Are There True Contradictions?

A Critical Discussion of Graham Priest's "Beyond the Limits of Thought" Author(s): Jrgen Dmont and Frank Mau Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift fr allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1998), pp. 289-299 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25171123 . Accessed: 03/11/2011 17:10
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DISCUSSIONS

ARE THERE TRUE CONTRADICTIONS? A Critical Discussion of Graham Priest's Beyond thought* the limits of

JURGEN DUMONT AND FRANKMAU

SUMMARY. dialetheic described, that Priest's mainly Priest's address attributes

analysis

article examines three aspects of Graham Priest's critically (the limit of what can be expressed, important kinds of limitations or other). First, or the limit of some operation it is shown known, conceived, on Hegel's account of the infinite cannot be sustained, considerations focusing The present of very Priest seems to rely on a too restrictive notion of object. Second, we discuss It is shown that Priest does not in Cantorian of the paradoxes set-theory. in full generality; rather, he relies on a reading of Cantor which implicitly

because treatment the issue a very

tor. Third, This

over arbitrary domains to Can strong principle concerning quantification the so-called is investigated. the main piece of Priest's work, "inclosure schema", to formalize We is supposed the core of many well-known schema claim, paradoxes. that formally dialetheism, Hegel, the schema is not sound. domain

however, Key words: ciple,

paraconsistent Cartwright

logic,

paradox,

infinity,

quantification,

prin

Priest,

Cantor,

1. Graham Priest

INTRODUCTION is one of the most of a important advocates core thesis is that there are ~ a, say a, and its negation, influential logico-philosophical

Undoubtedly,

(or dialetheic) position whose paraconsistent true contradictions, that both a statement, i.e., hold at the same time. In a series of highly

publications (see Priest [1979], [1984], [1987], and Priest et al. [1989])
a variety of paraconsistent he has developed and defended (or dialetheic) all sharing the main concession that there are true contradic approaches are more or tions. In contrast to the aforementioned contributions which less technical treatments belonging to the field of formal logic, Priest, in

Journal ?

29: for General Philosophy of Science Publishers. Printed 1998 Kluwer Academic

289-299,

1998.

in the Netherlands.

290

DUMONT AND FRANKMAU JURGEN the but

the limits of thought (Priest [1995]), discusses his new book Beyond there are true contradictions in a less technical of whether question

rather genuine philosophical setting. In this book he is concerned with a number of very important kinds of limitation. More precisely, he deals with or the limit of what can be described "the limit of what can be expressed; conceived; operation maintains the limit of what or other, that "[l]imits can be known; the limit of iteration of some i.e. infinite in the mathematical sense" (p.3).1 Priest

of this kind provide boundaries beyond which cer tain conceptual processes (describing, knowing, iterating, etc.) cannot go; a sort of conceptual neplus ultra" (p.3, Priest's emphasis). The main thesis to defend in his book is "that such limits are dialetheic; which he wants (p.3). a con

that is, that they are the subject, or locus, of true contradictions" as follows is to be understood Here, "true contradiction" (cf. p.5): tradiction a8c~a

is true if and only if a and ~a are both true and false (at to Priest, true contradictions the same time). According and the kinds of limits (or boundaries) which were mentioned above are closely related to one another. He writes:
The contradiction, in each these case, is simply Thus, are crossed. etc.) and to the effect the limits In each of of that do cross question cannot be crossed, all boundaries. in the conceptual processes are boundaries which thought the cases, there is a totality (of that generates operation these situations Closure an and

but yet which describable,

object

things expressible, that is both within

and without

an appropriate I will call the totality. emphasis)

