The Mugabe saga

Hector C Sikazwe
2008
Newcastle upon Tyne

Keywords

Land reform, Lancaster agreement, ZANU-PF, Mugabe, Freedom fighters,

Economic Sanctions, Political process, African politics

Abstract

When Robert Mugabe came to power in 1980, he promised to give white-owned land

back to the indigenous black citizens. Yet 20 years on, 4,500 white farmers still

owned 70% of the best land. Now after violent clashes, land invasions and legal

challenges, many white farmers have left, while others are grimly hanging on. This

discourse addresses briefly what happened to Mugabe’s promise, and why land is still

the most contentious issue a poverty ridden and yet agriculturally rich Country.

The devil is in the details of the genesis of the interaction between the indigenous

black population and the later white settlers who invaded the area. Hit by drought,

HIV/AIDS and economic meltdown, Zimbabwe is in the grip of its worst

humanitarian crisis since independence. The repeated cholera problem is simply an

exacerbation of the situation with one of the world’s startling statistics:

(a) Average life expectancy 42.5 years

(b) Agriculture devastated and in continuous meltdown

(c) World's highest inflation rate standing at world record of 231,000,000%!

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Twenty years ago the country was hailed as an African success story and dubbed the

“breadbasket” of southern Africa. Zimbabwe now has one of the lowest life

expectancies in the world, according to the World Health Organization. Farming is the

backbone of Zimbabwe's economy, but agriculture has been crippled by the combined

effects of drought, HIV/AIDS and controversial government land reforms.

1.0 Introduction

Land is extremely important to an African man, let alone any man that decides to use

land as a way of livelihood. This concept is vital whenever Zimbabwean issues are

being discussed. If Zimbabwe is viewed in isolation of this concept, Mugabe looks

really despotic and evil. This concept was very important to all parties in 1980 that

signed the Lancaster House Agreement that led to the transformation of Rhodesia

into Zimbabwe. To the world, Mugabe is a tyrant and despot but to the indigenous

Zimbabwean veterans, he is a patriot. This paper tries to explain the steps that have

led the Zimbabwean situation to be almost unattainable due to the land issue being

played down by the mediators. As long as the land issue is ignored, there is no hope

for any co-existence of the millions of black people and the minority white farmers.

The land issue has always been emotive in Zimbabwe, as can be seen with the current

crisis sparked off by the government seizure of mainly white-owned farms in 2000.

Mugabe has always been a nationalist and has always dwelt on specific issues

whenever he discusses the future of his Country: “Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans”. The

major promise that veterans were given after the struggle for independence from the

colonial BSA Company, that had previously declared UDI (Unilateral declaration of

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Independence) from British domination was land, was cardinal to the future of the

Nation of Zimbabwe.

2.0 Background to Land Issue

When the first white settlers arrived in 1890, the land between the Limpopo and

Zambezi rivers was populated by the Shona and the Ndebele people, who claimed

sovereignty. It is thought the Shona had been there for about 1,000 years. The

Ndebele arrived in the 1830s, having migrated north from Natal after falling out with

the Zulu King, Shaka. In 1889, the imperialist Cecil Rhodes, who had made a fortune

in diamond mining in the Cape, set up the British South Africa Company to explore

north of the Limpopo. He had already obtained exclusive mining rights from the

Ndebele king, Lobengula, in return for £100 a month, 1,000 rifles, 10,000 rounds of

ammunition, and a riverboat. As far as Lobengula was concerned he had not conferred

land rights. The first 200 settlers were each promised a 3,000-acre farm and gold

claims in return for carving a path through Mashonaland. The Shona were too

fragmented to resist and the British flag was raised at Fort Salisbury on 13 September

1890. The name Rhodesia was adopted in 1895. It became the British colony of

Southern Rhodesia in 1923.

