Soft Bandwagoning and the Endurance of American Hegemony

Zachary Selden Dept. of Political Science University of Florida 234 Anderson Hall Gainesville, Fl. 32611 zselden@ufl.edu

Draft for presentation at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., September 2-5, 2010. Not for citation without the authors permission.

Soft Bandwagoning and the Endurance of American Hegemony The end of the Cold War led to predictions that a new balance of power would soon emerge to counter the dominance of the United States.1 When that expected balancing behavior did not materialize, explanations of the enduring unipolar situation arose, including the benign nature of American hegemony and the centrality of the public goods that it provides, or the massive gap in capabilities between the United States and any combination of potential challengers that essentially precludes balancing.2 After the US-led invasion of Iraq, however, some argued that the long-anticipated return of balance of power was at hand in the form of soft balancing. 3 Soft balancing is distinct from traditional balancing behavior in that it does not seek to openly balance through alliance formation or an increase in military capabilities aimed against the predominant power. Instead, soft balancing is comprised of a range of activities designed to frustrate the ability of the predominant power to act with impunity, in particular by using international institutions to deny it international legitimacy for its actions. The actions of the United States in the wake of September 11th are said to have accelerated this trend toward soft balancing by weakening confidence in its image as a benign hegemon, thus generating soft balancing by states such as France, Germany, Russia and China.4 The concept of soft balancing, however, is at best an incomplete explanation of the current dynamics of the international system because a large number of states are in fact strengthening their security cooperation with the United States and increasing their ability to facilitate the global reach of the US military. Even more to the point, those states have generally increased their security ties to the United States during the same time period that US policy and actions are said to be producing a wave of soft balancing.
1 John Mearshimer, Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 15, No.3 (Summer 1990): 5-57; Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise, International Security , Vol.17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp.5-51; Kenneth. Waltz, Structural Realism After the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 25, no.1 (Summer 2000), pp.5-41.
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2 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Building of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); William Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, International Security, Vol. 24, No.1 (Summer 1999), p. 5-41 and U.S. Strategy in a Unipolar World, in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, G. John Ikenberry, ed. (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2002); Keir Lieber and Gerard Alexander, Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Isnt Pushing Back, International Security, Vol. 24, No.1 (Summer 2005), pp. 109-139; Robert Lieber, The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath (Cambridge: Persus Books, 2005); Michael Mastanduno, Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88.
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3 T.V. Paul, Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy, International Security, Vol 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 46-71.
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4 Robert Pape, Soft Balancing against the United States, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 7-45.
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If unipolarity and what the United States has done with its position is causing some states to engage in soft balancing, then it is puzzling that many other states are actively seeking closer security ties with the US in the post-2001 period. Since then, nine eastern European states have sought and obtained membership in NATO, an institution defined by its explicit American security guarantee. Georgia, several Balkan states and Ukraine (until 2010), are seeking NATO membership and all of them are participating in US-led military operations. India has dramatically shifted away from its deeply rooted principle of non-alignment to engage in a range of cooperative military activities with the United States in recent years. Japan and Australia have reaffirmed their alliances with the United States and are participating in US-led military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Soft balancing may explain some behavior in the international system but if Russia, China and France are soft balancers, why are Ukraine, Japan and India (to name a few) working to build closer security relationships with the United States? The answer is that Ukraine, Japan, India and many others are potentially threatened by rising regional powers, specifically Russia and China. In an effort to reduce their vulnerability, states in close proximity to Russia and China have strengthened their security ties with the United States. They have not done so by building formal alliances to counter the rising regional powers. Instead they have undertaken a range of behaviors designed to demonstrate their value by facilitating US military activities in the region, participating in US-led missions, and tying their militaries to that of the United States through cooperative programs, training exercises and other activities. It is not bandwagoning (forming an alliance with the predominant power) in the traditional sense where smaller states seek the protection of the predominant power through complete acquiescence, but a more subtle form of bandwagoning that seeks to increase the security of the weaker state by entwining its security with the predominant powers global interests. If soft balancing is a subtler form of balancing, then this sort of relationship could be termed soft bandwagoning. American hegemony endures, therefore, because it is still vital to the security interests of a large number of states. Thus, the basis of American hegemony has changed somewhat since the end of the Cold War but the change is relatively subtle. During the Cold War, American hegemony was based on the premise of something worse.5 That is, American hegemony could be annoying and troublesome but it was better than the alternative: potential domination by the Soviet Union. In the current environment, there is not a single something worse; rather there are multiple somethings worse in the form
5 John Lewis Gaddis, What We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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of rising regional powers. They do not necessarily pose immediate threats to the territorial integrity of their neighbors, but their ability to pressure weaker states for concessions and their repeated demonstrations of aggressive intentions drives their neighbors to build closer ties with the United States by engaging in soft bandwagoning. The proponents of soft balancing are correct in that balancing is occurring in the current international environment, but for the most part it is aimed at the rising regional powers of Russia and China that constitute the something worse for many of their neighbors rather than the United States. This article sets forth a theory of when and how states engage in soft bandwagoning. First, it demonstrates that soft balancing is an incomplete explanation of state behavior in the international system, which calls for an alternative theory to explain the dynamics of the system. Second, it defines the concept of soft bandwagoning and identifies the elements of behavior that can be considered as evidence of this concept in practice. Third, it examines a range of second tier states that are engaged in soft bandwagoning to demonstrate the relevance and explanatory power of the concept. Soft Balancing Soft balancing is employed to explain why no formal alliances or coalitions have formed to directly confront American hegemony. Both T.V. Paul and Robert Pape argue that US foreign policy since 2001 has become increasingly aggressive and that its assertion of a doctrine of preventative or preemptive war shattered the image of the benign hegemon (at least until the end of the Bush Administration in 2009). The United States is no longer the power that enforces and bolsters global rules and norms, rather it is pursuing a strategy that challenges norms of sovereignty. Second-tier powers, therefore, are concerned about the implications of this shift in US policy. They are not concerned about the direct implications for their own sovereignty, instead they view American actions as signals that the liberal basis of American hegemony has been altered in ways that affect the stability of the international system based on accepted norms and rules.6 Thus, soft balancing occurs under conditions when, (1) the hegemons power position and military behavior are of growing concern but do not yet pose a serious challenge to the sovereignty of second-tier powers; (2) the predominant state is a major source of public goods. that cannot simply be replaced; and (3) the predominant state cannot

