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WCD Pilot Case Study*
Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Final Report: November 2000
Prepared by the World Commission on Dams (WCD) Secretariat
Secretariat of the World Commission on Dams P.O. Box 16002, Vlaeberg, Cape Town 8018, South Africa Phone: 27 21 426 4000 Fax: 27 21 426 0036. Website: http://www.dams.org E-mail: info@dams.org * See note on pilot study on page viii
Disclaimer
This is a working paper of the World Commission on Dams - the report published herein was prepared for the Commission as part of its information gathering activity. The views, conclusions, and recommendations are not intended to represent the views of the Commission. The Commission's views, conclusions, and recommendations will be set forth in the Commission's own report. Please cite this report as follows:
World Commission on Dams. Orange River Development Project, South Africa, Case Study prepared as an input to the World Commission on Dams, Cape Town, www.dams.org.
The WCD Knowledge Base

This report is one component of the World Commission on Dams knowledge base from which the WCD drew to finalize its report Dams and Development-A New Framework for Decision Making. The knowledge base consists of seven case studies, two country studies, one briefing paper, seventeen thematic reviews of five sectors, a cross check survey of 125 dams, four regional consultations and nearly 1000 topic-related submissions. All the reports listed below, are available on CD-ROM or can be downloaded from www.dams.org Case Studies (Focal Dams)
Grand Coulee Dam, Columbia River Basin, USA Tarbela Dam, Indus River Basin, Pakistan Aslantas Dam, Ceyhan River Basin, Turkey Kariba Dam, Zambezi River, Zambia/Zimbabwe Tucurui Dam, Tocantins River, Brazil Pak Mun Dam, Mun-Mekong River Basin, Thailand Glomma and Laagen Basin, Norway Pilot Study of the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams- Orange River South Africa
Country Studies
India China
Briefing Paper
Russia and NIS countries
Thematic Reviews
TR I.1: Social Impact of Large Dams: Equity and Distributional Issues TR I.2: Dams, Indigenous People and Vulnerable Ethnic Minorities TR I.3: Displacement, Resettlement, Rehabilitation, Reparation and Development TR II.1: Dams, Ecosystem Functions and Environmental Restoration TRII.1: Dams, Ecosystem Functions and Environmental Restoration TR II.2: Dams and Global Change TR III.1: Economic, Financial and Distributional Analysis TR III.2: International Trends in Project Financing
TR IV.1: Electricity Supply and Demand Management Options TR IV.2: Irrigation Options TR IV.3: Water Supply Options TR IV.4: Flood Control and Management Options TR IV.5: Operation, Monitoring and Decommissioning of Dams TR V.1: Planning Approaches TR V.2: Environmental and Social Assessment for Large Dams TR V.3: River Basins Institutional Frameworks and Management Options TR V.4: Regulation, Compliance and Implementation TR V.5: Participation, Negotiation and Conflict Management: Large Dam Projects
Regional Consultations Hanoi, Colombo, Sao Paulo and Cairo Cross-check Survey of 125 dams
This is a working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams as part of its information gathering activities. The views, conclusions, and recommendations contained in the working paper are not to be taken to represent the views of the Commission.
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The Study Team

The following RSA consultants contributed sectoral reports that were subsequently compiled into a final draft report by WCD secretariat staff :
Maarten van Veelen Geoff Antrobus Bryan Davies Nicola Bergh Chris de Wet Andrew Ainslie Barri Nkono Muzi Muziya Tony Emmett Azghar Adelzadeh Kyra Naudascher-Jankowski BKS consulting Engineers Rhodes University University of Cape Town University of Cape Town Rhodes University Rhodes University University of Western Cape National Institute for Economic Policy Human Sciences Research Council National Institute for Economic Policy National Institute for Economic Policy Design and operations Agricultural economics Freshwater Biology Freshwater Biology Social anthropology Social anthropology Historical and social aspects Macro-economics Policy and decision-making Macro-economics Distributional analysis
WCD Secretariat used this report to provide guidance for case study teams involved in the WCD work programme in Brazil, Norway, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, USA and Zambia/Zimbabwe
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Acknowledgements
WCD is grateful for the assistance and support provided to this study by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the public utility (ESKOM). WCD would like to thank BKS for permission to use figures 2 and 3. WCD would also like to thank all the participants at the consultation meetings for assisting in the refinement of this methodology and for providing information and comment on the content and process of this study between October 1998 and October 1999.
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Financial and in-kind Contributors:

Financial and in-kind support for the WCD process was received from 54 contributors including governments, international agencies, the private sector, NGOs and various foundations. According to the mandate of the Commission, all funds received were untied-i.e. these funds were provided with no conditions attached to them. ABB ADB - Asian Development Bank AID - Assistance for India's Development Atlas Copco Australia - AusAID Berne Declaration British Dam Society Canada - CIDA Carnegie Foundation Coyne et Bellier C.S. Mott Foundation Denmark - Ministry of Foreign Affairs EDF - Electricit de France Engevix ENRON International Finland - Ministry of Foreign Affairs Co-operation Goldman Environmental Foundation Zusammenarbeit Halcrow Water Harza Engineering Hydro Quebec Novib David and Lucille Packard Foundation Paul Rizzo and Associates People's Republic of China Rockefeller Brothers Foundation Skanska SNC Lavalin South Africa - Ministry of Water Affairs and Forestry Statkraft Sweden - Sida IADB - Inter-American Development Bank Ireland - Ministry of Foreign Affairs IUCN - The World Conservation Union Japan - Ministry of Foreign Affairs KfW - Kredietanstalt fr Wiederaufbau Lahmeyer International Lotek Engineering Manitoba Hydro National Wildlife Federation, USA Norplan Norway - Ministry of Foreign Affairs Switzerland - SDC The Netherlands - Ministry of Foreign Affairs The World Bank Tractebel Engineering United Kingdom - DFID UNEP United Nations Environment Programme United Nations Foundation USA Bureau of Reclamation Voith Siemens Worley International WWF International
Germany - BMZ: Federal Ministry for Economic
GTZ - Deutsche Geschellschaft fr Technische
Table of Contents
List of Figures......................................................................................................................... vii List of Tables .......................................................................................................................... vii 1. 2.
2.1 2.2 2.3
Overview of the World Commission on Dams Global Case Study Programme........1 The Context and Scope of the Case Study on the Orange River Development Project...............................................................................................................................3
Orange River Basin........................................................................................................................ 3 National Context at the Time of Project Planning......................................................................... 3 The Objectives and Components of the Orange River Development Project................................ 6
3.
Projected and Actual Impacts of the Orange River Development Project ..............11
3.1 Time Schedules for Implementation............................................................................................ 11 3.2 Design Characteristics ................................................................................................................. 13 3.3 Financial Expenditure.................................................................................................................. 18 3.4 Irrigation and Agriculture ............................................................................................................ 20 3.4.1 Irrigated Area............................................................................................................................... 20 3.4.2 Cropping Patterns ........................................................................................................................ 21 3.4.3 Gross Value of Agricultural Production ...................................................................................... 23 3.5 Municipal and Industrial Water Supply....................................................................................... 25 3.6 Hydropower ................................................................................................................................. 28 3.6.1 Installed Hydropower Capacity ................................................................................................... 28 3.6.2 Projected and Actual Hydropower Generation from Gariep and Van der Kloof......................... 29 3.6.3 Economic Value of Power Generation ........................................................................................ 30 3.7 Flood Control............................................................................................................................... 33 3.8 Recreation and Tourism............................................................................................................... 34 3.9 Ecosystem Function and Biodiversity ......................................................................................... 35 3.9.1 Description of the Natural River System..................................................................................... 35 3.9.2 Habitats Affected......................................................................................................................... 37 3.9.3 Mitigation Measures .................................................................................................................... 43 3.9.4 Atmospheric Impacts ................................................................................................................... 44 3.10 Regional and National Effects ..................................................................................................... 46 3.10.1 Predicted Impacts......................................................................................................................... 46 3.10.2 Actual Regional and National Impacts ........................................................................................ 48 3.11 Social Effects............................................................................................................................... 50 3.11.1 Settlement .................................................................................................................................... 51 3.11.2 Displacement and Resettlement................................................................................................... 52 3.11.3 Employment16 .............................................................................................................................. 55 3.12 Interactive, Cumulative and Basin-wide Impacts ........................................................................ 59 3.13 Summary of Impacts and Performance........................................................................................61 3.13.1 Predicted versus Actual Outcomes .............................................................................................. 61 3.13.2 Unexpected Impacts..................................................................................................................... 63 3.13.3 Cost Recovery.............................................................................................................................. 63
4.
4.1 4.2
The Distributional Effects of the ORDP......................................................................66

Anticipated Distributional Effects of the ORDP ......................................................................... 66 The Actual Distributional Effects of the ORDP .......................................................................... 67
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5.
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4
Options-Assessment and the Decision-making Process .............................................72

Historical Context........................................................................................................................ 73 Planning and Appraisal................................................................................................................ 77 Detailed Design and Construction ............................................................................................... 81 Operations and Monitoring.......................................................................................................... 83
6. 7. 8.
8.1 8.2 8.3
Criteria and Guidelines: Policy Evolution and Compliance .....................................87 Issues raised and lessons learned for the project and planning cycle.......................93 Stakeholder Views on Development Effectiveness ...................................................101
Interview approach .................................................................................................................... 101 Interview results ........................................................................................................................ 102 Comments.................................................................................................................................. 108
8.
Bibliography.................................................................................................................109
List of Annexes
Annex 1: Purpose of the case study programme Annex 2: Basin Description: Climate, hydrology and geomorphology Annex 3: Conversion rates Current Rand to 1998 US$ Annex 4: Project Costs Annex 5: Predicted area, cropping pattern and gross agriculture value Annex 6: The pre-dam social context: Demographic landscape and control of the land Annex 7: Two contrasting case stories of resettlement Annex 8: Differing perceptions of the effects of resettlement on farm Workers Annex 9. Summary of outcomes of displacement for farmers and workers Annex 10: Definition of the Instream-flow requirement Annex 11: Cumulative environmental impacts within the catchment Annex 12: Institutional arrangements Annex 13. Minutes from the First stakeholder meeting Annex 14. Workshop proceedings and Comments from the final consultation meeting
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List of Figures
Figure 2.1: Location of Gariep and van der Kloof Dams in South Africa............................................. 8 Figure 2.2: Location of inter-basin transfer schemes to the Great Fish and Sundays River (Courtesy BKS). ................................................................................................................................... 9 Figure 2.3: Location of Irrigation Areas along the Middle and Lower Orange River (Courtesy BKS) ............................................................................................................................................ 10 Figure 3.1: Temporal Pattern of Expenditure on Major Project Components, 196379 ..................... 20 Figure 3.2: Predicted and Actual Irrigated Areas ................................................................................ 21 Figure 3.3: Inter-basin Water Transfers through the Orange-Fish Tunnel .......................................... 26 Figure 3.4: Seasonal Variation in Inter-Basin Transfers through the Orange-Fish Tunnel ................. 26 Figure 3.5: Predicted and Actual Hydropower Generation at Gariep Dam ......................................... 29 Figure 3.6: Predicted and Actual Hydropower Generation at Van der Kloof Dam ............................. 30 Figure 3.7: Natural and Regulated Flow Regimes of the Orange River .............................................. 36 Figure 3.8: Median Monthly Flows at Boegoeberg Measured before (a) and after (b) Major Impoundment .................................................................................................................... 36 Figure 3.9: Variation in Monthly Runoff at the Orange River Mouth................................................. 39
List of Tables
Table 3.1: Projected and Actual Completion Dates for Components of the Orange River Development Project ................................................................................................................................. 12 Table 3.2: Design Changes of Major Components of the Orange River Development Project........... 15 Table 3.3: Evolution of Cost Estimates on Orange River Development Project ................................. 18 Table 3.4: Predicted and Actual Cropping Pattern (ha) ....................................................................... 22 Table 3.5: Comparison of Predicted, Pre-Project (19716), and Recent Crop Production.................. 22 Table 3.6: Gross Value of Crop Production in 1998 US$.................................................................... 23 Table 3.7: Contribution of Field and Horticultural Crops to GVAP, 197693 (%)............................. 23 Table 3.8: Percentage of Farms where more than 50% of Gross Farm Income is Derived from Animal Production per Region, 1993 ............................................................................................. 24 Table 3.9: Planned Water Supply in the ORDP.................................................................................. 25 Table 3.10: Allocation and Usage of Inter-Basin Transfers from the Orange River Basin to the FishSundays Basin.................................................................................................................... 27 Table 3.11: Projected Installed Capacity of Power at Planned Stations in 1962/3 White Paper .......... 28 Table 3.12: Economic Value of Hydropower Production from inception to 1998 ............................... 32 Table 3.13: Comparison of Flood Peaks With and Without Dams....................................................... 33 Table 3.14: Emission Levels from Steam Coal Power Plant ................................................................ 45 Table 3.15: Number of Farms and Average Sizes (ha), 1971 and 1993 ............................................... 51 Table 3.16: Social Context Prior to Land Acquisition Farmers and Farmworkers in Districts Affected by Gariep and Van der Kloof Dams, 19623 and 19645 .................................. 52 Table 3.17: Number of People Displaced by Gariep and Van der Kloof Reservoirs ........................... 53 Table 3.18: Trends in Labour Force Provided by Proprietors, Tenants, and their Family Members in Downstream Adjacent Districts and in Non-adjacent Districts of Northern Cape............. 56 Table 3.19: Trends in Regular Employment (Regular Farmworkers and Domestics/Servants) in Downstream Adjacent Districts and in Non-adjacent Districts of Northern Cape............. 56 Table 3.20: Number of Seasonal and Casual Workers ......................................................................... 57 Table 3.21: Cumulative Impacts of Dams in the Orange River Catchment on the Variables Controlling Riverine Ecosystems ......................................................................................................... 59 Table 3.22: Predicted, Actual, and Unexpected Outcomes of the ORDP............................................ 62 Table 5.1: Chronology of the ORDP ................................................................................................. 72 Table 5.2: Number of Dams Commissioned in South Africa (by decade) ........................................ 77 Table 8.1: Summary of questionnaire responses by interest group.................................................. 104
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Note on Pilot Study