Three years after the pioneers arrived in Mashonaland, they conquered King

Lobengula and his people in neighbouring Matabeleland. Each volunteer in the war

was granted 6,000 acres of captured land. Within a year 10,000 square miles around

Lobengula’s capital Bulawayo had been marked out. Ndebele villagers who returned

were treated as tenants. Most of their cattle were seized and they were forced to work

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on the white farms, a slave-master arrangement that has existed until the struggle for

independence started in the 1950s

In Mashonaland, the white settlers imposed a ‘hut tax’ of 10 shillings (50p). Those

who could not pay were told to work to earn the money. When the Ndebele and Shona

rebelled in 1896, they were put down and their leaders hanged. This proved

excessively demeaning to the Africans but the white settlers realized that this would

later become a vice that they would not be able to cope with. Consequently, as the

settlers developed commercial farming, some lands were reserved for African

occupation amid fears total dispossession could lead to uprisings. After 1923,

European immigrants concentrated on developing Rhodesia's rich mineral resources

and agricultural potential. The settlers' demand for more land led in 1934 to the

passage of the first of a series of land apportionment acts that reserved certain areas

for Europeans.

Significantly, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 barred African land ownership

outside the reserves, except in a special freehold purchase area. Africans not needed

for labour on white farms were removed to the reserves, which became increasingly

congested, disease-infested and inhumanely unhygienic.

Following the abrogation of the company's charter in 1923, Southern Rhodesia's white

settlements were given the choice of being incorporated into the Union of South

Africa or becoming a separate entity within the British Empire. The settlers rejected

incorporation, and Southern Rhodesia was formally annexed by the United Kingdom

that year. Rhodesia was an internally self-governing colony with its own legislature,

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civil service, armed forces, and police. Although Rhodesia was never administered

directly from London, the United Kingdom always retained the right to intervene in

the affairs of the colony.

In September 1953, Southern Rhodesia was joined in a multiracial Central African

Federation with the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and

Nyasaland (Malawi) in an effort to pool resources and markets. Although the

federation flourished economically, the African population, who feared they would

not be able to achieve self-government with the federal structure dominated by White

Southern Rhodesians, opposed it. The federation was dissolved at the end of 1963

after much crisis and turmoil, and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became the

independent states of Zambia and Malawi in 1964.

White settlers in Rhodesia decided to maintain full control over the now Harare (then

called Salisbury) and decided to declare UDI (unilateral declaration of independence)

so that they could continue dominating and controlling land in Zimbabwe. Although

prepared to grant independence to Rhodesia, the United Kingdom insisted that the

authorities at Salisbury first demonstrate their intention to move toward eventual

majority rule. Desiring to keep their dominant position, the white Rhodesians refused

to give such assurances. On November 11, 1965, after lengthy and unsuccessful

negotiations with the British Government, Prime Minister Smith issued a Unilateral

Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom.

On December 16, 1966, the UN Security Council, for the first time in its history,

imposed mandatory economic sanctions on a state. Rhodesia's primary exports

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including ferrochrome and tobacco, were placed on the selective sanctions list, as

were shipments of arms, aircraft, motor vehicles, petroleum, and petroleum products

to Rhodesia. On May 29, 1968, the Security Council unanimously voted to broaden

the sanctions by imposing an almost total embargo on all trade with, investments in,

or transfers of funds to Rhodesia and imposed restrictions on air transport to the

territory. This was the beginning of sanctions that kept Ian Smith occupied for a long

time to come as the African settlers (Mugabe and Nkomo) took to the bush with

several leading African farmers that were later framed as “terrorists” whilst fighting

for land that legitimately belonged to them.

In the early 1970s, informal attempts at settlement were renewed between the United

Kingdom and the Rhodesian administration. Following the April 1974 coup in

Portugal and the resulting shifts of power in Mozambique and Angola, pressure on the

Smith regime to negotiate a peaceful settlement increased. In addition, sporadic

antigovernment guerrilla activity, which began in the late 1960s, increased

dramatically after 1972, causing destruction, economic dislocation, casualties, and a

slump in white morale. The grounds were now ripe for negotiated redistribution of

land that was in the hands of few white settlers.