6 Paul, p. 58.
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easily retaliate either because the balancing efforts of others are not overt or because they do not directly challenge its power position with military means.7 What distinguished soft balancing from traditional hard balancing is the means that are employed to balance the predominant power. Rather than military buildups or the formation of military alliances, soft balancing seeks to use to the power of international institutions to frustrate the aggressive plans of the predominant power. Soft balancing, therefore, is comprised of limited, tacit, or indirect balancing strategies largely through coalition building and diplomatic bargaining within international institutions short of formal bilateral and multilateral military alliances.8 The concept of soft balancing has been thoroughly critiqued by those who note, among other points, that is it often difficult to tell where the normal give and take of policy disputes end and soft balancing begins or how much of purported soft balancing is driven by domestic political considerations.9 Yet even more relevant is that the concept does not appear to consistently explain the behavior of those states frequently cited as examples of soft balancing, (France, Germany, Russia and China). Governments elected in France and Germany after the US-led invasion of Iraq altered the tone and substance of their foreign policy in significant ways that do not appear to be consistent with soft balancing, while much of Russia and Chinas recent activities appear to have far less to do with checking the power of the United States and more to do with the use of their position as regional powers to intimidate and extract concessions from smaller powers in their respective regions. France is often exhibited as the poster child of soft balancing, and the central role of France in scuttling the attempts of the US and the UK to secure an additional UN resolution authorizing the use of force to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein is the most compelling piece of evidence. But it is not clear that France was engaging in soft balancing even at the nadir of US-French relations in 2003. At the same time that French diplomats in United Nations were working counter to US interests, Paris was home to a secret intelligence cooperation cell in Paris that fostered close coordination between French, US, and other western intelligence services.10 France also maintained a sizeable contingent of special forces in Afghanistan as part of the US-led Operation Enduring
7 Ibid, p. 59.
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8 Ibid, p.58.
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9 William Wohlforth, Hard Times for Soft Balancing, International Security, Vol. 30, No.1 (Summer 2005). Pp. 72-108.
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10 Un chef de la police confirme lexistence dune cellue antiterrorist internationale a la Paris, Le Monde, September 14, 2006.
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Freedom in 2003.11 Furthermore, with the election of Nicolas Sarkozy to the presidency in 2006, the tone and substance of French foreign policy began to adopt a significantly more cooperative attitude toward the US.12 President Sarkozy appointed Bernard Kouchner, one of the few French political figures who actively supported the US-led action to remove Saddam Hussein, to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. 13 French security policy has converged with that of the US on Iran, with the French government pushing for more stringent sanctions.14 The transition from the Chirac to the Sarkozy presidency is the main driver of those changes, but if France were truly engaged in soft balancing in response to US hegemonic behavior, then a change in presidents (from the same party no less) should not have such a significant effect on the direction of French foreign policy. Soft balancing would be an expression of French national interests in the current international environment and not something that would shift dramatically based on a single election. Thus, it is not clear if France is engaging in soft balancing, or if it had a specific objection to one US policy while maintaining its cooperative relationship with the US on other security matters. Germany is often cited as another example of soft balancing. But once again, recent shifts in German policy lend credence to the idea that much of what is said to be soft balancing is in fact a product of an objection to a particular US policy rather than a shift in strategy. Chancellor Schroeder used his strenuous objection to the removal of Saddam Hussein to bolster his domestic popularity, but the election of Angela Merkel in 2005 brought about a significant warming in US-German relations.15 The changes have been more subtle than in France, but the more cooperative relationship between Germany and the US in recent years would indicate that what was seen as soft balancing was more a product of domestic politics than a re-evaluation of German national interests and its relationship with the United States. Russia and China are also said to be charter members of the club of soft balancers but it is difficult to determine what is constitutes soft balancing and what is driven by those two states desires to become major global actors and predominant in their regions. Russia has taken actions to frustrate the reach of the United States, but this is only a part
11 French Pulls Troops from Afghanistan, The Washington Post, December 20, 2006.
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12 Je taime, Nicolas Sarkozy tell America he aims to be ally-in-chief, The Times (London), November 8, 2007.
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13 French Foreign Policy: A Study of Bernard Kouchner, The Economist, October 11, 2007.
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14 Sarkozy clarifies Frances Iran policy, International Herald Tribune, September 24. 2007; Nicolas Sarkozy backs US on Iran bomb, The Telegraph, September 22, 2007.
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15 Germany Rediscovers the US as a Partner, Der Spiegel Online International, April 30, 2007.
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of the totality of Russian foreign policy which is mainly aimed at its neighbors. Russia has used its energy resources to pressure Ukraine during its elections, repeatedly violated the airspace of the Baltic states, and taken a range of actions against Georgia.16 In 2007 alone, a cyber-attack emanating from Russia temporarily crippled internet connectivity in Estonia, Russia cut off the flow of energy to Lithuania when that country decided to sell its main oil refinery to a Polish rather than Russian company, and Russian aircraft fired missiles into Georgian territory.17 In the summer of 2008, Russia launched an invasion of Georgia that demonstrated its willingness to use military force to resolve issues in its near abroad. President Vladimir Putin himself stated that Russias foreign policy priorities are to improve Russias position as a global actor and reduce the effectiveness of international organizations that obstruct its ambitions.18 True to his word, much of Russias actions in Europe have been oriented around dominating the supply of energy to Europe with an eye toward fragmenting an EU consensus on its policy toward Russia. 19 Thus, the bulk of Russias actions in the international environment appear to be driven by a perceived need for dominance over the states that comprised the former Soviet Union. China as well has sought to expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific region and South Asia. Its military build-up, establishment of military facilities in Burma and islands off the coast of India, and major assistance to Pakistans nuclear program are all seen to varying degrees as the moves of an aspiring regional hegemon by Chinas neighbors. Defense spending is difficult to gauge given the opacity of the Chinese budgeting system, but most estimates show double-digit increases since the early 1990s with an average increase of 16.5 percent annually since 2001.20 A 2006 review of the countrys foreign and defense policy signaled a decision to make a break with Dengs cautious axioms and instead, embark on a path of high-profile force projection.21
16 Janusz Bugjaski, Isolation and Marginalization: Russias Offensive in the Baltic Region, Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 18, 2006, pp. 162-166; Russia, Ukraine quarrel over gas, Washington Post, December 17, 2005. p. A19; Gazprom of Russia to double gas prices to Georgia, International Herald Tribune, December 22, 2006; Georgia-Russia tension escalates over downed drone, New York Times, April 22, 2008.
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17 Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia, The Guardian, May 17, 2007; Vladimir Socor, Russian Oil Pipeline Shutoff to Lithuania: Wider Ramifications, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 110, June 6, 2007; Russians Fired Missiles into Village, Georgia Says, Washington Post, August 8, 2007, p. A. 10.
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18 Speech of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, February 9-11, 2007.
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19 Janusz Bugajski, Russias Far Abroad, The Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2007.
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20 Gerrard Cowan, Chinas arms spend continues to soar,,Janes Defence Weekly, July 30, 2008, p. 19.
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21 Willy Lam quoted in Gordon Chang, China flexes its muscles, The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2008.
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Although many scholars of Asian security note the success of Chinas charm offensive using trade, diplomatic and other tools of persuasion to bolster its position in the region, there is a debate within the field as to Chinas intentions and how other states in the region are reacting.22 But it is important to note that Chinas actions are not exclusively or even mainly aimed at the US directlythey are aimed at maintaining and expanding Chinas influence and power in the Asia-Pacific region in a bid to become a military power commensurate with its economic strength. Chinas interests are to deter attacks, maintain and grow its ability to project power, complicate American involvement in the defense of Taiwan and prevent spirals of conflict among regional actors.23 Thus, it is difficult to label Chinas actions as mainly a reaction to U.S. policy. In fact one of the reasons cited for Asia not descending into an unstable multipolar order after the Cold War is that China decided to avoid making an aggressive challenge to the existing status quo, meaning the US presence in the region.24 Soft balancing is a potentially useful concept, but one that lacks explanatory power in the cases that are said to represent it in practice. France and Germany apparently shifted away from soft balancing with a change in governments, which suggests something other than systemic factors at work. Much of Russia and Chinas foreign policy appears to be driven by their aspirations to achieve regional dominance. However, even if soft balancing is accepted as the basis of the behavior of a few states, it cannot explain why many other states are pursuing the opposite path and actively seeking closer security ties with the United States during the same period in which US policy is said to be producing the phenomenon of soft balancing. Soft Bandwagoning Both soft balancing and soft bandwagoning are rooted in balance of power theory, which is the touchstone of realist international relations theory. Under conditions of
