PAKISTAN : STATE OF NATION AND FUTURE PROGNOSIS

INTRODUCTION

1. After more than six decades of the creation of Pakistan its pursuit for nationhood still persists. Serious doubts exist about it ever concluding successfully. Pakistan today seems far removed from the vision of participative and representative democracy with which it had been brought into existence in 1947. 2. The different constitutions of Pakistan (1956, 1962, 1973) were democratic in ethos; Democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam, giving Muslims freedom to their lives in accordance with the teachings of Islam, but with minorities having full freedom to profess their own religion.1

3. However, these are the very principles which successive regimes, whether democratic or military have failed to achieve. In Pakistan between politicians and military, the military has had an upper hand in all the power struggles. The government has changed hands numerous times in the last 64 years and over this period alternating between military governments and a fragile democratically elected civilian setup. Whatever be the government, corruption, nepotism, unprecedented inflation, terrorism, extremism and human rights violation have been plaguing the nation with serious internal challenges. 4. While one would not exult over Pakistans misery with claims of retribution, one does pity Pakistans current state of affairs. Pakistan would not be in the state it is at the moment if the army hadnt, always, held the paramount position it does in the Pakistani establishment. Right now, it almost enjoys de facto supervision vis-vis the civil administration. Most important of all, the terrorists bringing the country on its knees are the creation of the ISI, the state within the Pakistani state. 2 Time and again, religious and sentimental issues have dominated the thought process of the ruling class, at the cost of developmental progress.

5. The nation has been plagued with a myriad of issues rather than channelizing its energies towards development. Historically, there are many underlying reasons for this. After the creation of Pakistan, the state found itself with five different nationalisms. The different national sentiments and the religious extremism with sub divisions continue to create national threats for Pakistans internal political life. It is
1 2

Dr Ainslie T. Embree, Professor Emeritus, Columbia University. M.K.D. Prasada Rao. 2009. State of Pakistan: Letters to Editor, Indian Express, April 2. Available at www.indianexpress.com. Accessed on 2.1.2012.

2 interesting to note that although the territories of Pakistans two major ethnic groups, the Pakhtun and the Baloch, are controlled by Pakistan but they share a strong culture with their respective fellow compatriots in Afghanistan and Iran more than with the Punjabi ethnic groups in Pakistan. This creates a balkanisation in the state and these areas not only demand autonomy but the extremist perspectives want to break free of Pakistan. 6. The present research, thus, focuses on analysing the fault lines which have led to the present crisis in Pakistan and paint scenarios, for the future prospects for the state. HYPOTHESIS 7. There are numerous fault lines within the state of Pakistan which have tended to introduce deep fissures in the politics of the country and have hampered its growth and prosperity. Given the prevailing conditions and factors influencing the state of Pakistan, in the future, the status quo is likely to be maintained. Therefore, it is hypothised that amidst its vexing challenges, Pakistan will muddle through and continue with its present state of diluted democratic setup. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 8. The paper seeks to analyse the varied fault lines that have created deep fractures in the state of Pakistan, since its genesis and against this background, examine possible scenarios that Pakistan might face in times to come. TERMS OF REFERENCE 9. Diverse fault lines exist within Pakistan that have hampered its growth and prosperity. 10. In future, these fault lines will continue to have adverse effect on Pakistan and the state will continue in its present condition of compromised civilian democratic rule

3 SCOPE

11.

The research project has been divided into the following parts:(a) Part I External policies. with respect to its relations with (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (b) Afghanistan India America China. Perceptions of the state of Pakistan

Part II Balkanisation of State. (i) (ii) (iii) Pashtunistans Problems. Sindh Sentiments. The Bomb in Baluchistan.

(c) (d)

Part III Polarisation : Sectarian Divide. Part IV Radical Outlook. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Radicalisation of Islam. Toll on political leadership. Effects on Pakistan society & politics. Radicalisation : Shift towards Militancy.

(e)

Part V- State of economy. (i) (ii) (iii) Role of Donor Agencies & Influence of Aid on Economic Policy. Impact of Foreign Aid on The National Economic Policy. Diagnosing the Pakistani Economys Ailments.

(f)

Part VI Role of military in society and governance. (i) Military dominance: Basis and reasons.

4 (ii) (iii) Brief of military regimes. Fallouts of primacy of the military.

(g)

Part VII - Progonsis on Future of Pakistan (i) (ii) Political stable civil democratic government. Break down of the country into Baltic states.

(iii) Pakistan controlled by hard liners and turned into an Islamic state. (iv) (v) Parallel Pakistans. Civil or Military authorisation.

PART I - FOREIGN POLICIES

12. Pakistan has constants and variables that have driven its external behaviour. It has always sought extra regional linkages to narrow its power gap with its larger neighbour, India. This attitude towards India has been the only constant in its foreign policy since its birth. Pakistans perception of India as an existential threat has left it with no time or patient idealism in foreign policy such as hobnobbing with nonalignment or Panchshila. The variables have been the partners it has turned to, initially to Western alliances and now to China. The length of its relationship with China, however, is rendering this into a constant. Pakistans recent bitter experiences with the West and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have further inclined it to China. For Pakistan China is not just a counterpoise to the regional preeminent power ie India but also to other global actors. But as the history goes, Pakistans allies have always turned around because of its radical and fundamentalist non state actors calling the shots. What is left to be seen is how far china will go in supporting Pakistan. Indo Pakistan Relations. 13. No two countries in the world have so much in common as India and Pakistan. Yet they have perpetually been in a state of undeclared war with varying degrees of intensity. Pakistans aggression in Kargil (1999) brought the two countries on the verge of a nuclear confrontation. The legacy of suspicion and mistrust predates the partition of India in 1947. Pakistan is concerned at the possibility of Indias domination in the region and its inability to match Indias power all by itself. Pakistan developed a perception that it is an incomplete state without Kashmir being incorporated into it. On the other hand, India perceives Kashmirs accession and integration into India as an essential element of its secular and federal democratic

5 structure. Pakistan suffered another humiliation, when its Eastern wing, 1000 miles away from West Pakistan successfully waged an independence struggle in 1971. India played a key role in the war to liberate Bangladesh. The birth of Bangladesh proved to be the final burial of two-nation theory on the basis of which Pakistan puts a claim to Kashmir. 14. Attitude Towards India (a) Gen Public. A majority of Pakistanis still consider India as a major threat and view America as an enemy. According to a 2010 Pew survey, they are far less concerned about the Taliban and Al- Qaida, and when asked which is the greatest threat to their country India, the Taliban or Al-Qaida. Slightly more than half of Pakistanis (53 percent) choose India, compared with 23 percent for the Taliban and just three percent for Al-Qaida. Roughly 72 percent said it is important for relations with India to improve, and about 75 percent support increased trade and further talks with India. Fiftynine percent of the respondents described America as an enemy, and only eight percent trusted President Barack Obama. (b) Army. Within Pakistan, the policy towards India will continue to be dictated by the army, which shows no sign of flexibility on major issues and a great deal of frustration with hardline Indian attitudes. The armys India problem is complicated by the popular view (in the cantonments) that India only understands the language of force, an attitude that led to the politically catastrophic crossing of the Line of Control in 1999, in the Kargil region. 15. Contentious Issues. (a) Kashmir. The conflict in Kashmir dates to the partition of India in 1947. The State of Jammu & Kashmir was at this time majority Muslim but with a Hindu ruler, and it was unclear whether it would accede to Pakistan or India. Its eventual accession to India became a matter of dispute between the two countries, with both India and Pakistan claiming ownership of Kashmir. After a brief war in 1947-48, Kashmir was divided between Pakistan and India administered territories. A ceasefire line was agreed under UN supervision, which has since been renamed the Line of Control. Around one third of the territory has since been administered by Pakistan, with the remainder administered by India, including Kashmir Valley, which has a strong Muslim majority. Further wars have broken out between India and Pakistan in Kashmir in 1965 and 1999, whilst there is also a Kashmir separatist movement. Given the apparently irreconcilable territorial claims in Kashmir, there is no immediate end in sight to this conflict. (b) Terrorism. Pak has been sponsoring terrorism in India from its territory for more than two decades now. Pakistan was founded on the premise that Hindus and Muslims were two separate people, and could not live together. Kashmirs separation from India would vindicate that stand and give ideological sustenance to the two-nation theory. To meet this objective, Pakistan foments cross-border terrorism, and provides financial support as

6 well as safe haven to terrorists operating in India. Terrorism in Kashmir is projected as an insurgent movement to break away from India and join Pakistan. The most dangerous terror menace comes from Kashmiri groups based in Pakistan with long and intimate connections to Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e Tayiba. This was founded in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s by a group of Kashmiri activists with the assistance of the Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate or ISI. The ISI has been an architect of the Kashmiri insurgency and uses terrorism to undermine Indian control of Kashmir. (c) River Water. Water issues between India and Pakistan are historically constructed, emotionally charged, and politically divisive. Although water is technically not a core issue between the two, differences over the use of the rivers in recent years have the potential to derail any peacemaking efforts. When we talk about the water relations between India and Pakistan, we have essentially the Indus system in mind. That is the only river system common to the two countries and very important to Pakistan because 80% of that country falls within the Indus basin. Water-sharing on the Indus River between India and Pakistan stands settled by the Indus Waters Treaty 1960. However, the operation of the Treaty has been characterised by an unending series of disagreements. The Arbitration Clause in the Treaty has been invoked twice, once over the Baglihar Project and again over the Kishenganga Project. The first case has been settled by a Neutral Expert, but dissatisfaction continues in Pakistan. The second case is before a Court of Arbitration. (d) Nuclear Wpns. In the wake of their nuclear tests in May 1998 and the abandonment of nuclear ambiguity for an overt nuclear nation status, tension between India and Pakistan has reached to new heights. Almost a year after their tests, both states clashed in Kargil an off shoot of Kashmir, which had nearly culminated into an all-out conventional war that could have assumed a nuclear dimension. Pakistan maintains that the presence of a nuclear deterrent prevented the outbreak of a fourth India-Pakistan war. (e) China' Role in Indo- Pakistan Relations. Chinas strategists recognize the enduring nature of the India-Pakistan enmity and exploit it to Beijings advantage. In fact, Beijing has long been the most important player in the India-Pakistan-China triangular relationship. Since the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, China has aligned itself with Pakistan and made heavy strategic and economic investments in that country to keep the common enemy, India, under strategic pressure. Interestingly, Chinas attempts to improve ties with India since the early 1990s have been accompanied by parallel efforts to bolster the Pakistani militarys nuclear and conventional capabilities vis--vis India. (f) Afghanistan. Pakistan cites India's influence in Afghanistan as one of its top concerns. Pakistan worries about having to defend both its eastern and western borders if India and Afghanistan grow too close. Pakistan also alleges that India uses its consulates in Afghanistan to conduct espionage, stirring up anti government forces in Pakistan's frontier regions. Beyond security concerns, Pakistan worries that India has historically