Transcendence,

respectively,

(pp. 3f, Priest's

of this interplay between Tran that instances or examples on the one hand and true contradictions, which are caused by it, on the other hand can be traced through the whole history of western In the first part of his book (pp. 9-77) he discusses philosophy. Priest holds scendence and Closure of limits of thought in pre-Kantian (Plato, Aristotle, philosophy examples and Berkeley). The second Leibniz, Sextus, Anselm, Cusanus, Aquinas, is entirely devoted to a treatment of the limits of thought 79-121) part (pp. The third part consists in Kant and Hegel. of a tour de force through modern approaches to the set-theoretic 123-194). Finally, philosophizing the fourth part of his book (pp. 195-245) discussing spends in the context of (natural) language. Here he treats relevant Wittgenstein, Already far too comprehensive confine ourselves of Priest's discussion. focus on what we consider to be the heart of Priest's which is essentially of two ventricles: the left ventricle, Quine, Davidson, this brief overview to highlighting and Derrida. of contents here indicates that Priest's book is in full detail. we Therefore, to be the main problems and the (semantic) paradoxes (pp. in the era after the linguistic turn, Priest his main issues thesis in Frege,

to be dealt with

what we believe

Our critique will book which consists

ARE THERETRUECONTRACDICTIONS? 291 in nature, and the right ventricle, which is beating for Cantorian In the following and Priest's Inclosure Schema. sections we set-theory in order to determine shall examine these two ventricles the cardiac fitness position.

Hegelian

of Priest's

2.

THE LIMITS OF THOUGHT IN HEGEL

According

lowing: World in each Antinomy) has contradictory (that is the infinity generated it does have contradictory 114). properties, properties"(p. account of This statement has to be understood in the light of Hegel's

to Hegel, or at least to Priest's reading of Hegel, we have the fol to the effect that the sound... "Since there are perfectly arguments

the infinite. Hegel distinguishes between the finite, the spurious or false or true infinite (cf. p. 116). "[S]omething is finite infinite, and the genuine ... , that is, is limited or bounded if it is determinate else" by something is infinite (in the false sense) if it is not finite" (p. (p. 116). "Something one would 117). In a more recent terminology say that the false infinite "the true infinite is the corresponding Finally, infinity" completed infinity" (p. 119), or as Priest calls it "the generated or "actual infinity". This account of infinity leads to three problems which are best described in Priest's own words: is the "potential infinite".

(1) [I]f an object is infinite it falls in the category infinite, and this is to set a bound on
... To be an object as infinite is a contradiction to conceive in terms to be truly conceived in a sense, the same thing. For if something is are, as that which it can be conceived bounded the boundary; lies within and if something an unbounded is conceived it is bounded Hence, by the terms of the conception. it. In this sense, bounded and the same as an inconceivable is essentially object object. at the limit of conceivable, contradiction (p. 117, Priest's (2) infinite, at any [A] potential Hence it is not truly infinite an understanding of the way And we are back with the

that certain finitudes way is the notion of an object whose (3) The true infinite is therefore both finite and infinite, (p. 119)

emphasis) than finite. is, after all, never more stage of its existence, ... The notion of the potential infinite does not deliver an understanding the infinite behaves; of the it delivers behave, (p. 118) finitude is its infinitude, and which

We

shall now

turn to the discussion

of (l)-(3):

ad (1): Put into a very condensed form the general point of (1) seems to an object is categorized or conceived be this: by setting a bound or at least a conceptual or bound on it, and setting a bound on it amounts to making conceiving conceiving so the argument continues, it as finite.2 Hence, an object always implies that it is finite. categorizing or

292 This argument

JURGEN DUMONT AND FRANKMAU is not very

for two reasons: first, there are compelling or con of objects which can be categorized convincing counterexamples for example, ceived without setting a bound on them. Consider, objects can develop whole like our world, or the universe. Certainly, physicists even raising theories about (parts of) our world or the universe without or whether the question of whether these objects have boundaries, they are we can make sensible claims about these finite or infinite. Consequently, objects without setting bounds on them. we believe, that problem Second, (1) hinges upon a certain understand In Priest's of "object" which is unjustly restrictive. discussion the ing seems to be nothing but the common sense concept of "object" underlying can roughly be captured by "everyday macro are cups, tables, and books. However, if this physical object". Examples of "object", what are we to make of entities is the assumed meaning like notion of "object" which fictional, nowhere we abstract, very large, and theoretical objects? Priest does their existence. He simply seems to appeal to our common deny sense notion of "object" which is unsurprisingly of no help in cases where vague, are dealing with questions about entities like Sherlock Holmes, the universe, or electrons. infinite (or transfinite) sets, the world, In order an object this holds clouds,

