Jean Piaget: The Unknown Sociologist? Author(s): Richard F.

Kitchener Reviewed work(s): Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Sep., 1991), pp. 421-442 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/591188 . Accessed: 29/04/2012 17:00
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RichardF. Kitchener

Jean Piaget:the unknownsociologist?l

ABS'I'RAC'I'

Piaget'ssociologicaltheory is not widelydiscussedamong socioloFrench gists,partlybecausemuch of it is containedin untranslated works. In this article I summarize several aspects of Piaget's views,especiallyhis socialexchangetheory,and briefly sociological indicate its relevanceto severalcurrent theories in sociologyand socialpsychology. Rejecting both Durkheim's sociological holism and Tarde's individualism,Piaget advances a sociological relativism (relationalism)in whichall socialfactsare reducibleto socialrelationsand theory these,in turn,are reducibleto rules, values, andsigns.Piaget's of social values takes the form of a social exchange theory aspectlogicalway- its structural first characterized in an abstract, exchange aspects.Piagetclaimssocial and secondits developmental requires normative principles of reciprocityand that individual socialdevelopmentresultsin such an equilibriumbecauserationality itself is social in nature and based upon social co-operation. These views,in turn, derivefrom his orthogeneticviewconcerning as the course of evolution:developmentcan be characterized an both in individualactionand in manifested increasein equilibrium
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socla

Interactlon

I N'rRODUC'l'ION

theorybefore A sociologistmightreada scoreof bookson sociological encounteringthe name of Jean Piaget. For althoughJean Piaget is widelyknownfor his theoryof cognitivedevelopment,his nameis not Textbookson sociological a householdwordamong mostsociologists. theory typicallydo not mention his name or discusshis ideas. When Piagetis discussed,it is usuallyhis theoryof moraldevelopmentand are that is mentioned.2Severalsociologists3 symbolicinteractionism bookon structuralism4 alsoawarethatPiagethaswrittenan influential
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But thinker.5 that must be counted as an importantstructuralist and sociologyhas himself has articulateda distinctivestructuralist Piaget escapedthe attentionof mostsociologists.fi apparently My aim in this paper, therefore, is twofold: (1) to point out that work- Etudessociologiques explicitly has Piaget writtena substantial but a work virtually to devoted sociology and social psychology and (2) to articulate,in a very brief and to unknown sociologists,7 view. way, cursory the majoroutlinesof thissociological
I'S PIAGE ETUDESSOCIOLOGIQUES

to of Part the reason Piaget'ssociologicalviewsare not better known matureviews and is English-speakersthe factthat his mostsystematic collectionof writings are containedin a stilluntranslated sociology on The first edition (1965) of this onsociology- his Etudessociologiques. and containsfour reprintedarticlesH an excerpt from his 1950 work The second edition (1979) containsseveraladditional opus.9 magnum basis "' articles. These works(togetherwith severalothers)"form the theoryhaving theory,a richand complex ofhis completesociological similaritiesto exchange theory'2, to symbolic interfundamental to to actionism,'3 functionalism,'4 Habermas'theory of communiIn competence,'i and to certain versions of structuralism.'fi cative for the sociologyof addition,his theory has importantimplications science'7with significant similarities, for example, to Merton's'8 approachto the sociologyof science.A full-lengthstudyof normative sociologywould obviouslyhave to discussthese and related Piaget's '9 issues.
HOLISMVERSUS INDIVIDUALISM SOCIOLOGICAL

Debate TheClassical

a The historical setting of Piaget's sociological views concerned socialfacts- holismvs. debateover the natureof sociological classical EmileDurkheim,whoseinfluenceon Piagetcan hardly individualism. a maintained positionsometimescalledsociological be overestimated,20 whole has holism:social facts are irreduciblewholes since the (social) members possess. These holistic properties none of the individual individual properties, which modify, influence, or constrain the uniting or of the individualmembers members,emerge as a result together. associating the Whenevercertain elements combine and thereby produce bynew new phenomena,it is plainthatthese factof theircombination, phenomena reside not in the originalelements but in the totality

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formed by their union ... If, as we may say, this synthesis constitutingevery society yields new phenomena, differing from we consciousness, must,indeed, thosewhichtakeplacein individual admit that these facts reside exclusivelyin the very society itself which producesthem, and not in its parts,i.e. its members.They are, then, in this sense, external to individual consciousness, of consideredas such,just as the distinctivecharacteristics life are external to the mineral substancescomposing the living being. These new phenomena cannot be reduced to their elements in withoutcontradiction terms,sinceby definition,they presuppose somethingdifferent from the propertiesof these elements.2' Durkheim'ssociologicalholism has a complex basis, but part of the reasonhe introducedsuchholisticentitiesas 'thecollectiveconscience' was his belief that the moralorder providesthe basisfor societyand couldaccount theory,e.g., rationalself-interest, thatno individualistic for the origin and justificationof society. Only an irreduciblesocial theory could do this and morality had precisely this function: individuals engage in social interaction, according to Durkheim, because of super-individualnorms (feelings of obligation), which guide this behaviour and provide necessary sanctions. Durkheim believed the moralorder, in turn, resulted from socialconstraintor socializationin which adults and other authorities instilled such into the youth.As we willsee, thisappealto socialconstraint standards rejectedby Piagetin favorof a different set of social is fundamentally relations- socialcooperation. was holism(orsociologism) the individualism Opposedto Durkheim's emergof (andpsychologism) GabrielTarde, who denied sociological ence and holism and claimed that societyis merely an aggregateof individuals.Thus sociology was reducible to psychology,since the of subject-matter sociologyis reallythe beliefsand desiresof individuals 'under the different names of dogmas, sentiment,laws, wants, in studiestheir interrelations the 'Psychology customs,morals,etc.'22 Thus betweenminds.'23 single mind-,sociologystudiestheir relations and beliefs of individualstransmittedto sociologydeals with desires by other individuals meansof imitation,whichis the centralprinciple of needed to accountfor such transmission ideas.24
Piaget'sRelationalzsm

Although it remainsunclearwhetherTarde was reallya sociological or individualistic not (since he also wrote about an 'inter-individual' Piagetis the dilemmaposed the psychology), importantpoint vis-a-vis attempted and by the twopositionsof holismvs. individualism Piaget's Contrary (relationalism). relativism resolution,whichhe callssociological the to individualism, wholeis not the simpleadditionof the individual properties of the members forming the whole, but neither is it

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(contraryto holism)an emergent (non-predictable) entity somehow existingover and above (and hence independentlyof) the individual parts. Rather, the social whole is the resulting addition of all the relations betweenthe individualmembers,e.g., relationsof constraint, cooperation,social role-taking,etc. Thus, if we knew all the interactions between individualswe would have composition bW525 which wouldallowus to explainthe socialwholeby showinghowthe wholeis formed from individualparts as a result of these compositionlaws. This relationalisma centralfeatureof Piaget's is sociology,psychology, and his geneticepistemology general2fi is drawnin oppositionto in and Durkheim's holism and Tarde's individualism. In contemporary terms, it is the debate over 'methodologicalindividualism' and the foundationsof sociology.27 Rejecting both the viewthatan individualisticpsychology adequateas an accountof socialentitiesand the view is that there are irreduciblesocial wholes, Piaget offers a dialectical resolution in which inter-individualrelationscan explain all social entities.
I HE SOCIAL EXCHANGEOF VALUES

