotso.Ifpolicyistobedealtwithaccordingtojudicialmethod, informingtheformulationofprinciplestobeappliedtothecasein hand,thatisonething,butifthecourtisrequiredtodealwithpolicyat large,thenthefunctionisnonjudicial.
88
84
Sir Anthony Mason, Developments inAustralian Administrative Law(1998)28 HongKongLaw (1981)151CLR342. CouncilofCivilServiceUnionsvMinisterofCivilService[1985]AC374;KioavWest(1985)159CLR550. TheHonSirGerardBrennan,ThePurposeandScopeofJudicialReview,inMTaggart(ed)Judicial SirAnthony Mason,JudicialReview:AViewfromConstitutionalandOtherPerspectives(2000)
Journal379.
85 86 87
ReviewofAdministrativeActioninthe1980s,1986,p33.
88
28(2)FederalLawReview330,337.
107
PreviousCouncilconsideration 5.115 In response to arguments that decisions should be excluded from reviewonthebasisoftheirpolicynature,theCouncilnotedinitsfirstreport, AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977,ExclusionsUnderSection19, 1978that:
TheCourtisnotconcernedwithGovernmentpolicyexcepttotheextent towhichitproducesanunlawfuladministrativedecision.Inthisrespect thepowersoftheFederalCourtundertheActarenodifferentfrom thoseoftheHighCourt.Accordingly,thepresenceoflargeelementsof policyinthemakingofaclassofdecisionisnotagroundforexclusion fromtheAct.
89
5.116 InitsmorerecentpublicationWhatDecisionsShouldbeSubjecttoMerits Review?theCouncilrestatedthisview:

Thefactthatadecisionmakingpowermaybeexercisedbyreferenceto apolicydoesnot,initself,excludefromreviewadecisionmadeunder thepower.
90
5.117 Anexemptionfrommeritsreviewisrecognisedhoweverforwhatare categorisedasdecisionswithahighpoliticalcontent:

Thisexceptionrelatestodecisionsthatinvolvetheconsiderationof issuesofthehighestconsequencetotheGovernment.Onlyrarelywill decisionmakingpowersfallwithinthisexception,anditisunlikelythat adecisionmakingpowernotpersonallyvestedinaMinisterwould suffice.
91
5.118 TheCouncilnotedthough,thatevenwherethehighpoliticalcontent exception applies, in some areas, it will only apply to a few of the total numberofdecisionsmadeunderadecisionmakingpower.92 TheCouncil thereforeconsidereditpreferableforadecisionmadeundersuchapowerto
89
AdministrativeReviewCouncil, AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977:Exclusionsunder Ibid,paragraph5.12,27. AdministrativeReviewCouncil,WhatDecisionsShouldbeSubjecttoMeritsReview?,1999,paragraphs Ibid,paragraph4.27.
Section19,ReportNo.1,1977,paragraphs5051.
90 91
4.2,23and24.
92
108
besubjecttomeritsreviewwithanexclusionmechanisminplacetocover thosedecisionsfallingwithintheexception.93
Discussionpoint11
Generaltreatment 5.119 Itissuggestedthatinthemajorityofcaseswherelowlevelpolicyis involved,thereisnodifficultyinacourtreviewingadecisionmadeinthe application of preexisting policy. Where the decisionmaker has misconstrued the policy, the decision may be set aside for failure to take accountofrelevantcircumstances,thatis,thepolicy. 5.120 Thecourtmayalsoconsiderwhetherintheapplicationofpolicy,the decisionmaker has had regard to the facts of the particular case, or has reachedanunreasonableconclusionorhasalteredthepolicytodictatethe outcomeratherthanconsideringthespecialorparticularcircumstancesofthe case. 5.121 Inacasewhereanexecutivedecisionmakerhasspecifiedcriteriaina policystatementwhichisconsistentwiththestatuteandisnotunreasonable, adecisionignoringthecriteriawillbeprimafaciebad.Similarly,adecision whichfailsinaparticularcasetorecognisethatpolicycriteriaaresatisfied maybeconsideredunreasonable. 5.122 Wherethereisnoexistingpolicy,itislargelyforthedecisionmakerto determinewhichmattersheorsheconsidersmaterial. 94Wherethedecisionis aoneoffdecision,greaterrestraintshouldbeexercised,butthereseemsno basis,beyondthat,toseektolimitjudicialreview. Highpolicy 5.123 In areas of high policy, different considerations apply. While high policymaybeafactorjustifyingexclusionofmeritsreviewinsomecases95 differentconsiderationswouldapplyinrelationtojudicialreview.Itmaynot be appropriate, in view of their subjectivity and quite often, their polycentricity,foracourttoundertakejudicialreviewofsuchdecisionson
93 94 95
Ibid,paragraph4.28. SeanInvestmentsPtyLtdvMacKellar(1981)38ALR363,375. NotetheCouncilsviewwasthattheexceptionwouldbelimitedandcountervailingaccountability
requirementsshould applyseeAdministrativeReviewCouncil, WhatDecisionsShouldbeSubjectto MeritsReview?,1999,paragraphs4.274.29.
109
thebasisofgroundssuchasunreasonablenessorirrelevantconsiderations. Whereanapplicationismadetothecourtonthebasisofanerroroflaw, however, or an abuse of power, there would seem no reason to restrict judicial review. Notwithstanding the high policy element, it is still appropriatethattherepositoryofthatpower(i.e.thedecisionmaker)exercise thatpoweraccordingtothelaw. 5.124 In thosefewcases where judicial reviewmaynotbeappropriate,it may be argued that adoption of judicial concepts of justiciability and deferencearemoreappropriatewaystoachievethecorrectbalancebetween policydevelopmentandjudicialreviewthantheexclusionofcertainpolicy decisionsfromthescopeofjudicialreviewbywayoflegislation.
Decisionsrelatedtotheadministrationofjustice
Whataredecisionsrelatedtotheadministrationofjustice? 5.125 Decisions falling within this category include those relating to investigation,arrest,prosecution,bail,summarytrial,committal,thefilingof anolleprosequi,indictment,appealandparole. 5.126 Opinion appears to be divided on the interaction of judicial review with the decisionmaking processes of the criminal justice system. Some point to the beneficial influence on the latter system of concepts of reasonableness and accountability. Others have raised concern at the encroachmentofjudicialreviewontheareaofcriminaladministrationand expertise.96 Theexecutiveperspective 5.127 ExemptionscurrentlyexistinSchedule1totheAD(JR)Actfor:
96
Seeforinstance,DJGalligan,RegulatingPretrialDecisions,inNLang(ed),CriminalJustice,1994,p
151.
110
(r) (w) (x) (xa)
decisionsundertheExtraditionAct1988; decisionsundertheWitnessProtectionAct1994; decisions under subsection 60A(2B) of the Australian Federal PoliceAct1979; decisionstoprosecutepersonsforanyoffenceagainstalawof theCommonwealth,aStateoraTerritory.
5.128 Arguments advanced in 1978 for exclusion of such decisions from reviewatthetimeofthewritingoftheCouncilsfirstreport, Administrative Decisions(JudicialReview)Act1977,ExclusionsunderSection19,included: the Act may be used to hamper and frustrate the proper investigationandprosecutionofoffences the obligation to give reasons may necessitate the premature disclosureofinformationtotheprejudiceofaninvestigation thereareadequateexistingsafeguardsestablishedtostriketheright balancebetweenthelawenforcementagenciesandthecitizen it is inappropriate to subject law enforcement officers who are engaged in criminal investigation and prosecution to the obligationsoftheAct,particularlytheobligationtogivereasons; and most of the decisions lead to the matter being brought before a courtandthereareextensiveappellateprocesses.97
5.129 Withrespecttoexemptionsfromjudicialreviewprovidedforinthe FinancialTransactionsReportsAct1993andtheWitnessProtectionAct1994,the Government was motivated, respectively, by concerns that criminal investigationscouldbecompromised,andformaintenanceoftheintegrityof theprogram.InthecontextoftheWitnessProtectionAct1994,inresponding toinquiriesfromtheScrutinyofBillsCommittee,thethenMinisterforJustice said:
thedecisiontoexcludetheoperationoftheAD(JR)Actwasnottaken lightly.Itwasdoneonlyafterensuringthattherewereinternalreview mechanisms[theexemptions]arealldesignedtoprotecttheintegrity ofthe[program].Theimportanceofensuringthesafetyofwitnesses,
97
See Administrative Review Council, Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977: Exclusions
underSection19,ReportNo.1,1977,paragraph77.
PROPOSEDCONSIDERATIONSINDEVELOPINGAGUIDETOTHESCOPEOFJR theirrelativesandtheAFPofficersmeansthatinformationmustbe subjecttostrictsafeguards.

98
111
5.130 TheCommitteeacceptedthisargument. 5.131 Morerecently,argumentsforandagainstexclusionsinthisareahave arisen in thecontextofthe Jurisdiction ofCourts Legislation AmendmentAct 2000.Schedule2tothisAct: removes the right of the defendant to challenge the decision to prosecuteunderboththeAD(JR)Act,theJudiciaryAct1903andthe CorporationsAct1989 suppresses rights to review of other pretrial decisions once the prosecution is brought to court, and until the trial and any subsequentappealsarecompleted;99and channels much of the remaining jurisdiction from the Federal to StateandTerritorycourts.100
5.132 Thereasonfortheamendments,accordingtotheAttorneyGeneralin hissecondreadingspeech,wastoavoidtheuseofunmeritoriousdelaying tactics in the criminal justice process by removing the collateral access of defendantstofederaladministrativelawproceduresandremedies.101 Inhis response to the Senate Scrutiny of Bills Committee, the AttorneyGeneral suggested thatjudicial reviewwas frequently astalling tactic.102 Healso notedindebateoftheBillthatcollateralattacksgenerallylackmeritandare invariablyusedonlybydefendantswithdeeppockets.103 5.133 Other arguments for the exclusion from review of such decisions included:
98
SenateStandingCommitteefortheScrutinyofBills,FirsttoEighteenthReportsof1994,Parliamentary Inbothinstances,judicialreviewrightstotheHighCourtundersection75(v)oftheConstitutionare Forfurtherdiscussionoftheseamendments,seeSeanBrennan,JudicialReviewandthePretrial HouseofRepresentatives,Debates,Hansard,8March2000,14111. SenateStandingCommitteefortheScrutinyofBills,SixthReportof2000,10May2000,172. HouseofRepresentatives,Debates,Hansard,5April2000,15328.
PaperNo472,1994,p201.
99
notaffected.
100
Process(2000)AIALForumNo2633.
101 102 103
112
toavoidfragmentationofproceedingsbetweencourtsatdifferent tiersofthefederation toreducecostanddelay,andtheconsequentialdamagecausedby delaytotheprosecutioncase thatdefendantsstillhaverecoursetoreliefbywayofsection75(v) of the Constitution and to review either side of the prosecution proceedings thatthecriminalcourtsthemselvesprovidesafeguardsthroughthe discretiontodenyadmissibilitytoprejudicialevidence,thegrantof permanent stays to prevent an abuse of process and the appeal system;and that the amendments place defendants in Commonwealth prosecutions in essentially the same situation as their State counterparts.
Thejudicialperspective 5.134 The position of the courts is that they will only ordinarily interfere withtheprocessesofcriminaljusticebywayofjudicialreviewinexceptional circumstances.104 This applies equally to committal proceedings, issuing a warrant,decidingtoprosecuteorarrestingasuspect.InBartonvTheQueen105 forinstance,theHighCourtdecidedthatanexercisebytheAttorneyGeneral ofthepowertopresentan exofficio indictmentisnonjusticiable. Thecourt also noted that there was well established English authority that the prerogativepowerstoenteranolleprosequiandtograntorrefuseafiatin connection with a relator action, are not justiciable. Clearly, policy considerationssupportthisview.Itwouldbeundesirableforthecourtsto become closely involved in the question whether a prosecution should be commenced,whenultimately,itwouldbethetaskofthecourtstodetermine theaccusedsguiltorinnocence. 5.135 However,in Bartons case,Gibbs ACJandMasonJheldthatwhere therewasasuggestionofabuseofprocess,thecourtwouldstayaprosecution broughtwithoutreasonableground,atleastuntilapreliminaryexamination tookplacewhereantecedentcommittalproceedingsweredispensedwith,a trialintheirabsenceunlessjustifiedonstrongandpowerfulgrounds,must necessarily be considered unfair.106 Thecourts should notabdicate to the
104
LambvMoss(1983)49ALR533affirmedinYoungvQuin(1984)56ALR165andClynevScott(1983) BartonvTheQueen(1980)147CLR75,923. Ibid,100.
52ALR405.
105 106
113
AttorneyGeneralortheCrownprosecutortheirfunctionofdecidingwhere onbalancetheinterestsofjusticelie.107 5.136 Relevantfactorsforthecourtshavebeensaidtoinclude: thatthecourtsshouldnotbeseentostandtooclosetotheexecutive decisiontoprosecute thatthereisstrongpublicinterestintheexpeditiouscompletionof criminalmatters;and fragmentation of proceedings between State and Federal courts shouldbeavoidedwhereverpossible.108
5.137 IntheFederalCourtcaseofCranevGething,109FrenchJreaffirmedthe general principles of judicial restraint subject to exceptions in appropriate cases. Inhisview,successwouldbemostlikelyincasesinvolvingapure question oflawwith no factual elements, where,thoughinvestigation has commenced,noproceedingsarepending. 5.138 ThisgenerallycautiousapproachonthepartofAustraliancourtsmay be contrasted with that in the UK where an application may always be pursued for the judicial review of a decision made by a magistrate or magistratescourt.Inonecaseforexample,anorderforcertioraribywayof judicialreviewwasgrantedtoquashaconvictionbyamagistratescourton thegroundthattherehadbeenadenialofproceduralfairnessarisingfrom theprosecutorsfailuretodisclosetothecourtandthedefencetheexistence ofwitnesseswhocouldhavegivenevidencefavourabletothedefence.110 In another case, it was held that the sentence was so far outside the normal discretionarylimitsastoenablethereviewingcourttosaythatitsimposition mustinvolveanerroroflawofsomedescriptioneventhoughitmightnotbe evidentatoncewhatwastheprecisenatureofthaterror.111 PreviousCouncilconsideration 5.139 In itsfirstReport, Administrative Decisions(JudicialReview)Act1977, Exclusions Under Section 19 1978, the Councils majority recommendation
107 108 109 110 111
Ibid,101. SeanBrennan,JudicialReviewandthePretrialProcess(2000)AIALForumNo2633,37. CranevGething(2000)97FCR9. RvLeylandJJ,exparteHawthorne[1979]CrimLR627. RvStAlbansCrownCourt,ExParteCinnamond[1981]CrimLR2453.
114
was that all decisions relating to the administration of criminal justice (including the investigation, arrest, prosecution, bail, summary trial, committal,decisiontofilea nolleprosequi,indictment,appealandparoleof personsforanyoffenceagainstalawoftheCommonwealth)otherthan: appointments of investigators and inspectors under statutory powers the issue of search warrants and analogous warrants under the CustomsAct1901andotherlegislation;and decisions to require the production of documents, the giving of information and the summoning of persons as witnesses, be excludedfromreviewundertheAD(JR)Act.
5.140 TheCouncilhassaidsubsequently,inrelationtoaproposaltoexclude committalproceedingsfromtheAD(JR)Act,thatcertainquestionsaremore appropriatelyresolvedinajudicialreviewcontextbyacourtwithspecialist expertiseinthatareaandthatdefendantsshouldnothavetowaitfortrialto getananswer,forinstance,withrespecttothejurisdictionofamagistrateto conductacommittalhearing.112 5.141 In 1993, in a letter to the Standing Committee on Legal and ConstitutionalAffairsaboutexemptionsfromtheFinancialTransactionReports Act1988(theFTRA),theCounciltooktheviewthatdecisionsunderthatAct shouldnotbeexemptedfromjudicialreview.113Inresponsetoconcernsfrom the AttorneyGenerals Department that criminal investigations could be compromised if statements of reasons for decisions were required, the Councilreferredtorecommendationsmadeinits33rdreportin1991,Reviewof the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act: Statement of Reasons for Decisions,thatsection13A(1)oftheActshouldbeamendedtoprovidethat informationshouldnotberevealedifitwoulddiscloseorenableapersonto ascertain,theexistenceoridentityofaconfidentialsourceofinformationin relation to the enforcement or administration of the law. The Council recommendedthatthisamendmentshouldbeexpandedtocoverdecisions undertheFTRA.
112
AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act;Redefining AdministrativeReviewCouncillettertotheSenateStandingCommitteeonLegalandConstitutional
theActsAmbit,DraftReport1988,AppendixB,5.
113
Affairsdated26April1993,setoutintheCouncil'sSeventeenthAnnualReport,199293,p129.
115
5.142 In 1999, in What Decisions Should be Subject to Merits Review?, the Councilbroadlyendorsedtheapproachtakeninitsfirstreportin1978report, notingthat:
Decisionsofalawenforcementnature,includingdecisionsrelatingto investigations,shouldnotbemadesubjecttomeritsreview.Ifreviewof suchdecisionswasavailable,boththeinvestigationofpossiblebreaches andthesubsequentenforcementofthelawcouldbejeopardised.
114
5.143 The Council gives as examples decisions to place people on the Witness Protection Program, and decisions that involve prosecutorial discretions,includingwhetherthepersonconcernedwouldbeavaluableor useful witness. The Council notes, however, that a decision to remove someonefromtheProgramwouldnotbeofthesamequalityasitwould deprive theperson concerned ofan expectation ofsecurity and should be subjecttomeritsreview.115
Discussionpoint12
5.144 Having regard to the preceding discussion, it may be that where adequate alternative remedies exist in the criminal justice system, judicial reviewcanbedispensedwith. 5.145 However, where personal security is not an issue, where adequate alternativeremediesdonotexistinthecriminaljusticesystem,andwherethe judicialreviewsystemcanofferprotectiontoindividualrights,thenitmight bethatreviewshouldbeavailable.Arguably,thematterisonewhichwould bebetterdeterminedatthejudicialthanthegovernmentallevel,onacaseby casebasis,ratherthanthroughtheimposition,legislatively,ofatotalbanon accesstojudicialrevieworforspecifiedperiods.
114
AdministrativeReviewCouncil,WhatDecisionsShouldbeSubjecttoMeritsReview?,1999,paragraph Ibid,paragraphs4.32and4.33.
4.31.
115
116
Decisionswherethereareongoingrelationships
5.146 As reflected in extrinsic material surrounding the passage through Parliamentofthe PublicServiceAct1999,oneofthemajorobjectivesofthe review structure provided for in that legislation was to reduce the complexitiesandthelegalismofpreviouslyexistingreviewstructures. 5.147 Consistentwiththis,thePublicServiceActreflectsanemphasisupon harmonisation and alternative means of resolving workplace disputes. Though decided well before the passage of the current legislation, the approach is reflected in the decision in Ansell v Wells.116 In that case, in determiningtheparametersofnaturaljustice,itwassaidbythecourtthat:
TheproceduresofthePromotionsAppealsCommittees,byapplying statutorystandardsofrelativeefficiencyandseniorityinrespectof officersofthePublicService,shouldbedesignedtoensurefairnesstoall concerned,butwiththeaimoffosteringharmoniousrelationsbetween fellowofficerswhomustworkorcontinuetoworktogetherandnotof promotingdiscordbetweenthem.
117
5.148 Arguably, the values saved by resort to legal action can rarely outweighthedamagetoefficientadministration,particularlywherethereare onlymarginaldifferencesinmeritbetweenthecandidatesforpromotion.
Discussionpoint13
5.149 Theremaybesomejustificationforlimitingtherighttobeheardin employmentrelated cases, particularly where the attributes of various membersofstaffarebeingcomparedinacriticalfashion.
116 117
(1982)43ALR41.SeealsoFinchvGoldstein(1981)36ALR287. AnsellvWellsibid,60.
117
5.150 Similarly, in the case of grounds such as unreasonableness and irrelevant considerations, the subjective nature of the process necessary to arriveataconclusionmayoutweighthebenefitsofjudicialreview.However, itismoredifficulttoarguethatjudicial reviewshouldbelimitedincases whereerrorsoflawareinissue.Asagainstallgroundsofreview,however, the existence of adequate alternative remedies and dispute resolution strategies would seem to be a significant factor in limiting judicial review rights. 5.151 The emphasis upon informal dispute resolution mechanisms and accesstothespecialistMeritProtectionandReviewCommission(atleastfora fullmeritsreviewhearing)underthe PublicServiceAct1999 isnotedinthis regard.
Legislativedecisions
Introduction 5.152 Although there may be some overlap of judicial, executive and administrative powers,118 the primary characteristic of the activities of administrators in relation to legislation is to maintain and execute those laws.119 5.153 However,legislativepowermaybedelegatedbytheparliamenttothe executivesubjecttosomemeasureofparliamentarycontrol. Thisismost oftenachievedbywayofplacingregulationmakingpowerintheGovernor GeneralinCouncil.
118
Forinstance,judgesmaymakerulesofcourt,parliamentmaypunishforcontemptofparliament SeeGummowJinQueenslandMedicalLaboratoriesvBlewett(1988)84ALR615.
andadministratorsmaymakeconclusivefindingsoffact.
119
118
5.154 Subject to parliamentary control by way of disallowance, legislative powermayalsobegiventootherdesignatedpersons,forinstanceMinisters of State. It is in relation to this sort of power that issues arise as to the appropriateness,extentandnatureofjudicialreview. Whatarelegislativedecisions? 5.155 IntheUnitedKingdom,ithasbeensaidthatwhereaprovisionorrule isofgeneralapplication,itislikelytobelegislativeincharacter,whereas, whereitprescribestheapplicationofageneralruletoaparticularsituation,it islikelytobeadministrative.120 5.156 InAustralia,ithasbeenheldthatalegislativedecisionisoneinvolving makingnewrules ofgeneralapplication,thatis,applyingtothepublicat largeoradefinedsectionofthepublic,forexample,allnursinghomes.121The classicstatementofthedistinctionisthatofLathamCJin Commonwealthv Grunseit:
Thegeneraldistinctionbetweenlegislationandtheexecutionof legislationisthatlegislationdeterminesthecontentofalawasaruleof conductoradeclarationastopower,rightorduty,whereasexecutive authorityappliesthelawinparticularcases.
122
5.157 Exceptionstothisrulearerare.123 5.158 Consistent with this, in its 35th report in 1992, Rule Making by CommonwealthAgencies,theCouncilconsideredlegislativedecisionsto:
120 121 122
havetheeffectofchangingordeterminingthecontentofthelaw, ratherthanapplyingit bebindingontheexecutive,ratherthanmerelyguidelines;and beofgeneralapplicationandnotdirectedataparticularcase.124
SeetheDonoughmoreCommittee,ReportoftheCommitteeonMinistersPowers,1932,Cmd4060,1. NashuavChannon(1981)36ALR215. (1943) 67 CLR 58, 82. See also R v City of Munro Paragraph; ex parte
JohnWeeksPtyLtd (1987)46SASR400,406; CollinsvMunicipalityofWynyard(TasSupCt),GreenCJ, unreported,24December1987; BotanyBayCityCouncilvMinisterofStateforTransportandRegional Development (unreported, Federal Court, Lehane J, 28 May 1996). See also Yates Co Pty Ltd v The VegetableSeedsCommitteeandOrs(1946)72CLR37,54.
123
Forexample,the BuildersLabourersFederation(SpecialProvisions)Act (NSW)enactedtoabolishthe Administrative Review Council, Rule Making by Commonwealth Agencies, Report No 35, 1992,
BuildersLabourersFederation.SeeQueenslandMedicalLaboratoriesvBlewett(1988)84ALR615.
124
paragraph3.4.
119
5.159 This notwithstanding, as recognised by Gibbs CJ in the Bread Manufacturers of NSW v Evans,125 the distinction between legislative and administrativedecisions,whileeasytostate,isdifficulttoapply.Inthatcase, whichinvolvedachallengetothevalidityofanordermadebythePrices Commissionunderthe PriceRegulationAct 1948 concerningthesalepriceof breadorbreadproductsinNSW,HisHonoursaidthat:
Thedistinctionbetweenpowersofanexecutiveandthoseofan legislativenatureisafineoneandopinionsmayeasilydifferonthe question.
126
5.160 The difficulty of delineating the three major spheres of government wasfirstnotedbytheUKDonoughmoreCommissionin1932.127 Itwould alsoseemthattherequirementtopublishtheorderordecisionandprovision thatitbesubjecttojudicialscrutinybytheparliamentmaybeindicativeof the legislative status of a determination. However, publication in the Commonwealth Gazette ortherightofvetobytherelevantMinisterisnot sufficient.128 5.161 InthecaseofQueenslandMedicalLaboratoriesvBlewett,GummowJalso indicatedthatthereweredifficultieswiththeprinciple,notingthatitwasnot an essential attribute of a law that it formulate a rule of general application.129Onthatbasis,hesuggestedthat:
itisdifficulttoseehowasufficientdistinctionbetweenlegislativeand administrativeactsisthatbetweenthecreationorformulationofnew rulesoflawhavinggeneralapplicationandtheapplicationofthose generalrulestoparticularcases.
130
125 126 127
(1981)180CLR404. Ibid,416. DonoughmoreCommittee,ReportoftheCommitteeonMinistersPowers,1932,Cmd4060,1.Seealso See Beasley J, Aerolineas Argentinas & Ors v Federal Airports Corporation (1995) 63 FCR 100, [36].
GibbsCJinBreadManufacturersofNSWvEvans,Id.
128
ComparewithNashuaAustraliaPtyLtdvChannon(1981)36ALR215whereitwasheldthattherulesof naturaljusticeapplytobothjudicialandadministrativeauthoritiesandevenpurelyadministrativeand executivepowers.Evenwhereadiscretionisinonesenseunlimited,thatdoesnotmeanthatitisnot reviewableandcouldnotbewronglyexercisedorthatthecourtcouldnotintervene.

