Freeman Deliberative Dmcy (PPA 00)

Princeton University Press
Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment Author(s): Samuel Freeman Source: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 371-418 Published by: Blackwell Publishing Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2672831 . Accessed: 10/06/2011 13:44
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SAMUELFREEMAN
DeliberativeDemocracy: A SympatheticComment
As with many novel ideas in philosophy, accounts of deliberativedemocracyhave so proliferatedthat many wonder whether there is anything to the idea. But deliberativedemocracyhas become more than just another popular label that philosophers attach to different ideas (although this happens). Discussion also has gone beyond the point where what unites philosopherswho affirmthe idea is more than just their rejectionof some entrenched view. At this stage there are several fairlywell-defined areas of agreement (and disagreement) among the proponents of deliberative democracy.The aim of this essay is to discuss these, and to discuss the more distinctive arguments offered in support of a deliberativedemocracy.This is not a comprehensive review of the literaturenor even a critical review of the contents of the volumes under discussion. Rather,my purpose will be achieved if I can clarifysome of the main ideas and arguments that distinguish deliberativedemocracy from other conceptions.
The essay focuses on prominent themes discussed in two recent anthologies with the same title:DeliberativeDemocracy JamesBohmanandWilliam ed. Rehg(Cambridge, Mass.: MITPress,1997), referred here as 'DD1'; DeliberativeDemocracy ed. JonElster(Camto and bridge,England: Cambridge UniversityPress,1998), referred here as 'DD2'. to Also discussed MIT are themes developed in JuergenHabermas,Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: in Press,1996); JohnRawls,"TheIdea of PublicReasonRevisited," Rawls,CollectedPapers, ed. SamuelFreeman(Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress,1999); Amy Gutmannand and Dennis Thompson,Democracyand Disagreement (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1996).I am gratefulto Samuel Scheffler,ChrisKutz,and members of the GalaSeminarat Boalt LawSchool, UC Berkeley,and to SusanWolf,HenryRichardson,Doug McLeanand other members of the Philamoregroup,and to DavidEstlundand AmyGutmannforhelpful discussions of this essay. Thanks also to the editors of this journal for their editorial comments.
( 2000
by PrincetonUniversityPress.Philosophy& PublicAffairs29,
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IDEAL ADELIBERATIVE I. THE OF DEMOCRACY It is popularly assumed that democratic government involves free public debate and legislative procedures subject to the public scrutiny and criticism. J. S. Mill took an open legislative process subject to popular criticism to be one of the main advantages of a representative democracy.Within much contemporary analytical political theory, however, these assumptions do not hold. Democracy is often characterized as a procedure for making laws within which individuals who are counted equally register their preferences for competing alternatives, and outcomes are decided according to (bare) majority rule. Public discussion of measures under consideration is not essential to this conception of democracy;indeed public discussion does not even fit well with it. For characteristicof much analyticalpolitical theory is the assumption that individuals vote their private preferences and group interests and seek to maximize their individual utilities; in effect they act like economic agents removed to a differentforum.Whatpoint could there be in public discussion of their self-seeking and competing group purposes with others who have opposing interests?Itwould only encourage others to frustrate one's strategies and redouble their competitive efforts to gain limited political resources.Whereas discussions of particularpolitical aims might have a place behind the scenes, as a bargainingtool or in forming coalitions, they would not be to one's advantage within public debates open to all citizens. This indicates a second feature of the common sense conception of democracy. It is a convention of democracy to appeal to the common good. Few persons or political parties would openly admit in legislative debate that they advocate legislation that benefits some groups at the expense of other legitimate groups.While legislation with which we are familiaroften has these partialeffects, still those who advocate and support partialmeasures rarelyare able to admit it, even to themselves. Perhaps the conventional appeal to the common good is just a rhetorical flourish needed to keep in check the underlyingpolitical conflict of selfand group-interests.If so, then however important the appeal may be to maintaining civility,and however important it may be to participantsto believe they are acting in the public interest, the idea of the common good nonetheless would be irrelevantto explaining the substantive outcomes generated by democratic procedures.I do not think the common
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good is wholly ineffectual in this way, even in our politically barren era, where the pursuit of self-interest is celebrated as a virtue in some quarters and is even identified with what best promotes the common interest. Concern for the common good and other moral motivations of the kind not countenanced normally by the standard analytical model are still realforces in contemporarypolitical life, even when political parties have stunted views of the nature of the common good. Deliberativedemocracy is an idea that has attractedincreasing attention from philosophers and political and legal theorists over the past decade. The idea of a deliberative democracy focuses on, and captures to better effect than the standard analytical model, the intuitive givens of the commonsensical notion of democracy heretofore mentioned-free political discussion, open legislative deliberations,and pursuitof a common good. Still, knowing what we do about how democracy actually works under current conditions, it would be a mistake to try to explain legislators'and voters' actions simply in terms of what they publicly advocate and some idea of common interests. The idea of a deliberative democracy serves more as political ideal than as an explanatory concept. Forpolitical scientists, this may be reason enough to disregardthe idea. Forpolitical philosophers, the question remains of the feasibilityof this ideal and whether it can ever play a role in explaining political conduct. There is no settled and commonly accepted account of the central featuresof a deliberativedemocracy among political scientists and theorists. Accordingto one account, it simply involves discussion among the members of a group before voting.' For another,it is voting preceded by public discussions and communications intended to change peoples' in Most conceptions of democracy would be "deliberative" preferences.2 these respects. To provide a more precise account of the ideal of deliberative democracy, I'll begin by contrasting an alternative that pretty much captures the reigning analyticalconception. Accordingto this interest-based view (the "aggregative conception" as Joshua Cohen termed it in DD1, p. 411),democratic decision procedures are mechanisms for aggregating individuals' interests or preferi. See James Fearon, DD2, "Deliberation as Discussion," pp. 44-45.
Susan Stokes, DD2, "Pathologies of Deliberation," liberation and Ideological Domination," p. 140.
2.
p.
123;Adam Przeworski, DD2, "De-
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ences over alternative proposals (without taking into account their intensity). Citizens presumablyreflect on their individual and group interests and ascertainhow alternativeproposalsaffectthem;they then choose the proposal they believe most benefits them. Assuming that each person is to count as one, once a bare majorityfavors a proposal, then fairness demands that it carry the day according to the aggregativeview. Otherwise,to requiremore than a baremajorityis to assign greaterweight to the preferences and interests of a minority.It violates the "neutrality" condition on democratic choice: alternatives up for consideration, including those favoringthe status quo, should have an equal likelihood of success.3 To conceive of democracy this way is to see it as serving a role similar to economic markets. Democracy registers and responds to individual preferences-although not like the market,accordingto willingness and abilityto pay,but ratheraccordingto the greaternumber of persons having similar preferences. Theoreticallythere is nothing about the formal model of utility-maximizationoften used by aggregativeconceptions of democracythat would preventvoters from choosing and voting for measures that promote some conception of the common interest in preference to more particular interests they have. But whatever priority the common interest had would have to be decided by the intensity of peoples' preferences (or by their giving the common interest priorityin their ordinal rankings over alternatives).According to the utility-maximization conception of rationality,all preferences are to be put on a par (the completeness condition) and are assigned position and priorityaccordingto the intensity of underlyingdesire. Politicalmeasures that promote a common good have moral force then only to the degree that they emerge as the preferredchoice of a bare majority of voters. On this account there is nothing undemocratic about collective choices that benefit only the majorityat the expense of a minority.Indeed, according to
3. Whereasthe anonymitycondition says (in effect) that each person'svote is to count the same, the neutralitycondition says each proposal is to count the same. This follows from the allegedrequirementthat in democraticvoting no proposal is to be favored;there should be no presumptionin favorof the status quo. Any measure requiringmore than a the baremajorityviolates neutralitycondition.Onthis distinction,see KnightandJohnson, DDi, pp. 287-92. The effect of neutralityis to eliminate constitutional constraints (which requirespecial majorities)on voting. Givensuch momentous implications,the claim that neutralityis a requirementof democracy,relativelycommon among rationalchoice theorists,requiresfarmore argumentthan it is usually given.
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the aggregativeview, there is nothing undemocratic about the process when it consistently favors the private and group interests of an entrenched majority, and never offers as alternatives for consideration measures that promote everyone'sgood. In contrast to this and other aggregativeconceptions, the ideal of deliberativedemocracy says that in voting it is the role, perhaps the duty,of democratic citizens to express their impartial judgments of what conduces to the common good of all citizens, and not theirpersonal preferences based on judgments of how measures affect their individual or group interests. Citizens and legislators are to abstract from their personal and group-orientedpreferences (so far as this is possible) and vote impartiallyfor measures that, upon reflection, they sincerely judge are in the interest of every citizen. The idea of the common good is, of course, controversial.Some theorists deny that any political measure can be in everyone'sinterest.4The only sense to be made of the common good is the expression of the will of the majority.Taken to the limit, this position implies that even the most minimal accounts of the common good cannot provide a basis for social and political cooperation. (TakeHobbes'sview, for example, that whatever our differences, all have an interest in securing the conditions for "peaceand commodious living.")Underlyingthe rejection of a common good is the identification of a person'sgood with his or her revealed preferences or occurrent desires. It is probably true that, were a poll to be taken, no single end of any consequence would be desired by everyone in society, not even the absence of war.But whereas taking consumers' revealed preferences as given may work in economic theory, it has to many well-knownproblemswhen transferred ethics, political philosophy, and even normative economics.5 Revealedpreferences are not sufficient to specify an individual'sor a society'sgood. Tomake sense of a preference-basedaccount of a person's interests, it must at least be assumed that his or her preferences are adequately informed and rational to some degree. I will not consider further the position that conflict is so entrenched that nothing is in the common interest of the members of a society. Most discussions of democ4. See, for example, J. A. Schumpeter,Capitalism,Socialism, and Democracy 3rd ed.
(NewYork: Harper, 1950), chs.
21-23.
Fools:A Critiqueof the BehavioralFounda5. See, for example,AmartyaSen, "Rational

tions of Economic Theory," Philosophy& PublicAffairs 6 (1977):317-44
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racy,even by proponents of the aggregativeview, assume otherwise. The more important question for democratic theory then is, how are we to conceive of the common good? Is the common good simply such conditions as the rule of law and economic prosperity,which allow individuals the opportunity to pursue their private purposes? Or is it these conditions plus the availabilityof majoritarianprocedures for making laws? Oris some more substantial conception of the common good appropriate to a democracy? Rousseau notably contends that the role of democratic legislators is to vote, not their "privatewill"or particularinterests, but the will of the The general will aims for the common good. public, the "generalwill."6 ForRousseau the common good is not the same as the good of the majority;nor is it just any Paretoefficient measure that might benefit everyone. Instead, the common good is justice, which for Rousseau has its basis in the freedom and equality of each citizen; therein lies citizens' "greatest Rousseau sees the equal freedom and independence of good."7 each as a kind of basic interest that all have; being a free and independent person and possessing an equal status with like persons are essential to living a good life. For Rousseau, citizens are to vote their judgments regardingwhich measures are most conducive to the common good, understood as what is needed to maintain the freedom, equality, and independence of all citizens. The idea of citizens voting their common interest in maintaining their freedom and equal status as citizens is a central feature of the political ideal of deliberativedemocracy.These concepts requirefurther elucidation certainly if they are to be of any use to democratic legislators. But already we see a clear contrast between this ideal and the view.The common good, construed as the conditions needed aggregative to secure and maintain freedom, equality,and independence of citizens, is supposed to be the focal point of citizens' deliberations, which they are to reflect upon before making their collective decision. Turnnow to the idea of deliberation. A contrast is sometimes drawn between views that advocate voting one's preferences versus deliberating and making judgments (see Przeworski, DD2). But these are not mutually exclusive activities. Surelythe relevant distinction here is be6. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Bk. IV,ch. 7. See Rousseau, The Social Contract, Bk. II, ch. ii, par. i.
2,
par. 8.
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tween voting one's particularpreferences when informed by deliberative judgment about one's own good, versus voting one's impartialpreferences when informed by deliberative judgment about the common good. No reasonable conception of democracy would advise us to vote without thinking at all about how alternatives might affect relevant interests (whether our personal interests or the common interest). This would be irrational.In this regardwhat distinguishes deliberative from aggregativeconceptions is not deliberation per se, nor the fact that one involves voting but the other does not (contrastPrzeworski,DD2). Nor is it even that the deliberativeview involves discussion while the aggregative view does not. Even on the aggregativeview, voters can benefit by sharing information, being rational they would do so. Instead, the relevant distinctionbetween the two conceptions concerns the object aboutwhich citizens deliberate and vote and the kinds of reasons that they take into account in coming to their collective decision. Whereas an aggregative view counsels voting one's informed preferences regarding one's own good or partialgroup interests (except where furtherdeliberation is not worth the effort), deliberativedemocracy counsels voting one's deliberated judgments (or informed preferences) for the common good, where judgment is made on the basis of reasons and considerations that all can accept as democratic citizens. Integralto the idea of a deliberative democracy is then some idea of public reason. There are differentconceptions of public reason, and deciding which of these is appropriateis necessary to settling on an ideal of deliberativedemocracy. I address these issues in section III. So one reason deliberative democrats emphasize deliberation is so that citizens' judgments on laws and policies can be informed by considerationsthat all can reasonablyaccept in their capacity as democratic citizens. Here Rousseau might seem to suggest that, in orderto prevent voters' decisions from being swayed by eloquence and demagoguery, voters should decide on the basis of their individual deliberationswithout too much reliance on public debate.8 So far as Rousseau means to suggest here that communication and discussion among voters should be not be encouraged in a democracy,9deliberativedemocracy departs
8. "Butlong debates, dissensions, and tumult betoken the ascendance of privateinterests and the decline of the state."Rousseau, The Social Contract,BkIV,ch. 2. 9. JonElsterreadsRousseauin this way,in DD2, p. 14.