According to Piaget, all social facts can be reduced to interactions between individuals.Furthermore,all fundamentaltypes of interindividualinteractionconsist of either rules,values,or conventional sig72s; these correspond (respectively) the cognitive, the affective to and the symbolic aspects of individualbehavior. Although Piaget begins his socialtheorywitha discussionof the valuesof exchange,it turns out that such values (and signs) require normativerules to provide a rational foundation,just as the affective and symbolic rea ms requlrea cognltlvegroundlng. Values,accordingto Piaget,originatefromthe individual's interests (desires).But in interactingwith other persons,who have their own values,one willcome to exchangevalueswiththem. As a result,values become systematizedinto larger regulatory structures that tend towardsa reversibleequilibrium. In the paradigmcase of a social exchange of values between two individuals (A and B), there are four components: (1) an action performedby A towardsB (ra), a satisfaction (2) receivedby B as a result of this action (Sb)s (3) a debtincurredby B towardsA (tb), and (4) the payment thisdebtby A to B (va). of Suppose,for example,thatA givesa universitylectureto a class.This action,we maysuppose,is satisfying to a studentB. This satisfaction, turn,producesa debton the partof in B towardsA, an obligationto repay A in kind. The paymentof this debt mighttakethe formof a monetarypaymentto A (anactual value), or, say,a promiseto tellotherstudentsaboutA'sclasslectures(avirtual value).In this lattercase, A can count on B to spreadthe word about
. . . ..

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the qualityof A's lecturesand this is a 'valorization' A by B. As a of result,A will receivesomethingof value from B. Although there are severalimportantrelationsbetweenthese components,two equations in particular standout- those representingstatesof equilibria (where va= raand sa= va3. the casewhereA is valuedby B in proportionto In the servicerendered towardsB, we have an equilibrium since va= ra, i.e., if (ra= Sb) and (Sb=t,,)and (t,,= va),then (va= ra).In the case of virtualvalues,we have an equilibrium the followingcase:if (va= tb) in and (tb= rb)and (rb= sa),then (sa= va). Equilibrium The socialexchangeof valuescan thus be representedby an abstract, qualitativemodel in which one can define an equilibrium.But the above representationis a staticor synchronicway of understanding equilibratedvalue exchange. A much more fundamentalissue concerns the question, Why is this equilibriummaintained?,Why do A and B respect the equivalence?To ensure an equilibriumin which values are really conserved over time, one must bring in norms of obligations(rules). One can see why the existenceof normsof obligationis requiredif we contrasta virtualexchange values(an exchange of values over of time)withan actual exchange values. the caseof an actualexchange of In of values,e.g., an exchangeof goods in the open marketplace,thereis no need for normsof obligationsince everyonecan immediatelysee, during the actual exchange of goods, what obligationshave been incurredand paid. This perceived intuitive or reciprocity Piagetcalls (as it), is an example of a kind of thought or intelligence he calls pre-operational, relying exclusivelyon currentlyperceivedmatone ters of fact. Such a way of thinking can attain a certain degree of equilibrium, but it is inadequate precisely in those cases where intuitivemattersof factare not sufficient,viz.,whereone is reasoning about non-present,non-perceptualstates of affairs. This requiresa different (and higher) type of reasoning in which rulesor norms of reasoningare required,e.g., concerningthe transitivity relations. of Rules of reasoningare thus normativeobligationsbinding upon the individual;such rules of reasoning ensure that values will be conservedover time and hence thatequilibrium be maintained. will Piaget is obviously drawing upon a presumed similarity here betweenobject constancy valueconstancy: order to guaranteethat and In objectsare conservedin thoughtover timeand maintaintheiridentity (even when they disappear from view), certain types of mental operationsof transformations necessary. are Similarly, the caseof a in virtualexchange of values there is the analogous situationof value constancy, which requires a normativeoperation (a rule). In short, reasoningin general requiresnormativeprinciplesof inference and

F. Kitchener Richard

i.e., reciprocity,28 that norm normative most dutiesand the adequate one is of viewin whichthe reciprocal allrelevantpoints governing in an impartial are specified of each partyto the other parties rights we reciprocity havereachedan way.Withnormative disinterested and state ideal of equilibrium. reciprocity is operating, 'value If the principle of normativecoordinatethe meansand ends of will will conservation'occursinceit thirdperson and objective disinterested, partiesfroman concerned all one person can no such a situation of own point view. Consequently,in merely as a means towardone's one treat longer the other person in itselfto whom as an end but one's self-interest also,as Kantrequired, necessityof sacrificing this entailsthe even if responsibilities has ' . . . both individuals reciprocity personalinterest.In normative merely own as a functionof the other and not time things evaluate reciprocally, Valuesare thus conservedover a personalpoint of view'.29 from of a debt incurredto thatof normsinvolving,say,the relationequalvalidity all pointsof because to with obligationto repaythe debt,apply an abandoningegoism and Normative reciprocitythus involves view'.3" principleof view. The or moralpointof up taking 'thedisinterested point of view constitute reciprocitydefining this moral normative the exchangeof valuesover time. of norms moralreasoninginvolving socialexchange of values, necessarycondition for an equilibrated as normative A principles thatfunction is therefore,a set of moralnorms It is thusthe principleof normative the inferencebindingon all parties. of socialexchange of valuestakes that reciprocity explainswhy the does. form it ideal particular structural of Exchange Ideas Intellectual in mind here is to consideran way to illustratewhat Piaget-has intellectual One exchangeof ideasor discussion dialogue an intellectual actionand a socialexchangeof is which an exampleof inter-individual required to guarantee an are values.If Piaget is correct, norms and to support the ethics of equilibratedintellectual discussion a reasoning. and thereby communicates validity Suppose that A asserts a proposition A and thus attributes with agrees judgmentto B (ra).SupposeB of B's recognitionof the validityof a result As to A's proposition(Sb). to conservingthis accordof A proposition,B becomescommitted this i.e., thisconfersa value Finallythisresultsin A'svalorization, B (tb). and Sincetbin turn leads to rb,which validityupon A's proposition(va). or >rbSa leadstosa,wehave:rasbtb Piaget,there are equilibriumhere?Accordingto Whatguarantees exchange for an equilibrated and scaleof threenecessary sufficientconditions possess a common and B must of of intellectualvalues. First, A of A comparable the evaluations to renderingthe evaluations values

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B. This in turn involves: (a) the possession of a language.(b) an agreementconcerningthe meaning terms,and (c) an agreed upon of set of criteria standards reference)relatingtheseterms.Secondly (or of an equality valuesis required, an agreement about values (e.g., of ra= sb),and the recognized obligationof conservingearlier agreed upon propositions. This in turnrequiresnormative ruleswhichPiaget termsrules communication.3' consistof severalprinciples: the of They (a) principleof identity, which'maintains propositionin an invariant a way during the course of further exchanges;'and (b) the principle of contradiction which 'conserves [a proposition's]truth or its falsity withoutthe possibility affirmingit and denyingit simultaneously.32 of Finally,the possibleactualization anytime)of the virtualvaluesis (at necessary (i.e., the possibility of returning to earlier recognized validities).Here we have reversibility this entails a reciprocity and of pointsof view(ra= rb,sa= sb,etc.). The upshot of this discussion,therefore, is this: the exchange of qualitative valuesand the exchangeof intellectual valuescanbe saidto be in equilibrium the condition that there is a norm obliging us to on conserve these respectivevalues. What this shows, therefore, is that morality (moral norms) and logic (logical norms) are really much closer than most people suspect and in fact are isomorphicto each other - they are two aspectsof one and the same thing (a systemof equilibrated operationscharacterized a grouping).33 there is a as Thus parallelismbetween the intellectualexchange of values (cognition) and the affectiveexchangeof values(ethics). Social Exchange Theory Piaget'stheory of social exchange is thus similarin certain ways to modern socialexchange theory,but it is also different.The basicway in whichit differsfrom thatof Pareto34 Homans35 thatit is based and is on a Durkheimianconception of social exchange - one based on morality- ratherthan on an economicmodel of rationalself-interest or individualreward. On this point Piaget seems to be basicallyin agreementwith Blau3fi with Blau'sdistinctionbetweeneconomic and exchange and social exchange (although Piaget would reject both Blau'semergentzsm favorof relationalism] Blau'smodelof social [in and exchange basedon powerand unilateralrespect[in favorof equality and cooperation]). Mostmodern socialexchange theoriesare based upon a model of the egoisticindividualtryingto maximizehis/hergain. Piagetrejects this conception: self-interestcannot underlie the principle of reciprocityorjustice and neithercan utilitarianism classical or capitalism. On the other handLevi-Strauss' theoryof socialexchangehasmuchin common with Piaget'stheory, especiallywith regard to the claim of Levi-Strauss that 'generalizedexchange presumesequality'.37 Piaget