The World Commission Dams (WCD) faced a considerable challenge in meeting the mandate given to it by the Gland reference group at its inception in April 1997. This included, among other things, an assessment of the "development effectiveness" of dams, an issue that the Commission decided to address through thematic studies, the cross-check survey and a series of case studies of dam projects worldwide with a view to learning lessons from these experiences. The aim of the pilot study of the Orange River Development Project in South Africa, a major initiative of the South African Government beginning in the early 1960s, was to develop the methodology to be used for the 7 WCD focal dam project/river basin case studies being undertaken world-wide. It was designed to test a common approach that sought to inform the Commission on development effectiveness as well as a range of issues associated with the planning, design, appraisal, construction, operation and decommissioning of large dams. The Minister for Water Affairs and Forestry gave his agreement to the pilot study in September 1998. The ORDP was a major project involving two dams on the Orange River and a diversion tunnel that was planned during the apartheid years in the 1960s, and which has hydropower, irrigation, water supply and flood control functions. The multi-purpose nature of the project provided a good opportunity to test the methodology, and the study was undertaken between October 1998 and March 1999. In adopting a pilot approach for methodology development, it is recognised that this study addresses real issues and real experiences that can not simply be used as a "testbed" without giving some substantive feedback to the interest groups affected by the ORDP on the findings of the pilot study. This is the main purpose of this report. A secondary purpose was to provide a model for the consultants working on the other case studies world-wide. Where additional work would be required to bring the study up to the level of a full case study, this is identified in the text. Methodological improvements following the experience of the pilot study The following parts of the case study methodology were improved or addressed as a result of the study, and these modifications were presented in detail in the Methodology Guidelines for the Implementation of Phase II of the WCD Case Studies provided to case study team leaders. Revision of data sheets and enquiry forms The two sets of pilot data collection sheets (focal dam and cross-check survey), and the enquiry form were thoroughly tested and the pilot versions were revised to be more flexible and to include only data points of direct relevance to the study. The full data collection sheet for the focal dam was scaled down. Only two responses were received on the stakeholder enquiry form, which was felt to be too long and complex and a revised stakeholder interview process was therefore devised. The consultation process Valuable lessons were learned on the composition, structure and agenda of the scoping meetings that were put into practice in other case studies worldwide. Experience from the final stakeholder meeting demonstrated the challenge inherent in soliciting views on complex issues from a wide range of stakeholders. It also showed that due balance must be found between a qualitative and a quantitative approach. Experience from the second stakeholder meeting proved invaluable in the 7 case studies undertaken around the world, and the Secretariat substantially modified its approach as a result of the experience of the Orange River meeting.
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The structure and content of the report The final report has gone through a series of revisions before adopting the proposed structure. In addition a number of gaps were identified of which the following are the most important : 1. Definition of "the project" used as a baseline for defining the predicted benefits needs to be more rigorous. 2. More emphasis should be placed on operations and operating rules and how these have changed through time since project completion. 3. The methodology for the distribution of benefits analysis should include a time dimension. One matrix should be completed for the context at project completion, and another for todays context. The positively and negatively affected groups should be better disaggregated and quantified. 4. Sedimentation/reservoir characteristics should be included in Project design - lifetime of the reservoir. 5. Strengthen Context at the time of project planning for each sector. 6. Hydropower benefit methodology should use real tarifs not simulated benefits. 7. Basin-wide issues and cumulative impacts should be strengthened. 8. Strengthen the section on justification for the project (context at the time) and Criteria and guidelines. This pilot study therefore greatly contributed to refining and improving the case study methodology, and provided a model to guide the work of the case study teams. In the normal case study process, the final report would have taken into account the detailed comments given by stakeholders through the consultation process, and adressed them aftre the meeting, wherever possible. Given the timing and nature of the pilot study it was not possible to respond to the constructive criticism received, and this should be borne in mind by the reader. The draft report remains substantially the same as the circulation draft, with the exception of Chapter 7 Lessons learned, that draws in discussions from the final meeting.
Executive Summary
Proposals for irrigation projects in the Orange River Basin were initiated in the 1920s to meet the increased need to utilise its water resources given South Africas semi-arid climate. These proposals were considered too costly to be implemented through the 1950s, but development of the Orange River Basin became more of a priority after the successive electoral victories of the Nationalist Party in 1948, 1953 and 1958. The actual decision to plan a comprehensive Orange River Development Project (ORDP), however, was triggered by the objective of the Nationalist Party Government to stem the outflow of capital from South Africa. This flight of capital was partially caused by the increasing domestic resistance and international criticism against the Governments Apartheid policies, particularly following the Sharpville massacre in 1961. The decision to embark on the ORDP was also motivated by the Nationalist Party Governments goal of building a political symbol to Afrikaner Nationalism and a monument to the grand scheme of apartheid at a time when South Africa had just withdrawn from the British Commonwealth. The initial planning proposal for the ORDP was quickly assembled in the early 1960s by the Department of Water Affairs oriented by the various development policies of the Nationalist Party Government. The ORDP fit with the Governments interventionist policies of economic nationalism and satisfied a number of the Nationalist Partys key constituencies. In particular, the Nationalist Party Governments support for White agricultural interests as well as decentralised industrial development was to be served by the scheme. The politically motivated ORDP that was subsequently proposed by the Department of Water Affairs was an ambitious initiative which sought to provide substantial benefits for South Africa, the Orange River Basin, and White farmers in particular during the core years of the Apartheid regime in South Africa. The major objectives of the scheme included: provision of irrigation for increased agricultural production, supply of water for municipal and industrial use, generation of hydro-electric power for peaking purposes, prevention of damaging floods, creation of recreational facilities, further population settlement in the basin, creation of additional employment opportunities, stimulation of water and agricultural based industrialisation and the regional economy.
These objectives were geared towards the broader local, regional and national development goals of meeting the increasing consumption needs and raising the living standards of a rapidly growing South African population. As a result of the rapidity with which the 1962-63 planning proposal was assembled, many of the baseline surveys were cursorily conducted and few of the planning assumptions were thoroughly examined. While potential sedimentation problems were assessed, soil studies were cursorily completed and investigation of environmental impacts was not conducted. Moreover, the ORDP was a much larger and more complex water resources scheme involving dams than had been previously promoted by the Government of South Africa. Because of its size, complexity and cost, the scheme was planned to be completed over 6 phases. After minimal appraisal, the South African Parliament quickly authorised implementation of only the 1st phase of the ORDP for R85million in 1962-63.
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Information disclosure and the participation of project-affected peoples in the planning and appraisal of the ORDP was not regular practice at the time and was thus limited. Some public commentary on the proposed scheme was received early on from independent scientists and technical experts in South Africa but with little effect on the planning and implementation of the ORDP through the mid-1970s. White farmers to be displaced by the Gariep and Van der Kloof reservoirs were notified but, despite being somewhat organised and even taking the Government to court a number of times, did not have much voice in determining compensation arrangements. Given the Apartheid context, Black and Coloured peoples were neither notified nor compensated as these groups had been almost completely dispossessed of their lands and rights in the Orange River Basin and across South Africa by the time of the sanctioning of the ORDP. The rapidity with which the ORDP was initially planned and approved, as well as the complexity of the proposed scheme, resulted in the need for further detailed planning with the assistance of private domestic and foreign consultants. More detailed planning and appraisal, as well as the discovery of more economically viable alternatives, resulted in design changes and additions to the ORDP during construction. For example, based on a more in-depth assessment after Parliamentary approval of the ORDP, the national electricity utility (ESKOM) persuaded the Government in 1964-65 to raise the heights of both the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams immediately to meet increasing demand for peaking power in South Africa. Although only R85million was allocated to implement the first phase of the ORDP by Parliament in 1962-63, the design changes proposed by ESKOM and more detailed planning resulted in a significant increase in the cost of the scheme. In fact, an approximately four-fold increase in the estimated costs of the scheme over the decades is attributable to unplanned design changes, the need for foreign technical assistance with design and construction, the non-inclusion of inflation estimates in original planning projections, and unexpected costs for unplanned mitigation measures. Shortfalls in funding to meet rising costs resulted in further delays of the ORDP. Design changes and shortfalls in funding also led to schedule overruns during construction of the ORDP which in turn resulted in further cost increases. Because design changes and rising costs were considered amendments to the original authorisation given for phase 1 of the ORDP, however, further Parliamentary review was not required for increasing the actual expenditures on the scheme. Project infrastructure was substantially modified during implementation, and regular design changes meant that some features of the planned scheme were not built as the context evolved and other options were explored. Additions unplanned at the outset, such as Wellbedacht dam, affected the assumptions made and actual construction of the planned components. The later construction of the upstream Wellbedacht dam (which subsequently silted up) for municipal water supply effectively, but unexpectedly, reduced sediment inflows into Gariep reservoir, thus prolonging its life. The dynamics during planning, appraisal and design identified above clearly shaped the outcomes of the ORDP. As this pilot study shows, the actual achieved benefits of the ORDP are less than that which was predicted for irrigated agriculture, both in terms of area (46-57% of planned) and value of production (27%). On the other hand, outcomes are greater than predicted in the areas of agricultural productivity (166-457%) and the economic value of hydropower generation (107 %). Actual hydropower generated is broadly as predicted (although from an installed capacity over twice as large as that which was originally envisioned). The generation of dynamic system benefits for the grid from hydropower unexpectedly added 13% to the overall value of hydropower generation. Objectives for flood control and recreation were broadly met, although they were unquantified at the time of project planning. Unanticipated environmental impacts of the scheme include the proliferation of biting blackfly that caused damage to livestock and the recreation industry requiring an annual control programme of around 2 million Rand (equivalent to 330,000 in 1998 U.S. dollars). In addition, the ORDP disrupted flows and driving variables for the natural riverine ecosystem and river mouth (a wetland site of international importance).
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A comparison between the planned and actual settlement of new White and Coloured families in the command areas nor the predicted and actual displacement/resettlement from the ORDP was not possible due to data inavailability. However, compensation of White farmers seems to have been quite generous although less so for the payments made for land expropriations required for the Van der Kloof than the Gariep reservoir. Official compensation was neither planned nor offered to the Black and Coloured people negatively affected by the ORDP but the numbers of persons in these categories was already quite low given the centuries of dislocation and marginalisation to which they had already been subjected. Employment and regional development goals are difficult to verify but it seems that jobs were saved by the ORDP in the face of growing on-farm rationalisation and intensification nation-wide. The actual effect of the scheme on national agricultural production was not large and national economic growth even less, although data constraints limited analysis in these areas. Although data limitations preclude firm conclusions, the distributional consequences of the ORDP during the initial period of the 1970s throughout the mid-1980s after its commissioning were not surprising given the anticipated and actual outcomes of the scheme as well as policy context in which it was planned and implemented. The South African population as a whole benefited from the increased agricultural production, added supply of peaking power, and recreational opportunities created although the overall contributions to the national economic value in these sectors and total gross national product from the scheme are likely to have been small or negligable. In addition, South African taxpayers are likely to have borne most of the financial costs of the scheme as cost recovery from users during this early period was relatively low. Within the Orange River Basin, municipalities and industries most likely benefited from the water supplied by the ORDP but the access of different racial groups to this water supply was likely to have been unequal. Recreation industries within the basin also benefited by the new recreation resources created by the scheme although some business were negatively affected by the increased incidence of biting blackfly. Similarly, blackfly infestation somewhat reduced the large share of overall benefits derived from the increase availability of irrigation by White farmers and a smaller number of Coloured farmers who were either settled or resettled in the command areas of the ORDP. Some additional Coloureds as well as some Blacks who may or may not have been those displaced by the scheme did benefit from the mostly seasonal and casual jobs generated. Finally, while White farmers who were displaced did receive generous compensation, Coloureds and Blacks were not offered payment for their losses by the Government. On the other hand, these distributional effects of the ORDP did change as a result of the changing operation and replanning of the ORDP in conjunction with the evolution of societal values and Government policies in South Africa over time. The original planning documents envisioned that operations of the ORDP would shift from an early prioritisation of power generation followed by irrigation, municipal water supply and flood control to one in which needs for municipal water supply and irrigation would increasingly take precedence over time. The evolution of operating rules for the ORDP after the time of commissioning in 1971 were not determined in this study and thus further conclusions can not be offered at this time in this area. However, a reappraisal of the ORDP was undertaken with the Orange River Systems Analysis between 1988 and 1992 which found that potential demand for water in the Orange River Basin would far exceed supply by the year 2020. The need for a comprehensive replanning exercise was thus confirmed. Correspondingly an Orange River Replanning Study, the most comprehensive assessment of the Orange River Basin and ORDP since the original planning efforts between 1960 and 1965, was undertaken between 1994 and 1998. The appraisal also assessed how the construction of the upstream Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), jointly planned by South Africa and Lesotho beginning in the 1980s, might condition changes in the operation and effects of the ORDP. The most important shifts in criteria and guidelines that affected the decision-making and effects of the ORDP occurred as a result of the recommendations of three new policy frameworks promulgated
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during the ORDP implementation period: the 1970 Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Water Matters, the 1986 Report on the Mangement of Water Resources in the Republic of South Africa, and the new water regulations adopted after the transition to democracy in 1994 (especially the 1998 Water Act). These documents highlight the gradual change in South African policies from an emphasis on government subsidisation to full cost-recovery from users, as well as from agricultural production and industrial development to employment creation and provision of basic needs. A shift from technocratic to participatory decision-making and from a technical approach to one that takes human rights, environmental and social issues into consideration, and distributes ORDP benefits across a broader section of South Africa society also occurred. As a result, trends towards greater public participation, more in-depth financial and economic analysis, as well as more comprehensive examination of social and environmental issues in planning and options-assessment are evident in the decision making processes around the ORDP and LHWP over time. The more recent focus has been on altering the operation and management of the ORDP to improve the functioning of the scheme and to reorient it towards generating outcomes reflective of the new values that have been internalised in South Africa policies after the 1994 transition. In addition, a greater emphasis on basin-wide management, and coordination between the ORDP and LHWP in particular, seems to have been initiated during the 1990s. However, some conflicts have emerged between these new criteria and guidelines such as that between the prioritisation of cost-recovery versus the goal of achieving greater equity in outcomes. Within this changing context, attention to environmental concerns has also grown continually since project inception in 1962-63 and these concerns have been increasingly incorporated in planning, appraisal and operation of the ORDP. Environmental concerns have only recently been given force of law under the 1998 Water Act. Much effort, time and money has been spent in setting in-stream flow requirements (IFRs). However, the process of implementation appears far less rigorous. In this context, the passage of the 1998 Water Act has provided the legal framework for the formulation of IFRs for the ORDP but the regulations necessary for guiding implementation have yet to be promulgated.
1. Overview of the World Commission on Dams Global Case Study Programme