129 130
QueenslandMedicalLaboratoriesvBlewett(1988)84ALR615,6345perGummowJ. Ibid,635perGummowJ.
120
5.162 InaFederalCourtcase, AerolineasArgentinas&OrsvFederalAirports Corporation,131 the Court undertook an analysis of the character of a determination under section 56 of the Federal Airports Corporation Act 1986 imposingsecuritychargesforlargeaircraftlandingatmajorcityairportsin AustraliafromthedateoftheirimpositionuntilDecember1993.Inthatcase, itwasheldthatthedeterminationwasadministrativeratherthanlegislative incharacterbecause: it was not subject to disallowance by Parliament (a right of disapprovalintheMinisternotconstitutingsuch) itwasnotsubjecttoprenotificationintheGazette,aprecondition foranybylawcomingintoeffect;and itwassubjecttotwoformsofexecutivecontrolunderthe Prices SurveillanceAct1983(Cth)andbytheMinister.
TheAD(JR)Actandlegislativedecisions 5.163 UndertheAD(JR)Actarangeofmattershasbeenidentifiedbythe FederalCourtaslegislativeandthereforenonreviewable: determinationsunder the National HealthAct1953 relating tothe brandofdrugsthatmightbesupplied132 customstariffinstruments133 fisheriesmanagementplans134 fisheriestemporarymanagementorders135 determinations relating to pathology services made under the HealthInsuranceAct1973(Cth)136 statements ofprinciples madebyRepatriation MedicalAuthority undertheVeteransEntitlementAct1986(Cth));137and
131
AerolineasArgentinas&OrsvFederalAirportsCorporation(1995)63FCR100perBeasleyJ. Seealso ICIAustraliaOperationsPtyLtdvBlewett(1989)19ALD162. Sanyo Australia Pty Ltd v Comptroller General of Customs (Fed C of A, Davies J, No 645/91,
FederalAirportsCorporationvAerolineas(1997)50ALD54.
132 133
12March1992,unreported),butnotedbytheAdministrativeReviewCouncilin AdminReview (1992) No3268.

134 135 136 137
BienkevMinisterforPrimaryIndustriesandEnergy(1994)125ALR151. DonohuevAustralianFisheriesManagementAuthority[2000]FCA901;Bulletin[5642];BC200003816. MelbournePathologyPtyLtdvMinisterforHumanServicesandHealth(1996)40ALD565. InVietnamVeteransAssociationofAustralia(NSW)BranchvAlexCohen[1996]981FCA1theFederal
Court found that decisions of both bodies were not amenable to judicial review under either the AD(JR)Actorsection75(v)oftheConstitution.
121
licence area plans made under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth).138 5.164 The distinction between legislative and administrative decisions has beenerodedbytheinclusionintheJudiciaryActofsection39B(1A)(c).This sectionconfersjurisdictionontheFederalCourtinmatters'arisingunderany lawsmadebytheParliament'.139 Thecommonlawandlegislativedecisions 5.165 Ratherthancategorisingdecisionsaslegislative,theHighCourthas preferredtofocusontheneedforpersonstobeaffectedasindividuals140ina directmanner. 5.166 Inthecaseof KioavWest,whileadvertingtothedistinctionbetween decisionsofalegislativeand anadministrativecharacter,thecriticalpoint wasregardedbyBrennanJtobetheimpactontheindividual:
Thelegislatureisnotlikelytointendthatastatutorypowerofastrictly legislativenaturebeconditionedontheobservanceoftheprinciplesof naturaljusticefortheinterestsofallmembersofthepublicareaffected inthesamewaybytheexerciseofsuchapowerButthelegislatureis morelikelytointendtheexerciseofastatutorypowerofanexecutive, administrativeorquasijudicialnaturetobesoconditionedifanexercise ofthepowersinglesoutindividualsbyaffectingtheirinterestsina mannersubstantiallydifferentfromthemannerinwhichtheinterestsof thepublicatlargeareaffected.TheapproachisstatedbyEsteyJ. deliveringthejudgmentoftheSupremeCourtinAttorneyGeneralof Canadav.InuitTapirisatofCanada[citationomitted]: "Theanswerisnottobefoundincontinuingthesearchfor wordsthatwillclearlyandinvariablydifferentiatebetween judicialandadministrativeontheonehand,oradministrative andlegislativeontheother.Itmaybesaidthattheuseofthe fairnessprinciple...willobviatetheneedforthedistinctionin instanceswherethetribunaloragencyisdischargingafunction withreferencetosomethingakintoalisorwheretheagency maybedescribedasan'investigatingbody'...Where,however,
138 139
SATFMPtyLtdvAustralianBroadcastingAuthority(1997)46ALD305. See Australian Law Reform Commission Report 92, October 2001, The Judicial Power of the KioavWest(1985)159CLR550,584perMasonJ,619621perBrennanJand632perDeaneJ.Seealso
Commonwealth,AReviewoftheJudiciaryAct1903andRelatedLegislation,136.
140
RvDavies,ExparteMenziesHotelPtyLtd(1983)64LGRA53whichalsoreflectsamoveawayfromthe distinctionbetweenlegislativeandothersortsofdecisions.
122
theexecutivebranchhasbeenassignedafunctionperformablein thepastbytheLegislatureitselfandwheretheresorsubject matterisnotanindividualconcernorarightuniquetothe petitionerorappellant,differentconsiderationsmaybethought toarise."

141
5.167 AsalsonotedbyMasonJ(ashethenwas)inKioascase:
Thelawhasnowdevelopedtoapointwhereitmaybeacceptedthat thereisacommonlawdutytoactfairly,inthesenseofaccording proceduralfairness,inthemakingofadministrativedecisionswhich affectrights,interestsandlegitimateexpectations,subjectonlytothe clearmanifestationofacontrarystatutoryintention. Butthedutydoesnotattachtoeverydecisionofanadministrative character.Manysuchdecisionsdonotaffecttherights,interestsand expectationsoftheindividualcitizeninadirectandimmediateway. Thusadecisiontoimposearateoradecisiontoimposeageneralcharge forservicesrenderedtoratepayers,eachofwhichindirectlyaffectsthe rights,interestsorexpectationsofcitizensgenerallydoesnotattractthis dutytoactfairly.Thisisbecausetheactordecisionwhichattractsthe dutyisanactordecision "...whichdirectlyaffectstheperson(orcorporation) individuallyandnotsimplyasamemberofthepublicoraclass ofthepublic.Anexecutiveoradministrativedecisionofthe latterkindistrulya'policy'or'political'decisionandisnot subjecttojudicialreview.
142
Whoshoulddeterminewhenpersonsareaffectedasindividuals 5.168 Although there are a number of approaches that may be taken in determiningwhenpersonsareaffectedasindividuals,ithasbeensuggested by one commentator that decisionmakers should be allowed a choice in circumstanceswhereconsiderationofindividualinterestsispermissible,but notmandatory.143 Inthissituation,itissuggested,a hearingisrequired
141
(1985)159CLR550,[24]perBrennanJ. However,inthejudgmentofGummowJin Queensland
MedicalLaboratoriesvBlewett(1988)84ALR615,evenalthoughthedecisionoftheMinisterwithregard toanewpathologyservicestablewaslegislativeincharacter,thefactthatthecommitteewhichadvised himwasrequiredtofunctioninaccordancewithprinciplesofproceduralfairnessbroughtthedecision oftheMinisterwithinthescopeofjudicialreview.

142 143
(1985)159CLR550at584quotingSalemivMacKellar(No.2)(1977)137CLR396,452,perJacobsJ MAronson,BDyer,JudicialReviewofAdministrativeAction,2000,p341.
123
wherethedecisionmakerelectstohaveregardtoindividualinterests,butnot wherethedecisionisbasedongeneralconsiderationswithoutregardtoits effect on any particular individual.144 Under this approach, the critical approach is not how many people are affected, but whether the decision makerhastakenaccountoftheeffectonactual(asopposedtohypothetical) individuals.145 5.169 ThisapproachwastakeninDunlopvWoollahraMunicipalCouncil.146In thatcase,WoottenJconcludedthatalthoughnohearingwasrequiredwhere the Council made a common rule (in relation to the exercise of statutory powerstofixbuildinglines),theplaintiffinthatcasewasentitledtoahearing sincetheactionwasbasednotongeneralconsiderations,butonparticular mattersarisinginrelationtotheplaintiffsland.147 Government attempts to establish legislative rather than administrative decisionmakingregimes 5.170 Itisnotedthatinatleastoneinstance,thegovernmenthassoughtto limitthepotentialforlitigationbymakingdecisionmakinglegislativerather than administrative in character. In the veterans entitlements area for instance,148 withthepotentialforlitigationthatmightretardthemakingof SoPs,theRMAandtheSMRCweresetupasstatutorycorporationsandtheir functions were clearly made legislative in character rather than administrative.TheintendedeffectwastoexcludethemfromtheAD(JR)Act andfromsection39B(asitwasthen)oftheJudiciaryAct.149
Discussionpoint14
5.171 Having regard to the foregoing, particularly the impact of section 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act, it is suggested that distinction between legislativeandadministrativedecisionshasbeeneroded. 5.172 Havingregardtotheapproachadoptedinthecasesreferredtoabove, itissuggestedthatdecisionsthat:
144 145 146 147 148 149
Id. Id. DunlopvWoollahraMunicipalCouncil[1975]2NSWLR446,478479. Id. Forbackground,seeearlierdiscussioninrelationtoconsistencyandpredictability. It has been concluded that this approach is no longer available following the introduction of s
39B(1A)(c)oftheJudiciaryAct1903.
124
determinethecontentofaruleofgeneralapplication;and donotconclusivelydeterminetheapplicationofsucharuleina particularcase
should not be subject to the full range of judicial review. It is further suggestedthatthisisamatterbetterdeterminedbythecourtsthanbythe parliament.
Decisionsmadeinurgentoremergencycontexts
5.173 Ithaslongbeenrecognisedthattheneedforurgentactionmayresult intheexclusionofnaturaljustice.150 5.174 TheeffectoftheneedforurgentactionwasdiscussedbyWilcoxJin Marine Hull & Liability Insurance Co Ltd v Hurford,151a case concerning a statutorypowertodirectaninsurancecompanyunderinvestigationnotto issueorrenewpolicies. Inthatcase,adistinctionwasdrawnbythecourt between cases where the powers themselves by their very nature are inconsistent with theobligation to accordan opportunity to be heard and powers which may on occasion, but not always need to be exercised urgently.152 In the second instance, issues arise as to whether the hearing requirementisalwaysexcluded,excludedonlywhereurgencyisestablished, orlimitedbyurgencybutneverexcluded.153
150
SeeforinstanceWhitevRedfern(1879)5QBD15relatingtoseizureanddestructionofcontaminated
meat;RvDavey(1899)2QB301relatingtotheisolationofsufferersofaninfectiousdisease;MinoseaPty LtdvACCC(1994)35ALD493relatingtotheproductionofbooksforaninquiry.
151 152 153
(1985)62ALR253. Ibid,259260. SeealsocommentsinRidgevBaldwin[1964]AC40.
125
PreviousCouncilconsideration 5.175 InseekingexemptionfromtheapplicationoftheAD(JR)Actin1978, someagenciesarguedthatwhereadecisionismadeinanemergencycontext (egwherefoodisallegedtobeahealthhazard)thereshouldbenojudicial reviewbecausedelayinmakingthedecisionortakingactiontoimplement thedecisioncoulddestroythevalueandpurposeofthedecisionitself.154 5.176 The Council considered that the urgent or emergency context in whichsomeclassesofdecisionaremadeisnotagroundforexclusionsince thesignificantchangesmadebytheActdonotalterthelaworpracticetobe takenwithrespecttothesedecisions.ThiswasbecausetheActdoesnot: altertherulesrelatingtointerlocutoryinjunctions;and arequestforastatementofreasonsoranapplicationforanOrder of Review does not operate to prevent the decision from being madeandimplemented.155
Discussionpoint15
5.177 In cases where there is a need to make decisions in urgent or emergencycontexts,itmaynotbenecessarytoprovidearighttobeheard, although other grounds of review, such as actual or apprehended bias, unreasonableness and error of law would still apply. In many cases, the extentornatureoftheurgencymaynotbeabletobepredicted:insuchcases, itshouldnotbesoughttoanticipateitbywayoflegislativelimitation.
Doyouagree/notagreewiththisview? Arethereanyotherrelevantconsiderations? Pleaseelaborate.
154
SeeAdministrativeReviewCouncil, AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977:Exclusions AdministrativeReviewCouncil, AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977:Exclusionsunder
155
126
SECTIONIV Natureofthedecisionmaker
Statusofthedecisionmaker
Thejudicialperspective 5.178 Caselawsupportstheviewthatthestatusofthedecisionmakerdoes notinitselflimitthescopeofjudicialreview.156 5.179 InRvToohey;exparteNorthernLandCouncil,theHighCourtheldthat theexerciseofstatutorypowerbytheQueensrepresentativeisjusticiableon thegroundofimproperpurposeorbadfaith.157AsnotedearlierinPart(IV) ofthepaperinthediscussionrelatingtojusticiability,thefactthatadecision maker is a Minister or the Queens representative158 does not, in itself, precludejudicialreview,thoughitmayamenditinsomecase,inthecontext ofparticulargrounds,notablythatofproceduralfairness.159 5.180 However, the judgment of the High Court in FAI Insurance Ltd v Winneke160 supportstheviewthatthefactthatastatutorypositionhasbeen conferredonadecisionmakeratthehighestlevel(theGovernorinthatcase), maysuggestthatthecontentoftherulerelatingtoproceduralfairnessshould bereduced. Inthatcase,thecourtheldthatadecisionoftheGovernorin Councilrefusinganapplicationforrenewalofalicencewasreviewablefor procedural fairness, the insurer not having had the opportunity to meet adversecommentsoftheMinisterregardingtheirinvestmentsandfinancial position. 5.181 Susceptibility of the decisionmaker to accountability via other accountability mechanisms is also a significant factor. Hence the role of parliament in calling Ministers to account was relevant as evident in comments by Gleeson CJ and Gummow J in Minister for Immigration and MulticulturalAffairsvJia,acaseinvolvingclaimsofactualandapprehended
156
MinisterfortheArts,HeritageandtheEnvironmentvPekoWallsend(1987)75ALR218,SouthAustralia (1981)151CLR170. Similarlywithdecisionsofcabinet. See MinisterfortheArts,HeritageandtheEnvironmentvPeko MinisterforImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairsvJia(2001)205CLR507. (1982)151CLR342,370perMasonJ.
vOShea(1987)163CLR378.
157 158
Wallsend(1987)75ALR218,SouthAustraliavOShea(1987)163CLR378.
159 160
127
bias. InreviewingtheapproachtakenintheFederalCourt,theirHonours notedasfollows:

bothFrenchJandCooperJevaluatedthestatementsandconductof theMinisterinthelightofhispoliticalfunctionsandresponsibilities. Thisisamatterofimportance.Inconsideringwhetherconductofa decisionmakerindicatesprejudgment,orinsomeotherrespect constitutesadeparturefromtherequirementsofnaturaljustice,the natureofthedecisionmakingprocess,andthecharacteroftheperson uponwhomParliamenthasconferredthedecisionmakingcapacity, maybeofcriticalimportance.FrenchJwasrighttoconsiderthe Minister'sconductinrelationtotheradiointerview,andthelettertothe PresidentoftheTribunal,inthelightofthefactthathewas"anelected official,accountabletothepublicandtheParliamentandentitledtobe forthrightandopenabouttheadministrationofhisportfoliowhich...is amatterofcontinuingpublicinterestanddebate."161
5.182 AsnotedbyKirbyJinthesamecase,however:
Ministerialdecisionsarenotthesubjectofthesamerequirementsof actualandmanifestindependenceandimpartialityasarerequiredby lawofthedecisionsofcourtsandtribunals.Nevertheless,themisuseof highpublicofficebyaMinisterforendsalientothelegislation conferringpowersontheholderofthatofficewould,selfevidently, involveaseriouswrongdoing.
162
5.183 In many cases, there is authority (often stated legislatively) for the delegationofdecisionmakingpowersorthehearingfunctiontoothers. In some cases, all that may be required is the adoption of the findings or recommendations of the person who performed the decisionmaking function. Insuchcircumstances,itmaybethatthestandardofprocedural fairnessrequiredmaydifferfromthatwherethepowercannotbedivulgedto others.163
161 162 163
(2001)205CLR507,[78]. Ibid,[122]. In Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasey (2002) 193 ALR 90, a Minister's decision to approve a
recommendationcontainedinadepartmentalminutewasheldtobevalid,despitethefactthattwo officersinvolved inthe preparation ofthe minute stoodtobenefitfromthe recommendation being carriedout.ThemajorityoftheHighCourtfoundthattherewasnoreasonableapprehensionofbias,as theinvolvementofthetwoofficersintheactualdecisionmakingprocesswas'peripheral'.
128
5.184 However, according to Kirby J, also in Jias case, the fact that a decisionmakingpowerwasconferredbytheMigrationActpersonallyupon theMinister,thatitcouldnotbedelegatedtoanadministrativeofficerofthe Departmentandthatithadtobereportedtoparliament:
doesnotmeanthataMinisterisatlibertytogiveventtopersonal biases,idiosyncraticopinions,prejudiceagainstaparticularapplicantor blanketrules,appliedwithoutregardtoanyspecificfeaturesofthecase athand.NorisaMinisteratlibertytoapplyblindlyhisown,a departmental,aPartyorevenaGovernmentpolicywhichis inconsistentwiththeassumptionsofindividualjusticeand administrativedecisionmakingthatareinherentinthegrantofpower bytheParliament.
164
5.185 HisHonouralsowentontosaythat:
Clearlythepressures,processesandnatureofMinisterialdecision makingdifferfromthejudicialtask.Consequently,theobligation imposedbythecourtsonofficersoftheCommonwealth,including Ministers,shouldnotoverjudicialisetheperformanceoftheir functions,includinginthemakingofdecisionsrequiredofthemby statute.IacceptthattheMinistersremarkonanearlymorning interviewradioshouldnotbedissectedinthewaysometimes appropriatetoanalysesoftheconsideredreasonsofacourtortribunal.
5.186 CommentsinthiscasebyHayneJarealsorelevant:
Itistritetosaythatthecontentoftherulesofproceduralfairnessmust beappropriateandadaptedtothecircumstancesoftheparticularcase. Whatisappropriatewhendecisionofadisputedquestioniscommitted toatribunalwhosestatutorilydefinedprocesseshavesomeorallthe featuresofacourtwilldifferfromwhatisappropriatewhenthe decisioniscommittedtoaninvestigatingbody.Ministerialdecision makingisdifferentagain.
165
PreviousCouncilconsideration 5.187 In WhatDecisionsShouldbeSubjecttoMeritsReview? theCouncil saidthat:
164 165
MinisterforImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairsvJia(2001)205CLR507,[137]. Ibid,[181].
PROPOSEDCONSIDERATIONSINDEVELOPINGAGUIDETOTHESCOPEOFJR Factorsthatwillnotexcludemeritsreviewthatlieinthenatureofthe decisionmakerinclude:
129
The decisionmaker is an expert, or requires specialised expertise;and Thedecisionmakerisofhighstatus.
5.188 Inrelationtothelatter,theCouncilnotedthat:
Thestatusoftheprimarydecisionmakerisnotafactorthat,alone,will makedecisionsofthatpersoninappropriateformeritsreview. Forexample,thefactthatthedecisionmakerisaMinisterorthe GovernorGeneral,isnot,ofitself,relevanttothequestionofreview. Rather,itisthecharacterofthedecisionmakingpower,inparticularits capacitytoaffecttheinterestsofindividuals,thatisrelevant.166
Discussionpoint16
5.189 Althoughthenatureofthedecisionmakingbodyorthestatusofthe decisionmaker should not in itself render judicial review necessary or unnecessary,itissuggestedthatitmaynonethelesshaveanimpactonthe appropriatescopeofjudicialreview.Wherethestatusofthedecisionmaker islinkedtothemakingofparticularsortsofhighlevelpolicydecisions,other considerations become relevant. The preferred view may be that the determinationofsuchissuesisbestlefttothecourts.
166
AdministrativeReviewCouncil,WhatDecisionsShouldbeSubjecttoMeritsReview?,1999,paragraphs
5.20,5.21and5.29.
130
Expertdecisionmakers
Thejudicialperspective 5.190 The courts have tended to take a cautious approach where the decisionmakerisusingspecialknowledgetomakeanassessmentofafactual situation.167 5.191 AsnotedbyGleesonCJ,Gummow,KirbyandHayneJJinCorporation oftheCityofEnfieldvDevelopmentAssessmentCommission:
Theweighttobegiventotheopinionofthetribunal[orthedecision maker]inaparticularcasewilldependuponthecircumstances.These willincludesuchmattersasthefieldinwhichthetribunaloperates,the criteriaforappointmentofitsmembers,thematerialsuponwhichitacts inexercisingitsfunctionsandtheextenttowhichitsdecisionsare supportedbydisclosedprocessesofreasoning.
168
5.192 However,asnotedinearlierdiscussion:
Wherethequestioniswhetherthetribunalactedwithinjurisdiction,it mustbeforthecourttodetermineindependentlyforitselfwhetherthat isthecase.
169
5.193 AsstatedbyGummowJin MinisterforImmigrationandMulticultural AffairsvEshetu:

