COMMENT UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT T.

Christian Herren Chief, Voting Section Civil Rights Division Room 7254 NWB U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530 April 23, 2012 Re: Section 5 Submission No. 2012-1445 (Submission by the State of New York Regarding State Senate Redistricting Plan)

Dear Mr. Herren: The NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF) urges the Attorney General to object to the pending Section 5 submission by the New York State Senate of its redistricting plan, S.6696 (the Senate Plan or the Plan). The State Senate has failed to meet its burden of showing that its Plan will not have a retrogressive effect, or that its adoption was free from discriminatory purpose. This letter addresses one particular feature of the Senate Plan: the proposal to increase the number of State Senate districts in New York from 62 to 63 total districts. With respect to this particular aspect of the Senate Plan, LDF concurs with several contentions raised by others, including: (1) that the State must identify its changing methodologies for computing the size of the State Senate as a separate voting change requiring preclearance; and (2) that increasing the size of the Senate will have a retrogressive effect on minority voters in the eleven majority-minority districts contained in New Yorks covered counties, whose influence will necessarily be diminished under the Senate Plan.1
See Letter from Eric Hecker to T. Christian Herren, dated April 5, 2012, at 5-11 (hereinafter Hecker Comment Letter); Letter from Juan Cartagena, LatinoJustice, to T. Christian Herren, dated April 5, 2012 (hereinafter LatinoJustice Comment Letter), at 1-5; Letter from Margeret Fund, et al, Asian American Legal Defense & Education Fund, to T. Christian Herren, dated April 10, 2012, at 1-2; Letter from Joan Gibbs, Center for Law and Social Justice,
1

In addition to these concerns, which have been explained well by others and do not require repetition here, this comment letter focuses on an additional factor that provides an independent basis for an objection to the Senate Plan: that the proposal to increase the size of the Senate to 63 districts appears to have been designed in direct response to an important civil rights reform enacted two years ago to protect minority representation in New York: N.Y. Laws of 2010, Ch. 57, Part XX (Part XX). Part XX ended the practice known as prison-based gerrymandering in the New York state legislature, and, as explained below, was fully implemented earlier this year as an effort to protect minority voting rights and enhance the representation of minority communities, including those in the New Yorks covered counties. The decision to increase the number of districts in the Senate, and the placement of a new district outside of the covered counties, appears to be a direct effort to reverse these gains. Indeed, the timing of the Senates announcement that it would increase the number of its districts, which occurred only days after the implementation of Part XX, gives rise to a possible inference of discriminatory intent under the Arlington Heights framework.

Analysis I. Background on New Yorks Covered Counties

The implementation of all proposed statewide voting changes in New York is subject to the requirements of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973c(a). Because three counties in New York are covered by Section 5 (New York County / Manhattan; Kings County / Brooklyn; and Bronx County), statewide voting changes in New York are subject to Section 5s preclearance requirements.2 According to 2010 Census data, the three covered counties have an aggregate population of 5,475,681, or 28.3% of New Yorks total population of 19,378,102.3 The majority of state senate districts in these three counties are majority-minority districts.
to T. Christian Herren, dated April 2, 2012, at 1-2. In particular, we note that we agree with the analysis from other comment letters with respect to: (1) the fundamental difference between increasing the number of seats in a self-contained legislative body, as opposed to increasing the number of representatives in a states congressional delegation (see Hecker Comment Letter at 8, LatinoJustice Comment Letter at 4); and (2) the significance of the fact that New Yorks population increases have largely occurred amongst minority communities in the New York City area (see Hecker Comment Letter at 10, LatinoJustice Comment Letter at 4). See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 283-84 (1999) (statewide voting changes are subject to Section 5 review where a state is partially covered by Section 5). See U.S. Census Bureau, State and County QuickFacts, New York, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36000.html. The population totals of the covered counties as reported in the 2010 Census are as follows: New York County, 1,585,873; Kings County, 2,504,700; Bronx County, 1,385,108.
3 2

New Yorks covered counties are represented by 16 Senate districts: Senate districts 1722 and 25-34.4 Under the benchmark plan, 11 out of 16 of these districts are majority minority (Districts 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34).5

II.

Background on Part XX Gerrymandering in New York

and

the

Elimination

of

Prison-Based

As discussed in further detail below, the addition of a 63rd Senate District appears to have been a direct response to the implementation of Part XX. To understand this chain of events, some background on Part XX is instructive. Part XX, which itself was the subject of a previous Section 5 submission by the State (Submission No. 2011-0652), was designed to end the practice known as prisonbased gerrymandering, or the counting of incarcerated individuals where they are confined, rather than in their home communities (where they remain legally domiciled), for redistricting purposes.6 Generally speaking, the problem of prison-based gerrymandering has been described as civil rights issue: prison populations are disproportionately comprised of people of color, and are generally held far from their home communities; thus, the counting of prisoners as if they were ordinary constituents in the places where they are confined, rather than in their home communities, has the effect of reducing population counts in minority communities relative to other areas, diluting minority representation.7 These general patterns were replicated in New York, where prison-based gerrymandering had the effect of artificially inflating the reported population numbers of the disproportionately white areas where most state prisons are located. At the same time, prison-based gerrymandering reduced population numbers in the minority communities that are home to a disproportionate share of New Yorks incarcerated population.8 These two distinct, but interrelated phenomena resulted in a dilution of political power for minority communities. As explained in more detail below, Part XX
See New York Senate, Member Directory as of 2/1/2012, available at http://www.nysenate.gov/report/member-directory-212012. See New York Legislative Task Force on Demographic Research and Reapportionment, 2010 Census Data by District, at S-5 to S-9, available at http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/data/2010files/sen-prof.pdf. See Ex. A, Letter from Dale Ho to T. Christian Herren, dated March 18, 2011 (hereinafter LDF Comment Letter to Submission No. 2011-0652), at 1-2. See, e.g., Dale Ho, Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and the Current Redistricting Cycle, 22 Stanford Law & Policy Review 355, 360-62 (2011). See id. at 387-91; Ex. A, LDF Comment Letter to Submission No. 2011-0652, at 2-4 (citing studies by the Prison Policy Initiative, and explaining that minority communities and residents of New Yorks covered counties are disproportionately represented among New Yorks prison population).
8 7 6 5 4

was particularly beneficial for minority communities in the covered counties in New York. Part XX was therefore an important civil rights reform that restored representation and political power to New Yorks minority communities, and was heralded by civil rights organizations and good government groups.9 Accordingly, the Attorney General precleared Part XX on May 9, 2011. At that time, Part XX became part of the benchmark for purposes of analyzing state legislative redistricting plans in New York. Since the implementation of Part XX, the reported data from the prison reallocation process clearly illustrates the positive effect of Part XX on minority representation in the covered counties. According to data from New Yorks Legislative Task Force on Demographic Research and Reapportionment,10 a total of 46,003 incarcerated individuals were reallocated back to their home districts pursuant to Part XX. As noted above, New Yorks covered counties are represented by Senate districts 17-22, and 25-34; under Part XX, these districts received an aggregate increase in population numbers of 17,280, or approximately 37.6% of all reallocated individuals, as illustrated on the next page in Table 1:

See Ex. A, LDF Comment Letter to Submission No. 2011-0652, supra note 6, at 4 (citing attachments to Submission No. 2011-0652). Cf. Fletcher v. Lamone, No. RWT11cv3220, 2011 WL 6740169, at *7 (D.Md. Dec. 23, 2011) (three judge court observing that Marylands analogous law on prisoner allocation was was the product of years of work by groups dedicated to advancing the interests of minorities); id. at *19 (Williams, J., concurring) (Marylands analogous law was heralded as a civil rights bill focused on eradicating prison-based gerrymandering. . . . [T]he Act received the full support and advocacy of the NAACP of Maryland, the ACLU of Maryland, and the Legislative Black Caucus of Maryland.). The prisoner counts as reported by the New York Legislative Task Force on Demographic Research and Reapportionment (LATFOR) are attached here as Exhibit B, which shows the total number of individuals reallocated to each Senate District in New York as a result of Part XX. See Ex. B, LATFOR, Prisoner Counts By 2002 Legislative District, available at http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/data/?sec=2010amendpop
10

Table 1: Prisoners Allocated to Covered Counties

County Kings Kings Kings Kings Kings Kings Kings and New York New York Kings New York New York New York Bronx and New York Bronx Bronx Bronx Senate District 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 Prisoners Added 1,516 2,100 1,858 1,193 709 236 708 193 283 1,776 362 2,242 817 1,567 1,300 420

TOTAL ALLOCATED TO COVERED COUNTIES

17,280

STATEWIDE TOTAL

46,003

PERECENTAGE ALLOCATED TO COVERED COUNTIES 37.56% Source: Ex. B, LATFOR, Prisoner Counts By 2002 Legislative District, supra note 10

As noted above, the Census calculated that the three covered counties account for approximately only 28.3% of New York States total population; but these counties received 37.6% of the reallocated prison population. In other word, these counties are disproportionately represented among New Yorks incarcerated population, and therefore, under Part XX, received a substantial increase in population numbers relative to the rest of the state. But even that analysis does not fully capture the effect of Part XX on New Yorks covered counties. One interesting feature of the implementation of Part XX is that the number of individuals reallocated to their home districts (46,003) is smaller than the total number of prisoners in New York who were subtracted from the districts where they are incarcerated (60,708). This is because Part XX provides that certain incarcerated

individuals be excluded from the redistricting data set altogether.11 Thus, when taking into account the number of incarcerated individuals subtracted from each individual district, we find that Part XX resulted in a net decrease of 14,705 of the states total reported population for redistricting purposes. In the covered counties, however, Part XX resulted in a net increase in the reported population counts of 16,781, as illustrated below in Table 2: Table 2: Net Population Change under Part XX
County Kings Kings Kings Kings Kings Kings Kings and New York New York Kings New York New York New York Bronx and New York Bronx Bronx Bronx Senate District 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 Prisoners Added 1,516 2,100 1,858 1,193 709 236 708 193 283 1,776 362 2,242 817 1,567 1,300 420 Prisoners Subtracted 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 165 334 0 0 0 0 Net Population Change 1,516 2,100 1,858 1,193 709 236 708 193 283 1,776 197 1,908 817 1,567 1,300 420

TOTAL ALLOCATED TO COVERED COUNTIES

17,280

499

16,781

STATEWIDE TOTAL 46,003 60,708 -14,705 Source: Ex. B, LATFOR, Prisoner Counts By 2002 Legislative District, supra note 10

Part XX provides that the following individuals be excluded from the redistricting data set: (1) all incarcerated persons whose residential address prior to incarceration was outside of the state; (2) all those whom the task force cannot identify their prior residential address; and (3) all persons confined in a federal correctional facility on census day. See Part XX, 2.

11

Thus, although Part XX resulted in a net decease in the states total reported population, it caused an increase in the reported population of the covered counties. The net effect, therefore, was to increase the reported population numbers in New Yorks covered counties in relation to the rest of the state. In so doing, Part XX created the possibility of enhanced representation for minority communities in the covered counties.12 Heading into the current redistricting process, therefore, the anticipated effect of Part XX was the possibility of drawing additional state legislative districts to represent minority communities in the covered counties. This was especially likely given that: (1) the bulk of New Yorks population growth during the last decade occurred in New York City, of which the covered counties are a part13; and (2) 2010 Census data revealed that 13 out of the 16 Senate Districts the covered counties were overpopulated, with 4 of those districts exceeding a 5% deviation from ideal population size.14 As explained below, however, this progress would be set back by the Senates proposal to increase the number of its districts to 63. Although by itself, increasing the size of the Senate does not directly affect the counting of prisoners under Part XX, adding a 63rd Senate district located outside of the covered counties would essentially have the effect of undoing the gains to minority representation that had been effectuated under the benchmark as embodied in Part XX. Moreover, the timing of the States decision to increase the size of the Senate, just days after the effective implementation of Part XX, is curious and merits close scrutiny under Section 5s purpose prong.

III.

Retrogressive Effect

Section 5 prohibits voting changes that would result in a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.15 Here, the Senate Plan has a retrogressive effect insofar as it attempts to undo the gains to minority voting power effectuated by through the benchmark practice under Part XX. As noted above, one of the principal effects of Part XX was to boost minority voting power in New Yorks covered counties, in part by ending the artificial inflation of population numbers inand thus, the overrepresentation ofupstate communities.16 As several commentators observed, however, the addition of a 63rd Senate district, and its placement outside of the covered counties, amounts to an effort to undo the gains to minority representation that had been effectuated by Part XX:
12 13 14

Cf. Ex. A, LDF Comment Letter to Submission No. 2011-0652, supra note 6, at 2-3. See Hecker Letter at 10.