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however,and with Durkheimand companywith Levi-Strauss, of psychologyto socialexchange parts over Mauss the issueof the relevance holism versus sociologicalinand theory the issue of sociological theoryof socialexchange As shouldbe apparent,Piaget's of sociologicalholism. dividualism. is it a version but not is individualistic neither theory based on inter-personal exchange it Instead, is a social relations. adequately discussed concerns A question that has not been its origin and developreciprocityitself, a questionabout normative As principle? we a normative cometo acceptsuch How ment. do irulividuals - is formulated in expect, Piaget's answer- cooperation Consequently, as might answer- constraint. to responsethatof Durkheim's socialconstraintor socialcoopersees Piaget it, the issue is whether the development of normative is ation a better explanation of of geneticepistemology,any As reciprocity. partof Piaget'sprogram to appealto the empiricalquestion to answersuch a questionwillhave in theirsocialrelations.Hence we actuallydevelop how of individuals social evolutionand developmentof inter-individual so, look must to the doing find the answer.Before for relations, it is here that we will be made concerninga question must point one however, preliminary holism vs. arises in discussions about sociological invariably that intelligence logicand namely,is rationality, individualism, sociological or social individualin nature?
SOClAL NA'l'UREOF RA'l'lONALl't'Y 'l'HE

the importanceof the social is Piaget often criticizedfor denying theory of a purely 'individualistic' and dimension hence for having a view is often ascribedto psychoSuch and intelligence rationality. our discussionof Piaget'sreversionsof exchange theory. As logical interpretationis misshould have made clear, such an neither a matter of lationalism rationalityis taken.But, on the other hand, set of contrary,rationalityconsistsof a rewholes. On the sociological kind - equilibrated between individualsof a particular particular, relations Piagethas ln takingthe form of a logicalgrouping.correspondence lations thesis:the will call the consistentlymaintainedwhat 1 (social exchange) and that equilibriumpresent in inter-individual samething. Hence neither and the presentin individualactionis onerationalityis the correct answer to nor social individualrationality of rationality.However, the our question concerning the naturefor the developmentfor equisocialdimension is certainlyessential social relations(namely,coof librium.In particular,certain kinds the developmentof those equilibrated operation)are necessaryfor and the mature thinkingof instructuresfound in social exchange dividuals.

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Theory Role conditionfor the has Piaget often insistedthatthe socialis a necessary For and rationality. example of development intelligence,knowledge, sociallife is a necessaryconditionfor the developmentof logic. We believe therefore that social life transformsthe individual with regard to his very nature, changing an autisticstate into one of personality.38 he Elsewhere says: collectiveand sociallife constitutes human knowledgeis essentially one of the essential factors in the formation and increase of and pre-scientific scientificknowledge.39 in This claim has been defended in severalof Piaget'searly works4" whichhe argued,in a mannersimilarto thatof James,Dewey,Cooley, presupposeother and objectivity Meadand Baldwinthat rationality socialagents. If one were reallyautisticor egoistic,and thus unaware of others, one would also be unaware of oneself: Self-consciousness Furthermore,in the absence of of the presupposes consciousness others. would be possible,since objectivity no self-consciousness, objectivity and entails the distinctionbetween the self (the merely 'subjective') Being objectivemeans,among other things, not-self (the 'objective'). that This requiresan awareness not confusingthese two perspectives. what one thinks may not coincide with what is true. Lackingsuch a distinction,the individualwill fail to recognizehis/her own thought real.Thus for whatit is and willinsteadtakeit to be automatically In order to be objective,one must have become consciousof one's 'I'. Objective knowledge can only be conceived in relation to subjective,and a mind that was ignorantof itself would inevitably tend to put into thingsits own pre-notionsand prejudices,whether in the domain of reasoning, of immediatejudgment, or even of perception.An objectiveintelligencein no way escapes from this law,but,beingconsciousof itsown '1',it willbe on its guard,it willbe able to hold back and criticize,in short it will be able to say what, is roughly,is factand whatis interpretation interpretation.4l and self-consciousness the latter, in turn, thus Objectivity presupposes logicitself(along of other selves.Likewise, presupposesthe awareness of of reasonsfor things)depends upon the awareness with the giving for otherwise (in the absence of other persons and other persons, divergentpointsof view),therewouldbe no need to defend one'sown point of view. 'Onlyunder the pressureof argumentand opposition willhe seek tojustify himselfin the eyes of others . . .s42 Anyonewho thinksfor himselfexclusivelyand is consequentlyin a perceptualstate of belief, i.e. of confidence in his own ideas will

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naturallynot troublehimself aboutthe reasonsand motiveswhich have guided his reasoning.Only under the pressureof argument and oppositionwill he seek to justify himself in the eyes of others and thus acquire the habit of watching himself think, i.e. of constantly detecting the motives which are guiding him in the directionhe is pursuing.43 Thus when forced to give reasons to someone else for what one believes, the subject develops the ability to evaluate his/her own reasonsby takingup the other person'spoint of view and evaluating his/herown ideas from that perspective.Externaldialoguethus gives rise to internaldialogue. As severalindividuals44 have noted, such a view is similar to that of Cooley's45 'looking glass selfband also to Mead's4fi Baldwin's47 and views that the self emerges through social interactionand social role-taking(althoughPiaget'sconcern here is much less with the developmentof the self and the notions of 'me' versus'I'). There are importantdifferences, of course, between Piaget and symbolicinteractionism as there are importantsimilarities.For just example,Piagetstressessymbolicmediation(especially language)less than individualssuch as Mead do and has much in common with Cooley'smore 'individualistic' social psychology.But the similarities are impressiveto a strikingdegree and perhaps warrantslabelling Piageta 'symbolic interactionist'.
COGNl't'lVE DEVELOPMEN't' AND SOClAL DEVELOPMEN'l'

Piaget's claim that social interaction is the basis for the child's abandonment egocentrismis well-known underscores point of and his that the social is a necessary condition for the development of knowledge. But Piaget also claims that a particulartype of social relation,viz., cooperationis the particularform of socialinteraction necessary for the development of knowledge. ln fact, cooperation
generates reason.403 Stagesof SocialDevelopment

As is well-known, Piagetcharacterizes cognitivedevelopmentin terms of a series of stages - sensori-motor, pre-operational,concreteoperational,and formal-operational each of which has a certain increasinglygreater degree of equilibrium.When one has reached thisfinalstage,one has attaineda stateof relatively equilibrium full in which there is a set of (reversible) operations,performedon propositions possessingthe logical structureof a 'grouping'.Accordingto Piaget, social development also occurs via a series of stages, which correspondto the stagesof cognitivedevelopment.

