White paper On Mumbai Pune expressway

Submitted by: Ashish Chanchlani (07) Vesimsr.

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Index
Introduction.......................................................................... Background.......................................................................... Financial Details................................................................... Brief on Agency involved..................................................... Project details....................................................................... Project Viability.................................................................... Summary.............................................................................. Reference.............................................................................. Exhibit.................................................................................. 3 5 6 7 11 13 14 15 16

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Introduction
The importance of the road sector in India cannot be underestimated. It is one of the key factors in the economic and social development of the nation. India with 33,00,000 km of roads has the third largest network of roadways in the world half of which are un-surfaced roads. As per economist 1% growth in infrastructure leads to an equivalent growth of 1% in the GDP. We are aiming for a GDP growth rate of 9 % in the future. Hence the infrastructure sector should also grow at this rate. But the figures have so far been disappointing. Road transportation in India carries 80% of the passenger traffic and 60% of the goods traffic. Due to the cross subsidization in the railway sector (the cost of subsidy on passenger travel being loaded on the freight transportation), more freight traffic is being diverted to the road sector. Moreover the state and national and state highways, which carry 70% of all passenger and freight traffic in India, constitute a mere 1,80,000 km or just 6 percent of this total network and of these the national highways constitute only 2 per cent but carries 40 per cent of total traffic. Moreover the vehicular traffic in India is growing at a rate of 10% while the road sector in India is growing at 6%. Compounding the problem of under capacity in the physical infrastructure of transportation has been the perceived inability to finance, manage and create new infrastructure. The inadequacies and deficiencies in the road sector affect the global dispersal of development and affect global competitiveness. In light of the growing evidence of such shortcomings the transportation sector was declared a priority sector for privatization. This was seen as the best strategy for addressing deficiencies and to minimize the everincreasing gap between demand and supply for investment capital, technological knowhow and human capital in the infrastructure sector through private participation. Eliminate bureaucratic delays and other administrative bottlenecks so that that the time frame between conceptualization and completion of a project is reduced. Optimal utilization of funds that are available as well as private sector finance companies and international funding agencies like Asian Development Bank and International Finance Corporation. The road sector was declared an industry in 1994 and it was decided to amend the National Highway Act. This declaration if of great importance because this now allows companies to generate revenues through bonds, levy tolls and allow the private sector to participate in infrastructure construction on a BOT basis. It has also allowed 100 per cent foreign equity participation and given the rights to the private sector to develop services and rest areas along the roads. Companies involved in BOT projects can avail of a 100 per cent tax holiday for five years and a 30 per cent tax holiday for another five years. The financing mechanism will mainly involve enhanced budgetary allocation from the government (by levying cess on petrol, diesels and through tolls on major trunk roads), through external funding from ADB, World Bank etc., by setting up its own companies (as for e.g., MSRDC in Maharashtra) and allowing then to borrow from the market, through BOT schemes, setting up SPVs (special purpose vehicles) and annuity.

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Public private partnership in the road sector: The spiraling cost of infrastructure investment is growing beyond government resources. Hence only a partnership of private and public capital can help bridge the infrastructure gap, particularly in cash strapped developing countries like India. Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are essentially partnerships between public sector organizations and private sector investors and businesses for the purpose of designing, planning, financing, constructing and operating infrastructure projects. Here the government stops being the owner of assets and becomes the procurer of services. A project is typically defined as a public-private partnership or venture when the private participant takes up two or more phases of the overall project. These phases may be planning, financing, design, construction, supervision, maintenance, service or project management. The Government of India embarked upon an ambitious plan for attracting private sector involvement in the road sector in 1990. Since independence India relied heavily on the public sector for economic development funding its activities with budget allocations through national and state planning. Public sector companies were owned by the state and national governments. Thus the new policy to privatize represents a significant departure. The role of the government is till significant in this regard. Before the reforms took shape the government was responsible for raising the capital for any infrastructure development. The management of these companies undertaking the development and operational issues of the roads were answerable only to the government and all. At present the structure that currently exist for the road sector development is of public private partnership where every aspect of the project is equitably divided between the government and the private company. The salient characteristics of this new structure are The companies in this sector are formed and promoted through the initiative of government. The government provides the seed capital and key management personnel are selected from existing government organizations/ departments. Funds are raised through public bond issues, as and when required for specific projects, which are traded on the stock market. Investments are attracted from private financial institutions as well as the general public. Governments provide the necessary guarantees for such bond issues. The public corporation is entrusted with responsibility for overall management of the projects. Most of the functions related to construction, operation and maintenance are contracted out to large and small companies, which could be from private or public or even cooperative sector. These joint sector companies have some popular support, from consumers as well as investors. Involvement of people in the public companies can generate relatively greater accountability towards consumers as well as investors. These joint sector companies have relatively more independence, flexibility, and dynamism than the conventional public sector. They are similar to private sector companies in their management approach and work in a networked relationship with other participating companies.