22 See for example, Robert Sutter, Chinas Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (Lanham, Md.: Rowan and Littlefield, 2005); Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: Chinas Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).
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23 Thomas Christensen, Posing Problems without Catching Up, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001) pp. 5-40.
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24 Evelyn Goh, Great Powers and Hierachical Order in Southeast Asia, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/08), pp.113-157. For earlier predictions of multipolar instability in Asia see, Aaron Friedberg, Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia, International Security, Vol.18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; Gerald Segal, The Coming Confrontation between China and Japan? World Policy Journal, Vol. 10, No.2 (Summer 1993), pp.27-32.
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anarchy where there is no higher authority than the state that can guarantee the sovereignty of the individual states, each state must do what it can to survive. Some states will do better than others in the anarchic environment and the more powerful will seek hegemony as their expanding concept of national interest drives them to acquire still more power to protect their expanded territorial, political and economic interests. Yet, as one state approaches hegemonic status, other states will tend to form balancing coalitions to protect themselves against the potential threat posed by the aspiring hegemon. The existence of a single predominant power should prompt other states to either expand their military capability to balance against it or band together in a coalition whose collective power will provide sufficient resources to balance against that single power.25 Historically, states balance against the stronger power to protect their fundamental interest of remaining independent, sovereign actors.26 There are variations on this theme, notably the concept that states in fact only balance against threats and not against power in and of itself, but the idea that states will act to balance against the predominant power is a consistent theme in the realist study of international relations.27 Thus, balancing is the expected norm, but the concept of balance of power needs to be considered in a regional as well as a global context; geography is a significant variable that proponents of soft balancing tend to discount.28 Rising regional powers, particularly those with demonstrated aggressive attentions, pose a more significant immediate threat to their smaller neighbors than the globally predominant power. In this situation, states concerned about those proximate threats tend to bandwagon with the global power as insurance against rising regional powers. States that are not geographically proximate to the rising regional powers are less concerned about the implications of their increased capabilities and are freer to engage in behavior that runs contrary to the interests of the United States. This may explain the pattern in which some western European states engage in behavior that at times aims to counter American goals, while most eastern European states, members of the former Soviet Union, and states in the vicinity of China engage in behavior that forges closer security ties between them and the United States with the express intent of facilitating American military activities in
25 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1966).
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26 Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, Hegemonic Theories and Great Powers: Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999 Security Studies, 14 (1999)
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27 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
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28 Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p.66
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their region. When Russia and China take actions that raise the threat perceptions of their neighbors, the incentives for pulling closer to the United States increase. It is not a coincidence, for example, that Poland finalized its agreement to host the US third site missile defense system in the wake of the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 when public support in Poland for establishing a closer security relationship with the US soared.29 Bandwagoning and balancing are diametrically opposed terms used to explain state behavior in the international environment. In general, balance of power theory expects second-tier states to band together against the dominant power because of the threat posed, either direct or implied, by the power disparity. But states are not only concerned with maintaining their status; they may also seek to improve their position in the international system. To serve both ends, states may at times prefer to bandwagon with the predominant power. When the coalition attempting to balance a rising power appears too weak to be effective, less powerful states may consider joining the stronger side for domestic political reasons or the expectation of territorial gain rather than the weaker side as predicted by balance of power theory. 30 Hungary and Romania, for example, both joined with Nazi Germany before World War II rather than the opposing coalition. They did so in part because Nazi Germany was able to offer them territorial benefits.31 Russia, for example, jumped on the bandwagon to join Napoleonic France when Bonaparte granted Russia additional territory. Lesser powers also may do so because of common security interests with the predominant power, and this point is critical to understanding the trend of soft bandwagoning. Bandwagoning in a traditional sense involves joining a formal military alliance with the predominant power and often surrendering considerable autonomy to the larger power. This is clearly not occurring in the current international environment, but those states currently concerned about the rise of Russia and China are generally focused on the rising power of the regionally dominant players rather than any immediate threat. They will often need to maintain economic relations with the regional power and may be uncertain about the endurance of American hegemony and the utility of alienating the regional power by engaging in formal alliances with the United States.
29 U.S. Poland Sign Missile Deal Los Angeles Times, August 21, 2008.
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30 Deborah Larson, Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality? in Robert Jervis and Jack Synder (eds.) Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) pp. 85-111.
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31 Randall Schweller, Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In, International Security, Vol. 19, No.1, 1994, pp. 72-107.
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Therefore, the bandwagoning behavior falls below the threshold of formal military alliances and take the form of soft bandwagoning that includes a range of behaviors designed to link the militaries of the smaller state to that of the United States and demonstrate the willingness of the smaller state to facilitate American actions in the region. Thus, the conditions that produce soft bandwagoning are: (1) a relatively benign hegemon and (2) proximate potential threats posed by rising regional powers that outweigh the potential threat posed by the power disparity vis a vis the hegemon. Soft bandwagoning, like soft balancing, is not an easy concept to measure because it is relatively subtle. Yet, there are indicators that serve as measures of security cooperation. In particular, we can consider (1) participating in US-led military coalitions; (2) establishing bases for American forces or altering existing agreements in line with the U.S. Global Posture Review32; (3) participating in joint exercises and cooperative training programs and; (4) seeking to join or joining US-led alliances, specifically NATO, as soft bandwagoning activities that facilitate the global reach of the United States and increase the security ties between the United States and the weaker state. Those measures are significant indicators of the commitment that a weaker state can make to forge a closer security relationship with the hegemon. Participation in USled coalitions involves a commitment of military personnel and equipment and is thus an important indicator of an attempt to forge a closer relationship with the US. Allowing the US to establish bases on the national territory or using it as a temporary staging facility demonstrates a willingness to literally cede control over national territory to advance American strategic aims. Participation in joint exercises in an indication of the desire of the weaker state to become interoperable with US forces, a critical step in demonstrating its utility as a security partner with the United States. Seeking NATO membership is an indicator of the desire of the weaker state to be bound in a treaty with a firm collective defense obligation. It could be considered more as a form of traditional bandwagoning, but the alliance is not aimed against any particular country, and its multilateral nature dilutes the direct connection to the hegemon. If soft bandwagoing is a useful concept, we should expect to see evidence of the above indicators in the behavior of the states potentially threatened by the rise of Russia and China as regional hegemons. The obvious states to examine are those that border on Russia or were formerly part of the Soviet Union and those that border China or are in the Asia-Pacific region. The following table outlines those states and their behavior on four indicators of soft bandwagoning since 2001.
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Table 1: Increased Security Cooperation with the United States 2001-2009 in States Bordering on Russia and China33
Country Participation in US-led Military Operations x x x Military Cooperation and Training x x x x Basing of US Armed Forces or Host Agreement US Security Treaty via NATO or bilateral

