Social Forces, University of North Carolina Press

Consent, Informal Organization and Job Rewards: A Mixed Methods Analysis Author(s): Marty Laubach Source: Social Forces, Vol. 83, No. 4 (Jun., 2005), pp. 1535-1565 Published by: University of North Carolina Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598403 . Accessed: 28/02/2011 04:17
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and Consent,InformalOrganization Job a Rewards: MixedMethodsAnalysis*

MARTY LAUBACH, Marshall University

Abstract This study uses a mixed methods approach to workplace dynamics. Ethnographic observations show that the consent deal underlies an informal stratification that divides the workplace into an "informalperiphery,"a "conventionalcore"and an "administrativeclan." The "consentdeal" is defined as an exchange of autonomy, voice and schedule flexibility for intensified commitment, and is modeled as a single factor underlying these elements. When constructed as an additive scale, consent allows informal organization to be included in workplace models. Despite its derivation from subjectiveand informal processes,informal structure exerts an independent effect on objectivejob rewards such as wages.

Introduction The workplace is one of the most intensively studied areasin sociology, yet despite a century of studying organizations, we still have only a vague understanding of the dynamics between formal and informal organization, between structure and culture, and between objective and subjective elements. We can enter a workplace and adjust to the culture, identify and work with key informal power brokers, and manipulate that intersubjective dynamic which we know affects workplace outcomes. However, we have yet to fulfill Gouldner's (1959) call for reconciliation between the "rational" and "natural system" models and develop a theoretical framework that would move us from an understanding of the dynamics of a

* Thanksto MichaelWallace, Robert David R. Heise,P. Christopher Althauser, Earleyand J. Scott Long.Appreciationis also extended to the Indiana University1996 Social ResearchPracticum team who conductedthe Indiana Quality of EmploymentSurvey and to the many people still to willing to respondto surveys.Direct correspondence Marty Laubach,Departmentof Sociology and Anthropology, MarshallUniversity, One JohnMarshallDrive, Huntington,WV 25755-2678. E-mail:laubach@marshall.edu.

? The Universityof North CarolinaPress

SocialForces, June2005, 83(4):1535-1566

1536/ Social Forces83:4,June2005 to model of the workplace. Withoutthis generalmodel, workplace a generalized we can assertbut not demonstrate claimsthat:the formal,structural of the side has a minor role in determining or the informal attitudes, workplace workplace dynamicshas a measurable impacton objectiveoutcomes. This study is about measuringthe effects of one importantintersubjective in I dynamicthat is observable the generalized workplace. takea mixedmethods firstusing ethnographic datato identifythe elementsof that dynamic, approach: and then using surveydata to model it betweenthe structuralaspectsand job rewards. keydynamiccreates informalstratification workers This an of into (a) an administrative an elitegroupthatworksundernormative clan: controland enjoys core:the upper-tier, primarylabormarketworkingrelations;(b) a conventional conditions; majorityof primarymarketworkerswho work under bureaucratic and (c) an informal whose membersworkunderthe harshest "market" periphery: relationswith the strictesttechnicalor personalcontrol.I identifythis dynamic as the "consentdeal"- an informalrelationship betweenmanagersand workers that reflectsthe intensity by which managersenforce formal work rules and by which workersextend effort on workplacetasks (see Littlerand Salaman 1984). The intensityof this dynamicis measuredas an exchangeof autonomy, scheduleflexibility and voice by managersfor organizationalcommitmentby workers.For each worker,a high level of all elements indicates membership in the administrative clan and a low level of all indicatesmembershipin the extendedperiphery. Using these elements, I model the consent deal as a second-orderlatent factor,then construct an additive scale and measure its distributionbetween formalworkplacelevels and occupationtypes. Finally, incorporateconsent as I a measureof the informalintersubjective dynamicwithin a broaderworkplace model and test its effectsrelativeto the effectsof objectivestructural factorson workeridentitiesand wages. satisfaction, job
CONSENT

Burawoy's(1979) conception of workplace consent has been important to analyzingpower relationswithin the workplace.A number of ethnographies since have elaboratedon how managementgeneratesconsent and limits class consciousness(e.g., Hodson et al. 1994;McCabe1999;Smith 1996). However, these have failed to offer a conceptionof consent that can be used to broaden the research using statistical modeling.Indeed,studiesthat have used statistical havedeviatedfrom a relationaldefinitionin favorof worker-centered modeling measures - e.g., Vallas (1991) used worker perceptions indicative of class and and consciousness, Hodson (1999) used organizational citizenship resistance behaviors. A more usefulapproach offeredin Littler Salaman's was and (1984) discussion of control and consent.They begin with the observationthat the key factorin

Consent a Measure Informal as of / Organization1537 structureis the need to convertrawlaborpowerto determiningorganizational labor (Braverman 1974;Hache 1988), and that this is done through productive various labor control mechanisms(Edwards1979). They then echo Burawoy's observation that some process to generate worker compliance must also be designed into the organizationof the work process.They recognizethat while controlis oftenestablished workrulesandprocedures, these throughmanagement's rules cannot realistically accountfor all circumstances that arisein production. A normalizedproductionflow thereforerequires some amountof give and take, such as bending rules for extra effort. In fact, workerssometimes engage in a form of resistancecalled"workingto rule"in which they refuseto participate in this give and take,therebyslowingproduction.This requirement leadsLittler and Salamanto characterize work behaviorsand relationships the result real as of continualnegotiationsbetweenworkersand theirimmediatesupervisors over of whichis offeredin exchangefor interpretations formalworkrules,a flexibility a workingcommitmentto the overallobjectivesof management.Becausethis involvesan effectivesuspensionof the rules,procedures regulations and around which the formalorganization based,they concludethat consentis developed is "outsideformalorganizational for in procedures establishing legitimacy, what is describedas the 'informal'structureof the organization." (1984:68)
INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

theoristssince Roethlisberger Dickson ([1939] 1967) have and Organizational that informalorganization rivalsformalorganization its effecton in recognized the day-to-dayfunctioningof an enterprise. theoristshavediscussed Subsequent its importance for organizational dynamics (e.g., Burns and Stalker 1961; Pfefferand Salancik1978; Selznick 1949; Thompson 1967), and its effect on enhancingor restricting productivity(e.g., Burawoy1979;Graham1971;Mayo Reif et al. 1973;Roy 1959;Sayles 1963). However,despite this attention, 1933; there has been little consensuson how informalorganizationmanifestsacross WhileRoethlisberger Dicksondescribeinformalorganizations and organizations. as the "actually of human interaction" which the work of existingpatterns by the organizationis performed([1939] 1967:559),others characterize in such it termsas the "natural" "rational" v. system(e.g., Selznick1949;Thompson 1967), v. model (Burnsand Stalker1961), "culture" Ouchi (see "organic" "mechanic" andWilkins1985),"negotiated order" (Fine 1984),and"discourse" (Stinchcombe and Seiler 1990), none of which easilylend themselvesto modeling.Lawrence (1965:187) approacha usable construction with their discussion of workers as having a "status"which is determinedby "position in the informal social but Without a organization" never specifieshow that position was determined. clearspecification, workon informalorganization not advanced has quantitative much beyond network analysis,which reducesit to the number and type of communication linksbetweenworkers(e.g.,Mizruchi1994;Podolny1990; Vogel