See LATFOR, 2010 Census Data by District, at S-5 to S-9, supra note 5 (listing districts 17, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,. 30, 32, 33, and 34 as overpopulated, with districts 17, 25, 29 and 32 overpopulated by 9.2%, 7.4%, 6.7%, and 6.8%, respectively).
15 16

Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). See Ex. A, LDF Comment Letter to Submission No. 2011-0652, supra note 6, at 2-5.

Adding a 63rd Senate seat, as the Republicans have proposed, would significantly reduce the number of nonviable upstate districts reversing the impact of prisoner reallocation with additional impact to spare. In a Senate with 63 seats, only seven districts as currently drawn would fall below the Constitutional threshold.17 Another commentator similarly noted that a 63rd Senate Seat could help nullify the effects of prisoner reallocation.18 To be clear, the addition of a 63rd Senate District does not directly affect the changes to the redistricting population counts brought about by Part XX. That important reform remains the law of New York. Adding a 63rd district, however, shrinks the ideal population size of Senate districts, enabling the creation of an additional Senate district outside of the covered counties, which essentially seeks to cancel out the boost to minority voting power that had occasioned the implementation of Part XX. In sum, by seeking to undo the gains to minority voting power effectuated by Part XX, the proposal to increase the size of the State Senate to 63 districts would be retrogressive, and should be rejected by the Attorney General.

IV.

Discriminatory Purpose

Assessing a jurisdictions motivation in enacting voting changes is a complex task requiring a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence as may be available.19 The important starting point for assessing discriminatory intent under Arlington Heights is the impact of the official action whether it bears more heavily on

Sasha Chavkin and Michael Keller, Proposed 63rd Senate Seat Would Negate Impact of Counting Prisoners at Home, N.Y. World, Jan. 10, 2012 (emphasis added) (attached as Exhibit C). Available at http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2012/01/10/redistricting/. Colby Hamilton, The Senate GOP's Extra Seat: Hidden Method or Manipulation? WNYC, Jan. 10, 2012, available at http://www.wnyc.org/blogs/empire/2012/jan/10/the-senategops-extra-seat-hidden-method-or-manipulation/#more-12952. Village of Arlington Heights v. Met. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 at 266 (1977). In determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor, courts have looked to the Arlington Heights framework, at least in part, to evaluate purpose in the 5 context. See, Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644, (1993) (citing Arlington Heights standard in context of Equal Protection Clause challenge to racial gerrymander of districts); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982) (evaluating vote dilution claim under Equal Protection Clause using Arlington Heights test), and has also been used, in part, to evaluate purpose in this Courts earlier 5 cases. See also Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 469-470 (1987) (considering city's history in rejecting annexation of 489 black neighborhood and its departure from normal procedures when calculating costs of annexation alternatives); see also Busbee v. Smith, 549 F.Supp. 494, 516-517 (D.C. 1982); Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F.Supp. 987, 1019, aff'd, 459 U.S. 159 (1982).
19 18

17

one race than another.20 Other considerations relevant to the purpose inquiry include, among other things, the historical background of the [jurisdictions] decision; [t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision; [d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence; and [t]he legislative or administrative history, especially [any] contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body.21 Numerous cases arising under Section 5 have employed this standard to help ferret out discriminatory intent in the Section 5 process.22 Here, the timing and sequence of events surrounding the Senates decision to increase the number of its districts to 63 is problematic in several respects, but particularly in relation to the implementation of Part XX. That is, the Senate did not announce its intention to increase the number of its districts until January 6, 2012, just days after the implementation of Part XX, despite the fact that: (1) the population data that purportedly justified the increase in districts had been available for over nine months; and (2) the New York legislature had been holding public hearings and meetings on redistricting for over six months. In other words, there had been months of opportunities and numerous redistricting public meetings and hearings during which the issue of the size of the Senate could have been discussed or debated by members of the legislature, but it was not until shortly the implementation of Part XX that the Senate abruptly announced its intention to increase the number of its districts. Indeed, multiple news reports and commentators drew a direct connection between the implementation of Part XX and the Senates decision shortly thereafter to increase the number of its districts, inferring that the latter move was a direct response to Part XXs implementation. As explained in other comment letters, in its Section 5 submission, the Senate attempts to justify its decision to increase the number of its districts based upon the 2010 Census population numbers for New York State.23 That data was released on March 24, 2011.24 The first public meeting on redistricting held by LATFOR, New Yorks legislative task force with delegated authority over redistricting, took place on July 6,

20 21 22

Arlington Heights, 429 U.S., at 266 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). Id. at 268.

See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997) (applying the Arlington Heights test to assess whether a voting system was enacted for a discriminatory purpose); City of Pleasant Grove v. U.S., 479 U.S. 462, 478 (1987) (approving use of Arlington Heights as tool to prove purposeful discrimination in the voting context); U.J.O. of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (noting that the Arlington Heights factors are probative evidence of purposeful discrimination).
23 24

See, e.g., Hecker Comment Letter at 2-5.

See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau Delivers New York's 2010 Census Population Totals, March 24, 2011, available at http://2010.census.gov/news/releases/operations/cb11-cn122.html

2011; the first public hearing took place on July 19, 2011.25 LATFOR continuously held public meetings and hearings over the next six months, holding a total of 5 public meetings and 14 public hearings through the end of 2011.26 During those meetings and hearings, there was some minor discussion of the size of the Senate during those hearing, but no member of LATFOR or the New York Senate took a firm position that there was a constitutional requirement to increase the number of districts in the Senate, or advocated such an increase. During this period of time, Part XX was subject to a constitutional challenge in state court. On December 1, 2012, however, a state trial court rejected that constitutional challenge, upholding Part XX, and paving the way for its implementation.27 Shortly thereafter, LATFOR officially announced that it would implement Part XX during a hearing held on December 22, 2011.28 During the first week of January, LATFOR officially implemented Part XX, by adjusting New Yorks redistricting data to allocate prisoners to their home districts; but only [d]ays later, a lawyer for Senate Republicans released a memo calling to expand the size of the Senate to 63 seats.29 This abrupt decision, which occurred quickly on the heels of the implementation of Part XX, followed almost no mention of the purported need to increase the size of the Senate during the preceding six months. Various commentators and African-American members of the legislature immediately grasped the significance the proximity of these two events, drawing a direct connection between the implementation of Part XX with its attendant benefits for minority representation, and the increase of the number of districts in the Senate to preserve non-minority voting power.30

See LATFOR, Hearings http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/hearings/.