whilstitisforthiscourttodetermineindependentlyforitselfwhether inaparticularcaseaspecialisttribunalhasorlacksjurisdiction,weight istobegiven,onquestionsoffactandusage,tothetribunalsdecision, theweighttovarywiththecircumstances.Thecircumstanceswill includesuchmattersasthefieldinwhichthetribunaloperates,the criteriaforappointmentofitsmembers,thematerialsuponwhichitacts intheexerciseofitsfunctionsandtheextenttowhichitsdecisionsare supportedbydisclosedprocessesofreasoning.
170
167 168 169 170
Forexample,theworkofaspecialistmedicaltribunal,HockeyvYelland(1984)157CLR124. (2000)199CLR135,154155. Ibid,155. (1999)197CLR611,655.HisHonournotesthatasimilarapproachhasbeenadoptedinCanada,at
leastwithrespecttofindingsofnonjurisdictionalfact.
131
5.194 Themoredifficultcaseswouldseemtobewherethespecialistbodyis requiredtomakedeterminationsthatinvolveboththeassessmentoffactsand theinterpretationofthelaw,forexample,determinationsastotheexistence offactstomeetcriteriaestablishedbylaw.
Discussionpoint17
5.195 Itissuggestedthatthecourtsalreadyshowconsiderabledeferenceto theexpertiseofexpertdecisionmakers.Iflimitationsareimposedbywayof legislation,theyshouldonlyrelatetoareaswithintheparticularpurviewof thedecisionmakerandtogroundsofreview(identifiedearlier)which,by theirnature,comeclosetotheboundariesofmeritsreview.
Doyouagree/notagreewiththisview? Arethereanyotherrelevantconsiderations? Pleaseelaborate.
Outsidecontractors
5.196 As remarked in the Australian National Audit Office Audit Activity Report:JanuarytoJune2001:
Asaresultofthegreateruseofoutsourcedservicesassignificant elementsofprogramdelivery,projectandcontractmanagementhas becomeamajorelementofpublicadministration.
171
Theexecutiveperspective 5.197 Although there has been a concern at the possible reduction in executiveaccountabilityasaresultofthegreateruseofoutsourcedservices, theconcernhasbeenpredominantlywithbroadbasedagencyaccountability ratherthanwithaccountabilitytotheserviceuser.
171
IndustryCommission,CompetitiveTenderingandContractingbyPublicSectorAgencies,ReportNo.48,
1996,paragraph1.46.
132
5.198 Forinstance,inits1996report,CompetitiveTenderingandContractingby PublicSectorAgencies,theIndustryCommissiondrewattentiontotheneedto preserveaccountabilitywhenservicesofgovernmentarecontractedout:

TheCommissionagreeswithnumerousinquiryparticipantsthat,while responsibilitytodocertainthingscanbetransferred,accountabilityfor theresultscannot. Whateverthemethodofservicedelivery,agovernmentagencymust remainaccountablefortheefficientperformanceofthefunctions delegatedtoitbygovernment
172
5.199 More recently, in the Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines and Best PracticeGuidance,theGovernmenthassaidthat:
Whenoutsourcinganactivity,agenciescannotoutsourcetheir responsibilitytoensuretheefficientandeffectiveuseofCommonwealth resources,ortheiraccountabilityforperformance.Outsourcing contributestothequalityofoutcomesforanactivitywithoutaffecting theexistingaccountabilityframeworks.Whenanagencyoutsourcesa function,itisstillresponsibleforensuringtheservicesprovideris meetingtheagencysstakeholderneed.
173
5.200 Ithasbeensaidfurtherthat:
Theprinciplethatagenciesremainaccountableforanactivityeven thoughtheactivityissubjecttocommercialtenderingandcontractdoes notmeanthatthereisacommonsetofaccountabilityarrangements whichappliestoallproviders.Anumberoffactorswillneedtobe balancedtoensurethatprovidersaresubjecttothemixofaccountability arrangementsthatmaximisethebenefitsofcompetitivetenderingand contractingbutprotecttheinterestsofrelevantstakeholders.Agencies willneedtoconsider,onacasebycasebasis,thelevelofaccessthe agencyandtheAustralianNationalAuditofficerequiretoaproviders records,informationandassets(includingpremises)toadequately monitoraprovidersperformance.Thiscanbestatedinthecontract.
174
172 173
Ibid,paragraphs45. Department of Finance and Administration, Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines Best Practice, CommonwealthofAustralia1998,CompetitiveTenderingandContracting,AGPS,Canberra,1618.
September2001,15.
174
133
5.201 This approach does not provide individuals with a direct right of recourseagainstthedecisionmaker. 5.202 The implications of recent amendments to the Privacy Act 1988 to extenditsapplicationtopersonalinformationheldbycontractorsinrelation toservicesprovidedtotheCommonwealthortootherpersonsisrelevantin this regard.175 The Council understands that the Government is currently consideringwhethertoextendtheFreedomofInformationAct1982torequests by individuals about themselves held by the contractors for access to and correctionofpersonalinformationheldbythemonbehalfofthegovernment. TheCouncilperspective 5.203 AsnotedbytheCouncilin1998inits42ndreport,TheContractingOutof GovernmentServices,judicialreviewundertheConstitutionandsection39Bof the Judiciary Act is not limited to review of a decision taken under an enactment. Decisions taken by acontractorunder anonstatutory scheme maytherefore,inappropriatecases,bethesubjectofanapplicationtothe HighCourtortheFederalCourtforawritofmandamusorprohibitionoran applicationforaninjunction.176 Incontrast,theAD(JR)Actcurrently only extendstoreviewofadecisionunderanenactment.177 5.204 Recently, the Government paid recognition to the importance of transparency and accountability when managing government contracts. It indicated that the Ombudsman should have the jurisdiction to investigate actionsofprivatesectororganisationscontractedbyCommonwealthagencies toprovidegoodsorservicestothepublicandthatitwillconsideramending theOmbudsmanAct1976toachievethis.178 5.205 TheGovernmenthasalsoindicatedthatitdoesnotsupporttheview thatcommercialinformationisinherentlyconfidentialandthatanydecision to withholdinformation on commercialinconfidence grounds needs to be fullysubstantiated,statingthereasonswhysuchinformationshouldnotbe
175 176
PrivacyAmendment(PrivateSector)Act2000(Cth). Administrative Review Council, The Contracting Out of Government Services, Report No 42, 1998, However,theimpactofsection39(1A)(c)oftheJudiciaryActshouldbenoted. 379thReport,JointCommitteeofPublicAccountsandAuditContractManagementintheAustralianPublic
paragraph6.41.
177 178
Service,WholeofGovernmentResponse,tabledoutofsession,Monday,22April2002.
134
disclosed.179 Ithasalsoagreedinprincipletotheaccessbyauditorstothe premisesofgovernmentcontractors.180
Discussionpoint18
5.206 In its 42nd report, the Council recommended that the AD(JR) Act shouldextendtoincludeadecisionofanadministrativecharactermadeor proposedtobemade,byanofficerunderanonstatutoryschemeorprogram, thefundsforwhichareauthorisedbyanappropriationmadebyParliament. (Rec22)Theemphasishereisuponthenatureofthedecisionratherthanthe natureofthedecisionmaker. 5.207 Itissuggestedthatthisandotherrecommendationsmadeinthereport No 42 relating to the accountability of outside contractors remain an appropriateresponseinthisarea.
Doyouagree/notagreewiththisview? Arethereotherrelevantconsiderations? Pleaseelaborate.
Governmentbusinessenterprises
5.208 Ithasbeenremarkedthat:
Judicialreviewcanoccasionallyremedyindividualgrievancesbut rarelyprovidessystemicrelief.Thedecisiontolitigateandtomaintain thelitigationcanbehappenstantialReviewinthewakeof privatisationandoutsourcingcarriestheadditionalproblemthatthe complainantistypicallyconceivedasaconsumerwithaconsumer complaint,whichisnotthebusinessofjudicialreview.
181
179 180 181
Id. Id MarkAronson,APublicLawyersResponsetoPrivatisationandOutsourcinginMTaggart(ed),
TheProvinceofAdministrativeLaw,1997,40.
135
WhatisaGBE? 5.209 In theCouncilsfirstreport, Administrative Decisions(JudicialReview) Act1977,ExclusionsUnderSection19,1978,theCouncildevotedanumberof paragraphs182 to consideration of submissions that a number of statutory authorities183shouldbeexcludedfromtheapplicationoftheActonthebasis of their commercially competitive natures.184 In its 32nd report in 1989, consistent with an increasing sophistication in the manner of government involvementinbusinessactivities,ashiftinterminologywasapparent,with growingreferencetogovernmentbusinessenterprise. 5.210 In its 38th report in 1995, Government Business Enterprises and Commonwealth Administrative Law, this evolutionary trend was almost complete,withonlyfleetingreferencetostatutoryauthorities. 5.211 In this report, the Council defined government business enterprises (GBEs) as bodies owned (or partly owned) by government, that are principallyengagedincommercialactivity,andthatareseparatelegalentities from government. GBEs have characteristics in common with private enterprise(forexample,sellinggoodsorservicescommerciallyforfinancial return)whilealsobelongingtothepublicsectorasaresultofgovernment ownershipandtherequirementtooperateinaccordancewithgovernment policy.185Somemaybecomeincorporatedandsomemaybeprivatised. 5.212 Government business enterprises are subject to the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997, the Corporations Law 1997, Governance Arrangements and their own enabling legislation (the Australian Postal
182
AdministrativeReviewCouncil, AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977:Exclusionsunder In the absence of other considerations, where a statutory authority is exercising executive
183
governmentfunctions,itissubjecttoconstitutionalreviewandtoreviewundertheAD(JR)Act.As notedbyMcHughJinAustralianSecuritiesInvestmentsCommissionvEdensorNomineesPtyLtd(2001)204 CLR559,[147]:WhenaCommonwealthauthorityexercisesexecutivefunctionsoftheCommonwealth inamannerakintothatinwhichASICisrequiredtodoundertheASICAct,thatauthorityisthe Commonwealthforthepurposesofsection75(v)oftheConstitutionandsections39,39B,56,57and64 oftheJudiciaryAct.

184
Suchbodesincluded theAustralianIndustryDevelopment Corporation,theAustralianNational
Airlines Commission, the Australian National Railways Commission, the Australian Shipping Commission, the Canberra Commercial Development Authority, the Commonwealth Banking Corporation,theCommonwealthSerumLaboratories,theHealthInsuranceCommission,theHousing LoansInsuranceCorporationandtheReserveBankofAustralia.
185
AdministrativeReviewCouncil, GovernmentBusinessEnterprisesandAdministrativeLaw, ReportNo
38,1995,paragraph2.1.
136
Corporation Act 1989 for instance). They provide services collectively consumed by members of the public, including education, health care, transport,publichousing,landuseregulationandurbanplanning. 5.213 Examples of government business enterprises include Telstra Corporation,AustraliaPost,theSnowyMountainsHydroElectricAuthority, theDefenceHousingAuthorityandtheAustralianGovernmentSolicitor. Thejudicialperspective 5.214 DecisionsofaGBEthatarecommercialdecisions,ordecisionsmade otherthanpursuanttospecificstatutorypowersareunlikelytobereviewable under the AD(JR) Act although review may be available in limited circumstancesundertheConstitutionorintheStateSupremeCourts. 5.215 To come within the ambit of the AD(JR) Act, as with outside contractors,adecisionmustbeofanadministrativecharactermadeunder anenactmentwithinthemeaningofsection3oftheAD(JR)Act.Mostdayto day decisions made by a GBE, particularly commercial decisions (such as decisionsconcerningormadeundercontracts)areunlikelytofallwithinthis definition as they are made under general powers rather than under a statute.186 5.216 Undersection75(iii)oftheConstitution,whetheraparticularGBEmay be a person suing or being sued on behalf of the Commonwealth is a questiontobedeterminedineachcasebyreferencetotheparticularlegal structureandcircumstancesoftheGBE. 5.217 Under section 75(v), GBEs are not themselves officers of the Commonwealth. Whether an officer of a GBE is an officer of the Commonwealth will depend in each case on factors such as whether the personisappointed,paid,controlledandremovablebytheCommonwealth, or is appointed by the Commonwealth to exercise a function of the Commonwealth.187
186 187
Seeforexample,GeneralNewspapersPtyLtdvTelstraCorporation(1993)117ALR629. See TheCommonwealthofAustraliavBogle (1953)89CLR229 and DeputyCommissionerforTaxation
vStateBankofNSW(1992)174CLR219.
137
Theexecutiveperspective 5.218 CorporatisationofGBEstendstobeaccompaniedbyarequirementfor competitiveneutrality,aconceptdescribedintheHilmerReport.188 Insuch anenvironment,administrativelawbecomesanunnecessaryimpedimentto neutralandhenceeffectivecompetitionwithprivatesectorbusiness.189 5.219 The Humphrey Report190 concluded that as GBEs generally trade in goodsandservicesinthemarket,theiractivitiesarenotadministrative.The Report recommended that GBEs be exempt from statutory administrative law.ThisapproachwassubsequentlyconfirmedbytheGovernmentinJune 1997upontheintroductionofnewGovernanceArrangementsforCommonwealth GovernmentBusinessEnterprises. 5.220 However, in its report on Corporate Governance and Accountability ArrangementsforCommonwealthBusinessEnterprises,191theJointCommitteeof Public Accounts and Audit was of the view that, depending on their responsibilities,someaspects ofadministrativelawshouldapplyto GBEs. TheCommitteewasoftheviewthateachGBEshouldbeexaminedonacase bycasebasistodeterminewhataspectsofadministrativelawshouldapply. Otherviews 5.221 IthasbeennotedbyJusticeFinnthat:
astatutorycorporationasanagencyofgovernmentcanhaveno privateorselfinterestofitsownseparatefromthepublicinterestitis constitutionallyboundtoserve.Itisthisthatsharplydifferentiatessuch acorporationfromonethatisprivatelyowned.
and
despitethegrowingtendencytoapproximatethedutiesofdirectors ofstatutorycorporationstothoseofCorporationsLawdirectorsas witnessedbysection21ffoftheAct1997thegulfbetweenthetwo remainslargeandunbridgeable(atleastwithoutconstitutional upheaval).
188 192
SeetheHilmerReport, ReportoftheIndependentCommitteeofInquiryonNationalCompetitionPolicy, Ibid,at296. RHumphrey,ReviewofGBEGovernanceArrangements,March1997. JointCommitteeofPublicAccountsandAudit,CorporateGovernanceandAccountabilityArrangements Justice Paul Finn, The State Corporation June 1999 3(1) The Flinders Journal of Law Reform 1, 4
1993,Chapter13.
189 190 191
forCommonwealthBusinessEnterprises,ReportNo372,December1999,pxix.
192
138
5.222 Similarly,inHughescase,HisHonoursaid:
Thereis,Iconsider,muchtobesaidfortheviewthat,havingno legitimateprivateinterestintheperformanceofitsfunctions,apublic body(includingastateownedcompany)shouldberequiredasof coursetoactfairlytowardsthosewithwhomitdealsatleastinsofaras thisisconsistentwithitsobligationtoservethepublicinterest(or interests)forwhichithasbeencreated.
193
PreviousCouncilConsideration ReportNo1,1977/8 5.223 In its first report Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, ExclusionsunderSection19,1978,theCouncildidnotaccepttheargumentfor exemption from the AD(JR) Act of statutory authorities engaged in commercialactivities.Insteaditfeltthat: becausetheauthoritiesareCommonwealthinstrumentalitiesthey should be subject to judicial review in the same way as other Commonwealthbodies confidentialinformationwouldnotneedtobedisclosed thereisnotalwaysthechoiceonthepartoftheconsumertodeal withanotherserviceprovider;and the extent to which the authorities are seen by outsiders to be relatedtothegovernmentwillnotbeaffectedbytheirinclusionor exclusionfromtheAct.
5.224 The Council was divided as to the application of the Act to commercially competitive statutory authorities. By a narrow majority the Council recommended against exemption. The arguments in favour of exemptionwere: applyingtheActtothemputsthematacommercialdisadvantage competitors may get access to vital information through reasons statementsordiscovery
referringtohisjudgmentinHughesAircraftSystemsInternationalAirservicesAustralia(1997)146ALR1, 40.
193
Ibid,p6.
139
competitorsmayusetheActtodelayorhamperactivitiesofthe body apersonisnotasaffectedbythedecision,becausetheycanobtain theservicesfromanotherbody;and parliamentsdesiretoplacethesebodiesonanequalfootingwith privatebusinesses.
5.225 Theargumentsagainstexemptionwere: asgovernmentbodies,statutoryauthoritiesmustbesubjecttothe ruleoflawlikeallotherbodies although they may be engaged in some commercial activities, statutoryauthoritiesarenottrulyequaltotheircompetitors inmanyinstances,thereisnorealfreedomofchoiceforconsumers, whomustcontinuetodealwiththeauthority;and the AD(JR) Act protects against the release of commercially sensitiveorconfidentialinformation.
ReportNo32,1989 5.226 In its 32nd report, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review)Act:AmbitoftheAct,theCouncilwasoftheviewthat:
theAustraliancommunityhastherighttoexpectthatdecisionsof governmentbusinessenterprisesaremadeaccordingtolawtothesame extentasdecisionsofothergovernmentagencies.
194
5.227 Whilenotingthatitwouldbeofconcernifsignificantusewasmadeof theAD(JR)Acttochallengecommercialdecisions,andthatsuchasituation couldplacesuchenterprisesatadisadvantageinthemarket,theCouncilwas not of the view that significant use of the Act was being made for such purposes. In the case of those GBEs not created under statute but incorporated under companies legislation,theCouncil considered thatthe controls imposed by the requirements of company law provide[d]a sufficientsubstituteforcontrolthroughthejudicialreviewjurisdictionofthe courts.
194
AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:TheAmbit
140
ReportNo38,1995 5.228 In its 38th report, Government Business Enterprises and AdministrativeLaw,theCouncilsaidthat:
GBEsshould[not]beunderanyspecialobligationtooperateas modelbusinessesinrespectoftheircommercialactivitiesundertaken inacompetitivemarket.InsteadtheCouncilconsidersthatthe standardsoffairnessgoverningtheseactivitiesshouldbethesameas thosethatapplythroughoutthemarketplace.
195
5.229 Inthereport,theCouncilconcludedthat: Commonwealth administrative law statutes should prima facie apply to bodies that are governmentcontrolled, including GBEs; and GBEs should be exempt from the operation of Commonwealth administrativelawstatutesinrelationtotheircommercialactivities undertakeninamarketwherethereisrealcompetition.196
5.230 Consistentwiththis,theCouncilwasoftheviewthattheOmbudsman ActandtheArchivesActshouldnotapplytothecommerciallycompetitive activitiesofaGBEundertakeninatrulycompetitivemarket,althoughthe Ombudsman should make the initial decisions as to whether the relevant commercialactivitiesofaGBEareinfactperformedinatrulycompetitive market.197 5.231 As in its 1989 report, Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review)Act:TheAmbitoftheAct,theCouncilrecommendedthatthescopeof theAD(JR)Actshouldbeexpandedtoembracedecisionsofanofficerofthe Commonwealthunderanonstatutoryschemethatisfundedoutofmonies appropriatedbyparliamentspecificallyforthepurposesofthatscheme.198 5.232 Inresponsetothisapproachithasbeensaidthat:
195
AdministrativeReviewCouncil, GovernmentBusinessEnterprisesandCommonwealthAdministrative Ibid,paragraph4.29. Ibid,paragraphs4.35and4.42. Ibid,paragraph4.51.
Law:ReporttotheMinisterforJustice,ReportNo38,1995,paragraph4.27.
196 197 198
PROPOSEDCONSIDERATIONSINDEVELOPINGAGUIDETOTHESCOPEOFJR Withrespect,this[approach]doesnotindicatewhythepresenceofthe competitionfactormakesremovalofadministrativelawreview appropriate.Administrativelawreviewissimplyacasualtyofthe overwhelmingpoliticalpressuretoplacecorporatisedGBEsina positionofcompetitiveneutralityThereisnoinquiryastohow competitioninthemarketwillpromotethevaluesofopenness, rationality,fairnessandparticipationwhichareprotectedby administrativelawreviewpublicpowerwillcontinuetobeexercised bycorporatisedGBEsandindeedbyprivatisedGBEs.Afruitfulavenue forpromotingvaluesofrationality,fairness,opennessandparticipation intheirdecisionmakingwouldberecognitionoftheirpublicpowers andthecreationofstatutoryprivaterights,perhapsappropriatelycalled communityservicerights,bywhichitmaybecontrolled.
199
141
Discussionpoint19
5.233 Itissuggestedthattheviewswithrespecttojudicialreviewexpressed by the Council in its 38th Report, Government Business Enterprises and Commonwealth Administrative Law, remain an appropriate response in this area.
Decisionsbycertainothergovernmentbodies
Intergovernmentalbodies 5.234 InresponsetoinquiriesbytheCouncilinthepreparationofitsfirst report, Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, Exclusions Under Section 19, 1978, it was submitted that authorities established jointly by Commonwealth and State Governments or Commonwealth and foreign governmentsshouldnotbesubjecttotheAD(JR)Act.
199
MargaretAllars,PrivateLawButPublicPower:RemovingAdministrativeLawReviewFromGBEs
(March1995)6(1)PublicLawReview44,76.
142
5.235 In response to this claim, the Council noted that decisions of such authoritiesmadeunderaCommonwealthenactmentwerecurrentlysubject to review and that exclusion from the Act would not exempt them from judicialreviewbutonlyrestricttheforumforreviewtotheHighCourtor,in limitedcases,theSupremeCourtsoftheTerritories.200 Consultativeandadvisoryauthoritiesnotdealingdirectlywiththepublic 5.236 InseekingexemptionfromtheapplicationoftheAD(JR)Act,itwas suggestedthatdepartmentsnotdealingdirectlywiththepublic,orwhichact inaconsultativeoradvisorycapacity,shouldnotcomewithintheambitof theAct. 5.237 Inresponse,initsfirstreport,AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview) Act1977,ExclusionsunderSection191978,theCouncilsaid:
Whereauthoritiesdonotmakedecisionsaffectingapersonsinterests, thennopersonwouldhavestandingtomakeanapplicationunderthe Act.Whereaconsultativeoradvisoryauthoritydoesnotmake decisionsofanadministrativecharacteritsdecisionswillnotfallwithin thetermsoftheAct.
201
5.238 TheCouncilconcludedthatinsofarastheseauthoritiesfallwithinthe terms oftheActandtheirdecisionsaffecttheinterests ofmembers ofthe public,thenjudicialreviewshouldbeavailable.202
Discussionpoint20
5.239 Onthebasisoftheforegoing,itissuggestedthattheapproachadopted bytheCouncilinitsfirstreportandoutlinedaboveremainsanappropriate responseinthisarea.
200
SeeAdministrativeReviewCouncil, AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977:Exclusions Ibid,paragraph61. Id.
201 202
143
SECTIONV Other
Noimpactuponfinaldecision
5.240 In circumstances where the alleged irregularity would not have resultedinadifferentresultbeingreached,thereissomeauthorityforthe viewthattheremaybeadiscretiontodenyaremedy.AsnotedinReRefugee Tribunal;exparteAala,203suchasituationmayoccurwhere,irrespectiveofany question of procedural fairness or merit, the decision was one which the decisionmakerwasboundbythegoverningstatutetorefuse.Alternatively, theremaynothavebeenanopportunitytomakesubmissionsonapointof lawwhichmustclearlybeansweredunfavourablytotheprosecutor.Asalso notedinAala,theconcernofjudicialreview:
iswithobservanceoffairdecisionmakingproceduresratherthan withthecharacterofthedecisionwhichemergesfromtheobservanceof thoseprocedures.Unlessthelimitationordinarilyimpliedonthe statutorypoweristoberewrittenasdenyingjurisdictionalerrorfor trivialbreachesoftherequirementsofproceduralfairness,thebearing ofthebreachupontheultimatedecisionshouldnotitselfdetermine whetherprohibitionunders75(v)shouldgo.
204
5.241 However:
Noteverybreachofnaturaljusticeaffectsthemakingofadecision.The decisionmakermayhaveentirelyupheldthecasefortheparty adverselyaffectedbythebreach;orthedecisionmayhaveturnedonan issuedifferentfromthatwhichgaverisetothebreachofnaturaljustice.
203 204
(20002001)204CLR82. Ibid,[59]perGaudronandGummowJJ.
144
Breachoftherulesofnaturaljustice,therefore,doesnotautomatically invalidateadecisionadversetothepartyaffectedbythebreach
205
5.242 TheHighCourthasalsosaidthat:
Nevertheless,onceabreachofnaturaljusticeisproved,acourtshould refusereliefonlywhenitisconfident[emphasisadded]thatthebreach couldnothaveaffectedtheoutcome
206
Noinjustice
5.243 In one British decision involving applications for certiorari and declarations,ithasbeensaidthat:
[Anapplicant]maybedebarredreliefifhehasacquiescedinthe invalidityorwaivedit.Ifhedoesnotcomewithduediligenceandask forittobesetaside,hemaybesentawaywithnothing.Ifhisconduct hasbeendisgracefulandhehasinfactsufferednoinjustice,hemaybe refusedrelief.
207
5.244 Inrelationtoproceduralfairness,however:
theconditioningofastatutorypowersoastorequiretheprovisionof proceduralfairnesshas,asitsbasis,arationalewhichdiffersfromthat whichgenerallyunderpinsthedoctrineofexcessofpoweror jurisdiction.Theconcerniswithobservanceoffairdecisionmaking proceduresratherthanwiththecharacterofthedecisionwhichemerges fromtheobservanceofthoseprocedures.Unlessthelimitation ordinarilyimpliedonthestatutorypoweristoberewrittenasdenying jurisdictionalerrorfortrivialbreachesoftherequirementofprocedural fairness,thebearingofthebreachupontheultimatedecisionshould notitselfdeterminewhetherprohibitionunders75(v)shouldgo.The issuealwaysiswhetherornottherehasbeenabreachoftheobligation toaccordproceduralfairness,andifso,therewillhavebeen jurisdictionalerrorforthepurposesofs75(v). Casessaidtoturnupontrivialbreachesareoftenbetterunderstoodon othergrounds.Inparticularwheretheobligationtoaffordprocedural
205 206 207
Ibid,[104]perMcHughJ. Id. FHoffmannLaRoche&CoAGvSecretaryofStateforTradeandIndustry, [1975]AC295,320(CA),
perDenningMR;affirmed[1975]AC329.
PROPOSEDCONSIDERATIONSINDEVELOPINGAGUIDETOTHESCOPEOFJR fairnessexists,itspreciseorpracticalcontentiscontrolledbyany relevantstatutoryprovisionsand,withintherelevantlegislative framework,thiswillvaryaccordingtothecircumstancesofthe particularcase.