1538 / SocialForces 83:4,June2005

has 1968;Wellmanand Berkowitz1988;).This specification obviouslimitations for cross-organizational studies. Some characteristicsof informal groups can be found in the literature. Gouldner the informal (1959:410) organization acknowledges ambiguity regarding by describing it as "a residual or cafeteriaconcept of diverse and sprawling contents." relatesthe "natural-systems He model" (which focuses on informal with his earlierdiscussion(1954) of"representative bureaucracy," organization) which he says has its basis in consent. He notes that consent springs from a of "consensus ends and values"(1954:223),and that an importantcomponent is workerperceptionof having"somemeasureof controloverthe initiationand He administration the rules." also notes that "formalrules gave supervisors of in withwhichtheycould'bargain' orderto secureinformal cooperation something from workers"(1954:173) and identifies schedule flexibilityas an important for "chip" informalcooperation. bargaining Other hints can be found in discussionsof the informalcoalitionsthat are coalitionsas workers who want foundwithinorganizations. Thompsondescribes to "maintainor enhance their positions regardlessof the official, authorized positions they hold" (1967:125),and who tend to have high levels of discretion Pfefferand and some voice in enterprisedecision-making processes.Similarly, coalitionsconsist of workerswho are (1) involvedin the "enactment Salancik's and environment" an essentialpartof decision-making, of the organization's drivenin part by "the quest for discretionand autonomy." (1978:261) (2)

Observations of Informal Workplace Stratification and the elementsof consent that underlieit I observedinformalstratification while conducting ethnographicobservationsof Family Finance Corporation and (FFC),a family-ownedfinancialenterprisethat went public,overextended, was absorbedby a largercorporation.'These observationswere made while I workedover four yearsin severalroles:a temporaryemployeeassignedto the company,a part-time computer programmer,a full-time administratorand Relevantobservationsare presentedin summaryform an outside consultant.2 because the agreementunder which managementallowed these observations Much to or excludedinterviews quotationsattributed membersof the workplace. and incidentsobserved of naturalconversations of the data thereforeconsists in the course of my duties. To underscorethat people did recognizemy dual I role as workerand observer, was giventhe nicknameof"the professor" my by and I encouragedits use among coworkers. supervisor, FFChad two periodswith distinctculturesduringthe study,beforeand after its move to a building constructedduring its intensivegrowth phase.When I started,the culturewas very informal,with an "organic" managementstyle (per such that all levels of Burns and Stalker1961), and had workingrelationships

Consent as a Measureof InformalOrganization/ 1539

Fourth Floor. 10-15 Workers Mostly Upper-Tier Piimnay Labor Market Some executives, some upper-level managers, some highly skilled professionals, some upper-status clerical, few lower-status clerical

Third Floor: 30-40 Workers Mostly Upper-Tier Primary Labor Market Some managers, many professionals, some upper-status clerical, some lower-status clerical Accounting, Human Resources, MIS, Risk Management

Second Floor: 40-50 Workers Mostly Lower-Tier Primary Labor Market Few managers, few professionals, some upper-status clerical, many lower-status clerical Legal, Purchasing, Operations, Special Project Teams

First Floor: 100+ Workers Mostly Secondary Labor Market Few managers, few professionals, few upper-status clerical, many lower-status clerical Collections, Mail,Records, Reception

Administrative Clan

Conventional Core

Extended Periphery

Figure 1. Apparent Distribution of Administrative Clan, Conventional Core and Informal Periphery among Floors at Site of Case Study

1540 / SocialForces 83:4,June2005

workers and to intermingled regularly most peoplecouldbe expected do anytask. FFC'smain office was located in the convertedstorefrontsof a strip mall, and therewereno partitionsbetweendesksand few betweenfunctionalareas.There werescoresof temporary workers the throughout officeshelpingwith whatturned out to be a disastrous manualconversionof accountrecordsbetweencomputer systems,and these workerswere often treatedas regularstaff. Justprior to the move to the new building, a new managementteam was recruitedfor finance, information systems and personnel functions, and the formationof this team coincidedwith a changeto a more formal,"mechanic" style. Workingrelationshipsbecame much more formal and professionalized. Functionalunits were separated,workerswere given cubicles,managerswere given offices, and security procedureswere implemented to restrictaccess to the buildingby non-employees. Hierarchical distancequicklyappeared between clerical staffandtemporary workers. corporation The management, professionals, in stratification the distributionof appearedto objectifyits new organizational functionalunits by floor,which I have depictedin Figure1. The move to the new building with offices, cubicles and new furniture and equipment signaled a change in culture away from the business'searlier incarnation as an entrepreneurialfree-for-allto an established corporation. Workersseemed to take themselvesmore seriouslyby dressingmore formally and decoratingtheir cubicles and offices in a more "professional" style. The took an active role in developing the culture by implementinga corporation newsletter stagingoccasional and Functional corporate picnicsandholidayparties. - traditions,languagesand social ties that units began developingsubcultures build unit solidarity.
INFORMAL STRATIFICATION

and My dutiesincludeddeveloping, installing troubleshooting computersystems, and these responsibilities allowedme to travelto all socialand physicallevelsof the new buildingwhere I was able to observethe transformation workplace in and attitudes. could see thatthe informalnetworksthatdeveloped I relationships but prior to the move didn'tcompletelydisappear, congealedinto an informal administrative structure appeared shadowthe formalstructure. alsonoted that to I the emergenceof an informalpolarization that had eitherbeen camouflaged or minimizedby the earlier culture.Thispolarization created threegroupsthatwere but distinguishable, whose boundarieswere continuallyin flux. I came to call
these groups the informal periphery, conventional core and administrative clan.

Theirdistribution within the building(and among functionalunits) is depicted in the shadedareasin Figure1.