26 27

25

and

Meetings,

available

at

See id.

See Little v. LATFOR, Index No. 2310-2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Albany County Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/little/Decision_and_Order.pdf. See Jimmy Vielkind, Panel Shifts Inmate Count in New York Redistricting, Albany Times-Union, Dec. 22, 2011, available at http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Panel-shiftsinmate-count-in-New-York-2421310.php Chavkin and Keller, supra note 17. The memo setting forth the purported legal justification for the increase in the number of districts is dated January 5, 2012; it was made public on January 6, 2012. See LATFOR Makes It Official: Were Going To 63, Capital Tonight, Jan. 6. 2012, available at http://www.capitaltonight.com/2012/01/latfor-makes-itofficial-were-going-to-63/ (describing the legal memorandum, dated January 5, 2012, setting forth the purported legal rationale for increasing the size of the Senate). See Chavkin and Keller, supra note 17. See also Stephon Johnson, Mapped Out: Minority Voting Power Under Attack, Amsterdam News, Feb. 2, 2012 (quoting AfricanAmerican State Senator John Sampson as stating that, If you want to be honest, there wouldnt be [an attempt to] justif[y] the 63rd seat if it wasnt for the prison issue, by which he meant last years upholding of a state law that requires inmates to be counted as part of the home districts population and not in the district where theyre held behind bars.) (available at
30 29 28

10

Despite what appears to be obvious chain of causality, a spokeman for the Senate denied that there was any connection.31 But the proximity of these two events, particularly in light of the fact that the decision to increase the Senate was not discussed in any detail previously, despite ample opportunity during six months of public hearings, is highly unusual and probative of intent under Arlington Heights.

Conclusion For the reasons identified above, we urge the Attorney General to interpose an objection to the Senate Plan, as the Senate has failed to meet its burden of showing that it will not have a retrogressive effect, nor that it was adopted free of discriminatory purpose. At a minimum the Department should: (1) require a separate preclearance submission for the new methodology adopted by the Senate for calculating the size of the Senate; and (2) issue a More Information Request to learn more about the connection between the implementation of Part XX and the Senates decision to increase the numbers of its districts. Should you have any questions regarding the information presented in this Comment Letter, please contact Dale Ho at 212-965-2252.

Sincerely,

Dale Ho, Assistant Counsel Ryan Haygood, Co-Director, Political Participation Group Natasha Korgaonkar, Assistant Counsel Leah Aden, Assistant Counsel NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.

http://www.amsterdamnews.com/news/local/mapped-out-minority-voting-power-underattack/article_e77ad29c-4dc1-11e1-86f0-001871e3ce6c.html?mode=story). See Chavkin and Keller, supra note 17 (quoting Scott Reif, a spokesperson for the Senate majority, as stating that the proposal to add a 63rd Senate seat was unrelated to the effects of prisoner reallocation).
31

11

EXHIBIT A

Chief, Voting Section Civil Rights Division Department of Justice Room 7254 NWB 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20530

March 18, 2011

Re:

Comment Letter Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, Submission No. 2011-0652

Dear Chief Herren, The NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. submits this comment letter urging the Attorney General to approve legislation enacted by the New York State Legislature that changes how incarcerated individuals are allocated during the redistricting process. See N.Y. Laws of 2010, Ch. 57, Part XX (Part XX). Part XX was submitted to the Department of Justice for preclearance by the Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York on March 7, 2011 (the Submission Letter), and has been designated Submission No. 2011-0652. Under the benchmark practice, New York State previously relied on data that counts incarcerated individuals in the locations where they are confined, in direct contravention of the States legal rules concerning residence and voting.1 This practice has been referred to as prison-based gerrymandering. Here, the state seeks to revise the benchmark practice by providing that, [u]ntil such time as the United States bureau of the census shall implement a policy of reporting each such incarcerated person at such persons residential address prior to incarceration, the State shall, for redistricting purposes, count incarcerated populations at their respective residential addresses prior to incarceration rather than at the addresses of such correctional facilities.

See N.Y. Const. art. II, sec. 4 (For the purpose of voting, no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence, by reason of his or her presence or absence . . . while confined in any public prison.).

It is our view that Part XX will not have a retrogressive effect on minority voters in New York. In fact, the opposite is true: Part XX will enhance opportunities for effective minority representation. Given the demographics of New Yorks prison population and the comparative demographics of the communities where the vast majority of New Yorks prisons are located, counting prisoners as residents of the communities where they are housed has a discriminatory effect on African Americans and other communities of color, and, in particular, those minority communities located in Bronx, Kings and Manhattan Counties, the three New York counties covered by Section 5. The benchmark practice harms minority voters in two distinct but related ways: (1) by reducing the total representation of those communities in the state legislature; and (2) by limiting the access that constituents in those communities have to their representatives. As an initial matter, New York States prison population is disproportionately comprised of African Americans and Latinos. While New York is approximately 30% AfricanAmerican or Latino,2 77% of its prison population is African-American (51.3%) or Latino (25.9%).3 The vast majority of New Yorks prisons, however, are located in disproportionately white areas of the state.4 Thus, the practice of counting incarcerated individuals where they are confined has the effect of inflating the population count, and thus the political representation, of the disproportionately white areas where New Yorks prison populations are concentrated, largely at the expense of the fair representation of New Yorks communities of color. More directly pertinent to the question presented under Section 5 analysis, the vast majority of incarcerated individuals in New York come from New York City,5 which includes the three Section 5-covered counties in New York State noted above.6 Notably, the most recent available data shows that each of these three counties is majority-

See U.S. Census Bureau: American FactFinder, New York Data Set, http://www.factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&-context=qt&qr_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U_QTP5&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U&-CONTEXT=qt&tree_id=4001&-all_geo_types=N&-geo_id=04000US36&-search_results=01000US&-format=&_lang=en (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 3 See N.Y. State Dept of Corr. Servs., HUB System: Profiles of Inmates under Custody on January 1, 2008, at i (2008), available at http://www.docs.state.ny.us/Research/Reports/2008/Hub_Report_2008.pdf. 4 In New York, 98% of prison cells are located in disproportionately white State Senate districts See Peter Wagner, 98% of New Yorks Prison Cells Are in Disproportionately White Districts, Prisoners of the Census (Jan. 17, 2005), http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/news/2005/01/17/white-senate-districts/. For example, New Yorks 114th State Assembly District holds the highest percentage of state prisoners of any district in the legislature, 6.99%; of the 5594 African Americans who are counted as constituents in that district, 82.6% are incarcerated. See Peter Wagner, Prison Policy Initiative, Importing Constituents: Prisoners and Political Clout in New York, IV (Apr. 22, 2002), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/importing/. 5 The most recent available data indicates that New York City produces 66% of all prisoners in New York State, but 91% of these prisoners are incarcerated outside of the city See Wagner, supra note 4, I. The net result is that, during the 2000 Census, approximately 43,000 New York City residents were counted in various upstate communities for redistricting purposes. See id. 6 See Submission Letter at 5.