208
145
Discussionpoint21
5.245 From the foregoing it would seem that there is a range of factors relevanttowhetherornotjudicialreviewshouldlie.Arguably,suchmatters areonesuponwhichthecourtsshouldruleasitdependsverymuchonthe circumstances of the particular case. As such, they are not matters appropriateforlegislativeintervention.
208
ReRefugeeTribunal;ExparteAala(20002001)204CLR82,[60],[109]perGaudronandGummowJJ.
146
PARTVITHEEXISTENCEOFADEQUATEALTERNATIVE REMEDIES INTRODUCTION SECTIONI Twoperspectives

Theexecutiveperspective Thejudicialperspective
SECTIONII Whatisanadequatealternativeremedy
Natureofthereviewright
Adequatealternativeremediestwocasestudies SECTIONIII Thegroundsofreview

Erroroflaw Proceduralfairness Unreasonableness,irrelevantconsiderationsetc Concludingcomments
SECTIONIV Meritsreview
Thejudicialperspective Theexecutiveperspective PreviousCouncilconsideration
THEEXISTENCEOFADEQUATEALTERNATIVEREMEDIES
147
INTRODUCTION
6.1 Inapproachingtheissueofalternativeremedies,itisimportanttobear inmindthatjudicialreviewisbutoneelementinouradministrativejustice system.Aswellasjudicialreview,thereisalsointernalreviewbyasuperior officer,meritsreviewbyatribunalandofficialscrutinymechanismssuchas theOmbudsman,theparliamentarymemberwhoseconstituentisaffectedby adecision,andtheMinisterwhomaybethesubjectofrepresentationsonthe matter. Additionally,thereisaccesstothecourtsinmanycases,eitherby wayoflimitedorfullappeal. 6.2 Unofficialmechanismswhichmayalsohaveasignificantimpacton the political process includenongovernment organisationsandthemedia. Accesstoofficialdocumentsbywayoffreedomofinformationandstatutory requirementsfortheprovisionofstatementsofreasonsarealsoimportant, while systemic issues may be addressed by Commonwealth and State AuditorsGeneral. 6.3 Ithasbeennotedthatwideningthescopeofjudicialreviewbringsa greaterriskthattheefficientadministrationofgovernmentwillbeimpaired and possibly a fragmentation of the process of administrative decision makingand[setting]atrisktheefficiencyoftheadministrativeprocess.1
SECTIONI Twoperspectives
6.4 Inits1973ReportonPrerogativeWritProcedures,theEllicottCommittee took the view that where specific appeal regimes are in place, the courts shouldbeabletodeclinejudicialreviewjurisdiction.2TheCommitteenoted that:
Inrelationtosomestatutorydiscretions,provisionisalreadymadefor judicialreviewbeforethecourts,forexample,underthetaxationlaw. Wethinkitisdesirablethatwherethisisthecasethecourtexercising
1
AustralianBroadcastingTribunalvBond(1990)170CLR321,3367perMasonCJinthecontextofthe TheEllicottCommitteereport,paragraph33.
ambitoftheconceptofdecision.
2
148
thejurisdictionforgeneraljudicialreviewshouldhavepowertodecline toexerciseitsjurisdiction.
3
6.5 Thisargumentwas used bysomeagencies in seeking exemptionin 1978fromtheapplicationoftheAD(JR)Act:itisreflectedinparagraph10(2) (b)(ii)oftheAct,whichprovidesthattheCourtmaydeclinetoreviewan application if it considers that adequate provision is made under another enactment for review of a decision by the Federal Court, another court, tribunalorperson.Theformofreviewthatwillsupplementjudicialreviewis very broadly defined in subsection 10(3) of the Act to include reconsideration,rehearing,appeal,injunctionanddeclaration. Fromthis,it followsthat,subjecttothediscretionarylimitationsestablishedbysubsection 10(2),theAD(JR)Actremediesareintendedtobegenerallyavailable. 6.6 In the Explanatory Memorandum to the Administrative Decisions (JudicialReview)AmendmentAct1980,whichinsertedthecurrentSchedule1 into the AD(JR) Act, several references are made to the Government not wanting applicants short circuiting the statutory appeal procedures and goingstraighttotheFederalCourt.Similarargumentswerealsoreliedonfor exampleinrelationtoexclusionofdecisionsundertheIncomeTaxAssessment Act 1936 and, more recently, under the Jurisdiction of Courts Legislation AmendmentAct2000andtheWorkplaceRelationsAct1996,fromreviewunder theAD(JR)Act. TheAD(JR)AmendmentBill1986 6.7 ThisBill,whichwasultimatelyblockedintheSenate,representsthe mostsignificantlegislativeattempttorestrictjudicialreviewonthebasisof theexistenceofalternativeremedies. Itwouldhaveprovidedforthenear automaticrefusal ofreliefunder theActwheretherewere eitheralternate means of review or where the proceeding challenged was not complete, unlesstheinterestsofjusticerequiredotherwise.Proposedsection10(2)(d)(iii) oftheBillwouldhaverequiredthecourttoconsiderwhetheritwas:
desirabletorefusetogranttheapplicationinordertoavoid interferencewiththedueandorderlyconductoftheproceedingsor forthereasonthatthebalanceofconvenience(includingtheinterestof theapplicant,anotherpartyoranyotherperson,thepublicinterestand theconsequencesofdelayinthoseproceedings)sorequires.
Id.
149
6.8 Theaim,accordingtothenAttorneyGeneral,theHonLionelBowen, was toreducedelayandincrease administrativeefficiency,asproceedings wereincreasinglybeingfragmentedbyinterlocutoryAD(JR)applications.In supportingtheBill,theAttorneyGeneralsDepartmentnotedthat:

Wherethereisaneffectiveadministrativereviewofadministrative actionbyanindependentbody,personsaffectedbythatactionshould beencouragedtousethatremedy,ratherthantoseekresorttothe FederalCourtundertheAD(JR)Actinthefirstinstance.
4
6.9 TheBilltookintoaccountrecommendationsmadebytheCouncilinits 26thReportin1986,ReviewofAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977 Stage1,butwentfurtherthanhadbeenrecommendedbytheCouncilby requiringtheFederalCourttorefuseapplicationsmadeundertheActwhere the applicant had an alternative right to seek review unless the applicant satisfieditthattheinterests ofjusticerequiredthatitshouldnotrefuseto granttheapplication. 6.10 InconsideringtheBill,theSenateLegalandConstitutionalLegislation Committee recognised the need to strike a balance between merits and judicial review, and that applicants should be encouraged to use merits reviewbeforeresortingtojudicialreview. TheCommitteealsorecognised that there was a problem of applicants leapfrogging merits review and proceeding straight to judicial review for tactical reasons. However, the Committee was loathe to recommend restricting judicial review for all applicantsbecauseofafewunmeritoriousvexatiousones.
6.11 The existence of an adequate alternative remedy represents an importantfactorforthecourtsindeterminingwhetherornotjudicialreview shouldlie.5 6.12 UndertheAD(JR)Act,however,theFederalCourthastendedtostart from the presumption that if the court has jurisdiction to entertain an applicationforjudicialreview,theapplicationshouldnotberefusedmerely becausethereissomeotherremedyavailable,unlesstherearestrongreasons
4
QuotedintheSenateInquiryintotheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Bill1986,Parliamentary AcomprehensiveanalysisisprovidedinanarticlebyDameEnidCampbell,JudicialReviewand
Paper212,1987,paragraph4.4.
5
AppealsasAlternativeRemedies(1982)910MonashUniversityLawReview14.
150
to the contrary. It has been held that the onus persuading the court to examinethediscretionadverselytotheapplicantrestswiththerespondent partyrequestingtheexerciseofthediscretion.6 6.13 Under the Constitution, the court also retains a discretion to grant relief, amongst other things, having regard to whether there is a more convenient remedy. In one case for instance, in relation to the writ of mandamus,itwassaidbytheHighCourtthatmandamusisnotawritof rightandthattherearewellrecognisedgroundsuponwhichthecourtmay, intheexerciseofitsdiscretion,withholdtheremedy,includingthat:
thewritmaynotbegrantedifamoreconvenientandsatisfactory remedyexists,ifnousefulresultcouldensue,ifthepartyhadbeen guiltyofunwarrantabledelayoriftherehasbeenbadfaithonthepart oftheapplicant,eitherinthetransactionoutofwhichthedutytobe enforcedarisesortowardsthecourttowhichtheapplicationismade.
7
6.14 InanotherdecisionoftheHighCourtitwassaidthatalthougharight ofappealdoesnotbarthepowerofasuperiorcourttograntprohibition,and that any such provision would be invalid, the court nonetheless has a discretiontograntorrefusetheremedy. Factorsenliveningthediscretion mightincludethatadecisioninfavourofonepartymightrenderacademic whetherornotprohibitionshouldissue,orbecauseitwouldassistthecourt in discharging its ultimate responsibility. In Aala, the Court confirmed prohibitionasadiscretionaryremedy.Relevantfactorsthatmightcausethe discretion to be exercised adversely to the applicant include "the delay, waiver,acquiescenceorotherconductoftheprosecutor".8 6.15 Other considerations include "the high purposes of vindicating the publiclawoftheCommonwealth,ofupholdinglawfulconductonthepartof officersoftheCommonwealth,ofdefendingtherightsofthirdpartiesunder thatlaw,andofmaintainingtheprovisionsoftheConstitution".9
6 7
KellyvCoats(1981)35ALR93,perTooheyJ. TheKingvCommonwealthCourtofConciliationandArbitration;ExparteOzonePictureTheatres (1949)
78CLR389at400.SeealsoReRefugeeTribunal;ExparteAala(20002001)204CLR82perGaudronand GummowJJ.
8 9
ReRefugeeTribunal;ExParteAala(2000)204CLR82,107perGaudronandGummowJJ. Ibid,137perKirbyJ.
151
SECTIONII Whatisanadequatealternativeremedy
6.16 Inaddressingwhetherornotanalternativetoanapplicationunder subsection10(2)oftheAD(JR)Actisadequateithasbeensaidthat:
Inthiscontext,theadequateprovisionistobereadasadequateinthe senseofsuitabilityorsufficientprovisionforreview.
10
6.17 Indeterminingwhatconstitutesadequacyofthealternateremedy,it wouldseemthatitispropertocompareitwiththepowerofthecourtunder theAD(JR)Act.InthecaseofWebbvJackson11forinstance,acasecommenced intheSupremeCourtwasconsideredrelevantasitallowedarehearingofthe matter,includingtheadmissionoffreshevidence. Inthatcase,itwasalso consideredrelevantthatfiveotheractionshadbeenbroughtintheSupreme Courtinvolvingthesamesubjectmatter.Incontrast,arightofreviewunder thePublicServiceAct1922wasconsideredinadequateasitdidnotprovidethe rangeofremediesavailableundertheAD(JR)Act.12 6.18 Someofthefactorsconsideredrelevanttodeterminingtheadequacyor otherwisearesetoutbelow.
Natureofthereviewright
6.19 Factorshereinclude: Natureandscopeofreviewpowers 6.20 Thenatureofreviewprovisionsandthescopeofthepowersentrusted tothereviewbodymayberelevantfactorsindeterminingtheiradequacyas alternativereview mechanisms.13 Ithasbeen heldbytheHighCourtthat wherethereisafullappealright,therewillbenorightofjudicialreviewfrom the initial decision.14 However, the appeal needs to be full and comprehensive.15 In contrast to a right of appeal, recourse to a review
10 11 12 13 14
EdelstenvMinisterforHealth(1994)32ALD730,734perNorthropJ. WebbvJackson(1984)56ALR254. InglisvBateson(1990)99ALR149. BrockvChildSupportRegistrar(1995)38ALD255. Twist v Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 12 ALR 379; Marine Hull & Liability Insurance Co Ltd FurnellvWhangareiHighSchoolBoard[1973]AC660.
vHurford(1985)62ALR253.
15
152
tribunalwithnorightstoreverseorevenmodifytheoriginaldecisionwill notexpungejudicialreviewforproceduralfairness.16Similarly,anappealon aquestionoflawaloneisnotsufficient.17 6.21 Whileanappellatebodymayhavejurisdictiontoundertakeadenovo hearingandreviewadecisionitmaynothavethepowertosubstituteitsown decisionforthatappealedagainst,butmerelytoconfirmthedecisionorelse recommend that it be set aside or varied. As such, it would not be an adequatealternative.Theremedyonappealmustbeatruealternative;that is,iftheappealshouldsucceed,theappellatebodymusthavethepowerto rectifytheerrorcomplainedof.18 6.22 Accountmustalsobetakenofwhetherreviewbyappealisautomatic, on request, or whether leave to appeal must be sought and obtained. If establishment of an appeals tribunal and determination of an appeal is discretionary,thiswouldnotbeatruealternative.19 Thestandingorlackof standingoftheapplicanttotheappealwillalsobearelevantfactor. 6.23 Timelimitsmayalsobeafactor.Arightdependentonthesuccessof anapplicationforextensionoftherelevanttimelimitmaynotbeanadequate alternative. 6.24 Whether the onus of proof is on an applicant in an appeal from a decision,whentheywouldnothaveotherwisehavehadsuchanonus,isalso arelevantfactor.20
16 17
ColpittsvAustralianTelecommunicationsCommission(1988)14ALD554. Twist v Randwick Municipal Council (1976) 12 ALR 379; Marine Hull & Liability Insurance Co Ltd RvHullBoardofVisitors;ExparteStGermain(1979)QB425,4489,456,465. RvTownPlanningCommittee;ExparteSkyeEstateLtd[1958]SASR1,21,24,278,3940. MarineHullvHurford(1985)62ALR253,264.SeealsoCalvinvCarr[1980]AC574.
vHurford(1985)62ALR253.
18 19 20
153
Discussionpoint22 Arethecourtssufficientlyproactiveinrefusingtoallowjudicial reviewinthefaceofotherremedies? Pleaseelaborate.
Timing 6.25 Timingisalsoimportant. Hastherealreadybeenahearing? 6.26 Inonecase,theFederalCourt21refusedtoentertainanapplicationfor judicialreviewonthebasisthattherehadalreadybeenahearingintheAAT. Inreachingthisconclusion,theCourtwasinfluencedbythefactthattheAAT couldoffer: fullmeritsreview,encompassinglawandfact,withthepossibility ofanappealtotheFederalCourtonaquestionoflaw;and havingregardtotheAgedCareAct,reconsiderationofallthesteps taken to reach the ultimate decision and therefore, that proper conductofareviewbytheAATwouldcureallthedefectsinthe processthatledtotheultimatedecisionscomplainedof,ifthere weresuchdefects.
6.27 The Court also noted that its decision as to the adequacy of merits reviewwasnottheoreticalinviewofthefactthattheapplicationshadbeen heardbytheTribunal. Isthematterintheprocessofbeingheard/heard? 6.28 In SaittaPtyLtdvCommonwealth,itwasheldbyWeinberg Jatfirst instancethat:
Thefactthatithasavailabletoitadequatealternativeremediesinthe AATinproceedingswhichithasalreadycommencedprovides considerablesupportforthepropositionthattheproceedingsinthis
21
SaittavCommonwealth[2001]FCA817,[25][29]perGrayJ.
154
Courtshouldatleastbestayed.Wherefullmeritsreviewisavailableto, andhasalreadybeeninvokedbyanapplicant,Courtswilloftenexercise theirdiscretiontostayordismissapplicationsforjudicialreview.

