The idea of Germany having an independent national strategy runs counter to ever ything that Germany has wanted

to be since World War II and everything the world has wanted from Germany. In a way, the entire structure of modern Europe was cr eated to take advantage of Germany's economic dynamism while avoiding the threat of German domination. In writing about German strategy, I am raising the possib ility that the basic structure of Western Europe since World War II and of Europ e as a whole since 1991 is coming to a close. If so, then the question is whether historical patterns of German strategy will emerge or something new is coming. It is, of course, always possible that the ol d post-war model can be preserved. Whichever it is, the future of German strateg y is certainly the most important question in Europe and quite possibly in the w orld. Origins of Germany's Strategy Before 1871, when Germany was fragmented into a large number of small states, it did not pose a challenge to Europe. Rather, it served as a buffer between Franc e on one side and Russia and Austria on the other. Napoleon and his campaign to dominate Europe first changed the status of Germany, both overcoming the barrier and provoking the rise of Prussia, a powerful German entity. Prussia became ins trumental in creating a united Germany in 1871, and with that, the geopolitics o f Europe changed. What had been a morass of states became not only a unified country but also the most economically dynamic country in Europe -- and the one with the most substan tial ground forces. Germany was also inherently insecure. Lacking any real stra tegic depth, Germany could not survive a simultaneous attack by France and Russi a. Therefore, Germany's core strategy was to prevent the emergence of an allianc e between France and Russia. However, in the event that there was no alliance be tween France and Russia, Germany was always tempted to solve the problem in a mo re controlled and secure way, by defeating France and ending the threat of an al liance. This is the strategy Germany has chosen for most of its existence. The dynamism of Germany did not create the effect that Germany wanted. Rather th an split France and Russia, the threat of a united Germany drew them together. I t was clear to France and Russia that without an alliance, Germany would pick th em off individually. In many ways, France and Russia benefited from an economica lly dynamic Germany. It not only stimulated their own economies but also provide d an alternative to British goods and capital. Nevertheless, the economic benefi ts of relations with Germany did not eliminate the fear of Germany. The idea tha t economics rule the decisions of nations is insufficient for explaining their b ehavior. Germany was confronted with a strategic problem. By the early 20th century the T riple Entente, signed in 1907, had allied Russia, France and the United Kingdom. If they attacked simultaneously at a time of their choosing, these countries co uld destroy Germany. Therefore, Germany's only defense was to launch a war at a time of its choosing, defeat one of these countries and deal with the others at its leisure. During both World War I and World War II, Germany first struck at F rance and then turned to deal with Russia while keeping the United Kingdom at ba y. In both wars, the strategy failed. In World War I, Germany failed to defeat F rance and found itself in an extended war on two fronts. In World War II, it def eated France but failed to defeat Russia, allowing time for an Anglo-American co unterattack in the west. Binding Germany to Europe Germany was divided after World War II. Whatever the first inclinations of the v ictors, it became clear that a rearmed West Germany was essential if the Soviet Union was going to be contained. If Germany was to be rearmed, its economy had t o be encouraged to grow, and what followed was the German economic miracle. Germ any again became the most dynamic part of Europe. The issue was to prevent Germany from returning to the pursuit of an autonomous national strategy, both because it could not resist the Soviet forces to the eas t by itself and, more important, because the West could not tolerate the re-emer gence of divisive and dangerous power politics in Europe. The key was binding Ge rmany to the rest of Europe militarily and economically. Put another way, the ke

y was to make certain that German and French interests coincided, since tension between France and Germany had been one of the triggers of prior wars since 1871 . Obviously, this also included other Western European countries, but it was Ger many's relationship with France that was most important. Militarily, German and French interests were tied together under the NATO allian ce even after France withdrew from the NATO Military Committee under Charles de Gaulle. Economically, Germany was bound with Europe through the emergence of mor e sophisticated multilateral economic organizations that ultimately evolved into the European Union. After World War II, West Germany's strategy was threefold. First, it had to defe nd itself against the Soviet Union in concert with an alliance that would effect ively command its military through NATO. This would limit German sovereignty but eliminate the perception of Germany as a threat. Second, it would align its eco nomy with that of the rest of Europe, pursuing prosperity without undermining th e prosperity of other countries. Third, it would exercise internal political sov ereignty, reclaiming its rights as a nation without posing a geopolitical threat to Western Europe. After the fall of the Soviet Union, this was extended to inc lude Eastern European states. The strategy worked well. There was no war with the Soviets. There was no fundam ental conflict in Western Europe and certainly none that was military in nature. The European economy in general, and the German economy in particular, surged o nce East Germany had been reintegrated with West Germany. With reintegration, Ge rman internal sovereignty was insured. Most important, France remained linked to Germany via the European Union and NATO. Russia, or what was left after the col lapse of the Soviet Union, was relatively secure so long as Germany remained par t of European structures. The historical strategic problem Germany had faced app eared solved. Europe's Economic Crisis The situation became more complex after 2008. Germany's formal relationship with NATO remained intact, but without the common threat of the Soviet Union, the al liance was fracturing over the divergent national interests of its members. The European Union had become Germany's focus, and the bloc had come under intense p ressure that made the prior alignment of all European countries more dubious. Ge rmany needed the European Union. It needed it for the reasons that have existed since World War II: as a foundation of its relationship with France and as a mea ns to ensure that national interest would not generate the kinds of conflicts th at had existed in the past. It needed the European Union for another reason as well. Germany is the second-l argest exporter in the world. It exports to many countries, but Europe is a crit ical customer. The free-trade zone that was the foundation of the European Union was also one of the foundations of the German economy. Protectionism in general , but certainly protectionism in Europe, threatened Germany, whose industrial pl ant substantially outstripped its domestic consumption. The pricing of the euro aided German exports, and regulations in Brussels gave Germany other advantages. The European Union, as it existed between 1991 and 2008, was critical to German y. However, the European Union no longer functions as it once did. The economic dyn amics of Europe have placed many countries at a substantial disadvantage, and th e economic crisis of 2008 triggered a sovereign debt crisis and banking crisis i n Europe. There were two possible solutions in the broadest sense. One was that the countr ies in crisis impose austerity in order to find the resources to solve their pro blem. The other was that the prosperous part of Europe underwrites the debts, sp aring these countries the burden of austerity. The solution that has been chosen is obviously a combination of the two, but the precise makeup of that combinati on was and remains a complex matter for negotiation. Germany needs the European Union to survive for both political and economic reas ons. The problem is that it is not clear that a stable economic solution can eme rge that will be supported by the political systems in Europe. Germany is prepared to bail out other European countries if they impose austerit

