InternationalDiffusionandPostcommunistElectoralRevolutions ValerieBunce,CornellUniversity SharonWolchik,GeorgeWashingtonUniversity CommunistandPostcommunistStudies,39,no.

3(September2006):283304(Special IssueonDemocraticRevolutionsinPostcommunistStates)
1 DemocratizationandDiffusion

From19962005,awaveofdemocratizationthroughelectoral revolutionsswept through postcommunisteastcentralEurope,theBalkansandtheSovietsuccessorstates. ThewavebeganinBulgariaandRomaniaandthenmovedtoSlovakia,Croatia,Serbia Montenegro,Georgia,UkraineandKyrgyzstan (see,forexample,McFaul,2005Bunce andWolchik,2006a,2006b,2006c).Asaresult,accordingtoFreedomHousefigures, thenumberoffullyfreecountriesinthisregionreachedtwelveby2005thelargest numberoffullscaledemocraciesinthispartoftheworldsincethetransitionsfrom communismbeganinthelate1980s. Whilenotalloftheserevolutionssucceededinthe overarchinggoalofcreatingauthenticdemocraticorders,theydidsucceedinonerespect: removingauthoritarianleadersfrompoliticalpower. Insomeways,thisrecentround of democratizationinthepostcommunistregion conformstotheglobalwaveofdemocraticchangethatbeganinsouthernEuropeinthe mid1970sandthatthenspreadtootherpartsoftheworldwhatSamuelHuntington (1991)hastermedtheThirdWaveofdemocratization.Thus,thereareanumberofother examplesaroundtheworldof electoralrevolutionsthatis,attemptsbyopposition leadersandcitizenstouseelections,sometimesincombinationwithpoliticalprotests,to defeatilliberalincumbentsortheiranointedsuccessorstobringliberaloppositionsto powerandtoshifttheirregimesinadecidedlymoredemocraticdirection.While varyingintheirsuccess,suchrevolutionshavetakenplacein anumberofcompetitive authoritarianregimesmostrecentlyin Ethiopia,TogoandZimbabweand,overthepast decadeandahalfinCameroon,Chile,Indonesia,theIvoryCoast,Mexico,Nicaragua, Peru,andthePhilippines(seeLevitskyandWay,2002HowardandRoessler,2006 BunceandWolchik,2006aAckermanandDuvall,2000AndersonandDodd,2005 Angell,2001Carothers,2004GarberandCowan,1993Lowenthal,1991Pastor, 1999a,1999b). Inaddition,asseveralrecentstudieshavedemonstrated, thenumberof democraciesintheworldhasincreasedsubstantially sincetheThirdWavebeganin southernEuropeinthemid1970s.Theglobalspreadofdemocracy,moreover,seemsto followaregionaldynamic(Finkel,et.al,2005BrinksandCoppedge,2005). Fromsomeotherperspectives,however,thewaveof democratizationthrough electoralrevolutionssince1996inthepostcommunistregion issurprising. While electoralrevolutionshavenotbeenconfinedtothepostcommunistworld,asalready noted, theirfrequencyandrateofsuccessinthispartoftheworldisinfactuniqueby globalstandards.Thus,between1996and2006,suchrevolutionshaveoccurredin8 countriesintheregion,or40%ofallpostcommunistcountriesinwhichsuchrevolutions mighthaveoccurred (BunceandWolchik,2006c).Whatwehavewitnessedinthe

postcommunistworld,therefore,isanunexpectedlysuccessfuldiffusionofelectoral revolutionswithsuccessindicatednotjustbytheabilityofthesepivotalelectionsto producea liberalpoliticalturn,butalsobytheimpactof suchelectionson subsequent democraticperformance.Indeed,theonlyfactorthathasboostedFreedomHouse rankingsinademocraticdirectioninthisregion areelectionswhereilliberalleaderswere replacedbytheirliberalcounterpartswhethertheoccasionwasafoundingelectionor subsequentelectionsthattookplaceinthecontextoftherecentwaveof electoral revolutions(Bunce,2006). Second,thisregion hadalreadyexperiencedaround ofdemocratizationfrom 19881992.Thisearlywavetestifiedtoboththedemocraticpotentialofsomestatesin thisregionasaresultofbothprecommunistandcommunistlegaciesandtheremarkable capacityofcommunismasastrikingly similarandnesteddomesticandregionalsystem topromote theintraregional diffusionofpoliticalchangewhetherduringitsheydayor atitsend(see,forexample,Gitelman,1972 Mlynar,1980 Bunce,1999b).Bythemid 1990s,however,theeasydemocratictransitionsinthisregion hadalready takenplace, andneighboringstatesaneasymajorityofalltheregionsregimesfacedmoderateto severeobstaclestodemocratization(Bunce,1999a). Thesewereparticularlyimportant, onecanadd,in thosestateswherethereweresubstantialtensionsbetweencultural majoritiesandminoritiesinterestinglyenough,Slovakia,Croatia,SerbiaMontenegro andGeorgia,aswellastheRussianFederation,Ukraine,andMoldova. Atthesametime,manyofthefactorsthathadonceencourageddiffusioninthis regionwerenolongerpresent.TheSovietbloc,threestates,and domesticcommunist politicaleconomieshadall disintegrated,leavingtwentyseven regimesthatthenmoved inradicallydifferentdirectionsinresponseto thevirtuousandviciouscirclesof postcommunisteconomicandpolitical transitions(Bunce,2006). Moreover,the convenienceofacommonenemyduringthecommunistperiodorthecombinationof Sovietdominationandthefusionandcentralizationofpoliticalandeconomicresources inthehandsofthepartyhadgivenway toamorecomplexfocusforpopular resentments,therebycontributingtoadeclineinthecohesionoftheoppositionastate ofaffairsmoretypicalofdictatorshipsoutsidethisregionandhybridregimesingeneral anddebilitatinginsofarasdemocratictransitionsareconcerned(onopposition fragmentation,see,forexample,LustOkar,2004,2005VandeWalle,2005Howard andRoesler,2006). Putsimply,then,theregionhadbecomefarlessregional,havinglostthecookie cuttercharacterofthecommunistexperience,thedisciplineonliberaloppositions imposedby theinvasiveagendaofcommunism,andtheclosetiesthatcamefrom politicaleconomicintegrationthroughtheSovietblocor,forYugoslavia,trade integrationwiththeSovietUnion (Bunce,1999bandfortheimportanceandmeaningof regionsindemocratization,MainwaringandPerazLinan,2005). Theregion,therefore, waslogicallyfarlesssupportiveof diffusiondynamics,particularlythose(aswiththe electoralrevolutions)thatcrosscommonlyaccepteddivideswithintheregion thatis, eastcentralEurope, theBalkans,andthecoregroupoftwelveSovietsuccessorstates. Theelectoralrevolutionsthathavesweptacrossthepostcommunistregion since 1996,therefore,arepuzzlingdevelopments. Whydidtheserevolutionsbegin? Why weretheysosuccessful,particularlyintheearlypartofthewave,andwhydidthey move