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period (0-2 years), for example, there is During the sensori-motor other people are merelythe physicallocusof no socialization: virtually this pleasureand pain, and Piagetcharacterizes stage as that of pure or individualism autism.In the second, pre-operationalperiod (2-7 and the appearanceof years)there is the beginningsof socialization language, but the individualhas not yet distinguishedhis/her own point of view from that of others, and this lack of differentiation confusion of ('the Piaget labels egocentrism unconscious[inconsciente] This stage of egocenone's own point of view with that of others.'49 as trismhas the samecognitivecharacteristics thatof pre-operational thought, which centers on the immediate appearancesof things. is in Furthermore, this stagethe socialrelationof constraint dominant. period Duringthe concrete-operational (7-12 years)there are significant changes:the individualdistinguisheshis/herown point of view of fromthatof others,thereis a co-ordination differentpointsof view, appears. For the first time, as a discussionemerges, and cooperation result of this 'decenteringof the subject',a truly social point of view canbe saidto emerge and it correspondsto the parallelcognitivestage in whichconcretelogic,a logicof operations,appears. ( 12-15 years),thislogical operations Duringthe finalperiodofformal abilityto deal withpropositions.lt is in processculminates the abstract influencesbecome dominantand the at this stage that socio-cultural his/herculture.Ignoringthis latter assimilates individualincreasingly stage, the first three stages can be characterizedin terms of the autism-constraint-cooperation. stage-sequence: The progress of social development thus corresponds, stage by development;indeed, the individualand the stage,to logico-cognitive aspectsof one and the samereality, two social'constitute indissolvable Logical development at the same time social and individual.'5" correspondsto social development not only in terms of an isomorphism between the respective stages but also with regard to the underlyingdevelopmentaldynamicsinvolvingthe principleof equilibrium:there is an orthogenetictendencytowardsincreasingequilibto isomorphic the orthogenetic equilibration) riumin logic (individual moral and affective domains. The equilibriumfound in the social, equilibrium of logical thinking, characterizedby a grouping of operations,is isomorphicto the underlyinglogicalstructureof social as cooperation,which can also be characterized that of a 'grouping' actions.Hence '. . . a grouping is the form involvinginter-individual common to the equilibriumof individualactionsand interindividual actions, becausethere are not two waysof equilibrating interactions, from actingon objects'.5l and actionon othersis inseparable cooperationitself consistsof a systemof operationsof such a sort that the activitiesof the subjectexercised on objects and on the of activities the other subjectreducesin realityto one and the same

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integratedsystem (system d'ensemble) which the socialaspect and in the logicalaspectare inseparable form as wellas content.52 in This 'underlying reality' itselfa generallogic(a formof equilibrium) is characterizing generalcoordination actions.53 the of 'Cooperation is Co-operation' To illustrate Piaget's claim that cooperation involves a system of interactionshavingan equilibrated structure,considerthe following example. Two individuals,on opposite banks of a river, are each buildinga pillarof stonesacrosswhicha plankwillgo as a bridge.54 If these two individualsare cooperatingwith each other, what is the logicalstructureof thiscooperation? Piaget's answeris that'cooperation is co-operation, each is operatingin mutualaccordwiththe other so i.e., that the actionsof both partiesare adjustedto each other by meansof new operations.Eachpartyis adjustinghis/heractionsin relationto the actionsof the other. Some of these actionsare: (1) similar each to other and thus correspond each other with regardto their common to characters(e.g., each is makinga pillarof the same form and in the same verticaldirection).This correspondenceis itself a higher-order operationperformedon other actions;(2) Some actionsare reciprocal or symmetrical both partiesare orientingthe verticalslopesof the (e.g., pillars so as to face each other and to be inclined in opposite directions). Reciprocity (like correspondence) is also an abstract operationon actions;(3) Finally,some operationsmay be complementary,e.g., one of the banksof the riveris higher than the other, thus requiringa supplementaryaction on the part of one of the parties. (Performingthe complement of something is itself an operation.) Thus not only are the two partieseach individually actingin certain ways,but their actionsthemselvespossessa certainlogicalstructure,a seriesof operations correspondence, reciprocity, addition subtraction or of complementary actions,etc.- characterized a groupor groupingof as operations. It is preciselythis logical form that makes cooperation equilibrated. ThePrimawy Cooperation of lt is a centralclaimof Piaget'ssociological viewsthat individualsocial developmentproceedsthrougha seriesof stages- autism- constraint - cooperation - of increasing logical and social adequacy. Thus, contrary to Durkheim, Freud and others, the social relation of constraint can not adequately account for the development and structureof equilibrated thinking. Constraint a form of social relationsinvolvingan authority(e.g., is parents, teachers), who, by virtue of their power, enforces social agreementvia some sanction.But this is inadequateas an explanation

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of the moralor logicalorder. In a relationof constraint, whichthere in is a unilateralrelation of power, individualsare not equal. Consequentlythere is no reciprocity betweenthe two points of view, nor is there reversibility.Consequently,there is no normativeobligation present in constraint,only defactopower and coercion.(All of this is different in the case of cooperation,for here individualsare equal, there are reciprocalpointsof views,and reversibility present.) is Autismand constraintare not fundamentally different, according to Piaget,55 since both are cases of affirminga propositionor belief withoutproof! ln autism,the individualaffirmshis/herown opinion, whereas in social constraint, (s)he merely affirms the authority's opinion. In both cases,therefore,there is mere affirmation a belief of without any justification.Hence, in social constraint(as in autism), there is no felt need to proveor justifyone's opinion to others since (from this point of view) authoritiesneed no backing.The need to justifyone'sbeliefsor actionsemergesonly under the particular social conditionsof equality- when other individuals seen as equalsand are no longer as power-wielding authorities be obeyed.lt is preciselyin to this socialcontext that the need for evidencearises,since with regard to truthequalshave no specialprivilegedauthority.3ti Socialpressureand the sanctionsof family,school and peer group cannotaccountfor the natureof rationality objectivity and whetherin mattersepistemicor moral. Hence 'the sociologicalthesis,'in which sociological constraint invokedas the explanationof whyindividuals is are moral, is inadequate.But then so is 'the individualisticthesis,' according to which logic is constructed from solitary individual activities.57 Logic does not arise merely from the activityeither of isolated individualsor from social constraint,but rather from the interactions (relations) betweenindividuals.58 Habermas Communicative on Competence Social and Developrnent lf Piagetis a socialexchangetheorist,he is not a typicalone; indeed, as 1havesuggested,his modelof socialexchangeis muchcloserto thatof Durkheimand Maussthan it is to, say, Homansand Blau. His theory of socialexchangeis a rational,equilibrated in whichmorality one and logic (i.e., reason) prevailover egoism and self-interest.This can be seen mostclearlyin the caseof a communicative exchangeof ideas,for it is preciselyin the casein whichone individual is communicating A to another individual B that shows the necessity for the type of equilibrated reciprocity found in whatPiagetcalls'rulesof communication.'lf there are such normativerules of communication, can one perhaps without great distortion say communicationis a rational affair. For severaldecadesJurgen Habermashas been chartinga similar project- to laythe foundationsfor a theoryof communicative action59