Consent as a Measureof InformalOrganization/ 1541 InformalPeriphery

The informalperipherywas the "bottom" the informalstructure. of Workers in to this groupappeared visiblymanifestthe dissolutionof the boundarybetween and by temporary permanentworkersdescribed Smith(1997).Manywereeither or traditionalcontingentworkers(temporary part-timeworkers)or permanent workerswho weretreatedas contingent.Theirworktaskswerewell-definedand managerialcontrol was intensive and often antagonistic,whether conducted throughdirectattentionfrom a supervisoror automatedinto the technologyof theirwork.Theseworkersweregenerally givensuch highlyroutinizedtasksthat their contributioncame more from attendancethan applicationof a skill set, a starkrealitythat was reflectedin the minimal scheduleflexibilitythey received. For many workers,this outsider status was temporary,until their general to morerelaxed was to or supervision proficiency recognized be sufficient warrant until they wereableto demonstrate some levelof commitmentor skill.However, to thereappeared be some workers who wereconsistently to relegated out-group of these were simply due to deficient individual performance. status. Some Otherswere due to membershipin a racialor ethnic minorityor a subordinate work group being assimilatedthrough a merger.Still others simply workedin positions which had experiencedsuch high levels of turnoverthat incumbents beforeany opportunityto neededto show extraordinary patienceor proficiency improvetheir situation. in wererarely Workers the informalperiphery acknowledged management, by but when they were they were usually referredto with terms that indicated unreliabilityand expendability.On one instance when I was walking on the he first floor with one of the higherlevel managers, told me that these workers workersin the informal peripheryrespondedin were "clockwatchers." Many kind to this treatment, showinglow levelsof dedicationand sometimesevincing an minor formsof resistance. them,the enterprise For represented onerouswork environmentwith few redeemingfeaturesbeyond a paycheck.
ConventionalCore

core."These The majorityof workerswere in what I called the "conventional rules apply.Occupations are the workersfor whom the formal organizational but in this group includeeverythingfrom clericalto management, the workerconcerns.For tend to be dominatedby bureaucratic organizationrelationships who arehighlycommitted, example,thesemight be clericalor technicalworkers but their autonomyand otherwork conditionswere no differentfrom theirless the as committedcolleagues dictatedby theirformalposition.Similarly, corealso or includedprofessionals managerswhose positions gavethem very high levels of autonomy,schedule flexibilityand input into the organization,but whose

1542 / SocialForces 83:4,June2005

with the corporation were level of commitment- the alignmentof interests low relatively in comparisonto their peers.
Administrative Clan

Soon after starting work, and despite my status as a temporaryworker,my technicalskillsand managerial placedme in an informaltechnicalbackground administrativegroup that cut across the organization'sfunctional units and formal hierarchicalstructures.This group, which I titled the "administrative to clan"afterOuchi's(1980) organization type, appeared operatein the manner described by Thompson (1967) and Pfeffer and Salancik of the "coalitions" (1978). It centeredon managementand professionalstaff,but extendeddeep into the organization, drawingin workerswith criticalinstitutionalknowledge of or idiosyncraticskills. The group often appearedas a clique or "in-group" workersat variouslevelsthroughwhich the most criticaladministrative activity seemedto flow.Membership not necessarily was commensurate with structural factorssuch as formalhierarchical position, formalskill set or tenure. There were numerous examples of offices in which workerswould hold identicaljob descriptionswith the same formalauthority, only one worker but would be recognizedand treatedas part of the clan. Some clan memberswould in have minor differentials title from workerswho were otherwisetheir peers; thesedifferentials servedonly to legitimizea greater reliance however, apparently on the "other dutiesas assigned" clauseof theirformaljob description. One work unit that was giventhe title of "special was with projects" staffedpredominantly clerical clanmembers who wouldconducthigh prioritydataentry(or datacleanEventhis unit was up) projectsto assistany functionalunit of the organization. stratifiedamong clericalclan who workedautonomouslyand clericalnon-clan who were more closelysupervised. As noted, identifyingmembersof the clan was generally easy,but specifying of characteristics membershipwas not. Therewere no set boundariesbetween members and non-members nor were there designated rituals defining "star" membership; people moved in and out of the group as their proverbial rose or fell. Membershipappearedto take the form of an aura of reliability, as if it had been confirmedby some ordeal.In many cases it had been - some memberswereknown for theirwillingnessto put forthheroiceffortsfor critical othersfor theirabilityto help defineor represent some importantaspect projects, of organizational All were trustedworkerswho knew how to manage culture. criticaltasksunder minimaldirection. One characteristic that seemed importantwas engagementwith corporate culturalactivities regardless the actualfeelingsthe clanmemberhad toward of the activity.Clan memberswould help plan and even bake special dishes for and in parties,read and even contributeto the newsletter, participate a "vision committee" that appeared be FFC'sequivalentto qualitycircles. to

Consent as a Measureof InformalOrganization/ 1543 This reliability and trustworthiness appeared to reflect a sense that the heroic efforts of these workers were motivated by a sincere concern for advancing FFC's interest. Members had aligned their interests so completely with the corporation that, for them, the typical control processes were not necessary. This alignment closely resembled Ouchi's (1979, 1980) clan organization form, but unlike for Ouchi, the alignment applied to this informal group instead of to the organization as a whole. Interestingly enough, my label for this group as the "administrative clan" resonated well for coworkers with whom I discussed the validity of the concept.
WORKPLACE POLARITY

The administrative clan and informal periphery embody a number of workplace polarities. Members of the administrative clan tend to be on the "fast track"for promotions, get the highest raises, and have better ties with other supervisors and coworkers, while members of the informal periphery are generally ignored. The correspondence between informal structure and flexibility theory's "core"and "periphery"(e.g., Berger and Piore 1980; McLoughlin and Clark 1988; Osterman 1975; Piore 1971) became apparent in worker responses to staff cuts that were forced by FFC'sfinancial troubles. The business had been closing branch offices for months with little reaction from workers at headquarters because the enterprise was thought to be consolidating work there. However, when almost all of the external branches were cut, headquarters experienced two waves of layoffs. The first wave hit workers at all levels of the formal organization, but was focused on members of the informal periphery.Although this wave included some managers and professionals, survivors were clearly not concerned for their own jobs. When asked about the layoffs of managers and professionals,they replied with statements suggesting that management was merely "cutting dead weight." However, when the second wave of layoffs included administrative clan members (including myself), survivors displayed considerably more concern that the enterprise was in serious trouble and that their own jobs were at risk. An organization that would cut clan members was now seen as being in deep trouble. When I was brought back as a consultant, I was told that each unit was required to give up a staff member, and that I was cut because of my dual commitment to FFC and to my academic research. In an interesting addendum to the layoffs, as if to underscore the contingent nature of the extended periphery, FFC hired a new cohort of these workers within weeks after the layoffs. When I asked why FFC was simultaneously hiring and laying off workers, Human Resources staff indicated that turnover within these positions was so high that these positions were not considered when making strategic staffing decisions for the enterprise.