The World Commission on Dams (WCD) faces a considerable challenge in meeting the mandate given to it by the reference group at its inception in 1997. This includes, among other things, an assessment of the development effectiveness of dams, an issue that the Commission has decided to address through thematic studies, the cross-check survey, and a series of case studies of dam projects worldwide with a view to learning lessons from these experiences. This report is the product of one of eight case studies being undertaken worldwide with a common methodology and approach that seeks to inform the Commission on development effectiveness and on a range of issues associated with the planning, design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of large dams. It concerns the Orange River Development Project (ORDP), a major initiative of the South African government beginning in the early 1960s. The project aimed to irrigate 301 000ha of land, supply water to municipalities and industries, generate power, and reduce the occurrence of floods. In this report, particular emphasis is placed on comparing the outcome the project planners intended with the results achieved. Throughout the study, a key distinction is therefore drawn between that which was predicted and that which was not. This predicted and actual approach is important because the purpose of the study is not to answer the question should this dam project have been implemented? but rather to ask what its effect has been. In addition, the study seeks to document how effective the planning and implementation process has been in delivering the anticipated benefits, and how the decision-making process has addressed changing circumstances and unexpected consequences since the project was completed. The focus on the planning and decision-making process is essential, as lessons learned in this area will directly inform the Commissions findings and its proposals for future decision-making frameworks as well as criteria and guidelines (see Outputs 2 and 3 of the WCD Work Programme). The concept of development effectiveness is taken in the broadest sense. It includes not only the relevance and appropriateness of large dams as a response to the needs that motivated their construction (eg irrigation, electricity generation, flood management, water supply, navigation, and other multi-purpose benefits), but also the projected versus actual services and benefits delivered. It also assesses the costs and impacts associated with the results obtained, the distribution of gains and losses among groups, and the general conditions under which the dams were built and have been operated. The study uses existing data sources and reports to inform its assessment, as there is not sufficient time for additional research to be undertaken. In this respect, the availability of data in existing studies and reports has limited the findings of the study. In parallel to the study process, and as an integral part of the methodology, two consultation meetings were included, one after the scoping stage, that mapped out the issues to be addressed and identified available data sources, and one to consider the draft final report. These meetings were intended to ensure that the views of different interest groups could be considered by the study team, and provided opportunities for comment and input. The Commissions approach recognises that there is not always unanimity in the interpretation of the available data, or in the perceptions of different interest groups, and that these convergent and divergent views are a key aspect of differing perceptions of development effectiveness. Assessing development effectiveness thus entails taking account of the views and perspectives of different stakeholders and the groups affected by the project. This report will not take up a single position, but it will report on the views of different groups. Equally, it will not pass judgement, with the benefit of hindsight, on whether or not the project should have been built, or how things could, or should,
have been done differently. Nor will it comment on the future evolution and management of the project. The purpose of the study is to learn lessons from the past, focusing on those that are especially relevant to the planning, implementation, and operation of large dams worldwide. The intention of the case study is to provide an analysis of performance, an assessment of how the decision-makers planned and implemented the different phases of the project, and an appraisal of the way in which decision-making has responded to an evolving social, economic, and political context since project completion. The category unexpected includes all features and consequences not included in the original project design. At times, this will refer to issues genuinely unknown to the planners, and at times to issue known at the time but unaccounted for or neglected in the planning process. The case study methodology is based on six key questions that provide the foundations for the assessment of performance and decision-making: What were the projected versus actual benefits, costs, and impacts? What were the unexpected benefits, costs, and impacts? What was the distribution of costs and benefits, ie who gained and who lost? How were decisions made? Did the project comply with the criteria and guidelines of the day? What lessons can be learned for todays context?
Further details on the case study methodology and process are given in Annex 1, along with the list of case studies being undertaken. The report is broadly structured according to the six key questions listed above. Chapter 2 introduces the project purpose, design features, and predicted benefits. Chapter 3 deals with project performance, structured by sector, and enumerates the studies findings concerning predicted and unexpected costs, benefits, and impacts. The predicted and unexpected are presented together for each sector to improve the clarity of the analysis. However, a summary of findings is also presented at the end of the chapter. Thereafter, the chapters follow the order of the key questions above. Chapter 4 provides a sketch of the distributional intentions and outcomes of the project. The decision-making process that shaped the planned and actual outcomes of the project is examined in Chapter 5, while Chapter 6 offers an analysis of evolution and compliance with criteria and guidelines. Chapters 7 and 8 draws out convergent and divergent views on development effectiveness along with lessons to be learned for the WCD process. As this is a pilot study, it is indicated in the text where additional work would be required for a full case study.
2. The Context and Scope of the Case Study on the Orange River Development Project
This chapter of the report provides brief background information on the context in which the ORDP was initiated by the government of South Africa in the early 1960s. It first offers a physical description of the Orange River Basin. It also identifies the main objectives and components of the multi-purpose ORDP, of which the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams have been identified as the two focal dams of this study.
2.1 Orange River Basin