fromcountrytocountry?Willthewaveofelectoralrevolutionscontinueinthisregionin thefuture? Thepurpose ofthispaperistoaddressthesequestionsbyanalyzingtherecent waveofelectoralrevolutionsinthepostcommunistregion asaprocessofinternational diffusion.Webeginbydefiningdiffusionandidentifyingsomeofitskeypropertiesand causes.Wethenanalyzetheinventionoftheelectoralmodelandisolate thekeyfactors thatencourageditsmovementfromBulgaria,RomaniaandSlovakiatootherpartsofthe region. Intheconclusiontothispaper,weexplore tworelatedissuesthatarecentral to debatesaboutbothdiffusionandthefutureofdemocratizationinthepostcommunist world.Howhastheelectoralmodelanditsimpactchangedoverthecourseofits regionaljourney,andwhatdothesechangessuggestaboutitscapacityinthefutureto transformregimesinthispartoftheworld? DefiningDiffusion Diffusioncanbedefinedasaprocesswhereinnewideas,institutions,policies, modelsorrepertoiresofbehaviorspreadgeographicallyfromacoresitetoothersites, whetherwithinagivenstate(aswhen themovementofnewpoliciesinventedinone politicalsubunitspreadstoothersubunitswithinafederalpolity)oracrossstates(asthe spread,forexample,of publicsectordownsizingornongovernmentalorganizations) (see,forexample,AckermanandDuvall,2000Aksartova,2005 LeeandStrang,2006 Beissinger,2002BrinksandCoppedge,2005Markoff,1996Tarrow, 1998, 2005 TarrowanddellaPorta,2005). Whentranslatedtothecaseofinteresthere,diffusion referstoan electoralmodelofdemocratizationthatwasdevelopedandappliedina clusterofstatesBulgaria,RomaniaandSlovakiafrom19961998andthen embraced andimplementedthereafterbyoppositiongroupsandeverydaycitizenswhenelections wereheldinotherstatesintheregion.Here,thesuccessfulcasesofemulation,where electionsledtothedefeatofilliberalcandidates,incumbentorcoalitional,include CroatiaandSerbiaMontenegroin2000,Georgiain2003,Ukrainein2004and Kyrgyzstanin2005.Bycontrast,suchrevolutionsfailedtounseatilliberalleadersin Armenia,Azerbaijan (twice),BelarusandKazakhstan. Doesthisdefinitionmean thatdiffusiondynamicsareatworkwheneversimilar innovativedevelopmentstakeplaceinlaggedfashion acrossanumberofstates? The answerisno.Diffusion requiresknowledgeofanewdevelopmentin onestateby actors outsidethestateandacommitmentby theseindividualsandgroups,becauseoftheir valuesand/orinterests,toemulatethatdevelopmentintheirownlocality.Thus,diffusion impliesthatoutsidersmakeaconsciousdecision tocopywhathappensinanotherstate, ratherthan,say,remainingignorantorwaitingforasimilardevelopmenttohappenin theirownstate. Wheresimilarchangestakeplaceinanumberofstates,therefore, diffusioncanbeanillusion,toborrowfrom arecenttitle(BrinksandCoppedge,2005). Internationaldiffusion doesnotoccurwhensimilardevelopmentsareresponses,simply, tosimilarlocalconditionsforexample,theriseofcommunisminYugoslaviaand ChinaafterWorldWarIIinresponsetotheircommonexperienceswithforeign occupation andthedestructionoftheoldorderorwhenapowerfulinternationalactor orchestrateschangesin weakerstatesforexample,theinstitution ofcommunism throughoutmuchof CentralandEasternEuropeduringandafterWorldWarIIin

responsetoSovietconcernsaboutpostwarsecurityandeconomicrecovery. Althoughin bothsetsofexamples,therewasanearlierdiffusionofthecommunistidea,supportedin someinstancesbytheInternational,theactualspreadofcommunism,itisfairtosay,was largelyaproductof thepresenceof bothremarkablysimilardomesticandinternational circumstancesand,especially inthecaseof thespreadofcommunismthroughoutCentral andEasternEurope, theambitionsofanemergingregionalhegemonandSuperPower. Diffusioncanoccurinseveralways.Ideas,modelsandthelikecanspreadacross boundaries,simplybecausetheyprovideprecedentsthatareunusuallyappealingtoactors inotherstatesandthatinfluencetheirthinking,goalsandbehavior.Suchdemonstration effectsarelikelytobepersuasiveforactorsoutsidethestatewheretherearesignificant constituenciesthatstandtogainfrom similarchangeswhentheprecedentitselfsuggests farlessresistancetochangethanmanyhadassumedandwhen domesticconditionsare perceived,eitherrightlyorwrongly,tobesimilarinthesendingandreceivingstates. Inthisdynamic,diffusionislargelyinformalandtakestheformofattractiveprecedents thatlowerthecostsofactionelsewhere.However, diffusiondynamicscanalsooccur throughmorepurposiveandplannedactionsthataretheresultofcollaborationsbetween local andinternationalactors.Inthiscase,diffusionrestsondetailedemulationthat involvescloseattentiontohowthechangesoccurredandtheconditionsandstrategies thatcontributetotheirsuccessfuladoption. Here,akeyfactoristheexistenceof networks,wherein actorsinotherstatesconferwithinnovatorsaboutgoalsandstrategies innovatorstakeontheresponsibility forpeddlingtheirideasoutsidetheirstate or rootedcosmopolitansbasedinonecountrytravel toothercountriespromotingtheirpet idea,model,or policy (see,especially,Tarrow,2005 onthisargument). Although cross nationalnetworksarecriticaltomostprocessesofdiffusion,thesenetworkscanbe formalorinformal,longinplaceornew.Theydependontrustandsharedperceptionsof similarsituationsandsimilaropportunitiesandcapacitiesforchange(see,especially, Tarrow,2005). Nomatterhowdeliberateandplannedtheinternational transfer,however,the localconditionssupportingdiffusionvary,andtheobjectbeingdiffusednecessarily changesinitscorecomponentsanditsconsequencesoverthecourseofits internationaljourney (Jacoby,2004Beissinger,2002). Thisprocessreflectsinpart differencesinthesourcesofinnovation. AsMarkBeissinger(2002)hasarguedinhis studyofthediffusionofnationalistprotestintheSovietUnion,earlyinnovatorsor whathecallsearlyrisershadthedisadvantageoflimitedprecedentsfortheir behavior,buttheconsiderableadvantageof structural conditionsthatsupported their behaviorwhichispreciselywhy activistswereabletoreframetheiridentitiesand formsofparticipation,whichthen combinedtoformtheinnovation thatwasavailablefor subsequentdiffusiontoothergeographicallocales. Theyalsobenefitedfromwhatcanbe termedminiinnovations,whichinothercontextsandothertimeshadcontributed elementsofthefinalpackage. However,as thatpackagebeginstospreadoutsideitsfoundingcore,the weightingsofthetwofactorsshift.Thecrossnational impactofprecedentincreases,but itisjoinedwith weakerandweakerlocal structuralsupportforchange. Putsimply,ideas seemtooutracecapabilitiesand,forthatmatter,preparation.Thus,itbecomeseasier andeasierasprecedentsmountforemulatorstounderestimatetherequirementsofthe changeinquestion,andeasierandeasierforlocalactorscommittedtothestatusquoto