1544/ Social Forces83:4,June2005

CHARACTERISTICS DEAL OF INFORMAL ORGANIZATION: THE CONSENT

Despite the three distinct informal strataI observed,there appearedto be an of underlyingcontinuum that created"degrees" clan and peripheryas people moved into and out of those groups.This continuumreflected varyinglevelsof of consent- a characteristic the corporation-employee relationship indicating withinthis the levelof activecooperationin the processof production.However, contextconsentmeans much more - implyinga level of engagementbetween coalitions the workerand the corporation,or at least one of the organizational At the that administer corporation. its high end this engagementmeansOuchi's clanrelations, wherecontrolis normative (e.g.,Kunda1992)andmaximumeffort of is assumed,and at the low end the lack of engagementmeans a relationship where controlis technicalor direct (Edwards1979), and supervision suspicion, is close,leadingto the "lessreliable" workerperformance describedby Gouldner (1954:161). in is Thiscontinuumof engagement observable whatI referto as the "consent of based on Littlerand Salaman's deal," (1984) conceptualization consent as an exchangeof relaxedenforcementof rules for alignmentof interest.This takes voiceand schedule the form of an exchangeof perceivedautonomy, flexibilityfor clan and is as clearlyvisible in the administrative commitment, organizational as it is clearlyabsent in the extended periphery.Perhapsthe most important of these offeringsfrom managementis the perceptionof autonomy,which is of broughtup in the literatureas a characteristic desirablepositions. regularly In the administrative even membersat non-professional, clericalsupport clan, to of levelsperceivethemselves havehigh levelsof autonomymore characteristic In the informalperiphery, even membersof management professional positions. are closelyscrutinized. in The next offeringfrom managementis the perceived abilityto participate clan decisions.Administrative members,even from lower formal organizational themselvesas influencingthe corporation.This influenceis positions,perceive not alwaysdirect, although they are sometimes asked and are alwayslistened to when offeringan opinion. Administrative clan membersare awarethat they influenceindirectlyby preparingformal reportsand exercisedisproportionate in participating informationchannelswhich shapemanagement's conceptionof issues (i.e., Pfefferand Salancik's "enactment process").On the organizational other hand, peripherymembersgenerally learnabout decisionsand sometimes even the problemsthey addressas the decisions are being implemented.In a more direct applicationof Hirshman's(1970) terms, when problemsdevelop, clan membersaremore comfortable "voice" while peripheral workers exercising are more likelyto "exit." Thethirdjob characteristic the consentdealis perceived in scheduleflexibility. Foradministrative members,this often startswith theirworkinglong hours clan

Consent a Measure Informal as of / Organization1545 when they are called to help complete time-sensitiveprojectsin exchangefor time off."In many cases this flexibilitytakes the form of clan "compensatory members not observing strict time rules, as in arrivinglate or leaving early. Often this flexibilityis more perceptualthan real,becausetheir commitments as administrative clan requireface time at the workplace. This flexibilityis best a clericalworker in my unit who often had problems finding exemplifiedby daycarefor her children,especiallywhen she was called in on her days off to work on criticalproblems.She would occasionallybring her children,and we would set up games on a computerto occupy them as she worked.We would not even haveconsideredthis for someonewho was not a clan member.My own scheduleis anotherexample- I often came in late,but while I was occasionally workedat home. Membersof the teased,coworkersrecognizedthat I regularly periphery,either because their contribution comes more from their presence than their skillsor becausethey areunderintensepressurefrom managers, have If no such flexibility. they were"clockwatchers" describedby managers, as their tardinessand leavingearlywas being no less closely scrutinizedby those same managers. The fourth characteristic,organizationalcommitment, is the employee's contributionto the consent deal. It is criticalfor clan membershipand absent in the informalperiphery. Administrative clan membersact as if their interests are fully alignedwith the enterprise,and give much of themselvesto it, often to the detrimentof their familiesand social life. This commitmentis regularly not tested in extra responsibilities associatedwith their formaljob duties. For instance,the InformationSystemsunit at FFCwas also responsiblefor snow the removaland administering building'scleaningcontracts.One clan member in that unit was severelytestedwhen he found that someone on the night shift had defecatedon the floor of the executivesuites' restroom.He acceptedhis to responsibility cleanthe restroombecausethe cleaningcompanycould not be calledbeforethe executivescame in for the day.The incidentcan also be seen as who held the samelow regard workers, expressionof contemptfrom peripheral for the corporationas they felt the businesshad for them. The relativelevel of each of these of these componentsreflectsthe extent of are the consentdealbeingmade at the individuallevel.All characteristics present at high levels for membersof the administrative clan, and all are low or absent Workers with mismatchedor moderatelevels are in for the informalperiphery. mass of the conventionalcore.A professionalor manager the undifferentiated who has high levels of autonomy,voice and flexibilitybut does not returnhigh as At levelsof commitmentis not regarded clan.3 the other end, a temporaryor workerwho works in a very restrictive but demonstratesa high job entry-level in level of commitmentwould not be regarded the sameway as membersof the and informalperiphery, would be more likelyto be advancedin formalposition before otherswith more tenure.

1546 / SocialForces 83:4,June2005

This mismatch between the worker'scommitment and job characteristics offered informallyby managementcan be seen as indication of a boundary through which workers are moving into and out of the clan or periphery. It also suggests that the direction of effects between job characteristicsand commitment actuallygoes back and forth over time. Workersdemonstrating higher commitment than their position warrantsare sometimes informally extendedgreaterlevels of autonomy,voice and flexibilitywithin their jobs, or might even be promoted to positions with the commensuratecharacteristics. Perhapsthe best example of this was the SpecialProjectsUnit, which offered clericalworkersan "elite"status and very flexible work rules for working on criticalproblemsthat requiredinitiativeand creativity. On the other hand, workersin professionaland managerial positions who do not demonstratecommitment commensurate with the levels of autonomy, voiceand flexibility come with theirpositionsoftenhavethose characteristics that Threeexamplesillustratethis point. In the first case,a vice president restricted. who had been a college friend of the presidentbegan makinggreaterdemands for money and perksfrom the enterprise becauseof a successfulprojecthe had Whenthis did not come quickly, was foundto be secretly he initiated. negotiating for a position at a rivalcompany. This act of disloyalty overcamehis valueto the organizationso his autonomy,flexibilityand authoritywere severelyrestricted until he left. In the second case, a new set of managersfrom a conglomerate that took over the enterprise on imposed the same restrictions the founderand and drovehim out. Perhaps best examplewas the thirdcase of an the president, administrator who was part of the clan for much of the observation period,but who lost statusthroughhis decliningcommitment.His personality abrasive, was and the companymoved awayfrom the technologywhich was his specialty, but his earlydemonstrations commitmentweresufficient warrant of to clanstatusfor his most of his tenure.The action which precipitated fall from the clan and his not dismissal tellingan assistant to performsome workrequested was subsequent of his unit.4The words least compatiblewith clan status are the following:"I
won't do that it is not my job."