Armenia Australia Existing Azerbaijan Bangladesh Belarus Bhutan Bulgaria x x x x Burma Cambodia x Estonia x x x Finland x x Georgia x x x (sought) India x Indonesia x Japan x x Existing Existing Kazakhstan x x Kyrgyzstan x Korea (ROK) x x Existing Existing Korea (DPNK) Laos x Latvia x x x Lithuania x x x Malaysia x Moldova x x Mongolia x x Nepal x New Zealand x x Existing Pakistan x Philippines x x Poland x x x Existing Romania x x x x Singapore x x x Slovakia x x x Taiwan (ROC) x x Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine x x x (until 2010) Uzbekistan Vietnam x Sources: US Department of Defense; US Department of State country background notes; NATO; Statement of Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Commander US Pacific Command before the House Armed Services Committee, 12 March 2008. Author interviews with government officials in Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine 2006-2009.

33 Australia, Bangladesh, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Taiwan and Singapore do not border on the Peoples Republic of China, but they are clearly within the AsianPacific region. States in the sample that have participated in coalition operations in Iraq: Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, New Zealand, Poland, Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Thailand and Ukraine. States in the sample that have participated in coalition operations in Afghanistan: : Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, and Ukraine.
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Of the 39 states that surround the rising regional hegemons of Russia and China, all but 5 have engaged in activities that more closely link them to the United States since 2001. Twenty-one are currently participating or have participated in US-led military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Twenty-four have increased military-military cooperation with the United States since 2001, mostly by engaging in exercises to improve interoperability. Five have established new military bases that extend the reach of the US military or signed agreements that facilitate the long-term use of national installations by the US military. Six have sought and obtained a US security guarantee via NATO membership and one is actively seeking such a commitment.34 Those states are to varying degrees seeking to establish or deepen security ties with the United States in ways that advance the interests of the United States, and doing so when soft balancing would predict precisely the opposite behavior. The above, however, is a schematic view of the application of a complex principle across a wide range of cases. To illustrate the concept of soft bandwagoning in more depth, we now turn to three case studies: India, Japan and Ukraine. Taken together, they demonstrate that a range of significant secondtier powers are actively working to deepen and broaden their security ties with the United States rather than balance against it, softly or otherwise. There are obvious distinctions between them, but in all three cases, concerns about the regional rising hegemons of Russia and China appear to be the main driver of soft bandwagoning. India US-India relations have waxed and waned, but the trend since 2001 in particular has been towards closer strategic cooperation. Since then, Indian leaders have consistently moved the country toward greater strategic cooperation with the United States, reversing a long-standing non-aligned tradition in Indian foreign policy. Given Indias growing economic and military power, it would appear to be a good candidate to join the club of soft balancers. Yet, despite Indias rising position in the international environment and its traditional antipathy to the global position of the United States, India has sought out closer security ties with the United States in recent years.