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from Rousseau on this point. What makes a democracy deliberativeis common public reasoning and argument by members of the body politic about ends of legislation and means needed to achieve them. The idea here is that of the demos deliberating,the sovereign People as a legally constituted body engaged in public reasoning and argument about laws requiredto realizejustice and the common good. Why public deliberation?One branch of the republican tradition, often called "civichumanism,"10says that essential to persons' good is that they actively participate in public political life, taking part in common deliberations about the civic good. Only by active participation in politics can individuals develop the virtues needed to be good citizens and good persons. This Aristotelian position often underlies the position known as "participatorydemocracy."It is a conception of democracy based in a philosophical account of intrinsic human goods, primary among which is participationin the public life of the polis. Advocates of deliberative democracy generally avoid this kind of argument. They do not argue that participation in democratic deliberation is an intrinsic good or that it is necessary for human flourishing or self-realization.The major proponents of deliberative democracy try to avoid any general, all-inclusive conception of value and of what gives life meaning. Both Habermasian discourse theories and Rawlsian accounts of deliberative democracy accept liberal pluralism, or the inevitability of diverse and partiallyconflicting conceptions of the good under conditions of freedom and equality.Wherethese two versions mainly differis in the kind of reasons they offer for deliberativedemocracy,and in their accounts of public reason. In the discourse theory of democracy, public deliberation is seen as essential to the discovery of truth about rational laws that best promote justice and the common good.11In Rawlsianaccounts (Rawlsand perhaps Joshua Cohen), no such epistemological claim is made about the need for public deliberation to dis10. "Civichumanism"is Rawls'sterm. He distinguishes it from "classicalrepublicanColumbiaUniversityPress,1993,paism."See JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism,(NewYork: perback ed. 1996), pp. 205-206. justificationsaredependent on argumentationactually 11.Oras Habermassays,"Moral
being carriedout, not for pragmaticreasons of an equalizationof power,but for internal "DisJuergen Habermas, reasons,namelythatrealargumentmakesmoralinsightpossible."
course Ethics," in Moral Consciousness and CommunicativeAction (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1990)p. 57. See also p. 68, directedagainst Rawls.See also Between Facts and Norms,pps.
147, 151.
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coverthe truth about the common good. Rather,deliberativedemocracy is a moral requirement of political legitimacy and perhaps of political justice: To be just, political institutions should work for the good of all, whereas to be legitimate they should be justifiable to all on the basis of reasons that all can reasonablyaccept as democratic citizens.'2(Moreon these matters in sections II and III.) Advocates of deliberativedemocracy normally emphasize the significance of widespread agreement on laws and policies. For reasons to be discussed later,reasoned consensus about the laws and policies required by justice and the common good is an ideal to which democratic deliberation should aspire.Hereit is important to indicate what kind of agreement deliberativetheorists have in mind. Deliberativedemocracyis normally conceived as a model of deliberation that legislative and other decision-making bodies are to emulate (see discussion of Cohen below). The model is a normative ideal that procedures should attempt to approximate as closely as possible. As a model for decision making, it is to be distinguished from the theoretical construct of hypothetical agreement that typifies contractariantheory. Hypothetical agreements (such as the original position, or ideal speech situations) contain conditions that are not realizablein the world.Althoughtwo of the major advocates of deliberative democracy (Habermasand Rawls) employ hypothetical agreements, the construct is not necessary to deliberative democracy. Many proponents of deliberative democracy do not explicitly advocate contractarianagreementto justifyor applytheir democraticmodels (e.g., Sunstein, Cohen, Gutmann and Thompson). They leave open then the question of how to decide objective standards by which to assess the justice of laws and policies concluded within a deliberativedemocracy. The constructof hypotheticalagreementfor Rawlsand Habermasprovides a criterion for determining and justifying moral principles of justice and just laws and institutions. According to Rawls, ultimately the appeal would be to hypothetical agreement (in the originalposition and at the constitutional stage) to justify deliberative democracy itself. (For Habermas,it is less clearwhether the ideal speech situation is needed to justify deliberativedemocracy;see later the discussion of Michelman in
PoliticalLiberalism, principleof legitimacy." 12. Rawlscalls this requirement the "liberal of p. 137.Cohen relies on a similarprinciplehe calls the "principle deliberativeinclusion." See DD2, p. 203.
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DD1 on the problem of infinite regress.) It may also be that democratic citizens, in their deliberations, might need to appeal to the principles and procedures that would be agreed to under hypothetical conditions by free and equal, fully rationalbeings to come to a decision on laws and policies. (Habermasseems to envision citizens arguingabout what would be agreedto underhypotheticaldiscourseconditions.)Onthe otherhand, it may be that democratic deliberationis not the properforum for applying philosophical reasoning of the highly abstractkind needed to decide what would be agreed to under hypothetical conditions. (Rawlsseems less sanguine than Habermas about the prospects of legislators and judges applying philosophical abstractions such as the original position.13)
Whatmatters most for deliberativetheorists then is not hypothetical, but actual deliberation and agreement among free and equal citizens under the realized ideal conditions of deliberative democracy.This is a necessary (if not also sufficient) condition for the legitimacy of laws and the proper exercise of political power. (Whetherit is necessary or sufficient to the justice of laws and policies is a separate issue.) Proponents of deliberativedemocracynormallymaintainthat,whereas decisions that satisfy the conditions of a deliberative democracy are more likely to be just, they may not be. Deliberativedemocracy is an imperfect procedure with respect to justice and the common good.14 (Habermas,we will later see, claims that deliberation is the best method, perhaps even a necessary method, to discover what is called for by justice and the common good; deliberativedemocracy'sdecisions, if not necessarily just, are still beyond criticism except on the grounds of other deliberativedecisions.) Anotherfeaturecharacteristicof deliberativeviews is the idea that citizens can and should be morally motivated by justice or the common good and have a willingness to abide by (perhaps even participate in) democratic decisions regardingthese values. Proponents of the deliberative ideal assume that citizens can be moved by such motives as a concern for reciprocity and a desire to justify laws and institutions to others on terms they can accept (Gutmannand Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, p. 53);or by a sense of justice and willingness to coor operate with others on fairterms for their own sake (Rawls); by a comp. must not ask too much of a philosophicalview."PoliticalLiberalism, 368. 13. "We 14.See, forexample,GutmannandThompson, DemocracyandDisagreement,p. 368,n. 34.
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mitment to deliberativeinstitutions and norms arrivedat through deliberation (Cohen, DD1,p. 72); or by a commitment to reciprocityand public reason-giving (Michelman,DD1,p. 149),and so on. These are not accounts of the motivations of citizens in existing democracies but are motivations citizens generally must have if the ideal of a deliberative democracy is to be feasible. Regardingcitizens who have no such political motivations, or who might even reject deliberativeresolutions, they are an impediment to a deliberativedemocracy. Finally,deliberativetheorists take a more expansive view of the political and social conditions of democracy than do other conceptions. Democracy is often depicted simply as a political procedure providing for universal franchise with equal rights to vote and hold political offices, and where decisions are made accordingto majorityrule. Otherpolitical rights are normally recognized as necessary to establish and maintain this procedure:freedom of (political) speech, freedom of the press, the rightto form and join political parties,freedom of assembly and the right to present grievances,and perhaps even certainanti-discriminationmeasures that protect the social and political status of "entrenchedminorities."'5 other than these "procedural" But measures, there are no further constitutional restrictions on the substantive outcomes of duly constituted democraticprocedures.Deliberativeconceptions by contrasttypically prescribe certain substantive rights and institutional requirements in addition to proceduralrights:freedom of religion and of nonpolitical as well as political expression;freedom of association and a right of privacy in one's personal relations; freedom of occupation and adequate and fairwork and educational opportunities of which citizens can take advantage;adequate health care for all, and economic rights sufficient to establish individualindependence. Moreover,public financing of political campaigns and public provision of arenas for free expression of political views are among the institutions recommended to ensure that the political process is not controlled by concentrated group or wealthy interests. Stringent social as well as political conditions are said to be necessary if citizens are to achieve a status as political equals who are free; moreover, these social conditions must be in place if democratic citizens are to be in a position to discern and vote the common good.
15.See John Ely'sproceduralaccount of democracyand judicial review in Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress,1984),for a good example.
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(Cf. Cohen, DD1 and DD2; Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, chs. 6-9) To conclude this outline, I state the primaryfeatures of the political ideal of deliberativedemocracy to which I have alluded so far: Conceived as an ideal of political relations, a deliberativedemocracy is one in which political agents or their representatives (a) aim to collectively deliberate and vote (b) their sincere and informed judgments regarding (c) measures conducive to the common good of citizens. (d) Political agents are seen and see one another as democratic citizens who are politically free and equal participants in civic life. (e) A background of constitutional rights and all-purpose social means enable citizens to take advantageof their opportunities to participatein public life. (f) Citizens are individuallyfree in that they have their own freely determined conceptions of the good, and these conceptions are publicly seen as legitimate even though they are independent of political purposes. Moreover, (g) free citizens have diverse and incongruous conceptions of the good, which are constitutionally protected by basic rights. Because of this diversity (h) citizens recognize a duty in their public political deliberations to cite public reasons-considerations that all reasonable citizens can accept in their capacity as democratic citizens-and to avoid public argumenton the basis of reasons peculiarto theirparticularmoral, religious, and philosophical views and incompatible with public reason. (i) What makes these reasons public is that they are related to and in some way advance the common interests of citizens. (j)Primaryamong the common interests of citizens are their freedom, independence, and equal civic status. The main advocates of deliberative democracy (Habermas, Rawls, JoshuaCohen, Michelman,Sunstein,Gutmann,Thompson, and Estlund, among others)would endorse, I believe, most if not all of these features.'6 They primarily differ in the justifications they give for deliberative democracy and in the conceptions of public reasons that are suitable for democratic debate and justification, and in a few other ways. I turn now to these issues.
16.Forexample,Michelmansets forthseveralfeaturesof deliberativeness-"basic rights "motivational... feaof free and equal persons,""commitmentto public reason-giving," of and "expectations sincerity," so ontures such as public-spiritednessand reciprocity," which fit with the account above.See DDi, p. 149.Cohen'smodel of deliberativedemocracy is discussed later.
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II.ARGUMENTS DELIBERATIVE FOR DEMOCRACY Different reasons and arguments are given for deliberative democracy, and proponents usually relyon more than one of these. Manyarguments develop familiarlines of thought within democratic theory.Proponents of deliberativedemocracy often invoke the Millianargumentthat deliberation on laws leads to more rational and informed decisions, because free discussion and open debate allow relevant information to be distributed, mistaken reasoning to be exposed, and all the reasons for and against laws to be debated and considered.'7A second line of argument says that because democracycombines equal participationwith free and open debate and criticism, the points of view of all sides are expressed, and everyone'sinterests are considered. It is less likely then that the basic rights of minorities or individualswill be infringed upon or their fundamental interests ignored, particularlywhen citizens are called upon to reflect on the common good.'8Deliberation is also said to contribute to the legitimacy of decisions, because citizens who lose out in the resolution of competing claims are more likelyto accept the decision when it is adopted after careful consideration of the relevant merits of competing moral claims for resources.'9 Another kind of argument, also from J. S. Mill, is that public deliberation in a democracy tempers self-interest and broadens people's interests and concerns, because it requiresthem to consider interests other than their own and make principled arguments for their positions. (Elster, Gambetta, DD2, pp. 104, 23.) Having to
deliberatewith others and give reasons acceptable to them inclines citizens to take into account others' points of view and thereby extends people'simaginationsand empathy (Goodin)or engages theirmoral sentiments (Rawls) .20
An 17.See Diego Gambetta,DD2, "Claro! Essayon DiscursiveMachismo,"at p. 22. This which accountof "contestatory democracy," kindof argument seems implicitin PhilipPettit's is, he says, deliberativebecause, unlike interest-grouppluralism,it focuses on matters of common concern."[T]hepoint is to createa testing environmentof selection forthe laws."