The Consent Scale The ethnography demonstrated that an informalstructurethat is importantto is observable organizational dynamics throughthe four elementsof the consent deal:autonomy,voice, scheduleflexibilityand commitment.I next wonderedif this informalworkplace in dynamiccould be observedmore generally statistical models constructedfrom surveydata.This formulationwould allow me to test of element propositionsabout the relativeeffectson job rewards this subjective and the more traditionalstructuralelementsused in workplacemodels. In the

Consent a Measure Informal as of / Organization1547 following, I refer to this subjectiveelement as either "consent"or "informal organization,'dependingon the context,but it must be understoodthat since the consent deal underliesinformalorganization, regardthem as analytically I - dual sides of the same coin. synonymous The procedurefor modeling the consent scale is simple enough, but it first must face a paradigmatic objectionthat the three elementsof the consent deal which aregenerally as characteristics autonomy, voice and regarded structural scheduleflexibility arewell established causally as to subjective statessuch prior as the thirdelement- organizational commitment(e.g., Lincolnand Kalleberg Porterand Steers1982).This objection 1990;Mathieuand Zajac1990;Mowday, is met first by noting that some of the earlyproponentsof structuralanalysis as recognizedthe subjectivenatureof these characteristics outcomes of power Wallace Althauser1981).Secondly, and when obtainedfrom struggles(Kalleberg, these characteristics in realityself-reported are of surveys, subjective perceptions an individual worker's situation.Hackmanand Lawler demonstrated that (1971) thesemakegood approximations5 objective for structural but characteristics, they do not havethe consistency objectivity or the paradigm. example, For impliedby a worker's to autonomyand scheduleflexibilityare vulnerable changesbrought on by a changeof managers. job can be completelyrevampedand incumbents A "reined in" by a new manager without making any formal changes to job or charts.Self-reported characteristics alsonot are descriptions organizational job when askedto ratetheirlevel of autonomy,an administrative objectivebecause, clan memberin a clericalposition might offerthe same responsesas a manager, a that in creating perceptual equivalence beliesthe veryrealdifferences autonomy betweenclerksand managersbased on the differences their tasks. in Ultimatelyhowever,this paradigmaticconcern about levels of causalityis resolved modelingthe consentdealas a latentfactoroperatingat a levelthat is by or characteristics causally priorto and measured all four subjective perceptual by - a relationship measuredby confirmatory factoranalysis.
METHODS AND DATA

The data set used in the model was collected as the Indiana Quality of EmploymentSurvey(Wallace,Jamisonand Shin 1996), which was conducted in the summerof 1996 using the facilitiesof the Centerfor SurveyResearch at the IndianaUniversityInstitutefor Social Research. The IQESresultedin 705 completedcases(64 percentresponserate)fromacrossIndianaselected randomly from working adults (defined as people over aged 18 working more than 20 hours per week) employed in non-agriculture jobs. A randomizingprocedure for selectingrespondentsfrom householdsensuredagainstbias on the basis of who answeredthe telephone.The questions used in constructingmeasuresin this study are presentedin the Appendix,arrangedby factorswhich they were initiallydesignedto measure.

1548/ Social Forces83:4,June2005 One note regarding the of samplesize:because dynamics informal organization are differentfor small organizations(< 10 workers),the model is restrictedto This reducedthe samplesize to 582. with 10 or more workers. organizations
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF CONSENT

commitment are Given that autonomy,schedule flexibilityand organizational themselvesmeasuredas latent factors,consent is modeled as a second-order latent factor underlyingthese first-orderfactors.Figure 2 depicts the model with parameterestimates.The number of cases for this model is 557 due to list-wise deletion of missing values. Estimatesare computed by AMOS 3.62 to distribution-free estimators compensatefor distribution using asymptotically problems caused by categoricalvariables.(See Bollen 1989; Kline 1998.) The as (see freedom a thirdmeasureof autonomy Appendix), originalmodel included whichindicatedthatthe model did not fit the data but thatproducedfit statistics (X2= 51.2, df = 32, p = .016). By droppingfreedom,the fit statisticssupported the assertionthat the revisedmodel fits the data (X2= 21.2, df = 24, p = 0.63). the Eventhough this left two indicatorsfor autonomy, model is still identified coefficient (c = .74) indicatesthat this is a Kline (1998:235).Cronbach's per reliablemeasurefor consent.
DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

is scalein whichthe itemsareweighted A moreusefulformfor consent an additive by the paths from the latent factor (see Figure2). Heise and Bohrnstedt(1970) offerseveralstatisticsto test the suitabilityof compositescales.With these data, their invaliditystatisticfor consent(W<.01)verifiesthat thereis only one factor, = betweenthe scaleand theirvaliditystatistic(PTS .88) showsa high correlation statistic6 = .80), the use (Q the underlyingfactor,and alongwith their reliability of the compositescaleis supported. The actualboundariesbetween informalperiphery,conventionalcore and clan administrative are ill-definedand fluid,so consent reallycan be viewed as a variable.However,for analysesin continuousvariableratherthan a categorical which the categoriesare important- such as their relativeproportionswithin workplacecategories- a reasonablesplit can be made in which the informal peripheryconsists of workerswhose consentscores are more than a standard whose clan deviationbelowthe mean,and the administrative consistsof workers deviationabovethe mean.Table1 reports scoreis more than a standard consent and acrossformalorganizational thesedistributions positions,occupations profit and includes the F statisticwhich tests for differencesin means of the status, underlyingconsentscorefor eachworkplacecategory. to PanelA equatesformalorganization Wright's (1978) formulationof social classes,effectivelyreturningWright'sformulationto its origin as stratification

Consent as a Measureof InformalOrganization/ 1549

Maximum Likelihood Estimates = Chi-square 30.556 = Degreesof freedom 24 level Probability = .167 N = 560 Figure 2. Measurement Model for Consent (Standardized Parameters)

1550 / SocialForces 83:4,June2005 Table 1. Cross Tabulation of Combined Data for Informal Organization Groups by Formal Structural Classifications, Occghupations and Organization Type
Panel A. Class (per Wright) Non-Autonomous Worker Semi-Autonomous Worker Front Line Supervisor LowerManager Upper/Middle Manager LargeEmployer-Capitalist informal periphery 23.7% 11.9% 16.2% 8.0% 4.7% .0% 15.5% conventional administrative clan core cases 70.5% 71.9% 71.6% 64.8% 58.1% 38.9% 68.2% 5.8% 16.3% 12.2% 27.3% 37.2% 61.1% 16.3% 224 135 74 88 43 18 582 consent mean 25.98 26.78 29.39 31.24 33.38 37.05 28.56

F statistic for means 23.53** df 5

Panel B. Occupation Managers Professionals Technicians SalesWorkers Office Workers ServiceWorker Production Worker Laborer

informal periphery 6.3% 14.3% 15.4% 6.5% 20.2% 18.7% 9.9% 26.7% 15.5%

conventional administrative clan core cases 61.1% 64.3% 80.8% 71.7% 71.4% 65.3% 81.7% 63.4% 68.2% 32.6% 21.4% 3.8% 21.7% 8.3% 16.0% 8.5% 9.9% 16.3% 95 84 26 46 84 75 71 101 582

consent mean 32.69 29.18 25.88 30.49 26.91 27.68 28.39 26.05 28.56

F statistic for means 9.85** df 7 informal periphery 21.2% 13.4% 22.4% 15.5% conventional administrative core clan cases 68.7% 70.3% 49.0% 68.2% 10.1% 16.4% 28.6% 16.3% 99 434 49 582 consent mean 26.38 28.93 29.77 28.56