3 34 For example, Thailand conducted 40 military exercises with the US military in 2007, nearly double the number conducted on average during the 1990s. Singapore and the United States signed a Strategic Framework Agreement in 2005 that expanded defense cooperation and facilitated the berthing of US Navy vessels at Changi Naval Base. The US-Indonesian military relationship was normalized in 2005 and by 2007 included military exercises and training. Bulgaria and Romania signed agreements to allow the United States to rotate forces through bases in their countries in 2006. Poland agreed to host the US missile defense base in 2008.

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The emerging relationship is sometimes depicted as one driven by American desires to contain China, but this discounts Indias concerns about China and the potential threat it poses to India.35 India views China as the main strategic competitor in the region and much of Indias strategy is driven by its desire to balance against Chinas growing ability to act as a regional hegemon. In 1998 Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes stated that China posed the greatest threat to India, surpassing the threat posed by Pakistan.36 To support his contention he cited Chinas supplying of nuclear technology to Pakistan, but emphasized Chinas recent acquisition of bases in the Indian Ocean and alleged that China was stockpiling nuclear weapons along Indias northern border. This is by no means a consensus statement across the Indian political spectrum, but it is clear that the 1962 border war between India and China set the tone for the relationship in later years. 37 Indias nuclear weapons program is depicted by many Indian analysts as product of the Sino-Indian rivalry, and its continued development is seen more as aimed at balancing China than Pakistan.38 That perception has not diminished over time. Indian analysts also note that China sent its troops into Indian territory 65 times in the first half of 2008 alone. In response, India is developing its road and airfield infrastructure in the border region and creating new mountain divisions of 15,000 troops each to be deployed in the area.39 Although China has been a consistent factor in Indian strategic thinking since the 1960s, the potential danger posed by China increased significantly in the post-Cold War era. First, the demise of the Soviet Union put an end to Friendship Treaty that was seen as a major part of Indias security strategy. Second, China has increasingly used its expanding economic power to develop its military capabilities and power projection into the Indian Ocean. Third, China has expanded its ties with states around India, creating a perception of encirclement. All of this led Indian leaders to conclude in the late 1990s that they faced a deteriorating security situation. From the early days of independence, India viewed the Soviet Union as a major security partner. In addition to supplying most of its weapons, the Friendship Treaty with
35 Brahma Chellaney, Delhis Dilemma, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer 2000), pp.145 153.
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36 Indias New Defense Chief Sees Chinese Military Threat, New York Times, May 4, 1998, p. 6.
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37 Nuclear Cloud is Cast over Indias Relations with China, Washington Post, June 1, 1998, p. 14.
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38 J. Mohan Malik, China-India Relations in the Post-Soviet Era: The Continuing Rivalry, China Quaterly, No. 142, June 1995, pp. 317-355; Sujit Dutta, Indias Evolving Relations with China, Strategic Analysis, July 1995, p. 483.
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39 Vivek Raghuvanshi, Alleged PLA Intrusion Hightens India-China Conflict, Defense News, June 30, 2008, p.11.
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the Soviet Union was seen as providing a security hedge against China. The collapse of the Soviet Union left India in a weakened position. Indias defense policy has long since held China as the reference point and without the Soviet Union, India was more isolated and self-reliant than at any previous time.40 Thus, Indian leaders in the late 1990s turned to the obvious solution to help balance against the aspiring regional hegemon: they looked to a closer relationship with the global power. But improved US-Indian security cooperation faced a number of stumbling blocks. In particular, non-proliferation concerns made it difficult for the US to bridge the gap between its commitment to non-proliferation and its interest in a closer relationship with India. Starting in 2001, however, the US and India embarked on a new relationship when they agreed to establish a new strategic framework dialogue. This new framework included enhanced cooperation on export controls on high technology items, but the relationship quickly evolved toward increased military cooperation. 41 After a rapid series of discussions in November 2001, the US and India moved toward military cooperation in the form of military technology sales agreements and the protection of strategic sea lanes, an area of particular importance to India given Chinas increasing presence in the Indian Ocean. 42 The following month the two governments issues a joint statement that they, share strategic interests in Asia and beyond and that they would undertake joint security initiatives.43 This rapprochement was rapidly followed with more concrete actions, particularly in naval cooperation. The 1990s saw some limited cooperation between the Indian and US navies, and between 1992 and 1996 the two countries held three joint exercises. But relations soured after the Indian nuclear tests in 1998. That cooperation, however, quickly revived in 2001 after a series of high-level meetings between US and Indian officials. India granted refueling rights in Indian ports to US warships involved in operations in Afghanistan, the two countries ran joint exercises in December 2001 and India offered over-flight access and air base use to US aircraft involved in the global war on terror.44 A series of military exercises facilitated the development of unprecedented
40 Jasjit Singh, Indian Security: A Framework for National Strategy, Strategic Analysis, November 1997, p. 898.
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41 Building Indo-U.S. Trust, The Hindu, November 7, 2001.