See Philip Pettit, Republicanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) pp. 277-79,189,192.
University Harvard 18.Both Pettit (ibid.)and Rawlsin A Theoryof Justice (Cambridge: Press,1971; rev.ed.) relyon this argument.Tom Christianoin DD1does also, although 1999 he is mostly criticalof deliberativeviews.
19. Gutmann and Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement, pp. 41-42. DeliberationWithin," Philosophy& PublicAffairs 20. See RobertGoodin,"Democratic 29 (2000): 81-log; Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (rev. ed.), pp. 205-206; see also Gutmann and Thompson, Democracyand Disagreement,p. 42.
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Finally,an argument from autonomy says that democratic deliberation encourages people to reflecton theirpreferencesand providesthem with information that can lead them to alter their values and positions. Because of political reflection, people are not simply governed by given preferences formed as a result of their subconscious adaptation to existing circumstances.Theirjudgments are then more rational and citizens as a result are made more free. Cass Sunstein argues that "the central idea of deliberativedemocracy"is founded on autonomy, or the free and reflective process of preference formation. "Politicalautonomy can be found in collective self-determination, as citizens decide, not what they 'want,'but instead who they are-what their values are and what those
values require. "21
Ratherthan discussing these more familiar arguments, as important as they are, in further detail, the primary focus of this section will be three more distinctive argumentsfor deliberativedemocracy.The firstof these might be seen as a version of the first argument mentioned above, but given its association with Rousseau, as well as the attention it has gained from deliberativetheorists, it deserves special attention.
1. EpistemicArguments
Deliberativedemocracy assumes that there is a public good about which citizens can reason and about which they can be right or wrong. One of the main argumentsfor deliberativedemocracyemphasizes its epistemic Common deliberationis said to be a regulativeideal for demoreliability. craticpolitics because democraticdeliberationand agreementis the best (if not the only) means we have for ascertaining truth about the common good and laws that best promote it. JuergenHabermas relies on a "22 strong epistemic thesis to support a "discursivedemocracy. Because "Lawsrequirethe justified assent of all,"majorityrule is justified only in so far as democracy involves equal participation by all in a "searchfor
21.
HarvardUniversityPress, See Cass Sunstein, ThePartialConstitution(Cambridge:
1993), p. 178. In general, see Sunstein, ch. 6, also pp. 133-55. See also Joshua Cohen in DD1,
Pp.77-79. 22. Habermasalso relies on a "strong normativeview,"(Michelman,DDi, p. 162) involving considerationsof autonomy and political self-rule.
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truth."23 discover the truth about justice and the common good, parTo ticipants in democratic deliberations are to make "referenceto an ideal audience or an ideally inclusive community" and ascertain what they would agree to under hypothetical conditions of ideal democratic discourse.24 Some have noted a resemblancebetween Habermas's ideal communication situations and Rawls's hypothetical agreement. But Habermashas long insisted, against Rawls,that what would be agreedto under hypothetical conditions is not accessible to the moralphilosopher or individualthinker"ina strictlymonological form."25 "Real discourses" among existing communities of free and equal persons are needed to discover what would be agreed to under hypothetical conditions.26 Habermas claims that it is only by carrying out actual deliberation among equals in situations that approximate ideal discourse as closely as is realisticallypossible that we can discover what would be agreed to under hypothetical conditions of ideal discourse. To support this claim, Habermas seems to hold that actual deliberation among equals is necessary because otherwise it is not possible for individualthinkersto take into account and fully empathize with the situations, judgments, and interests of all affected by laws and other norms.27 This argumentwould be more convincing if democratic deliberation were aimed at discover23.
Habermas,"Popular Sovereignty Procedure," DDi, p. 47;also in Habermas,Beas in
tween Fact and Norm, pp. 474-75. 24. Habermas,Between Facts and Norms, p. 286. See pp. 322-23, where Habermasis
clearerthan usual that deliberativepolitics involves a "thoughtexperiment,"undertaken by a "real communicationcommunity," where it reflectson what would be agreedto within an "idealcommunication community."In this hypothetical community citizens are presumed to have equal powers of reasoningand attentiveness,full knowledgeof relevantinformation,an absence of egocentrism, self-deception and weakness of will, and an equal willingness for mutual understanding.(p.325). 25. See Habermas, "Discourse Ethics," MoralConsciousnessand CommunicativeAcin
tion, p. 68. 26. See the essaysin Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Comm unicativeAction, where this point is frequentlyemphasized, at pp. 57, 67, 68, 94, 211. AgainstRawls'sprinciples of
justice,Habermassays:'Allcontents, no matterhow fundamentalthe action norminvolved may be, must be made to depend on real discourses."(p. 94). In a strong statement of the epistemic need forjoint deliberation,Habermassays, "Moral justificationsare dependent on argumentationactuallybeing carriedout, not for pragmaticreasons of an equalization of power, but for internal reasons, namely that real argumentmakes moral insight possible."(p. 57). 27. Habermas,Between Facts and Norms, p. 450. Michelman discusses this feature of
Habermas's view in DDi, pp. 160-61, 165.
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ing a common good that is responsive to people'soccurrentinterests and circumstances. But for Habermas, deliberation is to be about rational interestsand needs and the judgments of hypotheticalpersons and aimed at discovering what would be agreed to among such fully rational and informed, morallymotivated,free and equal persons in ideal speech situations (Between Fact and Norm, p. 286). Empathywith existing citizens' currentsituations and interestswould not seem to be necessary for these purposes. It could even be distracting. A differentargument for the epistemic necessity of democratic deliberation invokes Condorcet'sso-called "jurytheorem." Rousseau is often said to have relied on this.28The jury theorem says that when a group faces a choice between two alternatives,and each member of the group has better than an equal likelihood of choosing the correct alternative (accordingto some independent standard),then a majorityis more likely than a minority to make the correctchoice, with a probabilityapproaching 1 of their being correct in very large groups.29 Certainfavorableconditions must hold for the theorem to apply: for example, voters' judgments must be adequately informed;also, voters need to abstractthemselves from their individual interests, conscientiously reflect on, and impartiallyvote their judgment of the common good. Moreover,they must formjudgments about the merits of legislationindependentlywithout blindly deferringto the opinions of others. Otherwise the biased or mistakenjudgments of a small number of people can distort the process of discerning measures for the common good. The main objection to the jury theorem is that it is unrealistic if not impossible to realizein the realworld. Some say that many voters simply are not likely to judge justice and the common good correctlymuch of the time.30Others argue that voters do not form their judgments independently; indeed, it is not even clearwhat it would mean for them to do so.31Also, it is especially peculiar to invoke the jury theorem with its independence requirementas a justification for a deliberativedemocracy,
28. See B. Grofmanand S. Feld, "Rousseau's GeneralWill: CondorcetianPerspective," A American Political Science Review82, no. 2 (1988), pp. 567-76. 29. See Estlund,DD1,pp. 185-9o and p. 202, n. 21, for a discussion of the jurytheorem. Harvard 30. See RonaldDworkin,SovereignVirtue(Cambridge: UniversityPress,2000), p. 207. JeremyWaldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
notes that Condorcethimself was skeptical about averageindividual compePress,1999) tence, especiallyin large assemblies (p. 32). Consensus and Equalityin Collec31. See, for example,Thomas Christiano,"Freedom,
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because the point of common deliberation is to mutually influence one another'sjudgments. In reply it can be said that independence does not rule out common deliberation and discussion. Rather,it requires coming to one's own reasoned judgment once all the arguments have been made, after critically reflecting on the reasons, and avoiding the influence of emotional appeals and uncriticalacceptance of others'positions because of their rhetoric or status.32 David Estlund argues for a more moderate epistemic view than that of Habermas or Rousseau.33 The problem with strong epistemic views, especially those that rely on the jury theorem (the "Correctness Theory" he attributes to Rousseau), is their implication that democratic legitimacy rests solely on the correctness of democratic decisions. So far as one votes in the minority,one must either believe a democratic decision is wrong and not legitimate, or concede one's error,thereby deferring not just one's conduct but also one's judgment to the democratic process. Neither alternativeis attractiveor fitting, Estlundcontends, from a democratic or moral perspective. Moreover,strong epistemic views imply that if there were some procedure other than democratic deliberation among equals that more reliablydiscovered the common good (decision by a council made up of moral experts and economists, for example), then this would be the preferredpolitical procedure for making laws. It seems peculiar to attribute to Rousseau the position that democracy is justified only in so far as it accuratelydiscerns the truth. Reasons of autonomy ("moral were paramountin Rousseau'sargument freedom") for democracy,and even if a feature of autonomy is accuratelydiscerning and acting from the GeneralWill, it puts the emphasis in the wrong place to say that democracy for Rousseau is justified only for epistemic reasons.34 Still,Estlundrightlypoints out the perils of a deliberativeconthat relies solely on epistemic arguments. He proposes a more ception
Ethicslol (October tive Decision Making," 1ggo): 151-81,for a criticismof the theorem'sapof contribution DD1,"TheSignificance Public to See plicationto democracy. also Christiano's
Deliberation," pp. 271-73 and 277, n. 25. 32. Thanksto MatthewRisse for this suggestion. For a differentaccount of how inde-
Leaders, Independence,and Condorcet's pendence is satisfied,see DavidEstlund,"Opinion JuryTheorem,"Theory and Decision 36 no. 2 (1994):131-62. and The Fairness Deliberation: EpistemicDimensionof Demo33.Estlund,DDi,"Beyond
cratic Authority," pp. 173-204.
autonomyis civicautonomy. 34.Thisis especiallyso if a furtherconditionof Rousseauian
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which emphamoderate epistemic account, "Epistemic Proceduralism," sizes the moral reasons for equal participation in government (such as fairness and equal respect for one another as citizens) while preserving the epistemic role of deliberation and voting.35 Democratic procedures do not have to be correct all the time or even more often than all other procedures. Instead, because of their moral properties, and assuming that majority decisions are correct more often than not, then there are reasons to respect good faith democratic decisions as legitimate, even when (one believes) they do not correctlyor optimallypromote the common good (within certain limits of injustice, one should add, cf. Estlund,
DD1, p. 188).
Estlund'sview seems right. Even if there were a moral savant whose judgments approximated substantive justice more often than those of some majorityof sincere and conscientious citizens, we should not give this person ultimate political power (althoughcertainlyhe or she should be given an advisoryrole). Proceduralviews emphasize fairnessof democratic procedures, whereas epistemic views emphasize substantive justice of outcomes. A pure procedural conception of democracy has no standard independent of the voting procedure itself to determine the justice of outcomes.36A pure epistemic conception says that justice is entirelyindependent of procedures for deciding what is just, so that the procedure that best approximates substantive justice is itself right (legitimate or just). Estlund rightly seeks to avoid either extreme. (Michelman,Cohen, and apparentlyHabermas do, too, among others). There are moral properties inherent in a process of democratic decision making among equals-fairness, equal recognition and respect, civic autonomy, and self-governancebeing among those frequentlycited-so that any constitution which denies competent members equal participation in democraticlawmakingproceduresis neitherlegitimatenor fully
Thiswould mean autonomyis necessarilysocial:it requiresactingon the GeneralWill only as ascertainedthroughdemocraticdeliberationin which one participatesas equal citizen. It is only in one'scapacityas equal citizen that one gives the law to oneself. 35. Estlund'saccount resembles in many respects CharlesBeitz'saccount of "Complex Proceduralism" his PoliticalEquality(Princeton: in PrincetonUniversityPress,1989), ch. 5. 36. I use the terms "pure proceduralconception of democracy"in Rawls's sense of pure proceduraljustice. It is the view that, so long as all democraticprocedures are complied with, then whatever the outcome, it is just. David Estlund distinguishes between pure proceduralismwith respect to justice and with respect to legitimacy.He says his own view is purelyproceduralwith respect to legitimacy,but not justice. See Estlund,DDi.
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just. These moral reasons are in addition to the traditional liberal reasons for democracy (emphasizedby Christiano,DD1),namely that democratic procedures are more likely to promote just outcomes and protect individual rights. 2. DeliberativeDemocracyas a Fundamental MoralIdeal A second distinctive approach is Joshua Cohen's argument that deliberative democracy is a basic moral ideal that engages our moral judgments and sentiments.37Cohen cites three features of a "well-ordered democracy"implicit in Rawls's idea of a well-orderedsociety.First,a wellordered democracy involves public debate on the common good; second, it ensures the fair value of equal political liberties and "manifests equality"in public institutions; third, it provides a basis for self-respect and the development and exercise of citizens' sense of justice. Cohen claims, againstRawls,that instead of being derivativeideas based in more fundamental notions of fairness or equal respect, these three features are part of "anindependent and expresslypolitical ideal that is focused in the first instance on the appropriate conduct of public affairs-on, that is, the appropriateway of arrivingat collective decisions" (DD1,p. 71).I understand this to mean that there is a political ideal of democracy as a deliberative undertaking among equals that is as fundamental to our moral awareness (among our "considered moral convictions" in Rawls's sense), as arethe ideas of fairnessand equal respect for persons.38 Wesharethis intuitive ideal in the same way that we (accordingto Rawls) share the political ideal of a well-ordered society. Indeed, Cohen'sargument implies that the latterideal may even be derivativefrom the democraticideal.He aims to elucidatethe ideal of deliberativedemocracywithout relying upon a more abstract conception (such as Rawls'soriginal position) or on substantive principles of justice.