7 supported minority ethnic factions in Afghanistan, creating tensions with the more numerous Pashtuns who live on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Sino Pak Relations 16. An enduring feature of international relations in contemporary times has been the high level of bilateral connections between China and Pakistan. Initially, they were strange bedfellows; one a socialist state and the other Muslim-majority, one a Western ally and the other a significant member of the Eastern Bloc. Yet, driven by perceived mutual common interests they managed to achieve such close proximity that the relationship now appears to have become deep-rooted, multi-dimensional and sustainable. President Hu Jintao has described it as higher than the mountains and deeper than the seas. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani has matched the poetic parlance by describing China as the most beloved of all nations 17. Irritants for Pakistan. some ruffled feathers. Occasionally, along the way there have been

(a) Pakistan has not been satisfied with the reasons why China never militarized the strong verbal support during the Indo Pakistan wars of 1965 or 1971. This was particularly true, during the Kargil conflict in 1999, when China appeared to take a neutral position between India and Pakistan and had asked the visiting Pakistani Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz, to settle disputes peacefully through dialogue and negotiations. Indeed in 1996, Chinese President Jiang Zemin did cause some ripples in Pakistan, when he asked d Pakistan to build a cooperative relationship with India and set aside the difficult issues. The reference to Kashmir was not specifically mentioned but widely understood. In fact, China had always been a bit uncomfortable on the continued stress on Kashmir by Pakistan. As a principle, china felt that selfdetermination could have adverse ramification for Tibet and the Nationalism based on religion was unpalatable, due to ramifications for the Chinese Muslims of Xinjiang. Also, on the part of China, there was some unhappiness over the former Pakistan President Pervez Musharrafs leanings towards the US. (b) In 2008, when Islamabad almost went bankrupt, Beijing refused to bail it out and recently China stopped aid for a project in Sindh because of deteriorating security.

18. Chinese Concerns. own sets of inflictions.

It is not only Pakistan but also china which has its

(a) Ten thousand Chinese workers reside in Pakistan and a fair of them have been kidnapped or killed in the last few years.

number

(b) Pakistan's northwest frontier has provided a sanctuary for Uighur separatist militants from China's Xinjiang province, some of whom were trained in Pakistani camps before returning to China. Chinese officials allege

8 that the Uighur East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the likely perpetrator of a deadly attack on Chinese border police before Beijing Olympics has established its military headquarters in Pakistan. (c) At home, China leverages its relationship with Pakistan as a way to control the Muslim Uighur activists but Beijing is coming to resent Pakistan's refusal to stop supporting militant groups that may be training Uighurs in Pashtun regions or elsewhere.

19. Chinese interest in Afghanistan. In addition to containing India, the other dimension opening up in the Sino-Pak relationship is the Chinese interest in Afghanistan. The US seems to believe that China would step in if the United States abandoned Pakistan. Last October, Chinese diplomats even told their American counterparts that "Pakistan is our Israel," by which they meant, right or wrong, they would support it. For the United States, Chinese involvement complicates the regional balance of power and risks making Pakistan another North Korea, a nuclear pariah locked in the orbit of the Chinese big brother. US Pakistan Relations

20. The long and checkered Pakistan-U.S. relationship has its roots in the Cold War and South Asia regional politics of the 1950s. U.S. concerns about Soviet expansionism and Pakistans desire for security assistance against a perceived threat from India prompted the two countries to negotiate a mutual defense assistance agreement in 1954. By 1955, Pakistan had further aligned itself with the West by joining two regional defense pacts, the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. As a result of these alliances, Islamabad received nearly $2 billion in U.S. assistance from 1953 to 1961, including $508 million in military aid. Differing expectations of the security relationship have long bedeviled bilateral ties. During and immediately after the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, the United States suspended military assistance to both sides, resulting in a cooling of the Pakistan - U.S. relationship and a perception among some in Pakistan that the United States was not a reliable ally. In the mid-1970s, new strains arose over Pakistans efforts to respond to Indias 1974 underground test of a nuclear device by seeking its own nuclear weapons capability. Limited U.S. aid was resumed in 1975, but was suspended again in 1979 by the Carter Administration in response to Pakistans covert construction of a uranium enrichment facility. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, Pakistan was again viewed as a frontline ally in the effort to block Soviet expansionism. In 1981, the Reagan Administration negotiated a five-year, $3.2 billion aid package with Islamabad. Pakistan became a key transit country for arms supplies to the Afghan resistance, as well as a camp for some three million Afghan refugees, many of whom have yet to return.

9 Contentious Issues. 21. Global War on Terror The last decade has seen a growing sense of dissatisfaction in American circles at Pakistan's unwillingness or inability to tackle its extremist elements in the way the U.S. wishes, combined with deepening resentment in Pakistan about what's seen as America's "imperial" attitude. 22. Osama bin Laden, Pakistan has failed to explain to the US as to why Osama bin Laden was found in Abbottabad and whether it was a case of complicity or negligence. 23. The Haqqani Network The Haqqani network is known to operate out of North Waziristan and yet the Pakistan Army has failed to launch major military operations in the region. This has been a source of tension in Washington. Killing of Pakistan Soldiers in US Air Attacks on Afghan Pak Border. On 26 Nov 2011 NATO helicopters and fighter jets attacked two military outposts in Northwest Pakistan killing 24 Pakistan troops. In response to this incident Pakistan shut down the NATO supply routes through Pakistan to Afghanistan. This has not gone down too well with the US. 24. 25. US Drone Attacks. US drone attacks along Pakistan Afghan border resulting in killing of innocent Pakistan citizens have been a sore point in US Pakistan relations with the Pakistani people clamouring for their military to stop assisting the NATO forces. 26. US Pulling Out of Afghanistan by 2014. There are different schools of thought in terms of how a troop withdrawal is going to impact the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. On one hand, the need for supplies to move through Pakistan decreases as more troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. This is one of the areas where the Pakistanis have leverage over the United States. On the flip side, there are Pakistani concerns about an Afghanistan that is out of control. Part of their support for some of these insurgent movements stems not just from a desire to see an Afghanistan that is friendly to Pakistan, but one that is stable too. Pak Afghanistan 27. Ever since Pakistans birth, Afghanistan has maintained an attitude of a hostile neighbour. At the heart of Afghanistans indifferent attitude towards Pakistan were the issues of Durand Line and Pakhtoonistan. Both of the issues were based on Afghanistans ambitions of regaining control of NWFP and other areas which, for a brief period, were part of Ahmad Shah Abdalis conquered territories. 28. Pakistan has spent 12 years between the Soviet withdrawal and 9/11 clamouring that it has been left to fend itself for handling Afghanistan and its consequences. The United States obliged this time. Its massive military infrastructure in Afghanistan is not going to be given away easily. As the US prepares to partially withdraw from Afghanistan by the middle of next year, recent

10 events point to dangers looming ahead. Feeling the need for strategic depth Pakistan wants to fill in the space, which other regional players are not prepared to allow.3 29. History seems to be taking a full circle . Pakistans future will be shaped by developments in Afghanistan, which track back to Pakistan in three ways: Indian involvement in the country, the American presence, and the connection between Afghanistan and Pakistan created by the overlapping Pashtun population. Of the states with interests in Afghanistan, only Pakistans can be said to be vital; since the Pashtun movement challenges Pakistans sovereignity and its claim that Islam and national unity override ethnic parochialism. 30. Robert Blackwill 3 anticipates the likely failure of the ISAF / American counterinsurgency strategy over the next several years. This is almost certain to promote civil conflict in Afghanistan and set the stage for a regional proxy war. And for all of Pakistans concerns about Indian influence, a civil war in Afghanistan could increase Indian activity, perhaps with American encouragement. Furthermore, the possibility Of Indian military advisors and arms transfer cannot be ruled out, and some Indians speak of using Indias massive training infrastructure to train a new and antiPakistani Afghan army. A negotiated settlement between the Afghan Taliban and the Karzai government would perhaps be the best way for Pakistan to ensure an India free Afghanistan and also to avoid a civil war. 31. Pakistans Perspective. If the Afghan Taliban were to assume power militarily or politically, or enter into a coalition with elements of the Kabul government, the odds of a stable arrangement are slim. If one factors in their radical allies the syndicate, as termed by a White House official, then Pakistan will find many channels of influence in Afghanistan. These include the Haqqani network the Talibans former ally Al-Qaida, the QuettaShura, and several of the Islamist parties active in Pakistan itself. The main issues that Pakistan has in Afghanistan which affects its policy are: (a) The role of India in Afghanistan is of deep concern to Pakistan. The mutual animosity between the two countries has spilt over into Afghanistan. It is of utmost interest to Islamabad to see of New Delhi out of Kabul. The limited presence or even the total absence of India in the affairs of Kabul would be welcomed by Pakistan. India meddling in its backyard & its perceived depth is not acceptable to Pakistan. (b) The future government in Kabul must be on the same wave length as Islamabad. Pakistan would not appreciate an Afghan government at logger heads with it. For Pakistan, Afghanistan is seen as its backyard. Islamabad would like to maintain this situation. (c) Afghanistan provides strategic depth to Pakistan. Islamabad would not like to lose it for reasons that have already been put forth. By the same note
3

http://www.cfr.org/publication/23655/plan_b_in_afghanistan.html.

11 Pakistan would also like to retain its strategic assets that are seen as an integral part of its security apparatus vis-a-vis India. This is also accompanied but other security issues and the enveloping of Pakistan by India. 32. In a single line the interests of Pakistan in Afghanistan can be summed up in the words of Gen Kiyani we want strategic depth in Afghanistan but do not wish to control it. Pakistans main objective guided by the armys perceptions will be to diminish Indias influence in Afghanistan and secure a regime that is minimally hostile to Pakistan. Policy continuity will persist under civilian or military leaders.

PART II BALKANISATION OF STATE

33. Pakistan, as a nation, is divided into five provinces, but the polity, bureaucracy and the military are predominantly controlled singularly by the moost influential province of Pakistan ie Punjab. For the Punjabi, the word Punjab is synonymous to the word Pakistan. Whereas for the Sindhi, Baluchi or the Pasthun, it is far from truth and a matter of long standing grudge. This issue therefore forms the most pronounced factor beind the regional divide or the so called Balkanisation. Pashtunistans Problems

34. The ever increasing co-operation between Pashtun nationalist and Islamist forces against Punjabi dominion could lead to the break-up of Pakistan and Afghanistan and the emergence of a new national entity: an Islamic Pashtunistan.4 35. The disquieting augmentation of al-Qaeda & the Taliban in the Pashtun clannish expanse of north-western Pakistan & southern Afghanistan is habitually accredited to the popularity of their messianic brand of Islam & to the clandestine help from Pakistani intelligence agencies. But another, more ominous rationale also explains their success: their symbiotic relationship with a simmering Pashtun separatist movement that could lead to the unification of the estimated 41 million Pashtuns on both sides of the border, the break-up of Pakistan & Afghanistan, & the emergence of a new national entity, Pashtunistan, under radical Islamist leadership.