In 1974, the major African nationalists groups – the Zimbabwe African Peoples

Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), which split away

from ZAPU in 1963 were united into the “Patriotic Front” and combined their

military forces. In 1976, a combination of embargo-related economic hardships, the

pressure of guerilla activity, independence and majority rule in the neighboring

former Portuguese territories, and a UK-US diplomatic initiative, the Smith

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government agreed in principle to majority rule and to a meeting in Geneva with

Black Nationalist leaders to seek an end to the conflict.

3.0 Lancaster house agreement

When former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979 the

situation of Rhodesia had been a central concern of the British government for years.

War had raged since the 1960s between the white government led by Ian Smith and

liberation fighters led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. Mrs Thatcher was

persuaded by the then Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington, to make one last push to try

to resolve the en-passé. Negotiations between white farmers and the millions of

displaced black Zimbabweans proved to be a major challenge for several initiatives

that had failed on several occasions. The situation did not promise much prospect of

success prior to the Lancaster House because the warring sides were so far apart in

position, and in particular Ian Smith had talked about it all for a million times over

that it was going to be a very difficult negotiation

Diplomatic efforts from the then Commonwealth Secretary-General Sir Shridath

Ramphal, managed to persuade all interested but sulking sides to attend. Lengthy

talks immediately got under way in the splendour of Lancaster House, just opposite

Buckingham Palace in London. The issues were basic:

(a) It was the toughest of issues. Whites - 5% of the population - owned 80%

of arable land.

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 (b) 95 % of the rest of the population, majority of the Millions being

indigenous black people scratched a living on the rest of the poor infertile

land.

The above situation was critical for any future discussions on the future of Zimbabwe.

Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo found this arrangement unacceptable and cardinally

critical. As though to add salt to the wound, when Lord Carrington finally presented

the draft constitution at the convention, it contained no reference to the land issue and

the African contingent went ballistic. The conference nearly came close to collapse.

As Mugabe and Nkomo later observed, this was typical of past discussions from the

British government's point of view where the future constitution was always being

proposed to preserve the status quo for a minimum of 10 years and then let the

Africans take over. They (Nkomo and Mugabe) found this insulting and degrading to

the African contingent.

When Mugabe and Nkomo understood the implications, they expressed indignation

and threatened to walk out of that meeting. They demanded Lord Carrington to

explain this insult as in their perception; the struggle was about land allocation and

not necessarily political independence for the struggling African Nation. This volatile

situation threatened to introduce the idea that Carrington was literally proposing that

the African representatives to sign a constitution which stipulated that they could not

redistribute land, and if that was the case they should go back to the bush and take up

arms again and the conference would have to break up. Sir Shridath believed the

conference was doomed to failure and that Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo would walk

out and the civil war would resume. The attendees had to change the method and

nature of the conference as more allies were created within very short period of time

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as Mugabe and Nkomo threatened to walk out. Mugabe then stated the famous

eloquent words regarding the state and independence of the Nation of Zimbabwe by

stating:.

“Zimbabwe will never be a colony again. Never shall we retreat!”

A secret diplomatic deal was then entered into with the support of the American

government to compensate White farmers so that the land could be redistributed

amongst the millions of black Zimbabweans. This deal was done secretly between the

American then President Jimmy Carter and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

4.0 Time line to destruction

Land reform in Zimbabwe began after the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement

in 1979 in an effort to more equitably distribute land between the historically

disenfranchised blacks and the minority-whites who ruled Zimbabwe from 1923 to

1979. The government's land distribution is perhaps the most crucial and the most

bitterly contested political issue today and anyone dealing with the Zimbabwean

situation needs to have this history in perspective.

After the Lancaster House Agreement paved the way for democracy, the first

democratic elections were won by Robert Mugabe in late February 1980. The three-

month long Lancaster House conference nearly failed over land issues. However, the

British government in conjunction with the American government agreed to fund

reform on a willing buyer, willing seller principle, where farmers who were unwilling

to stay in Zimbabwe would be bought out by funds provided by the American and

British government through a meticulously designed process using the Zimbabwean

government.