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42 Modest Start to Indo-U.S. Military Cooperation, The Hindu, November 30, 2001.
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43 India, US Agree to Make Joint Counter-terrorism Efforts, Times of India, December 5, 2001.
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44 Scott Cuomo, U.S. and Indian Navies Close Again, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 128, No. 2 (February 2002), pp. 41-49.
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military coordination that was on display in the tsunami relief operations carried out by the Indian and US navies in the Indian Ocean in late 2004 and early 2005.45 In 2005 the two countries signed the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship that elaborated on a common understanding of the need for improved defense cooperation and established a Defense Production and Procurement Group to facilitate defense industrial cooperation.46 The size and number of joint military exercises continued to increase with the MALABAR 07 naval exercise involving 20,000 personnel, mainly from the US and Indian navies.47 In 2009 India hosted the largest deployment of the US militarys ground forces armored vehicles outside of the Middle East for the bi-lateral YUDH ABHYAS exercise.48 Clearly one of the major driving force of US actions was the increased threat of terrorist activity and the desire to bring India into closer cooperation with its counterterrorism initiatives. This suited India as well given its record of terrorist incidents and its increased awareness of the potential for Islamist action related to Kasmir as well as elsewhere in India. But for India much of the effort to build a better security relationship with the United States was driven by the perceived threat of an increasingly powerful China. The broader strategic significance of improved US-India security ties were not lost on China. Alarmed at the growing level of Indo-US cooperation, China has attempted to dissuade India from pursuing closer relations with the United States.49 India is a nuclear power with a strong and growing economy. Its military is growing in capability and reach and the overall picture of Indias development is highly positive. It would seem logical that India, especially given its traditional antagonism toward the United States, would be a prime candidate for membership in the club of soft balancers. Instead, India is actively working to establish deeper security ties with the US. None of this is to say that the US and India have formed an alliance and there are numerous sticking points in the relationship that hinder its progress, particularly the US relationship with Pakistan. Yet, it is clear that the Indo-US strategic relationship has developed dramatically since 2001 in a manner that serves both Indian interests and
45 Sumit Ganguly and Andrew Scobell, India and the United States: Forging a Security Partnership? World Policy Journal, Summer 2005, p. 42.
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46 Text of the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship, signed July 28, 2005.
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47 India, US to Step Up Military Cooperation The Times of India, October 24 2006.

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48 Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander U.S. Pacific Command before the House Armed Services Committee, March 23, 2010, p. 18.
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49 China Seeks to Stem Indias Budding Military Ties with U.S. International Herald Tribune, January 19, 2002.
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American strategic goals in Asia. In an era of supposed soft balancing, India is doing precisely the opposite by taking significant steps to build a closer strategic relationship with the predominant power. Japan Unlike India, Japan is a long-standing ally of the United States. The post-World War II occupation, US military bases and US-drafted Japanese constitution obviously tied Japan to the US in a network of security arrangements that Japan did not have full control of in the 1950s and 1960s. It was not until 1972, for example, that Japan regained sovereignty over the island of Okinawa. Given its proximity to the Soviet Union, Japan had clear security interests in common with the United States that made for a solid alliance during the Cold War. In the 1990s, however, there were questions as to the direction and durability of the US-Japan alliance.50 For many observers, the end of the Cold War combined with the economic rivalry between the US and Japan was destined to lead to a weakening of the security-based alliance.51 Yet, in the first decade of the 21st century the US-Japanese alliance has only grown stronger. Most significantly, Japan and the US revamped their security alliance in 2005 in a manner that ties the two even more closely on a range of issues.52 Japan has also contributed Japanese Self Defense forces to the support of US-led coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.53 In fact, the security relationship has developed to the point that Japan is sometimes referred to as the Great Britain of Asia, implying that there is a special relationship with Japan on par of that with the United Kingdom.54 All of this would appear to run counter to the predictions of soft balancing. Japan is an economically powerful state that for many years was predicted to become a rival of the US, shaking off the restraints on it left from the legacy of WWII and emerging as a
50 Francis Fukuyama and Kongdan Oh, The US-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War (Santa Monica: RAND) 1993.
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51 Richard Betts, Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, (Winter 1993/94), pp. 34-77; Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with America, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18-32.
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52 Y. Funabashi, Keeping up with Asia, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2008.