or categorize to make good his general claim that to conceive us that is to set a bound on it, Priest would have to convince

not only for everyday macro-physical objects but also for fic and theoretical objects. Unfortunately, tional, vague, abstract, very large, reasons for this claim nor with a he neither provides us with convincing of "object", let alone with an careful philosophical analysis or explanation elaborate theory thereof. of of

of the nature ad (2): We can see nothing wrong with this explanation the potential infinite. Instead, we think that this is a very clear account the potential conception conception

infinite. But, in contrast to Priest, we do not see where this in particular, we cannot see that this could cause any problems; could by itself lead to contradiction.

ad (3): Here, we can simply repeat our objection which we raised against or (1). For here again, Priest has to require that in order to conceive as an object it has to be bounded or finite. Certainly, categorize something if this requirement were met, Priest could derive the desired contradiction. For then he could argue, that the conceivability of an infinite object implies or finitedness, and that would, of course, be contradictory. its boundedness or as before, we doubt that the notion of "object" or "conceiving However, categorizing an object" implies boundedness or finiteness.

ARE THERETRUECONTRACDICTIONS? 293 that Priest uses by looking at an example the false (potential, incompleted) infinity and the true (actual, completed) infinity. Priest's example (p. 119) that he the following infinite sum: borrowed from Hegel goes a follows: Consider We want to close this section between to illustrate the relation l+a+a2+a3+... According to Priest and Hegel (-l<a<l) this sum has to be regarded terms it gets closer as a false and closer

to that, Priest and Hegel hold that the limit of this sum, i.e. (1-a)"1, is the true (actual) infinity. This example which is perfectly in the spirit of Priest's (and Hegel's) on infinity seems to lead to a problem, if we write: general view (i) l+a+a2+a3+... = (l-a)"1 (-Ka<l)

infinity. By adding the successive (potential) to some number but will never reach it. In contrast

a denotes "l+a+a2+a3+..." For, as was mentioned above, the expression an actual infinite. the term "(1-a)-1" infinite whereas denotes potential it appears as if we could show that the potential infinite is Therefore, as identical with the actual infinite. And that is clearly absurd. However, the following considerations show, there is no real problem here. is First, observe that no finite (or partial) sum of the form "l+a+...+an" ever equal to the limit (l-a)_1. In this sense we are dealing with a potential no partial sum infinite on the left side of the equality sign. But obviously, is identical with Second, We then obtain: the completed is denoted by "l+a+a2+a3+...". sum, which it should be clear that we can rewrite (i) in a more precise form. lim

(ii)
Written with

(i -? oo)?(an)
in this official

?JL

(1

a)"1

(-K

a < 1)

completed

form, we can immediately sums on both sides of the equality

see that we

are dealing The expression sign.

(i

lim

oo)

says that we must not stop at some i, but that we have to go on essentially until oo. Thus we have to consider the sum on the left side as completed. a Therefore Priest's claim that the expression a3+..." denotes "l+a+a2+ infinite is clearly potential no contradiction and also that neither has contradictions the discussion once we lent credit to the thesis to be explained false. Hence, there is no mystery we can say to be resolved here. In conclusion, of (l)-(3) that we nor the discussion get unavoidably limits. of Priest's tangled example up with true

get to certain

294 3. After

JURGEN DUMONT AND FRANKMAU

THE ABSOLUTE INFINITY IN CANTORIAN SET THEORY

account of the finite, the false infinite, and having presented Hegel's the true infinite, Priest turns to the work of Georg Cantor, the founder of contemporary set-theory. Here again, Priest attempts to show, that even in celebrated Cantorian set-theory infinity" sion of the "absolute the conception, conceivability, leads to contradiction. Following two sorts of actual actual-infinite. actual-infinite. is really Can or expres M. Hallett,

Priest

(p. 128) distinguishes

between

infinity:

(1) the transfinite, which which (2) the Absolute, The

is the increasable is the unincreasable

quote from Cantor shows following torian in spirit. Cantor wrote (p. 128):

that this distinction

The

an Absolute, of formations and forms necessarily indicates transfinite with its plenitude a 'true infinite' whose magnitude is capable and therefore of no increase or diminuation, as an absolute maximum. be looked upon quantitatively (Cantor's emphasis)

to

As

to experts, Cantorian is well-known leads to a number of set-theory which we shall serious problems. One of them is the Burali-Forti-Paradox now briefly review. Assume i.e. there were a set of all ordinal numbers,
ON={0,l,2,...,a;,...,a;2,...,C4;3,...,a;2,...}

for every increasing unbound Cantor, for sets (ormore precisely: Following limit of ordinal numbers we always have the following ed sequence) a of ordinal numbers generates unbounded succession every operation: new is the limit of the succession. greater!) ordinal which to ON which is itself such an An application of this limit-operation a new ordinal ON+. Obviously, unbounded ON+ succession, generates (strictly cannot ON. be contained Therefore we have: ON+? it is strictly greater than all elements of But by assumption, ON is the set of in ON. Therefore the ordinal ON+ must be contained since ON. ON. Thus, we have obtained a contradiction: in ON

all ordinals; hence, we also have: ON+E

ON+<?ON andON+G ON.

It is not difficult to see that arguments of the same form can be applied to V, the set of all sets, or R, the set of all well-founded sets, in order to get V and VeV, or R?R and RgR. like V? further contradictions, are all versions of the "contradiction at For Priest these contradictions the heart of the Absolute" these contradictions formal Here, problems. account in Priest's interpretation, (p. 132). Consequently, show that even set-theory does not provide a consistent of Cantor's view of the Absolute.

it is important to note that Cantor, too, was well aware of these two kinds he introduced with these inconsistencies Confronted

ARE THERETRUECONTRACDICTIONS? 295 of collections: wrote:

If we start from the notion of a definite to distinguish that all of (a system, multiplicity two kinds of multiplicities... 'are together' its elements a totality) of things, For a multiplicity leads to a contradiction, it is can

consistent

and inconsistent.

In a letter to Dedekind,

Cantor

as I discovered, necessary, be such that the assumption

as a unity, as 'one finished so that it is impossible to conceive of the multiplicity thing'. ... If on the other I call absolutely Such multiplicities multiplicities infinite or inconsistent can be thought of without as of a multiplicity hand the totality of the elements contradiction so that they can be gathered into 'one thing', I call it a consistent 'being together', together multiplicity or a 'set'... (p. 135, Cantor's emphasis)

Despite

as "one finished this agreement, that the conception of the Absolute causes inconsistencies, there is also an important difference between thing" Priest and Cantor concerning the interpretation of these problems. Where a true contradiction Priest recognizes another example of caused by the

as a compelling reason to deny Cantor takes the contradiction Absolute, as "a unity" or as "one finished the existence of the Absolute thing". is not the end of the dispute because Priest is convinced This, however, that the resolution of the contradictions is not a matter of choice. Accord More ing to Priest, Cantor cannot escape contradiction. the existence maintains that Cantor's solution presupposes as a unity, meta-theoretically. In order to develop Priest's argument we Put have Priest precisely, of the Absolute the so

to introduce

into a very condensed form called "domain principle" (pp. 136-140). the domain principle says this: in order for the variables of a given for to have mal language (and therefore also for the quantified statements) a determinate meaning a given interpretation) the variables must (under In the extreme domain of objects. range over a well-defined, pre-fixed where we want to quantify over everything there is, the domain has case, to contain everything there is. So, if we assert "for all x" then "jc" ranges over all objects in the domain, there is. Obviously, i.e., over everything this domain of objects must be fixed in advance and stay fixed throughout for otherwise the meaning of the variables would not be the interpretation, In modern determinate but could change with the change of the domain. a domain plus an appropriately such defined model-theory interpretation a model. Usually comes function constitutes the domain is a set, which or under many domain of quantification, labels: domain of interpretation, universe of discourse. As Priest rightly emphasizes, this model-theoretic the domain as a unity, or as a finished understanding conceptualizes thing (p. 139). Given of existence principle, Priest's argument against Cantor's denial the Absolute If Cantor denies the goes as follows: or the existence of the Absolute, of ON, V, and R as unities he is of the domain