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Early 1980s

In 1981, the British government, under Margaret Thatcher was instrumental in setting

up the Zimbabwe conference on reconstruction and development. At that conference,

more than £630 million of aid was pledged to the Zimbabwean government to finance

the land redistribution program by compensating “willing white farmers” to give up

their farmland willingly through a negotiated 10 year program. Within the program, in

1981, the Communal Land Act changed the Tribal Trust Lands into Communal Areas

and shifted authority over these lands from traditional rulers to local authorities.

The 1985 Land Acquisition Act, though drawn in the spirit of the 1979 Lancaster

House “willing seller, willing buyer” clause (which could not be changed for ten

years), gave the government the first right to purchase excess land that white farmers

owned for redistribution to the landless millions of black Zimbabweans. However, the

Act had a limited impact, largely because the Zimbabwean government did not have

the money to compensate landowners as the pledge by the British government to

supply the compensation funds were withheld amidst claims that the Zimbabwean

government was corrupt and the farms were being given to top ZANU-PF leaders. In

addition, white farmers mounted a vigorous opposition to the Act. Because of the

"willing seller, willing buyer" clause, the government was powerless in the face of the

farmers' resistance. As a result, between 1980 and 1990, only 71,000 families out of a

target of 162,000 were resettled. This started proving to become a sticking point

between the Zimbabwean government and the British government.

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1992

Due to the volatile relationship that now encompassed the Nation over land reform,

the Zimbabwean government enacted the 1992 Land Acquisition Act. The 1992 Act

was enacted to speed up the land reform process by removing the "willing seller,

willing buyer" clause. The Act empowered the government to buy land compulsorily

for redistribution, and a fair compensation was to be paid for land acquired.

Landowners could challenge in court the price set by the acquiring authority.

Opposition by landowners increased throughout the period from 1992 to 1997

While some land was purchased by the fund, few families were resettled. Instead,

hundreds of abandoned and expropriated white farms ended up in the hands of cabinet

ministers, senior government officials and wealthy indigenous businessmen. Most

British and Americans cut their losses and money, alleging widespread corruption. To

date, fewer than 70,000 of the people of Zimbabwe have been resettled, most without

the necessary infrastructure to work the huge commercial farms on the 12 hectare

plots they have been allocated.

At that time, British contribution in terms of aid to Zimbabwe stood at a half billion

pounds since independence. Furthermore, £47 million of that was specifically targeted

for land reform, and approximately £100 million was budgetary support which could

have been used for land reform.

1997

As part of the implementation of the 1992 Land Acquisition Act, the government

published a list of 1,471 farmlands ear-marked to buy compulsorily for redistribution.

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The list came out of a nationwide land identification exercise undertaken throughout

the year. Landowners were given thirty days (as the 1992 Act demanded) to submit

written objections.

1998

In June 1998, the government published its "policy framework" on the Land Reform

and Resettlement Program Phase II (LRRP II), which envisaged the compulsory

purchase over five years of 50,000 km² from the 112,000 km² owned by commercial

farmers (both black and white), public corporations, churches, non-governmental

organizations and multi-national companies. Broken down, the 50,000 km² meant that

every year between 1998 and 2003, the government intended to purchase 10,000 km²

for redistribution.

In September 1998, the government called a donors conference in Harare on land

reform (LRRP II); 48 countries and international organizations attended. The

objective was to inform the donor community and involve them in the program. The

donors unanimously endorsed the land program, saying it was essential for poverty

reduction, political stability and economic growth. They particularly appreciated the

political imperative and urgency of the land reform, and agreed that the "inception

phase" (covering the first 24 months) should start immediately.

1999

The Commercial Farmers Union freely offered to sell the government 15,000 km² for

redistribution. Landowners once again dragged their feet. In response to moves by the

National Constitutional Assembly, a group of academics, trade unionists and other

political activists, the government drafted a new constitution. The draft was discussed

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widely by the public in formal meetings, and amended to include restrictions on

presidential powers, limits to the presidential term of office, and an upper age limit of

70 years for presidential candidates. This was not a suitable outcome for the

government, so the proposals were amended to remove those clauses and insert a new

one to compulsorily acquire land for redistribution without compensation. The

drafting stage of the constitution was largely boycotted by the opposition who claimed

that Mugabe only wanted a new constitution to entrench himself politically.