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that is, like Piaget's,both thatwill provide for a theory of rationality adequate and empirically grounded. lndeed, the philosophically influenceof Piaget'sgenetic epistemologyon Habermasis explicitly worked out by indeed 'only the genetic structuralism pervasive;fi the investigates developmentlogicbehindthe processin Piaget,which materialism are whichstructures formed,buildsa bridgeto historical of offers the possibility bringingdifferent modesof production . . . it Piaget'sgenetic viewpoints.'6l under abstractdevelopmental-logical as is thus most perspicacious a model of the growthof epistemology
rationality.fi2

Such a theory of communicativeaction 'clarifiesthe normative lt foundations of a criticaltheory of society.'fi3 does so (partly)by of providinga 'rationalreconstruction'fi4 the historyof socialsystems in 'internalist'(not merely 'externalist')terms,fitby showing that betterthanothers,betterin certaintypesof societiesare epistemically power.fi6 terms of their epistemic,moral and social problem-solving (or Consequentlyone can speak of an evolution better:development)of societiesin whichone canorderthemlinearlyaccordingto a 'stagelaw' logic.'6' sequenceby meansof a 'developmental Stressing'the correspondencethesis'we earlierascribedto Piaget, Habermasmaintainsthat societiesdevelop accordingto the developmental logic of a stage theory in a way isomorphicto the epistemic, This occurs,followingthe moraland ego developmentof individuals. stage theories of Piaget, Kohlberg and Loevinger, by means of a of processof 'decentration' the individualsubject,a processin which the distortingcognitionsof the purely subjectiveand individualego cognitionsof the 'decentered' giveswayto morerationaland objective of subject.This occursby meansof a stage-series epistemicconstruc'relational'structuresin tions of ever more abstractand universal which there is an increasing normative reciprocity (operational concerningall pointsof view and not merelythat of transformation) the subject.ln such a cognitivescheme there is justice and equality instead of egoism. As Habermasputs it: '1 speak of communicative actionswhen social interactionsare co-ordinated not through the egocentric calculationof success of every individual but through co-operativeachievement of understandingamong participants.'fi8 social (equilibrated Thusjust as the principleof normativereciprocity the characterizes developmentof individuals,so we can interaction) also use this same principle to rank hierarchicallythe various relationsof production,technology,and socialstrucsocio-economic ture of differentsocialsystemsinvolvingpowerrelationsand typesof socialintegration,e.g., neolithic,earlycivilized,and modernsocieties. As Piagetwouldput it, in sucha sequenceof socialsystems,one findsa progressiveincrease in the degree of equilibriumreached by each cashed can level of societyand this degree of equilibrium be partially adequacyof their socialproblem out in termsof epistemicand moral

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435

solving potential.Hence there is not merely individualdevelopment (ontogenesis);there is alsosocialdevelopment(sociogenesis). Building upon the speech act theory of Austin and Searleand the 'conversationalpragmatics'of Grice, Habermas has attempted to constructa theory of communicative competence.His programis to develop a theoryof rationality based not upon the solitary,Cartesian knowerbut upon the social relationsof interaction- the 'exchange relations'found in the act of communication. Although he explicitly disavowsanyattemptto ground rationality incorriblefoundations, on he does attemptto ground rationality a quasi-transcendental on basis by specifyingthose conditionsthat are necessarypresuppositions for an act of communication to occur. When an individual A says somethingto individualB, A is makingthe claim that what A says is intelligible,true, justified, uttered sincerely,etc. Furthermore,A is claimingthat good reasonscan be providedfor each of these claims. But if so, this claim presupposes universal(impersonal)criteriaof
evaluation.fi9

The very act of communicationthus presupposes certain ideal epistemicconditionsinvolvingtruth,objectivity rationality, and which correspond to correlative moral and socio-political conditions, namely,the aim of communication a certainideal situationin which is rationalityand objectivityprevail, in which there is unlimited discussion, mutual understanding, open communication free from domination and distortion,etc. But such conditions presuppose, as Piaget has maintained,a social situation of cooperation instead of dominationand constraint, this in turn presupposesequalityand, and we mightadd, democratic freedom.Communicative competencethus presupposes not only ideal standards of rationality, but also a particularkind of social and political structure- the emancipated societyof Habermas''criticalsocial theory.'We have thus come full circle,havingreturnedto his 'reconstruction historical of materialism' based, not surprisingly, upon a developmentalapproach.This is not to say, however,that Habermashas utilizedall the relevantaspectsof Piaget'stheory;in fact, there is littleof Piaget'sparticular sociological theory,especiallythat found in hisEtudessociologaques, Habermas that does utilize. How Habermas'theory would be modified, if Piaget's sociological theoryweregivenseriousattentionremainsan interesting and intriguingquestion.'"
CONCLUSION

In summary,what has Piaget shown? Firstof all, the social plays a necessaryrole in the developmentof knowledgeand logic. Piagetis not an individualist:the Cartesiansolitary knower, separate from socialinteractionwith others, cannot constructan equilibratedlogic.

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RichardF. Kitchener

In order for an individualto be able to constructa formallogic, one mustbe ableto give evidence(proof,justification) whatone claims. for But this requires social interactions with others who force the individualto defend his/herpointof view.Furthermore, givingof the reasonsentailsa socialperspectivein anotherway:if somethingis to count as a good reason for a belief or statement,universalprinciples are necessarilyinvolved, principles going beyond mere egoism or individualism. Consistent with his criticism of the inadequacy of sociological individualism, cannotaccountfor socialfacts,socialrelationsand one social institutionsby assuming an individualistic model of egoistic, rationalself-interest.Mereeconomicrationality, therefore,the economic exchangeor valuescapturedin the socialequilibrium modelsof mostexchangetheorists,is inadequateas a model of rationality: since this simple economicmodel involvingvalue exchange lacksunderlying normative principles, one can only attain at best a partial equilibrium (a mere regulation) but not the more adequate and completeequilibrium a grouping. Hence the pure economicmodel, of basedon profitmaximization, mustbe abandonedin favorof a model of cooperationbetweenequalsand normativereciprocity. If sociological individualism (elementarism)is incorrect, so is sociologicalholism. The collectivemoral order is not an emergent property, constraining and compelling the actions of individuals. lnstead, moralprinciples(likelogicalones) are principlesinherentin certainkindsof social relationsbetweenindividuals,those structural relationscharacterizing type of operationsand transformations the normatively possiblebetweenindividuals. Piagetis clearabouthow the socialexercisesits influence:it does not occur by means of imitation,internalization, introjection, socializor ation. As a cognitivistand constructivist, believes that any social he influence(justas any environmental influence)must be mediatedvia one's cognitive structureswhich are constructedby the individual. This cognitiveconstructionis not arbitrary variable,however,for or the social environment imposes strong constraints upon such a construction.ln a very illuminatingpassagePiagetsums up his views by saying betweenorganicmaturation,whichfurnishesmentalpotentialities but without providinga psychologicalstructureready-made,and socialtransmission, whichfurnishesthe elementsand the model of a possibleconstructionbut withoutimposingit as a finished product, there existsan operatoryconstruction, whichtranslates pothe tentialitiesoffered by the nervous system into mental structures. But it effects this translationonly as a function of interactions between individuals,and consequentlyis under the accelerative inor hibitiveinfluenceof differentactualtypesof socialinteractions.7'