The Orange River (also called the Gariep, the Khoi word for Great River, or Dragon River by the San) is the largest in Africa south of the Zambezi, with a total catchment area in excess of one million square kilometres. The Orange River Basin is also the largest watershed in South Africa. More than half the catchment is in South Africa, spanning six of the countrys current nine provinces, with the remainder in the adjacent countries of Lesotho, Botswana, and Namibia. The natural flow of the Orange River constitutes more than 22% of the South Africas surface water resources. The Orange River originates in the Drakensberg mountain range, in what is now the north-east corner of Lesotho. After leaving Lesotho, the river flows westward 2 100km through regions of steadily decreasing rainfall and increasing aridity, finally discharging its water in the South Atlantic Ocean near Alexander Bay. The rainfall at the source is in the order of 2 000mm per year, dropping to less than 50mm per year near the mouth. Evaporation rates range between 2 000mm and 2 500mm per year, generally increasing from east to west. The main tributaries are the Caledon River, which currently forms part of the western border of Lesotho, the Kraal River, and the Vaal River, which drains large parts of the Free State and southern Mpumulanga. Further downstream, the Orange receives water from the Hartebeest, Molopo, and Fish rivers, the latter which drains a large part of the waters of Namibia. Under natural conditions, all these rivers are dry several months of the year. The Orange River does not have extensive floodplains or a significant delta and it is deeply incised in the surrounding country between the current South AfricaLesotho border and Petrusville, which prevents irrigation on a large scale in this area. Further downstream, particularly in the Prieska-Upington area, the land is low lying with large tracts that are fertile, flat and suitable for irrigation. Further details of the physical characteristics of the basin are given in the section on ecosystems below and in Annex 2.
2.2 National Context at the Time of Project Planning

The construction of labour-intensive irrigation settlements along the Vaal and lower Orange rivers began as early as the 1920s and 1930s and the idea may be traced back to 1928, when the administrative head of the Department of Irrigation (later called the Department of Water Affairs DWA), Dr A. D. Lewis, proposed a scheme to link the Orange and Fish rivers by means of a tunnel. Although Lewis scheme was not implemented, the proposal was revived on several occasions through the following decades, but was considered too costly to undertake. The formal plan for the ORDP was put forward in 1962 (a year after South Africa became a republic under the leadership of Hendrik Verwoerd, the grand architect of apartheid).
Initial surveys and investigations, including drilling for potential sites for dams, were initiated in 1944. However, until the 1950s, no major storage was considered for the Orange River although diversion projects to the Fish and Sundays rivers had been proposed. A project to pump water from Lesotho, which at the time was still a protectorate of Britain, to the Orange Free State (now known as the Free State) in South Africa was mooted around 1955. The project was to be paid for by power generation and most likely would have provided water supplies to the growing Witwatersrand area (now called Gauteng) and not the Orange Free State. However, during the late 1950s, the development of the entire Orange River increasingly became a priority for South Africa. The reasons for this new direction have to be sought in the historical developments that preceded the scheme and in the political and economic circumstances of South Africa in the early 1960s when a White Paper was eventually tabled in the South African parliament to gain authorisation for the Orange River scheme. A key to understanding the political economy that gave rise to the Orange River scheme is the period 19481960, which Davenport (1977:2576) has characterised as the age of the social engineers. Although the proposed policies of the nationalists during this period differed in degree and direction, rather than in kind (Davenport, 1977:254) from the policies that had preceded them, they were pursued with an enthusiasm and systematic thoroughness that heralded a new period in South African history. This period marked not only the establishment of the foundations of apartheid, but also the peak of concerted efforts to consolidate Afrikaner political and economic power. With the National Partys (NP) newly won control over the state in the 1948 and 1953 elections, nationalists were able to consistently increase their control over the economy. As an important part of its election campaign, the NP had courted white farmers who were experiencing labour shortages and rising agricultural wages as a result of the large-scale urbanisation of the African population.1 The NP promised to curb black urbanisation, and offered farmers state protection, including higher prices for their products.2 Until the mid-1950s, the major governing parties were primarily dependent upon rural constituencies. For example, when the NP came to power in 1948, half of its members of parliament were drawn from agricultural backgrounds (Greenberg, 1980:88). These developments took place against a background of increasing protest and resistance from black political groups and trade unions, and the institution of repressive measures by the state. Prior to 1948, the liberation movement had experienced almost a decade of growth in size, militancy and level of organisation (Pampallis, 1991:180). The state responded to these pressures with a series of draconian laws specifically aimed at restricting political activity, including the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953, and the 1953 Public Safety Act. At the same time, a number of laws were enacted that reinforced the marginalisation of non-white racial groups (eg. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, the Population Registration Act of 1950, which required that all South Africans be racially classified, and the Group Areas Act of 1950, which designated specific areas for occupation according to racial group). An additional boost was given to the economy by the development of the newly discovered Orange Free State gold fields. The state also intervened directly in the economy, establishing SASOL in 1950 (to manufacture petroleum from coal), expanding production at ISCOR (the Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation), and setting up the National Finance Corporation and the Industrial Finance Corporation to provide funds for mining and manufacturing. In particular, Afrikaner business people benefited, eg from lucrative government contracts and appointments to official economy boards, and through the transfer of government bank accounts to Afrikaner banks. White farmers also benefited from the stricter pass laws, favourable prices for agricultural produce, and even the provision of prison labour by the state. The economic resurgence, however, was threatened on two fronts. On the one hand, black resistance to the state was growing. On the other, there was increasing pressure internationally. The growth of the anti-colonial movement through the 1950s and the granting of independence to African colonies in
the 1950s and 1960s not only raised the hopes of the oppressed in South Africa, but also changed the international context, making white domination less and less acceptable to the international community. The various protests also drew international attention to racial domination in South Africa and attracted condemnation in the United Nations. In particular, the massacres at Sharpeville and in the Cape (and their aftermath) attracted strong international attention and condemnation. Even before Sharpeville some foreign investors had become nervous that the South African state would not be able to contain the growth of resistance and had begun withdrawing their investments. After Sharpeville, however, this process accelerated, and between January 1960 and May 1961, gold and foreign exchange reserves dropped by 51% (Pampallis, 1991:214). In spite of the political upheavals inside the country and the pressures from abroad, the South African economy continued to grow. Trade and currency controls introduced by the government from 1961 were able to stem partially the outflow of capital after Sharpeville, and increased military spending provided a boost to the economy. Furthermore, the setbacks inflicted on black opposition groups provided further encouragement to foreign investors, and from 1964 until the recession of the mid1970s, South Africa experienced a period of sustained economic growth. It was during this period of economic growth and the successful suppression of political opposition within the country, sometimes referred to as the golden age of apartheid, that the huge ORDP was planned and executed. Within its historical context, the ORDP may be seen as an outgrowth of the increasing confidence of Afrikaner nationalism3 during this period. Just as the grand scheme of apartheid represented the culmination of the social engineering of Afrikaner nationalisms political dreams, the ORDP may be seen as a culmination of the economic dream of South Africa as the economic giant of the south, as a monument4 to Afrikaner confidence. It was envisaged that the irrigation components of the scheme would increase the value of the South African agricultural production, make provision for the establishment of a large number of irrigation farms, and stimulate the production of meat, wool, milk, lucerne, cotton, wheat, raisins, dried beans, and peas. This was consistent with the important role of white farmers within Afrikaner politics in the first two decades of NP rule. Thus, a number of unstated goals beyond those benefits predicted in the White Papers were probably instrumental in the decision to embark upon the scheme. One of these was to restore international confidence in South Africa in the aftermath of Sharpeville and the political repression that followed. Besides demonstrating that South Africa was capable of undertaking a scheme of this magnitude, the ORDP would also provide considerable opportunities for co-operation with foreign governments and business interests. In this regard, the lucrative contracts awarded to French, British, and Italian firms undoubtedly played an important role in securing political support and inward investment from abroad. The ORDP also had two other implications for international relationships. Firstly, the appointment of international consortia for the construction of the two main dams would provide access to international funding and strengthen South African ties with the French, Italian, and British governments, if only to protect these countries interests. Secondly, the importing of foreign technicians for the building of the dams also increased the necessity for international contacts through embassies and departments. Internally, the ORDP also provided major opportunities for South African firms,5 as well as employment for both skilled and unskilled (primarily white) workers. Because of the extensive lobbying that had taken place for providing relief to eastern Cape farmers by linking the Fish and Orange rivers, and the degree of public support for the project, debate on the project was relatively limited. In particular, the United Party found itself in a difficult position because some of its leaders had been actively involved in the lobbying. The debate in parliament tended to focus more on who should take credit for the scheme than on its inherent weaknesses.
Within this context, the engineers from the DWA were asked to provide a large-scale project in a very short time scale with little opportunity for detailed project planning and assessment.
2.3 The Objectives and Components of the Orange River Development Project
The central objective of the comprehensive ORDP at the time that it was sanctioned by the government of South Africa, in 1962/3, was to store and divert water to promote irrigation and increase agricultural production along the Orange River and in the eastern Cape regions of the country. Secondary aims included municipal and industrial water supply, hydroelectric power generation, and the reduction of severe flood damage. The 1962/3 Report on The Proposed Orange River Development Project, or 1962/3 White Paper, prepared by South Africas DWA, projected the following benefits from the scheme: the irrigation of some 301 000ha (360 000 morgen) of land and corresponding increases in agricultural production; the supply of water to the municipalities of Bloemfontein, Kimberley, De Aar, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, and Cradock, and many small towns in the southern Orange Free State, north-western Cape, and eastern Cape regions; the generation of hydroelectric power from a total installed capacity of some 199.6MW, of which 35.4MW would be required to provide pumping to meet irrigation and municipal and industrial water requirements; flood control along the whole course of the Orange River downstream of the proposed Gariep Dam, reducing the occurrence of damaging floods by 50%, equivalent to a capital asset of R1 000 000; the creation of tourist and recreational facilities, especially at the two largest human-made reservoirs proposed in the scheme; the settlement of white South African families on 230 000 morgen of irrigable land and 600 coloured South African families on 4 000 morgen of irrigable land; the creation of an additional demand for farm labour of 40 000 units, involving a total population of 160 000 coloured South Africans; the stimulation of industrial and regional development in the form of agricultural, iron, steel, and water-intensive industries as well as communication facilities, schools, hospitals, and road and railway extensions.
Details of these and other predicted benefits, as they appeared in official documents of the time, are further elaborated in the various sections of Chapter 3. In order to deliver these projected benefits, the comprehensive ORDP as outlined in the 1962/3 White Paper was to be developed in six phases over successive decades with the following components: a main storage dam at the Ruigte Valley to regulate the Orange River (first called the Ruigte Valley Dam, then the Hendrik Verwoerd Dam, and now the Gariep Dam); a high diversion dam at Van der Kloof to enable gravity command over the Van der Kloof and other areas in the Orange Free State and northern Cape (the P. K. Le Roux Dam or Van der Kloof Dam); the Van der Kloof Canals System, including a left bank canal and right bank canal as well as associated distribution canals and drainage systems, which would feed water by gravity and by pumping to areas in the Orange Free State and the Karoo; the Orange-Fish Tunnel, to divert water from the Gariep Dam to the north-eastern Cape; the Fish-Sundays Canals System to divert water from the Fish River into the Sundays River Valley;
the Conway Canal and Wapadsberg Tunnel to deliver water to the Fish River Catchment and Upper Sundays River Valley; the Hofmeyr Canal from the Orange-Fish Tunnel to serve 15 000 morgen extending as far as the Grass Ridge Dam; the Torquay Dam to be situated 25 miles upstream of the Orange-Vaal confluence and associated Torquay Canal System; various hydroelectric power stations, including one at Gariep Dam, one at Van der Kloof Dam, one at Torquay Dam, and one at the outlet of the Orange-Fish Tunnel.
Figure 2.1 gives an overview of the Orange River, Figure 2.2 shows the downstream irrigation areas and Figure 2.3 gives the detail of the transfer schemes to the Fish and Sundays rivers. Primarily the objectives and components of the comprehensive ORDP detailed in the 1962/3 White Paper have determined the scope of this case study. However, a 1964/5 White Paper proposed a major change in the design of the scheme the raising of the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams much earlier than was originally planned. Because this proposal was incorporated into the scheme prior to initiation of full-fledged implementation of the scheme, the scope of this study includes the objectives and components of both the 1962/3 and 1964/5 White Papers.
Notes
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World War II brought on a crisis in South African agriculture. The contradictions in labour tenancy, already apparent in the 1930s, were exacerbated by wartime demand for agricultural products and the accelerating flight of African labour to the cities. But European farmers responded to the crisis, as they had in the past, not by generalising market relations, but by insisting on even more elaborate state measures to control the African rural population (Greenberg, 1980:85). Within three years of the NPs coming to power, the maize price increased by 50%, allowing the doubling of farm profits (Greenberg, 1980:89). As Greenberg (1980:53) has argued, racial domination is rooted in the pre-capitalist countryside. In other words, long before industrial and commercial capital demands control over labour and unions, farmers require their own forms of subordination of labour. In the period leading up to the announcement of the Orange River project, a government commission had recommended that a proposed irrigation scheme in the Pongola Valley should be completed before embarking on the Orange River scheme. On its own admission, the government decided to ignore this advice and to undertake both schemes at the same time. In addition, the government decided to think bigger in regard to the Orange River than had ever been done in the past and to look at the full possibilities of the Orange River. In a lengthy address to parliament in March 1962, Verwoerd highlighted the grand scale of the Orange River project proposed by his government. This, he maintained, was the image of a South Africa which is constantly growing. In the past 14 years we have actually brought into being a new State of which we can be proud, a country with a great future, a country which economically is as stable and as promising as it has hardly ever been before ... (Hansard, 29 March 1962:3469). Through the years, Afrikaner nationalism has evinced a strong attraction to the construction of massive monuments such as the Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria and the Afrikaans Language Monument in Paarl. During the budget debate of 1962, when the Orange River project was extensively discussed, the member of parliament for Kimberley North made explicit reference to the water scheme as a monument to nationalist rule. He maintained that although Verwoerd had been in office for only three and a half years, his government had already established three major monuments. These were the Republic of South Africa, the granting of self-government to the Transkei, and the harnessing of the waters of the Orange River. (Hansard, 28 March 1962:33923). In the past, government contracts were extensively used to foster the growth of Afrikaner capital, and with the inclusion of a large number of South African (as well as foreign) firms in the project team, it is likely that this was also the case with the Orange River project.
Figure 2.1: Location of Gariep and van der Kloof Dams in South Africa.
Figure 2.2: Location of inter-basin transfer schemes to the Great Fish and Sundays River (Courtesy BKS).
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Figure 2.3: Location of Irrigation Areas along the Middle and Lower Orange River (Courtesy BKS)
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3. Projected and Actual Impacts of the Orange River Development Project