Panel C. OrganizationType Government (F,S,L) PrivateCompany Not-for-profit

F statistic for means 6.47** df 2

Consent a Measure Informal as of / Organization1551 in the workplace.This panel demonstratesa relationshipbetween formal and informalorganization roughlydepictedin Figure1, whereeven workersat high consentscores, and workersat formal positions have informal periphery-level clan-levelscores.Managers and the lowestformallevelscan haveadministrative executives whose consent scoresplacethem in the informalperipherymight be consideredexamplesof Hogan, Curphyand Hogan'sassertionthat the failure rate among executives is 50 percent and that the "base rate for managerial the is (1994:494)However, basictrend incompetence between60 and 70 percent." in PanelA is the expectedincreaseof the proportionof clan at increasing levels of formal organizationand the increasingproportionof informalperipheryat lower formallevels. PanelB reportsthat the threeoccupationswith the largestpercentage clan of membersare managers, salesand professionals, resultwhich demonstrates a the importanceof sales workersto the informaladministrative networkingof the The of organization. occupation typeswith the lowestpercentage clanandhighest serviceworkersand technicians, officeworkers, a percentperipheryarelaborers, resultwhich demonstrates that nonprofessional office workers(e.g., secretaries, and and receptionists accountclerks)andtechnicians (e.g.,legalassistants licensed nurses)now have lower standingthan productionworkers. practical Panel C reportsthat governmentand non-profit corporationshave higher in of than for-profit do. percentages workers the informalperiphery corporations In addition, government a lowerpercentage peoplein the administrative the has of clan while non-profitenterprises havethe highestpercentages workersin the of clan. This can be interpretedas supportingthe assertionthat profit-producing organizationsare more concernedwith generatingconsent than government and in are corporations, thatworkers not-for-profit corporations highlypolarized, but these ideas need to be exploredfurther.
MODELS OF INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

The final step in this analysisis to constructa workplacemodel that includes the effectsof informalorganization job rewards. on This model (Figure3) draws on typical models used for attitudinal studies (e.g., Leicht and conceptually Wallace1994;Lincolnand Kelleberg 1990;Mathieuand Zajac1990),but differs in using the consent deal as a measurefor position in the informal structure of the workplace,placed causallybetween structuraljob characteristicsand outcomes. Themodelstarts with individual characteristics as age,sex,race,education such and marital status, and then adds the respondent'sworkplacecharacteristics such as corporationsize, scope (local to international), organizationtype (i.e., government and not-for-profit corporation) and the industry concentration (1978) measuresof the effect of the by sales - one of Pfefferand Salancik's environment.These individualand organizational characteristics corporation's

1552 / SocialForces 83:4,June2005

FormalPosition and Job Characteristics Technological Change Part-time Work Hoursat OtherJobs HoursWorked Home at Tenure withOrganization Substantive Complexity Skill Occupational UnionMembership Formal Structure Position Class) (i.e., Wright's

EmployerOffers Autonomy Schedule Flexibility in Participation Decisions

Figure 3. WorkplaceModel that Includes the Effectsof Informal Organizationon Job Rewards

such as the level of technical are seen as influencingpositional characteristics changein the job, whetherit is parttime, the numberof hoursworkedat home, the numberof hours workedat otherjobs, the substantive complexity, objective skill requirement(from the Dictionaryof OccupationalTitles), organizational tenure,union membership,and formal position (using Wright'scategoriesin of Appendix1).All of thesearemodeledas determinants positionin the informal organizationas measuredby the consent deal, and the resultsare reportedin Table2. The effectsof formalposition in the organization(Wright's scale) are reportedboth for the individualstrataand for all levelsas a whole using a sheaf coefficient(Heise 1972). Position in the informal organizationappearsto be primarilydetermined though with an R2of only .29, the largestportion of the by job characteristics, factorsin the model. The strongest varianceremainsunexplainedby structural effect comes from position in the formal organizational structure,followedby substantivecomplexity,job skill, and union membership.Other determinants such as being male, education, not working for government,and working in a competitiveindustryappearto be mediatedthroughformalposition as they is drop out when formalstructure enteredin the model, suggestinga somewhat meritocraticapproachto informal stratificationonce formal stratificationis controlled. In the extendedmodel,informalpositionis includedamongthe determinants for threecommonworkoutcomesthatareprominentin the literature: wages,job

Consent as a Measureof InformalOrganization/ 1553 Table 2. OLS Regressions of Informal Position on Individual, Organizational, Job Characteristics and Formal Structural Position
Full Models Individual characteristics Gender (female=1) Race (white= 1) Age (by category) Education (years) Marital status (married=l) Organizationalcharacteristics Employer size (by category) Organization Scope (local-global) Not-for-profit (=1) Government (=1) Industry concentration (by sales) Position and job characteristics Technologicalchange Part-time work Hours at other jobs Hours worked at home Tenurewith organization Substantivecomplexity Occupational skill (a) Union Membership Formal position: Wright'sclass Class:LargeEmployer (= 1) Class:LargeManager (= 1) Class:Small Manager (= 1) Class:First Line Supervisor (= 1) Class:Autonomous Worker(= 1) Class Sheaf Coefficient R2 N= 537 .04 .08 .23 .03 .03 -.03 .07 .05 .26** .16** -.12** .02 .04 -.02 .03 .02 .23** .17** -.10* Individual -.09* .03 .04 .17** .03 Organization -.09 .02 .06 .19** .04 Job Formal Position -.09* .00 .00 -.02 -.02 -.06 .00 .01 .00 -.02

-.02 -.04 .04 -.12* -.12**

.00 -.02 .02 -.11* -.10*

.00 -.02 .01 -.07 -.07

.14** .14** .15** .10* -.10 .27** .29

Note:Coefficients standardized. are of Titles(U.S.Department Labor). of (a) FromDictionary Occupational for workers. (b) Thereference category classis non-autonomous * <.05 ** <.01 (two tailedtest) p p

1554 / SocialForces 83:4,June2005 Table 3. OLS Regressions of Work Identity, Job Satisfaction and Wages on Individual, Organizational and Position Characteristics
Full Models Individual characteristics Gender (female= ) Race (white=l) Age (by category) Education (years) Marital status (married=l) Organizationalcharacteristics Employersize (by category) OrganizationScope (local-global) Not-for-profit (=1) Government (=1) Industry concentration (by sales) Position and job characteristics Technologicalchange Part-time work Hours at other jobs Hours worked at home Tenurewith organization Substantivecomplexity Occupational skill (a) Union Membership Formal position: Wright'sclass Class:LargeEmployer (= 1) Class:LargeManager (= 1) Class:Small Manager (= 1) Class:First Line Supervisor (= 1) Class:Autonomous Worker(= 1) Class Sheaf Coefficient Informal position Consent R2 N .07 .02 .07 .00 .03 .17** .02 .02 .01 -.04 .02 -.07 -.04 .22** -.03 .01 .01 -.13** -.03 .07* .09* .08* .28** .17** Work Identity .01 .07 -.03 -.06 -.01 Job Satisfaction .07 .10** .05 -.01 -.03 Wages -.29** .02 .07* .15** .05