22
6.29 Inanothercase,theCourtdeclinedtoallowanapplicationforjudicial review whilst an appeal under section 44 of the Administrative Appeals TribunalAct1975wasunderway.23 Preliminaryorproceduraldecision 6.30 Ithasbeenheldthatifundertakenattooearlyapoint,judicialreview mayresultinafragmentationofthedecisionmakingprocessandthatthis maybedetrimentaltotheefficiencyofthesystemasawhole.24 6.31 Thepositionhasalsobeencomplicatedbytherestrictedinterpretation ofdecisioninAustralianBroadcastingTribunalvBond.Inthatcase,MasonCJ heldthatadecisionisgenerallybutnotalways,adecisionwhichisfinalor operativeanddeterminative,atleastinapracticalsense,oftheissueoffact fallingfordetermination. 6.32 Therearedoubtstooastowhetheranisolatederroratapreliminary stageshouldinvalidateasubsequentorfinaldecision.AccordingtoToohey andGaudronJJinBond:
Ifthedecisionistostandbecauseitisnotattendedbyareviewable error,reviewoftheconclusionsandfindingsleadingtothatdecisionto seeiftheywereattendedbysomeerrorwhich,exhypothesi,wasnot carriedintothedecisionsoastorenderitreviewableisafutile exercise.
25
Isanappealpending? 6.33 Ithas been heldthatwhether ornotthefactthattheapplicanthas chosentoappealandthathisappealisstillpendingisagoodreasontorefuse anapplicantajudicialremedy mustdependonthestatusoftheappellate body,thenatureoftheappealandthegroundsonwhichremedyissought,
22 23 24
SaittaPtyLtdvCommonwealth(2000)FCA1546. AnitaChowdharyvPeterBayneinhiscapacityasaseniormemberoftheAAT&Comcare(1999)AAR100. ThisisthegeneraltenorofcommentsmadebyMasonCJinAustralianBroadcastingTribunalvBond Ibid,378.
(1990)170CLR321,3367.
25
155
forexample,appealtotheMinisterwhennotaffordedafullhearingno assuranceoforalhearingorlegalrepresentation.26 ArethereconcurrentAATproceedings? 6.34 In one case,27 it has been observed that where full merits review is availableandhasbeeninvokedbyanapplicant,Courtswilloftenexercise their discretion to stay and dismiss judicial review. In that case, it was consideredrelevantthattheAATcouldconsiderquestionsoflawarisingin proceedingsbeforeit.28Itcouldthereforeconsideraspartofitsconsideration of decisions in issue, the validity of the Aged Care Principles. Although unabletoexercisejudicialpowerortograntthedeclaratoryreliefsought,it could arrive at a conclusion as to whether or not the steps preceding the makingofthesanctiondecisionswerelawfulandwhethervariousprovisions oftheActwerecontravened. 6.35 Ifthepresenceorabsenceofjurisdictiondependsonquestionsoffact, and the court against which prohibition has been sought has not yet determinedthosequestionsoffact,letalonewhetherithasjurisdiction,the courtmaydecidetheapplicationforreviewtobepremature.29 Wasthereadelayininstitutingproceedingsforjudicialreview? 6.36 Inonecase,30delayinbringingproceedingstohaltanInquiryalready startedunderthePublicServiceAct1922wasconsideredanimportantfactor indenyingrelief. Assessmentoftheadequacyofthesuggestedalternative maynotbepossibleuntilthestrengthoftheapplicantsclaimisascertained. Publicinterestelement 6.37 Inthesamecase,publicinterestintheefficientadministrationofthe PublicServiceAct1922washeldtobeafactorinrefusingrelief.31 Benefitofcourtproceedingtoapplicant 6.38 Ithasbeenheldinonecasethattheapplicantwouldnotsufferany great hardship if [the respondents] application succeeds was a relevant
26 27 28 29
RvSpalding(1955)5DLR(2d)374. SaittaPtyLtdvCommonwealth[2000]FCA1546,[103][104]perWeinbergJ. Byvirtueofsection42oftheAdministrativeAppealsTribunalAct1975. RvJudgesofFederalCourtofAustralia;ExparteWesternAustralianNationalFootballLeague(Inc)(1979) VickersvHanks[1999]FCA695perCarrJ. Id.
143CLR190.
30 31
156
consideration.32 It was noted in this regard, in a case not involving pure issuesoflawbutatbest,mixedquestionsoffactandlaw,thatalthoughthe AntiDumpingAuthoritywasnotnecessarilyconstitutedbylegallyqualified membersitspracticeistoobtainadvicefromtheAustralianGovernment Solicitoronanylegalissuesraised.33 Complexityoftheissues 6.39 Itwasheldinonecasethat:
giventheapparentcomplexitiesofthislitigation,itisdifficulttostate inadvanceofthefinalhearingwhatultimatesubstantiverelief,ifany weretobegranted,wouldbetheappropriaterelief.Untilthelikely formofthatreliefisknown,itisprematuretospeculateaboutthe possibleexistenceofdiscretionaryreasonswhytheCourtmight, notwithstandingaprimafacieentitlementtorelief,nonetheless,decline toorderjudicialreview.Thisisparticularlysowhenthetruenatureand scopeoftheadministrativereviewnowrelieduponisnotyetfully known.
34
Relativecost/speed 6.40 Itisrelevant,generallyspeaking,tohaveregardtoanyunnecessary delayandanyincreasedcostifthealternativesuggestedremedyispursued.35 Thedesirabilityofaspeedy,authoritativedecisionmayalsobeanimportant factor.AsnotedbyFoxACJinGrahamvCommissionerofSuperannuation:

Themainconsiderationiswhatisbesttobedoneintheinterestsofthe partiesandthepublicinterestandwithaviewtosavingcostandtime andreachingassoonaspossibleafinalityofdecision.
36
6.41 Itwasnotedinthecasethat:
Ifthematterwerenotdealtwithbythecourttheapplicantcouldseek reconsiderationbytheCommissionerandthengotheAATandifthe
32
ReDuPont(Australia)LimitedandEIDuPontDeNemoursandCoand:ComptrollerGeneralofCustoms;
Peter Kittler; AntiDumping Authority and Minproc Holdings Ltd (1993) 30 ALD 829, [14][15] per HeereyJ.
33 34 35
Ibid,[16]. MoranHospitalsPtyLtdvConorKingandPaulHuntley(1997)49ALD444. MercantileCreditsLtdvCommissionerofTaxation(No1) (1985)5FCR510followedin RossMilton (1981)3ALNN86.
HagedornvDepartmentofSocialSecurity(1996)44ALD274.
36
THEEXISTENCEOFADEQUATEALTERNATIVEREMEDIES questionoflawwasstilldecidedadverselytoher,shemighthaveto comebacktothecourt.Theinabilityanadministrativecourttomakea definitiverulingwasheldtobeafactorinthedecision.

37
157
6.42 Expediencywasafactorin KellyvCoats,acaseinvolvinganerrorof law,whereitwasheldbyTooheyJthattheapplicationbeforetheFederal Court'islikelytobeamoreexpeditiouswayofdisposingofthematterthan theprocedurestobefoundintheRepatriationAct.38 Otherjudicialconsiderationinthecase 6.43 Inonecasewherejudicialconsiderationhadalreadybeenundertaken at first instance, the Full Federal Court indicated that it would not be appropriateforthecourttoexercisethediscretionunderparagraph10(2)(b) (ii)oftheAD(JR)Act.39 Urgency 6.44 InthecaseofTwistvRandwickMunicipalCouncil,MasonJnotedthat:
Thiscaserelatedtoanappealtothedistrictcourtfromademolition ordermadebytheCouncil.Theprovisionindicatedalegislative intentiontoexcludeanyhearingpriortothemakingofthedemolition order.Theappealtherebyprovidedtheexclusiveremedy.Theappeal wasahearingdenovoafullandcomprehensiveoneonfactsandlaw.
40
6.45 InDuPont,41itwasnotedthattheregimeprescribedundertheCustoms Act1901containedlegislativedirectionsastothetimesinwhichvarioussteps weretobetakenandthat:

Becauseofthecommercialcontextinwhichthequestionsofalleged dumpingarisemaychangerapidlythereisanobviousneed,explicitly recognisedbyParliament,tohavethedisputedissuesresolved promptly.
42
37 38 39 40 41
Id. KellyvCoats(1981)35ALR93,95. SwanPortlandCementLimitedvComptrollerGeneralofCustoms(1989)25FCR523. (1976)136CLR106,1134. ReDuPont(Australia)LimitedandEIDuPontDeNemoursandCoand:ComptrollerGeneralofCustoms; Id.
PeterKittler;AntiDumpingAuthorityandMinprocHoldingsLtd(1993)30ALD829,[14]perHeereyJ.
42
158
Consequencesofthedecision 6.46 InMinisterforImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairsvMiah,43inallowing judicial review, McHugh J indicated that the nature of the interest and consequences for the individual, as well as the subject matter of the applicationwereimportant.Inthatcase,consequencesincludedpossiblerisk tolifeandwere,onthatbasis,undeniablyimportant. 6.47 Conversely,ithasbeenheldbytheFederalCourtinanothercasethat proceedingsunderthePublicServiceActshouldproceedunderthatAct.44
Discussionpoint23 Are there factors other than those identified in the discussion paper relevant to the circumstances in which remedies will presentadequatealternativestojudicialreview? Pleaseelaborate.
Adequatealternativeremedytwocasestudies
6.48 Inviewoftheirsuccess,anoverviewoftheincometaxandworkplace relations schemes where, in excluding or limiting judicial review, heavy relianceisplacedontheavailabilityofremediesalternativetojudicialreview. Bothschemesappeartoenjoybothjudicialandgovernmentsupport.Details ofthetwoschemesaresetoutinAppendix4tothediscussionpaper.
43 44
(2001)206CLR57. BeckvThornett(1984)6ALNN209.
159
Discussionpoint24 Arethereparticularfeaturesofthetaxandworkplacerelations reviewregimesthatsetthemapart? Are there other decisionmaking regimes which might be includedhere? Pleaseelaborate.
SECTIONIII Thegroundsofreview
6.49 Animportantfactorinfluencingthecourtsdeterminationwhetherto exercise thediscretion to allowajudicial reviewapplicationtoproceed to hearing or not can also be the ground of challenge and the consequences flowingfromjudicialintervention.
Erroroflaw
6.50 There is authority to suggest that where prohibition/certiorari are soughtforpatentjurisdictionalerror,acourthasnodiscretiontorefusethe writoncethecourthasdeterminedthenatureoftheerror. 45Indeed,whenan applicationisonthegroundofnojurisdiction/erroroflaw,thecourtshave seldomdeclinedtogivearemedymerelybecausethedecisionissubjectto appeal.46 6.51 AsimilarapproachprevailsundertheAD(JR)Act.Ithasbeenheldfor instancethatassumingthattheapplicantscomplaintistrulyoneoferrorof law, the present application [for judicial review] is likely to be a more expeditiouswayofdisposingofthematterthantheprocedurestobefoundin theRepatriationAct.47
45 46
YirrellvYirrell(1939)62CLR287. See for example, Swan Portland Cement Ltd v ComptrollerGeneral of Customs (1989) 90 ALR 280. Ibid,96perTooheyJ.
KellyvCoats(1981)3ALN52.
47
160
Proceduralfairness
6.52 The factors relevant to refusing relief in the face of an alternative remedyhavebeenidentifiedbyMcHughJin Miahscase,acaseinwhichit wascontendedthattherighttoafulldenovoreviewbytheTribunalindicated Parliamentsintentiontolimittherequirementsofnaturaljusticeatthestage whereadelegateisexaminingtheapplications.Whilenotingthat:
Itistruethattheexistenceofappealorreviewrightsmayaffectthe extenttowhichtherequirementsofnaturaljusticeapplyatanearlier levelofdecisionmaking,
6.53 HisHonourconsideredthat:
thereisnogeneralrulethatarightofappealorreviewnecessarily deniesorlimitstheapplicationoftherulesofnaturaljustice.Thereisno inflexiblerulethatthepresenceofarightofappealorreviewexcludes naturaljustice.
48
6.54 His Honour suggested that the following factors can be relevant in determining whether such a right excludes or limits the rules of natural justice: thenatureoftheoriginaldecision:preliminaryorfinal whethertheoriginaldecisionismadeinpublicorprivate theformalitiesrequiredfororiginaldecision theurgencyoftheoriginaldecision thenatureoftheappellatebodyjudicial,internal,"domestic" thebreadthofappealdenovoorlimited;and thenatureoftheinterestandsubjectmatter.
6.55 Inthecaseathand,HisHonoursviewwasthattherightofappealto thetribunalwasinsufficienttoconcludethattheParliamentintendedthatthe delegate wasnotrequired to accord natural justice. Although the denovo rightofreviewwasimportantitwasnotsufficienttooutweightheinference ofthesubjectmatterthatproceduralfairnessshouldlie.
Unreasonableness/irrelevantconsiderationsetc
6.56 It would seem that in cases involving applications on the basis of grounds involving greater focus on fact than law, the courts are more
48
MinisterforImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairs;ExparteMiah(2001)206CLR57,[145].
161
preparedtoregardalternativereviewprocessesincludingmeritsreviewbya tribunalasadequate. 6.57 ThiswasthecaseforinstanceintheFederalCourtcaseofMengKokTe vMinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairsandAnother49whereBransonJheld thatthealternativeprocess,reviewbytheAAT,involvingfullmeritsreview, wouldbeanadequatealternativetojudicialreviewandthatquestionsoffact andlawcouldbeargued.Moreover,thedecisionoftheAATfollowingsuch reviewwouldbeopentobeappealedtotheFederalCourtonthegroundof erroroflaw.
Discussionpoint25 Doyouagreewiththisassessment? Howdoothergroundsinfluencethecourt'sdeterminationofthe existenceofadequatealternativeremedies? Pleaseelaborate.
SECTIONIV Meritsreview
6.58 Asreflectedintheabovediscussion,thecourtsarepreparedinsome cases to regard full de novo merits review by a tribunal as an adequate alternativeremedy.Asalsonotedabove,arangeofotherfactorssuchasthe timingoftheapplication,thenatureofthedecisionappealedfromandthe grounduponwhichreviewissought,arealsopertinent. 6.59 In BragvSecretary,DepartmentofEmployment,EducationandTraining,50 DaviesJexpressedthegeneralprinciplethat:
49 50
MengKokTevMinisterforImmigration&MulticulturalAffairs(1998)FCA(16October1998). (1995)38ALD251,253.
162
Thiscourtistoobusyanditsprocessestoocostlyforitgenerallytobe appropriateforanapplicanttocometothecourtwhenthereisan informalandexpeditiousadministrativetribunalestablishedtoresolve thedispute.
and:
Weexpresstheviewthatinmany,(perhapsmost)circumstances,the Courtsproperresponsetoanapplicationofthisparticularsort[where thestatuteestablishesaspecificappealmechanism]shouldnotbeto embarkuponafullhearing,butrathertoexercisethediscretionunder s10(2)(b)(ii)adverselytotheapplicant.
51
6.60 InitsreportontheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Amendment Bill1987,theSenateStandingCommitteeonLegalandConstitutionalAffiars indicateditssympathywiththeconsiderationsunderlyingtheBill,namely, thatwhereadministrativetribunalshavebeenestablishedwithjurisdictionto deal with matters in their entirety, such tribunals should resolve those matters,ratherthantheCourt,whichmayaddressonlyquestionsoflaw.52 6.61 Establishment of a comprehensive merits review system was consideredbytheGovernmenttobeasignificantargumentforthelimitations onjudicialreviewprovidedforintheMigrationReformAct1992:
Thereviewproceduresestablishedin[theAct]providefor comprehensivemeritsreviewofallvisarelateddecisionsandin recognitionofthis,thisgroundofreviewwillnolongerbeavailable.
53
51
SwanPortlandCementLtdvComptrollerGeneralofCustoms(1989)25FCR523,530perMorling,Pincus
and OLoughlin JJ. ThePrivyCouncilhasalsoagreedwiththese sentiments: HarleyDevelopmentv CommissionofInlandRevenue[1996]1WLR727.

52
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Administrative Decisions (Judicial ExplanatoryMemorandumtotheMigrationReformBill1992,paragraph415.Further,aspointedout
Review)Bill1987,ParliamentaryPaperNo212,1987,paragraphs4.1314,26.
53
byMasonJinMinisterforAboriginalAffairsvPekoWallsendLtd(1986)162CLR24,42,whentheground ofassertedunreasonablenessisgiventoomuchortoolittleweighttooneconsiderationoranother:a courtshouldproceedwithcautionlestitexceeditssupervisoryrolebyreviewingthedecisiononits merits.
163
6.62 Similarly,ithasbeenremarkedinrelationtomigrationvisadecisions that:

Thereisanobligationtoprovidereview,butthereisnoobligationto providereviewbothofanadministrativecharacterandinrelationto providingadditionalaccesstothecourts.Theobligationistoprovide onebutnotboth.
54
6.63 Conversely, inits32nd reportin1989,whenconsideringtheissueof exclusionfromreviewoftaxationdecisionstheCouncilwasoftheviewthat:

theavailabilityofacomprehensiveappealssystemdoesnotprovidea basisforanexclusionfromtheAD(JR)Act.TheActspecifically contemplatesinsection10that,incertaincaseswhichcomebeforethe courtonajudicialreviewapplication,adequateprovisionforappealor reviewwillbemadeelsewhere.Thesectionprovidesforexerciseofthe courtsdiscretioninthosecircumstancestorefusetograntthejudicial reviewapplication. Ifthemainreasonfortheexclusionistheexistenceofarightofreview onthemerits,theconsistentlinewhichoughttobetakeninthe Commonwealthisthat,wheneverlegislationgivesarightofreviewofa particularclassofdecisionbytheAAT,stepsoughttobetakento excludereviewundertheAD(JR)Act.Quiteproperly,thiscourseisnot infacttaken.Section10oftheAD(JR)Actisinplacetodealwith alternativeremedies.
55
6.64 AsstatedbytheLawCouncilofAustraliainitssubmissionin1998to theSenateLegalandConstitutionalLegislationCommitteeonthe Migration LegislationAmendment(JudicialReview)Bill1998.