This chapter provides comparisons between the actual outcomes of the ORDP and those planned for or predicted. As will be seen, the 1962/3 White Paper was inadequate as a planning document. In addition, significant modifications to the project occurred as a result of the 1964/5 White Paper. Consequently, it is useful to incorporate projections made in both White Papers in the evaluation of project performance. For the planned schedules, design characteristics, and project benefits the projections made in these White Papers are compared with the actual outcomes. For the analysis of project costs figures are taken from four White Papers (1962/3, 1964/5, 1974, and 1984/5) as these papers provide the only available estimates of actual costs, as well as projected costs. Additional outcomes that were not included in the original project documents are also identified as part of the analysis. Where relevant, baseline or pre-project contexts have been compared with post-project outcomes. The goal of this chapter is thus to determine, to the extent possible given its nature as a pilot study, the tangible effects and consequences of the scheme in a variety of areas. This chapter is structured as follows: first the baseline pre-project, planned, or predicted information and targets will be provided, then the actual, including those unanticipated, outcomes are compared with these. Where relevant, the methods by which these findings were derived and the results of the comparisons are briefly explained. The findings and results from the various sections of this chapter are then integrated in the subsequent examination of the distributional effects of the ORDP offered in Chapter 4. Further examination of the projected, actual, and distributional objectives and outcomes of the scheme is provided in the subsequent chapters on the decision-making process and criteria and guidelines.
3.1 Time Schedules for Implementation

Table 3.1 provides a snapshot of the projected schedules for completion of the various components of the ORDP over its proposed six phases. Included in the table are the phases when the construction, installation, or extension of various components was to be completed as outlined in the 1962/3 and 1964/5 White Papers. Most of the major components were to be implemented in phases 1 and 2, although no firm dates were given as to when these phases would be completed in full. On the other hand, it was originally planned for critical design changes to components to be implemented in phases 1 and 2, as well as several additional components, to be completed in phases 3 to 6. The table also identifies those components to be initiated during one phase but only completed under another phase. Components subsequently added to the scheme are provided at the end of the table. In the pilot study, the actual dates of completion for only a limited number of components could be verified. These are reported in the table while further details of the changes in design of these components are identified in the next section. As can be seen from the table, the Gariep Dam and Power Station were completed virtually on schedule in 1971 and 1972 whereas the Van der Kloof Dam and Power Station were commissioned seven years later. The Van der Kloof Right Bank Canal was completed only in 1983 while the Left Bank Canal has been deferred indefinitely. The OrangeFish Tunnel and the Fish-Sundays Canal, on the other hand, were operational as of 1975 and 1976. Power stations originally planned besides Gariep and Van der Kloof have not been installed as far as is known based on the information available for this study. For example, the 1962/3 White Paper envisaged a hydroelectric station to be built by Eskom at Elizarand with a capacity of 4MW in the first phase and 8MW in the sixth phase. This was abandoned because later investigation found that it would be difficult to make available a suitable site for balancing storage upstream of Elizarand.
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Table 3.1: Projected and Actual Completion Dates for Components of the Orange River Development Project
Planned Component 1st Phase Gariep Dam Gariep Power Station Gariep Pumping Station Van der Kloof Dam Van der Kloof Power Station Van der Kloof Pumping Station Van der Kloof Left Bank Canal Van der Kloof Right Bank Canal Orange-Riet River Scheme Warmsand/Lower Kakamas Canals Marten/Kraphol Islands Canals Richtersveld and Alexander Bay Diversion Dam and Canal System Orange-Fish Tunnel Orange-Fish Tunnel Power Station Augrabies Falls Power Station Elizarand Power Station Fish-Sundays First Stage Canal a.k.a. Klipfontein Canal 2nd Phase Fish-Sundays Distribution Canals Kimberly Pump Station Torquay Dam Torquay Canal Torquay Power Station Geelhoutboom Power Station 3rd Phase Roodeblom Power Station Conway Canal Wapadsberg Tunnel 4th Phase Hofmeyer Canal Jansenville Canal System Klipfontein Power Station 5th Phase Meadows Power Station and Canals Barbers Krantz Power Station and Canals 6th Phase Morgenzon Power Station Grass Ridge Power Station Brakvlei Power Station Boegoeberg Power Station Proposed Additions in White Paper 1968/9 Caledon-Bloemfontein Pipeline Wellbedacht Dam Proposed Additions in White Paper 1971/2 Fish-Sundays Cookhouse Tunnel Van der Kloof/Ramah Canal Predicted Completion 1970 1970 ns 1970 ns ns ns (2nd phase with additional work in 5th phase) ns (2nd phase) ns (additional work in 4th phase) ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns (2nd phase) ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns (4th Phase) ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns Actual Completion 1971 1971/2 nv 1978 1978 nv Deferred indefinitely in WP 1984/5 1983 Proposed as imperative to be completed in WP 1984/5 with minor design changes nv nv nv 1975 nv nv Decided to abandon in WP 1971/2 1976 Proposed as imperative to be completed in WP 1984/5 with minor design changes nv Not started Not started Not started nv nv nv nv nv nv nv nv nv nv nv nv nv 1973 1973 1976 1983
Note: Predicted completion based on 1962/3 White Paper. Dates not specified are indicated by the abbreviation ns. Components for which completion was not verified are indicated by nv.
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Findings on Schedules for Implementation:

There was significant variation in time of completion for components of the ORDP: while some were completed virtually on schedule, others were significantly delayed. A number of components of the comprehensive scheme have either not been implemented to date or have been abandoned.
For Further Investigation:

Information has not been obtained for completion dates of all ORDP components. Projected completion schedules for components added to the ORDP after 1964/5 are required.
3.2 Design Characteristics

The Gariep and Van der Kloof dams are, with the Orange-Fish Tunnel, the major components of the ORDP. Gariep Dam, which creates the major storage volume in the ORDP, is a double curvature arch dam with gravity abutments at either flank. It has an unusual ratio between crest length and dam height of 10.4 (whereas the normal value for arch dams is in the order of 4 to 5). The major data for Gariep Dam are:
Double Curvature Arch Dam

Crest length Maximum height above foundation Volume 914m 88m 1 730 000m3 8 460m3/s 16 440m3/s
Integrated Spillways and Outlets

Radial-gated chute spillway Free overflow spillway in dam
The original 1962/3 White Paper planned for a much lower Gariep Dam, which could have been increased in height at a later stage if the anticipated sediment deposit in the reservoir reduced the reservoir storage capacity. However, Eskom, the South African power utility, saw merits in building a high dam immediately and in the 1964/5 White Paper the full supply level was planned to be raised from 4 070ft (elevation 1240.5m) to 4 130ft (elevation 1258.8m) in the first stage, which would increase the storage volume from 1 640 million m3 to 5 960 million m3. The Van der Kloof Dam was planned to divert water to various parts of the region around the Orange River. It was also designed to store silt that passed through Gariep. The main data for Van der Kloof Dam are:
Double Curvature Arch Dam

Crest length Maximum height above foundation Volume 760m 108m 1 000 000m3 8 550m3/s 13 390m3/s 21 940m3/s
Integrated Spillways and Outlets