minority,7 and that the majority of state legislative districts in these three counties are majority-minority districts.8 There is no sizable prison population physically located in any of these counties.9 Although precise figures for the home address information of the New York prison population as of 2011 and are not yet available, recent data from last year indicates that the three Section 5-covered counties are the counties of residence for approximately 20,000 incarcerated individuals.10 It is therefore clear that a reallocation of incarcerated individuals from the districts where they are confined back to their districts of home residence will result in a substantial net increase in the redistricting population base in the three Section 5-covered counties in New York. This will, in turn, enhance opportunities for effective representation for minority voters residing in the districts located within the Section 5-covered counties. Their level of representation in the state legislature will no longer be diluted by the artificial inflation of population numbers in other parts of the state, but will instead be tied directly to the actual number of individuals who are legally domiciled in those counties.11 The second, but related, point is that Part XX will enhance equal access to elected representatives for minority constituents living in the three Section 5-covered counties. When incarcerated individuals have concerns as constituents, they undoubtedly must look to the legislators representing their home districts rather than those who represent the
See Wagner, Importing Constituents, supra note 4 Fig. 14, available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/importing/fig14.html (showing that, as of the 2000 Census, Bronx County is 14.53% non-Hispanic white; Kings County is 34.66%; and New York County is 45.79%). 8 For instance, Kings County (Brooklyn) is home to 21 State Assembly districts (nos. 40-60). Eleven of those districts are majority minority (nos. 40, 41, 42, 43, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, and 58). See Wagner, Importing Constituents, supra note 4, Fig. 15, available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/importing/fig15.html. Similarly, New York County has 12 State Assembly districts (nos. 64-75). Six of those districts are majority minority (nos. 64, 68, 69, 70, 71, and 72). See id. Bronx County contains 11 state assembly districts (nos. 76-86). All eleven are majority-minority. See id. 9 See Wagner, Importing Constituents, supra note 4, Fig. 14, available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/importing/fig14.html (showing that, as of the 2000 Census, Bronx County, with a population of 1.3 million, holds 232 prisoners; Kings County, with 2.5 million people, hold no prisoners; and New York County, with 1.5 million people, holds 1,263 prisoners). 10 See Submission Letter at 7. 11 We further note that the net increase in the population base of the Section 5-covered counties could result in an increase in the number of districts in those counties. Thus, the sheer increase of the population count of those counties may directly increase the level of representation afforded those counties in the state legislature. But even if the total number of districts representing individuals from these counties remains unchanged, the crucial factor is that the districts representing these communities will be drawn such that political influence is distributed more fairly.
7

districts where the prisons are located.12 As noted, the majority of incarcerated individuals in New York State come from New York City, with approximately 20,000 incarcerated individuals from the three Section 5-covered counties. The interests of those 20,000 individuals are represented by legislators from Bronx, Kings, and New York Counties. Under the benchmark method of counting prisoners, however, the legislators who represent districts in those counties are effectively spread thin they must respond to the concerns of their constituents who are physically present in their districts, as well as those 20,000 constituents who are incarcerated elsewhere. Put another way, minority constituents of those districts lack the same level of access to their representatives that individuals in other districts have. By reallocating incarcerated individuals to their home addresses, Part XX will better equalize the number of true constituents in election districts throughout the state, and thus ameliorate the long-standing discriminatory effect that the benchmark practice has had on minority constituents in the covered jurisdictions. Finally, we note that there is no real risk that the reallocation of incarcerated individuals back to their home communities will result in the creation of phantom majorityminority districts. The process of drawing districts that provide for effective minority voting opportunities always requires an attention to the particular facts unique to a district, such as registration disparities, turnout rates, and levels of racial polarization. Linedrawers seeking to create districts that afford minority voters with an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice will take into account the fact that incarcerated individuals who are reallocated to their home districts are non-voters. Doing so will be a relatively simple matter, given that, under the proposed law, linedrawers will know exactly how many incarcerated individuals are being reallocated and to which census tracts. The proposed voting change therefore carries no risk of retrogressing minority strength by producing ineffective minority voting rights districts. In sum, Part XX will not have a retrogressive effect on minority voters in New York. This legislation received the support of various organizations that advocate on behalf of minority communities, including many that have constituencies in the three Section 5covered jurisdictions.13 All evidence suggests that the state's intention was to enhance, and not impair, opportunities for effective political participation for minority voter. Enclosed please find several newspaper clippings and a media advisory related to the proposed change.

12

For instance, State Senator Dale Volker, who represents New Yorks 59th State Senate Districta district that can only satisfies the minimum population threshold because of its prison, see Wagner, Importing Constituents, supra note 4, 5has stated that his community has more cows than people, and that he would choose the cows over incarcerated people as his constituents because they would be more likely to vote for me. Jonathan Tilove, Minority Prison Inmates Skew Populations as States Redistrict, Newhouse News Serv., Mar. 12, 2002, available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/news/newhousenews031202.html. 13 See Submission Letter Exs. F, O.

New York has satisfied its burden of demonstrating that this proposed change has neither a discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory effect. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1976); see also Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 (28 C.F.R. 51.25). Therefore, we respectfully submit that the Attorney General should preclear Part XX.

Sincerely,

Dale Ho Assistant Counsel NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. 99 Hudson St., Suite 1600 New York, NY 10013 (212) 965-2200 dho@naacpldf.org

Legal Defense Fund Applauds Legislation Ending Prison-Based Gerryman...