36. The central political problem facing Pakistan, largely shielded from international attention by the war on terror, is how to deal with the deep ethnic tensions between the Punjabi majority, which controls the armed forces, and Baluchi,

The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan, St Martins Press, New York, 1983.

12 Sindhi and Pashtun minorities that have been denied a fair share of economic and political power5. 37. If history is a reliable guide, the prospects for the survival of the Pakistani state in its present form, with its existing configuration of constituent ethno-linguistic groups, cannot be taken for granted. There is no precedent in the history of South Asia for a state consisting of the five ethno-linguistic regions that made up Pakistan as originally constituted in 1947, or even for the truncated Pakistan consisting of the four regions that remained after Bangladesh seceded in 1971. The ideologues of Pakistani nationalism exalt the historical memory of Akbar and Aurangzeb as the symbols of a lost Islamic grandeur in South Asia. By contrast, for the Baluchis, Sindhis and Pashtuns, the Moghuls are remembered primarily as the symbols of past oppression.6 38. The Emergence of Nationalism. Non-Pashtuns constituted at least 35% possibly as much as 45% of the population of Afghanistan during the decades preceding the Soviet occupation, and their relative strength has grown in the wake of the large-scale Pashtun refugee movement to Pakistan. As the ethnic balance has changed, the Pashtuns in Afghanistan have intermittently attempted to forge some form of political unity with the Pashtuns in Pakistan that would make possible a restoration of unchallenged Pashtun dominance in Kabul. By the same token as Ghaffar Khans Bannu Declaration of 22 June 1947 demanded that the Pashtuns be given a choice between joining Pakistan and establishing an independent Pashtunistan, rather than a choice limited to Pakistan or India.7

Sindh Nationalism

39. Sindh is Pakistan's second largest province with approximately 24% of the nation's population and is located in the south-eastern part of Pakistan. The partition of 1947 changed the demographic complexion of Sindh. The Muslim Sindhis constituted a majority, while a substantial number of Hindu Sindhis, Christians, and Parsis were also living in that territory, particularly in Karachi, which at the time of partition was a city of 300,000 inhabitants. At the time of partition of 1947, a large number of migrants from India also settled in Sindh, mostly in Karachi. Sindh is the only province of Pakistan where ethnic polarisation is serious because of the presence of large ethnic groups and their clash of interests. The ethnic combustion in Sindh is most distinct due to its disparate ethnic makeup and socio-economic ramifications for the entire nation. 40. Sindh has for centuries been a multi-ethnic province with a Sindhi majority. At Partition, Punjabi Muslims from India were incorporated into the Pakistani Punjab, while those from other regions were forced into Sindh. Communal riots were instigated in order to drive out Sindhi Hindus and make room for this influx of Urduspeaking refugees, calling themselves Mohajirs. They tended to take the place of
5

6 7

Malik Asif Hayat, Ethnicity in Pakistan - A Case Study, Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Session 62, Lahore, Pakistan .

Khalid Athar, Altaf Hussain: Safar-e-Zindagi, Farid Publishers, June 2011 (11th Edition), pp.22-23 Salma Jafar, Karachi politics: Make space for the Pashtuns

13 Sindhi Hindus as traders or professionals, and as the bulk of the industrial working class. The ethnic Sindhi urban population was minute, and remains so. In the following decades, Punjabi and Pathan workers began to pour into the cities of Sindh, leaving ethnic Sindhis in a tiny majority in their own province. In the 1981 census, 52% of the province spoke Sindhi, and 22% Urdu, as their first language. As Urdu was the national language, these migrants have not felt the need to learn Sindhi. Sindhi speakers are in a clear minority in urban areas such as Karachi (54% Urdu, 14% Punjabi, 9% Pathan and 6% Sindhi in 1981). 41. There is a division in the political movement between those who wish to work with Mohajirs and those who wish to work against them. The former claim that being Sindhi is not a matter of language or place of origin: the Baluch, who have been accepted for so long, are included in this definition, as are the Mohajirs, deposited in Sindh by fate and the forces of history. Punjabis however do not qualify in this definition; they are seen as having come to Sindh on the strength of state power, as conquerors and usurpers whose roots lie in the Punjab, and who should be expelled from Sindh and their lands restored to Sindhi ownership. However, this united front view is not shared by all leaders, many of whom for the sake of personal ambition try to outbid the others with even more rabid and chauvinistic expressions of Sindhi nationalism based solely on linguistic ethnicity.

Balochistan 42. Balochistan is the largest among Pakistan's four provinces, comprising 43 percent of land area of the country. But only six per cent of Pakistan's population or around 8 million people inhabit Balochistan. The Baloch make up 54.7 percent of the population while 29 per cent are Pashtun. Despite being the richest province in terms of energy and mineral resources, Balochistan remains one of the most underdeveloped provinces. The Baloch therefore have long been demanding greater autonomy and a larger share of the dividend from natural resources. 43. The denial of autonomy has been a major cause of the ongoing conflict. The 1973 Constitution provided that the concurrent list determining the quantum of provincial autonomy would be revised after every 10 years. This has never been one. Upon assumption of Presidency in October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf promised to, among other things, work towards strengthening the federation, removing interprovincial disharmony and restoring national cohesion. 8 However, this still has not been done. 44. The current state of affairs is exemplified with the political kidnappings in vogue. The relatives of the nationalist leaders and political workers of Balochistan also suffered violations of their rights at the hands of the security agencies. Some of them included Obaidullah and Samiullah Baloch, brothers of Senator Sanaullah Baloch, who were allegedly kidnapped by intelligence agencies near Askari Park in Quetta Cantonment while heading towards Quetta Airport and three relatives of Senator Agha Shahid Bugti of Jamori Watan Party (JWP) identified as Jamal Bugti
8

Shanna Dietz Surendra, Explaining Social Mobilization in Pakistan: A Comparative Case Study of Baluchistan and Azad Kashmir

14 who were kidnapped by intelligence agencies from Sariab Road and Bilal Bugti and Murtiza Bugti who were kidnapped by intelligence agencies.

PART III : SECTARIAN DIVIDE IN PAKISTAN

Religions in Pakistan

45. The state religion in Pakistan is Islam, which is practiced by about 95-98% of the 18,73,43,000 people of the nation. The remaining 2-5% practice Christianity, Hinduism and other religions. Muslims are divided into two major sects: the majority of them practice Sunni Islam, while the Shias are a minority who make up an estimated 5-20%, depending on the source. Nearly all Pakistani Sunni Muslims belong to the Hanafi Islamic law school. The majority of Pakistani Shia Muslims belong to the IthnAshariyyah Islamic law school, with significant minority groups who practice Ismailism, which is composed of Nizari (Aga Khanis), Mustaali, Dawoodi Bohra, Sulaymani and others.

Constitutional Provisions 46. The constitution of Pakistan establishes Islam as the state religion, and provides all its citizens the right to profess, practice and propagate their religion subject to law, public order and morality. The constitution limits the political rights of Pakistan's non-Muslims and only Muslims are allowed to become the President or the Prime Minister. Moreover, only Muslims are allowed to serve as judges in the Federal Shariat Court, which has the power to strike down any law deemed unIslamic. Shia-Sunni Conflict 47. ShiaSunni relations were cordial, and majority of people of both sects participated in the creation the state of Pakistan in 1940s. Despite the fact that Pakistan is a Sunni majority country, Shias have been elected to top offices and played an important part in the country's history. Several top Pakistani Generals such as General Muhammad Musa and Pakistan's President Yahya Khan were Shia. Pakistan's President and Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was Shia as was his daughter Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and her husband, President Asif Ali Zardari. There are many inter-marriages between Shias and Sunnis.

15

48. Pakistan, the country with the second largest Muslim population in the world, has seen serious Shia-Sunni discord. Almost 80% of Pakistan's population is Sunni and 20% being Shia. This Shia minority forms the second largest Shia population of any country and is larger than the Shia majority in Iraq. 49. Some see a precursor of Pakistani ShiaSunni strife, in the April 1979 execution of deposed President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, on questionable charges by Islamic fundamentalist General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was Shia and Zia ul-Haq was a Sunni. Zia-ul-Haq's islamization that followed was resisted by Shias who saw it as "Sunnification. Further exacerbating the situation was the dislike between Shia leader Imam Khomeini and General Zia ul-Haq. 50. Shia formed student associations and subsequently a Shia party whereas Sunni began to form sectarian militias recruited from Deobandi and Ahl alHadith madrasas. Preaching against the Shia in Pakistan was done by radical cleric Israr Ahmed. Muhammad Manzour Numani. He was a senior Indian cleric with close ties to Saudi Arabia. 51. Anti-Shia groups in Pakistan include the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-eSahaba Pakistan, offshoots of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). The groups demand the expulsion of all Shias from Pakistan and have killed hundreds of Pakistani Shias between 1996 and 1999. As in Iraq they "targeted Shia in their holy places and mosques, especially during times of communal prayer." From January to May 1997, Sunni terror groups assassinated 75 Shia community leaders "in a systematic attempt to remove Shias from positions of authority." Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has declared Shia to be "American agents" and the "near enemy" in global jihad. 52. From 19872007, as many as 4,000 people are estimated to have died in sectarian fighting in Pakistan and 300 being killed in 2006. Amongst the culprits blamed for the killing are Al-Qaeda working "with local sectarian groups" to kill what they perceive as Shia apostates." Most violence takes place in the largest province of Punjab and the country's commercial and financial capital, Karachi. There have also been conflagrations in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and PoK. An example of an early Shia Sunni fitna shootout occurred in Kurram, one of the tribal agencies of the Northwest Pakistan, where the Pushtun population was split between Sunnis and Shia. 53. Arab states especially Saudi Arabia and GCC states have been funding extremist Deobandi Sunnis and Wahabis in Pakistan, since the Afghan Jihad. Whereas Iran has been funding Shia militant groups such as Sipah-eMuhammad Pakistan, resulting in a tit for tat attacks on each other. Pakistan has became a battleground between Saudi Arabia funded Deobandi Sunni and Wahabis and Iran funded Shia causing deaths of thousands of innocent Muslims.

16 54. Sunnis dominate Shias by a large number in Pakistan. The tension between these two groups hinges around their religious beliefs. (a) Shias Demands. Recognition of the Shia political party, Fiqah Jaaferia, formed with Iranian funding. Proportional representation in all walks of life. (b) Sunnis Demands. Enforcement of Hanafai Fiqah, the Sunni law, on all Muslims in Pakistan. Ban on Moharram processions of Shias. (c) Aggravation of Situation. (i) Afghan War. Saudi Arabia and the Iran lent support to their sects to strengthen their followers and settle scores on Pakistani soil. (ii) Zia`s Hand. General Zia established Islamic courts and towed the Sunni line, thus boosting Sunni confidence and militancy. In 1984, they formed the militant organisation Anjuman-E-Sahaba Pakistan. Their main demands have been: (aa) (ab) Declare Pakistan a Sunni state. Declare Shias and other sects as minorities.