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Background
Mumbai Pune expressway The Mumbai-Pune Expressway had been a priority project for the Maharashtra State Government for quite some time. In the last decade the Mumbai and Pune regions have grown and evolved into large urbanized areas, which are increasingly interrelated. In a 1994 article on industrial policy in Maharashtra, the concentration of the state's industrial activity in Mumbai and Pune was vividly highlighted by data which showed that the two cities and the corridor between them, the Mumbai-Thane-Pune urban belt as it is sometimes referred to, contained 72% of factories, provided 77% of industrial employment, controlled 88% of working capital, and yielded 86% of total state industrial output. More recently this link between Pune and Mumbai has become crucial for the development of the computer and information sector that is perceived to be a key element in facilitating globalization and international business linkages. The route continues to be a corridor for substantial investments by both the private sector and the State Government. The traffic on the MumbaiPune section of National Highway 4 is expected to increase from 60755 passenger car units per day in 1990 to a projection of 100,000 passenger car units per day by the year 2004. The distance between the two cities is some 180 km and it takes about four and a half to five hours to cover it under good traffic conditions. However increasingly, and particularly during the monsoon, the traffic on the Mumbai-Pune road gets frequently and unpredictably paralyzed by accidents which block the narrow and winding curves of the two lane highway. Landslides in the ghats are a frequent occurrence due to the monsoon rains. The resulting delays and traffic blockages turn a 5-hour journey to one that would involve anywhere between 10 to 15 hours. The commuters troubled by the harrowing experiences mentioned above eagerly await the completion of the proposed expressway. The Expressway is being constructed as a six-lane, divided, access controlled concrete road (with a provision of two extra lanes for future addition) with a variety of services and amenities. It is the first of its kind in India. The construction of an emergency telephone service, fire fighting equipment, hospitals with emergency facilities, rest areas, petrol pumps and frequent, closely spaced pedestrian and cart track crossings are included in the design of the expressway. All tunnels are provided with adequate artificial lighting and ventilation along with backup emergency supply. The completed road is planned with continuous fencing along its stretch to deter pedestrians and cattle and facilitate the movement of highspeed vehicles. A pipeline of sufficient diameter is laid along the road length for communication cables.

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Financial Details
In October 1997, preliminary estimate of the project was prepared. It was assessed that the total cost of the expressway would be about Rs 1630 crore. Almost all tenders were received within the estimated cost (Rs 1488 crores). As this is a BOT project, cost of land acquisition and shifting of certain utilities was borne directly by the government. In order to subsidize the project, the government has given 1,030 hectares of land, which was used to generate surplus income and make the project financially viable. The cost of the work is to be recovered from the toll being levied on vehicles using the road. A request was made to the government to give guarantee for the finances to be obtained from financial institutions. This was essential since MSRDC is a newly formed company with an equity output of only Rs 5 crore. It was therefore thought that with government guarantee and project strength, MSRDC would be in a position to get funds from financial institutions through private placement financing. Through private placements, Rs 2120.81 crores was obtained which was also meant for the flyover projects in Mumbai. The MSRDC was raised with an equity contribution of Rs 150 crore from the GoM and 125 cr from the Bombay Municipal Corporation. The means of finance for the MSRDC as of July 12, 1999 were as follows. Budgetary Support from BMC and GoM: Rs 275 cr Loan from MMRDA: Rs 548 cr Bank Loans: Rs 107 cr Capital Market borrowings: -Bonds (rated AA) of over Rs 1897.6 crores