y and then take steps to make sure that the austerity is actually implemented to the degree necessary and that the crisis is not repeated. From Germany's point of view, the roots of the crisis lie in the fiscal policies of the troubled coun tries. Therefore, the German price for underwriting part of the debt is that Eur opean bureaucrats, heavily oriented toward German policies, be effectively put i n charge of the finances of countries receiving aid against default. This would mean that these countries would not control either taxes or budgets t hrough their political system. It would be an assault on democracy and national sovereignty. Obviously, there has been a great deal of opposition from potential recipients of aid, but it is also opposed by some countries that see it as some thing that would vastly increase the power of Germany. If you accept the German view, which is that the debt crisis was the result of reckless spending, then Ge rmany's proposal is reasonable. If you accept the view of southern Europe, which is that the crisis was the result of the European Union's design, then what Ger many is proposing is the imposition of German power via economics. It is difficult to imagine a vast surrender of sovereignty to a German-dominated EU bureaucracy, whatever the economic cost. It is also difficult to imagine Ger many underwriting the debt without some controls beyond promises; even if the Eu ropean Union is vitally important to the Germans, German public opinion will not permit it. Finally, it is difficult to see how, in the long term, the Europeans can reconcile their differences on this issue. The issue must come to a head, i f not in this financial crisis then in the next -- and there is always a next cr isis. An Alternative Strategy In the meantime, the basic framework of Europe has changed since 1991. Russia re mains a shadow of the Soviet Union, but it has become a major exporter of natura l gas. Germany depends on that natural gas even as it searches for alternatives. Russia is badly in need of technology, which Germany has in abundance. Germany does not want to invite in any more immigrants out of fear of instability. Howev er, with a declining population, Germany must do something. Russia also has a declining population, but even so, it has a surplus of workers , both unemployed and underemployed. If the workers cannot be brought to the fac tories, the factories can be brought to the workers. In short, there is substant ial synergy between the Russian and German economies. Add to this that the Germa ns feel under heavy pressure from the United States to engage in actions the Ger mans want to be left out of, while the Russians see the Americans as a threat to their interests, and there are politico-military interests that Germany and Rus sia have in common. NATO is badly frayed. The European Union is under tremendous pressure and nation al interests are now dominating European interests. Germany's ability to use the European Union for economic ends has not dissipated but can no longer be relied on over the long term. Therefore, it follows that Germany must be considering a n alternative strategy. Its relationship with Russia is such a strategy. Germany is not an aggressive power. The foundation of its current strategy is it s relationship with France in the context of the European Union. The current Fre nch government under President Nicolas Sarkozy is certainly committed to this re lationship, but the French political system, like those of other European countr ies, is under intense pressure. The coming elections in France are uncertain, an d the ones after that are even less predictable. The willingness of France to en gage with Germany, which has a massive trade imbalance with France, is an unknow n. However, Germany's strategic interest is not necessarily a relationship with Fra nce but a relationship with either France or Russia to avoid being surrounded by hostile powers. For Germany, a relationship with Russia does as well as one wit h France. An ideal situation for Germany would be a Franco-German-Russian entent e. Such an alliance has been tried in the past, but its weakness is that it woul d provide too much security to Germany, allowing it to be more assertive. Normal ly, France and Russia have opposed Germany, but in this case, it is certainly po ssible to have a continuation of the Franco-German alliance or a Russo-French al liance. Indeed, a three-way alliance might be possible as well.

Germany's current strategy is to preserve the European Union and its relationshi p with France while drawing Russia closer into Europe. The difficulty of this st rategy is that Germany's trade policies are difficult for other European countri es to manage, including France. If Germany faces an impossible situation with th e European Union, the second strategic option would be a three-way alliance, wit h a modified European Union or perhaps outside of the EU structure. If France de cides it has other interests, such as its idea of a Mediterranean Union, then a German-Russian relationship becomes a real possibility. A German-Russian relationship would have the potential to tilt the balance of po wer in the world. The United States is currently the dominant power, but the com bination of German technology and Russian resources -- an idea dreamt of by many in the past -- would become a challenge on a global basis. Of course, there are bad memories on both sides, and trust in the deepest sense would be hard to com e by. But although alliances rely on trust, it does not necessarily have to be d eep-seated trust. Germany's strategy, therefore, is still locked in the EU paradigm. However, if t he EU paradigm becomes unsupportable, then other strategies will have to be foun d. The Russo-German relationship already exists and is deepening. Germany thinks of it in the context of the European Union, but if the European Union weakens, Russia becomes Germany's natural alternative.