Ahmedia Issue 55. The two million odd Ahmedias in Pakistan believe in Mirza Ghulam Ahmed and do not accept the finality of Prophet Mohammed. This difference in faith has led to violent clashes with orthodox Muslims. 56. History of Riots. (a) 1953. In 1953, first anti-Ahmedia riot in Punjab took place. It led to the imposition of martial law and the breakdown of the civil government.

(b) 1974. In 1974, Mr Bhutto, the then Prime Minister declared the Ahmedias as non-Muslims through a constitutional amendment, and were eased out from important government posts. Their places of worship were closed down and they were barred from practicing their religion in public. (c) General Zia`s Eighth Amendment ensured that Ahmedias were relegated to second class citizens, by giving them segregated electorates.

17 PART IV : RADICAL OUTLOOK

57. After emerging from the partition of British India in Aug 1947; Pakistan's secular elite used Islam as a national rallying cry against perceived and real threats from predominantly Hindu India. They assumed that the country's clerics and Islamists were too weak and too dependent on the state to confront the power structure. Unsure of their fledgling nation's future, the politicians, civil servants, and military officers who led Pakistan in its formative years decided to exacerbate the antagonism between Hindus and Muslims that had led to partition as a means of defining a distinctive identity for Pakistan with "Islamic Pakistan" resisting "Hindu India. 58. Radical Islamic groups, which portray themselves as the guardians of Pakistan's ideology, have been granted special status by the military-civil bureaucracy that normally governs Pakistan. The Islamists claim that they are the protectors of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent capability as well as champions of the national cause of securing Kashmir for Pakistan. Secular politicians, who seek greater autonomy for Pakistan's different regions or demand that religion be kept out of the business of the state, have come under attack from the Islamists for deviating from Pakistan's ideology.9 Islamisation and Radicalisation In Pakistan 59. Jinnah, the founder-father of Pakistan, envisioned a democratic, secular federation of states as a homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent. After Pakistans defeat in the war of 1971, the leadership of the country fell to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who created a unique combination of Islam and socialism, which was designed to give legitimacy to his government. The Constitution of 1973 retained the name of the country as Islamic Republic of Pakistan and more importantly declared the state religion of Pakistan as Islam. In 1977, General Zia Ul Haq deposed Bhutto in a military coup on the grounds of saving the country from degeneration and instability. Islamist organizations that had never supported military regimes before were used by General Zia through a policy of Islamisation and promoting Jamaat members and their allies to ministerial positions. 60. Zias interpretation of Islam was basically drawn from the Deobandi and Jamaat-i-Islamis view of religion. During this period Pakistan recorded its greatest increase in religious parties, sectarian organizations, and jihad-related organizations. The country also recorded its highest ever growth rate in religious schools, as the number of Madrassas increased from 600 in 1982 to approximately 7,000 by 2002 which has crossed the count of 30,000 in the recent past.10

Between Mosque & Military : Hussain Haqqani, Pakistani Ambassador to US,pp 3

10

Robert Looney, "Reforming Pakistan's Educational System: The Challenge of the Madrassas," Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Fall 2003:pp 260.

18 Radical Jihadi Groups of Pakistan 61. Pakistan has been home to a large number of radical jihadi groups, which are operating with bases both within Pakistan, and outside its territory. Many of these groups are often in a state of transition with events like splits, mergers, changes in names, or changes in affiliation being quite common. These can be divided as: (a) Sectarian. Groups such as the Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Shia Tehrik-e- Jafria, which are engaged in violence within Pakistan. (b) Anti-Indian. Terrorist groups that operate with the alleged support of the Pakistani military and the intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), and the Harakat ul-Mujahadeen (HuM). (c) Afghan Taliban. The original Taliban movement and especially its Kandahari leadership centered around Mullah Mohammad Omar believed to be now living in Quetta. (d) Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The organization which was led by Osama bin Laden and other non-South Asian terrorists believed to be ensconced in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Foreign militant groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Group, the Libyan Islamic Fighters Group and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement are also located in FATA. (e) The Pakistani Taliban. Groups consisting of extremist outfits in the FATA, led by individuals such as Hakimullah Mehsud, of the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan, Maulana Faqir Muhammad of Bajaur, and Maulana Qazi Fazlullah of the Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM).11

Effects of Islamic Radicalisation on Pak Society & Governance

62. Zia government (1979-88), gave free hand to religious extremists organizations having Jihadi motivations and orientations which they used to their utmost to strengthen them within the Pakistan policy. To win the fundamentalists sympathy, Zias reactionary bourgeois military dictatorship took over their projects for Islamic reforms and used them to its own advantage.12 63. Despair and frustration arising from political instability and dictatorial regimes, resulted in extremism, fundamentalism, intolerance, and socio-political annihilation of minorities. The madrassas have become the home for deserted children and for children of poor families as well. The rural poor have no gateway to modern
11
12

Jayshree Bajoria, "Pakistan's New Generation of Terrorists," Council on Foreign Relations,2010: pp 2. Ali, Tariq. (2002). The Clash of Fundamentalism. London: Verso.Pp. 189.

19 education. They are driven to madrassas, which are located all over Pakistan, where education is free with free hostel, food and clothing. They naturally act as magnets to draw talibs (students) which are subsequently converted into Jihadis.13 By joining sectarian based movements and organizations, the unemployed youth have found an occupation to earn livelihood an ideology to live with and a new family in which they found security and feeling of belongingness. The net outcome of the journey of extremism in Pakistan is an intolerant culture being imposed on any inhere ably progressive society which is otherwise keen to live a modern, productive and normal life. 64. The problem of militancy is embedded in the extended society; the way in which the state is being governed and the kinds of relief a citizen is denied, through lack of normal economic, legal and administrative or political processes. There is a feeling of deprivation among a large majority of the people. This practice has severely compromised merit, excellence, and professionalism which have been replaced by the mediocre. All these trends promote militancy, as citizens have no customary channels to redress their grievances. Moreover, Talibanisation is growing amidst political instability and ethnic tensions.14 65. Talibanisation. A number of religious and sectarian groups in Pakistan have joined hands with Al-Qaeda, Taliban and many of them claim themselves to be Pakistani Taliban. All these militant groups want transformation of the society according to their own particular fundamentalist view point which seems to be very close to the views of Taliban. Two events in recent years show how Talibanisation is entering into the society. The dreadful alarming situation arose was an eye opener for all when in 2009 a local hard core Islamic cleric Maulana Fazlulla took over Swat, an area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwah, famous for its natural beauty and tourism. Establishing his so called Islamic rule over there, his style of occupation was similar to that of hard core Taliban. All video and CD shops were destroyed or closed. Women were not allowed to go out. A large number of girls schools were also destroyed. A military operation had to be launched against these elements and to do so a very large number of internally displaced persons were moved from Swat to other areas. The operation ended with Maulana being removed and the beautiful Swat valley destroyed.

Toll on Pak Political Leadership

66. The most tragic and saddening of all incidents was the killing of Ms Benazir Bhutto who was an educated, liberal and moderate leader. After being threatened by fundamentalist elements she was eventually killed by them leaving political vacuum and instability of Pakistan.15

13 14

Datta, S.K. and Sharma Rajeev (2002). Pakistan from Jinnah to Jehad. New Delhi: UBS Publishers Distributors Pvt. Ltd. pp. 216. National Security Paper 2009-10. (2010). National Strategy for Countering Extremism and Terrorism. Islamabad: National Defence University. pp. 128.
17

Niaz, Unaiza. (2011). Wars, Insurgencies, and Terrorist Attacks: A Psychological Perspective from the Muslim World. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 171, 181.

20 67. Two more recent tragic and painful incidents in 2010 show how radicalisation and intolerance are spreading in Pakistan. Due to flourishing of radical views, the Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer was shot down by his own extremist bodyguard after he had raised certain concerns regarding interpretation of blasphemy law. Few months later, on the same issue the Minister for Minorities; Shahbaz Bhatti was killed by militant extremists in Islamabad. These incidents have become not only a matter of grave concern for the moderates and civil society but also for the government.

Radicalisation : Shift to Militancy 68. In Pakistan today, radicalisation has turned to militancy which has become an extremely complex phenomenon. Since 2001, when Pakistan joined the war on terror, there has been a significant deterioration in the security situation in Pakistan. As an increasing number of suicide attacks rock Pakistan's major cities, concerns for the country's security are rising. In recent years, many new terrorist groups have emerged, several existing groups have reconstituted themselves, and a new crop of militants has emerged which is more violent and less conducive to political solutions than their predecessors. Links between many of these new and existing groups have strengthened, giving rise to fresh concerns for stability. Pakistani authorities have long had ties to militant groups based on their soil that largely focused their efforts in Afghanistan and India. But with Pakistan joining the United States as an ally in its "war on terrorism", Islamabad has seen harsh blowback on its policy of backing militants operating abroad.

PART V- STATE OF ECONOMY 80. Pakistans economy was unable to reach its growth target for the current fiscal year, as 2.5% GDP growth was achieved in the year 2010-2011 while the target was 4%. The economy suffered a loss of $10billion dollars due to the floods in 2010, & the uncertain security situation also damaged the economy. The investment for 2011-2012 is 13.4% of the GDP, which is lower by 2% from last year the external debt had increased by $544million. The GDP for 2011-12 of few of the countries in Asia are mentioned below for comparison with Pakistan to get the initial feelers of the countrys present economic state :(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) China: 9.5%. India: 7.8%. Sri Lanka: 7.0%. Bangladesh: 6.3%. Pakistan: 2.4%.