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Published on NAACP LDF (http://naacpldf.org)

Home > Our Work > News Updates > Legal Defense Fund Applauds Legislation Ending Prison-Based Gerrymandering in New York

8/04/10 Related Case or Issue: Prison-Based Gerrymandering

[1]

(New York) --The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF) congratulates the New York State Senate for passing legislation to end prison-based gerrymandering in New York. Their courageous decision will bring New Yorks redistricting process in line with basic principles of democracy, and will serve as a model for other states in the effort to count incarcerated populations correctly in the next round of redistricting. Until now, New York counted prison populations during the redistricting process as most states do: by counting them where they are incarcerated, a practice known as prison-based gerrymandering. Prison-based gerrymandering violates the principle of one person, one vote enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which requires that election districts be roughly equal in size, so that elected officials each represent the same number of constituents. Prison-based gerrymandering artificially inflates population numbers and thus, political influence in districts where prisons are located, at the expense of all other districts. With approximately 60,000 incarcerated persons in New York State, the proper counting of incarcerated individuals is critical to ensuring fair representation throughout the state. African-Americans living in New York are incarcerated at a rate that is more than eight times higher than that of whites. African-Americans and Latinos are 30% of the states population, but over 70% of its prisoners. 98% of New Yorks prison cells, however, are located in disproportionately white State Senate districts. Because incarcerated persons in the United States are disproportionately African-Americans and other people of color, the current counting of incarcerated persons at their place of incarceration, rather than at their pre-arrest residence, severely weakens the voting strength of entire communities of color. Ending prison-based gerrymandering in New York will enable state and local officials to better fulfill their obligations under the federal Voting Rights Act, said John Payton, LDF President and Director-Counsel. New Yorklike nearly every other statedefines a persons domicile as a place where that person voluntarily resides. Article II, Section 4 of the New York Constitution makes clear that an incarcerated person retains the place of residence he or she had prior to arrest. This rule comports with common sense: incarcerated persons do not choose the districts where they are confined, and can be moved at any time at the discretion of the Department of Corrections

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Legal Defense Fund Applauds Legislation Ending Prison-Based Gerryman...

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Services. They have no opportunities to interact with or develop enduring ties to the surrounding communities. They cannot use local services such as parks or libraries. And, of course, incarcerated persons cannot vote in those communities. They are not constituents of those districts in any ordinary sense of the word. By contrast, incarcerated persons remain legal residents at their pre-incarceration addresses. They maintain ties to the outside world through their families and other relationships in their home communities. At the end of their sentences, they are released to those communities. The average length of incarceration is less than three years, but the prison count remains in effect for a decade. By counting incarcerated residents of these communities elsewhere, prison-based gerrymandering deprives these districts of the proper level of political representation to which they are entitled. LDF, the nations oldest civil rights law firm, is committed to the full and equal participation of all persons in our democracy, and applauds the passage of this landmark legislation in New York, which follows similar bills in Maryland and Delaware earlier this year. We urge Governor Paterson to sign this important legislation into law, and call on other states to enact similar legislation before the next redistricting cycle begins, said Dale Ho, Assistant Counsel in LDFs Political Participation Group. Moving forward, the Census Bureau should ease the burden on state and local governments by changing its enumeration methods to count prisoners in their home communities in the next decennial census.
Source URL: http://naacpldf.org/press-release/legal-defense-fund-applauds-legislation-ending-prison-basedgerrymandering-new-york Links: [1] http://naacpldf.org/case/prison-based-gerrymandering

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Anti-prison Gerrymandering Bill Passes in New York

http://www.blackvoicenews.com/news/news-wire/44823-anti-prison-ger...

MONDAY, 09 AUGUST 2010 08:49

By Stephon Johnson, Special to the NNPA from the Amsterdam News NEW YORK (NNPA) - The New York State Senate has passed legislation that could end prison gerrymandering once and for all. Passed as part of the revenue bill, the legislation states that people in prison be counted in their home communities and not the communities where theyre incarcerated for the purpose of redrawing district lines. The bill awaits Gov. David Patersons signature. Im really just excited, said State Sen. Eric Schneiderman when speaking with the AmNews. I spoke to the governor and the governors council and Im sure hell sign it. Once its signed, I will work with him and I will also work with the incoming administration to make sure that the ball doesnt get dropped. Across the country, sentiments have been expressed that prisoners being counted at institutional addresses is unfair to their home communities. Redistricting lines can determine the racial and economic balance of a political district. Also, census counts determine funding to specifical neighborhoods. Its not a complicated process, Schneiderman said. Its about making sure the [Department of Correctional Services] enters the right information into the new census blocks.... The politics are hard. The technologys easy." Schneiderman couldnt help but redirect the attention to the amount of time that he and a coalition of groups and individuals put in to help this bill see the light of day. He also mentioned promoting the idea of prison gerrymandering bills with other states in time for reapportionment. The other thing is that we have a coalition that we built over the past five or six years that includes the NAACP, David Jones and the Hip Hop Action Network, and Eddie Ellis and Edith Wagner from the Prison Policy Initiative, said Schneiderman. What were going to do is get together and figure out how to use this and try to get other states in on this as well before the 2012 [redistricting] lines are drawn. The NAACPs Legal Defense Fund released a statement praising the passing of the bill and marking the vote as a new day in New York State. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund congratulates the New York State Senate for passing legislation to end prison-based gerrymandering in New York, read the statement. Their courageous decision will bring New Yorks redistricting process in line with basic principles of democracy and will serve as a model for other states in the effort to count incarcerated populations correctly in the next round of redistricting. ... Prison-based gerrymandering artificially inflates population numbersand thus, political influencein districts where prisons are located at the expense of all other districts, continued the statement. With approximately 60,000 incarcerated persons in New York State, the proper counting of incarcerated individuals is critical to ensuring fair representation throughout the state. Schneiderman believes that Andrew Cuomo, the reported front-runner for New York State governor, will carry the torch that this bill lit to ensure its enforcement. I think Cuomo understands this and he will come through, said Schneiderman. If [Republican gubernatorial candidate] Carl Paladino became governor, Id be worried. But I dont think thats going to happen.

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Anti-prison Gerrymandering Bill Passes in New York

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This is a big deal, Schneiderman stated. Things like this and repealing the Rockefeller Drug Laws makes me feel like banging my head against the wall in Albany for all these years and suffering in the Senate was worth it. < Prev Next >

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Editorial - An End to Prison Gerrymandering - NYTimes.com

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/opinion/23mon3.html?pagewanted=...