37. "Deliberation DemocraticLegitimacy," DDi, pp. 67-92. and in 38. "Thenotion of a deliberativedemocracyis rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democraticassociationin which the justificationof the terms and conditions of association proceeds through public argumentand reasoning among equal citizens. Citizensin such an ordershare a commitment to the resolutionof problems of collective choice throughpublic reasoning,and regardtheir basic institutions as legitimate insofaras they establish the frameworkfor free public deliberation." Cohen, DDi, p. 72.
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At this point Cohen's account shows the (admitted) influence of Habermas (Cohen,DD1,p. 88, n. 12).Beginningwith an ideal of deliberation as a public activity of justification among equals, Cohen asks, what conditions "makedeliberation possible" (p. 79). His elucidation begins with a "formalconception of a deliberativedemocracy." Formally,deliberativedemocracy is (Di) an ongoing and independent association, (D2) whose basis of legitimacy is free deliberation among equals; (D3) it is pluralistic:its members have different conceptions of their good; (D4) decisions both are and are publicly known to be the result of common deliberation;and (D5) participants recognize one another as having the deliberative and motivational capacities needed to realize the ideal. At the second stage, Cohen sets forth an "ideal deliberative procedure"to give substantive content to this formal conception. (I1)Ideal deliberation is free in so far as (a) it is not constrained by prior norms, and (b) participants take the conclusions of deliberation to provide sufficient reason to act (a motivational assumption). (12)Deliberationis reasoned, since only justification by the better argument underlies decisions. (13) Partiesare both formallyand substantively equal, to the degree that distribution of resources does not play a causal role affecting deliberation. (14)Deliberation aims for a rationallymotivated consensus, to find reasons acceptable to all who are committed to acting on the results of free and reasoned deliberation by equals. These features of ideal deliberation imply two generalizations about the object of democratic decision. First, deliberation naturallyfocuses on the common good, because the aim of deliberationis to secure agreement among all (DD1,p. 75). Second, ideal deliberation respects citizens' autonomy, because it encourages the exercise of their deliberative capacities and the formation of preferences as a result of deliberation. The role of Cohen'sideal deliberativeprocedure is to provide"amodel [institutions]should mirror,so faras possible"(DD1,p. 79). It differsfrom Rawls's hypothetical social contract,which is not a model forinstitutions, but a "thought experiment" (Rawls)that aims to provide principles of justice that are to apply to institutions. Cohen then does not aim to describe a hypothetical procedure that justifies substantive principles of justice and the common good to regulate the deliberations of a democracy. Rather,he describes an ideal procedure that democratic institutions are to emulate as a pattern for deliberating about justice and the
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Deliberative Democracy:
A SympatheticComment
common good. He seeks to set forth the conditions for the possibility of this ideal (DD1,p. 79). In this regard Cohen'sdeliberative ideal resembles Habermas'sview (so far as Habermas too aims to set forth a model for "ideal discourse" and the conditions of its possibility). But does Cohen also follow Habermas in holding (1)that his procedure is not to be regulatedby external principles of justice, and (2) the properway to discover the laws in which the ideal procedure results is not by individual deliberation, but by actually engaging in the procedure under real-worldconditions that emulate the ideal?Points (1)and (2) are part of what Habermasmeans by It "proceduralism." appearsthat Cohen at least endorses point (1),for his condition I1says that ideal deliberation is free in so far as "consideration of proposals is not constrained by the authority of prior norms or requirements"(DD1,p. 74).39 The apparentlack of antecedent substantive principles to regulatethe deliberations of democratic citizens does not mean that Cohen makes no provision for them. The conditions of the possibility of democratic deliberation (as specified by the ideal, 11-14)have substantive implications. Substantiverightsand liberties along with opportunities and egalitarian social institutions must be in place to make democratic deliberation possible. Cohen contends that a condition of deliberation among equals is that democratic citizens be guaranteed certain "non-political" liberties more commonly associated with liberalism.These liberties are in addition to the traditionalpolitical rights that ensure equal consideration and rational and informed inputs to deliberation (such as equal rights of participation and freedom of political expression and assembly).40Moreover,a condition of deliberation (13)is that citizens have access to resources that are adequate to render each citizen politically independent of the influence of power-relations. This provides grounds for a "politicalminimum," or sufficient income to render citizens inde39. Whether Cohen also endorses (2), the epistemic branch of Habermas's "proceduralism," less clear.NeitherHabermasnor Cohenseem to endorse a furtherconis dition, that just laws are simply whateverlaws would result from what is agreedto in any ideal procedure(assumingall its backgroundconditions aremet) realizedin the realworld. See section IVfor furtherdiscussion. 40. Cohen says, "The[basic]liberties are not simply among the topics for deliberation; that makes it possible."DDi, p. 84. they help to comprise the framework
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pendent so that rights of political participation can be effectively exercised.41By arguingthat such rights are a condition of democratic deliberation, Cohen provides a place for many of the rights, opportunities, and institutions covered by liberal conceptions of justice. prinThe implicationis that,while there areno (so to speak)"external" ciples or constraints (such as an independent conception of justice or of value) to limit the deliberativefreedom of democratic citizens (see condition I(i)), there are still many conditions "internal" deliberativedeto mocracy that regulatetheir deliberations on the common good; namely, the rights, liberties, powers, opportunities, and egalitarian social institutions that must be in place if democratic deliberation among equal citizens is to be possible. It helps to see this aspect of Cohen'sview in light of later papers in which he discusses the role of public reason in deliberation (also in DD1 and DD2). These later discussions imply that, so long as democratic citizens rely on public reasons, then their deliberations are free and not subject to the constraints or authorityof norms that are prior to democratic deliberation itself (more on this later). One question needing furtherclarificationis how Cohen sees the relationship between decisions that resultfrom ideal democratic deliberation and justice. The title of Cohen's article ("Deliberationand Democratic Legitimacy")suggests that deliberative democracy is a condition of political legitimacy. But in denying that ideal deliberation is constrained by antecedent principles, how does Cohen avoid the inference that democratic procedures, when fully complied with, necessarily result in just outcomes? Not only Rawls,but apparentlyeven Habermas, reject this position.42Even on Habermas'spurportedly "proceduralist" account, while "realdiscourses"are the only reliablemeans of access to what would be agreedto under theoretical conditions of ideal discourse, still any actual agreement, no matter how closely its conditions approxiSocialPhipaper,"TheEconomicBasisof DeliberativeDemocracy," 41.See here Cohen's losophyandPolicy612 (1988):25-50. 42. For Rawlsno actual political procedure satisfies pure proceduraljustice, for there sequence," by are external standardsof justice, provided by his hypothetical "four-stage which to assess the decisions of actualdeliberations.Habermasseems to endorse a similar sort of viewwhen he says,for example,that the participantsin democraticdeliberationare presumablyto to to make"reference an ideal audience or an ideallyinclusive community," ascertainwhat theywould agreeto undertheirhypotheticalconditions.BetweenFactsand Norms, p. 286, see also pp. 322-23, 325, discussed in note 24 above. I assume this provides an epistemic standardof justice for actual democraticdeliberation.
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mate the theoretical ideal, can depart from this hypothetical situation. Cohen'smodel of democratic deliberation does not appear to incorporate any such hypothetical standardor other means that determines the validityof actual deliberateddecisions. So it is not clearwhether his view resembles more Rawls'saccount, or Habermas'saccount, or whether he adopts a third "purelyprocedural"way which says that real decisions resulting from actual deliberation that closely matches the deliberative ideal are not only democraticallylegitimate but also necessarily just. If not (and I suspect not), and Cohen recognizes an independent criterion of justice that applies to the outcomes of any actual decision procedure, then what becomes of his condition (Ih)regardingthe independence of In deliberativedemocracy from prior standards of authority?43 his later papers (DD1and DD2), Cohen is clearer about the distinction between proceduralversus substantive conceptions of democracy and clearlyrejects a proceduralview.The implication is that while justice itself requires a deliberative democracy, still democratic decisions can be legitimate (so far as they accord with the deliberative ideal) without being always just.44 3. Public Reasonand DemocraticLegitimacy The third distinctive argument for deliberativedemocracy relies on the idea of public reason. It has long been argued that democracy encourages not only informed political decisions, but also conciliation, fairness, and taking up others' points of view, because grievances are aired and proposals are debated in the hopes of convincing others of their soundness or desirability.45Because of the publicity of democratic proceed43. Forexample,suppose citizens under ideal deliberativeconditions decide that once the politicalminimum and public goods are satisfied,income and wealth areto be distributed by market exchanges and free gifts, or, alternatively,so as to satisfy average utility requirements.Arethere democraticgrounds for criticizingthese decisions on grounds of justice or legitimacy? 44. See Thomas Christiano,"TheSignificanceof Public Deliberation," DDi, pp. 243-78, for a thoughtful discussion of public deliberationand, at 262ff., a criticism of Cohen. He argues Cohen is liable to incoherence because of his position that ideal deliberativeoutIf comes are "politically justified." Christianomeans that for Cohen deliberativeoutcomes arenot only legitimatebut also just, I hesitate to attributethis position to Cohen, although admittedlyhis earlierpaper in DDi is ambiguous. 45. See WilliamNelson'sdiscussion and elaborationof J.S. Millin JustifyingDemocracy
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ings, there are already pragmatic reasons for making proposals and arguments in terms that others of differentpersuasions and interests can accept. But Kantians, contractualists, and political liberals claim that there is an independent moral requirementthat citizens should be given reasons they can accept in their capacity as free and equal citizens, because this expresses mutual respect and public recognition of them as equals and as free.46 That institutional principles be justifiable in terms acceptable to free and equal citizens is said to be a condition of their political autonomy.47 is also said to be a requirementof political legitiIt macy that the exercise of political power be justifiable according to considerations all can reasonably accept as democratic citizens.48What makes a democracy deliberative is that its discussions and judgments on laws proceed accordingto these "publicreasons"(Cohen,DD1,p. 413). Joshua Cohen, in two other essays, appeals to the idea of public reason to reviseand furtherdevelop his account of deliberativedemocracy.49 Cohen says that what primarily distinguishes the deliberative from
(London:Routledge,1980). See also Christianoin DDi, and CharlesBeitz, PoliticalEquality,pp. 113-16, on how the openness of democraticprocedurespromotes responsible deliberationmore likelyto reach substantivelyjust results. 46. "Therequirementof providingacceptablereasons forthe exerciseof politicalpower to those who are governedby it ... expresses the equal membership of all in the sovereign politicalbody responsible for authorizingthe exercise of that power." JoshuaCohen, DDi, "Procedure and Substance in DeliberativeDemocracy," 407-37, at 416. In Democracy pp. and Disagreement,Gutmannand Thompson say,"reciprocity," seeking and giving"muor tuallyjustifiablereasons expressesthe core of the process of deliberation," 52-53),and (pp. "prescribes accommodationbased on mutual respect."(p. 56). 47. On the relationshipbetween "fullpublicity"and political autonomy,see Rawls,Political Liberalism, 66-81,and the earlier1980Dewey Lectures,"Kantian pp. Constructivism in MoralTheory," Rawls,CollectedPapers,ch. 16. 48. ForRawls,the requirementthat laws and policies be justifiablein terms of public reasons follows from a "liberalprinciple of legitimacy," which requiresthat for political power to be "proper" (Rawlsseems to mean bothjust and legitimate),it must be exercised in accordance with a constitution, the essentials of which all reasonable citizens as free and equal might reasonablybe expected to endorse, in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as both reasonableand rational.(See PoliticalLiberalism, 137,217, pp. 393)Thisimplies a "duty civility" justifycoercivepoliticalaction in terms of the "politiof to cal values of public reason."(PoliticalLiberalism, 217)ForRawlsthis duty underwritesa p. democracythat is not simply constitutional,but also "deliberative." PoliticalLiberalSee ism, p. lix (1996paperbacked.):"Theideal of public reason contains a formof public political deliberation.... A belief in the importance of public deliberationis essential for a reasonable constitutionalregime." and 49.Cohen,DDi, "Procedure Substancein Deliberative and Democracy," Cohen,DD2,
"Democracy and Liberty,"pp. 185-231.