thereisabundantevidencethatthemeritsreviewprocessatthe momentisnotsoefficientandeffectivethatoneshouldbeprepared simplytosay,bycomparisonwithalltheotherareasofmeritsreview andprimarydecisionmakingatthefederallevelthatthisoneshouldbe subjecttoonlythelightesttouchesofjudicialreview.whatsetsapart theproposedprivativeclauseintheJudicialReviewBillisthatitwould operatetoprotecttherulingsofbodiesthatdonothavethestatusof
54
The Hon Philip Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Second Reading AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:TheAmbit
Speech,MigrationLegislationAmendmentBill(No4)1997,Hansard,25June1997,2.
55
oftheAct,ReportNo32,1989,paragraphs268and270.
164
courtsbutwhichneverthelessmakefindingsthattypicallyinvolve issuesofbothfactandlaw
56
6.65 Further, in oral evidence before the Committee, the Australian Law ReformCommissionsaidthat:
Itseemstobeamisguidedbeliefthatjudicialreviewissomealternative tomeritsreview,particularlywhentheformofmeritsreviewisasfined downandsparseastheRRTprocessis,coveringwhatareinmanycases someofthemostdifficultfactfinding,judgmentalandlegal conundrumsthatanydecisionmakeratthefederallevelisfacedwith.
57
6.66 In the context of the same report, the Commonwealth Ombudsman notedthat:
Itisquestionablethatmeritsreviewcouldeverbeasubstitutefor judicialreviewinrelationtodealingswithtechnicallegalarguments andtheprovisionofprecedentandguidancetotribunalmembers.58
6.67 Inseekingexclusionin1978fromtheambitoftheAD(JR)Act,some agenciesarguedthattheexistenceofadequatealternativeavenuesofreview isrelevanttodeterminingwhetherclassesofdecisionsshouldbeexcluded fromtheAct. 6.68 Initsfirstreportin1977ontheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview) Act1977,theCouncilsaidthat:
ReviewundertheActrelatesonlytounlawfulness,whereasalternative remediessuggestedasadequate(suchasappealstotheAdministrative AppealsTribunal)generallyrelatetothemeritsofthedecisionin question.Whileindividualsmayregardreviewonthemeritsasmore
56
Submission of the Law Council of Australia to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
CommitteeInquiryintotheMigrationLegislationAmendmentBill(No2)1998,Migration(VisaApplication) ChargeAmendmentBill1998andMigration(JudicialReview)Bill1998,18January1998,paragraph12.4.
57
AustralianLawReformCommission inTranscriptofEvidencein SenateLegalandConstitutional
Legislation Committee Consideration of Legislation Referred to the Committee (ed), Migration Legislation Amendment(JudicialReview)Bill1998,1998,paragraph2.80.
58
SubmissionoftheCommonwealthOmbudsmantotheSenateLegalandConstitutionalLegislation
CommitteeInquiryintotheMigrationLegislationAmendmentBill(No2)1998,Migration(VisaApplication) ChargeAmendmentBill1998andMigration(JudicialReview)Bill1998,18January1998,14.
THEEXISTENCEOFADEQUATEALTERNATIVEREMEDIES desirablethanjudicialreviewinmostsituations,therewillbecasesin whichjudicialreviewispreferable. JudicialreviewbytheFederalCourtispartofacomprehensive administrativereviewstructurewhichincludestheAdministrative AppealsTribunalandtheOmbudsman.Therecanbeanoverlappingof jurisdictionofthethreemainreviewbodiesinsomeareas.Butthisisan integralpartofthestructureandthethreeavenuesofreviewcan operateconsistently.Accordingly,theexistenceornonexistenceof reviewbytheTribunalorOmbudsmanisneutralinanyargument basedonalternativeremedies,anddoesnotjustifyanyexclusionfrom theAct.59
165
6.69 TheCouncilrejectedtheargumentfromagenciesthattheexistenceof alternateremediesjustifiedtotalexclusionfromtheAD(JR)Act,notingthat section 10 of the Act explicitly provides that the AD(JR) Act rights are additionaltootherexistingremedies. 6.70 Initsreport,theCouncilalsonotedthat:
Judicialreviewisabasicremedyinadministrativereview,foritisthe primarymeansofensuringthatadministrativeactionissubjecttothe ruleoflaw.Hencetheexistenceofanalternativeremedyisnotinitself asubstituteforjudicialreview.Generallyspeakinganalternative remedybecomesrelevantonlywherethereareotherprincipleswhich supportexclusionfromtheActandwherethealternativeremedycould properlyberegardedascompensatingfortheconsequencesof exclusion.
60
6.71 Subsequently in its 26th Report in 1986, Review of Administrative Decisions(JudicialReview)Act1977Stage1,theCouncillooked,attheissueof overlappingremedies,recommendingthattheCourtsdiscretiontostayor refusetograntanapplicationforreviewofadecisionshouldbecapableof exerciseatanystageoftheproceedingsandshouldbeexercisedattheoutset ofproceedingswhereverappropriatealthoughonlyinapreliminaryway.61
59
AdministrativeReviewCouncil, AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977:Exclusionsunder Ibid,paragraph55. AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977Stage
Section19,ReportNo.1,1977,paragraphs52,54,289.
60 61
One,ReportNo26,1986,paragraphs47,92.
166
6.72 Asnotedabove,whiletakingintoaccounttherecommendationsmade in the Report, the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Amendment Bill 1987wentfurtherthanthis. 6.73 Inits32ndreportin1989,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(Judicial Review)Act:theAmbitoftheAct,theCouncilsuggestedthat:
Theaim[ofgovernment]shouldbetoensurethatjudicialreviewisnot theonlyavenueofchallengeofdecisionsbutperformsitsintendedrole ofprovidingaremedyoflastresort.62
6.74 IntheReport,theCouncilrecommendedthattheAD(JR)Actshouldbe amendedbyprovisionsalongthelinesoftheAdministrativeDecisions(Judicial Review) Amendment Bill 1987 and that the Bill should be amended by substituting words along the following lines for the concluding words of proposedparagraph10(2)(c):
the Court shall refuse to grant the application if it is satisfied, having regardtotheinterestsofjustice,thatthealternativereviewrightis,inallthe circumstances,adequate.
63
The Council also recommended that the concluding words of proposed paragraph10(2)(d)oftheBillshouldbeamendedtoread:
the Court shall refuse to grant the application if it is satisfied, having regardtotheinterestsofjustice,thatitshoulddoso.
64
6.75 Inrelationtooverlappingjudicialremedies,theCouncilnotedthat:
Totheextentthat,insomeareasoftheCommonwealthadministration, thereexistssidebysidewithrightsundertheAD(JR)Actarightof appeal,ortomakeotherapplicationtothecourtstheoperationofthe AD(JR)Actasoneforkofabifurcatedreviewpathneedstobe considered.
65
62
AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:TheAmbit Ibid,paragraph363andRecommendation15. Id. AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:TheAmbit
63 64 65
167
6.76 Initsdeliberations,theCouncilnotedthatarightofappealiswider thanareviewrightas,unlessrestrictedtoissuesoflaw,itwillallowreview onmattersoflawandthemerits. 6.77 In What Decisions Should be Subject to Merits Review? the Council considered that the preliminary nature of some decisions was a factor justifyingexcludingmeritsreview,inthefollowingterms:
Thisisbecausereviewofpreliminaryorproceduraldecisionsmaylead totheproperoperationoftheadministrativedecisionmakingprocess beingunnecessarilyfrustratedordelayed.Inthecaseofpreliminaryor proceduraldecisions,thebeneficialeffectofmeritsreviewislimitedby thefactthatsuchdecisionsdonotgenerallyhavesubstantive consequences.Thebenefitsareoutweighedbythecostofpotentially frustratingthemakingofsubstantivedecisions.66
6.78 Morerecently,theCouncilhassaidthat:
WhiletheCouncilsupportstheuseofindependentmeritsreview tribunals,itisnotoftheviewthattheexistenceofmeritsreviewinany wayjustifiestheremovalofjudicialreviewortheremovalofappeal rightsundersection44oftheAdministrativeAppealsTribunalAct1975. IntheCouncilsview,thepreferableapproachwouldbetolegislateto givecourtsclearpowerandauthoritytostrikeoutproceedingsfor judicialreviewatapreliminaryhearing,unlessthecourtwassatisfied, atthatstage,thattherewasabonafideissueastothelegalityofthe tribunalsproceedingsordecision.Underthisproposal,courtscouldbe required,ineachapplicationforjudicialreviewofadecision,to considerwhetherornottoexercisethispower.67
66 67
Atparagraph4.4. ExtractfromtheCouncilssubmissiontotheSenateLegalandConstitutionalLegislationCommittee
Inquiry intothe MigrationLegislationAmendmentBill(No2)1998, Migration(VisaApplication)Charge AmendmentBill1998andMigrationLegislationAmendment(JudicialReview)Bill1998,18January1998.
168
Discussionpoint26 In what circumstances should the availability of full merits review be sufficient to displace an application for judicial review? Pleaseelaborate.
Concludingcomments
6.79 Havingregardtotheprecedingdiscussion,itisapparentthatthereare circumstanceswherejudicialreviewmightappropriatelybesupplantedinthe faceofanadequatealternativeremedy. Moreover,therearecircumstances wherefullmeritsreviewbyatribunal,aswellasarightofappealtoacourt, willberegardedasadequateforthispurpose. 6.80 Asreflectedintheprecedingparagraphs,thecircumstancesinwhich analternativeremedymayberegardedasadequatearemultifarious. As illustrated in the tax and workplace relations areas, some of these circumstances can be actively anticipated and provided for through the provision of comprehensive complaint handling and alternate review processes.Inthetaxarea,forinstance,meritsreviewissupplementedbutnot supplanted by a comprehensive objection and review stage, the rulings processandafullappealright. 6.81 In situations where grounds such as procedural fairness and unreasonableness form the basis of an application for judicial review, the better response may bethatafull merits review can providean adequate alternativetojudicialreview.Inthecaseofaclaimofbiasforinstance,itwill bethetaskofthetribunaltoundertakeafullandunbiasedhearingofthe application. 6.82 Inthecaseofagroundsuchasunreasonableness,where,asdiscussed earlier, there is a strong likelihood that the mischief complained of, the unreasonableness, will be cured by the review process the arguments for meritsasopposedtojudicialreviewarepertinent.
169
6.83 Arguably,theissuebecomesmorepointedincircumstanceswherea tribunalisanexperttribunalandthesubjectmatterofthedecisionisofa technicalandcomplicatedmatter. Theworkplacerelationsareaisacasein point. 6.84 Otherrelevantfactorsincludethequalityofthedecisionmakingbody andthepowersofthedecisionmakingbody. 6.85 Insituationswhereothergroundsofreviewarelikelytobereliedon, where there is not full merits review or where issues of error of law are involved,therighttojudicialreviewmaybethepreferredoption. Insuch circumstances,thoughnotallreviewoptionshavebeenemployed,itmaystill bepreferabletopermitjudicialreview.Ithasbeensaidforinstance,that:
Thereisnoreasonfordrivingthesubjecttothatexpensiveprocess(ie appeal)toabidebythechanceofrepetitionoferror,which,if committed,can,atleast,beonerectifiedbyprohibition,andmaybeso committedastobeplacedbeyondthereachofeventhatremedy;orfor compellinghimtosubmiteventothatdirectinconveniencearisingfrom thatdecisionalone,ifnonelaybeyondhim.68
Discussionpoint27 Doyouagree/notagreewiththeseviews? Arethereanyotherrelevantconsiderations? Pleaseelaborate.
68
BurdervVarley(1840)12Ad&E233.
170
PARTVIIHOWMIGHTJUDICIALREVIEW APPROPRIATELYBELIMITED INTRODUCTION SECTIONI Theunderlyingconstitutionalframework Theuncertaineffectofprivativeclauses Generalprinciplesrelatingtothelegislativeremovalofrights Removalofrightsandjudicialreview SECTIONII Theneedforclarityandspecificity
Theneedforclarity Theneedforspecificity
INTRODUCTION
7.1 Much of this discussion paper has been devoted to examining the circumstances,ifany,inwhichlimitationsmightappropriatelybeimposedon thescopeofjudicialreview. 7.2 The purpose of this final Part is to consider the way in which any limitationsonjudicialreviewmightappropriatelybeimposed:thefocushas shiftedfromwhentohow.
SECTIONI Theunderlyingconstitutionalframework
7.3 Theconstitutionaldoctrinesoftheruleoflawandtheseparationof powers to which reference has been made in Part III find particular expressioninsection75(v)oftheConstitution.Thatsectionconfersoriginal jurisdictionontheHighCourtinallmattersinwhichawritofmandamusor
HOWMIGHTJUDICIALREVIEWAPPROPRIATELYBELIMITED
171
prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. 7.4 Those doctrines and section 75(v) in particular place a significant constraintonthecapacityofparliamenttolimitthescopeofjudicialreview. AsDixonJpointedoutinRvHickman;ExparteFoxandClinton:
Itis,ofcourse,quiteimpossiblefortheParliamenttogivepowertoany judicialorotherauthoritywhichgoesbeyondthesubjectmatterofthe legislativepowerconferredbytheConstitution.Itisequally impossibleforthelegislaturetoimposelimitsuponthequasijudicial authorityofabodywhichitsetsupwiththeintentionthatanyexcessof authoritymeansinvalidity,andyet,atthesametime,todeprive[the HighCourt}ofauthoritytorestraintheinvalidactionofthecourtor bodybyprohibition.1
7.5 The point was reiterated in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of AustraliawherefivemembersoftheHighCourtstated:

ThereservationtothisCourtbytheConstitutionofthejurisdictioninall mattersinwhichthenamedconstitutionalwritsoraninjunctionare soughtagainstanofficeroftheCommonwealthisameansofassuringto allpeopleaffectedthatofficersoftheCommonwealthobeythelawand neitherexceednorneglectanyjurisdictionwhichthelawconferson them.Thecentrality,andprotectivepurpose,ofthejurisdictionofthis Courtinthatregardplacessignificantbarriersinthewayoflegislative attempts(byprivativeclausesorotherwise)toimpairjudicialreviewof administrativeaction.2
7.6 Nevertheless, subject to the overriding requirement that the subject matterofthelawliewithinCommonwealthlegislativepower,3itappearsto remainopentoparliamentsotodefinethepowersofadecisionmakerasto excludeatleastmostofthetraditionalgroundsofjudicialreview.
Theuncertaineffectofprivativeclauses
7.7 Theprincipal meansbywhichparliamenthas in thepastsoughtto limitjudicialreviewhasbeenthroughtheuseofprivativeclauses.
1 2 3
(1945)70CLR598,616. [2003]HCA2,[104]. Ibid,[102].
172
7.8 AstraditionallyconstruedinAustralia,suchclauses havebeen read notaspurportingtolimittheroleofthecourtsbutasexpandingthepowers ofadecisionmaker. Thisapproachtoconstruction,basedonthe Hickman principle,makesitdifficulttoidentifyorpredicttheirmeaningwithanyreal certainty.4
Generalprinciplesrelatingtolegislativeremovalofrights
7.9 As a general principle, there is considerable authority, both within Australiaandelsewhere,insupportoftheviewthatwhererightsaretaken awaybylegislation,thisshouldbedonetransparentlyandunambiguously. 7.10 This view accords with principles of drafting legislation in plain Englishsothatapersonsrightsandobligationsareclearonthefaceofthe legislation.Suchanapproachalsoaccordswiththesettledstatutoryruleof constructionthatifparliamentistoenactalawthattakesawaycommonlaw rightsorprinciplesthenitmustclearlysayso. AsnotedbyDeaneJinthe HighCourtcaseofBakervCampbell:
itisasettledruleofconstructionthatgeneralprinciplesofastatute shouldonlybereadasabrogatingcommonlawprinciplesorrightstothe extentmadenecessarybyexpresswordsornecessaryintendment...Itis tobepresumedthatiftheParliamentintendedtoauthorisethe impairmentordestructionofthatconfidentialitybyadministrative actionitwouldframetherelevantstatutorymandateinexpressand unambiguousterms.[emphasisadded]
5
7.11 A further enunciation of this principle is to be found in another decisionoftheHighCourt, CocovTheQueen.6 Inthatcase,whichinvolved considerationofQueenslandlegislationprovidingforauthorisationofentry ontopremises toinstalllisteningdevices incircumstances wheretheentry
AnexampleofthisistheHighCourtsdecisioninPlaintiffS157/2002vTheCommonwealthofAustralia
[2003]HCA2wheretheCourtunanimouslyheldthattheprivativeclauseandtimelimitclauseinthe MigrationAct1958 wereConstitutionallyvalidbutconstruedthemsonarrowlysoastosignificantly reducetheireffect.Theprivativeclausewasnotconsideredclearenoughtopreventjudicialreviewof anadministrativedecisioninvolvingjurisdictionalerrorand,specifically,involvingcontraventionofthe rulesofnaturaljustice.

5
(1983)153CLR52,1167perDeaneJ.Thiscasewasconcernedwithwhethersection10ofthe Crimes
Act1914 displacedlegalprofessionalprivilege;seealso SorbyvCommonwealth 152CLR281,309310; GoldbergvNg(1995)185CLR83,9394perDeane,DawsonandGaudronJJ;121,perGummow.

6
(1994)179CLR427.
173
would otherwise have constituted unlawful trespass, Mason CJ, Brennan, GaudronandMcHughJJsaidasfollows:
Statutoryauthoritytoengageinwhatotherwisewouldbetortious conductmustbeclearlyexpressedinunmistakableandunambiguous language.Indeed,ithasbeensaidthatthepresumptionisthat,inthe absenceofexpressprovisiontothecontrary,thelegislaturedidnot intendtoauthorisewhatwouldotherwisehavebeentortiousconduct.7
7.12 Their Honours also observed that courts 'should not impute to the legislature an intention to interfere with fundamental rights' and that any suchintentionmustbe'clearlymanifestedbyunmistakableandunambiguous language'8andthatforthispurpose:
Generalwordswillrarelysufficeforthatpurposeiftheydonot specificallydealwiththequestionbecauseinthecontextinwhichthey appear,theywilloftenbeambiguousonanaspectoftheinterference withfundamentalrights.9
7.13 However:
thepresumptionisrebuttableandwillbedisplacedifthereisaclear implicationthatauthoritytoenterorremainuponprivatepropertywas intended.Suchanimplicationmaybemade,insomecircumstances,ifit isnecessarytopreventthestatutoryprovisionfrombecoming inoperativeormeaningless.10
7.14 AsimilarapproachisreflectedinarecentdecisionoftheHouseof Lords,inRegvSpecialCommissioner;ExparteMorganGrenfell,acaserelatingto legalprofessionalprivilege,whereithasbeensaidthat:

thecourtswillordinarilyconstruegeneralwordsinastatute, althoughliterallycapableofhavingsomestartlingorunreasonable consequence,suchasoverridingfundamentalhumanrights,asnot havingbeenintendedtodoso.Anintentiontooverridesuchrights mustbeexpresslystatedorappearbynecessaryimplication.
7 8 9 11
Ibid,436. Ibid,437. Id. Id. [2002]UKHL21,[8]perLordHoffmann.SeealsojudgmentofLordHobhouse[45].
10 11
174
7.15 In NAAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, a case involvingthevalidityofaprivativeclauseintheMigrationAct1958,FrenchJ (intheminority)observedthat:
Clearlanguageisexpectedasanindicationofparliamentaryintentionto abridgeorextinguishfundamentalrightsorliberties.
12
7.16 Thedesirability oflegislativetransparency andaccountability inthe contextofcommonlawfreedomshasbeennotedinCocovTheQueen:

curialinsistenceonaclearexpressionofanunmistakableand unambiguousintentiontoabrogateorcurtailafundamentalfreedom willenhancetheparliamentaryprocessbysecuringagreatermeasureof attentiontotheimpactoflegislativeproposalsonfundamentalrights.
13
7.17 IntheUnitedKingdom,thisprincipleisanelementofwhatisknown asthe'principleoflegality'.Theprincipleinvolvesapresumptionthatbroad discretionary powers will be interpreted by the courts to be subject to fundamental common law rights unless the parliament clearly states otherwise.14Inthiscontext,LordHoffmaninRvSecretaryofStatefortheHome Department;exparteSimmshasobservedthat:
ParliamentarysovereigntymeansthatParliamentcan,ifitchooses, legislatecontrarytofundamentalprinciplesofhumanrights.The constraintsuponitsexercisebyParliamentareultimatelypolitical,not legal.ButtheprincipleoflegalitymeansthatParliamentmustsquarely confrontwhatitisdoingandacceptthepoliticalcost.Fundamental rightscannotbeoverriddenbygeneralorambiguouswords.Thisis becausethereistoogreatariskthatthefullimplicationsoftheir unqualifiedmeaningmayhavepassedunnoticedinthedemocratic process.Intheabsenceofexpresslanguageofnecessaryimplicationto thecontrary,thecourtsthereforepresumethateventhemostgeneral wordswereintendedtobesubjecttothebasicrightsoftheindividual.15
12 13 14
(2002)ALD1,[447]. (1994)179CLR427,[436437]perMasonCJ,Brennan,GaudronandMcHughJJ. NAAVvMinisterforImmigrationandMulticulturalandIndigenousAffairs (2002)69ALD1,[448]per
FrenchJreferringtoDyzenhaus,HuntandTaggart,ThePrincipleofLegalityinAdministrativeLaw: InternationalisationasConstitutionalisation(2001)1OxfordUniversityCommonwealthLawJournal5.
15
[2000]2AC115,131
175
7.18 In the context of suggesting that the Australian legislature should clearlystatewhetheritintendstoabrogatethefundamentalprincipleoflegal professionalprivilege,DawsonJhasnotedthat:
itdoesnotseemtomethatthelawshouldeasethewayforthe legislaturetoexpandthepracticenorshoulditdisguisethefactthata principlewhichthelawregardsasfundamentalisinvolved.16
Removalofrightsandjudicialreview
7.19 Ononeview,traditionalprinciplesofjudicialreviewarefundamental principlesthatareakintofundamentalcommonlawrights,andassuch,the samerulesofstatutoryconstructionshouldapplywheninterpretingjudicial reviewprinciples.Thatis,theyaretobetreatedasapplicabletoanexerciseof statutorypowerintheabsenceofclearlegislativelanguagethattheyaretobe removed. 7.20 InPlaintiffS157/2002vCommonwealthofAustralia,17acaseinvolvingthe ConstitutionalvalidityofaprivativeclauseintheMigrationAct1958,Gleeson CJreferredwithapprovaltotheexcerptfromthejudgmentofLordHoffman referredtoabove,notingthat:
Courtsdonotimputetothelegislatureanintentiontoabrogateor curtailfundamentalrightsorfreedomsunlesssuchanintentionis clearlymanifestedbyunmistakableandunambiguouslanguage. Generalwordswillrarelybesufficientforthatpurpose.Whatcourts willlookforisaclearindicationthatthelegislaturehasdirectedits attentiontotherightsorfreedomsinquestion,andhasconsciously decideduponabrogationorcurtailment.
18
7.21 Thiscaserelatedtoanissueofproceduralfairness. Othercasesalso supporttheviewthatthisrightisfundamentaltogoodadministration.The importanceofthedoctrineisevidencedbythewillingnessofcourtstorequire

16
BakervCampbell (1983)153CLR52,131. Seealso TheDanielsCorporationInternational PtyLtdv
AustralianCompetitionandConsumerCommission[2002]HCA49whereGleesonCJ,Gaudron,Gummow andHayneJJsuggestthatlegalprofessionalprivilegeisacommonlawrightorimmunityandthat statutoryprovisionsshouldnotbeconstruedasabrogatingitintheabsenceofclearwordsornecessary implicationtothateffect[11].

17 18
[2003]HCA2. Ibid,atparagraph30referringtoCocovTheQueen(1994)179CLR427,437perMasonCJ,Brennan,
GaudronandMcHugh;RvHomeSecretary;ExparteSimms[2000]2AC115,131andAnnettsvMcCann (1990)170CLR596,598perMasonCJ,DeaneandMcHughJJ.
176
thatdecisionmakingbeinaccordancewithnaturaljusticedespitetherebeing nopositivestatutoryprovisionsrequiringthis:
alongcourseofdecisionsestablishthat,although,thereareno positivewordsinastatuterequiringthatthepartyshallbeheard,yet thejusticeofthecommonlawwillsupplytheomissionofthe legislature.
19
7.22 The importance of natural justice is also evidenced in the strong presumptionthataprivativeclausewillnotbeeffectivetoexcludejudicial review,especiallywheretherehasbeenabreachofnaturaljustice.20 7.23 Similarly, simply seeking to establish a comprehensive code of procedurewhichoustsnaturaljusticeisnotsufficient.21 Amajorityofthe HighCourtin MinisterforImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairsvMiah22 held that to exclude the common law natural justice rules a clear legislative intentionisrequired.Inthecircumstancesofthatcase,itwasheldthatthere wasnosuchclearintention. 7.24 InAnnettsvMcCann,itwassaidthat:
Itcannowbetakenassettled,thatwhenastatuteconferspowerupona publicofficialtodestroy,defeatorprejudiceapersonsrights,interests orexpectations,therulesofnaturaljusticeregulatetheexerciseofthat powerunlesstheyareexcludedbyplainwordsofnecessary intendment.
23
7.25 The expectation that the legislature intends that administrative decisionsmadeunderlegislationmustbeexercisedinareasonablemanner andthattherewillbeareasonableassessmentofthejurisdictionalfactsofthe casearealsoprinciplesthatarecentraltogoodadministration.24
19 20 21 22 23 24
CoopervTheBoardofWorksfortheWandsworthDistrict(1863)3ER414,418perBylesJ. AnisminicLtdvForeignCompensationCommission[1969]2AC147. MinisterforImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairs:ExparteMiah(2001)206CLR55. Id. AnnettsvMcCann(1990)170CLR596,598perMasonCJ,DeaneandMcHughJJ. Kruger v The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 36, per Brennan and Minister for Immigration and
MulticulturalAffairsvEshetu (1999)197CLR611,650perGummow; RvConnell;ExparteTheHetton BellbirdCollieriesLtd(1944)69CLR407,430,432,perLathamCJ.
177
7.26 Arguably,thesetraditionalprinciplesofadministrativelawshouldbe regardedasbeingofthesamenatureasfundamentalcommonlawrightsin thatparliamentoughttoberequiredtouseexpresswordstoexcludethem.25 7.27 InMiah,KirbyJobservedthat:

[O]rdinarypresumptionswhichrunsodeepinthecommonlawmaybe giveneffect.Intheabsenceoftheclearestpossibleindicationtothe contrary,courtswillnormallyassumethatanAustralianparliament doesnotintendtoworkseriousproceduralinjusticeuponpersons whoseinterestsareadverselyaffectedbylegislation.Thisisnota presumptionthatchallengestheauthorityofsuchparliaments.Itisone respectfuloftheassumptionthat,inAustralia,parliamentsactjustly andexpecttherepositoriesofpowerunderlegislationtodolikewise.
26
SECTIONII Theneedforclarityandspecificity
Theneedforclarity
7.28 As a general principle of administrative justice, it is suggested that provisionswhichtakeawaytherighttoreviewofadministrativedecisions shouldbeclearlystated,theireffectsapparentontheirfaceandfocusonthe ambitofthepowerconferredratherthanontheextenttowhichacourtis precluded from examining an exercise of power. In NAAV v Minister for ImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairs,FrenchJ(intheminority)notedthat:
Inarepresentativedemocracythosewhoaresubjecttothelaw,those whoinvokeitandthosewhoapplyitareentitledtoexpectthatitmeans whatitsays.Thatpropositioninformstheapproachofcourtstothe interpretationoflawsintakingastheirstartingpointtheordinaryand grammaticalsenseofthewords: thatruleisdictatedbyelementaryconsiderationsoffairness,for, afterall,thosewhoaresubjecttothelawscommandsareentitledto
25
StephenGagelerTheUnderpinningsofJudicialReviewofAdministrativeAction:Commonlawor MinisterforImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairs:ExparteMiah(2001)206CLR55,[192].RvAnderson;
Constitution?(2000)28(2)FederalLawReview303,313.
26
Ex parte IpecAir Pty Ltd (1965) 133 CLR 177, 189 per Kitto quoted in Minister for Immigration and MulticulturalAffairsvJia(2001)205CLR507,[62]perGleesonCJandGummowJ.
178
conductthemselvesonthebasisthatthosecommandshavemeaning andeffectaccordingtoordinarygrammarandusage.
27
7.29 Suchanapproachensures thatapersonsrightsandobligationsare apparent on the face of the legislation which is desirable from a policy perspective.Thisisconsistentwithprinciplesofdraftinglegislationinplain English, and principles of transparency and governmental accountability. This approach avoids the need for the judiciary to reconcile the apparent inconsistencybetweenstatutorylimitationsondecisionmakingpowersand theexclusionofjudicialreviewofthosepowersbywayofprivativeclause. 7.30 It is also consistent with the presumption against interference with commonlawrightsandprinciples(seeabove).
Theneedforspecificity
7.31 Asanimportantcompaniontothisviewisitissuggestedthatinsofar asitmayseektolimitjudicialreview,parliamentshoulddosowithreference toparticulardecisionmakingpowers. 7.32 In view of the range andnature ofdecisions thatmay be made by administrators, sometimes within the boundaries of a single piece of legislation,itisimportantforlimitationsonjudicialreviewtobedirectedat specificdecisionmakingprocesses. 7.33 Couchinglimitationsinclearlanguagebutnotseekingtoanchorthem to specific areas of decisionmaking is to encourage uncertainty and, necessarily, to invite the intervention of the courts in the interpretative process. 7.34 As suggested throughoutthediscussionpaper,judicialreview isan importanttoolintheprotectionofindividualrightsinthefaceofthevast rangeofgovernmentadministrativedecisionmaking.Itissuggestedthatto diminishorremovethisright,itshouldbeincumbentonparliamenttodoso withbothtransparencyofpurposeandwithcertaintyofeffect.
27
(2002)69ALD1at[430]citingCorporateAffairsCommission(NSW)vYuill(1991)172CLR319,340per
GaudronJ..
179
Discussionpoint28 Doyouagree/notagreewiththeseviews? Arethereanyotherrelevantconsiderations? Pleaseelaborate.
180
APPENDIX1 ADMINISTRATIVEDECISIONS(JUDICIALREVIEW) ACT1977

SCHEDULE1
Section3 (a) decisions under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 or the WorkplaceRelationsAct1996; (b)decisionsundertheCommonwealthBanksAct1959; (c)decisionsundertheCoalIndustryAct1946,otherthandecisionsoftheJoint CoalBoard; (d)decisionsunderanyofthefollowingActs: AustralianSecurityIntelligenceOrganisationAct1956 IntelligenceServicesAct2001 AustralianSecurityIntelligenceOrganisationAct1979 InspectorGeneralofIntelligenceandSecurityAct1986 Telecommunications(Interception)Act1979 TelephonicCommunications(Interception)Act1960; (da)aprivativeclausedecisionwithinthemeaningofsubsection474(2)ofthe MigrationAct1958; (e)decisionsmaking,orformingpartoftheprocessofmaking,orleadingup to the making of, assessments or calculations of tax, charge or duty, or decisionsdisallowingobjectionstoassessmentsorcalculationsoftax,charge or duty, or decisions amending, or refusing to amend, assessments or calculationsoftax,chargeorduty,underanyofthefollowingActs: ANewTaxSystem(GoodsandServicesTax)Act1999 ANewTaxSystem(LuxuryCarTax)Act1999 ANewTaxSystem(WineEqualisationTax)Act1999 AustralianCapitalTerritoryTaxation(Administration)Act1969 DebitsTaxAdministrationAct1982
APPENDIX1:AD(JR)ACT1977
181
CoalExciseAct1949 CustomsAct1901 CustomsTariffAct1995 ExciseAct1901 FringeBenefitsTaxAssessmentAct1986 IncomeTaxAssessmentAct1936 IncomeTaxAssessmentAct1997 PayrollTaxAssessmentAct1941 PayrollTax(Territories)AssessmentAct1971 PetroleumResourceRentTaxAssessmentAct1987 Actsprovidingfortheassessmentofsalestax SuperannuationGuarantee(Administration)Act1992 TaxationAdministrationAct1953,butonlysofarasthedecisionsaremadeunderPartVI ofthatAct TrainingGuarantee(Administration)Act1990 TrustRecoupmentTaxAssessmentAct1985 WoolTax(Administration)Act1964 (ea)decisionsoftheCommissionerofTaxationunderSubdivisionB(except subsection222AGF(3))ofDivision8ofPartVIofthe IncomeTaxAssessment Act1936;
Note:SubdivisionBdealswiththemaking,reductionandrevocationofestimatesofcertain liabilities.
(f)decisionsoftheCommissionerofTaxationundersubsection3E(1)ofthe TaxationAdministrationAct1953; (g)decisionsunderPartIVoftheTaxationAdministrationAct1953; (ga) decisions under section 14ZY of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 disallowingobjectionstoassessmentsorcalculationsoftax,chargeorduty; (h)decisionsundertheForeignAcquisitionsandTakeoversAct1975; (ha)decisionsoftheMinisterunderDivision1ofPart7.4oftheCorporations Act2001; (hb)decisionsoftheSEGCunderPart7.5oftheCorporationsAct2001; (j)decisions,ordecisionsincludedinaclassofdecisions,undertheBanking (Foreign Exchange) Regulations in respect of which the Treasurer has certified,byinstrumentinwriting,thatthedecisionoranydecisionincluded
182
in the class, as the case may be, is a decision giving effect to the foreign investmentpolicyoftheCommonwealthGovernment; (l)decisionsoftheNationalLabourConsultativeCouncil; (o)decisionsundertheDefenceForceDisciplineAct1982; (p)decisionsundersection42ofthe CustomsAct1901 torequireandtake securities inrespect ofduty thatmaybepayableunder the CustomsTariff (AntiDumping)Act1975; (q)decisionsundersubsection25(1)orPartIIIAoftheCommonwealthElectoral Act1918; (r)decisionsundertheExtraditionAct1988; (s)determinationsmadebytheChildSupportRegistrarunderPart6Aofthe ChildSupport(Assessment)Act1989; (t)decisionsunderanenactmentofQantasAirwaysLimitedoracompany thatisasubsidiaryofthatcompany; (u) decisions of Snowy Mountains Engineering Corporation Limited or a bodycorporatethatisasubsidiaryofthatbodycorporate; (v) decisions of CSL Limited or a company that is a subsidiary of that company; (w)decisionsundertheWitnessProtectionAct1994; (x) decisions under subsection 60A(2B) of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979; (xa) decisions to prosecute persons for any offence against a law of the Commonwealth,aStateoraTerritory;
Note:AnapplicationunderthisActinrelationtoothercriminaljustice processdecisions cannotbeheardordeterminedincertaincircumstances:seesection9A.
(y) decisionsoftheAdministrative Appeals Tribunal (other than decisions madeonreviewofdecisionsoftheAustralianArchives)madeonareview that is required by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 to be conductedbytheSecurityAppealsDivisionofthatTribunal; (za)decisionsunderPartVIIIBoftheJudiciaryAct1903(whichrelatestothe AustralianGovernmentSolicitor).
APPENDIX2:LEGISLATIVELIMITATIONSONREVIEW
183
APPENDIX2 LEGISLATIVELIMITATIONSONREVIEW
Clausesofthefollowingvarietiesaregenerallyregardedasprivativeclauses: 1. Clauseswhichseektomakeorders,awardsorother determinationsfinal 2. Clauses forbidding the courts from granting the remedies traditionally used by them for judicial review, such as certioari, prohibition or mandamus Section 150 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 is illustrative of both these techniques.Itreadsasfollows:
(1)SubjecttothisAct,anaward(includinganawardmadeonappeal): (a)isfinalandconclusive; (b) shall not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashedorcalledinquestioninanycourt;and (c)isnotsubjecttoprohibition,mandamusorinjunctioninany courtonanyaccount. (2)AnawardisnotinvalidbecauseitwasmadebytheCommission constitutedotherwisethanasprovidedbythisAct.
Subsection474(1)oftheMigrationActiscouchedinsimilarterms.1 Section177oftheIncomeTaxAssessmentAct1936alsoseekstoexcludejudicial reviewbymakingthedecisionfinalandbyexcludingjudicialchallenge. It reads:

Theproductionofanoticeofassessment,orofadocumentunderthe handoftheCommissioner,asecondCommissioner,oraDeputy Commissioner,purportingtobeacopyofanoticeofassessment,shall beconclusiveevidenceoftheduemakingoftheassessmentand,except inproceedingsunderPartIVCoftheTaxationAdministrationAct1953 onarevieworappealrelatingtotheassessment,thattheamountandall theparticularsoftheassessmentarecorrect.
1
Other examples of such clauses are to be found, for example, in section 41 of the Defence (Re
Establishment)Act1965;section7oftheIndependentSchools(LoanGuarantee)Act1967andsection48of theCommonwealthElectoralAct1918.
184
3. Clauses expressly stating that judicial review lies only on stipulated grounds Section5oftheAD(JR)Actdoes thisindescribing thegroundsonwhich reviewshallbepermissibleunderthatAct.Additionally,reviewislimitedto administrativedecisionsunderanenactmentanddoesnotextendtodecisions bytheGovernorGeneral.2 Anotherexampleisprovidedbyformersection166LAoftheMigrationAct whichdefinedwhatwerejudiciallyreviewabledecisionsforthepurposesof that Act. Application for review couldnotbe broughton the grounds of unreasonableness,failuretotakeintoaccountrelevantortakingintoaccount irrelevantconsiderations,badfaithorbreachofnaturaljusticeandactualbias replaced reasonableapprehension ofbias asagroundofreview. Theno evidencerulewasrestrictedandtheerroroflawandimproperexerciseof powergroundscouldalsoberestricted. Subsection500A(ii)oftheMigrationAct,relatingtotherefusalorcancellation oftemporarysafehavenvisas,providesthat:
Therulesofnaturaljustice,andthecodeofproceduresetoutin subdivisionABofDivision3ofPart2donotapplytoadecisionunder subsection(1)or(3),
whilesubsection36(B)((5)oftheNativeTitleAct1993providesthat:
IftherelevantMinistercomplieswithsubsection(1)thereisno requirementforanypersontobegivenanyfurtherhearingbeforethe relevantMinistermakesthedetermination.
4. Clauses prescribing time limits beyond which there can be no judicial 3 review
InReportNo32,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:TheAmbitoftheAct,1989, Providedtheyarereasonable,suchlimitshavebeenruledvalidbythecourts.SeeforinstanceYong
theCouncilrecommendedtheextensionoftheActtotheGovernorGeneral,recommendation2.
3
JunQinvMinisterforImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairs(1997)144ALR695andHongvMinisterfor ImmigrationandMulticulturalAffairs(1998)82FCR468.
185
Forinstance,subsection11(3)oftheAD(JR)Actimposesa28daytimelimit onlodgementofapplicationsforreviewwiththeFederalCourtortheFederal MagistratesCourt. Section486AoftheMigrationActprovidesthat:

(1) anapplicationtotheHighCourtforawritofmandamus,prohibition orcertiorari,oraninjunctionoradeclarationinrespectofaprivativeclause decisionmustbemadetotheHighCourtwithin35daysoftheactual(as opposedtodeemed)notificationofthedecision. (2) TheHighCourtmustnotmakeanorderallowingorwhichhasthe effect of allowing, an applicant to make an application mentioned in subsection(1)outsidethat35dayperiod.
Otherwaysinwhichjudicialreviewmaybelimited
Other ways inwhichjudicial reviewmaybelimited by way oflegislative provisioninclude: 5. Clausesgivingadecisionmakingbodyverywidejurisdiction For instance,itcan be required as aprecondition to the validexercise of decisionmaking power, that a decisionmaker formulate a view as to the existence or otherwise of acertain state of facts. The more subjective the power,thelesslikelyitisthatitslimitswillbebreached.4 Groundssuchas unreasonableness, no evidence and relevant and irrelevant considerations remainavailableonlyintheoryinsuchcircumstanceswhilegroundssuchas fraudandimproperpurposes,whilesubsisting,areverydifficulttoprove. An example of such a provision is subsection 14 Financial Sector (Shareholdings)Act1998whichprovidesthat:
If the applicant satisfies the Treasurer that it is in the national interest to approvetheapplicantholdingastakeinthecompanyofmorethan15%,the Treasurermaygranttheapplication.
It has been held that, in the exercise of such discretion inclusion of qualifying words such as
reasonableeffectivelylimitthescopeofthediscretionandprovideanopeningforjudicialreview.See LiversidgevAnderson[1942]AC206.
186
Although judicial review of such decisions is not precluded, it is severely limited by both the subjectivity of the determination of what constitutes nationalinterestandbypossibleconcernastotheappropriatenessofcourts embarkinguponaconsiderationofsuchapolicyladenandsubjectiveissue. Anotherexampleofsuchaprovisionissubsection23(1)ofthe Australian HeritageCommissionAct1975:
Subjecttothissection,wheretheCommissionconsidersthataplacethat isnotintheRegistershouldberecordedaspartofthenationalestateit shallentertheplaceintheRegister.
Relevantly also, this Act places decisionmaking power essentially in the handsofanexpertbody,subsection12(4)oftheActprovidingthat
TheCommissioners,otherthantherepresentativeCommissioners,shall bepersonshavingqualificationsrelevantto,orspecialexperienceor interestin,afieldrelatedtothefunctionsoftheCommission.
6. Clauses providing protection for a bodys decisions or purported decisions,orprovidingthatanythingthatthebodydoesshallhaveeffect asifenactedbyparliament An example of the former is provided by section 175 of the Income Tax AssessmentAct1936whichstatesthat:
Thevalidityofanyassessmentshallnotbeaffectedbyreasonthatany oftheprovisionsofthisActhavenotbeencompliedwith.
Similarprovisionismadebysection87oftheReserveBankAct1959:
ThevalidityofanactortransactionoftheBankshallnotbecalledin questioninanylegalproceedingsonthegroundthatanyprovisionof thisActhasnotbeencompliedwith.
Couched in slightly different terminology, subsection 89(2) of the Export FinanceandInsuranceCorporationAct1991providesthat:
APPENDIX2:LEGISLATIVELIMITATIONSONREVIEW TheeffectofatransactionenteredintobyEFIC[theExportFinanceand InsuranceCorporation]maynotbecalledintoquestionmerelybecause: (a)aprovisionofthisActhasbeencontravenedinrelationtothe transaction;or (b)thetransactionisnotwithinthelimitsofEFICspowers.
187
Otherexamplesofsuchprovisionsincludesection16ofthe NationalCrime AuthorityAct1984andsection66oftheFisheriesAct1991. There are also many clauses of this kind in relation to appointments: for instance,section10oftheDefenceForceRetirementandDeathBenefitsAct19735 providesthat:
Thevalidityoftheappointmentshallnotbecalledintoquestionby reasononlyofadefectorirregularityinconnectionwiththenomination ofthememberordeputymember.
Anexampleofaclauseprovidingthatanythingthatthebodydoesshallhave effectasifenactedbyParliamentissection7ofthePapuaNewGuineaLoans GuaranteeAct1974whichprovides,that:

Aprovisionofaguaranteeorofanagreementtowhichaguarantee relateshaseffectasifenactedbythisActandoperates notwithstandinganythinginanylawofAustraliaorofaStateor TerritorywhetherpassedormadebeforethecommencementofthisAct.
7. including evidentiary clauses deeming all things done and that a By certain resulthasbeenachievedonproductionofacertificate,orother formalproofofproperform Subsection177(1)oftheIncomeTaxAssessmentActisillustrative,providing that:
Theproductionofanoticeofassessment,orofadocumentunderthe handoftheCommissioner,aSecondCommissioner,oraDeputy Commissioner,purportingtobeacopyofanoticeofassessment,shall beconclusiveevidenceoftheduemakingoftheassessmentand,except inproceedingsunderPartIVCoftheTaxationAdministrationAct1953
5
Otherexamplesofthistypeofexclusionappear,forexample,insection14oftheNationalMuseumof
AustraliaAct1980;section11ofthe AustralianWarMemorialAct1980;section19ofthe Constitutional Convention(Election)Act1997andsection120DisabilityDiscriminationAct1992.
188
onarevieworappealrelatingtotheassessment,thattheamountandall theparticularsoftheassessmentarecorrect.
Afurtherexampleisprovidedbysection22oftheProductGrantsandBenefits AdministrationAct2000:
TheproductionofanoticeofassessmentunderthisPartisconclusive evidence: (a)thattheassessmentwasproperlymade;and (b)exceptinproceedingsunderPartIVoftheTaxationAdministration Act1953 onarevieworappealrelatingtotheassessmentthatthe amountsandparticularsintheassessmentarecorrect.
Similarly,subsection33A(2)ofthe FreedomofInformationAct1982 provides that:

(2)WhereaMinisterissatisfiedthatadocument: (a)isanexemptdocumentforareasonreferredtoinsubsection(1)6; and (b)isnotadocumentcontainingmatterthedisclosureofwhichunder thisActwouldbe,onbalance,inthepublicinterest; theMinistermaysignacertificatetothateffect,specifyingthatreason.
whilesubsection36(3)providesthat:
WhereaMinisterissatisfied,inrelationtoadocumenttowhich paragraph(1)(a)applies,thatthedisclosureofthedocumentwouldbe contrarytothepublicinterest,heorshemaysignacertificatetothat effect(specifyingthegroundofpublicinterestinrelationtowhichthe certificateisgiven)and,subjecttotheoperationofPartVI,sucha certificate,solongasitremainsinforce,establishesconclusivelythatthe disclosureofthatdocumentwouldbecontrarytothepublicinterest.
TherearemanyotherexamplesofsuchclausesinCommonwealthlegislation.
Thatis,it:
(a)would,orcouldreasonablybeexpectedto,causedamagetorelationsbetweentheCommonwealth andaState;or (b) would divulge information or matter communicated in confidence by or on behalf of the Government of a State or an authority ofaState, tothe Government ofthe Commonwealth, to an authority of the Commonwealth or to a person receiving the communication on behalf of the CommonwealthorofanauthorityoftheCommonwealth.
189
8. Bywayofaselfexecutingdecision,thatis,adecisionwherethedecision followsautomatically Such devices are most commonly used in relation to the continuation or suspensionoffiscalentitlements.7 Subsection 57(2) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 is illustrative:
Whereanemployeerefusesorfails,withoutreasonableexcuse,toundergoan examinationthe employers rights to compensation under this Actare suspendeduntiltheexaminationtakesplace.
Another example of a selfexecuting or automatic decision is subsection 1282(6)oftheCorporationsAct2001whichprovidesthatwhere:

theASCgrantedanapplicationbyapersonforregistrationas aliquidator;and thepersoncompliedwithrelevantlegislativerequirements, thentheASICmustissuethepersonwithacertificateofregistration.8
Seealsosections189and190oftheMigrationAct1985.Section189provides that:
(1)Ifanofficerknowsorreasonablysuspectsthatapersoninthe migrationzone(otherthananexcisedoffshoreplace)isanunlawful noncitizen,theofficermustdetaintheperson. (2)IfanofficerreasonablysuspectsthatapersoninAustraliabut outsidethemigrationzone: (a) is seeking to enter the migration zone (other than an excised offshoreplace);and (b)would,ifinthemigrationzone,beanunlawfulnoncitizen;
7
Theeffectofsuchclausescanbetoexcludejudicialreviewbycircumventingtheneedforadecisionof
an administrative character. In the case of Buck v Comcare (1996) 137 ALR 335 in considering this provision,JusticeFinnoftheFederalCourtheldthatitdidnotauthoriseorrequireadecisionofan administrativecharactertobetaken.Suspensionarosewhenthecircumstancessetoutinthesubsection occurredandbyforceofthesubsection. Consequently,thecourtdidnothavejurisdictionunderthe AD(JR)Act.However,caselawinthisareaisnotconsistent.ThefindinginBuckscasewasdoubtedby TamberlinJinSashTrajkovskivTelstraCorporation(1998)153ALR248,257whereitwasconcludedthat itwasessentialthattheAdministrativeAppealsTribunalcometoaconclusionastotheexistenceand limitsofitsjurisdiction.
8
Subsection1280(5)makessimilarprovisionwithrespecttoauditors.
190
theofficermustdetaintheperson. (3)Ifanofficerknowsorreasonablysuspectsthatapersoninanexcised offshoreplaceisanunlawfulnoncitizen,theofficermaydetainthe person. (4)IfanofficerreasonablysuspectsthatapersoninAustraliabut outsidethemigrationzone: (a)isseekingtoenteranexcisedoffshoreplace;and (b)would,ifinthemigrationzone,beanunlawfulnoncitizen; theofficermaydetaintheperson.
Section190providesanobjectivearangeofobjectivetestsforsection189:
Forthepurposesofsection189,anofficersuspectsonreasonable groundsthatapersoninAustraliaisanunlawfulnoncitizenif,butnot onlyif,theofficerknows,orsuspectsonreasonablegrounds,thatthe person: (a)wasrequiredtocomplywithsection166;and (b)didoneormoreofthefollowing: (i)bypassed,attemptedtobypass,orappearedtoattemptto bypass,immigrationclearance; (ii)wenttoaclearanceofficerbutwasnotabletoshow,or otherwisedidnotshow,evidencerequiredbysection166tobe shown; (iii)ifanoncitizen,wenttoaclearanceofficerbutwasnotable to give, or otherwise did not give, information required by section166tobegiven.
Therearemanyotherexamplesofsuchclauses.9 9. Byamendingtherangeandscopeofjudicialreview By virtue of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002, a number of provisions of which the following is an example, were includedintheMigrationAct:
51AExhaustivestatementofnaturaljusticehearingrule (1)
9
Otherexamplesincludesection95H(automaticgrantoffreetimetocertainparties)and95L(grantof
freetimeonapplicationsinrelationtotheSenate)oftheBroadcastingAct1942,andsections65and75of theDevelopmentAllowanceAuthorityAct1992,relatingtothegrantingofprequalifyingcertificatesupon theapplicationfortransferofbenefitsofacertificateandsection30Dofthe VeteransEntitlementsAct 1986.
191
This Subdivision is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirementsofthenaturaljusticehearingruleinrelationtothe mattersitdealswith.