The Government of Maharashtra had guaranteed the bonds. As a result the rate of interest in these bonds was low (~14%). The bonds had been rated as AA. It was proposed that the toll collections from the MSRDC's projects would be used to pay the interest obligations on the bonds. In case of the Mumbai Pune Expressway (MPE), it was estimated that during the initial years when the toll collections were not high enough to service the interest obligations, alternative revenue source such as the sale of land along the highway would be considered. They had even laid telecom ducts along the sides of the expressway hoping that these could be leased and would serve as an additional source of revenue. Traffic and Toll Income Projection The vehicular traffic in the Mumbai Thane Pune belt was 60755 PCU in the year 1996 and is expected to reach 100000 PCU by the year 2004 requiring a ten-lane corridor between Mumbai and Pune. This belt also contains 72 per cent of factories, provides 77 per cent of industrial employment, control 88 per cent of working capital, and yielded 86 per cent of total state industrial output.

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Traffic Profile on existing NH4:

The Mumbai to Pune 94-kilometre Expressway project had initially been budgeted at around Rs. 1,600 crores. Finally Rs. 2,136 crores was spent on it: a cost escalation of about 30 per cent! With an average initial debt repayment interest of 13 per cent, the total liability is now a whopping Rs. 3,000 crores. In a move to justify the construction when the proposal was still on the table, its proponents had projected that nearly 50,000 passenger car units (PCUs) would be using the expressway every day by 2004. Today, in 2011, the actual number of vehicles using the expressway daily is only 36,000. With a majority of these being cars (one car = one PCU; one bus = 2.5 PCUs), the present volume of traffic on the expressway is estimated to be only about 25,000 PCUs. The Toll rates proposed were as follows: Toll Plaza's are provided at 4 locations. Toll will be collected at these locations from vehicles using the expressway. Toll rates will depend on the distance covered by the vehicles. The toll rates for the use of the expressway for 95 km from Kalamboli to Dehu Road are as follows :Type of Vehicles Car Light vehicles & mini buses Trucks Buses 3 Axle vehicle Multi axle vehicle Rates 100.00 155.00 215.00 295.00 510.00 680.00 Minimum 60.00 95.00 130.00 180.00 310.00 410.00 Rates in Rupees

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The toll collections were estimated considering that around 40 -50 % of the traffic on the NH4 would divert to the expressway. The majority of users were expected to be trucks and Multi axle vehicles and they would contribute a significant amount of revenue. Accordingly the toll rates for the expressway had been designed. There was a lot of risk involved especially if the traffic growth did not match up to the expectations. But MSRDC was optimistic on this count, and it was widely perceived that in addition to the current users of the roads, there would be growth on account of extensive containerization at the JNPT and that most MAV's would use the expressway instead of the existing road. This would further the MSRDC's goal of increasing the efficiency of transportation in the sector, since with the encouragement to MAV's, lesser number of vehicles could carry larger loads.

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Brief on Agency involved (MSRDC)

After the recommendations were accepted; tender documents for the expressway were prepared and bids invited by the Maharashtra public works department (PWD). Six corporations purchased the tender documents but only one, the Reliance Corporation, submitted a bid. The Reliance bid was for Rs 3,600 crore, a sum more than twice the currently anticipated cost of the expressway and the government did not accept it. It is difficult to pinpoint why the Reliance bid was so high. Factors that could have driven up the bid price can be speculated. Potential costs for hold-ups to the project by the environmental lobbies could be one. The unexpected decline in real estate demand leading to reduction of real estate values throughout the Mumbai-Pune belt, the cost of raising capital needed to acquire high end construction equipment, non-availability of government subsidies, the overall size and cost of the project and uncertainty that tolls would provide sufficient pay back in the stipulated time frame, could be other factors that deterred private companies. Finally the government entrusted the work of constructing the road to MSRDC. The MSRDC was set up in Maharashtra to expedite work related to road sector development in the state on a BOT scheme. After that a committee was set up to look into the geometric standards and technical provisions to de adopted for the construction of the highway. The committee finally recommended the construction of a rigid pavement, which would have an incremental sot of 6% over the flexible pavement but was more economical. MSRDC started a series of meetings with the concerned authorities and departments so that work could be completed expeditiously and in time. Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) was persuaded to complete the shifting of the electrical and transmission lines. The revenue department was requested to expedite the work of land acquisition; forest and other departments were urged to expedite forest and environment clearances. The project required 646 ha of land for right of way, 455 ha of land for quarry and dumping area and 1338 ha for real estate development. Appropriate reservations were also required for real estate land so that the land could generate surplus revenue. Land acquisition and forest clearance was initiated and accordingly forest and environment clearances were received in October 1997 and November 1997, respectively. The choice of concrete technology and the large size of the project as well as the relatively short time in which the work was to be completed necessitated the use of highly automated, sophisticated equipment and high quality construction materials. Modern machinery used in the project includes high capacity cone crushers, sand-manufacturing machines, computer controlled automated batching plants and laser guided slipform pavers. Equipment costing Rs 300 crore was purchased for achieving this fast track construction. Project management consultants It was decided to employ a panel of PMCs to carry out detailed engineering design and estimate and supervise the construction work. The PMCs were selected on the basis of marks allotted with weight age of 80 percent on the technical and 20 percent on the financial offer. A condition was put that a PMC will not be allowed to undertake work of more than one section. The minimum technical supervisory staff was also insisted upon. Based on the detailed designs and estimates prepared by the PMCs, MSRDC invited bids from contractors for the construction of the expressway.