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53 Japan maintained a refueling operation in the Indian Ocean as part of Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001-2007. Japan has also maintained an airlift support operation in Iraq since 2006, and had a battalion-sized deployment of Self-Defense Forces in Southern Iraq performing humanitarian and reconstruction tasks from 2004 to 2006.
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54 K. Takahashi, Japan to Become Britain of the Far East, Asia Times, February 25, 2005; Mike Mochizuki and Michael OHanlon, A Liberal Vision for the US-Japan Alliance, Survival, Vol.40, No.2 (Summer 1998).
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power in its own right.55 But rather than minimizing its security relationship with the US, Japan is actively seeking to forge closer security ties with it. The agreement that formalized the US-Japan security relationship during the Cold War has been updated in ways that strengthen Japans role in advancing the two countries mutual security interests. The most recent 2005 security agreement follows on changes in the security agreement made in 1997, which in turn extended Japans responsibilities and the scope of bilateral activities from the previous arrangement. Under that agreement, the 1960s formulation of Japans geographic involvement in security-related matters was confined to the region north of the Philippines and the area surrounding Japan. The 1997 defense guidelines remove this geographic definition and states that Japan will play a role in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japans peace and security.56 At the time, Japanese officials did not conceive of the Middle East or the Indian Ocean as being within their remit.57 This rapidly changed as Japan moved rapidly to support the United States through its maritime contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom beginning in December 2001. Japans participation in US-led operations since 2001 was primarily symbolic; the refueling operation in the Indian Ocean, the airlift mission in the Persian Gulf and the 500 Japanese Self Defense Force personnel in southern Iraq are helpful but hardly decisive contributions. But those contributions are designed to portray Japan as reliable ally willing to act in support of US goals beyond the East Asian region. The question is why would Japan feel compelled to do so if, as a theory of soft balancing predicts, it could be expected to distance itself from the United States and frustrate its actions? The reason is that Japans security depends on a combination of multilateral and bilateral relationships to mitigate potential dangers in the region, but the bilateral relationship with the United States is the linchpin. The rise of China as a potential regional hegemon, the danger posed by North Koreas weapons programs, and the longstanding if overshadowed territorial issues between Japan and Russia all play a role in the development of a stronger security relationship between the United States and Japan in the post-2001 period.58
55 Jeffrey A. Frankel and Miles Hahler (eds.), Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the US in Pacific Asia (Washington DC: National Bureau of Economic Research) 1993; Chalmers Johnson, Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State (New York: W.W. Norton) 1994.
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56 Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan, Asian-Pacific Security and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism, International Security, Vol.26, No.3 (Winter 2001/02), p. 171.
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57 Ibid.
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58 Hakamada Shigeki, Nature of Russian State and Japans Strategy towards Russia, The 30th Policy Recommendations of the Japan Forum on International Relations, February 2008; Kent Calder, China and Japans Simmering Rivalry, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (March/April 2006), pp.129-139; Robert
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Japan is generally not seen as seeking to balance China in any traditional sense. China is a major trading partner for all states in the region, including Japan, and Japan for its part seeks to enmesh China in a web of ties that will ensure Japanese security. Nonetheless, Japan wants to avoid the emergence of a China-dominated system in the region. This interest dovetails with the rather consistent US strategy toward China, which is sometimes summed up as opening up, tying down and binding together.59 The agreement of 2005 is a significant revision of the previous guidelines, and it should be viewed in the context of Japans concerns over Chinas military build-up, particularly opposite Taiwan. The security agreement boosts military cooperation, gives Japan the ability to play a larger role in global security affairs, and shifts more of the burden of supporting the US military presence in the region onto Japan. It is seen in Japan as an agreement that marks a new stage in the relationship with the United States and increases the security and foreign policy ties between the two countries.60 The practical ramifications of the 2005 agreement can be seen in the increased cooperation on missile defense and US force deployments. Under the agreement, Japan will host an X-band early warning system in northern Japan. In addition the Japanese Air Defense Command will more to the US Yokuda Air Base near Tokyo, which will become a joint command for missile defense. US forces stationed in Japan will be realigned to allow for more flexibility, and Japan will shoulder most of the financial burden of this movement. As part of the US Global Posture Review, 8,000 US Marines of the stationed in Okinawa will move to Guam. Yet at the same time, the headquarters for the US Army First Corps will move from the United States to Camp Zama near Tokyo to build better bilateral coordination. These moves are designed to reduce the burden on local communities in Okinawa where the heavy US military presence has become a political issue for local officials, while at the same time increasing the coordination of US and Japanese forces and strengthening the ability of the US to deal with regional contingencies. After 2001 Japan moved to tie itself more closely to the United States because of its regional security concerns, particularly the potential danger of China-dominated
Scalopino, In Search of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding the Korean Peninsula-Challenges and Opportunities, American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol.28, 2006, pp. 367-378. 59 G. John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, Between Balanace of Power and Community: The Future of Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 2, No.1 (February 2002), pp. 69-94.
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60 See for example, Bilateral Alliance Will Only Get Stronger, The Daily Yonimuri, July 1, 2006; Troop Pact takes Alliance with U.S. into New Era, The Japan Times, May 3, 2006; Japan to step up its Asia Security Role, Christian Science Monitor, May 1, 2006; Committing to U.S. strategy, The Japan Times, May 5, 2006.
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Pacific region. Some of the intensified security ties developed between 2001 and 2009 were ascribed to the close relationship between then Prime Minister Kozumi and President Bush, and in fact the relationship did appear to waver after those two leaders were replaced.61 Yet this too would seem to go against the predictions of soft balancing. If soft balancing is a reaction to specific policies put in place by the Bush Administration, why did the security relationship with Japan show signs of stress only after President Obama took office promising a renewed attention to multi-lateral diplomacy? Japan is not a soft balancer but rather a soft bandwagoner carefully increasing its security utility to the globally predominant power to balance the influence of the potential regional hegemon.

Ukraine As a former republic of the Soviet Union, Ukraine provides an interesting example of soft bandwagoning. Ukraine has maintained a cooperative relationship with the United States since gaining its independence in 1991, despite significant shifts in leadership and governance as well as varying levels of attention from the United States. Yet, the level and depth of US-Ukrainian security cooperation has increased over time and done so precisely in the period in which soft balancing against the United States was said to be the emerging paradigm. As Ukrainian leaders were quick to point out in this period to visiting American officials, Ukraine participated in all NATO operations and was a considerable contributor to the US-led coalition in Iraq. As with the previous cases, Ukraines actions demonstrate a preference for soft bandwagoning with the United States rather than soft balancing against it. Given that a significant portion of the population of Ukraine speaks Russian and feels close ties to Ukraines eastern neighbor, it would have been an easier choice to simply avoid closer security ties with the United States and not contribute to its military operations. Despite this, Ukraines political leadership has consistently chosen to do so. The reason for doing so is clear: Ukrainian leaders recognize the need to mitigate the pressure that can be inflicted on Ukraine by Russia. Regardless of their political affiliation, Ukrainian leaders were motivated by a fundamental need to maintain the countrys independence and autonomy. Thus, they have sought to tie Ukraine into European and transatlantic structures, particularly NATO, even when public opinion is

61 U.S.-Japan ties close and personal, The Straits Times, June 26, 2006.
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highly divided on the issue.62 More to the point, they have actively sought to establish a deeper security relationship with the United States. US-Ukrainian security cooperation started soon after Ukraine achieved its independence. In 1992 the two countries signed an agreement that allowed for US armed forces personnel to train Ukrainian military personnel.63 This cooperation intensified over time as Ukraine sought to tie itself closer to the United States on security issues. In particular, Ukraine has expended considerable effort to make its military more compatible and interoperable with the US Armed Forces.64 Those efforts were put to the test when Ukraine contributed 2000 troops to the US-led coalition in Iraq and embarked on a range of additional activities to boost its level of security cooperation with the United States. Ukraine also worked hard to tie itself to the United States via membership in NATO. This changed with the election of President Yanukovitch in 2010 and his decision to suspend the push for NATO membership, but what is significant for the purposes of this article is Ukraines consistent drive to make itself eligible to join an American-led alliance from 2002 to 2010. Although NATO is a multinational organization, the driving force behind its enlargement since the end of the Cold War is the American security guarantee. The new members of NATO take the collective defense aspects of NATO very seriously and view it as an important part of establishing a security relationship with the United States.65 This has become all the more evident in the debates regarding NATOs new Strategic Concept. The newer members of NATO in Central and Eastern Europe are adamant that the new Strategic Concept reaffirm in the strongest terms possible the collective defense aspects of NATO. What makes NATO unique is the fact that it establishes the United States as an ally treaty-bound to come to the defense of the other members of the organization. It was no doubt a major consideration in Ukraines push for membership as it was for the other former Soviet republics that are now NATO members. The NATO-Ukraine relationship begins in earnest with the Ukraine-NATO charter in 1997.66 That Charter gave Ukraine a special status with NATO and allowed further
62 Public opinion surveys in Ukraine indicate that a minority favors joining NATO while approximately one-third consistently oppose NATO membership.
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63
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64 Leonoid Polyakov, U.S.-Ukraine Military Operations and the Value of Interoperability, Strategic Studies Institute, December 2004.
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65 Zachary Selden and John Lis, NATOs New Members: Net Gain or Drain on the Alliance? Problems
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of Post-Communism, Vol.49, No.4 (July/August 2002).