21 81. Donor Agencies And Influence of Aid on Economic Policy. There are three leading multilateral agencies IMF, World Bank and the ADB that provide loans and credit. All three institutions pursue a common objective of promoting economic growth and reduce unemployment. These agencies have contributed significantly in providing assistance to Pakistan and almost 50 percent of external debt is owed to these institutions. (a) International Monetary Fund (IMF). The prolonged use of Fund resources in Pakistan has not been very successful in achieving the desired objectives. One of the major reasons was that the successive governments used foreign resources to fix the external payment imbalances but they did not adopt complementary policy reform. (b) The World Bank. The World Bank has played an important and essential role in the development process of Pakistan particularly in modifying the structure of the economy to restore growth. The bank focuses on supporting the governments development strategy and is organized around three mutually reinforcing pillars which are strengthening macroeconomic stability and government effectiveness, strengthening and enabling the investment climate and supporting pro-poor and pro-gender equity policies. The World Bank is funding US$ 1.2 billion for 18 active projects and, over the past five years, an additional US$ 1.5 billion in adjustment lending to strengthen the government's broader reform programs. The World Bank is the main financer of Pakistans Poverty Alleviation Fund, which provides assistance to poor communities throughout the country. (c) Asian Development Bank (ADB): ADB in Pakistan is presently undertaking various initiatives to promote social protection and social safety mechanisms, capital market reforms, reforms at the Provincial level,support for Devolution, etc. Loans totaling US$13.55 bn were approved for specific schemes. 82. Impact of Foreign Aid. Foreign aid consists of loans and grants. Pakistans dependence on foreign aid is very high and significant enough to make a difference to its national economy. The economic turnaround in Pakistan can be attributed to September 11, 2001. In terms of external debt indicators the burden has actually fallen in the last four years. . 83. Diagnosing the Pakistani Economys Ailments. Some of the signs of Pakistans economic illness are: (a) Inflation. While inflation recently touched 25%. Major reasons for the current hike include: rise in aggregate demand due to an unprecedented rise in private sector credit, the oil price spike and the food shortages. (b) Trade Deficit. Another challenge is the increasing trade deficit. The trade deficit is widening due to an unprecedented rise in imports due to higher trade deficit & increase in imports of machinery. The higher oil imort bill due to higher international oil prices is a source of concern but is beyond their

22 control. The higher machinery import, on the other hand, is still welcome as it is a reflection of the growing capacity of the economy. (c) Human Resource Devp. Investment in developing human resources, which is the single most dominating factor that has kept the country below its potential. Technical and vocational education has fallen woefully short of providing the skills that are required by the economy. (d) Investment in Infrastructure. Higher growth rates for an extended period of time in the range of 7 to 8 percent annually are possible only if energy, water resources and infrastructure needs are fully met. (e) Widening Tax Base. In a country of 180 million, less than 1% of people pay income tax. Billions of rupees of government revenue never make it into the treasury because of leakages, waste and corruption. (f) Inconsistency and Confusion. During the last four years, four governors changed hands at the State Bank of Pakistan, four finance ministers, four finance secretaries, and five heads of the Central Board of Revenue. (g) The Political Economy of Defense. In addition to defense spending, the omnipresence of the military in the Pakistani state has had several deleterious consequences. While authoritarianism is not inherently bad for economic growth, the armys control of the state has meant that economic decisions take place in an environment that is contorted by the heavy hand of the military, which makes economic growth uncertain. As an example, economic decisions like which country to buy certain products from are determined primarily by strategic concerns as opposed to economic ones. (h) Lack of a Long-Term Social Contract. The civilian elite must also share in the blame, as they have been unwilling to create an implicit social contract with the Pakistani people. Without a vision or a long-term commitment, there has been no concomitant long-term economic plan. Thus, every change of government has led to new mistakes and new plans, augmenting the rollercoaster nature of Pakistans economic growth. (j) The Political Economy of Aid. Pakistan has always been an incredibly aid-dependent country, but once it became a frontline state due to American security concerns, the aid became much more oriented towards unproductive sources like the military. Pakistan has foregone deep-seated infrastructural reform because it knows its nuclear weapons and importance in fighting terrorists guarantee continued Western aid.

23 PART VI ROLE OF MILITARY IN SOCIETY AND GOVERNANCE 84. Democratic governance is a system of government wherein all the people of a country have the choice to vote and elect their representatives, who in turn govern the country by the legitimacy provided by this process. Traditional democratic structure demands civilian control of the military. However, governance in Pakistan has been alternating between civilian democratic governments and militarydominated rule. India and Pakistan were carved out of the erstwhile British India on 15 and 14 Aug 1947 respectively and inherited the same constitution (i.e. Government of India Act of 1935). Formed with the intent of a Parliamentary and Representative Democracy by its founder father M.A. Jinnah, Pakistan has taken on an altered civil-military relationship. Military dominance: Basis and Reasons 85. The immediate and foremost requirement of the newly formed Pakistan was to frame a democratic constitution for the country. The debate over the representation of eastern and western wings of the country and religion versus secularism were the two main hindrances in the way of framing the constitution .The framed constitution failed twice. Finally, after a lapse of more than quarter of a century (1947-1973) they had a constitution envisaging a federal, democratic structure for the country. After that a parliamentary form of government16 came into being. But the delay in framing the constitution harmed the growth of political democracy. 86. Secondly, all governments in Pakistan have offered unequivocal commitment to maintaining a strong military for protecting the countrys security needs. Such commitment of intent and resources promoted the militarys growth. Pakistan does have the British legacy of functional institutions such as the nations military and the bureaucracy which have been able to sustain the state. The members of the civil and military services have the basic educational facilities, such as a number of staff colleges and academies, for training them to do their jobs. As a result, the military and civil service officers are reasonably competent in carrying out their assigned responsibilities.17 Civilian institutions however did not experience a simultaneous strengthening and civilian governments vulnerable to military intervention in politics.18 87. Thirdly, security pressures on Pakistan due to strained relations with India, Afghanistans claim on Pakistani territory and sporadic troubles in the tribal areas also helped to grow the stature of military to grow. The military continued to enjoy respect in society. It was too powerful for civilians to tamper with and virtually ran itself without outside interference. So when the military decided to displace civilian

18

Nor ul haq, Governance and democracy in Pakistan:weaknesses,strengths and prospects, IPRI journal X, no. 1 (winter 2010):1-21. Available at ipripak.org/journal/. Accessed on29.12.11 17 Riaz Haq, Failure of Democracy and Governance in Pakistan, Pg. 15. Available at www.DEFENCE.PK. Accessed on 13.12.11. 18 Babar Sattar. A Military- Political Complex? Legal Eye. Available at www.sarid.net/governance/index.htm. Accessed on 12.1.12 .

24 governments in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999, it faced no opposition and many groups welcomed the assumption of power by the military19. 88. Fourthly, Pakistan was created on the basis of religion. In Pakistan, the concept of nationalism was observed for two patterns; one that was based on religion and another, which was based on territory. Differences at large became the identity of the groups, as if individual from Sindh is Sindhi and individual from Punjab is Punjabi20.The sub-nationalism and the religion with sub-divisions(Shia-Sunni) continued to create national threats for Pakistans internal security. Amidst such a scenario, the military provided the nationalism factor, which was completely absent, considering the conditions under which formation of Pakistan took place in 1947. 89. Lastly, a leadership void since the creation of Pakistan and till this date has contributed to military dominance. The main responsibility for safeguarding democracy in a country falls on political parties. Pakistan, since its inception, was lacking in well organized and well established political class that could carry the representative system of governance forward.

Brief of Military regimes

S.NO PERIOD 1. 1947-51

MODE APPOINTED AS PM BY M A JINNAH

ELECTIONS NO ELECTIONS

NAME

LIAQUAT ALI KHAN 2. 1951-58 INITIALLY GOV GEN OF PAKISTAN(TILL 1956),THEREAFTER PRESIDENT NO ELECTIONS

ISKANDER MIRZA 3. 1958-69 MILITARY RULE NO ELECTIONS

19

Sadaf farooq; The rule of Generals:The influence of military governments on Pakistans internal security and stability. 29 March -01 April 2010. Available on www.psa.ac.uk. Accessed on 1.12.11 20 Munawar Sabir The state,media,religion and emerging challenges in Pakistan, South asian studies journal vol.26, No. 1,January-June 2011,pp69-81. Available on pu.edu.pk. Accessed on 26.1.12

25

FD MARSHAL AYUB KHAN 4. 1969-71 FEILD MARSHAL AYUB KHAN STEPPED DOWN AND APPOINTED GEN YAHYA KHAN AS THE PRESIDENT NO ELECTIONS

GEN YAHYA KHAN 5. 1971-76 ELECTED AS PRESIDENT FIRST ELECTIONS IN 1971 1976

1976-77

REELECTED

ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO

6.

1977-88

MARTIAL LAW

NO ELECTIONS

GEN ZIA-ULHAQ 7. 1988-90 ELECTED AS PM DEC1988

BENAZIR BHUTTO 8. 1990-93 ELECTED AS PM 1990

NAWAZ SHARIF 9. 1993-96 ELECTED AS PM 1993

BENAZIR BHUTTO

26

10.

1996-99

ELECTED AS PM

1996

NAWAZ SHARIF 11. 19992008 MILITARY RULE NO ELECTIONS

GEN PARVEZ MUSHRRAF 12. MAR 2008 ELECTED AS PM 18 FEB 2008

YOUSUF RAZA GILANI

REGIMES IN PAKISTAN

90. General Ayub Khan: 1958-69.General Ayub Khans succession to power was ascribed to the instability created by politicians during first eleven years of Pakistans existence. The elitist classes, the feudal lords, the ulema and the bureaucrats, had all lost the trust of the people and this gave Ayub direct access to the masses.21He sought to modernise Pakistan especially the agricultural sector and also encouraged industrial growth. However, the regime failed to bring about genuine socio-economic development as capital remained concentrated in few hands. The General was finally forced to step down after the failure of Op Gibraltar. 91. General Yahya Khan: 1969-71 . The objective of this regime remained similar to the preceding one except for the declaration to frame a new constitution, establishment of constitutional government and smooth transfer of power to representatives of the people elected freely and impartially on the basis of adult franchise. He succeeded in holding elections but was unable to deal with the problems that followed. He finally had to leave in disgrace after Pakistans humiliating defeat in 1971 after the secession of East Pakistan. 92. General Zia-ul Haq: 1977-88 In 1977, General Zia overthrew his benefactor Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, proclaimed martial law and hanged Bhutto on trumped
21

Sadaf Farooq. The Rule of Generals: The Influence of Military Governments on Pakistans Internal Security and Stability, 29 March- 1 April 2010. Available at www.psa.ac.uk. Accessed on 1.12.11

27 up charges. Haq began Islamisation of Pakistan society and even the armed forces, which later proved nearly fatal to the stability of Pakistan. He also promulgated the draconian Eighth Amendment whereby civilian administration could be dismissed by Pakistan presidents in collusion with Pakistan army generals. Zia ruled the country for 11 years including three years as a civilian president with absolute powers till his death in a mysterious air crash in 1988. 93. After his death, General Aslem Beg endeavoured to take Pakistan army out of direct governance leading to the emergence of ruling troika. 22 Gradually with issues like Pakistans policies towards major countries, Kashmir proxy war, military modernisation and so on, the Pakistan army bulldozed its way into civil administration with successive Pakistan governments unable to defy the armys diktats. 94. General Parvez Musharraf: 1999-2008 The coup of 1999 was welcomed by political parties and people alike, as a relief from the widespread corruption and prevailing hapless conditions. Rapid land distribution, devolution of power and empowering the President to dismiss the parliament were some of the initiatives taken. Musharraf even closed down the extremist madrassas and many Jehadi organisations (in effect they remained active under changed identities and acquired more power).In Musharrafs era internal security deteriorated sharply, separatist movement in Baluchistan, suicide bombing all over the country including the capital, violence as a result of assassination of former prime minister, sacking of the chief justice and threats by militants within its own borders were the main contributors. Fallouts of Primacy of Military 95. The objectives of all the military regimes in Pakistan was to defend and protect the country from the elements who might threaten to disrupt social, political, economic order of the society and create inter provincial rivalry ,with the ultimate aim of transfer of power to the elected representatives. Yet not even a single military regime succeeded in fulfilling these objectives. 96. Military regimes have been the obvious choice for rule, given the prevailing conditions, however, in the process these regimes have tended to introduce deep fissures in the politics of the country while leaving the succeeding political governments with legacies with which the latter are not equipped to cope. Also, a transition from military rule to an elected from of government in Pakistan has historically produced weak civilian governments due to the presence of a strong institutionalised military. The government thus formed shall remain unstable. 97. Pakistan at its birth failed in acquiring an identity of its own and subsequent political leaders succeeded in filling this vacuum by giving it an anti-India perception. This fact coupled with the successive military regimes continued to exploit the IndoPak difference of opinions to their vested interests. This pushed the military to acquire a preponderant position by further exploiting the sentiments of its people on the basis of security threats from India as is evident from the orchestrated anti-India rhetoric like the Kargil disaster.
22

Troika was an informal grouping comprising of the president, the prime minister and the army chief.