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Award of contract The PMCs evaluated the bids from the contractors and an exhaustive technical evaluation was carried out. Marks were distributed on various aspects like for example, experience on similar works; record of early completions/delays; availability of machinery and qualified personnel; quality of works executed; proposed work plan, etc. Bids were ranked by assigning 25 percent weightage to technical scores and 75 percent weightage to the financial bid. Work orders to the contractors were issued in January 1998. The work of tunneling was awarded to Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd, on a turnkey and cost plus basis. Facilities to contractor MSRDC provided a number of facilities to contractors such as providing land for labour camps, quarries, electric supply for construction activities; locating petrol pumps adjacent to the alignment; removal/diversion of utility services such as telephone/water/sewer lines coming on the alignment; obtaining permission for tree cutting; ensuring availability of survey/laboratory equipment at site; and ensuring requisite site communication facilities. A number of facilities were also given to PMCs. The special features of construction are given in Exhibit 2 and the special features of the contract are shown in Exhibit 3. Organizational structure and operational characteristics of MSRDC The organisational structure and management strategy of MSRDC appears to be like modern autonomous business corporations. There was a dynamic approach to collection, transmission and free flow of information within the organization. Many activities of a project were carried out simultaneously as for example the land survey was concurrently taken up with the task of selecting PMCs so that as soon as the PMCs were selected the, the survey data could be provided to them. Similarly, each PMC and contractor could plan the construction of various sections of the expressway independently, in coordination with other agencies, as well as keeping with the overall framework. There was parallel information processing, networking and decentralized decision-making strategies and transparency established. All units involved in the project such as the PMCs, contractor's site and main offices and MSRDC offices were connected with a networked computerized system so that problems could be tracked easily and decisions could be taken immediately and that decision is reflected everywhere. Inter-related processes such as material inventory, ordering, store control, manpower and machinery requirements, measurement and certification of completed work, accounting, billing and cash flow management are linked in this network. Any information regarding delays, shortages of material, manpower or resources can be tracked continuously and corrective measures can be taken immediately. There was a well-defined criterion for selecting PMCs and contractors and it maintained a customer-service provide relationship with the PMCS. While it had the right to choose the PMCs and contractors depending upon the organisational structure, price and service provided it was also answerable to the public for the efficient and early completion of the project, as it had raised money through bonds.