the existence

296

JURGEN DUMONT AND FRANKMAU

statements: for all objects thereby himself asserting universally quantified for all sets (well-founded jc, x is not the Absolute; jc, sets, or ordinals) x is not V, (R, or ON). These statements to the domain have, according if there is a pre-fixed, only a determinate meaning principle, completed domain of quantification which contains there is, or all sets everything But now, we have the sets, or ordinals), (or well-founded respectively. that the variable in phrases like "for all objects jc", and "for all problem or V etc., respectively. sets jc" range over the Absolute, And since these if there is a pre-fixed, phrases only have a determinate meaning completed domain containing all objects, all sets, all well-founded sets, or all ordinals, that these Cantor is committed, contrary to his denial, to the assumption exist as unities. For if he did not, he could not inconsistent multiplicities even assert that the Absolute if Cantor (V, R, ON) is not a unity. Therefore, to the domain principle, subscribed and Priest presents enough evidence (cf. p. 138) that he did, Cantor cannot escape contradiction. his position is untenable. So far we have seen that Priest is right in maintaining Consequently, that one cannot

to the domain principle. However, if one subscribes escape contradiction Priest does not address the question of whether one has to subscribe to the reasons that one domain principle. Nowhere does he present compelling general question of what is presupposed itself. As has been very carefully by the domain principle the domain principle established presupposes by Richard L. Cartwright, what Cartwright calls the "All-in-One 1994, (cf. Cartwright Principle" to this principle is to "to quantify over certain objects p. 7). According a 'collection' or a 'completed constitute that those objects presuppose - some of which collection' those objects are the members" something 1994, p. 7). (Cartwright, If Cartwright's is correct, the domain principle itself presup analysis poses wants the All-in-One which Cantor general principle, Principle, we might to deny in the case of inconsistent collections. Therefore, to resolve the contradictions and other inconsistent mul of the Absolute try is a completed entity, but tiplicities by denying not only that the Absolute a more has to. Moreover, he does not discuss the more

that there is a domain that contains everything simultaneously by denying there is, all sets, all well-founded sets, or all ordinals. If we adopt this posi tion we can certainly escape Priest's argument against Cantor because then a pre-fixed, domain and the Absolute, the identification with completed can no longer be the contradiction Hence, V, R, or ON is not possible. derived. of the benefits and costs of this Here, of course, a careful evaluation move is called for and in particular, one would have to present an alternative

ARE THERETRUECONTRACDICTIONS? 297 a thorough discussion of (formal) account of quantification. Obviously, these topics is beyond the scope of our paper.3 Our purpose was only to indicate that Priest's argument is not fully decisive but leaves enough room for a solution which saves the main idea of Cantor's solution: inconsistent multiplicities need not be conceived as unities, or finished things.

4. We would "Inclosure of like to close Schema".

THE INCLOSURE SCHEMA with a remark on Priest's so-called

our discussion

limits, which we Rather, Priest holds,

In his view, it is not a mere accident that the kinds true contradictions. have described above, generate there is a close connection between these limits and that is open can formally to a systematic analysis. be captured by his Inclo two properties satisfy the following need

the corresponding contradictions to Priest this connection According sure Schema. In order to formulate

this schema we which

and ij), and a function S (the diagonaliser) <j> conditions (cf. pp. 142f;147):

(i) (ii)
As

Q, = {y: </>(y)} exists, and i/)(Ci) if jcis a subset of fi such that ip(x)\ (a) 5(x)?x

(b)8(x)en
one can easily see, contradiction. According fi as our jc.Now, with are satisfied, one can derive a we have that if)(Q) which allows us to take to (i) (ii.a) we obtain 8($l)& fi, and with (ii.b) we get Priest demonstrates have obtained a contradiction. for if these conditions that the Inclosure Schema can be used to formalize

Berry's,

Mirimanoff's, (Russell's, Burali-Forti's, Koenig's, paradox). On the one hand this shows the great importance of the Inclosure Schema. On the other hand it shows that these - in the sense of the Inclosure are only genuine paradoxes paradoxes if the Inclosure Schema is formally sound. Schema and Richard's Unfortunately, function S which the latter is not the case. is defined as a function of fi, symbolically In order to see this consider the from the power set of ?), i.e. the into fi: "P(fi)'\