.02 .01 .10* .07 -.07

.01 -.01 -.03 .10* .02

.02 .07* -.02 -.10** .06*

-.02 .01 .01 -.02 .08 .08

-.0 -.10* -.13** -.15** -.02 .17**

.17** .06 .04 .01 -.06 .20**

.24** .17 537

.59** .40 537

.09** .60 512

Note:Coefficients standardized. are of of Titles(U.S.Department Labor). (a) FromDictionary Occupational for workers. (b) Thereference category classis non-autonomous * <.05 ** <.01 (two-tailed test) p p

Consent a Measure Informal as of / Organization1555 and satisfaction workeridentity(often referred as work commitment).These to resultsare reportedin Table3, and demonstratethat informalposition exertsa tested in the model. strongeffect on the job rewards is Positionin the informalorganization the strongestfactorinfluencingboth the respondent'ssatisfactionwith the job and subjectivesense of identity as a worker.The results regardingjob satisfactionare interestingin that informal position dwarfsthe other significantfactors- substantivecomplexity,formal position, being white, and working for government- a finding that suggests that in an economy transitioningfrom productionto serviceand office work, is job satisfactionin largeorganizations derivedmore from informalworkplace relationships then being intrinsic to the type of work performed. Another interesting result is that the substantivecomplexity,a subjectivemeasure of the emphasisplaced on skill, is significantwhile the objectivemeasureof skill based on the Dictionaryof OccupationalTitles is not. Finally,while the sheaf coefficientmeasures magnitudeof the effectof formalposition,the direction the is obvious based on the negativeresultsof supervisorsand managersrelative to nonautonomous workers, indicating that less autonomy (or perhaps the that accompaniesit) leads to satisfaction. The resultsfor worker responsibility that few identitydemonstrate therearerelatively factors beyondinformalposition in this post-industrial that makeidentityas a workersalient,only substantive era complexityand workingfor a non-profitcorporation. The model for wagesis particularly interesting. Manyfactorsin the model are of wages,with the strongest effectscomingfrombeingmale, significant predictors formalposition,union membership, education. and objectiveskillrequirements, the resultsshow that the net effectof informalorganizationis almost However, half the effect of formal organization.It has the same effect as organizational the for tenure,and has more effectthan substantive complexity, differential age, in an organization is broaderin scope,workingin a positionwhich that working requireshours at home, and workingin a more highly concentratedindustry. Again, even with the controls for objective position and job characteristics, this effect on one of the most visible and objectivework outcomes can only be as of side interpreted a very realmanifestation the informaland intersubjective of the organization.

Conclusion Consent,measuredby the exchangeof autonomy,voice and scheduleflexibility commitment by workers,createsan informal by employersfor organizational stratification mirrors that traditional stratifications basedon structural workplace factors. a productof the intersubjective As worldof the workplace, consentoffers a finerresolutionon the effectsof the types of experiences that affectworkplace attitudesand behaviorsthan traditionalobjectivestructuralmeasures.Created

1556 / SocialForces 83:4, June2005

as a scalefrom surveydata,it offersquantitative analystsan abilityto studythis worldacrossworkplaces waysthat complementthe findingsof in intersubjective Thismeasureoffersa largestepin fulfilling and ethnographers networkanalysts. Gouldner'scall for reconcilingthe rationaland naturalsystemsmodels into a more powerfulsynthesis. Whilethe ethnographic datasupportthe contentvalidityof the scaleand the statistic demonstrates the additivescaleadequately that Heise-Bohrnstedt validity of measuresthe underlyingfactor,determinations constructvaliditycan only be established througha processdescribed Bollenas testingwhetherthe measure by in derived "relates otherobservedvariables a wayconsistentwith theoretically to that This studybeginsthatprocessby demonstrating the (1989:189). predictions" distributionof informalperipheryand clan among occupationsand by formal The but position complements, does not duplicateformalstructures. workplace exertsa dominant that modelscontinueit by demonstrating informal organization but outcomessuchas workeridentityandjob satisfaction, influenceon subjective has an importantinfluenceon objectiveoutcomessuch as wages. also The proposedmeasureof consent and the connectionbetweenconsent and informal organization is latent but not obvious in the workplaceliterature. one Perhaps of the virtuesof this analysisis that it addsno new measuresto the studies.While it is no great available workplace for already long list of variables with newsthatsome functionof autonomyand commitmentis highlycorrelated much of what sociologists find interestingin the workplace,this repackaging of of variablesis an important reconceptualization the workplace.It offers a reduction and clarificationof existing models, and an opportunity to revisit existingdata sets as well as developadditionalnew data to expandthe study of consentand informalorganization. perceptions, analysis usingconsentshouldfocuson otherattitudes, Subsequent behaviors and outcomes. Models that include informal organization could shed light on how the intermix of subjectiveand structuralfactors influence promotion and pay equity, perceptionsof workplacerelations,discrimination, as well as broaderperceptionssuch as the meaningfulnessof the job and the rights of workersand management.Ultimately,it is hoped that this scale will relations the roundout workplace models,and facilitate studyof how workplace and boundaries affectworkerattitudeson socialfactors transcend organizational not directlyrelatedto the workplace. Additional the This study demonstrates power of mixed methods research. that shouldidentifyotherinformaldynamics haveclearly mixedmethodsresearch of observations the effectswithinthe overallworkplace. observable Ethnographic should includea searchfor measuresthat can be used in surveysand workplace a discussionof the dynamicsthat can guide the constructionof models by their more quantitative colleagues.

Consent as a Measureof InformalOrganization/ 1557 Notes with procedures 1. This studywas conductedin accordance approved the Bloomington by Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects,Bryan Hall, Room 10a, Campus A IN underprotocol#97-1509. moredetailedreportof resultsis Bloomington, 47405-1219 is stillbeingcompiled. FamilyFinanceCorporation a pseudonym. in around observations FFC, is augmented at but 2. Discussion offered thisstudyrevolves my by years of observationsduring my prior careeras a technicianand managerof data processing systems. 3. I note again that my conflicting commitments to researchand to FFC became a in consideration my gettinglaid off. who relatedthis storyto me were shockedby it, treatingit as an 4. The clan informants exampleof despicable heresy. 5. Hackman Lawler and betweenemployee, and (1971) foundhigh correlations supervisor for such researcher and Thishas ratings job characteristics asvariety, autonomy taskidentity. the as for measures. supported use of worker perceptions an approximation objective 6. Thesearecomputedusingthe communality factorscoresfromSPSS's and Axis Principle method.Because ct extraction Cronbach's is knownto be a lowerlimit,Heiseand Factoring Bohrnstedt offera moregeneralized measure. reliability

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Appendix 1. Definitions of Variables.