beforewarnedandforearmed. Moreover,thetemporallaginadoptionisindicativeof lesssupportivelocalconditions.Indeed,itisprecisely thisdynamiccharacteristicofthe diffusioncyclethatdescribesthechangingcharacterandimpactoftheproteststhat broughtdowncommunism inCentralandEasternEuropefromthefallof1988toearly 1990. TheprocessbeganinPolandin1988,wheremassprotestsagainstcommunism hadalonghistory.However,bythetimetheseprotestshaddiffusedtoRomania,the numbersofparticipantsandtheirpoliticalcohesion declinedtheregimerespondedwith violence,ratherthanmoreconciliatoryactions andtheprotestsdidnotproduce,asinthe earliercasesofPoland,EastGermanyandCzechoslovakia,eitherafullcollapseof communismorarapidtransitiontodemocraticpolitics. Lookingaheadinouranalysis,it ispreciselythispatternthatwealsofindintheelectoralrevolutionsforexample, decliningmassparticipation,moreviolenceandlesspowerfuldemocraticconsequences. Thispatternleadstoafinalissuethatiscentraltodiffusioningeneralandthe movementoftheelectoralmodelofdemocratizationinparticular.Whatfactorsseemto becriticalinencouraginginternationaldiffusion? Threesetsoffactorsstandoutoncea newmodelbecomesavailableforpossibleexport. Oneisthenatureoftheinnovation itself. Isitviewedbythoseoutsidethestate asattractive,successful,andtransferable?If so, individualsandgroupsinotherstateshavestrongincentivestofollowtheleadof actorsin theinnovatingstate.Anotherset offactorsfocuseson similaritiesbetweenthe sendingandthereceivingcountry.Themoresimilartheyare,especiallywith respecttoboththedemandforchangeandtheconditionssupportingandnecessitating suchchange,themorelikelytheinnovationwilltravel.Thisisparticularlythecase, whenthereistheperceptionofcommon needs,capacitiesandbenefitsputsuccinctly, commoncontextsandcommonidentities.Itishardly accidental,therefore,thatdiffusion tendstobearegionalprocess. Finally,internationaldiffusionismorelikelywhenthere arecollaborativenetworks thatcrossnationalboundariesthatpromotediffusionofthe particularmodelinquestionandthatprovideincentivesforactorsonbothsidesofthe diffusion processtoembracetransplantation. Withthesetheoretical insightsinmind,letusnow tracethediffusionofthe electoralmodelofdemocratizationinthepostcommunistregion.Webeginwiththe inventionofthemodelitselfandthenaddressthequestionofwhyitdiffused. InventingElectoralRevolutions Thereisconsiderableevidencethattheelectoralmodelthatwasdeployedinthe postcommunistregionwasitself theproductofinternationaldiffusionnotjustof specificcomponents,suchaselectionsasthecoredefinitionofdemocracy,theroleof civilsocietyindemocratization,andtheriseofinternationalelectionmonitoringasan internationalnorm,butalsotheelectoralmodelasacompositeoftheseandother elements(seeBunceandWolchik,2006a,2006b,2006c).Theelectoral modelofregime changefirstappearedinthePresidentialelectioninthePhilippinesin1986andinthe PresidentialplebisciteheldinChilein1988(see,forexample,AckermanandDuvall, 2000GarberandCowan,1999andseeSchock,2003).Inbothcases,itwasassumedby thoseensconcedinpower thattheseriggedritualswoulddeliveraneasyvictory especiallysincetheelectionsinbothcaseswereannouncedsuddenly,withthe assumptionthattheoppositionwouldnothavetimetoprepare(whichwaspreciselythe

logic,andjustasflawed,ofthecommunistsinPolandwhentheysuddenlycalledfor semicompetitiveelectionsinJune,1989). However,localopponentsoftheMarcosandPinochetdictatorships,respectively, assistedby theinternationaldemocratizationcommunity,wereabletocapitalizeontheir earlierexperienceswithoppositionorganization,popularprotests,andstrategiesofnon violentconfrontationswiththeregimeandcombinedtheseresourceswith ambitious campaignstoregistervotersandgetoutthevote(forexample,throughtheCrusadefor CitizenParticipationinChile)monitorthequalityoftheelectionsandeducatevoters aboutregimeabusesandtheimportanceofseizingthepoliticalmomenttorejectthe regimeintheChileancase(theplebisciteofferednoalternativecandidate)andtosupport theAcquinoLaurelticketinthePhilippines(alsosee,forexample,SantaCruz,2005on theriseofelectionmonitoringasaninternational norm).Alsocriticalinthisprocess(as itwastobeinothers)wasthewillingnessoftheU.S.,albeitratherlateinthegamein thesecases,totakeastandrejectingthevalidityoftheannouncedelectionresultsand,in thecaseofthePhilippines,togoastepfurtherinencouragingMarcostoacceptthereal electionresultsandvacateoffice.WhilebothMarcosandPinochetlost,thetransitionsto democracywereneitherimmediatenortroublefree.However,bymostaccounts,a cornerwasturnedacornerthatwastheresult,itmustberecognized,ofhardworknot justduringtheelection,butalsoyearsbeforethat.Anotherremarkableaspectofthese twoelectionsisthefactthatpublicswerewillingandable,liketheopposition,totakethe electionseriously,ratherthanignoreorboycottit,andtoregister theirpolitical preferences,despitethedemobilizingeffectsofbothharassmentandhopelessness. Thismodelofregimechangethatis,transformingelectionsinauthoritariansettings intogenuinelycompetitiveandfairprocesseswithsubstantialpopularinvolvement thenmoved tootherpartsoftheworld,suchasNicaragua,Indonesia,andeventuallyMexico,aswellasthe postcommunistregion.OneofthemostinterestingcaseswastheNicaraguanelectionsof1990, whentheSandanistas,fearingfraud,butsupremelyconfidentoftheirpublicsupport,welcomed internationalelectionmonitorswhothenendedupcertifyingthevictoryoftheopposition.Just asinterestingisthefactthattheSandanistasacceptedthisjudgment,asdid,forexample,the losersmanyyearslaterinpivotalelectionsinBulgaria,Romania,SlovakiaandCroatiabetween 1997and2000.However,inSerbiain2000(asinthePhilippinesandIndonesiabeforeit),the electionwasimmediatelyfollowedbypopularproteststosupportatransferofpoliticalpower mandatedbyelectionsinthefaceofattemptsbytheincumbentstofalsifytheelectionresultsa dynamicthatalsomaterializedinGeorgiain2003,Ukrainein2004,andKyrgyzstanin2005. Themodelthenmovedtothepostcommunistregionthoughhardlyinmechanical fashionorintheabsenceofthehardworkandcreativeideasofoppositiongroupsthat confrontedthesimilarsituationofwantingtouseelectionstodefeatilliberalincumbentsortheir anointedsuccessors.Thestorybeginswithfourinterconnectedpoliticalstrugglesthattook placeinSerbia,Bulgaria,RomaniaandSlovakiafrom19961998.Thefirstwere themassive threemonthlongprotestsinSerbiafrom19961997proteststhatweremotivatedby Milosevicsattempttodenytheoppositionitssignificantvictoriesinmanyofthelocalelections thattookplacein1996(Lazic,1999Pavlovic,2005Thomas,1999). Theseprotests,asinthe othercasesaswell,builtonpreviousroundsofpoliticalprotestintheSerbiancasegoingback totheearly1980sandinRomania,Bulgaria,andSlovakiato1989. Although theSerbian protestsfailedin theshortterm, theycontributedinimportantwaystoasubsequentroundof electionbasedprotestsinthefall of 2000thatsucceededinbringingdownMilosevic(seeSt.