Radial-gated chute spillway Free overflow spillway in dam Total spill capacity
As for Gariep, the 1962/3 plans for Van der Kloof were for a lower dam, which was designed to be increased in height depending on reservoir sedimentation. The South African electricity utility Eskom, however, requested that the crest level be raised from 3 800ft (elevation 1158.2m), as proposed in the
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1962/3 White Paper, to 3 840ft (elevation 1170.5m), which would increase the storage volume from 1 590 million m3 to 3 160 million m3 and thus increase the power benefits. At the time of project planning, sedimentation was considered of major importance and the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams were designed to be raised at some future date when sedimentation was expected to reach detrimental levels. The 1962/3 White Paper states that the silt load of the Orange River amounts to 0.8% of the runoff. The report further states that the practice of intensive soil conservation measures and improved agricultural techniques would largely reduce the future silt load, and suggests that the storage basin should have such a large storage potential that the silt load of the river could be kept in check for at least a thousand years, by means of successive raisings of the dams. This goal had considerable impact on the selection of suitable dam sites. The raisings of the dam to control sedimentation were planned in the following manner in the 1962/3 White Paper: 4 070ft the originally proposed full supply level in 1962/3 White Paper; 4 130ft the first raising, after 20 years, as proposed in 1964/5 White Paper and as built; 4 150ft the second raising, after 60 years; 4 180ft the third raising, after 120 years; a further raising after 250 years.
According to the latest figures, the Gariep reservoir has lost 10% of its storage volume due to sediment deposits, while Van der Kloof has lost 1.5%. There are three prime reasons why sedimentation has not become a major problem: The Wellbedacht Dam, completed in 1973, upstream of Gariep, for water supply to Bloemfontein, has trapped most of the sediments that otherwise would have flowed into the Gariep reservoir (the Wellbedacht reservoir is now practically filled with sediments). Both the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams were built higher than originally planned to better exploit the hydropower potential at these sites. This led to an increase of storage of the reservoirs, and thus an increased allowance for sedimentation. The watershed management programme, mainly carried out in the 1960s and 1970s, led to a reduction of erosion rates in the upstream catchment. The sediment yield for the Gariep Catchment, for example, was rather constant around 560t/km2/a from 1930 to 1970, and then dropped to 470t/km2/a.
Table 3.2 provides an overview of design changes to various components that were originally planned for in the ORDP, in addition to the more immediate raising of the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams. Components that were subsequently added, such as the Wellbedacht Dam, are not shown in the table although it is possible that design changes to these additions could have also occurred.
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Table 3.2: Design Changes of Major Components of the Orange River Development Project
Project Component Gariep and Van der Kloof dams Gariep Power Station Gariep Pumping Station for Bloemfontein Van der Kloof Left Bank Canal Van der Kloof Right Bank Canal Brief Description of Change Raising heights/full supply levels in phase 1 Installation of 4 x 80MW units Replacement with Wellbedacht Dam and Caledon-Bloemfontein Water Supply Scheme Reduction in scope/size; pump station built in phase 2 Realignment of right bank canal; enlargement of first 14km of right bank canal; addition of Ramah Branch Canal/Distribution Canals; modification of pumping station A high-level 106km high level canal Diameter of tunnel enlarged from 16.75ft to 17.25ft Diameter of tunnel enlarged from 17.25ft to 17.5ft Addition of Elandsdrift Weir; lengthening of canal by 30km; starting of canal higher up Great Fish River; addition of Cookhouse Tunnel Protection works for bank erosion Protection works for bank erosion; addition of a small weir and link canals Addition of central control system for project Year Decided 1964/5 1971/2 1968/9 1971/2 1971/2
Orange-Riet River Scheme Orange-Fish Tunnel Orange-Fish Tunnel Fish-Sundays Scheme
1971/2 1968/9 1971/2 1971/2
Fish-Sundays Scheme Fish-Sundays Scheme No component
1973/4 1984/5 1974/5
Source: Various White Papers of the South African government. The original proposal for irrigation by the Van der Kloof Left Bank Canal could not be implemented in many areas because of the high salinity of the soils or because of negative benefit/cost ratios determined in 1971/2. The 1962/3 White Paper projected irrigation of 113 058ha from the left bank canal but the only soils recommended for irrigation after 1971/2 were those between the Van der Kloof Dam and Hopetown, about 25 524ha in total. Correspondingly, the left bank canal was redesigned with a reduced length of 140km and a carrying capacity of 28m/sec. Distribution and drainage networks were planned to be built only for 12 248ha that could be commanded by gravity and the pump stations for the remainder were to be built later. In 1984/5, however, it was decided to defer completion of the Van der Kloof Left Bank Canal. According to the 1962/3 White Paper, the Van der Kloof Right Bank Canal would ultimately have supplied water to 11 135ha of irrigable riparian land between Van der Kloof Dam and the boundary between the Orange Free State and the Cape Province and also to 11 990ha of high-lying land in the vicinity of Luckhoff and 17 130ha in the Riet River Valley in addition to supplementary water to 3 426ha in the existing Riet River Valley Scheme. The water for the Riet River Valley and high-lying lands in the vicinity of Luckhoff were to have been supplied by means of a pump station about 16km from Van der Kloof Dam on the gravity canal and by a high-level branch canal.1 Subsequent investigations based on more in-depth soil surveys and benefit/cost analysis revealed that instead of there being only 17 130ha of irrigable land in the Lower Riet River Valley, there were actually 119 000ha suitable for irrigation. Correspondingly, several design changes were proposed: a realignment of the right bank canal so that it would join the Riet River Canal about 27km downstream of Koffiefontein instead of in the vicinity of Koffiefontein; an enlargement of the first 14km of the canal from the Van der Kloof Dam for latter phases of the scheme because it had to be constructed along steep slopes and rocky areas;
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the construction of the right bank canal with an initial capacity of 57m/sec from the Van der Kloof Dam down to a point 14km from the dam where the first pump is envisaged; the installation of a pump station about 14km from the Van der Kloof Dam; the construction of a branch of the canal, 112km long, along the right bank of the Orange River down to Ramah on the boundary between the Orange Free State and the Cape Province (This canal was planned with a capacity of 8.7m/sec where it would branch off at the pump station and would be able to command 7 900ha by gravity.); the construction of distribution canals and drains for the development of 8 840ha of irrigable land under the gravity canal on the right bank from the dam down to Ramah on the boundary between the Orange Free State and the Cape Province (These would form the distribution and drainage systems for the lands served by the pump station and Ramah Canal.); the construction of a high-level canal, 106km long, from the pump station and past Luckhoff down to a point about 27km downstream of Koffiefontein where it would join the existing Riet River Canal from the Kalkfontein Dam. (It was proposed that this canal be constructed with a capacity of about 12m/sec at the pump station for supplementary irrigation on the existing Riet River Scheme as well as for the irrigation of 7 700ha. Distribution canals and drains for the 7 700ha were envisaged as future components of the ORDP.)
It was originally planned that the Orange-Fish Tunnel would receive its water from the Gariep reservoir. The design of the 51.5-mile Orange-Fish Tunnel was modified in 1968/9 to promote greater flexibility in the operation of that part of the scheme. The diameter was increased from 16.75ft to 17.25ft in order to adapt the carrying capacity to the needs of peak consumption. The planned diameter was increased again to 17.5ft three years later for the same reasons. The tunnel was eventually built with a diameter of 5.2m and is 83km long. On average, it transfers some 20m3/s from the Orange to the Great Fish River. Maximum capacity varies according to the head but is at least 53m3/s. On completion of the Orange-Fish Tunnel, water was to be discharged at the tunnel outlet into the Teebusspruit, after which it would flow via the spruit and the Great Brak River into the Grass Ridge Dam. Investigations found that bank erosion was occurring and remedial measures to address this unexpected impact were implemented from the 1970s. The design of the Fish-Sundays works were also dramatically revised in 1971/2. The 1962/3 White Paper originally envisaged the following: the construction of a canal 103km long, capacity 9.9 m/sec, from the Klipfontein diversion weir down to the upper reaches of Skoenmakers River to supply 2 570ha in the Lower Sundays River, out of a total of 9 420ha below Lake Mentz, with a full water application, as well as the construction of a hydroelectric power station at Elizarand in phase 1; the construction of distribution canals to irrigate 13 700ha in the Lower Sundays River, as well as the enlargement of the Klipfontein main canal and the construction of distribution canals to serve 21 400ha of new development in the Lower Fish River area in phase 2; the supply of 182 000 m/sec/day of supplementary water to Port Elizabeth in phase 4.
The following design changes were made to the Fish-Sundays Scheme, which was built in 1971/2: a weir in the Great Fish River on the farm Elandsdrift 565 to provide a measure of balancing storage for the utilisation of floodwaters coming down the Fish River as well as for the water released into the river from the Grass Ridge Dam; a main canal with a total length of 133km and a capacity at the weir of 46 m/sec, which would decrease to 35 m/sec just downstream of a proposed bifurcation to the left bank and further decrease to 16.5 m/sec where the canal discharged into the Skoenmakers River;
17
the main canal would start higher up the Great Fish River so that sufficient height could be gained to command the greater part of the 875ha of land scheduled for the Somerset East Irrigation District; en route use would be made of several siphons and tunnels the largest tunnel, known as the Cookhouse Tunnel, was planned to be about 13.7km long with a diameter of 4.6m after being lined with concrete.
These design changes for the Fish-Sundays Scheme were justified for the following reasons: The canal would start higher up because the Somerset East Irrigation District had no storage dam and was dependent solely on erratic floodwater and normal river flow from the Little Fish River. The original canal would have followed very steep mountain slopes for long distances between the weir and Somerset East. Studies showed that initial capital expenditure and maintenance costs could be reduced if the Cookhouse Tunnel was built through the Bosberg mountain range to the Somerset East Irrigation District. Enlargement of the main (Klipfontein) canal was proposed for phase 1 rather than in two phases in view of the countrys limited labour forces. To speed up completion of the Cookhouse Tunnel the DWA bought a new rock-tunnelboring machine that could also be used for other tunnel schemes in the country. According to the 1969 report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Water Matters, Port Elizabeth was projected to experience a water shortage of 568 000 m/sec/day by 2000. This is 386 000 m/sec/day more than the required supply figure quoted in the 1962/3 White Paper. The revised design would meet the water demands of Port Elizabeth as well as supplement or provide additional irrigation in a variety of areas equalling 50 613ha plus about 20%.
During the late 1970s, it was discovered that water supply to irrigation in the Lower Sundays River Valley was plagued by mineralisation and the total demand for water from Lake Mentz already exceeded the dependable yield from that reservoir. It was thus proposed in 1984/5 to complete the Fish-Sundays scheme with an additional weir, an additional link canal, and river protection works by 1992.
Findings on Design Characteristics:

Several major and minor design modifications to various components of the ORDP were required for the following reasons: objectives for the scheme evolved (such as increased demand for hydropower generation), better information became available (after more in-depth soil surveys were conducted), less costly or more beneficial alternatives were found (such as the Wellbedacht Dam/Caledon Water Supply Scheme), and unexpected impacts emerged (such as bank erosion). Sedimentation did not become a problem for the Gariep and Van der Kloof reservoirs because of the earlier raisings of the dams, the effectiveness of the originally planned watershed programme, and the construction of the additional Wellbedacht Dam upstream of Gariep, which trapped (and eventually silted up with) most of the sediment that otherwise would have flowed into the Gariep reservoir. Some components of the scheme, such as the Van der Kloof Right Bank Canal and the Elizarand Power Station, were either deferred indefinitely or abandoned completely.

Actual design changes to components originally planned for the ORDP that occurred after 1984/5 should be determined. Planned and actual design changes to components added to the ORDP after 1964/5 should be determined.
18
3.3 Financial Expenditure