5(fi)EO. Thus, we a number of examples all important paradoxes

class of all sub-classes

5: P(fi) -> n
Now, since 6 is defined as a function, and Priest is obviously working with the standard set-theoretic concept of "function", we have, by the definition of 8, that for every element jc in the domain of 8 namely P(fi) - the value

298

DUMONT AND FRANKMAU JURGEN

S(x) of jchas to lie in the range of S namely ft, i.e. for all .xEP(ft): S(x)eQ. But together with (ii.a) 5(x)?x this implies that we can only choose proper subsets x of ft, i.e. xCft and jc^ft. For in case we chose ft for jc,we would obtain J(jc)?ft, and that is not in accordance with the definition of S. Hence, S would not be a well-defined function. In other words, we cannot choose ft as x. Obviously, that blocks the derivation of the contradiction. Confronted with this problem there seem to be two options: One could hold that the Inclosure Schema the paradoxes. would reveal In this case structure of the underlying the internal problem of the Inclosure Schema does capture

in the reasoning that there must be an unsound element of the paradoxes that we are not dealing with genuine paradoxes. indicating that the Inclosure Schema, because of its internal Or one could maintain structure of the does not, as it stands, capture the underlying problem, that we are dealing with to give up or modify the Inclosure genuine paradoxes, Schema (at least one would have to redefine S). It is, of course, not possible to pursue these complex issues any further in this paper. Here, our aim was to point to an internal problem of the Inclosure Schema. merely paradoxes. In this case could still claim but one would have one

5. The

CONCLUDING REMARKS

treatment of his main is that Priest's thesis upshot of our discussion Put very cautiously, unsolved. leaves a number of important problems we can say that one does not have to believe in the existence of true Priest fills in the missing details. But despite these to emphasize that Priest's work is without a doubt the best book in print on these very fundamental and important issues. Beyond a clear, systematic, and provocative work. Itmakes the limits of thought is a powerful case for Priest's main thesis, and contains a subtle analysis of the cluster of all important issues and debates which are related to it. contradictions reservations unless we want

NOTES
like to thank Donald W. Bruckner, Dirk Greimann and Lorenz B. Puntel *)We would on an earlier draft of this paper. comments helpful 1 are to Priest's All page references indicated otherwise. book, unless 2 on objects It should be noted that a phrase like "setting bounds and thereby making it. In Hegel's finite" carries strong anti-realist with case, this is, of course, implications He real suprise, since Hegel was an idealist philosopher. But how about does not seem to have a firm position since he never explicitly realism/anti-realism issue. Priest's own addresses for

it no

position? the thorny

ARE THERETRUECONTRACDICTIONS? 299

3 The interested L. Cartwright the excellent article by Richard should consult [1994]. can also be found in Patrick treatment of these matters and comprehensive thorough Grim issues in which takes up many Universe, book, The Incomplete important accounts of quantification. to the domain and alternative principle, reader

A very Grim's related

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Richard Patrick L. Cartwright, of Everything", "Speaking Universe. The Incomplete Totality, Press, 1991. 8, 1979, Logic 219-241. 13, 1984, Nous 28:1, 1994, 1-20. Cambridge MA,

Grim,

Knowledge,

and Truth.

The MIT Graham Graham

Priest, Priest,

Journal "The Logic of Paradox", Logic of Philosophical Journal of Paradox revisited", of Philosophical "Logic In Contradiction: Richard

153-179. Graham Graham Priest, Priest, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1987. A Study of the Transconsistent. on Paraconsistent and Jean Norman (eds.), Logic. Essays 1995.

the Inconsistent. Graham Priest,

Routley, 1989. Verlag, Philosophia the Limits of Thought. Beyond

Cambridge

University

Press,

Jiirgen Dumont Bruno-Walter Ring

Frank Mau 24 Department University of Philosophy of Osnabriick Katharinenstr. 5

81927 Munchen
Germany

49074 Osnabriick
Germany