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aggregativeconceptions of democracy is that, whereas the latter aims for procedural fairness, the former is built around the idea of political justification (DD1,p. 412).In a democracy marked by a "reasonablepluralism"of religious, philosophical, and ethical views, political justification among equals requiresnot simply that everyone'sinterests be given equal consideration. It also requirespublic deliberation in terms of reasons that freepersons with differentviews can reasonablyaccept as equal citizens. This requirement,which Cohen calls the "principleof deliberative inclusion" (DDi, p. 417,DD2, p. 203) in turn imposes certain demands
on a democracy: In addition to procedural rights of political participation, there aresubstantiveliberties,opportunities, and social institutions that must be provided for if citizens are to take part in democratic deliberation as equals. The basic idea of Cohen'sdeliberativeinclusion principle seems to be that reasonable persons who have differentmetaphysical, religious, and ethical views must be given reasons that they can regardas sufficient, as measured by their reasonable comprehensive views. Otherwisethey are not treatedas equals in democraticdeliberation(cf.DD1,p. 418).Forwhile laws are justifiable to those in the majorityfor reasons they can accept, they are not justifiable to the reasonable minority.For example, no considerations could convince reasonable religious persons that the compelling demands of their faith ought to be prohibited, for the framework of what constitutes good reasons is providedby their religiousview.This means that if democratic citizens are to be regarded as having equal
standing, they must be guaranteed religious freedom (DD2, p. 205-206).
Cohen makes similarappeals to public reason to justify freedom of nonpolitical expression (DD1, p. 419f., DD2, p. 207ff.) and "moral liberty," or freedom of sexual relations (DD2, p. 212ff.). These and other arguments
showwhy a deliberativeconception is not proceduralbut providesa place for substantive liberties and guarantees.The efforts of Cohen and others to show how substantive liberties, opportunities, and resources are a condition of deliberativedemocracy are one of the more fruitfulareas of inquiry in currentdiscussions of deliberativedemocracy.50
50. See also Habermas,Between Facts and Norms, and Gutmannand Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement,also relevantin DDi, JamesBohman, "Deliberative Democracyand EffectiveSocialFreedom:Capabilities, Resources,and Opportunities," 349-82; pp. and JamesKnightand JamesJohnson, "WhatSort of EqualityDoes DeliberativeDemocracy Require?" pp.279-320; and in DD2, Jon Elster,"Deliberationand ConstitutionMaking,"pp. 97-122.
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One potential objection to Cohen'sargumentfor religious and expressive freedom is, "Ofcourse the losing minority does not find religious restrictions reasonable or justifiable. But this shows that people have different conceptions of what is reasonable and justifiable. Given these differencesit is unrealisticto seek 'discussion aimed at reaching reasonable agreement' (Cohen, DD1,p. 419) in a democracy."This kind of objection is expressed by more than one critic of deliberativedemocracy.51 It constitutes a serious challenge, because it raises a question about the viability of the idea of public reason. Ratherthan directlyresponding to these criticismshere, it may help advance the debate more to clarifywhat is meant by public reason.
III. THE IDEAOF PUBLICREASON
Whethera democracy is deliberativedepends not just on joint deliberation among citizens, but also on the topics about which citizens deliberate and the kinds of considerations they recognize as good reasons in democratic argument and decisions. A democracy is deliberative in so far as its citizens engage in public reasoning about a common good. The idea of public reason is central to accounts of deliberative democracy. What is public reason? The idea has taken on a life of its own since it was reintegratedinto political philosophy in the early1980s.52Presentlythere are severaldifferent accounts of public reason. Accordingto one account, public reasons are the neutral reasons that people share in common in a democracy.53 Accordingto another, they are the considerations that fully rational and informed persons with diverse values rely on in a procedure of ideal disA course.54 third account says public reason is embodied in the Thomist
51.In DD1, see GeraldGaus, "Reason,Justification,and Consensus:Why Democracy "TheSignificanceof PublicDeliberaHaveitAll,"pp. 205-42, andThomasChristiano, Can't OxfordUniverLawandDisagreement(Oxford: tion,"pp. 243-78.See also JeremyWaldron,
sity Press, 1999), pp. 91-93, and ch. 7.
as 52. By Rawls,so faras I am aware.See Rawls's1985paper,"Justice Fairness:Political first in not Metaphysical," CollectedPapers,at p. 395for Rawls's explicitreferenceto public reason:"Theaim is free agreement,reconciliationthroughpublic reason." CambridgeUni53. See CharlesLarmore,Patternsof MoralComplexity,(Cambridge: versityPress,1987), p. 53 on "neutraldialogue."BruceAckermanhas an earlieraccount in Sociallustice and the Liberal State (New Haven:YaleUniversityPress,1980), ch. ii. 54.JuergenHabermassays the role of moralphilosophy is to analyzethe "communicative presuppositionsand the procedureof a discursiveprocess of opinion- and will-forma-
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whereas a fourth argues that only secular reatraditionof naturallaw,55 sons can be public reasons. There is even a non-democratic account of "Hobbesianpublic reason,"according to which one person judges what we all have reason to do.56 Here I will focus mainly on Rawls'sidea of public reason and will distinguish it from these conceptions. It is a complicated idea, but it is essential to understanding what may be called "thepolitical liberalideal of deliberativedemocracy"endorsed by Rawls, Cohen, and others. A sense of Rawls'sidea is conveyed in his claim, "in a constitutional regime with judicial review, public reason is the reason of its supreme court."(PoliticalLiberalism,p. 231).His point here is not to endorse the reasoning or decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court,but to indicate that in constitutional argument and justification within a democracy, certain kinds of considerations count as reasons and others do not. Most citizens (even those who are Christians) agree that a constitutional court should not rely on the Bible or on abstracttheological arguments.Evenif it be granted that these are reliable sources of moral truth, they still are sources that a large portion of democratic citizens, whether rightly or wrongly,reject as untenable. The idea of public reason extends the exclusion of considerations from public political argument beyond religion to all "comprehensivedoctrines."It assumes that citizens in a deare mocracy,because they have ultimatepoliticalauthority, owed ajustification in terms of reasons they can accept for the exercise of coercive political power,which is exercised alwaysin their name. Of course, there are always going to be reasonable citizens who disagree with supreme court and other political decisions, no matterwhat reasons are provided. Unanimity on political decisions is rarelyto be had, even among reasonable citizens under optimal conditions. But this is not the issue.57 The
through the Public tion in which the public use of reason is manifested.""Reconciliation MITPress,1998), p. 72. Use of Reason," TheInclusion of the Other(Cambridge: in NaturalLaw,and PublicReason," RobertP Georgeand in 55.See JohnFinnis,"Abortion, ChristopherWolfe, eds., NaturalLaw and Public Reason (WashingtonDC: Georgetown UniversityPress,2000) pp. 75-106,at 77-78. 56. David Gauthier, "PublicReason,"Social Philosophyand Policy12 (Winter1995): 19the locus of 42, p. 25, discussed in Gaus,DD1,pp. 225-26. Gauthiersays, "Bytransferring rationalitysupplants the resort deliberationfrom each individualto an agreed arbitrator, to force in the resolution of conflicts."(p. 26). See also MichaelRidge,"HobbesianPublic Reason,"Ethicsio8, no. 3 (1998): 538-68. 57. In this regard,earlierclaims by deliberativedemocratsthat deliberationseeks consensus (forwhich they have been widely criticized,see, e.g., Gaus,DD1,or Waldron,Law
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issue rather is that, whether or not citizens accept or reject particular decisions or laws, it is important that they should be able to understand why the court or the legislature arrivedat its conclusion and be able to accept the premises from which deliberation and argument proceed. Otherwise,no justificationhas been providedto citizens who disagree.58 The idea of public reason presupposes a "dutyof civility"(PoliticalLiberalism,p. 217) to be able to explain political decisions in terms of values and considerations that all citizens can accept in their capacity as sovereign citizens.
Here it is important to emphasize that Rawlsconceives of public reason as an idea only characteristicof a constitutional democracy.Public reason should not then be understood as the reasons commonly affirmed by members of just any society of shared values and moral beliefs. The fact that all subjects of Iranmight publicly affirmthe political priorityof the Koranand Islamic moral law would not make Islamicreligion a basis for public reason.59Public reason is defined against a background of democratic institutions. It presumes that citizens take democratic institutions seriously and are committed to maintaining them. Moreover, public reason is reason addressed to persons in their political capacity as democratic citizens, and not in their capacity as economic agents, members of a particular association (religious or otherwise), or in any other role.60 The idea assumes that citizens think of themselves as free and as equal participants in public life, and that they address one another as such. Their self-conception as free and equal citizens is made possible through institutions guaranteeing political freedom and selfrule.These institutions providenot only for equal rights to vote and hold office; they also secure freedom of thought, expression, and the press, and public forums for free political expression, all of which are essential
and Disagreement)probablyneed to be revised,or at least clarified.(Onthis Cohen is now clear:"Evenan ideal deliberativeprocedurewill not, in general,issue in consensus."DD2, p. 197).The agreementthat is to be had among reasonablepersons is on the kinds of reasons that arerelevantto politicalargument,and (ifRawlsis right)on a liberalconception of justice, or at least a range of liberalconceptions, to construe these reasons and determine theirweight. See Cohen, DD2, p. 222, who appearsto agree. 58. Cf.Rawls,A TheoryofJustice,p. 580 (p.508 rev.ed.), "Beingdesigned to reconcileby reason,justificationproceeds fromwhat all partiesto the discussion hold in common." 59. Of course Iraniansare not so uniformin their beliefs, but supposing they were. p. 60. Rawlssays (PoliticalLiberalism, 213): "Publicreason is characteristicof a democraticpeople: it is the reason of its citizens, of those sharingthe status of equal citizenship. The subject of their reason is the good of the public."
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to criticaland informed deliberation among equals.6'Finally,public reason presupposes freedom of the person, including institutions that guarantee freedom of conscience and of association and citizens' liberty to act on their conscientious convictions (moral, philosophical, and religious) and pursue their ideas of a good life. It is primarilybecause a constitutional democracy recognizes nonpolitical as well as political freedoms that Rawls sees there to be a special need for public reason to regulate argument and deliberation in public political life in a democracy.A democracy that tolerates differentmoral, philosophical, and religious views inevitably will be marked by conscientious conflicts of belief and doctrine among reasonable persons. Religious pluralismis normally accepted as inevitable in a constitutional democracy,but Rawlsclaims that equally inevitable are differences of conscientious belief among reasonable persons regardingthe nature of reality,knowledge,and truth,as well as differencesin comprehensivemoral values and the ends that give meaning to life. Even among reasonable persons, agreement cannot be achieved on any metaphysical doctrine of realityor comprehensive set of values or on ultimate moral principles dealing with many aspects of life. The implication is that such values as rationalor moral autonomy,social welfareor utility,economic efficiency, self-realizationor culturalexcellence-all of which have been suggested as a basis for unity in a democracy-cannot serve as shared values to ground public reason or political cooperation, any more than can the will of God and divinely inspired naturallaw. Even under the ideal conditions of a well-ordered democratic society, where everyone endorses free democratic institutions and a democratic constitution, reasonable persons inevitably will affirm different and conflicting "comprehensive doctrines"that are themselves reasonable. Rawls calls this "the fact of reasonablepluralism." account of public reason responds to this fact. His One of the severalroles of a political conception of justice is to provide a basis forpublic reasoningthat can be reasonablyaccepted by democratic citizens. Herethe complicated idea of what is "reasonable" needs discussing. It a crucial idea in the accounts of deliberative democracy by Rawls, is Cohen, Gutmann and Thompson, and others. A frequent objection to
61.The rightto present grievancesand criticizegovernmentand majorityviews, along with freedom to form and join political partieswith alternativeplatformsfor realizingthe common good, areprotected too.
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Rawlsand others who use the concept is there are differentways to define or specify 'reasonableness,' this is something aboutwhich people and I cannot adequately respond here to the question will always disagree. whether this poses a problem for Rawls and other deliberative democrats who rely on the idea.62 What is important for our purposes of understanding the idea of public reason is Rawls'saccount of reasonableness, not someone else's. Rawls construes 'reasonable'as a moral concept that is not definable in any straightforward way. There is no list of necessary and sufficient conditions that specify its meaning. Atbest what it means can be revealed by its uses, which might then be elucidated by other concepts, and explicated by moral principles. It is within the context of his theory that Rawlsseeks to explicate the concept of (political) reasonableness. To be reasonable ultimately is to have a settled disposition to reason and act from the requirements of a liberal political conception of justice. Rawlsbegins to elucidate the concept of reasonableness by elaborating primaryfeatures of the idea of a reasonable person with two moral powers who regardthemselves as free and as equals.63Reasonable persons (accordingto Rawls'sspecification) recognize and accept that other reasonablepersons inevitablywillaffirmcomprehensivedoctrinesdifferent from their ownf.64 For Rawls,part of what it is to be reasonable is to accept the inevitability of reasonable pluralism.This is partly a result of
62.The papers mentioned in note 51object that people have differentstandardsof reasonableness, and that what constitutes reasonableacceptance is a subject of controversy. (Gaus,DD1,p. 223; Christiano,DD1,pp. 268-69). The implication is that pluralism is so deep in a democracythat there is no more likelihood of agreement on a basis for public reasoningthan on anythingelse. Sufficeit to say that Rawlsrecognizesthat because of their differentphilosophicalviews people will have differentdefinitions and criteriaof reasonableness. He still believes, and argues,that a well-orderedsociety is realisticallypossible, where citizens agreeon a liberalconception of justice and standardsfor public reason and politicalreasonableness. 63. Ofreasonablecomprehensivedoctrines Rawlsthen says that, among other characteristics, they "arethe doctrines that reasonable citizens affirm."(PoliticalLiberalism,p. loose"account of reasonablecomprehensivedoctrines 36) He hopes that the "deliberately can be compensated for by the account of reasonablepersons. See PoliticalLiberalism, p. liberalismalso supposes that a 59. See also pp. xvi/xviiiin the paperbackedition:"Political reasonablecomprehensivedoctrinedoes not rejectthe essentials of a democraticregime." 64. Disagreement on comprehensive moral, philosophical, and religious doctrines is inevitable among even rationaland fullyreasonablepersons because of certain "burdens of judgment,"such as vagueness of generalterms, evidentiarydisputes, and diverseexperiences.