2000

The government organized a referendum on the new constitution, despite having a

sufficiently large majority in parliament to pass any amendment it wished. Had it been

approved, the new constitution would have empowered the government to acquire

land compulsorily without compensation. Despite vast support in the media, the new

constitution was defeated 55% to 45%. There was wild jubilation by the MDC's local

and foreign supporters, prompting "End of Mugabe" headlines in the British and

Zimbabwean media.

A few days later, the pro-Mugabe War Veterans Association organized like-minded

people (not necessarily war veterans, as many of them were too young to have fought

in the Liberation War) to march on white-owned farmlands, initially with drums, song

and dance. As the "liberation" continued, the seizing began to take on a more

aggressive aspect. They claimed to have "seized" the farmlands. A total of 110,000

km² of land was seized.

The referendum result prompted the government to delay the parliamentary elections,

so that an intensive voter registration exercise could take place. In the June

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parliamentary elections, ZANU PF got 48% of the vote (62 seats) and the MDC and

ZANU got 52% (58 seats). The composition of the new parliament prevented the

government from making further amendments to the constitution without opposition

support.

2002

Mugabe defeated Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change

(MDC) in presidential elections in March 2002. The incumbents picked Land Reform

as the basis of their campaign. The western media labeled the elections as having been

rigged and undermined the confidence of the Zimbabwean government. Tension grew

between the MDC and the ZANU-PF party as accusations flew left right and center.

When the election results were declared, Robert Mugabe immediately decided to live

up to the elections pledge he had made to implement land reforms. This meant white

farmers who were on land that had been designated as “land to be redistributed” had

to be given eviction orders. The eviction orders were nevertheless meant to be

contested in a court of law if the compensation package was disputed. Robert Mugabe

ordered white farmers defying eviction orders to pack up and leave but said loyal

farmers willing to cooperate with his government would not be left completely

landless.

"All genuine and well meaning white farmers who wish to pursue a farming

career as loyal citizens of this country will have land to do so," was Mugabe’s

pledge to white farmers.

Hundreds of white farmers ignored government orders throwing them off their land

waited anxiously for Mugabe's annual Hero's Day address to the nation, marking the

guerrilla war that ended white rule more than two decades ago. Mr Mugabe stopped

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short of calling for immediate action against defiant farmers, but vowed that those

who

"Want another war should think again when they still have time to do so."

Mugabe with his specific land redistribution policies declared that no white farmer

need go without land but the Zimbabwe government would not allow whites to

remain on large properties or own more than one farm while clinging to ties with

Britain, the former colonial power whilst the black community thrived on small

potions of rejected land in their own country. Defiant ant-British comments were

given on National Radio

"To those who want to own this country for Britain, the game is up and it is

time for them to go where they belong. There is no room for rapacious

supremacists," Mugabe declared.

Nearly 3,000 white farmers were ordered to leave their land as part of the country's

often violent program to seize white–owned farms and give them to blacks. The

government targeted 95% of white owned farms for seizure. Several senior

government officials warned white farmers they faced arrest and possible

imprisonment of up to two years if they continued to defy eviction orders. The

government explained that the policy was a mere "fast track" land seizure program

that was launched in 2000 as a final effort to correct colonial era imbalances in land

ownership.

2004

On July 3, 2004, a report adopted by the African Union executive council, which

comprises foreign ministers of the fifty-three member states, criticized the

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government's handling of the election and for the first time, Mugabe was on his back

foot to defend the situation.

Nationalization of Land became the only alternative to legitimize the government’s

actions. Minister for Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement John Nkomo said, on

June 5, 2004, that all land, from crop fields to wildlife conservancies, would soon

become state property. Farmland deeds would be replaced with 99-year leases, while

leases for wildlife conservancies would be limited to 25 years. However, there have

since been denials of this policy.