The 1962/3 White Paper stated that the cost of all six phases of the comprehensive ORDP, not including costs for power infrastructure, purchases of lands, costs of resettlement, or operations and maintenance costs, amounted to R300 million. Of this amount, R85 million was allocated to complete phase 1 of the scheme in 1962/3. The costs of additional power infrastructure were projected at R99.7 million and were allocated as follows: R51.3 million for dams, canals, etc needed for power generation; R33.7 million for generating plants and stations; and R14.7 million for transmission and distribution lines. The costs for resettlement of whites and coloureds were estimated at R60 million over a period of 30 years. It is not possible to compare the overall expenditures on the ORDP over time with the figures estimated in the 1962/3 White Paper because projections for all financial costs incurred on the project were not included in the original estimates and because it is not possible to assemble detailed expenditures for all components and aspects of the ORDP. Regarding the latter point, actual detailed expenditures since 1981 are unavailable, as are the actual costs of the power component, which neither Eskom nor the DWA could find in their archives. However, revised figures for actual expenditure and projected expenditures were announced periodically in White Papers that appeared in 1984/5. These are analysed below. Such an analysis is complicated by the numerous changes in design characteristics of the scheme as reviewed in the previous section. Without full, disaggregated information on each component it is difficult to evaluate the divergence of actual expenditure from expected expenditures. Data from four White Papers (1962/3, 1964/5, 1974, and 1984/5) were compiled for analysis.2 These figures did not include the costs of power infrastructure, purchase of lands, of resettlement, or operations and maintenance. Further, as much of phases 2 to 6 were not built, only figures for phase 1 are included. Following the redesign of the project, the major expenditure areas are thus the nonpower and irrigation costs of the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams, the Orange-Fish Tunnel, and the Fish-Sundays conveyance. Since the White Papers express expenditures in South African currency as valued at the time, and these costs occur over a period of 20 years, they are converted into 1998 US$ (using the method described in Annex 3). Note that costs for on-farm development are not included in the cost for irrigation. Table 3.3: Evolution of Cost Estimates on Orange River Development Project
Source of Estimate 1962/3 White Paper 1964/5 White Paper 1974 White Paper 1984/5 White Paper Cost in 1998 US$ 571.3 873.8 2 235.1 2 313.7
Note: Detailed figures are provided in Annex 4. The observed increase between the White Papers of 1962/3 and 1964/5 of from $571 million to $870 million is mainly the result of the increase in heights of the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams. The subsequent increase found in the 1974 White Paper to over $2 300 million is not justified solely by changes to the projected design. In fact, the original estimates omitted the effect of inflation and, thus, would have underestimated the costs of the works involved. A comparison of the 1964/5 figures with the 1974 and 1984/5 figures suggests that the ORDP was almost three times as expensive as initially planned. To what extent this is a result of changes in project design as opposed to cost overruns on the original design is not possible to determine with the limited information currently available. An estimated cost for the Gariep and Van der Kloof powerhouses was made according to standard industry practice, as fixed costs for such items vary little. The results suggest that the two powerhouses probably cost about $200 million (in 1998 US$). As the power rating of the two
19
facilities changed with the change in dam height, these figures cannot be compared directly with the estimates for power provided in the 1962/3 White Paper. The figures cited thus far for the investment costs of the project are adjusted for inflation but not the opportunity cost of capital. If the cost streams are capitalized from the period of expenditure to 1998 using a capitalization rate of 10% the infrastructure cost comes to $29.6 billion and the powerhouse costs to $2.4 billion. These figures represent the present value of these expenditure streams if they had been invested at 10% interest at the time of expenditure and compounded to 1998. Given uncertainty over the appropriate capitalization rate, sensitivity analysis of these figures was undertaken using 5% and 15%, yielding present values of $8.5 and $99.5 billion, respectively for infrastructure and $0.9 and $7.1 billion respectively for the powerhouse. The large range between the 5% and 15% values reflects the importance of accurately estimating the opportunity cost of capital in arriving at present values. In the course of the present study a more precise indication of the cost of capital was not possible, however, this issues is taken up under the WCD thematic on financial and economic analysis. The purpose of presenting these present values is to provide a figure that accurately reflects the present day value of these costs. It also provides a way for stakeholders to see and to weigh different elements of the project, when such can be valued in monetary terms. In the current study this ability is limited due to the limited number of impacts that were comprehensively valued. Still, the benefits of hydropower production are presented in present value terms as well, to provide an example of how this method provides the ability to put costs and benefits streams occurring in different period into a comparable format. Finally, employing the historical cost figures from the 1984/5 White Paper for the 196379 period and including the estimate powerhouse costs it is possible to examine the temporal pattern and distribution of expenditure. The figure shows that the Gariep Dam and the Orange-Fish Tunnel were the most costly portions of the project. In terms of overall expenditure, as projected in the White Paper, for the 196292 period, the total is shared as follows: Gariep (39%), Orange-Fish (34%), Van der Kloof (27%), and Fish-Sundays (1%). The temporal pattern of expenditure reveals that the two White Papers in the 1960s were overly optimistic in terms of time scale (projecting completion in 1970) as expenditure did not peak until the early 1970s, and then tapering off by 1979 (Figure 3.1).
20
Figure 3.1: Temporal Pattern of Expenditure on Major Project Components, 196379

$250
$200
$150 1998 US$ millions
Gariep Van der Kloof Orange-Fish Fish-Sundays
$100
$50
$0 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980
Findings on Financial Expenditures:

Phase 1 of the ORDP has ended up costing almost three times the planned expenditure, although the data do not clarify to what extent this is a result of cost overruns or changes in project design.

Disaggregating expenditure data by project component would assist in determining to what extent actual expenditure reflects poor planning versus changes in project design. Additional information on actual expenditures on the ORDP is required, especially for the power, recreation, and resettlement components of the scheme.
3.4 Irrigation and Agriculture

In the case of irrigation, actual versus expected performance of the project is evaluated by examining the respective figures for the command area, cropping area, and cropping patterns. This section then goes on to discuss the impact that irrigated water has had on agriculture in the command areas by examining the gross value of agricultural production (GVAP) with and without project scenarios.
3.4.1 Irrigated Area

Under the provisions of the 1962/3 White Paper the total command area to be brought under irrigation from the comprehensive ORDP was 301 000ha (or 360 000 morgen). The projected command area comprised 206 500ha designated within the Orange River Basin of which 13% was existing irrigated land, and 94 500ha in the Fish and Sundays rivers watersheds of which 19% was considered existing irrigation. Three irrigation areas totalling 58 500ha were included in the White Paper that were outside the irrigation area supplied by the two focal dams.3 Information on areas actually irrigated were not available from the irrigation board data nor the census data, and so both the overall figure (301 000ha) and a reduced area (301 000 - 58 500 = 242 470ha) were used to calculate a range within which the ratio of actual to predicted irrigated and cropped areas
21
is expected to lie. The reduced figure of 242 470ha is further broken down to 161 370ha for the Van der Kloof sub-system and 81 100ha for the Gariep sub-system. A detailed breakdown of the predicted irrigated areas appears in Annex 5. The 1993 agricultural census data give an actual irrigated area of 164 000ha. This equates to 68% of the predicted 242 470ha within the same magisterial districts. On the other hand, the Orange River Replanning Study (ORRS) projects an irrigated area of only 138 093ha or approximately 56% of the predicted 242 470ha within the same areas. Comparison of these two sources is presented in Figure 5 (details are in Tables 1 and 2 of Annex 5).4 As the data contained in the ORRS comes from irrigation boards it can be seen that the agricultural census data for the irrigation area seem to provide a higher figure when compared with data from the irrigation boards.5 Figure 3.2: Predicted and Actual Irrigated Areas
300 000 250 000
Hectares
200 000 150 000 100 000 50 000 0 Upper Orange River Lower Orange River Fish River Sundays River Total
River reach Predicted (ha) Irrigated 1993 census Scheduled 1994/5
Source: Agricultural Census, 1993.
3.4.2 Cropping Patterns

The 1962/3 White Paper also foresaw a significant change in cropping patterns towards higher valued products such as cotton, potatoes and vegetables, and deciduous fruit and away from fodder crops such as lucerne and teff and cereals such as maize and wheat. Fodder crops still dominated the proposed cropping mix with 151 000ha, followed by 66 000ha of wheat (double cropped), and 48 000ha of cotton. No figures were provided for the pre-project cropped areas. The assumption underlying the proposed cropping pattern was that water was the main factor preventing farmers from growing the higher valued crops. This did not take account of the fact that higher amounts of working capital would be required as well as enhanced technical and management skills. Implicit in the production assumptions was the premise that adequate markets were available or would be developed for the new output, which contrasts with the growing international isolation being experienced by South Africa from the early 1960s. The provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937 (amended in 1968) had been used to a greater and greater extent during the 1950s and were regarded by the government of the day as an effective tool for controlled marketing to deal with surpluses should the need arise. The predicted and actual cropping patterns are compared in Table 3.4 (and in more detail in Annex 5) using the actual cropped areas during the latest two census years (1988 and 1993). The predicted figures for the ORDP include areas double cropped (66 345ha) and irrigated from sources outside the
22
focal dams (58 525ha). It should be noted that the census return does not explicitly separate the area doubled cropped and the comparison in this section is based on total cropped area during the whole year. A reduced predicted figure of 308 815ha excluding these external areas is used for a comparative study. Table 3.4: Predicted and Actual Cropping Pattern (ha)
Winter cereals Summer cereals Potatoes and vegetables Other field crops Other crops Fruit Fodder crops Total External areas Reduced total Cropped area/reduced total area Predicted 66 345 22 165 19 220 74 655 2 210 31 610 151 135 367 340 58 525 308 815 1988 Census 53 799 22 456 3 545 0 0 18 581 29 307 127 688 0 127 688 41% 1993 Census 32 718 14 963 3 545 12 729 400 20 279 30 773 115 407 0 115 407 37%
Source: 1962/3 White Paper and Agricultural Census, 1993. Despite the problems with data availability, reliability, and correspondence in spatial terms, the general observation holds that there has been a significant shortfall in achieving predicted cropped areas more than 50%. The total area cropped that was reported in 1993 (115 407ha) is lower than the 1988 census value (127 688ha). In terms of the crops actually produced, the largest differences between predicted and actual are to be found in winter cereals, fodder crops, other field crops (eg seed cotton), and potatoes and vegetables. Summer cereals (mostly maize and grain sorghum) and fruit (viticulture, citrus, and deciduous) have been closest to achieving predictions. Since 1993, there has been considerable development along the Lower Orange River with expanded irrigated areas planted to vines. These areas were not accounted for in the above data comparison, which is based on the 1993 census.6 The predicted and actual volumes of production for different crops are shown in Table 3.5. Despite the considerable shortfall in total irrigated area outlined above, the actual production of major crops demonstrated considerable increase over the project predictions. Increases in production were recorded for summer cereals, other field crops, and winter cereals and vegetables by 3, 4.5, 2.1, and 1.7 times the predicted production respectively.7 Table 3.5: Comparison of Predicted, Pre-Project (19716), and Recent Crop Production
Summer cereals Winter cereals Fodder crops Other field crops Vegetables Predicted 30 000 25 000 210 000 21 028 34 210 Average, 19716 Census 11 425 24 400 152 016 13 548 16 326 Average, 198893 Census 89 400 114 347 192 368 44 420 56 950
The significant increases in agricultural production may be attributed to both the introduction of irrigation and the securing of larger volumes of more reliable water supplies. Other inputs were also increased, eg fertiliser, apparently quite substantially between 1971 (pre-project) and 1996 (Abstract of Agricultural Statistics, 1996). The yield increases predicted also seemed rather conservative, and could have contributed to the under-estimation of the project benefits in terms of realising greater agricultural productivity.
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3.4.3 Gross Value of Agricultural Production