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437

Kant's critical philosophy revolved around reason. But Kant distinguishedPure Reason(Logic)and Practical Reason(Ethics)and argued that they are inextricably connected.Piaget'sgeneticepistemology, translatedinto appropriateevolutionarydress, can be seen as makingessentiallythis same point. For followingnineteenthcentury evolutionarythinkerssuch as Spencerand Comte,Piagetbelievesthe course of development (in all spheres) can be characterizedby a principleof orthogeneszs tendencytowardsincreasingequilibrium - a (progress).Such a principle is both rational and good. There are, however, two forms of this equilibrium:Logic (Pure Reason) and Ethics(Practical Reason).These are two forms of one and the same underlying principle of rationality(equilibrium).One can thus see Piaget'soverall program as a type of evolutionaryKantianism(or better: Hegelianism). As such it is rooted in the Enlightenment tradition of freedom, rationalityand progress. This principle of increasing equilibrium(orthogenesis)constitutes the source of his particular viewson sociology. There is much to criticizein such a sociologicaltheory but before suchcriticism be made, it is necessary firstunderstandwhatthis can to sociological theory is. Although several individuals have claimed Piagethasno sociological viewsor 'underestimates social,'I believe the their claims are wrong (or certainlyexaggerated). Indeed, most of them are simplyunawarethatPiageteven has a richlyworkedout (but unknown)sociology.I have attemptedto sketchthe viewsof 'Piaget, the unknownsociologist,' to showwhy such viewsmight be worth and studying.
(Date accepted: February 1990) Richard Kitchener F. Department Philosophy of Colorado StateUniversit

NOtES

Joutnal for
.

1. I wishto thankthe assessors this Analysis,' pp. 3-29; J. R. Pitts, 'Introducof their helpful suggestions tion,' pp. 685-716; J. R. Pitts, 'Process of concerning an earlier version of this Socialization,' pp. 821-22) to Piaget's The manuscrlpt. Moral Judgment the Child(M. (,abain, of 2. For example, D. Martindale (The trans., New York, Free Press, 1965
[Originally published 1932]) along with

Nature and Types of Sociological Theoty,

Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1960, pp. two excerpts from his early works. 6F369) does mention Piagetas a sym3. T. Bottomore, 'Structure and Hisbolic interactionist. the monumental tory,' in Blau Approaches the Studyof In to Theonesof Societ: Foundatiorks Moder of Social Structure, New York, Columbia SociologicalTheoty (Parson,et al., (eds), University Press, 1975, pp. 159-71; F. E. New York, Free Press, 1961), there are Katz, 'Structural Autonomy and the occasional references(K. Naegeli,'Some Dynamics of Social Systems,' in Rossi, Observations the Scopeof Sociological Structural on Sociology, York, Columbia New

438 UniversityPress, 1982, pp. 99-121; R. Merton, 'Structural Analysis in Sociology,'in Blau,Approaches theStudyof to Social Structure, New York, Columbia University Press, 1975, pp.21-52; I. Rossi, 'RelationalStructuralismas an Alternativeto the Structural and InterpretativeParadigm Empiricist of Orientation,'in Rossi,Structural Sociologw, New York, ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1982, pp. 3-21; I. Rossi, From the Sociologyof

Richard Kitchener F.
Facultedes.sciences economiques socialesde et l'Universite de Ceneve, Geneva, Georg,

1945; 'Pensee egocentrique et pensee sociocentrique,' Cahiersinternationaux de sociologie, vol.10,1951, pp. 34 49. 9. J. Piaget,Introduction l'epistemoloa
gie genetique.Vol.111:La Penseebiologique, la pensee psychologique la penseesocioloet glque, Paris, Presses Universitairesde

France,1950. 10. J. Piaget, 'Logique genEtiqueet Symbots the Sociology Signs: Towarda sociologie,' Revue philosophique,vol.57, to of en Dialectical Sociology, New York,Columbia 1928, pp. 167-205; 'L'individualite histoire,' in L'individualite.3mt semaine University Press,1983. 4. Jean Piaget,Structuralism, Mas- internationalede Synthese, Paris, Alcan, C. chez l'enfant chler, trans., New York, Harper, 1971. 1933; 'Le developpement de l'idee de partie et des relationsavec (Originally published1968) Bulletin Internationaux .scides 5. Although Rossi ('Relationalism l'etranger,' Structuralism an Alternativeto the ences sociales (Paris: UNESCO), vol.3, as Structural InterpretativeParadigm of 1951, pp. 605-21; 'Problemes de la de Empiricist Orientation') concernedto psycho-sociologie l'enfance,'in Guris distinguish a 'relational structuralism vitch, Traite de sociologie, vol. 2, Paris, de from other types of structuralism, and PressesUniversitaires France,1960. I 1. J. Piaget,TheLanguageand Thought although he is certainly correct that Piaget is a relational structuralist,it of theChild,M.(,abain,trans.,New York, remains somewhat unclearprecisely what Meridan Books, 1955 (originallypubthis relationalstructuralismis. I have Iished1923);J?gmentand Reosoninginthe tried to clarify this in my 'Holistic ChiEl,M. Wardentrans.,Totowa, N. J., Adams&Co.,1959 (originally Structuralism, Elementarism, and Littlefield, of Piaget's Theoryof Relationalism,' -Human published1924);The Child'sConception Development, vol.28,1985, pp.281-94. the World, J. R. A. Tomlinson, trans., & 6. T. Bottomore and R. Nisbet, Totowa, NJ., Littlefield Adams, 1969 'Structuralism,' Bottomore Nisbet, (originallypublished 1926); The Moral in and entre A History of Sociological Analysis, New Judgment of the Child; Le.srelatiorLs York, Basic Books, 1978, pp. 557-598, l'affectivite et l'intelligence darLs le derecognize the importance of Piaget's veloppement mental de l'enfant, Paris, Universitaire, structuralist sociologyand cite his Etudes (,entre de Documentation on CriticalRe.sociologiques, (,eneva: Droz, 1965. Un- 1954; Comments Vygotsky's fortunately, they do not discussit in any maris C'oncerning The Language and Thought of the Child and Judgement and detail. in (,ambridge, I. T. M. 7. It is also unknownto most social Reasoning theChiEl, psychologistsand developmental psy- Press,1962. 12. P. M. Blau,Exchangeand Powerin chologists.See my 'Piaget'sSocial Psychology,' Human Development, vol. 11, SocialLife, NewYork,Wiley,1964;E. Foa and U. Foa,SocietalStructures theMind, of 1981,pp.253-78. IL., 8. J. Piaget,'Essaisur la theorie des Springfield, C. C. Thomas,1974;G. valeurs qualitativesen sociologie stati- (,. Homans,SocialBehavior:its Elementaty Brace & que,' Publicationde la Faculte des sciences Forms, New York, HarcourtX C:. The economiqueset sociales de l'Universite de World,1961; L&vi-Strauss, ElemenCeneve, Geneva, Georg, 1941; 'Les re- tao Forms of Kinship, Boston, Beacon, lations entre la morale et la droite,' 1969 (originally published 1949); M. trans.,New Publications la Facultedessciences de econom- Mauss,TheCift, 1. Cunnison, pubiques et sociales de l'Universitede Ceneve, York, Free Press, 1954 (originally Geneva Georg, 1944; 'Les operations lished 1925);J. W. Thibaut and H. H. logiqueset la vie sociale,' Publications la Kelley, The Social Psychologyof Croups, de