2005

Parliament, dominated by Zanu-PF, passed a constitutional amendment, signed into

law on September 12, 2005, that nationalized Zimbabwe's farmland and deprived

landowners of the right to challenge in court the government's decision to expropriate

their land.

2006

In January 2006, Agriculture Minister Joseph Made said Zimbabwe was considering

legislation that would compel commercial banks to finance black peasants who had

been allocated formerly white-owned farmland in the land reforms. Banks failing to

lend a substantial portion of their income to these farmers would have their licenses

withdrawn, Made warned. This proved to be the initial pangs of the economic

recession that Zimbabwe now experiences.

The newly resettled peasants had largely failed to secure loans from commercial

banks because they did not have title over the land on which they were resettled, and

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thus could not use it as collateral. With no security of tenure on the farms, banks have

been reluctant to extend loans to the new farmers, many of whom do not have much

experience in commercial farming, nor assets to provide alternative collateral for any

borrowed money.

5.0 International pressure on Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe’s economic woes are the direct result of a concerted and systematic

campaign to affect regime-change through an economic strangulation. Zimbabwe has

a critical shortage of foreign currency. However for the past four years or so,

Zimbabwe has been unable to obtain finance or credit facilities from international

lenders to inject into the economy. And this is a direct consequence of a sanctions

regime imposed against the Zimbabwe by particularly the US, The United Kingdom

and the EU nations in particular.

Some believe Mugabe is an evil, brutal, dictator that needs to be removed from office

at all cost, even by assassination as hinted by the MDC. It is however immoral to

cause the removal of Mugabe from office by precipitating the collapse of a

developing, only recently independent, now famine-ravished African country through

an economic sanctions regime. Consider the following sanctions that have been

implemented in the past decade:

(a) The US introduced economic sanctions on Zimbabwe through the Zimbabwe

Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, 2001. (ZIDERA) Through this

enactment Zimbabwe’s access to finance and credit facilities was effectively

incinerated. ZIDERA empowers the US to use its voting rights and influence

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 (as the main donor) in multilateral lending agencies, such as the IMF, World

Bank, and the African Development Bank to veto any applications by

Zimbabwe for finance, credit facilities, loan rescheduling, and international

debt cancellation. The US cites Zimbabwe’s human rights record, political

intolerance and absence of rule of law as the main reasons for the imposition

of sanctions. The ZIDERA also suggests that if Zimbabwe acts to correct these

ills, then the sanctions will be removed and economic support measures are

suggested.

(b) Zimbabwe’s ability to reschedule previously obtained loans from the IMF,

World Bank etc affected outstanding projects conditions of application of

terms of the loans were severely applied. Loan payments and opportunity to

apply for new debt cancellations in times of severe financial crisis has severely

affected the Zimbabwean economy. Once the IMF and World Bank stopped

doing business with Zimbabwe, this had an immediate and adverse impact on

Zimbabwe’s credit and investment rating. The drop in investment rating

affected the dream of low cost capital on the international markets.

(c ) ZIDERA was like a hunchback crisis for Zimbabwe. At the stroke of a pen,

Zimbabwe’s access to international credit markets was blocked. Zimbabwe

relying purely on barter trade, and trade, mining, agricultural concessions, and

on exports-generated foreign currency, the economy has been slowly but

surely asphyxiated whilst the British government and western media have

scoffed at the visibly economic woes.

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(d) The direct consequence of the foreign currency crisis/squeeze has resulted in

the continued devaluation of the domestic currency, rapid inflation, and all

else that has manifested itself in the current Zimbabwe economic crisis.

(e) In addition, both the US and the EU froze financial and other assets of

persons, or companies linked to ZANU PF who it is alleged sustain the ZANU

PF government.

5.0 Misinformation and propaganda

For almost a decade now, the British government has sustained a campaign against

Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. The British government describes Mugabe’s country as

corrupt and non-democratic. Mugabe is considered as a brutal dictator who must be

removed from power at all cost. In its estimation, he is too old; Zimbabweans deserve

a democratic government, human rights, regular meals and a stable currency.