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Project details
The Mumbai Pune express highway is considered to be a success story and hence other state governments are closely watching the activities of MSRDC. It is considered to be the finest example of public private partnership in road sector development. But the very aim of attracting aim of involving a full private participant failed in these case as not even a single international infrastructure company bid for the project and only one Indian company, reliance, bid for the project inspite of many incentives provided by the government like the guaranteed 20% return on investment, a promise of rapid and single window approval, tax incentives and reduced duties on imported equipment for all investments in industry, and, allowing up to 40 per cent government support to the project, not a single international infrastructure company bid for the project. Private sector entrepreneurs are allowed to recover their investments first, followed by the government. The government finally did not accept any of the competitive bids and the responsibility for constructing the road and its subsequent management was entrusted to the MSRDC 1997. A number of reasons may be cited for the failure to attract private participants. Foremost among them is the uncertainty related with toll-based system where the developers are themselves responsible for recovering their investment. Private participants are unsure as to if they would be able to recover their investment due to uncertainty in traffic density and attendant risk. And also due to the fluctuations in real estate cost the valuation of subsidy through free allotment of land by the government is difficult. Construction details of Mumbai-Pune expressway are as follows: Section-wise details and names of PMCs and contractors involved in the project Section Length, km Estimated Rs crore cost Tender amount crore 136.82 Name of PMC Rs Name contractor of

Section A (Kon to 13.232 Chowk)

127.33

Stup

IJM/SCL

Consultants with joint Hyder venture 195.05 194.00 Inter Continental Hindustan Consultant & Constructi on Technocrat s Pvt Co, Mumb ai Ltd (India)

Section B (Chowk 16.629 to Adoshi)

Section C (Kusgaon to Ozarde)

22.995

177.46

163.56

Frischmann Larsen & Toubro Prabhu (India) Ltd, Chennai Pvt Ltd

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Section D (Ozarde 16.150 to Dehu Road)

132.70

133.47

Sir Owen Williams Investment Ltd

Jog Engineering Ltd, Pune

Ghat Section Package I: Adoshi 7.130 to long tunnel 86.46 93.15 Consulting Shapoorji Engineering Pallonji & Co, Services (India) with Lighten Ltd Asai joint venture Consulting Larsen & Engineering Services (India) Toubro Ltd Ltd, Chennai Panvel bypass 8.200 Package I: 0/0 to 8/200 Package II: 8/200 1.550 to 9/750 108.00 88.89 Technogem Consultants, Thane Technogem Consultants Thane PBA-PCEC (joint venture), Mumbai M Venkat Rao, , Visakhapa tnam Konkan Railway Corporatio n Ltd

Package II: Long 8.280 tunnel to Lonavla bypass

108.96

104.35

64.50

49.99

Tunnel work twin tunnels

5 5.724

200.00

200.00

Other expenses: Toll plaza, building, fencing, Sign boards, technical consultant's fees, etc Total

324.00

1488.0 0

Source: Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation http://www.msrdc.org/projects/mumbai_pune.html

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Project viability
In 1990, the Government of Maharashtra appointed RITES and Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick of UK to carry out feasibility studies for the new Expressway to be operated on toll basis. Important findings of the feasibility study are as given below RITES recommended the construction of a dual three-lane expressway taking off from the NH4 at Kon near Panvel and ending at Dehu Road on the westerly bypass outside Pune a total length of 84 km. Project cost, as estimated by RITES at 1994 prices, was Rs 11,464 million. RITES estimated that the diversion of traffic to the new expressway would be the order of 40-45 percent of the total corridor traffic. The EIRR for the project was 17.81 percent, which is above the planning commission's cut-off rate of 12 percent. Hence, the expressway project, as envisaged by RITES, was economically viable. RITES recommended that subsidy might come from income through property development on the land in the vicinity of the expressway.

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Summary
This White paper of the Mumbai-Pune Expressway points out that delivery of infrastructure like roads and highways totally through the private sector is presently difficult. Foreign construction companies have not shown a direct interest and involvement by responding to potential contract opportunities with competitive bids. Domestic private sector companies to appear unable or unwilling to submit bids that have comfortable but acceptable profit margins that indicate a genuine interest in these projects as good business ventures. Mega projects of the scale of the Mumbai-Pune Expressway (Rs.1600 crore) currently appear to be beyond the capacity of the Indian private sector to assume as one integral project. In the absence of such private sector capacity to take on the responsibility of delivering needed physical infrastructure the role has been creatively shouldered by the Maharashtra Government by forming and supporting MSRDC in its primary mission - build essential projects in a timely fashion. The experience of Mumbai Pune Expressway clearly indicates that the public sector freed of political intervention and outdated organizational structure and given command and authority to innovate, is able to deliver needed products efficiently by outsourcing to the private sector not only construction but also co-ordination and oversight functions. Not only has needed infrastructure been created, but according to statements made by some of the participating private sector companies, they have obtained incentives to upgrade their productivity and skills.