Jean Pzaget
New York, John Wiley, 1959. For the most part, writers on exchange theory (1. K. (,hadwick-Jones, Social Exchange London, Academic, 1976; P. P. TheoUy, Cambridge, Ekeh, SocialExchangeTheory, Harvard University Press, 1974; A. Heath, Rational Choice and Social Exchange, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976; M. J. Mulkay, FuncStrategw, and Theoretical Exchange tionalism, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971) are unaware of Piaget's theory of exchange. For one of the few discussions of Piaget and certain aspects of exchange theory see P. Moessinger, 'Piaget et Homans, meme Balance?,' Canadian Psychological Review, vol. 19, 1978, pp.291-5 and 'Interpersonal (,omparisons in Piaget's Interpersonal Equilibrium.' Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science,vol. 11,1979, pp. l 53-9. 13. (J. H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, (,hicago, University of (,hicago Press, 1934; (,. H. (,ooley, HumanNatureand the SocialOrder,New York, Scribner,1902. and 14. R. Merton, Social TheoUy Social New York, Free Press, 1968; T. Structure, L., Parsons, The Social System, Free Press, 1951 and Societies: Evolutionary and C'omparative,Englewood (,liffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1966. For a comparison of Piaget and Parsons, see (,. W. Lidz and V. M. Lidz, 'Piaget'sPsychology of Intelligence and the Theory of in Action,' in Loubser, et al., Explorations in Ceneral Theoryin Social Science:E.s.say.s Honor of TalcottParsons,New York, Free Press,1976, pp. l 95-239. of 15. Habermas, The Theory Communicative Action. Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalizationof Society, T. Mc(,arthy, trans., Boston, Beacon Press, 1984 (originally published 1981); The Theory of Action. Vol.2: Life World Communicative and System: a Critique of Functionalistic Reason, T. Mc(,arthy, trans., Boston, Beacon Press, 1987 (originally published 1981). 16. E. Durkheim, TheDivisionof Labor in Society,New York, Free Press, 1947. (originally published 1893); Levi-Strauss, Forms of Kinship. For a The ElementaUy discussion of Piaget and structuralismsee H. Gardner, The Questfor Mind: Piaget, Movement, and Levi-Strauss, theStructuralist
(Jlencoe I

439 New York,RandomHouse, 1974;Rossi,

op. cit.

'GeneticEpistem17. R. F. Kitchener, ology and the Prospectsfor a Cognitive Synthesis, of Sociology Science;a Critical vol. SocialEpastemology, 3, 1989, pp. 15369. of 18. R. Merton,TheSociology Science:
Theoretical and Empirical Investigations,

Chicago, Universityof Chicago Press, 1973,pp. 25F80. 19. I know of no such study. I am currently working on such a project, tentativelyentitled: Cenetic Epistemology
of and theSocialFoundations Knowledge.

(in 20. In his'Autobiography' Boring,

in et al., A Historyof Psychology Autobiography, vol. IV, Worcester, Mass., Clark

University Press, 1952, pp. 237-56) Piaget explicitly acknowledgesthe importantinfluencenot only of Durkheim but also of (,omte, Spencerand Tarde. To this list surely must be added Marx and Pareto.There are no currentworks that adequatelydiscussthe strong similarities between Durkheim and Piaget played role and the important Durkheim in Piaget's development. The theme common to both is Kantianism- the versionof Durkheimvs. the sociological versionof Piaget(See my psychological
CeneticEpisPiaget'sTheotyof Knowledge: Reason,New Haven, and temology ScientiJic (,T., Yale University Press. 1986). In

two particular similarthemes standout: to theattempt explaintheoriginof Kant's categoriesand the attempt to establish on of principles morality scientific Kant's
grounds.

The 21. E. Durkheim, Rulesof Sociological Method,New York,Free Press, 1938,

pp.xlvii, xlv, xliv (originallypublished

1895). 22. (J. Tarde, TheLawsof Imitation,E. trans.,NewYork,Holt, 1933, (,. Parsons, published1890) p.28 (originally op. 23. Martindale, cit., p. 306. 24. Tarde's notion of imitation stronglyinfluencedPiaget(Plays,Dreams and Imitation in Chilkhood,C. (,attegno

and F. M. Hodgson,trans.,NewYork,W. W. Norton, 1962 [originallypublished

1946]). op. 25. Piaget,Structuralism, cit. 26. I have discussed this further in

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RichardF. Kitchener

'Holism and the Organismic Model,' 42. Juxlgment Reosoningin theChild, and Human Development, vol. 25, 1982, p. 137. pp. 233-49 and 'HolisticStructuralism, 43. Ibid. Elementarismand Piaget's Theory of 44. H. E. Barnesand H. Becker, Social Relationalism.' Thought from Lore to Science,vol. 2, New andR. M. 27. For a collectionof articleson this York,Heath,1938; M.Deutsch debate see John O'Neill (ed.), Modes of Krauss, Theories SocialP.sychology; M. of T. St. Individuali.smand Collectivism,London, Kando,Social Interaction, Louis,MO., 1973. (,. V. Mosb,1977; Martindale, Nature The of Theoty. 28. On normativereciprocity gen- and Types Sociological in 45. Op.cit. eral see Alvin W. (,ouldner, 'The Norm 46. Mind,Self and Society. of Reciprocity, Amencan SociologicalReview, vol. 25, 1960, pp. 161-78,' Levi47. J. M. Baldwin,Social and Ethical Interpretations MentalDevelopment, in New Strauss, cit., Mauss, cit. op. op. 1897. 29. Piaget, 'Essai sur la theorie des York,Macmillan, 48. 'Logiquegenetiqueet soKiologie,' valeurs qualitativesen sociologie statique,'op. cit., p.123. op. cit., p. 191. 49. 'Pen see egocentrique et pensee 30. For this conceptsee K. Baier,The op. cit., p. 39. Moral Point of View, Ithaca, (,ornell socioKentrique9 50. 'Les operationslogiqueset la vie University Press,1958. op. 31. Introductiona l'epistemologie gene- s(Kiale,' cit., p. 158. 51. J. Piaget,Introduction l'epistemoloa tique,op. cit., p.270. gie genetique, cit., p. 265. op. 32. Ibid. 33. A 'group'is a set of the operations 52. Ibid.,p.264. . . . . . 53. 'Les operationslogiqueset la vie - c osure, ass(KIatlon,mverslon, anc identity - performed on elements. A s(Kiale op. cit., p. 170; Introductiona 'grouping' the additional has operation of l'epi.stemologie genetique, op. cit., p. 204;
tautology.

34.V. Pareto,TheMindand Society, New York, Harcourt, Brace & (,o., 1935 (originally published1916) 35. Op. cit. 36. P. M. Blau, 'A Theory of Social Integration,' AmericanJournal Sociology, of vol. 65, 1960, pp. 545-56; Exchangeand Power in Social Life; 'Interaction: Social Exchange,' Sills,International in Encyclopedia of theSocialScience.s, 7, New York, vol. Macmillan, 1968. 37. Op.cit.,p.266. 38. 'Logiquegenetiqueet sociologie,' op. cit., p. 204. 39. Introductiona l'epi.stemologie genetique,op. cit., p.187. 40. The Language and Thought f the Child; Jufdgment Reosoningin theChild; and TheDIoralJudgment theChild;TheChild'.s of Conception the World;TheConstruction of f Realityin the CX'hild, (,ook, trans.,New M. York: Ballatine, 1971 (Originallypublished 1937) 41. The Child Conceptionf Phy.sical '.s CatAsality, Gabain, M. trans.,Totowa,NJ., Littlefield, Adams& Co., 1969, pp. 241242 (Originally published1927)

'Problemesde la psycho-sociologie de l'enfance,' cit., p.234. op.