Protic,2005Bieber,2003Pribecevic,2004). Alsohelpfulin producinganewgenerationof protestersandexpandingthegeographyofantiMilosevicsentimentwereMilosevicsdecisions followingtheseprotests,tocrackdownontheautonomyofuniversities,localgovernmentsand themedia(Pavlovic,2005Goati,2001). ThesecondsetofstrugglestookplaceinRomania,wheretheliberaloppositionfinally cametogetherandranasophisticatedpolitical campaignthatsucceededinreplacingtheformer communistincumbentpresident(whocamebacktopowerin2000),withacandidatewithfar strongerliberalcredentialsandcommitments(see,forexample,RomanianCoalitionforaClean Parliament,2005MunguiPippidi,2006butseeBunce,2002on theadvantagesfor democratizationofauthoritarianforceslosing,thenwinningpower).Thethirdsetofstruggles tookplaceinBulgariaatroughlythesametime.InBulgaria,Serbianprotestsnextdoorhad beenveryinfluential inmotivatingpublics,intellectualsandleadersoftheopposition motivationthatwasstrikinglysimilartohowtheCzechsandSlovaksreactedtotheoutbreakof largescaleprotestsinEastGermanyinthefallof1989. InBulgaria,therewerelargescale publicprotestsagainstthecommunistledgovernmentin1997thatledtothefallofthe governmentanditsreplacementthroughanelectionwithagovernmentledby aunitedliberal opposition. Although theircohesionprovedtemporaryandtheireffectivenesslimited(asin Romania),theirvictory,againasinRomania,provedtobeadecisivepoliticalturningpointas indicated,forexample,bytheimprovementinFreedomHousescoresfollowingthesepivotal electionsinbothcountries.Thisimprovement,moreover,remainedinplaceintheyearstocome, aidedinpartbycontinuinginternationalsupportfordemocratizationbytheEuropeanUnionand theUnitedStates. Thesamegeneralizationappliestothefourthparticipantinthedevelopmentofthe electoralmodelin thepostcommunistregion:Slovakia. Inapivotalmeetingtakingplaceinthe Viennaairportattheendof1997,leadersoftheSlovakopposition,theAmericanambassadorsto SlovakiaandtheCzechRepublic,andrepresentativesoftheInternationalRepublicanInstitute, theNationalDemocraticInstitute,FreedomHouseandtheNationalEndowmentforDemocracy cametogethertodeviseastrategyforunseatingVladimirMeciar,theilliberalSlovakPrime Minister,intheupcomingparliamentaryelections. ThesuccessoftheBulgarianandRomanian oppositionswerecruciallessonsofthevalueofunity.ThismeetingledtotheOK98campaign, whereallthecomponentsoftheelectoralmodelcametogetherforexample,theformationofa cohesiveopposition(bringingtogethernolessthaneighteenparties)ambitiouscampaignsto registervoters,advertisethecostsoftheMeciarregime,andgetoutthevoteandthedeployment of bothdomesticandinternationalelectionmonitoring,aswellasexitpolls.Inthiscase,the willingnessoftheoppositiontounitebehindthiscampaignreflectedthedisastrousresultsof theirfailuretocooperateinthe1994electionsafterabriefperiodofgoverningthecountryina broadcoalition(MeciarwonandbecamePrimeMinisteragain).They couldbuilduponthe previousdevelopmentofavibrantcivilsociety whichalreadyhadaveryhighdegreeof organizationandcoordination,reflectinglongterm internationalsupportand thecreativityand hardworkoflocalactivists.Asaresult,Meciarlosttheelection,and,ashadleadersinboth BulgariaandRomania,acceptedtheverdictofthevoters. Itwasthroughthesefourinteractivecasesthattheelectoralmodelwasineffectinvented, appliedandmadeavailableforexporttoothercountriesintheregionthatalsohadregular electionsauthoritarianleadersinpowerandfragmentedoppositions(thoughmorerepressive domesticpolitics).ItsfirststopinthediffusionprocesswasinCroatiain2000,wherethedeath ofthelongservingdictator,FranjoTudjman,in1999hadweakenedthegoverningpartyand

providedanopportunityfortheoppositiontowinpower.Inthiscase,asinBulgariaand Romania,theelectionwasforthePresidency,andasin thesecasesaswellasSlovakia,the electoraloutcomeproducedasmoothtransition. AsinSlovakia,andincontrasttothesituation inBulgariaandRomaniaafterthesepivotalelections,theelectoralrevolutionhaddramatic effectsondemocratizationinCroatia..TheCroatianelectionof2000wasinfactarevolution, andonethatwasenhancedbythereturntopower threeyearslater oftheCroatianDemocratic Union.ThisturnovercementeddemocracyinCroatiainpartbecauseofSanadersstrong commitmenttoleadingCroatiatotheEuropeanUnion. Laterin2000,theelectoralrevolutionmovedtoSerbia.Here,therewereseveralkey differences.OnewasthatthestruggleagainstMilosevicwasseverelyconstrainedbytheheavy authoritarianhandoftheMilosevicregime.Thus,forexample,therewerenoexternalelection monitorsinSerbiainthefall2000electionsthemediawerecloselycontrolledbyMilosevic andtheassistanceprovidedby theinternationalcommunitywasimportant,butnecessarilyonthe geographicalmargins,giventheimpossibilityofadomesticpresence. Moreover, astudent group,Otpor,playedthecentralroleinthestruggleagainstMilosevic,andthesize,dedication andgeographicalspreadofthismovementarewhat,arguably,provedtobepoliticallydecisive. Finally,thevictoryoftheopposition(whichwascomposedofeighteenpartiesthatcame togetheraround thecandidacyofamoderatenationalist,VojislavKostunicathanksinpartto thewillingnessofthefarmorecharismaticDjindjictoplayasecondaryrole)wasdelayedby Milosevicsrefusal tocedepower. Incontrasttothepreviouscasesdiscussed,where authoritarianleadersormovementscededpowerafterlosingelections,Milosevicfinally stepped downonlyaftertheoppositionmountedmassiveSerbiawideprotests.LikeitsCroatian counterpart,theSerbianpresidentialelectionproducedachangeinregime,aswellas government.However,incontrastto thesituationinCroatia,theSerbianoppositioncontinued tobeplaguedbyseveredivisionsthatwereexacerbatedby thecontinuingborderproblems representedbyKosovoandMontenegro(andgrowingpressuresforautonomyinVojvodinaas well)andbypressuresonthepartoftheinternationalcommunitytomovequicklyincooperating withthedemandsof theHagueWarCrimesTribunal (seeBieber,2003). Theassassinationof Djindjicin2003themosteffectiveleaderoftheSerbianoppositiondidnothelpmatters(and seeMiller,2004). TheGeorgianoppositionthenfollowedsuitinthe2003parliamentaryelectionsthough thisproduced,itisimportanttorecognize,acoupdetatbytheopposition,sinceShevardnadze resigned,butwasnotinfactupforreelection(Papava,2005Wheatley,2005). InGeorgia,the politicalcontextwaslessconstrainingthaninSerbia,especiallygiventhelacklustercampaignby Shevardnadzesallies,thedefectionof somany keyplayersfromtherulinggrouptothe opposition(suchasMikheilSaakashvili,thecurrentpresident),therelativeopennessofthe Georgianmedia,theformationofayouthgroupinsupportofpoliticalchange(Kmara)that workedcloselywiththeGeorgianoppositionaroundSaakashvili,andthepresenceofa significantnumberoflocalandinternationalelectionmonitors(KarumidzeandWertsch,2005). Aswiththeothercases,moreover,itwasclearthattheGeorgianoppositionmodeledits campaignonthepreviouselectoralrevolutionsintheregion.ThanksinparttotheOpenSociety Foundation,forexample,therewasclosecollaborationbetweenGeorgiansandgraduatesofthe SerbianandSlovakexperiences. Moreover,theAmericandemocracypromotioncommunity alsoplayedarole,astheyhadin SlovakiaandSerbia.Whatwascriticalwastheirlongterm investmentinGeorgiancivilsociety (asin Bulgaria,Romaniaandespecially Slovakia),the pressurestheyplacedonShevardnadzepriortotheelectiontoimprovethequalityofthe