Unfortunately, this also happens to be the mindset of the conventional British media

on the matter. One cannot surpass the BBC, Sky news or the Economist in this

propaganda. These foot soldiers of neo-imperial Britain have trekked miles to sell

their pear-shaped campaign of calumny against Mugabe. For example, the Economist

of March 15, 2007 raised this alarm for the umpteenth time:

"Once the bread-basket of southern Africa and one of the continent's

wealthiest countries, Zimbabwe is now a basket-case and suffers a severe

shortage of food. It is also the world's fastest-shrinking peacetime economy,

with unemployment now standing at 80 percent. Its inflation rate is the world's

highest: currently 1 730 percent, although the IMF thinks that figure could

rise to over 4 000 percent by year's end. From infant mortality to life below

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 the poverty line, the country's unhappiest trendlines run remorselessly

upwards. To stifle dissent and quash opposition, Zimbabwe has been turned

into a police state where elections are routinely rigged."

The suggestion that Zimbabwe’s economy is as disabled as it is because of

mismanagement is partly true but misleading. What Mugabe has done is to

mismanage the endemic crisis caused by the country’s inability to access capital,

which in turn are the result of a raft of economic sanctions in place against the

country. The Western Countries must take a fair share of blame for the economic

crisis in Zimbabwe as they have driven the African Nation into a catch-22 situation.

Simply put, owing to the size of the US and British vote and influence in these

institutions, neither the IMF, World Bank nor the African Development Bank will

lend to Zimbabwe, or offer it credit facilities. Therefore, needless to say, as a direct

result of the US 2001 Act, Zimbabwe’s relationship with these multilateral lending

agencies was immediately and severely affected the poor African ailing economy.

Like a sting in the tail, The International Monetary Fund affirmed that it would

maintain its suspension of financial and technical aid to Zimbabwe for failing to clear

its arrears and remedy the Southern African country's deteriorating economic and

social conditions. Hypocritically, the board expressed deep concern over the

deteriorating economic and social conditions and regretted that the authorities have

not undertaken the policies recommended by the IMF, whilst on suspension.

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6.0 Conclusion

Zimbabwe has continued to struggle with the stranglehold that the US and British

government through their surrogate world lending institutions (IMF, World Bank,

ADB etc) have imposed whilst the majority of the black community suffers.

Propaganda to bring down the Mugabe-led government has persisted for almost a

generation and yet the regime continues to defy the international community because

reason at the end of the day has prevailed. There is the cold hand of injustice that the

British government has played in Zimbabwe through the long corridor of History.

With the amazing rise in the Zimbabwe's official inflation rate that has surged to over

231,000,000%, the opposition has resumed calls of appeal to South Africa's former

president, Thabo Mbeki, to rescue the historic power-sharing deal he brokered last

month but the ZANU-PF are no longer interested in discussing the future of the

Country with the opposition and regard Tsvangarirai as a non patriotic-western-boot-

licking slave. The Zimbabwean economy in the meantime has taken a definite tumble

for the worst and the last kicks of the dying embers of the once vibrant economy are

now doing their last legs. With the economy continuing its rapid collapse and no end

in sight to the political deadlock, the World Food Program with the help of local non

governmental organizations have launched a non-partisan program to feed starving

Zimbabweans directly. It said that more than 80% of the country's population was

living on less than £1 a day and nearly half is chronically malnourished.

The latest inflation figures are envisaged to increase pressure on the country's

president, Robert Mugabe to stop stalling over the composition of a new power-

sharing government with the prime minister designate, Morgan Tsvangirai. The

president is demanding security ministries such as the army and police as well as the

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finance portfolio even though foreign donors have made it clear that there will be no

aid to revive the economy unless that falls under Tsvangirai's control. Mugabe views

the demands by the donor community as “posturing” and “interventional” and has

indicated that only Zimbabweans will make decisions for Zimbabwe!

The influence of Britain and the USA on what happens in Zimbabwe has become a

cancerous detriment to the inter-party talks. Western International pressure on the

political process in Zimbabwe has emboldened Mugabe who is currently using the

political maneuverings to allow China and Russia to side with Robert Mugabe’s

government as gesture of support for the beleaguered leader in their own quest for

supremacy in African politics.