54. Introductiona l'epi.stemologie genetique,op. cit., p.263. 55. 'Logiquegenetique et sociologie, op. cit., p. 191. 56. Ibid.,pp. 19sFe7. 57. 'Les operationslogiqueset la vie s(xiale,'@.cit., p. 159. 58. 'Problemes la psycho-sociologie de de l'enfance,' cit., p.234. op. 59. Op.cit. 60. Although is widelyknown,few this

individuals havediscussedthisintRuence. See, however,MichaelSchmid,'Habermas' Theory of Social Evolution,' in Thompsonand Held, Habermas: Critical Debate.s, (,ambridge,MA.,M. I. T. Press, 1982, pp. 162-80, andAnthony Giddens, 'ReasonwithoutRevolution? Habermas' Theoriede.skommunikativen Handelns,' in Bernstein,Habermos Modernity, and Cambridge, MA., M. I. T. Press, 1985, pp. 95-121. I am not aware of any full-lengthdiscussionof Habermasand Piaget. 61. Habermas, 'Toward Reconstruca tion of Historical Materialism,' his in

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441

'Konnen komplexeGesellCommunication thcEvolutionof Society, respectively; and schafteneine vernunftigeldentitit ausBoston,Beacon,1979,p. 169. in 62. In addition to Piaget's general bilden?,''ZumTheorienvergleich der developmentaltheory, Habermascon- Soziologie:am Beispielder Theorie der and 'Gessistently cites the important work of sozialen Evolutionstheorie,' LawrenceKohlberg (e.g., 'From Is to chichte und Evolution,'in his Zur Redes Matenalismus, Ought,'in Mischel,CognitiveDevelment korastraktionffistorischen Suhrkamp, 1976,pp. 92-118, and Epistemology,' New York, Academic, Frankfurt, 1973,pp. 151-236),JaneLoevinger (e.g., 129 43, and 20(}59 respectively; zur 'The Meaningand Measurement Ego sStichworte einerTheorieder Sozialiof Development,' American P.sychologi.st, sation,''Notizenzum Begriffder Rollenvol. 21, 1966, pp.19S206), and Erik kompetenz,' in his Kultur und Kntik, Suhrkamp, 1973,pp. 11S94, Erikson(e.g., Childhood SocietR, and New Frankfurt, and in York,W. W. Norton, 1963)as providing 195-231 respectively; 'Einleitung,' and supplementary developmental theo- Dobert,Habermas Nunner-Winkler, rizing for an adequate philosophical Die EnSicklungde.sIchs, Koln, Keipenaccountof moraldevelopmentand ego heuerand Wirsch,1977,pp. 930. 68. sAreplyto My(,ritics,'in Thompdevelopment. is the workof theselatter It Critical Debates,' thinkers,however, rather than the dis- son and Held, fIaberms.s: tinctivesociological theoryof Piagetthat (,ambridge,MA., M. I. T. Press, 1982, ('Moral DevelopHabermasseems to have appropriated. p. 264. (,f. his remarks p. Indeed, besides an occasional passing mentandEgoIdentity, 88.):'Ishallprothat 'moralconreference to Piaget's theory of moral ceed on the assumption signifies ability makeuse the to development the latter's and earlywork,I sciousness' competencefor corlscio2tsly have found no explicit reference to of interactive processi morally ng relevant confiicts acof Piaget's Etude.s .sociologique.s. 63. Habermas, Theotyof Communi- tion . . . the consensualresolutionof an The a thatis cative Action, Vol. 1, Reoson and the actionconfiictrequires viewpoint withthe aidof whicha Rationalization Society,op. cit., pp.396- open to consensus, of 7. transitive ordering ofthe confiicting inter64. Fora discussion 'rational of recon- ests can be established.But competent struction' thecontextof developmental agentswill. . . be in agreement in aboutsuch pointof viewonlyif itarises theories see my 'Developmental Expla- a fundamental of internations,' Review of Metaphy.sic.s, 36, fromthe verystructures possible vol. 1983,pp. 791-818. action. The reciprocitybetween acting 65. On 'internalist' 'externalist' vs. his- subjectsis such a point of view. In comtory of sciencein the contextof Piaget's municative actiona relationship at least of reciprocity established is with theory, see my Piaget's Theoryof Know- incomplete ledge,ch.7. the interpersonal relation betweenthe in66. On similarattemptsto use prob- volvedparties.Two personsstand in an lemsolvingpowerto showprogress the incompletely in reciprocal relation insofaras historyof science,see I. Lakatos,Philo- one maydo or expectx only to the extent sophicalPapers, vol. 1, (,ambridge,(,am- that the other maydo or expressy (e.g., bridgeUniversity Press,1980,pp.8-101, teacher/pupil,parent/child).Their reand LawrenceLaudan,Progres.s and its lationship completely is reciprocal both if Problerras, Berkeley, Universityof Cali- maydo or expectthe samethingin comforniaPress,1978. patiblesituations = y) (e.g., the norms (x 67. See J. Habermas, 'MoralDevelop- of civil law) ...[The expression 'norment and Ego Identity,"Historical Ma- mative reciprocity'] not entirely apt, is terialismand the Developmentof Nor- sincereciprocity nota normbutis fixed is mative Structures,' and 'Toward a in the generalstructures possible of interReconstructionof Historical Material- action. Thus the point of view of ism,' in his Communication and the reciprocity belongseo ipsoto the interacEvolutionof Soczety, Boston,BeaconPress, tive knowledgeof speakingand acting 1979, pp. 6994, 95-129, 13s77 subjects.

442
69. Cf. his remarks ('What Universal is Pragmatics?,' cit., pp. 2-3.): '. . . anyop. one acting communicativelymust, in performing any speech action, raise universal validity claimsand supposethat they can be vindicated [or redeemed: einlbsen]. Insofar as he wants to participatein a processof reaching understanding, he cannotavoidraisingthe following - and indeed preciselythe followingvalidity claims.He claimsto be:

Richard Kitchener F.

speakermustchoosean utterancethat is right (richtig) so that the hearer can accept the utterance and speaker and hearer can agree with another in the utterancewith respect to a recognized normative background. Moreover, communicativeaction can continue undisturbedonly as long as participants suppose the validityclaimsthey reciprocally raisearejustified. The goal of comingto an understanding (Verstandigung) to bring about an is a. Uttenng somethingunderstandagreement (Einver.standnts) terminthat ably; ates in the intersubjective mutualityof b. Giving[thehearer]something to reciprocal understanding, sharedknowlunderstand; edge, mutualtrust,and accordwithone c. Making hintself therebyunderanother. Agreementis based on recogstandable; and nition of the corresponding validity d. (,omingto an understanding with claimsof comprehensibility, truth,truthanother per.son. fulness,and rightness.' The speaker must choose a compre70. In The Theory f Communicative hensible(ver.standlich) expressionso that Action. Vol.1: Reoson and the Rationalizspeakerand hearercan understand one ation f Society, pp. 101, 409 (footnote) another. The speaker must have the Habermas beginsto addressthe issueof intentionto communicate true (wahr) the connection between Piaget's 'exa proposition(or a propositional content, change theory'and his theory of comthe existentialpresuppositions which municative of competence distinguishing by are satisfied) thatthe hearercan share purposiveaction in general from comso the knowledge of the speaker. The municativeaction. But these remarks speakermust want to express his inten- remain.sketchyat best and call out for . tions truthfully(wahrhaftig) that the exp Icatlon. so hearer can believe the utteranceof the 71. Introductiona l'epi.stemologie genespeaker (can trust him). Finally, the tique,op. cit., p. 197.