elections,andtheircontributionstocampaignstrategiesandoppositiondevelopment.These benefitsrecognized,however,intheGeorgiancontextaselsewhere,theirinfluencewasnotjust limiteditwasattimescounterproductive(see,forexample,thecriticalinsightsonexternal assistanceprovidedbyDevdariani,2003CooleyandRon,2002Grodeland,2006Mendelson, 2004MendelsonandGlenn,2002MendelsonandGerber,2005). Indeed,intheviewofmost participantsandlocalanalysts,thekeyinternationalcontributionswere,first,theprecedentset bysuccessfulelectoralrevolutionsinSerbiaandSlovakia,and,second,thestrategicinsights offeredbygraduatesoftheseearlierelectoralrevolutions(see,especially,Kandelaki,2005 Meladze,2005). ThenextsuccessfulelectoralrevolutionoccurredinUkraineayearlater(see,in particular,Kuzio,2005Kubicek,2005Way,2005a,2005b). Asin theGeorgian case,asingle charismaticpoliticianinthiscase,ViktorYushchenkoplayedacriticalrole. Asinboththe Georgian andSerbiancases,thesuccessfulpoliticalbreakthrough exploitedarecordofa leadershipthathadgrownincreasinglycorrupt,carelessandviolentbenefitedfromdefections fromtherulingcirclesbuiltuponearlierroundsofprotestsandrecentsuccessesinlocal electionsandreachedouttodiversegroups,withyoungpeopleplayingnearlyasimportanta roleasonesawinSerbiawithOtpor.Moreover,asinSerbiaandGeorgia,politicalprotestsafter theelection (whichwereaslargeandaspersistentasthoseinSerbia)wereagainnecessaryto forcetheauthoritarianchallengertoadmitdefeat. MoredistinctivetotheUkrainiancase, however,wasthebreakdownofcentralcontroloverthemediaduringthecampaignand especiallyduringtheprotests,andtheremarkableroleoftheSupremeCourt,whichcamedown insupportoftheoppositionsargumentthattheelectionshadbeenfraudulentandhadtobe repeated. Asin Serbia,moreover,theunityoftheoppositionwasshortlived,afactorthat complicatedconsistentmovementtocreatedemocraticpolities. TheelectoralmodelthenmovedtoanumberofnewlocalesKyrgyzstan,whereit succeeded,asinGeorgia,indeposingthelongservingleader,despitethefactthattheseelections werealsoparliamentary,notpresidential,andtoAzerbaijanandKazakhstan,whererepressive regimes,dividedoppositions,andsporadicprotestsallowincumbentstomaintainpower.These dynamicsweresimilartoearlier,failedattemptstocarryoutelectoralrevolutionsinArmenia andBelarus.GiventhepoliticalchaosthathasensuedinKyrgyzstansincethespring2005 elections,itisfairtosaythattheelectoralmodelhashadmixedresultsinthatcountry(see,for example,Weyerman,2005Huskey,2005a,2005b,2006). Effortsofoppositionandcivic activiststousemassproteststounseattheLukashenkaregimeafterthemanipulatedelectionsof 2006failedonceagaintobringaboutachangeofregime.However,althoughthegovernment wasabletocontaintheprotestsbyarrestingoppositionleadersanddispersingprotesters,the numberofcitizenswhoparticipatedinthesedemonstrationswassubstantiallyhigherthanin earlierattempts. Thereareseveralgeneralizationswecandrawfromthisbriefoverviewoftheoriginsand thediffusionoftheelectoralmodelinthepostcommunistregion.First,aswithsomany innovations,theinventionofthemodelitselftestifiestotheimportanceofdiffusiondynamics. ThemodelthatwasdeployedinBulgaria,RomaniaandSlovakia,inshort,wastheculmination ofanumberofdevelopmentswithinandoutsidetheregion,including,forexample,thedeclining internationalconstraintonviolationsofstatesovereignty(Finemore,2003)andthegrowing consensusaroundinternational democracypromotionthroughencouragementofcivilsocietyon thepartoftheWorldBank,USAIDandEuropeanfoundationsandgovernments(van Wersch anddeZeeuv,2005Hermann,2005USAID,2005Finkel,et.al.,2005). Putsimply,the

diffuserswerethemselvesinfluencedbydiffusion.Second,whileprecedentplayedapowerful role,especiallyincommunicatingthatsuchchangewaspossible,sodiddeliberateandcareful emulation.Thelatter wasfacilitatedbynetworksoflocal,regionalandWesternpoliticalactivists whocametogethertodefeatilliberalleadersandshiftthepoliticaltrajectoriesofthesecountries inamoredemocraticdirection.Third,thehardworkoflocalactivistswas,inthefinalanalysis, thekeyfactorwhichhelpsexplain,forexample,thecontrastbetweenthepositiveandongoing consequencesoftheOK98campaigninSlovakiaandthefarmorechaoticdynamicsofthe electoralrevolutionintheKyrgyzparliamentaryelections.Finally,asthediffusionliterature suggests,themodelchangedwithrespect totheweightofprecedentversussupportivelocal conditionslocalcapacitytoproducepowerfuldemocraticconsequencesdeclinedasthemodel movedfromitsoriginalsiteinBulgaria,Romania,Slovakia,andCroatiatoSerbia,Georgia, UkraineandKyrgyzstan. Theseinsights,however,donotanswerakeyquestion:whydidtheelectoralmodel movesosuccessfullyfromcountrytocountryinthepostcommunistregion?Whydiditbecome themodelofchoice,andwhydiditsucceedattheveryleastinbringingdowndictatorsand improvingtheprospectsforsubsequentdemocraticdevelopment?Itistothesequestionsthatwe nowturn. . TheElectoralModel Asnotedabove,specialistsindiffusionarguein concernthatakeyfactor affectingthelikelihoodofsuccessfuldiffusioniswhethertheobjectbeingdiffusedin amenabletointernationaltransplantation.Inonerespect,theelectoralmodelisnotas easytodiffuseas,forexample,someminorchangeinpublicpolicy.Thisisbecausethe electoralmodelthreatenstounseatthoseinpower.Thepoliticalthreatsinvolved, moreover,weresubstantialincountrieswheredictatorshipswerelonginplaceasin CroatiaduringtheTudjmanera,SerbiaMontenegrounderMilosevic(especially beginningin1997)andKyrgyzstanunderAkayev(who,likeMilosevic,hadgrownmore authoritarianoverhistimeinoffice).However,eveninthemoredemocraticsettings, authoritarianincumbentshadsignificantpoliticalandeconomicresourcesattheir disposaltoblockpoliticalchangeforexample,controloverthemedia(whichwas extremelyimportantinUkraine)andtheuseofpoliciesthathelpedkeeptheopposition dividedanddispirited(asinBulgaria,Romania,andSlovakia). However,inmostotherrespects,theelectoralmodelisunusuallyamenableto diffusion.First,asMarkBeissinger(2006)hasargued,drawingupontheworkofSidney Tarrow(2003,2005),theelectoralmodelhasthedecidedadvantageofbeingmodular.It isacompactpackageofdetailedandinterrelatedtasks,suchasforgingcooperation amongoppositiongroups,registeringvotersandgettingoutthevote,pressuringthe governmentforreformsinelectoralcommissions,usingthemedia(wherepossible)to counterthebiasesoftheofficialmedia,runningcampaignsthatprovidevoterswiththe informationandhopetheyneedtotaketheelectionseriouslyandvotetheirconsciences, monitoringelections,andpreparingforprotestsItheeventthatilliberalleaderslose,but refusetovacatetheiroffices.Werecognize,ofcourse,thatthesetasksrequirean extraordinaryamountofwork,coordinationand,inthepoliticallydangeroussituationsin Serbia,UkraineandKyrgyzstan,bravery.Foreexample,approximately700membersof