66 Text of the charter available at:
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military and political cooperation.67 But a new phase in the relationship commenced when the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine decided in 2002 to state that joining NATO was national security imperative.68 Ukraine lobbied hard for a Membership Action Plan for NATO membership (MAP), which is generally seen as the final step on the road to NATO membership, although it can be a decade-long process and there is no guarantee of membership. The US was supportive of Ukraines candidacy in 2008, but the objections of other NATO members led to the compromise wording in the summit communiqu that states Ukraine will become a member of NATO while denying it immediate entry into MAP.69 Although a disappointment to Ukraine, the United States took steps to reaffirm the US-Ukraine security relationship and the two countries signed the United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership in December 2008. The Charter acknowledges the need and willingness of both parties to further expand security cooperation and underlines Ukraines eventual membership in NATO.70 All of this was part of a concerted effort on the part of Ukraine to build a strong cooperative security relationship with the United States to balance the influence of Russia. This does not mean, however, that Ukraine maintains a hostile relationship with Moscow. Far from it, many of Ukraines actions can be seen as an attempt to balance against Russia without provoking it. 71 Nevertheless, US-Ukrainian cooperation shifted into a higher gear after 2001, just when soft balancing against the US is said to have become a prevalent phenomenon. This was driven by several factors, most significantly the Orange Revolution and the election of a strongly pro-Western president in 2004. But it is also important to recall the increasing level of pressure by Russia on Ukraine over this period as Moscow stepped up its efforts to build its influence in the near abroad. 72 Russias use of natural gas exports as a tool to pressure its immediate neighbors as well as the rest of Europe is one obvious example, but Ukraines difficulties with Russia also extend into issues that impact on the territorial integrity of the country. In the wake of the
67 The Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council was established soon after, bringing together members of the Ukrainian parliament with their counterparts in NATO member countries to discuss the parliamentary aspects of security cooperation.
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68 James Scherr, New Documents on Ukraines National Security Policy: A Sound Basis for Action? (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2003).
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69 NATO summit final communiqu Bucharest

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70 United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, December 18, 2008

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71 Frank Morgese, US-Ukrainian Security Cooperation 1993-2001: A Case History, US Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 2002)
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72 Dimitri Trenin, Russias Coercive Diplomacy (Carnegie Moscow Center, 2008).

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Russian-Georgian war of 2008, Ukrainian authorities became concerned about the activities of Russia in the Black Sea region. Those instances are only the most proximate demonstrations of Moscows intention to rebuild its sphere of influence across the region. Any one instance, be it violations of Baltic airspace, gas disputes engineered in the dead of winter, or issuing passports under dubious conditions, cannot be seen as a potential threat to Ukraines sovereignty. Yet, taken together they are more than enough to generate the need to bind itself to the only power that can balance Russia: the United States.

Conclusion It is asserted by proponents of soft balancing that the actions of the United States in the post-2001 era have generated a backlash that is inimical to long-term American interests. This may in fact be true to an extent; the US-led invasion of Iraq and the war on terror (or long war) has no doubt contributed to an rise in anti-American sentiment in parts of the world. Based on this observation, advocates of soft balancing have attempted to depict this as a seismic shift with considerable implications for the direction of international relations rather than the friction created by disagreements over specific policies. If this were truly a major shift, then it is difficult to explain why so many states built or deepened their security ties to the United States after 2001. As this article has shown, there is a more complex set of factors at work. Some states in the current environment may be engaged in soft balancing, but many states are also seeking to tie themselves to the United States in what can be termed soft bandwagoning. Soft bandwagoning does not necessarily mean a formal military alliance; it can be defined as a set of actions that facilitate the global reach of the US military while simultaneously increasing the security ties between the US and the country in question. A survey of the states that surround Russia and China shows that soft bandwagoning is far more prevalent that soft balancing. This pattern cuts across old alliances and new partnerships. India has broken a long-standing tradition of neutrality to form a closer security relationship with the United States, which is at least in part driven by its perception of a threat from a rising regional hegemon in the form of China. India is a major rising power itself and it would seem logical that it would seek to balance the hegemon by forming alliances with other secondtier powers. Japan is a long-standing ally of the United States that has sought to bolster its security ties to the United States in the post-2001 period. Once again, Japan should be a candidate for the club of soft balancers. As a major economic power emerging from the

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restriction placed on its international interests by WWII and the Cold War, it should be joined with others to balance the US. Ukraine as a post-Soviet republic has sought a closer security relationship with the United States, but it is only one example: virtually all of the European post-Soviet republics and Warsaw pact members have sought, or obtained, a closer security relationship with the United States in recent years. The reason for doing so are that there are potential regional hegemons, who are far more threatening to the states in question that any current exercise of American power in the international environment. Thus, the actions of the United States may be irritating at times to some states, but American hegemony is preferable to domination by the potential regional hegemons who are the somethings worse. States are more concerned about their immediate neighbors who can pose a territorial threat to their basic interests because, even in the information age, geography still matters.

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