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a reasonable person's desire to cooperate with others on terms that all 65 can reasonablyaccept. This means not simply that reasonable persons are tolerant of other doctrines. Habermas charges that Rawls'sidea of reasonablenesssimply implies toleration.66 if tolerationwere all there But were to being reasonable, it could be said of Christianfundamentalists, who arewilling to tolerate other religions while insisting on instituting a state religion,that they too arereasonable. Reasonablepersons for Rawls are not simply tolerant (indeed they will not tolerate injustice at all). Rather,they want to be able to live with others according to principles otherreasonablepersons can acknowledgeand policies they can endorse; also they want to be able to justify laws and political policies to people holding different reasonable doctrines with reasons that other reasonable persons recognize and can reasonably accept as well. Reasonableness involves a readiness to politically address others of different persuasions in terms of public reasons. Rawls'sideal of public reason then responds to the "factof reasonable pluralism." Reasonablepluralism-not pluralismper se-defines the parametersand the reachof public reason.Thismeans threethings (atleast). first,Rawls's idea of public reason does not relyon autonomy or any other "comprehensive" account of the human good; nor does it depend on an account of the origin of moral duty (in reason, emotion, or God'swisdom or will.) The idea that autonomy, God, utility,human perfection, or some other comprehensive value, is a condition of justice and the human good must be given up within public reasoning, for these values cannot provide bases for agreement on a common good among democratic citizens. Second, public reason does not tryto addressunreasonable doctrines. So (to mention views Rawis'scritics have raised against public reason) there is no assumption that Social Darwinists, religious fundamentalists, slave holders, or Nazis are amenable to public reason, nor should any effort be made to accommodate their views. These doctrines could not be affirmedby reasonable persons wanting to justify their relations
65. Two other featuresof reasonable persons Rawlsmentions are: (1)They want to be seen as fully cooperatingmembers of society by others; (2) they have a "reasonable moral The psychology." lattercondition implies reasonablepersons are capable of acting for the sake of a conception of justice. PoliticalLiberalism, 81-82. pp. 66. See Habermas,in "Reconciliation through Public Reason,"in his The Inclusion of the Other(MIT, 1998), originallyappearingin TheJournalof Philosophy,92 (March1995),
109-131. Cf. Gaus, in DD1, p. 224.
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in terms that others can reasonably accept. Perhaps some, if not all, of these unreasonable doctrineswill exist within a well-ordereddemocratic society. Any society no matter how ideal will have some unreasonable people holding irrationalor unjust doctrines.Whereasexpression of such unreasonable views is to be tolerated, their effects are to be contained by society. There is no requirement that they be respected or accommodated by public reason. Finally,to say reasonable pluralismdefines the reach of public reason means that public reason must rely upon principles, values, and methods of reasoning and assessing evidence that are shared by the reasonable doctrines affirmed by reasonable citizens in a democratic society. These values and principles do not always lie on the surface of reasonable doctrines. Some do; reasonable doctrines reject slavery and affirm the values of the integrityof human life, for example, which provide reasons for a variety of measures, such as laws prohibiting violence and unjustifiedcoercion, maintaining public order,public health, and so on. But other sharedvalues and principles have to be uncovered.Again,public reason is the reason of democratic citizens. It is addressed to reasonable persons who see themselves as free and equal citizens, and it addresses them in their political capacity as democratic citizens. The values shared by reasonable democratic citizens will be (forthe most part) values of public reason"respond in some political values.These "political way to how reasonable persons think of themselves politically: of their status and role as citizens, their political rights and duties, their political relations to other citizens, and to the proper exercise of political power. A working assumption of Rawls'sliberal ideal of deliberativedemocracy is that reasonable persons in a well-ordereddemocratic society conceive of themselves politically as free and equal citizens; as such they should recognize they have fundamental political interests in maintaining the powers of reason and volition that enable them to be cooperating members of democratic society. This conception of persons as free and equal, with interests in maintaining their moral and rational powers, provides the fundamental basis for thinking about the political values of public reason. The reasons that are public and shared in a democracy will in some way respond to political values, which themselves are in turn related to conditions needed for realizing this ideal conception of democratic citizens.
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The point here is not to expound Rawls's"politicalconception of the person," nor to explore the complicated relationships between public reasons, reasonableness, political values, and the democratic conception of citizens. The point ratheris simply to suggest that these ideas are interconnected, and that they provide the background for the idea of view. This responds to some concerns and critipublic reason in Rawls's cisms that the idea of public reason (as Rawls uses it) is empty or too obscure to performany service within democratic thought. Complicated perhaps, but that does not make it empty, or even obscure, for Rawls suggests specifically how to provide the "contentof public reason." With this in mind, turn now to the basis for public reasoning. Rawls says public reasoningin a constitutional democracyseeks a "sharedpublic basis" for reasoning, justification, and agreement. How can reasonable persons affirmingsuch differentmoral, religious,and philosophical views willingly accept, without compromising their beliefs, a shared basis for public reasoning about justice and the common good? First,consider why there is a need for such a basis for public reasoning. Whydo the political values of public reasons themselves not suffice? Assume that all reasonable persons and all reasonable comprehensive doctrines (in a well-ordereddemocratic society) can agree on the political values of justice, the general welfare, and domestic tranquility.They can agree too on the priorityof justice over the political pursuit of aggregate happiness or perfectionist values of culture.They also agree on the importance of such political values as respect for human life, public order and personal security, freedom of expression, freedom of the person, equal opportunity,the civic equalityof citizens, economic efficiency and preventing social and economic waste, full employment and individual self-sufficiency,public health and sanitation,personal privacyand the integrity of socially recognized relationships, and so on; these are primary among the values that are to be politically protected, pursued, or maintained. On what more do democratic citizens and their political agents need agree to engage in public deliberation and justification of the laws? The answer should be clearfrom any democracy even when functioning impartially and at its best. Without a shared basis for justification and agreement, public reasoning is not only contentious, but also inconclusive and incomplete. Even if all citizens might agree on the rel-
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evant political values of public reason and impartiallyvote the common good, they will still assignpoliticalvalues differentdegreesof importance. In the absence of a more secure basis for public reason, they likely will assign importance to the political values of public reason according to the demands of their particularvalues and comprehensive views.67 But this is a breakdownof public reason:laws are ultimately decided according to the particularreasons of comprehensiveviews, which many democratic citizens cannot reasonably be expected to endorse. Consequently the coercive powers of government are exercised against citizens on grounds that they do not find reasonable, or on grounds that they cannot endorse as free and equal citizens. It is the role of a political conception of justice to address this problem. It supplies "thecontent of public reason." A citizen engages in public reasonwhen he or she deliberateswithin a frameworkof what he or she sincerely regardsas the most reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that expresses political values that others, as free and equal citizens might also reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse.68 Toengage in public reason then is not just to reason in terms of public political values, assigning them weight or significance according to the requirements of one's comprehensive conception of the good. To take the most prominent and contested case: in deliberating about the permissibility of abortion, a legislator, judge, or citizen who on religious grounds assigns infinite weight to the political value of respect for the integrity of human life, while assigning little or no weight to other relevant political values (women'sfreedom to control their procreation,the
67. Joshua Cohen apparentlydoes not find this to be such a problem. He says that differentcomprehensiveviews will interpretacceptablereasons differentlyand will assign them differentweights. So long as people appeal to considerationsthat are acceptable to all, then "thefact that a proposalhas majoritysupportwill itself commonly count as a reason for endorsingit."See, DD2, p. 197.Forreasons mentioned in the text below I disagree. Cf.Rawls'sclaim:But "theassignment of weights is an essential and not a minor part of a conception of justice,"for if two people differabout the weight to be assigned to different principles "thentheir conceptions of justice are different."(A Theoryof Justice,p. 41 (pp. 36-37 rev.ed.). 68. Rawls,"TheIdea of PublicReasonRevisited," CollectedPapers,p. 581. in
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equality of women as equal citizens, and society's interest in the ordered reproduction of society over time) is not engaged in public reasoning; rather he or she is interpreting the political values of public reason in terms of his or her comprehensive view. The same is true of those who assign greatweight to women's freedom and equality on grounds of the nonpublic value of rationalautonomy,while assigning little or no weight to respect for the integrityof human (fetal)life. None of this should be construed to imply that the idea of public reason provides a unique and clearly defined outcome to controversialissues. The idea of public reason is more about the kinds of considerations that should count in public deliberation in a democracy than it is about the outcomes that these deliberations should reach. People will disagree as much about what is requiredby the political values of public reason in a democracy as they do about contested religious, philosophical, and moral views. (Rawlsclearlyleaves this open, because he recognizes that people will affirmdifferentpolitical conceptions of justice that give "content"to public reason.) But at least they share the political values of public reason and endorse a liberalpolitical conception; thereforethey have a common basis for reasoning and argument,which is not the case when they rely on the concepts and values of their comprehensive views. The role of public reason is not so much to eliminate or even diminish actual political disagreement, as it is to provide democratic citizens with reasons and arguments that, if valid and sound, they can accept as democratic citizens. Werelaws and policies decided for purely nonpublic reasons, it could not be said that democratic citizens are politically free. Their political power is then being used against their will in ways they cannot endorse as citizens. Public reason then is a condition of political autonomy and collective self-rule. Now comparetwo alternativeaccounts of democraticdeliberationand public reason with Rawls'sview. Habermas and Gutmann and Thompson contend (unlike Rawls)that democratic deliberation and discourse are not barredfrom takinginto account more general philosophical and moral considerations. Gutmann and Thompson argue that appeal to these reasons is sometimes necessary, because "mutuallyjustifiable grounds"are not always available to resolve many contentious political issues.69Disputes over women's constitutional right to abortion and the
69. Gutmannand Thompson, Democracyand Disagreement,p. 76.
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legitimacy of capital punishment are primary examples of such "deliberative disagreement.""Bothsides have grounds for reasonably rejecting the position of their opponents."70 The implication is that at some point, public or "mutuallyacceptable reasons"run out;when they do, all that citizens and officials can do is appeal to the values that are part of their reasonable moral,philosophical, and religiousview to decide these contentious issues.7' ForHabermas,appealing to abstractphilosophical and moral considerations is not simply a last-ditch necessity, but also an integralpart of a "discursive" democracy.Whereaspeople inevitably differin their ethical views, free and equal democratic citizens should be able to agree on the moral and epistemic conditions of discourse to which they need to adhere if they are to achieve a valid agreement on laws that satisfy For universalizablenorms of justice.72 Habermas,discursive democracy has an epistemological and moraljustification;it is ultimately based in a "post-metaphysical" theory of "idealspeech,"which providesthe conditions for the validity of normative and theoretical claims. At some level
70. Gutmannand Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement,p. 78. They also say with respect to abortionand capital punishment that there are "mutually acceptable reasons" to which either side in democraticdebate can appeal "thatnot only call into question our best judgmentbut also permit other citizens to rejectour judgment and defend opposing ones." 71.Gutmann'sand Thompson'sconception of public reason differs from Rawls'sand Cohen's in that it does not exclude many reasons the latter would deem or metaphysical,epistemological, comprehensivemoralreasons. Forexample,they do not wholly rejector exclude from public reason the basic principlesthat libertariansand utilitariansofferas justifications.See, generally,chs. 3 and 4 of Democracyand Disagreement. Theydefinepublicreasonsin termsof a principleof reciprocity: "When citizensmakemoral claims in a deliberativedemocracy,they appeal to reasons or principlesthat can be shared by fellow citizenswho are similarlymotivated.The moralreasoningis in this way mutually p. acceptable." (DemocracyandDisagreement, 55).Theirdiscussionindicatesthat,whereas religiousconsiderationsadvancedbyfundamentalistsdo not satisfythisreciprocityrequirement on reasons (p. 65),philosophicalconsiderationson abortionof the kind advancedby RonaldDworkinand JudithThompson do satisfythe criterion,as perhapswould the secular pro-life arguments (made by JohnNoonan) that life begins at conception since the zygote has a full genetic code (pp. 85-86). Abortionis their example of an issue that is not resolved by the reciprocityrestrictionon public reason. (Herethey are in disagreement with Rawls.See PoliticalLiberalism,p. 243nf,246). In the event of such "deliberative disagreement", they propose principlesof accommodation to preservemutual respect in the face of unresolvabledifferences. 72. Habermascontends against communitarianismthat moral questions of universal justice, not ethical questions of national identity,arethe primaryquestions of deliberative discoursein a democracy.See his Between Factsand Norms,p. 282.