28 98. Today the role of the military in civil administration which had been constantly expanding has become mainstream. This is so simply because the civil administration now requires military participation out of dire necessity to maintain law and order, among other problems. For instance, in the biggest peace-time mobilisation of the armed forces, a quarter million military personnel were employed to conduct the fifth population census in March 1998. 99. In the wake of different nationalities that co-exist in Pakistan, bounded by the only common factor of Islam that too divided by sectarian issues, the military provides a national identity to Pakistan. Military men have a self image as dedicated, selfless national guardians. It has the monopoly of force and is always considered most robust, well organised and disciplined institution. This aspect has greatly helped it to firmly entrench itself in all aspects of Pakistani society. 100. In spite of all the criticism, of military coup and military rule for nearly two and a half decades, Pakistans military continues to be a professional military. But continuous and excessive involvement of the military in terms of time and manpower in non- military matters has taken its toll on professionalism. Involvement in unrelated spheres of administration damages the discipline inculcated among the personnel through a particular style of training and functioning.

PART VII - THE FUTURE OF PAKISTAN : A PROGNOSIS

101. To carry out an prognosis on the future of Pakistan, it is important to consider the future of the fault lines that exist in Pakistan. 102. The Future of Pashtun Nationalism. Pashtun nationalism today is weaker than it has been in the past, and a Pashtunistan movement on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border does not threaten the territorial integrity and internal stability of Pakistan. The provincial government of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), where the Pakistani Pashtun are concentrated, is economically dependent on Islamabad for over 90% of its operating budget. They do not want to become part of a Pashtunistan with their brethren across the Afghan border who have a lower standard of living. But that does not mean Pashtun ethno-nationalism is going to disappear. They will demand greater provincial autonomy for the NWFP and greater use of Pashto language in schools, etc. 103. The Future of the Pakistan Taliban. The Swat and South Waziristan campaigns show that the army can carry out a policy of forceful containment. However, Islamabad tends to fall short in the follow-up civilian reconstruction, and it seems that the Pakistan Taliban are biding their time and will return once the army loses interest. A war of attrition probably favours the Taliban in that its continuing suicide bombings will sap morale. How many suicide bombing attacks can Peshawar and other Pakistani cities take before conceding to the Pakistan Taliban? Already, there is anecdotal evidence that young officers are voicing criticism of the kinetic campaigns against the Taliban. That said, major Taliban advances in the frontier

29 over the coming years are likely to come by way of a series of negotiated, facesaving government capitulations rather than an outright collapse of government authority.

104. The Future of India-Pakistan Relationship. The prospects for a viable peace process transforming long time enemies into partners are not very likely . But there are signs of new thinking in India where there is a growing realisation that a failed neighbour will prevent India from attaining global power status. Kashmir, the Mumbai attack of November 2008, water and energy shortages, Pakistans perception of Indias role in Afghanistan and mutual distrust of each others covert security services are all flashpoints for escalation as well as agenda items for negotiation. Miscalculations and intelligence failures in all of the previous crises and the feeling among some South Asian analysts that a threatened Pakistan might escalate a future crisis into the unthinkable are not grounds for comfort. The good news is that more Pakistanis are beginning to understand that the danger to Pakistan is not from an invasion by the Indian army but from their own internal problems. More and more Pakistanis feel the need to redistribute funds from defence to under-budgeted education, health care and jobs for its burgeoning youth. It is in Indias own interest to engage with Pakistan directly rather than leave it to the US to do all the heavy lifting. 105. The Future of China-Pakistan Relations. No country has been more central to Pakistans foreign policy and security interests than China. In contrast to the US, whose relationship with Pakistan has been both episodic and heavily conditioned, that with China has been consistent, predictable and until recently without conditionality. The Pakistan-China relationship is described as an all-weather relationship, in contrast to the United States, which is perceived as only a fairweather friend. One new tension in the relationship is Chinas increasing concern about Uighur protests and Islamic radicalisation in Xinjiang, which now colours Chinas view of Pakistan-exported militancy. Given Chinas increasing ties with India, its continuing close relations with Pakistan, and its expanding investment in and political links with Afghanistan, China is likely to emerge in the coming decade with significant leverage over the key countries in South Asia. As China grows more comfortable in discharging its responsibilities as a global power, it may be able to coax its ally, Pakistan, into stabilising regional arrangements. China wants stability in the Af-Pak area given the dangers to China from Pakistans export of extremism into Chinas own provinces. At the same time, China is uncomfortable with the US in its backyard.

106.

The Future of US-Pakistan Relations (a) The year 2011 has been an annus horribilis for US-Pakistan relations, with the Raymond Davis affair, the Abottabad raid to kill Osama bin Laden, the bombing of the Pakistan army posts in Mohmand agency and the accusations hurled by the former US Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen who called the Haqqani terror network a veritable arm of the ISI, 2012 is unlikely to fare much better. While efforts will be made to at least have a workable, even if purely transactional, relationship, the competing and

30 contradictory objectives and policies of the two countries in Afghanistan are likely to push them into a state of conflict with each other. (b) Given that 2012 is an election year in the US, coupled with the possibility of 2012 becoming an election year in Pakistan as well, domestic politics in both countries will play a major role in how they handle their bilateral relations. There are broadly two possibilities insofar as the US policy towards Pakistan is concerned: first, the administration will start taking a much tougher line with Pakistan to buttress its national security credentials. This means that the US will start to turn the screws diplomatic, economic and even military to force Pakistan into compliance; alternatively, the administration may try to avoid precipitating matters and continue harbouring fond hopes of changing Pakistan's malevolence on the one hand by sweettalking the Pakistanis, and on the other keep the aid drip trickling in. But given that this approach has not delivered over the last ten years, chances of it working in the future are very dim. (c) A conflict between the two countries, therefore, seems unavoidable, unless of course the Americans decide to throw in the towel and accede to all of Pakistan's demands on Afghanistan. After the NATO bombing of the Pakistani posts in Mohmand agency, a hair-trigger like situation prevails along the Pak-Afghan border. This means that even an accidental incident involving an exchange of fire between the ISAF and Pakistan army could easily snowball into a major conflagration. There is also a real possibility of the NATO forces launching deliberate attacks inside Pakistan in response to a major terrorist attack inside Afghanistan, or even in the US homeland. (d) The Pakistanis are fully aware that with the drawdown of US/NATO troops without a clear defeat of the Taliban, serves to maintain the Pakistan armys incentive to hedge its bets with their Afghan Taliban clients. It seems likelier that the Afghan Taliban will be neither completely defeated nor victorious, and that what may emerge in Afghanistan is a de facto partition of Afghanistan with a nominal central government in Kabul. However, the Afghan Taliban will not prevail over most of Afghanistan as they did in the late 1990s. Instead, they will be naturally contained by the internal balance of power dynamics within Afghanistan (i.e. fighting the Northern Alliance and others), leaving Pakistan relatively free from their impredations. The impact of the eventual withdrawal of NATO in the face of a de facto partition of Afghanistan on the Pakistan Taliban is not clear. By reducing NATO pressure on the Pakistan army to fight the Pakistan Taliban, a stable modus vivendi might emerge between the Pakistan Taliban and the army. Or the army may decide to crack down on the Pakistan Taliban, whose Afghan Taliban cousins will be unable to help as they become preoccupied in intra-tribal-ethnic conflict inside Afghanistan. In the near term, the Pakistanis are concerned about a widening of the war beyond the operations against the Pakistan Taliban as a result of US pressure to go after Afghan Taliban sanctuaries inside Pakistan. Pakistan sees its home-grown Taliban differently from the Afghan Taliban, who are not viewed as Pakistans enemy. USPakistani relations will progress only if the divergent objectives of the two sides can be resolved. US pressure on the Pakistan army to expand its war or

31 else acquiesce in US direct attacks on Afghan Taliban leaders in Baluchistan may trigger dissension within Pakistani society and especially within its army that leads to serious destabilisation of the country.

Possible Scenarios 107. The possible scenarios that emerge from the study are as under :(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) Pakistan will manage to survive or muddle through with all the problems. Parallel Pakistans. Democratic consolidation. Balkanisation of Pakistan. Pakistan controlled by hardliners and turned into a Islamic state. Civil or Military authoritarianism.

Scenario 1: Pakistan will Manage to Survive 108. The most likely future for Pakistan over the next five to seven years is some form of what has been called muddling through. (a) The military will play a key but not necessarily central role in state and political decisions and not necessarily always. This scenario may also include direct military rule. However, it has been seen that, it has not made much difference whether the military or civilians are in power, since both have had progressive moments and both have also contributed to the long decline in Pakistans integrity as both a state and a nation. (b) In this scenario, the political system is bound by certain parameters: the military may take over, but only as a temporary fix; it neither encourages nor tolerates deep reform; and civilians are content with a limited political role. The political system is frozen in an intermediate, gray zone between full fledged democracy and military autocracy. The state is always in transition, but it never arrives, confounding both Pakistans supporters and its critics. (c) In this scenario the civilian government is under pressure to tackle broad governance issues, especially the sectarian, economic, and energy crises, and military officials continue to operate in the shadows while rattling their sabers to prevent undesirable outcomes in domestic and foreign policy. New centers of power, such as the judiciary, may exert a democratic effect and help ensure the rule of law, but the scenario includes continuing military mediation of civilian crises, which reproduces the depressingly familiar (and democratically corrosive) pattern of civil-military relations under formal elected rule.