The Lancaster house agreement is a sad history that the British government can not

shake off as it is a stigma that can not be erased as long as remedial action is not

considered. Mugabe has legitimacy when he declares that Zimbabwe is for

Zimbabweans and that the land reforms policies are meant to reverse the balance of

economic control from minority white farmers to majority black indigenous

population. Pride as a Nation has as well played a major role in Zimbabweans being

prepared to be in dire poverty than to oust their only source of pride; Robert Mugabe

and Tsavangari have signed an agreement in September 2008 that still jointly holds

the United Kingdom as being responsible for compensating the white farmers that

have had their land seized by the Zimbabwean government. The 30 page document

says in part:

“Britain should compensate those whose lands were taken, describing the

seizure of thousands of white-owned farms as irreversible. The parties hereby

22 | P a g e
 call upon the United Kingdom government to accept the primary responsibility

to pay compensation for land acquired from former landowners for

resettlement,"

The Zimbabwean government has said it would only compensate farmers for

improvements on the farm, not the land. Instead, the agreement states that former

colonial-power Britain should compensate for the land according to the Lancaster

house agreement. The recently signed power-sharing deal underscores this and also

adds that land acquisition and redistribution is irreversible as it is the right of the

Zimbabwean government to autonomously decide on what it intends to do with the

land and the redistribution process without pressure from

Mugabe insists for the following issues to be resolved before he steps down and hand

over power:

(a) Land is at the core of the crisis in Zimbabwe and cannot be separated from

other issues of concern to the Commonwealth or UN such as the rule of law,

respect for human rights, democracy and the economy. A program of land

reform is, therefore, crucial to the resolution of the Zimbabwe problem;

(b) Such a program of land reform must be implemented in a fair, just and

sustainable manner, in the interest of all the people of Zimbabwe, within the

law and constitution of Zimbabwe;

(c) The crisis in Zimbabwe also has political and rule of law implications, which

must be addressed holistically and concurrently. The situation in Zimbabwe

poses a threat to the socio-economic stability of the entire sub-region and the

continent at large;

23 | P a g e
(d) The need to avoid a division within the African neighbours, SADDC,

Commonwealth,; and

(e) The orderly implementation of the land reform can only be meaningful and

sustainable, if carried out with due regard to human rights, rule of law,

transparency and democratic principles. The commitment of the Government

of Zimbabwe is, therefore, crucial to this process.

Unfortunately, Economic sanctions have been used and seen in several countries to

affect and sometimes bring down a whole Nation. Human rights groups are opposed

to economic sanctions as has been proven with time that sanctions tend to simply

affect ordinary citizens and barely touch the regime leaders being targeted. It is highly

bemusing that very highly schooled academicians and learned individuals instigate

these sanctions with full knowledge that the effects do not affect the targeted

individuals. The only sane explanation is that there is a dark movement of West

imperialistic and regime-change notion in the world that needs to be arrested and

shamed for what it is.

Russia, South Africa and China blocking of further economic sanctions against

Zimbabwe using the UN indicates the huge chasm between the west and the rest of

the world. South Africa and the rest of the African Nations that understand the

imperialist approach to Africa by the British and US government shows the resistance

that domination will always churn up anywhere it raise its ugly head. Meddling in

other Nation’s internal politics through systematic economic and political

manoeuvring will constantly be resisted.

24 | P a g e
Mugabe was ready in 2004 to hand over power to younger and better articulate

Zimbabwean men belonging to ZANU-PF until there were serious espionage links to

British and US secret agents that were discovered to have been in touch with these

young men. Mugabe’s obsession that the British government wants to re-colonize the

Nation in whatever format will always be an anchor for the response that the

government has always taken.

Considering, the impasse that has gripped the Nation, the only solution that can be

found is in the hands of the indigenous Zimbabweans and local regional leaders to get

involved. Zimbabwe’s problem is an African problem and can only be resolved by

Africans who have the interest of African affairs at heart.

25 | P a g e
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