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of democraticdeliberation,these philosophical bases of democracyneed to be invoked to resolve democratic disagreements (to dispute alternative comprehensive conceptions of political truth, if for no other reason). Moreover,while Habermas contends that a discursive democracy must recognize a distinction between the public domain of universal moral norms of justice that apply to all and citizens' privateautonomy to pursue their chosen ethical ends, he is nonetheless sympathetic with the feminist critiqueof the liberalpublic-privatedichotomy.Habermasthen endorses the idea that the topics for public deliberation are to be negotiated and decided by the participantsin democraticdiscoursethemselves. "Liberal misgivings about opening up an unrestrictedspectrum of public issues and topics are not justified so long, at least, as the personal integrity of the individual is preserved."73 Habermas'saccount of discursive democracy is an extension of his general philosophical theory of communicative action and ideal discourse. Accordingto this theory,the norms to which fully informed free and equal citizens could agree in an indefinite process of ideal deliberation supply validity standards for the justice and legitimacy of actual democratic deliberationsand decisions. Metaphysicaland religiousdoctrines that hold otherwise are simply unsound. Now from Rawls'spolitical liberalaccount of deliberativedemocracy,to make the terms and conditions for ideal speech part of public reasoning requires that citizens who hold other philosophical views about truth and objectivityto either concede error,or at least learn to live with a public philosophy at odds with their conscientiously held views. Insofar as Habermas'saccount of democracy requires that actual citizens appeal to the provisions of this philosophical theory to resolve issues of justice and decide laws, one might say that Habermas does not have an idea of public reason (certainly not in Rawls'ssense). Forhis conception requiresthat democratic citizens appeal to considerations with little if any connection to their self-conception, interests, and needs as democratic citizens. They are to appeal to the best reasons all things considered from the universalpoint of view of ideal speech. To a lesser degree, the same might be said of Gutmann's and Thompson'saccount of deliberativedemocracy.Whereasthey do not rely on an epistemic theory of validity and justification like Habermas, they
73. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 313.
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do see democratic deliberation partly as a matter of addressing and reTo solving "moraldisagreement."74 politically resolve or accommodate many moral conflicts (e.g., abortion rights, capital punishment, surrogate parenting, the permissibilityof pornography)requiresthat citizens ultimately relyon and appeal to their general moral, religious,and philosophical views. According to their view, so long as we remain within Rawls's"domainof the political,"these problems are not politically resolvable.75 Public reason in Rawls'ssense is not sufficiently "complete" (to use Rawls'sterm) to provide a democratic resolution or accommodation of these and other moral conflicts. It is noteworthy that both Habermas and Gutmann and Thompson criticize Rawlsfor incorporatingpublic principles of justice into his account of a well-ordered democracy.Habermascontends that it is not the role of philosophers to provide democracy with a blueprint for substantive justice. Rigid adherence to philosophical conceptions of justice thwart the political autonomy of citizens.76Moreover,for Habermas it seems that only actual discourses among free and equal citizens can discoversubstantivenorms of justice to which the hypotheticalparticipants of ideal democratic discourse would agree.77Gutmann and Thompson also argue that rigid reliance on principles of justice, including justice as fairness,might limit the autonomy of citizens too much, and that democratic deliberation is a more likelyway to discover political truth.78 They
74. For Gutmann and Thompson, accommodating moral disagreementon a basis of mutual respect is at least as important as resolvingit. See Democracyand Disagreement, pp. 9, 79-85. In this and other regards,their view resembles that of Rawls. 75.1 say "politically resolvable" ratherthan "morally resolvable." course,moralprobOf lems are not morallyresolvableon the basis of public reason.ForRawls,it is not the role of liberaldemocraticpoliticsor public reasonto completelyresolvemoraldisagreement.How could they?A political resolution is a moral resolution for Rawls,but it is not a complete moralresolution.Itmorallyresolvesa problemforpurposesof democraticjustice and politics. 76. Politicalphilosophy for Habermashas a more "modest"role to play than working out substantive requirementsof justice; it should instead provide the proceduralconditions for the "normative validity"of democraticdecisions. "What[moralphilosophy] cannot do is make any kind of substantive contribution .... Moralphilosophy does not have privilegedaccess to particularmoraltruths." Habermas,"Morality EthicalLife," his and in
Moral Consciousness and CommunicativeAction, p. 211. 77. "Real argumentmakes moralinsight possible."Ibid.,p. 57;see also pp. 67, 68, 94, 211.
78. See Gutmannand Thompson, Democracyand Disagreement,p. 44,where they say that the assumption that we can know the political truth before democratic deliberation with otherswho will be affectedby laws can rarelyif ever be justified.
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say Rawls's conception is not deliberative enough, but is ...in "constitutionalist the priorityit gives to principles of justice overprocesses of deliberation."(Democracy and Disagreement, p. 39) Whereas substantive principles of justice that protect liberty and provide opportunity may need to be provided constitutionally to constrain the options availablein democratic deliberation,these principles cannot determine democratic choice among permissible options in advance (on the appropriatelevel of the social minimum, for example, or the permissibility of pornography).Rawls underestimates the degree of indeterminacy of principles of justice, and the potential of deliberative democracy to resolve questions of justice left undetermined by philosophical reflection. Actualdemocratic deliberations are needed to resolve many substantive questions of democratic justice.79 In Rawls'sdefense, there are severalreasons why public acceptance of and adherence to a conception of justice might be a desirable thing to have in a deliberative democracy.This is not the place to go over them all. But one primaryreason Rawlsgives for his principles of justice is that they are integral to public reason and public justification. Democratic citizens ultimately have to apply some standards to guide public deliberations when ordinarypolitical values of public reason conflict or are ambiguous or obscure. Moreover,citizens have to appeal to principles to justify their decisions to one another if laws are to be commonly accepted and legitimate. What could these justifying principles and standardsbe in a democracyexcept substantiveprinciplesofjustice and other moral norms? On this it would seem Rawls and Habermas do not disagree. (Wherethey disagree is that Rawls contends for these principles and standardsto be compatible with the freedom and equality of democraticcitizens, the bases for theirjustificationmust be limited;they must be reasonablyacceptable to citizens generallyin their capacity as democratic citizens.80) But if reliance on standards of justice is necessary to resolve disputes of public reason, then the fact that citizens democrati79. See Gutmannand Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement,pp. 35, 38-39, 200, 223-29. Forexample,they contend that actualdemocraticdeliberationis requiredto define an adequate social minimum, and more generally,what their principle of basic opportunity requiresin the way of social conditions needed forfree and equal deliberation.See pp.
217-19.
8o. Gutmannand Thompson do not deny the role of principles of justice in public deliberation.Theirobjectionto Rawlsis that he tries to restrictpublic reason to relianceon a single conception of justice (or at least a narrowrange of liberal conceptions), and that,
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cally relyon principles advocated by some known philosopher or statesman should not undermine anyone'spolitical autonomy-at least not so long as citizens accept (orreject)them because these principles provide good and sufficient reasons, and not on the authorityof any person (living or dead). Is the FirstAmendment compromised because it was accepted by the framersand endorsed by our forebears?Perhapsif we accept it only for originalistreasons, simply because our forebearsdid. But not if we accept the FirstAmendment because freedom of speech and religion are independently justifiable by good public reasons. Accordingto Rawls'saccount then, democratic citizens' public recognition of principles of justice is necessary for them to fully engage in public reasoning. Public reason requires ascertaining and reflecting on political values, clarifying their obscurities, assigning their respective degrees of significance, and applying them to decide the laws and to resolve constitutional issues. A political conception of justice is needed for these purposes, to provide "the content of public reason"and to make public reason "complete." be a political conception, a conception of To justice must be "freestanding" any comprehensive view and have its of origins in ideas and values implicit in democratic culture. This is what makes it a political conception, as opposed to being a part of a more comprehensivedoctrine (such as Habermas's account of ideal discourse). What makes a political conception reasonable is that it addresses itself to the reason and fundamental interests of free and equal democratic citizens according to a criterion of reciprocity-it aims to provide reasons that reasonable persons can reasonably accept in their capacity as free and equal citizens. Finally,for public reason to be complete requires that decisions about the meaning and relativeimportance or "weight" of competing political values be decidable according to a reasonable political conception and not simply according to comprehensive philosophical, moral, and religious views of citizens or officials. Rawlssays three main features characterizereasonable political conceptions that can provide the content of public reason: first, a list of basic rights, liberties, and opportunities; second, an assignment of special
besides the fact that this conception is indeterminatewith respect to many questions, exclusive relianceon it limits political autonomy and the range of public reason. So in addition to justice as fairness,they see libertarianism, utilitarianism, otheregalitarian and views as admissible within the range of public reason. See their Democracy and Deliberation, chs. 3-4. ForRawls,such a move makes public justificationimpossible.
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priorityto these rights,liberties, and opportunitieswith respect to claims of the general good, economic efficiency, and perfectionist values; and third, measures ensuring citizens all-purpose means to make effective use of their basic freedoms.81 These three features imply that a reasonable political conception will be liberal.Rawlslatelyhas emphasized that severalliberalconceptions can satisfy these requirementsand the criterion of reciprocity.Justiceas fairness is not the only one. Thereis a "family of political conceptions" that are reasonable and that can provide the content of public reason in a deliberative democracy.Accordingly,"the forms of permissible public reason are always several."82 This seems to weaken the requirements of public reason. It implies, first,that it is unrealisticto expect general agreement on the laws or even on a constitution in a well-ordered deliberative democracy. Second, it means that so long as we are given reasons that stem from a range of liberal conceptions-even a liberal conception we might reject-then the criterion of reciprocityis satisfied and we are given reasons that we can reasonablyaccept as democraticcitizens.83 Third,it raises some question regardinghow extensive agreement on a common good can be in a deliberative democracy.These and other implications of Rawls'slatest thoughts on public reason warrantmore discussion than can be given here.
IV. OTHERISSUES
Besides differencesabout public reason, other areasof contention among deliberativedemocrats appear in the volumes under discussion. Henry Richardsonargues that it is better to see democratic deliberationas aiming for volitional agreement and forming joint intentions regardingthe
81. Rawls,CollectedPapers,p. 582. discourseconception of legiti82. Ibid.,p. 583.Rawlsmentions specificallyHabermas's
macy,as well as Catholicviews of the common good, as permissibleformsof public reason, so long as they are expressedin terms of politicalvalues and not in terms of the comprehensive doctrinesof which they arepart. See also PoliticalLiberalism,(paperbacked.) pp.