32 (d) It also includes the continuation of sectarian and ethnic violence, but neither, apart from other aggravating factors, will drive Pakistan over the edge. 109. Outcome. In this scenario, the economy may improve, democracy may stabilize, and there may be an increase in the governments coherence, but all or some of those factors may also take a turn for the worse. Lurking in the background will be a steady increase in the population, stagnant economic growth, no serious attempt to modernize the educational system, and continued ethnic, sectarian, and social violence. These trends are very hard to alter and impossible to change quickly. Given the militarys current campaign, extremist violence might be tamed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but a revival of the insurgency is likely, given the absence of real economic growth and the weakness of political institutions. With no police reform and a new attitude toward domestic jihadis, it is doubtful that maintenance of law and order will improve in the Punjab and it will certainly worsen in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Balochistan could again see a revived separatist movement, perhaps with outside assistance. In this muddling through scenario, there may be a visible, slow decline of Pakistans integrity as a state and further confusion about Pakistans identity as a nation. 110. Impact on India. India will continue to fight the Pakistan sponsored proxy war. India is likely to support the growth of a stable Pakistan. India would like to see a weak Pakistan, strong enough to maintain internal order but not so strong that it can challenge India.

Scenario 2 : Parallel Pakistans 111. A second future for Pakistan, probably as likely as some kind of muddling through within the next five years and already evident now in some provinces, would be the emergence of parallel Pakistans. (a) In this scenario the state carries on with a recognizable central government but some of the provinces and regions go their different ways, not as separate states following a breakup but in terms of how they are governed, how their economy functions, how they educate their children, how they tilt toward authoritarian or democratic traditions, and how they accommodate Islamist, regional, and separatist movements. (b) Centrifugal forces are intensifying and Pakistan is heading in this direction. Those who oppose democratization do it in part because they fear the weakening of the state and the unconstrained growth of separatism; those who favor democratization see it as the mechanism by which different and diverse regions and social classes can live together peacefully in the same state. (c) As the Pakistani state becomes weaker and as divisive tendencies grow stronger, those who favor a strong state will be tempted to invoke the

33 argument that there is an existential external threat to Pakistan that requires the suppression of ethnic, sectarian and other differences. Such a strategy would do nothing to increase Pakistans growth rate or address the demographic explosion. (d) For the near future, the next five or six years, Pakistan will either struggle on or undergo a more rapid decline, which will be evident by the rise of a more complex and fractious relationship among the provinces and between them and the center. This will be delayed if the present cooperative arrange-ment between the politicians and the generals continues, even if there is a change in personalities. General Kayani is not irreplace-able, but the spirit of cooperation with civilian politicians is; similarly, neither President Zardari nor Prime Minister Gilani is indispensable, but their willingness to give the military some political space while attempting to reform Pakistans government is this scenario predicts the emergence of many Pakistans within the framework of an inter-national entity called Pakistan. (e) The armys grip will loosen but not fail, and problems generated by a bad economy, a bad demo-graphic profile, and a bad sectarian situation will all deepen. This is not quite the Lebanonization of Pakistan, but we have already seen the rise of the equivalent of Hamas and Hezbollah, although their outside supporters are less visible, and their impact not as great as in Lebanon. The army will ensure that the state remains formally intact, but it may be powerless to prevent alliances between and among regional groups and outside powers. For example :(i) China already has considerable influence in Northern Pakistan and is a growing economic factor elsewhere; (ii) Some minority sects already look to Iran for protection and inspiration, and Tehran has an incentive to balance out extremist Sunni groups in Pakistan as well as the Taliban in Afghanistan. (iii) Some leaders in Karachi, and the Mohajir community in particular, now look to India with very different perspectives than did their forefathers who abandoned it, and they talk about an independent Karachi with strong economic and security ties to other countries, just like Singapore. (iv) Finally, the Baloch and some Sindhis are utterly dis-enchanted with Pakistan and the emergence of hardcore Punjabi leaders allied to the army would further alienate them. 112. Impact on India. India will get the opportunity to influence the smaller entities arising out of this scenario. Scenario 3 : Democratic Consolidation 113. It seems very unlikely now, but Pakistan could see the slow and steady stabilization of democracy.

34 (a) This would require agreement between the two dominant parties, an increase in their coherence, and the army recognizing that it cannot govern this state effectively and that it must allow (or even assist) a new generation of politicians to come to real power. This is Pakistans greatest challenge, even greater than that of India, but their response is muted. Such a future would also require continued support for democratization from Western states, as well as Indian actions that reward Pakistan for moving in this direction. (b) The Zardari government, for all of its obvious problems, has put Pakistan on this path and other mainstream parties have not obstructed these changes. The process seems to have settled in to a game of one step forward, followed by one step backward, or perhaps a hop sideways. The parties have resisted turning to the military for support, as they did time and time in the past. They appear to have learned that it is better to play by the rules of the game and continue to tolerate each other rather than risk destabilizing the system, and losing power to the military for another decade. However, democratic institutionalization also needs a military committed to a subordinate role in a democratic framework. (c) Were Pakistan to move in this direction, it would not necessarily mean that the economy will recover, and it certainly would not mean that social pressures caused by population growth and urbanization will moderate. These are time-bombs, buried deep within the Pakistani state, which would present grave problems for a future democratic regime, but such a regime, freer than the present government from the taint of corruption, and making a more serious effort at improving the functioning of the state, would also have a much greater claim on international resources and help from India. (d) In this scenario, by 2020 Pakistan will slowly emerge as a progressive Islamic state, its political landscape will be transformed and the economy will liberalize and integrate into the South East Asian region. Pakistan will continue to face numerous challenges, but the mix of political, economic, and social conditions make the countrys prospects as hopeful as they have ever been. Political environment is and decades of economic stagnation, systemic corruption, and civilian-military antagonism finally start to wane, while more transparency, accountability, and equity usher in a new era of democratic politics. (e) The once all-powerful army begins to cede power to the civilian government on issues not directly related to military combat. The government is well supported by the emerging urbanized professional middle-class, and prioritizes job creation and equitable wealth distribution. The improving economy coupled with government expressions of moderate Islam not only undermine the appeal of radical Islam, but also enable the government to gain legitimacy among a wide-range of constituencies throughout Pakistani society.

(f)

Drivers of the Secanrio .

35 (i) Urbanization/Demographics. Rapid urbanization produces a major demographic change and contributes to the emergence of a growing professional middle-class. The growth of the urbanized middleclass establishes the basis for significant change in economic, social and political life.These citizens challenge traditional norms and values while demanding better economic opportunity, education, healthcare, a greater voice and better, more accountable governance.The balance of power shifts to the urban areas and diminishes the political influence of landowning elites. (ii) Media. Relaxation of the regulatory environment and technological innovation under President Musharraf contributed to a proliferation of private cable channels, and electronic and print media. This diversity of outlets creates the potential for wide cultural and political changes. The media provides a platform for citizens to highlight issues and rally public opinion. The press freely criticizes governmental policies,increases public debate and viewpoints, and ultimately contributes to greater accountability and awareness of citizens rights. Additionally, press freedoms provide a greater role for investigative reporting and coverage and analysis of critical issues. (iii) Civil-Military Relations. The raid against Osama bin Laden deep inside Pakistans territory and an increase in militant attacks focus domestic and international pressure on the military, altering the power balance between Pakistans military and civilian governments that has historically contributed to the destabilization of democratic governance and to stop-and-go economic performance. The armys institutional strength survives the repercussions,but questions about its competence, complicity, and ability to secure and protect strategic assets exposes its weaknesses and opens up opportunities for a recalibration of the military-civilian relationship. (iv) External Actors. Previous U.S. polices of engagement and subsequent abandonment contribute to Pakistans fear that the U.S. could abruptly leave Afghanistan, exposing it to India and other hostile neighbors. Cognizant that Pakistan possesses legitimate interests and concerns in Afghanistan as well as the broader region, the U.S. encourages Pakistan to play a constructive role in stabilizing Afghanistan. Additionally, both the U.S. and India have an interest in stabilizing Pakistan and in checking Chinas rising influence. A slow improvement in Indo-Pak relations, confidence-building measures, and an increase in foreign trade lead to a diminished sense of existential threat and create political space for reduced military influence and other internal reforms. (v) Economic Reforms and Development. With a rising middle-class and the associated economic opportunities, the diaspora investors and entrepreneurs (possessing technical skills and capital) invest in Pakistans economy over the decade.Their local market knowledge enables them to take advantage of opportunities that multinational corporations and investment banks deem too risky given

36 Pakistans political and economic instability. Economic and structural reforms (tax agriculture and real estate) lead to macro-economic stability and jump-start economic growth.

114. Impact on India. Relations with India will improve and India will be free of fighting the scourge of terrorism. This along with the measures taken by the Indian government to improve the conditions of the minority community, the Muslims in India will be a more coherent part of the country.

Scenario 4 :Balkanisation of Pakistan 115. The fourth scenario is that Pakistan will break away into smaller states. (a) Ralph Peters, a retired U.S. army officer, raised the possibility of Pakistan being reduced to a rump of Punjab and parts of Sindh, with Balochistan and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa breaking away. His views have been much cited as evidence of U.S. malice toward Pakistan, and his name and the prospect of an outside effort to break up Pakistan comes up repeatedly. (b) Peters suggested that Balochistan might become a free state including parts of Irans province of Sistan and Baluchistan, while the NWFP/KP would become a part of Afghanistan.

37

(c) However, it may be misleading to talk of a breakaway of discontented provinces and the breakup of the state, or total state failure, within the next five years as Pakistan has come to show lot of resilience inspite of myriad of problems it faces. (d) In the longer term the breakup of Pakistan is possible, but any breakup would be preceded by the disintegration of the army, either after a war or because of ethnic and sectarian differences, or by the splitting of the army by some Punjabi political movement. None of that seems likely or plausible at the moment, but the breakup of the Soviet Union was also unexpected and unpredicted by most Soviet experts. 116. Impact on India. India will need to maint a smaller conventional military to deal with Pakistan in the Western borders and can deploy more forces to protect the border against China. However, India will need to play a far greater role in dealing with the new states emerging out of Pakistan.

Scenario 5 : Pakistan controlled by hardliners and turned into a Islamic state.

117. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan can be attributed to three reasons: (1) Poor economic conditions (2) Use as a political weapon (3) The proliferation of Islamic "madrassas". Pakistans economy subsists on foreign aid. No economic or industrial advancement has taken place. The vast majority of Pakistanis face economic and social uncertainties. This becomes a fertile ground for flourishing of Islamic fundamentalism. This scenario can emerge as under :(a) The extraterritorial U.S. raid on Osama bin Ladens compound has provoked a deepening political crisis as the breach of national sovereignty strips credibility from the countrys military and Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI). To stem the erosion of their influence, fundamentalists in the Army align with ultra-conservative Islamic clerics behind a radical domestic agenda, with the hopes that a strong commitment to Islam will restore the legitimacy needed to preserve power in Pakistani politics and society. Meanwhile, the government responds to public demands to distance Pakistan from the U.S. by seeking non-Western sources of funding, and by publicly inviting Islamic countries under their nuclear umbrella as a guarantor of Islam against interference from Western powers. This nuclear posture, alongside escalating ISI-enabled terror attacks on Indian interests in Afghanistan, and in India itself, once again raises the specter of India-Pakistan armed conflict. (b) Pakistan fails to address the structural economic problems that have forced it to seek external patrons. These problems, coupled with the contagious effects of the Arab Spring, lead to violent public protests. The protests are motivated by two distinct grievances: first, students and provincial tribal members oppose the greedy ruling elites of Punjab. Second, Islamic conservatives mobilize worshippers to fight against corruption through a return to stricter, traditional values and Sharia interpretation of existing laws.