Otpor,theSerbianyouthorganizationthataroseinresponsetothehardlinepoliciesof theMilosevicgovernment,isacaseinpoint(Goati,2001).Thepoisoningof YushchenkointhecourseofthecampaigninUkraineillustrates therisksinvolved.And, asthecaseswehavediscussedillustrate,theelectoralmodelmustbeadaptedtolocal conditionsandcircumstances,includingboththenatureoftheauthoritarianregimeand theunityandsizeoftheopposition. Theelectoralmodel,however,isnonethelessan unusuallywelldefinedsetofactivitiesandstrategies(Tucker,2005). Asthefailureof theattempttocreateanelectoralrevolutioninBelarusin2006illustrates,someofthe techniquesthathavecometobeassociatedwiththeelectoralmodeldonottravelaswell asothers,andnotallattemptsleadtosuccess.Butthemodelclearlyhasinspired democraticactivistsamongboththepartisanpoliticaloppositionandthenon governmentalsectorinanumberofcountries. Somecharacteristicsofelectionshavealsobeenbeneficialtothediffusionofthe electoralmodel. Asanumberofscholarshaveobserved,competitiveauthoritarianism or regimesinwhich democraticformsarecombinedwithapoliticsthatfavors authoritarianincumbents opensupacontradiction betweentheclaimoflegitimation throughpoliticalchoiceandtherealityofregularelectionsthatareriggedinvariousways tofavorilliberalcandidates(Schedler,2002LevitskyandWay,2002).Moreover, electionshavetheadvantageofoccurringatfixedintervals,therebyfeaturing,asaresult, welldefinedbeginningsandespeciallyendings.Theyallowforpreparationthoughitis interestingtonotethatilliberalleadersoftenrecognizethisproblemandchangethe electoralcalendarinordertoweakentheopposition.Itisevenmoreinterestinghow oftenthisstrategybackfiresasitdid,forexample,withPinochetinChilein1988, JaruzelskiinPolandin1989,MilosevicinSerbiain2000,andAkayevinKyrgyzstanin 2005. Thelimitedtemporalparametersof electionshavethebenefitsofenergizing activistsandcitizensbyprovidingacontainedperiodoftimeinwhichtheyarebeing askedtothinkhard,participateagreatdeal,andtakerisks.Becauseelectionsalsohave anendpoint,moreover,theyprovideanimmediatemeasureofsuccessandfailurewhile alsohighlightingintheprocessanissuethatmatterstobothpublicsandoppositions:the contrastbetween playingbytherulesofthepoliticalgame(anddictatorsarefondof elaboratingsuchrules)andviolatingthem. Indeed,electionsaredistinctive,becauseoftheircloseassociationwith democraticpolitics. Publicscannothopetostopoligarchsfromstealingmoney,but politicianswhostealvotesareanothermatter.Whilemanyanalystshavecriticizedthe simpleequationofdemocracywithelections,thefactisthat,inthepublicmind,elections aretheindicatorofdemocracyaformofgovernmentthathasbecomeaglobalnorm. Moreover,itiseasyforalltorecognizethatdemocracycannottakerootifilliberal leadersstayinoffice.Thisisanecessaryconditionandonethatpublicsrecognizeas such. Finally,thediffusionof theelectoralmodelisencouragedforasimplereason. It isintheinterestoftheopposition,becausetheyareoutofpower,tograbholdofmodels ofpoliticalchangethatenhancetheirprospectsforwinningpower.Thereisnothing abstractandsacrificialaboutemulatingamodelthatpromises,ifsuccessful,togive oppositionsachancetorule. Theimpactofthisfactorisparticularlyimportantinthe politicalcalculationsofpartisan politicalleaders,includingsomewhohaveplayedkey rolesinelectoralrevolutions,whohadbeeninvolvedin politicallifeatveryhighlevels

butlosttheirpositionsorhadfallingsoutwiththeauthoritarianleader.Although electoralrevolutionsareoftendepictedasexamplesofpeoplepower,withsome justificationgiventhehighlevelofpopularinvolvementtypicalofsuchevents,and althoughactivistsfromthenongovernmentalsectorhaveoftenplayedkeyrolesaswell, standardissuepoliticians,orthosewhohavealreadyheldhighpoliticaloffice,have beenkeyactorsinalltheelectoralrevolutionsin thisregiontodate. Boththegoalsandthecomponentsoftheelectoralmodel,therefore,attractan internationalfollowing,especiallyinregimeswherethereareregularelectionsandwhere authoritariansarerulingandhavebecomeovertimemorecorrupt,morecarelessandless popular.However,thisdoesnotexplainthepopularityofthismodelinthe postcommunistworldinparticular.Here,wewouldemphasizeseveral factors (andsee BunceandWolchik,2006a,2006b).First,thereis,simply,thepersuasivepowerof success.Thefactisthatthefirstelectoralrevolutionsinthisareaweresuccessfulnot justinbringingdowndictators,butalsoinmovingBulgaria,RomaniaandSlovakiain particularinadecidedlymoredemocraticdirection.Justasappealingwasanother consequence.JustasSlovakiajoinedtheEuropeanUnionin2004,soBulgariaand Romaniaarebothslatedformembership.Moreover,thepostcommunistregionfeaturesa longlegacyofriggedelectionsfarlonger,forexample,than,say,SubSaharanAfrica, wheretransitionstodemocracytookplaceatroughlythesametime.Moreover,the populationsinthesecountriesareextremelywelleducated,whichisimportant,among otherthings,forrunningsophisticatedcampaigns.Finally,thisregionfeaturesbotha numberofdemocraticsuccessstories,allofwhichwerecementedbyelectionswherethe liberaloppositioncametopower,andalargenumberofcountriesaswellthatarehybrid democracieswhereauthoritarianshavemanagedtostayinpower,butincontextswhere therearepoliticalopportunitiesforchangenotjustregularelections,butalso,for example,rapidlyexpandingcivilsocieties(thoughstartingwithdeficienciesinthis regardseeHoward,2002),vibrantparliaments(whichwascriticalinUkraine,for example),andlongstandingtraditionsofpublicprotests(asineverycasewhereelectoral revolutionshavetakenplace). Theelectoralmodel,however,isnottheentirestoryofwhytheserevolutions movedfromcountry tocountry.Twoothersetsoffactorsplayedacriticalrolefactors that,itisfairtosay,aredistinctivetothisregionandthatworkinthesimilardirectionof encouragingpoliticalemulation.Theseincludetheassumptionofsimilarcircumstances bythemainactorsinvolvedandcollaborativenetworks. SimilarConditions Asnotedabove,thereweremanyreasonstoassumethatthecollapseof communism,communiststatesandtheSovietbloc,coupledwiththeremarkable divergenceinthepoliticalandeconomictrajectoriesofthepostcommunistregimes followingthesechanges,wouldhavehadtheeffectofweakeningtheregionalimpulsefor crossnationaldiffusionofpoliticalchange.However,thislineofargumentignores,first, theexistenceofan extremelyattractivemodelofsimultaneousandrapidtransitionsto democracyandcapitalismprovidedbytheexperiencesofPoland,Hungary,theCzech RepublicandSloveniainparticular(Bunce,2006).Inaddition,todownplaydiffusionis alsotoignorethemanysimilaritiesamongthelargesubsetofcountriesintheregionthat

