In their research examining how groupthink can led to conflict in NASA, Dimitroff et al.

(2005) claim that NASA has developed values built upon success that encourage complacency, which ultimately led to groupthink. This conflict-related culture was identified as one of the fundamental reasons for the crash (Dimitroff et al. 2005). Due to challenge confronting all American public administrators, NASA was constantly under pressure from political, budgetary and schedule forces that clashed with acceptable risks, flight quality, and safety during its years of operation (Romzek, et al. 1987). While leaders might unknowingly constrain a group, groupthink is a natural outcome when faced with pressure from above. There was not necessarily conflict at NASA or at Morton Thiokol Inc. (MTI, the contractor responsible for the solid rocket boosters), but a case of not raising the red flag high enough. MTI management were raising concerns to operate the shuttle in the cold temperatures that were predicted on the morning of the launch, but, NASA management still pushed to meet its schedule, and subconsciously was willing to accept escalated risk (mainly due to the success of the Apollo program). After MTI engineers warned about the O-ring problem, NASA discounted their opinion and urged them to reconsider. MTI management then had an internal conference, ignored MTI professional experts recommendations, reversed their opinion (despite the engineers opposition), and announced their approval to launch. This is the effects of groupthink, where MTI jointly rationalized their earlier decision and overturned it, all due to pressure and rationalization from NASA. The investigation report (CAIB, 2003: 100) commented The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Communication failures, incomplete and misleading information, and poor management judgment all figured in a decision-making process that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key shuttle managers. Organizations need to develop a direct communication line between lower-level employees and decision makers to share important information and issues. Management should encourage employees to use any kind of channel to ensure that decision makers have the correct information (Dimitroff et al. 2005). To prevent incidents with loss of life and/or equipment, NASA management should emphasize the priority of quality of their operation (flight safety) instead of any cost or schedule concerns. While cost and schedule can be a matter of negotiation between NASA and any contractor, safety should never be compromised. NASA apparently repeated this behaviour in 2003 with the loss of Columbia Space Shuttle. The instigation Board claimed that NASA Safety Panel had an ineffective voice in the events leading to the disaster. Nine members of the Safety Panel resigned due to this criticism as they felt NASA management was not receptive of their recommendation and did not respond to their concerns. Dimitroff et al. (2005:38) concludes that With revised priorities and practices, we strongly feel that NASA can continue its legacy of going where no man has gone before safely.

Winsor, D. (1988) research intensely the communication failures which initiated the Challenger Accident. She claims that several people involved in the project knew that there is high likelihood of a failure to occur, and knew how to prevent it, and yet that knowledge was not transferred to the organization as a whole. Information on the solid rocket booster moved slowly from engineers to management. The main reason is that bad news often not passed upwards and when it does, people are less likely to believe it than they would with good news. Another reason was the hierarchical relationship between the organisations involved: MTI dependent on Marshall Space Centre (where the shuttle program was headquartered) for the contract and Marshall dependent on NASA for funds and career opportunities. However, NASA and Marshall, were technically part of the same agency. Despite working together on common project, the organisations view each other as outsiders, so the taboo against airing organizational dirty linen in public was added to the general difficulties of communicating bad news. When first signs of problems with the O-rings appeared in 1984, MTI did not treat it as serious concern in their communications to Marshall (Romzek, et al. 1987). Both engineers and managers at MTI were especially hesitant to communicate bad news to those outside the company. On the other hand, Marshall treated the Oring situation as serious when they communicated downward to MTI but as relatively minor when they communicated up to NASA headquarters. Even though many working on the project knew of the problem with the shuttles solid rocket boosters, decision makers were either unaware or not convinced enough by the of worrying facts and recommendation to stop the launch. NASA needs to return to what it does best, using the form professional accountability based on deference to expertise (Romzek, et al. 1987). In addition, NASA should improve external communication and coordination in cross-functional teams as well as decision making process (Yukl, 2002).

References: Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) (2003, August). National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) report, Vol. 1. Retrieved February 14, 2012, from http://caib.nasa.gov/news/report/volume1/default.html Dimitroff, R., Schmidt L.A. and Bond, T. (2005) Organizational Behaviour and Disaster: A Study of Conflict at NASA. Project Management Journal, Vol. 36, Iss. 2, pp. 28-39 Romzek, B.S and Dubnick, M.J., (1987) Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy Public administration review, 47(3), pp. 227-238

Smircich, L. and Morgan, G. (1982) Leadership: The Management of Meaning. Journal of Applied Behavioural Science, vol. 18, no.2, pp.257-73 Winsor, D. (1988) Communication Failures Contributing to the Challenger Accident: An Example for Technical Communicators Transactions and Professional Communication, Vol.31, No.3, pp.101108 Yukl, G. (2002) Leadership in organizations, London, Prentice Hall.