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Reference

Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation http://www.msrdc.org/projects/mumbai_pune.html Indian Concrete journal official website http://www.icjonline.com/june2ka.html Indian Concrete journal official website http://www.icjonline.com/june2ka.html Concession agreement. Online: National Highway Authority of India http://www.nhai.org/concession-agreement.html The Mumbai Pune expressway. Online: Article http://www.financialexpress.com/te/daily/2000o730/fec300031.html Dandekar, C Hemlata and Mahajan, Sulakshana.MSRDC and Mumbai Pune Expressway: A sustainable model for privatizing construction of physical infrastructure. http://www.epw.org.in/36-7/content.html National Highway Authority of India Official website. Article http://www.nhai.org/road network-html Online Article http://www.epw.org.in/36-7/sa1a.html

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Exhibit
Exhibit I: Government policy initiatives Policy Initiatives for Attractive Foreign / Private Investment Government will carry out all preparatory work including land acquisition and utility removal. Right of way (ROW) to be made available to concessionaires free from all encumbrances. NHAI / GOI to provide capital grant up to 40% of project cost to enhance viability on a case to case basis 100% tax exemption for 5 years and 30% relief for next 5 years. May be availed of in 20 years. Concession period allowed up to 30 years Foreign direct investment up to 100% equity partners for construction of roads and bridges. Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 based on UNICTRAL provisions. The Housing and Real Estate development which is an integral part of the Highway project will be treated as infrastructure and will be entitled for same tax benefits NHAI permitted to participate in equity in BOT projects upto 30% of total acre. Almost duty free import of modern high capacity equipment of highway construction. Private sector allowed to retain toll money. Strengthening of Central Road Fund. Its final format should ensure that the cesses and other charges like tolls are domiciled in a non-diversionary fund. NHAI to look at highways as a service rather than only from the point of view of construction. Safety, performance and operational indices to be incorporated in tender documents.

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Exhibit II: Special features of construction (Mumbai Pune Expressway) The Mumbai-Pune expressway has several special construction features, which are briefly elaborated below. Under each contract, the total length assigned to a contractor was 16 to 20 km, which can be conveniently managed by him. Each section has got independent number of access and each side is accessible by adjoining roads. Several quarries were available within the stretch and the average lead works out to 3 to 4 km, which indirectly reduces the burden on the contractor. Useful materials available from cutting like stone, the contractor without any extra charges/cost can use murum, etc. All the structures on expressway are simple in nature, except viaducts in Section B having height of 20 m and above. Shortage of construction material including cement was not anticipated. The total formation width is about 45 m, and as such sufficient workspace is available to the contractor for deploying large number of construction equipment. Most of the work to be done using heavy machinery considering work volume and time limit. Indian Concrete journal official website http://www.icjonline.com/june2ka.html

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Exhibit III: Special features of the contract (Mumbai Pune expressway) The contract was based on the FIDIC format, which is generally adopted on international contracts of World Bank-aided projects. The FIDIC format has been modified to suit the special requirements of this project. Some of the important provisions in the contract are highlighted below. As a measure to cover financial risks of the contractors, the contract provided for payment of price variation as per a pre-determined formula linked to various pricerelated indices. As a further measure of risk coverage, the contract provides for full reimbursement of customs duty paid by the contractor for importing construction machinery necessary for the work. Foreign exchange fluctuations in respect of the exchange spent for purchase of construction equipment would also be borne by MSRDC. The contracts have a provision for payment of bonus to the contractors for early completion at the rate of Rs 20 lakh per week of early completion. It has also a provision for levy of penalty of Rs 30 lakh per week of delay in completion. Early payment of the contractor's bills has been guaranteed and delay in payment of certified bills beyond 10 days would entitle the contractor to an interest of 15 percent on undisbursed amount. Mobilization advance of 10 percent and machinery advance of 5 percent is allowed to the contractor at 15 percent interest. Contractors have been exempted from payment of royalties on construction material used on this project. Simple dispute redressal mechanism was evolved. In case of abandonment of work or termination of contract, the balance work need not be carried out at the risk and cost of the contractor. Indian Concrete journal official website http://www.icjonline.com/june2ka.html

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