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August 22, 2010

Gov. David Paterson of New York took a stand for electoral fairness earlier this month when he signed legislation that bans prison-based gerrymandering the cynical practice of counting prison inmates as residents, to pad the size of legislative districts. The new law, which requires that prison inmates be counted at their homes, deserves to be emulated all across the country. Prison-based gerrymandering mattered little when inmate populations were small. But by the 1990s, when more than a million people nationally were behind bars, lawmakers had perfected the art of inflating the political clout of underpopulated areas by drawing legislative districts around prisons. More than a dozen New York counties with large prisons already take inmates out of the count when they draw districts for county offices. According to an analysis by the Prison Policy Initiative, a New York-based research group, seven New York State Senate districts could now have trouble meeting federal population requirements, which means that those districts will have to be drawn along different lines. The new law could lead to a political realignment in places like Rome, the upstate city where inmates at the Mohawk and Oneida correctional facilities make up about half the residents of one City Council district. Currently each resident there has twice the voting power of a resident who lives elsewhere in that city. Republican politicians who represent upstate prison districts have predictably tried to portray the new law as a power grab by New York City Democrats. But only about half of the nearly 60,000 people held in New York prisons come from the city while nearly 40 percent of inmates are from upstate areas. They will now be rightfully counted in the places they come from and to which they will eventually return. By upholding the principle of one person, one vote, the new law will benefit citizens in all parts of the state.

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Editorial - An End to Prison Gerrymandering - NYTimes.com

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N.Y. Law on Prisoner Residency May Help Democrats - NYTimes.com

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/07/nyregion/07prison.html?pagewante...

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August 6, 2010

By STEPHEN CEASAR

The people who spend their nights at 639 Exchange Street in a rural slice of upstate New York have long officially been counted as residents of Wyoming County. This seems to make perfect sense, except that 639 Exchange Street is the Attica Correctional Facility, and more than half of its over 2,000 inmates are temporary guests whose last home was hundreds of miles away, in New York City and its suburbs. The practice of counting inmates where they are incarcerated rather than at their last official address has long been criticized as disenfranchising poor, urban and largely minority neighborhoods by undercounting their populations, thus reducing their political clout when legislative districts are drawn. But under a provision in the budget legislation that state lawmakers approved on Tuesday, New York will become the second state, after Maryland, to end the practice, a change that could sharply affect the states political map. Republicans have been the main beneficiaries of counting prisoners as residents of the counties where they serve their sentences because the prisons sit in communities that lean Republican. The elimination of prison populations of upstate districts will have a net impact of restoring populations to Democratic districts in New York City and the downstate suburbs, said Doug Forand, a Democratic political consultant. The law will now count more than 34,000 of the states nearly 60,000 inmates as residents of New York Citys five boroughs or urban communities in Rockland County, Westchester County and Long Island. When state lawmakers redraw the boundaries of legislative districts using the results of this years census, the law could affect how these districts are formed. When districts were last drawn, in 2002, seven upstate districts met population requirements as a result of people behind bars, according to an analysis conducted by the Prison Policy Initiative, a nonprofit advocacy group that has studied the issue.

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N.Y. Law on Prisoner Residency May Help Democrats - NYTimes.com

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/07/nyregion/07prison.html?pagewante...

The removal of these inmate populations, combined with the continuing movement of people from upstate districts, may leave some districts with too few residents to continue as they are. Should that happen, the districts will be redrawn and stretched farther east and south, causing a ripple effect that will extend those and other districts into Democratic-rich areas like New York City and increasingly Democratic areas like the Hudson Valley, Mr. Forand said. While Republicans are a decided minority in the Assembly and have poor prospects of winning the governors office in November, they are neck and neck with Democrats in the State Senate, which the Democrats control by a 32-to-30 majority. So Republicans are guaranteed to fight any redistricting move that could cost them seats considered safe for their party. But Democrats argue that the issue is not about politics but about equality. Assemblyman Hakeem Jeffries, a Brooklyn Democrat, who sponsored the legislation in the Assembly, said, The practice of inmate-based gerrymandering fundamentally undermines the principal of one person, one vote, by reallocating political power to a handful of upstate, rural communities. Republicans accuse Democrats of being purely motivated by the ballot box. Senator Elizabeth OC. Little, a Republican from Queensbury whose upstate district relied on the nearly 13,000 prisoners housed there to meet the minimum population required when it was drawn in 2002, said Democrats were trying to use redistricting to increase their clout. Inmates in her district, Ms. Little added, use the same community resources as other residents, including the courts, hospitals and utilities. To not count them there is absolutely absurd, she said. Senator Joseph A. Griffo, another Republican whose district relied on its prison population, said that the change in law underscored how the Legislature was dominated by Democrats from New York City. The measure also lacks consistency, Mr. Griffo said, noting that other transient groups, like college students and military families, are still counted where they sleep. This is another attempt by New York City leadership to silence the upstate voices, he said. Which districts will be most affected will not be clear until the census data is final. The population each district will need to meet the minimum threshold is based on the states total population, said Peter Wagner, executive director of the Prison Policy Initiative. No matter the political implications and the battles that ensue, some government watchdogs

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N.Y. Law on Prisoner Residency May Help Democrats - NYTimes.com

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saluted the change in the law. Its a very significant step, righting a historical wrong, said Susan Lerner, executive director of Common Cause New York. Its a first step to a fair, equitable and nonpolitical redistricting process this year.

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EXHIBIT B

Prisoner_counts_by_2002_Legislative_district A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 SD 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018 019 020 021 022 023 024 025 026 027 028 029 030 031 032 033 034 035 036 037 038 039 040 041 042 043 044 045 046 047 048 049 050 051 B C D E Census2010 Total Population Prisoners Added Prisoners Subtracted Adjusted Total Population 341,254 564 0 341,818 314,159 162 0 314,321 322,962 655 0 323,617 309,135 568 0 309,703 316,844 180 0 317,024 307,789 521 0 308,310 311,141 190 0 311,331 305,226 541 0 305,767 304,372 206 0 304,578 314,840 925 0 315,765 320,102 207 0 320,309 302,224 416 414 302,226 324,533 431 0 324,964 323,939 964 0 324,903 322,621 326 0 322,947 322,463 219 0 322,682 341,278 1,516 0 342,794 316,903 2,100 0 319,003 315,070 1,858 0 316,928 302,990 1,193 0 304,183 298,327 709 0 299,036 321,754 236 0 321,990 332,657 894 0 333,551 320,917 223 917 320,223 335,683 708 0 336,391 325,280 193 0 325,473 313,038 283 0 313,321 321,361 1,776 0 323,137 333,345 362 165 333,542 318,569 2,242 334 320,477 292,157 817 0 292,974 333,737 1,567 0 335,304 314,246 1,300 0 315,546 315,408 420 0 315,828 313,382 549 0 313,931 328,256 1,473 127 329,602 326,645 218 1,711 325,152 347,376 321 666 347,031 332,117 797 0 332,914 316,324 193 3,152 313,365 316,491 529 3,453 313,567 313,027 623 5,856 307,794 322,103 529 454 322,178 317,410 936 432 317,914 306,856 593 12,077 295,372 304,204 1,326 0 305,530 292,134 852 2,607 290,379 294,748 404 3,571 291,581 296,854 1,060 2,229 295,685 296,761 783 0 297,544 296,420 437 2,895 293,962