sharethecharacteristicsofnotjustacommunistpastand,thus,bothsimilarobstaclesto transitionandasimilarpoliticalandeconomicagenda,butalsoanumberof postcommunistcharacteristics,allofwhichwouldencouragethelogicofemulating successfulelectoralrevolutionsintheirneighborhood.Theseinclude: 1)recent statehood orrecentlyregainedsovereignty2)earlierroundsofpoliticalprotests,both accompanyingstatedisintegrationandmorerecentlyfocusingontheissueofcorruption 3)heterogeneouspopulationswhichoftenprovideapretextforstrugglesforpolitical powerthataccentuateculturaldifferences4)hybridformsofdemocracythatinclude regularelections,limitedopportunitiesforpoliticalcompetitionandsomecivilliberties andpoliticalrights,butalsofragmentedliberaloppositionsandcorruptauthoritarian incumbents,and4)generally pooreconomicperformance(withthebestperforming economiesintheregionthosewhereeithernoreformshadbeenintroducedorwhere reformsweresubstantial andsustainable)oragrowingdegreeofinequalityinthefaceof relativelygoodeconomicperformance.Byourestimate,thisprofiledescribesvirtually everycountry intheregion wheresuccessfulelectoralrevolutionshavetakenplace(with SlovakiaandUkraine,however,strongerontheeconomicside,andBulgariaand Romania,togetherwithSlovakia,moredemocraticthantherest).Inaddition totheeight countrieswheretherehavebeensuccessfulelectoralrevolutions,wewouldaddtothislist AlbaniaandArmenia(whicharefarmorehomogeneousthantherest),Azerbaijan, Macedonia,Moldova,Kazakhstan(thoughNazarbayevisrelativelypopularandless accommodatingthaninthepastofoppositionpoliticalactivity),andRussia(seeFish, 2005).Putsimply,thisisaremarkablylargegroupofsimilarcountriesthatbecauseof theircommonalitiescanbeconsiderableprimecandidatesforelectoralrevolutions. Thesesimilarities,however,areobjective.Perhapsevenmoreimportantisthe assumptionofsimilarity onthepartofboththosewhocarriedoutelectoralrevolutions andthosewhowouldliketofollowsuit.Inpartthisassumption reflectsalongingrained habitofthinking.Inthemindsofmanyoppositionleadersandintellectuals,justas communismproducedsimilarcontexts,soleavingcommunismsuccessfullyhasasimilar listof preconditions.Onlysomeofthesearesituational therestaretheproductof specificgoalsandstrategies. Moreover,forlocaldemocracypromoterswhohave succeededincarryingouttheirownelectoralrevolutions,anumberoffactorsinfluence theircommitmenttosharingtheirexperienceswithotheractivistsintheregionwhowant tocopythemthebeliefthattheirexperiencesarenecessarilyinstructiveforother countriesthathavegonethroughcommunismanddemocraticdetoursaftercommunism (thoughrecognizingthateachcontexthasdistinctivequalities)andthebeliefaswellthat thespreadofdemocracythroughtheregionwillhelpguaranteetheirdemocratic experiment. Selfinterestarisingfromtheavailabilityofoutsidefundingforsuchwork alsoplaysarolehere.TherecentdecisionbytheEuropeanUniontofocusassistanceon thecountriesthatneighbortheexpandedEUhas,ofcourse,facilitatedthisprocessand theSlovaks,PolesandHungariansinparticularhavetakenadvantageofthisfact(see Fischer,2005).However,justasimportantisalongtraditioninthisregionthatthefruits oflocalstruggleshouldbesharedwithothersintheregionabeliefthatdatesbackto theworkofdissidentsduringcommunism,asSolidarityscommitmenttoregional outreachafter1980illustrates(Kenney,2002).Atthesametime,thereceiversinthis processalsoassumerelevancethoughthisseemstodependonlocaldissidentculture, whichintheRussiancase,forexample,seemstobelesssupportiveofthisargument

(MendelsonandGerber,2005). Theyassumethattheissuesarethesameandthatthe strategiesusedelsewhereintheregionarehelpful.No onedoubts,ofcourse,that contextsvary,butmanyseemtofeelthatthevariancecantoleratesimilargoalsand strategies. Putsimply,then,postcommuniststructuralsimilarities,theselfinterestofboth sendersandreceivers,andcommunisterahabitsandnetworksallworktogetherto facilitatethegeographicalspreadofelectoralrevolutions.Whilethesefactorshardly guaranteethatthemodelwillremainthesameorwillalwaysproducethedesiredsetof results,they nonethelessrenderthisregion,asduringthecommunistera,aremarkable antechamberforthediffusionofpoliticalchange.Liketheelectoralmodelitself,so similaritiesamongthesecountriesinstructureandinperceptioncreated opportunities,incentivesandcapacityforthesuccessfuldiffusionofelectoralrevolutions. CollaborativeNetworks Thethirdsetofenablingfactors istheexistenceofcollaborativenetworks.The electoralrevolutionshavegeneratedaspiriteddiscussionoftheroleoftheUnitedStates inparticularinexportingdemocracytothepostcommunistregion.Atitsmostextreme, theargumenthasbeenputforththattheserevolutionswereengineeredbytheUnited Statesforexample,byprovidingfundingforoppositiongroupsthatwouldsupportthe UnitedStatesaftertakingpower(Herd,2005Nygren,2005a,2005b).Thisargumentis onereason,forexample,whyVladimirPutinhasrecently pushedthroughareformin Russiathatfacilitatesthemonitoringofforeignsupportofnongovernmental organizationswhichhasprovidedthefoundation,forexample,forallegationsofBritish politicalinterferenceinRussiannongovernmentalorganizations. ThereissubstantialevidencethattheUnitedStateshasplayedanimportantrole indemocracypromotionabroadthatishastargetedinparticularsupportofcivilsociety, fairelections,andruleoflawandthatthepostcommunistregionstandsoutasthearea whereAmericansupporthasbeenthemostconsistentovertimeandthemostgenerous, especiallyonapercapitaandperstatebasis(seeBunceandWolchik,2006cFinkel, et.al,2005).However,toreducetheseelectoralrevolutionstoUS engineeringisto ignorethefactsthat:1)theU.S.hasfocusedfarlessonoppositionsupportthanonfree andfairelectionsandawiderangeofcivilsocietyorganizations(thoughtheU.S.did playaroleinhelpingfragmentedoppositionsbecomemorecohesivein Slovakia,Serbia, Bulgaria,andRomania)2)otheroutsidegroupsalsoplayedarole,asinthesubstantial supportRussiaprovidedtoYanukovychin theUkrainianelectionsin 2004supportthat byRussianaccountsfaroutstrippeddirectcampaignsupportby theUnitedStates)3) Americansupportlackstheconsistencyandthecoordinationthatisinkeepingwiththe ideaofanAmericanplot,and4)participantsintheserevolutionsconsistentlystate that Americansupportoccurredonlyatthemargins(seeCarothers,2004forsupportoftheir perspective)andthatitwasmosthelpfulwithrespecttolongtermsupportofcivil society,withdrawalofsupportof illiberalincumbents(whichwasimportantinallthe successfulcasesandabsent,onecanargue,in allofthefailedcases),assistancein electoralmechanics,andquickcritiquesofunfairelections(asinUkraine,Georgiaand Serbiainparticular).