Iii4.iii.
is 83. Libertarianism not a reasonable political conception according to Rawl'scriterion. It cannot then providecontent to public reason.This should not surprise,since libertarians normallyreject democracy.ForRawls,libertarianismis not a reasonable political conception forit does not ensure citizens resourcesto make effectiveuse of theirfreedoms and opportunities.Not having a place for a social minimum, libertarianismcannot satisfy We the limitingcondition of a politicalconception, the criterionof reciprocity. cannot rea-
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public good rather than cognitive agreement in judgments. The cognitive model of deliberationignores the place of individualwill in shaping the common good. It treats citizens as seekers after impersonal truth ratherthan as "self-originating sources of claims"in deliberation, and is "insufficiently respectful" of the views of citizens (DD1, p. 360). As Richardson's paper implies, deliberativedemocrats conceive of the common good differently.ForRousseau, the common good was justice, and modern Kantians,such as Habermas,Rawls,and Cohen agree. But others adopt a broader conception of the common good to be determined by deliberation,one that goes beyond justice and aims to discovershared ethical values implicit in a democracy'sculture. (Nussbaum,Richardson, perhaps Sunstein and Michelman). IrisYoung (DD1)even argues that a common good is not needed for democratic deliberation, and that given the degree of "difference" among social and cultural groups, we should not expect agreement on a common good. That people are open and mutually accountable, and that they share problems to be solved is deenough for them to address their problems through "transformative
liberation."84
Regardingdeliberationitself, advocates normally depict it as a kind of imperfect procedure for ascertainingjustice and the common good. The opposite position would say that democracy is purely procedural:the actualoutcomes of fairdemocraticproceduresconstitute the truthabout justice or the common good. So assuming all procedural conditions are satisfied,there is no furtherstandardby which the decisions of fairlyconstituted democratic procedures can be assessed. An intermediate position rejectsboth the epistemic and the purelyproceduralviews and maintains that so long as the outcomes of a fair process do not violate fixed standardsof justice, there is no basis upon which to question the results of fair democratic procedures.85
sonably expect everyone,especiallythose worse off, to reasonablyaccept politicalterms of cooperation that assign rightsto income and wealth only accordingto libertarianentitlement principles. 84. Because Youngrecognizes that "justand wise solutions to their shared problems" (DDi, p. 402) are the aim of democraticdeliberation,her rejectionof the common good as the focus of deliberationshould not be understood as a rejectionof a sharedcommitment to justice. She aims to rejectviews that insist that differencesand perspectives should be put aside in deliberationin favor of an impartialpoint of view. For in non-ideal circumstances of social and economic inequality,so-called "impartial" norms are often biased, and the "commongood"is usually defined so as to reinforcesocial privilege.DDi, p. 399. 85. So, Thomas Christianoarguesthat the significanceof democraticdeliberationlies,
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Habermascalls his account a "procedural concept of democracy," but it is not one in the sense described. Habermas might call his account "procedural" because he believes "realdiscourses,"or actual democratic procedures are necessary to "makemoral insight possible."But because this is insight into what is alreadyrequiredby an independent standard of justice, this is an epistemic view. Another sense in which Habermas might call his account "procedural" refersto the hypothetical democratic procedure about which real democratic citizens are to deliberate. As Habermasexplains this hypothetical ideal, there are no substantive limits on its outcomes, and just laws are simply whatever would be agreed to under these hypothetical conditions. But in this sense of "procedural" Rawls's originalposition and four-stagesequence are"purely procedural," too.86 So there is little on this point to distinguish Habermas's"procedural concept of democracy"from Rawls'sview. We have seen that one primary regard in which Rawls differs from Habermas is that in Rawls'sideal of a well-ordered democracy, citizens are united in affirming a substantive liberal conception of justice that providesthe basis forpublic reasoning and justification.87 Habermasand others contend Rawls'sconception undermines political autonomy, because citizens allow themselves to be guided by a substantive conception of justice and a democratic constitution that has not been democratically accepted among themselves within actual discursive procedures. FrankMichelman calls Habermas'sview "deep democracy,"because it says that the "rightness"of reasoning, the "validity" laws and the of constitution, and the legitimacy of political authorityare dependent on
not in the fact that it enables citizens to discoverwhat is requiredby some externalstandard,but in such facts as democraticrule checks the powerof elites, protects fundamental rights,and advancesthe self-respectof citizens. See the papers by Thomas Christianoand discussion of this issue, by JackKnightand JamesJohnsonin DDi, and HenryRichardson's in his paper in DDi, p. 359. 86. Rawlssays:"Theidea of the originalposition is to set up a fairprocedureso that any principlesagreedto will be just.The aim is to use the notion of pureproceduraljustice as a A basis of the theory." TheoryofJustice,p. 136(p. 118 ed.). See also p. 120 (p.104rev.ed.). rev. most recentworkon 87.As previouslyindicated,this needs to be qualifiedgiven Rawls's Rawlssays that therewill be different the subject.In "TheIdeaof PublicReasonRevisited," liberalconceptions of justice that providecontent to public reason in a well-orderedsociety.So at most it can be said here that citizens areunited in affirmingthe basic libertiesand their priority,and a social minimum (althoughthey disagreeabout how that is to be set).
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actual agreementwithin democratic processes.88He calls Rawls'sliberal view "rights-foundationalist," because it requiresthat people must only agree in principle to the fundamental laws for them to be valid and for political authorityto be legitimate. For example, for Rawlsa democratic constitution affirmedonly by our forebearsbut not formallyby us is still valid and legitimate so long as we could agree to it if situated as equals; whereasforHabermas(apparently), validityand legitimacydepend upon our actually agreeing to a (just) constitution.89 What makes Habermas's version of deliberative democracy "deep"says Michelman is that it is "unrestrictedly process-bound'... process-bound allthe way down."(DD1, p. 159).This account, he continues, runs the riskof an infinite regress.We disagree about what a proper democratic procedure is. Suppose we deliberate, argue, and eventually agree on proper procedures: what validates this deliberativeprocess and agreement?How could the process of democratic legitimation ever get going without some philosopher or statesman stepping forwardto define what "right reason"requiresbyway of a properdemocraticprocess?"For that matter,has not Habermashimself set the example?"(DD1,p. 162).Michelman contends that to halt this regress, deliberative democrats all must be "reallyjust a sect of rightsfoundationalists malgre nous." (DD1,p. 167). Habermaswould likely reply that specifying deliberativeprocedures is indeed a philosopher'stask,but that this does not involve issuing "substantive"moralprinciples, only specifyingthe rightsand institutions that are "conditionsof rational discourses and negotiations."90 Here a great deal of confidence must be placed in what many will see as a rathershaky "procedure" versus "substance"distinction, for substantive rights and liberties are already built into Habermas'sdemocratic procedures (inliberties and a social minimum), and these cluding basic "non-political" rightsput all sorts of substantivelimits on permissibleoutcomes of democratic deliberation. In any case, Michelman'spaper raises a question of
88. Michelman,"HowCan the People EverMake the Laws:A Critiqueof Deliberative Democracy," DDi, pp. 145-72 at p. 152. criticismof Rawlsin "Reconciliation 89. See Habermas's Throughthe PublicUse of Reason,"Journalof Philosophy92 (March1995): 128, where Habermassays Rawlsiancitizens, because their deliberationsare to be guided by the principles of justice, "cannotreignite the radicaldemocraticembersof the originalposition in the civiclife of theirsociety." Rawls replies to this criticismin "Reply Habermas," to JournalofPhilosophy92 (March1995) 15360, and PoliticalLiberalism (1996 paperbacked), pp. 399-409.
go. Ibid., p. 131.
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the relationship between deliberative democracy on the one hand and such moral categories as the justice of laws and political procedures, the legitimacy of political authority,and the validity and legitimacy of laws. Habermas and Rawls,we have seen, apparentlyagree that standards of justice are independent of any actual political procedure.They disagree, however, about political legitimacy and the validity of laws and about how we discoverwhat justice requires. Habermasseems to hold that no constitution or law can be legitimate (as opposed to "valid,"i.e., just) unless actually accepted by those governed by them in real deliberative procedures.Moreover,standards of justice are only discoverablein "real discourses"among those affected. Rawlsthinks he has discovered these standardsof justice, without needing directlyto consult with most of us. Moreover,he contends that the exercise of political authority in a democracy is legitimate only if it accords with a constitution the essentials of which could be reasonably accepted among free and equal citizens. So assuming they are just, a constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are legitimate and binding on us, even though actually endorsed in formal procedures only by our forebears.These measures still meet Rawls's, but not Habermas's,test of political legitimacy. That we could affirm a previously enacted constitution and prior laws is sufficient for Rawlsfor their legitimacy.91
V CONCLUSION
There are some illuminating criticisms of deliberativedemocracy in the two anthologies under discussion that carefully develop objections often made against deliberative views. Regrettably,given the expository aims of this essay, I am unable to discuss these criticisms. Instead, I conclude with the following summary and questions:
91. I assume Rawls intends his liberal principle of legitimacy as necessary and not a sufficientcondition.A proposalthat Congresshas notpassed (e.g.,universalhealth care)is not valid law or legitimatelyenforceable, even though requiredby basic justice and any point is that, assuming a law is enconstitution commandingreasonableconsent. Rawls's acted accordingto legitimateprocedures,its legitimacystill depends on the furthercondition that it accordwith a constitution that would command reasonableconsent. This does not mean that all unjustlaws arenot legallyvalidor legitimate,for even under ideal conditions a law could be enactedaccordingto ajust constitutionand stillbe unjustor not wholly just (due to mistake or lack of adequate information).See Rawls,A Theoryof Justice,sec. 53, "TheDuty to Complywith an UnjustLaw."
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For well over a generation, academic energies largely have been devoted to the study of preferencesand what many see as the conative bases of democracy. A major benefit of recent discussions of deliberative democracy is that they have revivedinterest in the deliberativecomponent of democracy,therewith reinvigoratingthe democratic ideal. Whatever one's views about agents' ultimate reasons for action, the shifting of emphasis from preferences to the reasons that people have, or might have, to defend their choices should have beneficial effects, not just for normative political theory,but (indirectlyat least) for analyticalpolitical science, too. Even if one accepts the Humean view that what matters ultimately for explaining, and justifying, choices are people's preferences, still something can be learned about people's preferencesfrom the arguments and justifications given for them in democratic debate. Political actors are not always insincere, and not everythingthat is or can be said to defend laws and justify proposals is a rationalizationof desires. (Even Hume, who believed reason "inert,"still saw reason as informing and guiding desire.) Moreover,people do have principle- and conceptiondependent motivations, and ideals can be effective in shaping political decisions and choices. The skeptical political scientist does not have to give up moral skepticism to recognize the influence of ideas and moral arguments on collective choice. Formany normativepolitical theorists, the revivalof interest in democraticdeliberation can bringwelcome relief from the seeming predominance of rational choice theory in normative discussions. Conceding the benefits of this literature, deliberative inquiry still may help refine and even refocus the uses of rational choice theory in political philosophy. Deliberativedemocrats contend not simply that democratic deliberation can influence and even shape peoples' political preferences (Cohen, DD2, p. 199),but also that people have interests not explicable solely in terms of their revealedpreferences;that in addition to their particular good democratic citizens share certain common interests; and that it is the role of democratic deliberation to discover these common interests and the laws and policies needed to realize or maintain them. The implication is that there are objective normative standardsby which to assess democratic decisions that are independent of citizens' preferences, and these standardscan be applied to criticallyassess the validity
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and legitimacy of democratic decisions. In these regards (and others), deliberativetheorists differfrom advocates of aggregativeviews. Deliberativedemocrats disagree,we have seen, about whether we can know substantive requirements of justice and the common good before actual deliberations.They also disagreeabout the nature of the common good and if it involves more than justice; they differtoo about the interests of democratic citizens and about permissible public reasons. One of the more pressing problems confronting Rawlsiandeliberativetheorists is to respond to doubts about the fruitfulness of the concepts of reasonableness and public reason. Rawlshimself sought to give content to these ideas by developing them within the context of a liberalpolitical conception of justice. In so far as deliberative theorists (particularly Cohen and Gutmann and Thompson) rely on the ideas of reasonableness and public reason divorced from Rawls'sor some other (political liberal)conception of justice, some account of how they are to be understood is needed to respond to the uncertainties and objections of others. Another issue that needs attention is the relationship between duly enacted deliberativedecisions and their justice and legitimacy.Assuming that duly enacted deliberativedecisions are a condition of legitimacy,is justice, or something near to it, also needed for legitimacy?If not, then how far can deliberativedemocratic decisions strayfrom justice and remain legitimate? A thirdissue that needs furtherclarificationis whether and if so how the deliberativeideal is consistent with constitutional limits on democratic decisions, such as separation of powers, a bill of rights, and judicial review. This is one way into furtherdiscussion of the larger question of the relationshipbetween deliberativeand constitutional democracy.Arethe two compatible (as Rawlsand Michelman contend), or do they stand in opposition with one another (as others seem to maintain)?92
Finally,the main benefit of the deliberativeliteratureis that it has challenged theorists to rethinkideals centralto the democratic tradition.The ideas that democratic citizens are free and equal, that they are self-governing and should be subject only to laws that they have accepted, and that these laws should promote justice and the common good, are at the
92.
See Gutmannand Thompson, Democracyand Disagreement,p. 26-27, 33-39.
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core of democratic thought. The bare majoritarianismcharacteristicof aggregativeand pluralistviews has never been able to do justice to these elusive ideas. Deliberativedemocracy seeks to instill them with a more fitting content. It is guided foremost by the idea that for democratic citizens to be politically free they must be governed by laws grounded in reason, not in conflicting interests, which they can legislate and endorse in their capacity as equal citizens. Perhapsthe greatest challenge to deliberative democrats comes not so much in providing a coherent and intuitively appealing account of these ideas, for this can surelybe done. The real challenge is to supply reasons to believe that the deliberative ideal, once clarified,is feasible given human nature and the obstacles to just and harmonious social life.

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Princeton University Press

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Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment

123;Adam Przeworski, DD2, "De-

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Fools:A Critiqueof the BehavioralFounda5. See, for example,AmartyaSen, "Rational

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Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment

Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment

Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment

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HarvardUniversityPress, See Cass Sunstein, ThePartialConstitution(Cambridge:

Habermas,"Popular Sovereignty Procedure," DDi, p. 47;also in Habermas,Beas in

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autonomyis civicautonomy. 34.Thisis especiallyso if a furtherconditionof Rousseauian

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See Gutmannand Thompson, Democracyand Disagreement,p. 26-27, 33-39.

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