Page 1 of 5

Prisoner_counts_by_2002_Legislative_district A 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 052 053 054 055 056 057 058 059 060 061 062 Total: AD 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018 019 020 021 022 023 024 025 026 027 028 029 030 031 032 033 034 035 036 037 B 290,862 295,046 302,881 309,516 297,343 285,036 283,477 297,961 270,736 303,809 304,003 19,378,102 C 653 678 648 477 2,083 478 543 322 1,998 339 689 46,003 D 0 2,791 4,989 0 59 2,546 0 7,372 0 0 1,891 60,708 E 291,515 292,933 298,540 309,993 299,367 282,968 284,020 290,911 272,734 304,148 302,801 19,363,397

Census2010 Total Population Prisoners Added Prisoners Subtracted Adjusted Total Population 149,382 179 0 149,561 142,833 323 0 143,156 143,108 344 0 143,452 137,024 80 0 137,104 131,677 102 0 131,779 145,372 468 0 145,840 134,480 54 0 134,534 128,281 101 0 128,382 130,285 63 0 130,348 138,509 112 0 138,621 135,087 422 0 135,509 126,438 49 0 126,487 131,694 81 0 131,775 131,344 74 0 131,418 135,528 81 0 135,609 134,747 38 0 134,785 136,600 67 0 136,667 130,690 662 0 131,352 128,933 91 0 129,024 128,831 98 0 128,929 132,039 98 0 132,137 127,045 114 0 127,159 124,069 163 0 124,232 124,351 50 0 124,401 125,471 116 0 125,587 123,681 59 0 123,740 124,451 130 0 124,581 123,186 57 0 123,243 122,770 324 0 123,094 122,060 97 0 122,157 131,083 532 0 131,615 125,758 579 0 126,337 115,034 285 0 115,319 121,976 102 0 122,078 130,758 181 0 130,939 111,188 72 0 111,260 124,254 288 414 124,128

Page 2 of 5

Prisoner_counts_by_2002_Legislative_district A 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 038 039 040 041 042 043 044 045 046 047 048 049 050 051 052 053 054 055 056 057 058 059 060 061 062 063 064 065 066 067 068 069 070 071 072 073 074 075 076 077 078 079 080 081 082 083 084 085 086 087 088 089 B 126,330 127,257 127,591 116,834 114,942 114,124 121,728 120,832 117,179 127,412 124,776 129,871 133,740 127,463 124,831 128,055 127,728 124,991 123,795 120,027 113,909 123,974 126,132 130,360 127,763 125,373 136,671 132,385 140,310 134,810 129,298 127,919 131,796 122,886 117,394 129,766 133,261 149,377 125,532 126,463 121,803 139,940 124,298 119,471 125,736 124,748 130,899 125,392 120,826 132,139 131,096 129,296 C 159 180 947 189 397 429 127 76 296 121 43 90 237 315 200 572 868 1193 1090 629 335 157 138 454 60 144 261 47 145 130 1068 370 1102 622 470 73 367 225 471 659 470 879 236 209 173 434 757 629 647 572 106 37 D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 917 0 0 0 0 0 213 0 0 121 0 0 0 165 0 0 0 127 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,092 E 126,489 127,437 128,538 117,023 115,339 114,553 121,855 120,908 117,475 127,533 124,819 129,961 133,977 127,778 125,031 128,627 128,596 126,184 124,885 120,656 114,244 124,131 126,270 130,814 126,906 125,517 136,932 132,432 140,455 134,940 130,153 128,289 132,898 123,387 117,864 129,839 133,628 149,437 126,003 127,122 122,273 140,692 124,534 119,680 125,909 125,182 131,656 126,021 121,473 132,711 131,202 128,241

Page 3 of 5

Prisoner_counts_by_2002_Legislative_district A 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 090 091 092 093 094 095 096 097 098 099 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 B 137,827 128,861 133,416 129,837 135,492 145,915 138,725 144,514 138,734 134,814 140,947 128,454 134,109 134,686 132,644 137,005 134,254 125,994 131,716 139,831 138,331 132,613 139,495 135,737 135,275 127,225 127,428 128,680 129,137 127,496 131,094 134,240 131,778 124,261 130,736 131,678 131,765 129,764 126,373 130,747 139,115 126,203 125,431 118,100 130,126 131,932 124,338 123,427 126,488 127,086 117,899 109,926 C 142 81 70 201 112 160 151 130 437 46 703 240 125 143 478 641 987 153 121 162 201 147 221 258 212 133 772 248 175 812 679 115 82 206 198 192 439 150 250 345 124 714 246 1677 145 64 289 359 386 301 127 1305 D 1,711 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,411 1,279 0 3,006 1,722 1,197 2,420 0 0 0 0 2,772 0 0 147 2,432 2,224 7,875 0 4,689 432 2,027 0 0 0 1,544 1,731 0 0 0 123 232 3,026 0 0 0 59 0 0 0 2,791 0 1,891 0 0 E 136,258 128,942 133,486 130,038 135,604 146,075 138,876 142,233 137,892 134,860 138,644 126,972 133,037 132,409 133,122 137,646 135,241 126,147 129,065 139,993 138,532 132,613 137,284 133,771 127,612 127,358 123,511 128,496 127,285 128,308 131,773 134,355 130,316 122,736 130,934 131,870 132,204 129,791 126,391 128,066 139,239 126,917 125,677 119,718 130,271 131,996 124,627 120,995 126,874 125,496 118,026 111,231

Page 4 of 5

Prisoner_counts_by_2002_Legislative_district A 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 Total: B 132,951 129,830 128,607 127,442 128,575 124,739 131,129 121,064 121,520 19,378,102 C 134 130 558 200 128 201 76 181 199 46,003 D 1,041 0 0 0 2,588 5,507 0 0 782 60,708 E 132,044 129,960 129,165 127,642 126,115 119,433 131,205 121,245 120,937 19,363,397

Page 5 of 5