However,perhapsthemostimportantqualificationisthatallofthesuccessful electoralrevolutionsgrewoutofcomplexcrossnationalcollaborationsthatincludednot justUSdemocracypromotersandoften USambassadorsaswell,butalsoregional democracypromotersandexperienced,dedicatedlocalactivistswillingtotakealotof chances.WiththeexceptionofKyrgyzstan,moreover,thesecollaborationsledto significantplanningwhich,asarguedearlier,isrequired,given,forexample,the complexdetailsthatmustbeaddressedinordertoformeffectiveoppositionsthat participateinelections,ratherthanboycottthem,andmounteffectivecampaignsto convincevoterstovote,followtheirconsciences,anddemandthattheirvotescountto winelectionsandtoprepareforthepossibilitythatthevictorswillnotbeallowedtotake power.Asarguedearlier,moreover,therewereanumberoffactorsinplacethatlaidthe groundworkforsuchplanningthatis,notjustthemanysimilarities,perceivedand objective,amongthesecountries,butalsopracticerunswithearlierelections,prior roundsofpoliticalprotest,invigorationofdissidentnetworks,andevenearlier experienceswithbothpublicopinionpolling,electionmonitoringandexitpolls(allof which,forexample,werealreadyinplaceinBulgaria,Romania,Slovakia,andGeorgia). Butwhenallissaidanddone,therewereinternationalcoalitionsthatwereparticularly vibrant,flexible,persistent,and,itmustbesaid,geographicallyexpansive,ifnotrestless, inthepostcommunistregion. Ifelectoralrevolutionsareamovingtarget,soarethe peoplewhopromotesuchrevolutions. Thesewereinfactthemajorthemesinthemorethanonehundredinterviewsthat wehaveconductedinCroatia,Georgia,Serbia,Slovakia,UkraineandWashington,D.C. with variousinternationalanddomesticparticipantsintheseelectoralrevolutions(also seeMeladze,2005Kandelaki,2005Devdariani,2003). Perhapsthemostcommon theme,however,wasthedeeplyheldbeliefamonglocal activiststhatthestrugglefor democracyincountriesthatfell shortofdemocraticstandardsinthepostcommunist regionwasinlargemeasurethesamestruggle.Illiberalleadersandtheirallies,itis widelyassumed,usesimilarstrategies,inpartbecauseoftheirexperiencesunder communism(wheretherewerealso,wemustremember,regularelections)andinpart becausetheycommitsimilartransgressionsandprovide,asaresult,similaropportunities forpoliticalchange.Moreover,thestrategiesthatcanworktodefeatthemaresimilaras well. Inthissense,thepostcommunistcontextiswidelyviewedasbothspecifictothe regionandsimilarwithintheregion,especiallyforthemajorityofcountriesintheregion thatcombineilliberalleaderswithhybridregimes. Thus,forgraduatesofsuccessfulelectoralrevolutions,theassumptionisthat theirexperiencesarerelevanttooppositionsinneighboringcountrieswheresuch revolutionsareneeded,buthavenotyetoccurred.Justasinterestingisastrongbelief thattheyhavearesponsibilitytosharetheirinsightsabouteffectivestrategiesfor politicalchangethroughelectionsandlaterthroughothermechanisms,suchasassistance inthedevelopmentofmorerobustlocalgovernmentsandcivilsociety.Theactivitiesof thePontisFoundationinBratislavaintrainingdemocraticactivistsinBelarusand Ukraineareacaseinpoint.Inpart,theseactivitiesstemfromthebeliefthattheir democracyisnotsafeuntilitisembeddedinalargerdemocraticcommunityinpartit reflectsalocalversionof theEUmodelofspreadingdemocracy(helpedbytheGood NeighborPolicy)andinpartitissimplyatraditioncarriedonfromthecommunistera, whereindissidentsfeltcompelled,sincetheywerestrugglingagainstthesameenemy,to

sharetheirideasandstrategieswithothersin CentralandEasternEuropeandtheSoviet Union(Kenney,2002). Importersofthesestrategies,moreover,alsoassumedthattheycouldandshould modelthemselvesafterthesuccessfullocalcasesalbeitrecognizingtheimportanceof modificationsbaseduponlocalconditions. Again,intheinterviewswehaveconducted, itwasfrequentlyobservedthat,whilelocalconditionsandlocalstruggleswereimportant, knowingthatithadbeendoneelsewheresuccessfullyandlearningfromparticipantsin thesecasesabouthowitwasdoneinshort,bothprecedentandemulationwere criticaltoboththedecisiontotry anelectoralrevolutionandthequalityofthe implementation.Fromthevantagepointoflocalactivists,therefore,electoral revolutions inothercountriescontributedtoasenseofoptimismand,becauseofsharinginformation, strategiesaswell. Conclusion:TheFutureofElectoralRevolutions Whatwehavearguedthusfaristhatelectoralrevolutionsinthepostcommunist regionsucceededinspreadingfromstatetostatebecauseofthesuccessofearlyefforts thenatureoftheelectoralmodelingeneralanditsresonancewithcommunistlegacies andpostcommunistdevelopmentsthesimilaritiesamongmanyhybriddemocraciesin thisregionandtheperceptionofsignificantsimilaritiesonthepartofbothgraduatesof electoralrevolutionsandthoseactivistswhohopedtofollowintheirfootstepsand, finally,theexistenceoflargeandcreativenetworksoflocal,regionalandAmerican democracypromoterswhowerecommittedtospreadingtheirideasandstrategies. Together,thesefactorscontributedtoadiffusionprocessthatwasenhancedbythepower ofbothexampleandplanning. However,intheprocessofdiffusion,theelectoralmodelchangedandinmany waysbecamelesseffective,especiallywithrespecttoproducingamajorshiftinthe directionofmoreauthenticanddurabledemocracy.Totakethetemporaland geographicalextremesofthisdynamic:both SlovakiaandKyrgyzstan experienced electoralrevolutions,buttheimmediateresultintheformerwasasecuredemocracyand inthelatter precariousdemocracy. Thisoutcomesuggestsatypicalstoryofdiffusion processes,whereinprecedenttriumphsoverplanningasaresultof impatience,less supportivelocalconditions,andcleverincumbents(see,forexample,Silitski,2005a, 2005b).Forexample,intheimmediateaftermathoftheKyrgyzandUkrainianevents, NazarbayevraisedstudentstipendstopreventaninhousereplayofOtpor,Kmaraand PorawhileensuringthattheoppositionwouldhavelittlechancetocontesttheDecember 2005election.Similarly,PutininRussiahassupportedthecreationofanofficialyouth organizationinanattempttochannelyouthfulactivisminadirectionthatwillsupporthis regime.Forall thesereasons,electoralrevolutionswillbeincreasinglydifficulttostage successfullyinthepostcommunistworld. Thereisalsoanadditionalconsideration.ItisfareasierfortheUnitedStatesto supportdemocraticchangeinGeorgia,forexample,thaninAzerbaijan,Russia, UzbekistanorKazakhstan.Partofthereasonisoilandtheotherpartisthegeopolitical importanceofthesecountriesintheWaronTerroranimportancethatintroducesthe complication,soreminiscentoftheColdWar,ofwhetherpressuresfordemocratic politicalchangemightbedestabilizingandtherebycountertoUSinterests.Butjustas

critical,itcanbesuggested,isanotherconsiderationthatisderivedlessfromthe arroganceof USforeignpolicythanfromitsmodesty.MostUSdemocracypromoters recognizethatthesuccessoftheireffortsdependsprimarilyondomesticcapacityand commitmentfordemocracy.Intheremainingcountriesinthepostcommunistregionthat fallbelowthedemocraticbarandthathavenotexperiencedanelectoralturningpoint (Fish,1998Bunce,1994),suchcommitmentandcapacity arevirtuallybydefinition limited.Putsimply,internationaldemocracypromotionisimportantonly atthemargins, anditssuccessdependsinboth theoryandpracticeonwhethertherearedomestic partners. Inthissense,thesuccessofinternationaldiffusionalwaysrestondomestic receptivity.

1 1

WearethankfultotheInternationalCenterforNonViolentConflict,theSmithRichardsonFoundation, theEinaudiCenterforInternationalStudies,andtheInstitutefortheSocialSciencesatCornellUniversity fortheirsupportofthisproject.Inaddition,wethankVladMicic,SaraRzyeva,NancyMeyers,and MelissaAtenfortheirresearchassistance.

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