(2) Sections 494A to494D,in sofaras theyrelatetothisSubdivision, are takentobeanexhaustivestatementoftherequirementsofthenatural justicehear5ingruleinrelationtothematterstheydealwith.
192
APPENDIX3 ALTERNATIVEREMEDIES
Twocasestudies Taxation
Thereviewscheme
In the taxation jurisdiction, provisions have been implemented to confine taxpayerchallengesunderPartIVCofthe TaxationAdministrationAct1953 (TAA). These provisions include sections 175 and 177 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (ITAA 1936) and paragraph (e) of Schedule 1 to the AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977(AD(JR)Act). DespitethefactthatresolutionbetweentheAustralianTaxationOffice(ATO) andataxpayercanbedealtwithbyanobjectionandappealprocesswithin theATO,ataxpayerdissatisfiedwithadecisionbytheCommissionercan alsoeither: applytotheAdministrativeAppealsTribunal(AAT)forareviewof thedecision(handledbytheTaxationDivisionoftheTribunal);or appealtotheFederalCourt.
Alternatively,thetaxpayermayelectthatamatterbedealtwithbytheSmall TaxationClaimsTribunal(whichispartoftheAAT)iftheamountindispute islessthan$5000. Subsequently,theCommissionerorthetaxpayermayappealtotheFederal CourtfromadecisionoftheAATonaquestionoflaw.Often,theCourtwill referthematterbacktothetribunaltomakeappropriatefindingsoffactafter ithasdecidedonthequestionoflaw. Additionally,asystemofpublicandprivaterulingswasintroducedon1July 1992.Thisisanimportantelementintheselfassessmentscheme.Aprivate rulingisawrittenexpressionofopinionbytheCommissionerabouttheway in which a tax law or tax laws would apply to a person in relation to a
APPENDIX3:ALTERNATIVEREMEDIES
193
particular arrangement inrespect ofaspecified yearofincome. Apublic rulingenablestheCommissionertoexpresshisopiniononthewaytaxlaws apply to arrangements and, by its nature, has a wider application than a privateruling.IftheCommissionerprovidesaprivateorpublicruling,itis legallybindingtotheextentthatitisfavourabletothetaxpayer.Rulingsnot legallybindingaretreatedasadministrativelybinding. Othernoteworthyaspectsofthereviewsystemincludethat: thetaxpayerbearstheonusofprooftoestablishthattheassessment exceedstheamountofthetaxpayerstrueliability; the taxpayer needs to prove positively what changes need to be made in order to correct the assessment, as simply showing the assessmentissomehowwrongwillnotsuffice1;and the taxpayer must show on the balance of probabilities that the assessmentexceedstheamountofthetaxpayerstrueliability.
Significanceofthereviewschemefromtheexecutiveperspective
Themakingofataxationassessmentiscentralnotonlytothecollectionof revenuebutalsototheissueofanoticethattaxisdueandpayableandtothe issuingofadepartureorder. Itisthereforenotsurprisingthatthelegislaturehassoughttoprotectthat processfromdisruption,primarilythroughsections175and177oftheITAA 1936. Throughsuchprovisions,thelegislaturehasaimedtoinsulatetheassessment making process from review and give the Commissioner an evidentiary advantageinseekingtorecoveroutstandingtaxes. Additionally,Schedule(1)(e)oftheAD(JR)Actoperatestoexclude:
Decisionsmaking,orformingpartoftheprocessofmaking,orleading uptothemakingof,assessmentsorcalculationsoftax,chargeorduty, ordecisionsamendingorrefusingtoamend,assessmentsorcalculations oftax,chargeordutyunder[amongstothers],theIncomeTax AssessmentAct1936.
TrautweinvFederalCommissionerofTaxation(No1)(1936)56CLR63;McCauleyvFederalCommissionerof
Taxation(1996)39ATR1.
194
Arguments for limiting judicial review clearly include the potential to undermine the current tax collection system and the possibility that substantialresourceswouldhavetobedevotedtodefendingjudicialreview proceedings.
Significanceofthereviewschemefromtheperspectiveofthetaxpayer
UndertheprovisionssetoutinPartIVCoftheTAAataxpayerhas: arighttoseekreviewoftheexcessivenessofanassessment recourse to a specialised tribunal through the AAT, which has considerableexpertiseintheareaoftaxation;and recourse to the Federal Court which has considerable taxation expertise. UndertheseprovisionstheCommissionerisunderastatutoryduty totakewhateveractionisnecessarytogiveeffecttoadecisionby theAATorFederalCourt.
AsnotedbyBrennanJinDeputyCommissionerofTaxationoftheCommonwealth ofAustraliavRichardWalter:
ThejurisdictionoftheFederalCourtonappealoroftheAdministrative AppealsTribunalonreviewofadecisionoranobjectionextendsto everyissuewhichaffectstheamountsultimatelyincludedinthetaxable incomeortaxliabilityofataxpayer.
2
AsaresultoftheRichardWaltercase,inwhichsubsection177(1)wasfoundto beconsistentwiththe Hickmanprinciple,judicialreviewproceedingscanbe instigatedwithrespectto: allegationsofbadfaith; wheretheCommissionerhasnopowertomakeanassessment;and declaratoryreliefmaybeavailablewherenoassessmenthasbeen made.
DeputyCommissionerofTaxationoftheCommonwealthofAustraliavRichardWalterPtyLimited(1995)183
CLR168,199.
195
WorkplaceRelationsAppealscheme
Thescheme3
Under section 45(2) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (the WRA) most decisionsoftheAustralianIndustrialRelationsCommissioncanbeappealed to the Full Bench but leave is required. In determining whether to grant leave, the Full Bench can take into account the usual special leave considerationsandmust,undersection45(2),grantleaveifitisinthepublic interest to do so. Section 45(2) is not exhaustive of the special leave considerations, but rather creates an extra, mandatory, ground of public interestforgrantingleave. Inadditiontotheavailabilityofappealsundersection45(2),undersection109 theMinistermayapplyforareviewbyaFullBenchofanaward,orderor decisionofasinglememberiftheMinisterbelievesthedecisionisnotinthe publicinterest.4 AFullBenchhasfullmeritsreviewpowers.Thatis,itmayquash,confirmor varythedecision,makeanewdecision,orreferthematterbacktoasingle member.5 AFullBenchmayreviewthedecisionwhereanapplicantshows thatthedecisionwasnotreasonablyopentothecommissioner,orsomeother judicialreviewtypeground.6 Theappealisbywayofarehearing ofthe case.7 TheCommissionmayreferaquestionoflawtotheFederalCourtwhichthen allowsfortheusualappealprocessthroughthecourts.8However,thereisno appealfromaFullBench. Aprivativeclauseexistsinsection150oftheWRAtoprotectadecisionbythe AIRC.TheprivativeclausehasbeenintheWRA,andthepredecessortothat
3 4 5 6
AllsectionreferencesaretotheWorkplaceRelationsAct1996unlessotherwisespecified. WorkplaceRelationsAct1996section109. WorkplaceRelationsAct1996section45(7). CoalandAlliedvAustralianIndustrialRelationsCommission(2000)203CLR193,204.AmalgamatedMetal
Workers'UnionvGas&FuelCorporationMis674/86MDPrintG5853, AustralianIndustrialRelations Commission,22February1985.

7 8
CoalandAlliedvAustralianIndustrialRelationsCommission(2000)203CLR193,204 WorkplaceRelationsAct1996section46(1).
196
legislationsince1904. Theredoesnotappeartohavebeenmuchdirectre considerationoftheprivativeclause. Theprivativeclausedoesnotoperatetooustjudicialreviewundersection 75(v)oftheConstitutionwhereanapplicantseeksaconstitutionalwritunder thatsection.9TheoriginaljurisdictionoftheHighCourtiscomplementedby section44(2A)ofthe JudiciaryAct1903 (Cth)byallowingtheHighCourtto remitconstitutionalwritmattersbacktheFederalCourt.10
Supportforthescheme
TheCourtshavedemonstratedtheirsupportfortheWRAscheme.Oneofthe main reasons for this is that the scheme insists on applicants exhausting appeal rights in the industrial hierarchy which allows a review court the benefitofspecialistopinionswhenmakingitsowndetermination.Asnoted byKirbyPinBoralGas(NSW)PtyLtdvMagill:
1. It recognises and gives effect to the legislative scheme provide by Parliamentforinternalappeals 2. It affords a place to the specialised tribunal which may have a superior advantage in ready knowledge of the developments of jurisprudence under scrutiny which this court does not initially enjoy. Furthermore,thattribunalfrequentlyhasasuperiorarmouryofremedies atitsdisposalthanthiscourtcanoffer 3. Whilst it may involve the possibility of additional cost or delay, it affordsthiscourt theadvantageofhavingtheopinionoftheappellate tribunalshouldthetribunal determine thequestion ofjurisdiction and shoulditstillbetheintentionofthepartytochallengejurisdiction 4. Itallowscompleteexhaustionofanyadditionalfactorwhichmaybe relevanttoestablishingthefactssaidtogroundjurisdiction,whichfacts maybemorereadilydeterminedbelowthaninthiscourtrecognisesthe pressureofbusinessinthiscourt;and
5. Itconservestocaseswherenootherremedyexists,thediscretionary
and exceptional remedies provided by the writs in the nature of the
9
RvColdham;ExparteAustralianWorkersUnion(1983)153CLR415. RePrintingandKindredIndustriesUnionvNationwideNewst/asCumberlandNewspaperGroupNoNI142
10
of1994(940003),IndustrialRelationsCourtofAustralia.
197
prerogativewritsandrecognisesthepressureofbusinessinthiscourt, includingtheexerciseofgeneralsupervisoryjurisdiction.
11
Thecourtinthatcasealsoreferredwithapprovaltothefollowingcomments madebyMasonJwithrespecttojurisdictionalchallengestodecisionsofthe AustralianConciliationandArbitrationCommission:

Iftheevidenceremainsthesame,iftheFullBenchonappealhas confirmedthedecisionatfirstinstanceandiftheissueoffactisonein theresolutionofwhichtheCommissionsknowledgeofindustry speciallyequipsittoprovideananswer,greaterweightwillbeaccorded thanincasesinwhichoneormoreofthesefactorsisabsent.12
11 12
BoralGas(NSW)PtyLtdvMagrill(1933)32NSWLR501. RvAlley;ExparteNSWPlumbersandGasfittersEmployeesUnion(1981)153CLR376,390.

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ADMINISTRATIVEREVIEWCOUNCIL

PART II THE SIGNIFICANCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL SCOPE OF JUDICIALREVIEW.................................................................................................26 SECTIONI............................................................................................................26

PARTIIIOTHERFACTORSRELEVANTTOTHESCOPEOFJUDICIAL REVIEW....................................................................................................................35 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................35

PARTVPROPOSEDCONSIDERATIONSINDEVELOPINGAGUIDE TOTHESCOPEOFJUDICIALREVIEW..........................................................79 SECTIONi............................................................................................................79

PART VII HOW MIGHT JUDICIAL REVIEW APPROPRIATELY BE LIMITED..................................................................................................................170 Introduction.......................................................................................................170

APPENDIX I sets out Schedule 1 to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review)Act1977.

SECTIONI TheCouncil Theproject Timingoftheproject

SECTIONII Whatisjudicialreview? Furtheraspectsofjudicialreview

SECTIONIV PreviousCouncilinvolvementinconsiderationofthescopeof judicialreview

1.12 Whereas merits review isavailablein relationtodecisions specified undertheAdministrativeAppealsTribunalAct1975,judicialreviewisavailable foralldecisionsofanadministrativecharacter.

MinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairsvGuo(1997)191CLR559,578579,598600. (1986)162CLR24,4041citingWednesburyCorporation[1948]1KB,228. SeeforinstanceBeasleyJ,AerolineasArgentinas&OrsvFederalAirportsCorporation(1995)63FCR100.

DescribedbytheHighCourtin ReRefugeeTribunal;ExparteAala (20002001)204CLR82,[20]per

IncludingasaresultofthelimitationsimposedonreviewbySchedule1oftheAD(JR)Actitself. MAronson,BDyer,JudicialReviewofAdministrativeAction,2000,p72. TheAD(JR)ActwastheresultoftherecommendationsmadebytheCommonwealthAdministrative

Thedoctrineofultraviresmaybenarroworextended.Thefirstformisthatapublicauthoritymay Anexerciseofdiscretionarypowerinbadfaithiswherethepowerhasbeenexercisedforanulterior Wherethepowerisnotexercisedforthepurposeforwhichithasbeengiven.Thepurposeofthe

Underthisground,adecisionmakermusthavelegalauthoritytodealwiththematteruponwhich Inmostcases,thesortoffraudwhichoccursisthefalsificationorsuppressionofevidence. AcopyofSchedule1totheAD(JR)ActisincludedatAppendixItothediscussionpaper.

InAbebevCommonwealth(1999)197CLR510theHighCourtupheldthepowerofParliamenttodo Regulation17oftheNationalSecurity(CoalMiningIndustryEmployment)Regulations1941(Cth).This Providedtheyarereasonable,suchlimitshavebeenruledvalidbythecourts.SeeforinstanceYong

SeeS157/2002vCommonwealthofAustralia[2003]HCA2,[5]perGleesonCJ. Id. RvHickman;ExparteFoxandClinton(1945)70CLR598.Thecaserelatedtothevalidityorotherwise

Ibid,616perDixonJ. Seealso DeputyCommissionerofTaxationoftheCommonwealthofAustraliav CoalIndustryAct1946,section44; ConciliationandArbitrationAct 1904, section60; CourtsMartials

CoalIndustryAct1946,section44; ConciliationandArbitrationAct 1904, section60; CourtsMartials

Seeforinstance DarlingCasinoLtdvNewSouthWalesCasinoControlAuthority (1997)191CLR559; SeeparticularlythedecisionoftheHighCourtinS157/2002vCommonwealth[2003]HCA2. In ProjectBlueSkyvAustralianBroadcastingAuthority (1998)CLR355,[93]perMcHugh,Gummow,

KirbyandHaneJJsaidthatratherthanseekingtomakeadistinctionbetweenmandatoryanddirectory provisions,thebetterapproachwas'toaskwhetheritwasapurposeofthelegislationthatanactdone inbreachoftheprovisionshouldbeinvalid'.

SECTIONIV PreviousCouncilinvolvementinconsiderationofthescopeof judicialreview

AdministrativeReviewCouncil,AdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)AmendmentBill1980,Report AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977Stage Ibid,paragraph9.

AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977Stage Ibid,paragraph96,onconditionthatStatejurisdictiontoreviewsuchdecisionswasrevived. AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977Stage

AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:TheAmbit Ibid,seeRecommendation15. Ibid,paragraph218.

AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:TheAmbit Ibid,paragraph421. Ibid,paragraph424.

PARTIITHESIGNIFICANCEANDCONSTITUTIONAL SCOPEOFJUDICIALREVIEW SECTIONI Thesignificanceofjudicialreview

theUnitedStates,theCanadian CharterofRightsandFreedomsortheUnitedKingdoms HumanRights Act1998.

ChurchofScientologyvWoodward(1982)154CLR25,71perBrennanJ. Corporationof theCity ofEnfield vDevelopmentAssessmentCommission (2000)199CLR135,157per

normativeandbindingontribunalmembers.Thefosteringof consistencybetweenmembersandtheknowledgeofthecorrect interpretationofacertainprovisionarebenefitsforallthoseinvolvedin theimmigrationprocess,fromapplicants,departmentaldecision makersthroughtoreviewofficers.8

CommitteeInquiryintotheMigrationLegislationAmendmentBill(No2)1998,Migration(VisaApplication) ChargeAmendmentBill1998andMigration(JudicialReview)Bill1998,SubmissionNo5,18January1998, 12.

FormerChiefJusticeofAustralia,SirAnthonyMasonACKBE,TheImportanceofAdministrative RvToohey;ExparteNorthernLandCouncil(1981)151CLR170,222perMasonCJ. JusticeRSFrench,JudicialReviewRights(March2001)28AIALForum30,32.

2.14 Morerecently,initssubmissiontotheSenateLegalandConstitutional LegislationCommitteeontheMigration(JudicialReview)Bill1998,theCouncil observedthat:

2.16 TheCouncilmaintainstheseviews,andconsidersthat,withoutgood reason,thescopeofjudicialreviewshouldnotbelimited:

CommitteeInquiryintotheMigrationLegislationAmendmentBill(No2)1998,Migration(VisaApplication) ChargeAmendmentBill1998andMigration(JudicialReview)Bill1998,SubmissionNo4,18January1998, at5.

2.24 SimilarviewsweresubsequentlyexpressedbyfourHighCourtjudges inMinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairsvWuShanLiangwhereitwasalso notedthat:

2.25 In aseparate judgmentin WuShanLiangs case,Kirby Jsaidthata decisionmakersreasonsmustbeconsideredfairlyandthat:

ReDrakevMinisterforImmigrationandEthnicAffairs(1979)2ALD60,68. AttorneyGeneral(NSW)vQuin(1990)170CLR1,3738perBrennanJ. (1996)185CLR259,272perBrennanCJ,Toohey,McHughandGummowJJ.

Itiserroneoustoadoptanarrowapproach,combingthroughthewords ofthedecisionmakerwithafineappellatetoothcomb,againstthe prospectthataverbalslipwillbefoundwarrantingtheinferenceofan erroroflaw.21

Ibid,291. JusticeBrennan,'ThePurposeandScopeofJudicialReview'(1986)2AustralianBarReview93,95. DavidBennettQC,CommonwealthSolicitorGeneral,BalancingJudicialReviewandMeritsReview

2.29 Suchlimitationsareofcoursesubjecttothewellrecognisedprinciple thatthesubjectsrightofrecoursetothecourtisnottobetakenawayexcept byclearwords.24 2.30 AssaidbyGleesonCJinS157/2002vCommonwealthofAustralia:

PARTIIIOTHERFACTORSRELEVANTTOTHESCOPEOF JUDICIALREVIEW INTRODUCTION Reasonsforlimitingjudicialreview SECTIONI Thejudicialperspective

UniversityLawReview 784,788andTheImportanceofJudicialReviewofAdministrativeActionasa SafeguardofIndividualRights(December1994)1(1)AustralianJournalofHumanRights3,8.

aSafeguardofIndividualRights AnAddresstotheAustralianBarAssociationFifthBiennialConference, 4July1994,14.

WBlackstone, CommentariesontheLawsofEngland (1809)Bk1,p251. SeealsoMargaretAllars,The RightsofCitizensandtheLimitsofAdministrativeDecisions:TheContributionofSirAnthonyMason toAdministrativeLaw(2000)28(2)FederalLawReview187.

(1981)151CLR170,219. Id. MargaretAllars,'TheRightsofCitizensandtheLimitsofAdministrativeDecisions:theContribution

interests and considerations. See, forexample, LonFuller, TheFormsandLimits ofAdjudication (1979)92HarvardLawReview353.

ThorpevCommonwealthofAustralia(No3)144ALR677,692. SirAnthony MasonACKBE,TheScopeofJudicialReview,Lecture2, NationalLectureSerieson ReDitfort;exparteDeputyCommissionerofTaxation(NSW)(1998)19FCR347,369.

ForfurtherdiscussionseeAustralianLawReformCommissionReport92,October2001,TheJudicial KioavWest(1985)159CLR550,584perMasonJ,61921perBrennanJand632perDeaneJ. JeremyKirk,Rights,ReviewandReasonsforRestraint(March2001)23(1)SydneyLawReview19,26. (1987)75ALR218.

couldhavedevisedit':however,thecourtsshouldnotintervenetodevisea fairermethodofallocation.23 3.28 Caselawindicates thatthecourts willretreat fromreviewthatwill haveanimpactontheallocationofresources.AsnotedbyoneBritishjudge:

Authoritystandardsregulations,atendencyinthisregardisnoted,although whetheritwillcrystalliseremainsuncertain.31 3.31 Ithasbeensaidthat:

3.32 Althoughunlikelytobereviewablegenerally,suchdecisionswould nonethelessbereviewableforultravires.Further,ithasbeenobservedwith referencetotheTampacase33thatthecourtsmustbesatisfiedthatamatteris nonjusticiablebeforetheydeclinetodealwiththematter.34 3.33 Inthatcase,itwasnotedthat:

Ibid,153,perGleesonCJ,Gummow,KirbyandHayneJJ. SeealsojudgmentbyGaudronJinthe (1978)71ALR673. (2000)199CLR135,155. (2000)199CLR135,151,perGleesonCJ,Gummow,KirbyandHayneJJ.Seealsothejudgmentof

the high number of decisions likely to be brought forward for review51

Ibid,paragraphs171172. Ibid,paragraph171. Ibid,paragraphs6873. Ibid,paragraphs7480.Seemoredetaileddiscussionlaterinthediscussionpaper. Ibid,paragraph124. Ibid,paragraph128. Ibid,paragraphs136138. Ibid,paragraph150. Ibid,paragraph154.

Ibid,paragraphs157and158. Ibid,paragraph217. Ibid,paragraph223. Ibid,paragraph170.

abuseofprocess; thehighvolumeofapplications; theneedforconsistency;and cost.

SeecommentstothiseffectbytheCourtinKordanPtyLtdvCommissionerofTaxation46ATR191. SeeAppendixIofthispaper. AdministrativeReviewCouncil,ReviewoftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act:TheAmbit Ibid,paragraph124.

havebeensaidtoberelevanttothequalityofthedecision,whileconceptsof: accessibility affordability costtothegeneralpublic83 timeliness;84and discerniblereasonsforthedecision85

Asnotedelsewhereinthispaper,thepositionwithrespecttomigrationandtaxationdiffersinthat,in Reflectedinsection13oftheAdministrativeDecisions(JudicialReview)Act1977. JusticeRSFrench,AdministrativeJusticeinAustralianAdministrativeLaw,inRobinCreykeand

meritswillachievethesameoutcomeandresultnotonlyinthesettingaside ofthedecisionbutthemakingofthecorrectorpreferabledecisioninitsplace. 3.67 Ithasbeensaidinthisrespectthat:

MAronson,BDyer,JudicialReviewofAdministrativeAction,2000,p10. DennisPearce,IsThereTooMuchNaturalJustice(1992)121994AIALForum9.SeealsoJusticeRS Judicial Review Rights (March 2001) 28 AIAL Forum

Discussionpoint4 Arethereotherfactorsrelevanttothepublicperspectiveinseeking todefinethedesirablescopeofjudicialreview? Pleaseelaborate.