38 This movement consolidates around anti-Western rhetoric that blames internal problems on the governments appeasement of U.S. interests. The protests reach their height before the 2013 elections, and help to produce a coalition government led by the PML-N that includes both the MQM and small, radical Islamic political parties. (c) The coalitions power is short-lived as Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resigns for personal health reasons soon after the election and his politically weaker brother, Shahbaz, assumes the role of care-taker P.M. The governance vacuum accelerates into an economic free-fall. As Europe and the U.S. suffer from continued slow growth, sovereign debt, and credit crunches, Pakistans fragile financial conditions finally implode under the cumulative weight of high inflation and unemployment. Increasing insecurity on the India-Pakistan border, where local skirmishes have occurred over water sharing issues, leads to the promotion of an ambitious colonel chosen for his close relationship with clerics powerful in military circles. Colonel Masood Khan gains trust throughout the army ranks for innovative defense plans, and becomes the public face of the army. (d) With security concerns at their highest level after a terrorist bombing in Kashmir in 2016, Pakistan and India come to blows. After Colonel Khan foils an Indian covert operation, the officer becomes a national hero. Patrons in both Sharifs PML-N party and the military urge him to take up the political reins dropped by Prime Minister Sharif in time for the 2018 elections. Khan, a reformer at heart, takes the opportunity to transform Pakistan into a democratically elected, ultra-conservative Islamic state. (e) By 2020, Pakistans military, government, and judiciary are aligned behind a fusion of nationalism and radical Islam. Domestically, laws are rewritten to favor Shariatic punishments and relations are legitimized between the military and externally-focused terrorist networks. Internationally, Pakistans foreign policy centers on building networks with Islamic countries to contain threats from India and the West and to create a common Islamic security regime. While economic imbalances persist, the public is hopeful that prioritizing religious ideals will reduce corruption and provide opportunities for Pakistan to proposer. (k) Drivers of the Sceanrio. (i) Identity. Corruption, repeated economic setbacks, and proU.S. sympathies of secular politicians fuel populist anger among Pakistanis. This anger is amplified by protest movements that seek to mirror the successes of the Arab Spring by forcing politicians to address imbalances between wealthy, land-owning elites and workingclass citizens. Elected officials, who have strong ties to the elite class and depend on Western aid to fund policy programs, respond with hollow promises for change. Sectarian and ethnic divisions pitting Sunni versus Shia, and Punjabis against others, provoke grass-roots mobilization. This combative environment sets the stage for a charismatic leader whose reform proposals aim to bind the restive and

39 divided populace behind a populist and nationalist agenda.The public began to distrust both the capability and willingness of the armed forces to defend against breaches of sovereignty and protect Pakistani citizens. (ii) Civil-Military Relations. Civil-military relations are under the most significant strain in Pakistans history as the Osama bin Laden raid opens the role of the Army to public debate. The Army, cognizant that power is quickly slipping away, signals a deeper commitment to fundamentalist Islam just as politicians assuage the public by elevating the political role of radical clerics. The convergence of ideologicallydriven goals with security threats from India and from domestic terrorist actors, leads to both a larger budget for the Army, and the elevation of Colonel Khan from the public face of the Army to the Prime Minister of the nation. (iii) Economic Trends. The combined effects of worsening unemployment, ineffective tax collection, military spending, and global recession trigger a financial collapse in Pakistan, hastening central bank insolvency in 2013. GDP growth, already sluggish at two percent by the end of 2011, slows to less than half a percent by 2013, as credit access and foreign direct investment dry up. Income inequality, in part reflecting demographic trends that leave substantial numbers of the countrys burgeoning youth population perpetually unemployed, heightens resentment towards the political elite. After the elections of 2013, media revelations of financial impropriety among political clans contributes to rising populism. (iv) External Actors. After the killing of Osama bin Laden, the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan reaches its nadir. As Pakistan shifts away from the U.S. and turns to China, its efforts to pull its northern neighbor closer prove ineffective: China, unwilling to risk spurring Islamic tensions within its own borders by allying too closely with a fundamentalist Pakistan, limits itself to opportunistic partnerships predicated on trade and resource procurement. Pressured by regime changes in the Middle East and North Africa, Saudi Arabiaalong with expatriate networks in Dubai and Bahrainincreases financial assistance to Pakistan, augmenting its nuclear and military resources and building towards a nuclear Islamic defense regime.

118. Impact on India. This scenario will have huge impact on India as the fundamentalist groups within India will try to align with their brethren across the border. Indian military will need to play more and more important role in foiling terrorists bids across India while being ready for a conventional confrontation at any time.

Scenario 6 : Civil or Military Authoritarianism

40 119. Much more plausible than a breakup of Pakistan would be its slide into one or another form of authoritarianism. This could happen at the provincial level if the army permitted it, or joined with a regional authoritarian movement. Authoritarianism might have staying power in Pakistan, although an authoritarian regime would face the same problems of state competence and national identity as any other kind of regime. There are four authoritarian models; Pakistan might evolve into one or some combination of them. (a) First, there is liberal authoritarianism, most perfectly embodied in Singapore. Here a dominant party ensures that the state is well run, dissent is carefully channeled, and the economy thrives. Many Pakistanis would opt immediately for a liberal authoritarian system, especially since, as in Singapore, it holds out the hope of further liberal reform while maintaining economy prosperity and social calm. However, Pakistan has no political party capable of running such a state, and the army cannot imagine one because it is preoccupied with defense issues and lacks the secular and liberal bent of the Turkish army. (b) Classical authoritarianism, along the lines of Saddams Iraq, is even less likely. While Pakistan may yet see the rise of a brutal and charismatic leader, it is hard to see how that would work in Pakistan, which lacks resources, such as oil, to sustain tough authoritarianism. (c) Moderate military authoritarianism, along the lines of Egypt, is more plausible. Something like this was tried by Ayub, and even Musharraf might have moved in this direction had he not been so intent on pleasing all of his audiences. He lacked the ruthlessness of a Nasser or a Hosni Mubarak. Such a regime would have the support of China or Saudi Arabia, and if it was effective, of many Western powers. Such a soft authoritarianism would have to be linked to outside assistance to succeed, economics being the driving factor. Here, China could be a major factor, building in Pakistan an acceptable Islamic but authoritarian state identity just Islamic enough to claim legitimacy in terms of its historical roots, but not so Islamic that it would tolerate Islamist movements abroad, particularly in China. Such Islamic exports could be confined to India or other hostile neighbors. (d) Finally, there are two models of Islamist authoritarianism: Iran and Saudi Arabia. An Iranian model does not fit Pakistan, and not only because the very large Shiite minority would not tolerate the imposition of a Sunni state. Irans population is quite modernized, and very sympathetic to liberal values, although power remains with the clerics and the revolutionary guards, two institutions that are absent in Pakistan. On the other hand, the Saudi model does not fit at all. Pakistan has fewer resources and vastly more people and diversity than either Saudi Arabia or Iran. More likely would be the emergence of provincial Islamist governments with the weakening of the center. Under the second scenario described above, some provinces could be nominally Islamist and free elections would not be able to remove them, like in Iran.A provincial government with an Islamist bent (like Saudi Arabia) might attempt to export radicalism abroad, while a weak government in Islamabad could implausibly claim that the policing mechanisms of the central state are too feeble to prevent such activities.

41 (f) At the moment authoritarianism would not sit well with most Pakistanis, but if it brought order and a degree of prosperity it would find a foothold. By analogy, this is what the Taliban did in Afghanistan, although the pre-requisite for such a development would have to be the collapse of the army, which seems very unlikely under all present circum-stances. Authoritarianism also does not match up well with Pakistans diverse religious or social order, or with its deeply complex South Asian culture. Authoritarianism might be an experiment, but an experiment that would be likely to fail in its incapacity to deal with a society that is traditionally averse to centralization projects. This would be even more the case of any totalitarian movement that might arise in Pakistan. Among other factors, the new media would make it hard for either form of government to establish itself. 120. Impact on India. An all powerful civilian government will lead to more concrete progress on the India-Pakistan confidence building measures. Whereas, an all powerful military will require India India to maintain a greater preparedness for a conventional confrontation and keep its guard in Kashmir.

Post-Crisis Scenarios

121. Finally, it is important to note that all calculations about the future of Pakistan can be changed instantaneously should there be another major crisis, especially one with India or now one involving Pakistans role in Afghanistan and the actions of terrorist groups that have strong links to Pakistan. Military defeat frequently leads to the erosion of an armys domestic political power, as in Greece in 1974 after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and in Argentina in 1982 after the Malvinas/Falklands War. In Pakistan, however, defeat in the 1971 war with India did not result in the armys withdrawal from politics and civilian affairs; it only strengthened the armys resolve to take revenge on India and persuaded the army to back the nuclear weapons program. Pakistans deep involvement in Indian-administered Kashmir and with Indian Islamist groups precipitated a number of crises and earned Pakistan the reputation of being a reckless state. Pakistans defeat also strengthened jingoistic nationalism, which, under Zia, was encouraged by the state, some elements of which still have close relations with the hypernationalist Honor brigade. For the army to consider complete withdrawal from politics, which would be transformational, it needs at least to be able to claim a draw on the Kashmir problem and to have some assurance that Pakistans security environment will be stable and normal

CONCLUSION

42 122. At the most abstract analytical level, the interplay between the contested ideas of Pakistan and the integrity of the Pakistani state will determine Pakistans future. When a state is unable to protect its citizens and to collect the taxes required for the delivery of basic services, its citizens will regard themselves not as citizens but as subjects. They will try to leave the state, seek to transform the very idea that holds them together, or fight the stateor all three at the same time. Pakistan has never had a workable arrangement between the state and those ruled by the state. In the words of Hamid Kizilbash, talking about the upsurge in sectarian and political violence, The people we ignored are taking their revenge.1 123. Five or six things must happen before Pakistan can be safely put in the normal state category. They include developing nearly-normal relations with India, reviving the economy, repairing the state, rebalancing the civil-military relationship, redefining the role of the military in the state, taxing the rich, fighting domestic insurgencies more effectively, and allowing a reshaped police force to emerge. The politicians would have to moderate their disputes, concentrating on issues and reform, not on patronage and corruption. 124. Given the state of affairs in Pakistan, it is most likely that it will muddle through and manage to survive surrounded by the myriad of problems discussed in this paper.

1. Speaking at the conference Empowering Faculty and Transforming Education in Pakistan at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, April 7, 2010.