Standardresponses are =strongly agree, 2=somewhat agree, 3=somewhat disagree, and 4=strongly disa not prompted. These are recoded to reflect higher levels of agreement, with "neither agree nor disagree" alphas are computed for organizations with more than 10 employees and no missing values for consent Consent Organizationalcommitment

Agreement with statements (standard responses): 1. I am willing to work harderthan I have to help my employersucc 2. Ifind that my values and my employer'svalues are very similar 3. I am proud to be workingfor my employer Computed as mean score. Reliability a = .70

Autonomy

Agreement with statements (standard responses): 1. I have a lot of say about what happenson my job. 2. It is basicallymy own responsibilityto decide how my job gets don 3. My job gives me a lot of freedom about how I do my work [this was dropped from full consent model] Computed as mean score. Reliability ac=.66 Please tell me how much say you have in thefollowing areas ( =a lot of say, 2=some say, 3=none at all; reflected for higher values to indicate greater say): 1. The days of the weekyou work. 2. The time of day you work. 3. The number of hoursyou work Computed as mean score. (Each item was adjusted such that 1=1, 2=3, and 3=5) Reliability a = .79

Schedule flexibility

Voice

Agreement with statements (standard responses): My job does not allow me to participate in important decisions that affect my organization. (Not reflected so higher values indicate greater participation)

Consent

Computed from confirmatory factor model path parameters as consent = .5370 * workhard + .8946 * myvalues + .9038 * iamprou + .6400 * sayhours + .7283 * saydays + .6387 * saytime + .7040 * idecide + 1.4833 * lotofsay + 1.0000 * partdecs. Reliability a = .74

Individual Characteristics Female White Age Education Dichotomous variable (Female= 1)

Computed as a dichotomous variable (white = 1) from a question that offered a selection of racial groupings. The sample was 89.3% w Computed from year of birth.

Asked as highest grade of school or level of education and grouped by attainment (1=high school, 2=some college, 3=college degree an graduate work)

Married

Computed as a dichotomous variable (married = 1) from a questio that included living with a partner, widowed, divorced, separated, and never married.

OrganizationalCharacteristics Employer size

How many people workfor your employerat all locations? Respondents who gave the exact number were assigned this numbe respondents who gave a category response were assigned the catego mean. Note: In 12% of the cases the survey staff obtained organizat size through outside sources.

Organizationscope

Respondents were coded at the broadest scope from the following Does the company (organization)you workfor have more than 1 location in Indiana?Does your company (organization) have locatio in other states?Does your company (organization) have locations ou the United States?

Not-for-profit Government Industry concentration by sales

In your presentjob do you workfor the government,a private comp a not-for-profitorganization,or are you self-employed?(Not-for-pro

In your presentjob do you workfor the government,a private comp a not-for-profitorganization,or are you self-employed?(Governmen

Respondents were asked what kind of business or industry they w for, with a follow up question asking what product or service the c provided. These were coded to the 1990 Industrial Classification S using the AlphabeticalIndex of Industriesand Occupations,publish the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Indust environmental data such as the concentrationratio in corporatesal appended by industry code based on data obtained from the IRS S Statistics of Income, 1993. CorporateIncome TaxReturns.Missing v (i.e. from government organizations) were recoded to the sample to ensure that the cases are not excluded from the overall analysis not contribute to the analysis of this factor.

Positionand Job Characteristics Technologicalchange

Sinceyou beganyour presentjob, how much change has there been i technologyyou use on your job? (1 =very much, 2=some, 3=not ver

An additional volunteered category of"none" was added and resp were reflected to increase with increasing change.

Part-time work

Computed from On average,how many hoursper week do you wor (1 = less than 35 hours)

Hours at other jobs Hours worked at home Organization tenure Substantivecomplexity

On average,about how many hoursper week do you work in all othe outside of your main job?

On average,about how many hoursper week, if any, do you work at doing thingsfor your job? For about how long haveyou workedforyourpresent employer? Coded as years. Computed from the following

How long does it take to learn the key aspectsof your job? (1 =a few hours, 2=a day, 3=a few days to a week, 4=several weeks, 5=2 to 5 months, 6=6 months to a year, 7=a few years, 8=5 years o

My job requiresa high level of skill. (Standard agreement responses

I am constantlylearning now things on my job. (Standard agreemen

Computed as mean score (LEARNJOB/2,HISKILL,and LEARNI Reliability a = .67 Occupational skill

Respondents were asked their job title and normal duties, which w then coded into DOT Occupational Codes. For distribution by oc groups, see Table 1. Occupational averages were obtained for eigh related measures (SEI, DOT data and people scores, average GED and math scores, specific vocational preparation, averageeducatio occupation, and percent of occupation with college degree). Thes computed as z-scores and averaged into a skill scale, which was re a dichotomous variable for high (scale > 0) and low (scale <0) ski

Union membership

Do you currently belong to a union? (Union = 1)

FormalOrganizationalPosition Based on ErikWright's(1978) model of social class including "contradictorylocations" based in owners Employersize Organizationtype Is a supervisor Number supervised Skilledoccupation FormalOrganization Position How many people workfor your employerat all locations?.

In your presentjob do you workfor the government,a private comp a not-for-profitorganization,or areyou self-employed? In your job, do you supervisethe work of other employees? (Supervisor = 1) How many people do you supervisedirectlyor indirectly?

As above, but recoded into a dichotomous variable for high (scal and low (scale < 0) skilled worker.

1. Non-Autonomous Worker: self-employed, non-supervisory, not not work in a "skilled"occupation

2. First Line Supervisor:not self-employed and supervises 5 or les

3. Semi-AutonomousWorker: self-employed, non-supervisory not supervises 5 or fewer people, works in a "skilled"occupation

4. LowerManager:not self-employed and supervises between 6 a

5. Upper/MiddleManager:not self-employed and supervises mor 20 people

6. LargeEmployer/Capitalist: self-employed and employs 10 or m

WorkOutcomes Workeridentity (often viewed as work commitment) Agreement with statements (standard responses): 1. My work is the main part of who I am.

2. I have other activities more important than my work. (this was cod disagreementas high values) 3. My main satisfaction in life comesfrom my work. Reliability ct = .66 Job satisfaction

Uses standard satisfaction responses: 1. All in all, how satisfiedwould you say you are with your job? (1 = not at all satisfied,2 = not too satisfied, 3 = somewhat satisfied, 4 = very satisfied,and 5 = completelysatisfied) 2. If you had to decide all over again, how likely is it that you would take the same job?

3. How likely is it that you would recommendthis job to a goodfrien who was interestedin a job likeyours? Reliability a = .79 Wage levels

About how much will you earnfrom your main job this year? Respondents who did not answer directly were asked a series of qu that attempted to categorize wage levels into the following: $0-499 $5000-9999, $10000-14999, $15000-19999, $20000-24999, $2500 $30000-34999, $35000-39999, $40000-44999, $45000-49999, $50 $55000-59999, $60000-64999, $65000-69999, $70000-74999, and or over. The IQES had a 96% response rate to this. All responses re into wage categories.