The 1962/3 White Paper also provided estimates of the GVAP expected from the 301 000ha (360 000 morgen), which are summarised in Annex 5. The GVAP for phases 1 to 6 of the ORDP was estimated at $168 million (in 1998 US$ R120 million in 1962). This included $13.23 million (1998 US$) derived from 22 575ha of existing irrigated land in the Lower Orange River. The estimate exceeds that calculated in a previous table in the 1962/3 White Paper by almost $9 million (1998 US$), a difference that is not explained. The 1962/3 White Paper indicated that the estimates of GVAP were based on the agricultural crop patterns ... and yields conservative[ly] ... anticipated ... since the production of most crops can be increased by 50 per cent if scientific farming practices are applied (1962/3:19). The estimates of GVAP for main crops are listed in Annex 5. The White Paper justified the inclusion of the existing irrigation along the Orange River ... since such development will now become independent of supplies from Vaal Dam (1962/3:19), which presumably accounts for the opportunity value of being able to use the water from the Vaal Dam for a different purpose. The predicted income by reach is presented in Annex 5 excluding those areas not covered by the census data analysis for this study. Despite the increase in production volumes noted in the previous section, a comparison of GVAP (at constant 1998 US$) of crops calculated for the pre-project start date with those in 1993 suggests minimal achievement of the expected targets for increased value. As indicated in Table 3.6, the analysis area achieved only 27% of the predicted target of $413 million (1998 US$) with only the Lower Orange River reaches coming close to achieving the predicted values. Further investigation would be required to ascertain what factors, such as declining real agricultural prices, may account for this shortfall. Table 3.6: Gross Value of Crop Production in 1998 US$
Predicted Project Start* 1993 Census 1993 Actual as % Predicted 17 94 11 33 27 1993 Figures Adjusted for Livestock Values
Upper Orange River Lower Orange River Fish River Sundays River Total
215.6 54.3 103.4 39.9 413.2
4.1 12.8 4.1 12.5 33.5
35.9 51.2 11.1 13.1 111.3
90 128 28 33 278
Source: Agriculture Census, 1993.
Note: * The effective pre-project dates used were Van der Kloof: 1971; Gariep: 1976; Sundays River: 1988.
The impact of introducing a more assured supply of irrigation to the project area is demonstrated by the increasing contribution of field and horticultural crops to GVAP as shown in Table 3.7.8 All reaches showed a significant increase in contribution from field and horticultural crops, including the traditionally important cropping areas of Gordonia (Lower Orange) and Kirkwood (Sundays). Excluding these areas, field and horticultural crops contributed between 5 and 14% of GVAP in 1976 whereas by 1993 they contributed between 18 and 58%. Table 3.7: Contribution of Field and Horticultural Crops to GVAP, 197693 (%)
Upper Orange River Lower Orange River Fish River Sundays River 1976 514 739 79 72 1981 1032 1356 211 68 1988 3754 2159 314 76 1993 1858 3570 621 83
24
Further analysis of farms by dominant farming activity is summarised in Table 3.8, which indicates the extent of the importance of livestock. Overall, 66% of the farms in districts affected by the ORDP had 50% or more of the gross value of sales as animal based. Two specific magisterial districts, namely Kirkwood (Sundays River) and Gordonia (Lower Orange River) are the exceptions. In Kirkwood, farms producing horticultural products (citrus) dominated in 1993 (58%) with only 23% of farms having a dominance of livestock. In Gordonia, horticulture (vineyards and deciduous fruit) shares were predominant with livestock at 35% and 37% respectively. Table 3.8: Percentage of Farms where more than 50% of Gross Farm Income is Derived from Animal Production per Region, 1993
Upper Orange River Lower Orange River Fish River Sundays River % 7086 3779 83 23
Source: Calculated from Agricultural Census, 1993. More detailed farm level analysis would be required to calculate the livestock contribution for multiple products (beef, milk, mutton, wool, and mohair, as well as ostrich hides, feathers, and meat) to the GVAP for the study area. The importance of livestock to the overall farm budget is also evident from the sizeable area allocated to the production of fodder crops. It can be inferred that the value produced from animal production is significant. In the Fish River Basin in particular, irrigated grazing has been an important component of wool production during the 1980s (Laker, pers. comm. 1999). Clearly, many livestock activities would not have been sustainable without access to irrigation. The low to very low carrying capacity of the natural grazing necessitates additional feed supplies. Cultivated pastures improve productivity of animal production, while irrigated crops can provide some income diversification to hedge against price fluctuations. Figures from a farming model developed for the ORRS (1997) enable a quick sensitivity analysis of the results obtained above in order to include the potential GVAP of livestock. The study indicates that the livestock contribution to farm level gross margin varies from 35 % for large farms with irrigated cash crops, to 60% for extensive farms with limited irrigation. The contribution for smaller farms with a small irrigation component ranges from 12 to 20% (ORDP Replanning Study, 1997). Even if applying the upper figure of 60% contribution to GVAP from livestock to the estimate of total GVAP, it would increase the realisation of the predicted value of production from the 27% based on crops alone to just under 67%. The corresponding amounts are presented in the final column of Table 3.6, with the total annual GVAP reaching as high as $278 million (1998 US$). This remains an under achievement of the value predicted in the 1962/3 White Paper. It has not been possible to draw a firm and reliable conclusion on the actual GVAP due to a number of reasons: farm data was obtained at the magisterial district level but it was not possible to break down this data to identify the farms irrigated with ORDP water; general concerns regarding the adequacy of census data over the years and conflicting reports on trends in farm incomes over time make it difficult to identify period by period figures for GVAP; and the absence of reliable data on the livestock subsector as supported by irrigation.
For this reason, future references to the impact of ORDP in this paper will simply use the adjusted annual figures from Table 3.6 as indicative of irrigation impacts and these figures are not converted into present values.
25
Findings on Irrigation and Irrigated Agriculture:

The available data on scheduled areas, irrigation boards, and agricultural census returns indicate that the project has developed in the region of 46% to 57% of the predicted irrigated area. The current scheduled irrigated area is 138 000ha compared with the predicted area of 243 000 to 310 000ha. The comparison of actual irrigated area with predicted was complicated by the lack of data on actual areas irrigated and lack of clarity on areas included in the original plan but not developed as can be inferred from the sections on schedules and design changes of the ORDP. Although the predicted irrigated area and extent of crop diversification to higher valued products did not fully materialise, the lower-bound estimates of actual volume of crop production significantly exceeded predictions, eg 300% for summer cereals, 457% for winter cereals, 211% for other field crops, and 166% for vegetables. Fodder crop production was about 90% of that predicted. However, the calculated lower bound for GVAP was low at 27% of predicted contribution if livestock is excluded, and ranges to 67% if an upper bound estimate of livestock value is included.

Findings on irrigated area, cropping patterns, and agricultural production should be validated. A more detailed farm level analysis to calculate livestock contributions to GVAP is needed. A more detailed analysis should be done of the price trends for farm products over time and other external factors affecting GVAP.
3.5 Municipal and Industrial Water Supply

One of the original central objectives of the ORDP was to supply water to towns, villages, and industry. The 1962/3 White Paper states that, the comprehensive project makes provision for the initial delivery of 100 million gallons of water per day for domestic and industrial use to various towns and villages and that the quantity can be increased according to the demands of the circumstances in the future. Total municipal water supply from the ORDP was thus initially projected to reach 151Mm3/yr, which is equivalent to about 4.8m3/s. Mean annual inflow to the Gariep is 205m3/s, so this represents just 2.5% of the inflow into the Gariep reservoir (Table 3.9). Of the total allocation, 66% was allocated as an inter-basin transfer to towns and cities on the Fish and Upper Sundays rivers, and Port Elizabeth. Table 3.9: Planned Water Supply in the ORDP
Area Der Aar Bloemfontein Kimberley and environs Towns along the Fish River Towns along the Upper Sundays River Port Elizabeth Total Initial Supply (million gall/day) 1 15 20 14 10 40 100 (m3/s) 0.048 0.720 0.960 0.672 0.480 1.920 4.800 (Mm3/yr) 2 23 30 21 15 61 151
Source: 1962/3 White Paper. The exact supply of water from the ORDP to municipalities in the Orange River Basin could not be determined due to data and time limitations. It is known that in the White Paper of 1968/9 Bloemfontein was omitted as a direct beneficiary due to the decision to build a dam at Wellbedacht that would provide water to Bloemfontein. The discussion of actual impacts under the ORDP instead provides a brief review of data on urban and industrial supply and demand in the Fish-Sundays Basin. To facilitate this discussion it is first necessary to review the inter-basin transfers from the Orange River Basin.
26
The Gariep Reservoir became operational in late 1970 and the Orange-Fish Tunnel in 1977. The tunnel has a capacity of 54m3/s, which is equivalent to 1 703 Mm3/yr if operated continuously at this level. The first conclusion then is that considerable amounts of water (roughly 25% of Gariep inflow) could potentially be transferred to the Fish-Sundays basin. Data from the first full hydrological year of operation (1977-78) shows an initial annual flow of 200 Mm3/yr (see Figure 3.3 below). Since that time, inter-basin transfers have increased substantially. In the 1990s annual flows have fluctuated in a range around 560 Mm3/yr, equivalent to a continuous flow of approximately 18 m3/s. Monthly figures (see Figure 3.4) show that supply is fairly steady through the year with the exception of the June and July period when the Fish and Sundays basin receives most of its rainfall and transfers reach a low-point. Figure 3.3: Inter-basin Water Transfers through the Orange-Fish Tunnel
700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0

77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 97
Annual Flow (million m3/yr)
Notes: 1977 refers to the hydrological year 1977-78 Source: Department of Water Affairs and Forestry Figure 3.4: Seasonal Variation in Inter-Basin Transfers through the Orange-Fish Tunnel
25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 1990-97 average flow in m3/s
No v De c Ja n Fe b M ar Ap r M ay Ju n
O ct
Ju l Au g
Se p
27
These figures for supply of water from the Orange River can be cross-referenced by examining demand for these inter-basin transfers for use in irrigation and urban and industrial water supply. As suggested in the previous section on irrigation, some 45 000 to 50 000 hectares of land is irrigated with Orange River water. Data from the Orange River Replanning Study (ORRS) suggest that in 1994 total hectares scheduled for irrigation was just over 44,000 and that total water consumption (including evapotranspiration losses) could be expected to be just shy of 450 Mm3/yr. The ORRS also states that in light of increased forecasts in demand that Port Elizabeth was eventually allocated 207Mm3/yr as opposed to the figure of 61Mm3/yr cited in the original White Paper. Despite the large allocation the ORRS suggests consumption in 1994 by Port Elizabeth of 11Mm3/yr. This, against a backdrop of 63Mm3/yr in total urban and industrial demand in Port Elizabeth. Other major consumers of Orange River water in 1994 included Grahamstown at 7Mm3/yr and Craddock at 5Mm3/yr. On this basis consumption for municipal and industrial use would total approximately 25Mm3/yr and total demand for inter-basin transfers would equal 475Mm3/yr. Table 3.10: Allocation and Usage of Inter-Basin Transfers from the Orange River Basin to the Fish-Sundays Basin
Irrigation Allocation Scheduled (has) 1. Fish -Sundays River Canal Scheme a. Irrigation Total Irrigation Scheme 25% for losses above Darlington b. Water Supply Total Cradock Cookhouse 25% for losses above Darlington 2. Lower Sundays River GWS a. Irrigation Total Irrigated Area 15% for losses b. Water Supply Total Extension to Port Elizabeth Kirkwood, Sunlands, Hermitage, and Addo (m3/ha/yr) 16 288 13 030 3 258 (Mm3/yr) 523 418 105 Consumed (Mm3/yr) 445 356 89 7 5 0 1 11 773 10 350 9 000 1 350 122 106 16 85 74 11 238 207 no data available 31 3 7 6 1 433 8 7 1 28 13 11 no data available 2 Urban Consumed Allocated (Mm3/yr) (Mm3/yr)
32 085
15% for losses 3. Lower Fish River GWS a. Irrigation Scheme 343 b. Water Supply Grahamstown 15% for losses Total 44 201 Source: ORRS, Report on Existing Water Infrastructure in the Eastern Cape Region. Note: All data for 1993/4. Based on figures in 1.a and 2.a an estimate of water usage of 9 802m3/ha/yr is calculated and applied to 3.a.
The preliminary conclusion of this investigation is that after 17 years of operation of the Orange-Fish Tunnel the ORDP has reached only one-sixth of its projected final target of roughly 151Mm3/yr to municipal and urban water supply in the Fish-Sundays basin. Supply to Port Elizabeth mirrors this trend as it has also achieved roughly one-sixth of the target figure, which coincidentally represents the percentage of Port Elizabeths needs supplied by Orange River water. Further investigation of the trend in demand and supply as regards the Port Elizabeth area would be useful in indicating the rate at which this usage is changing. Nonetheless, fairly constant supply figures throughout the 1990s suggest that growth in demand is not currently driving the overall levels of inter-basin transfers. Despite the failure to achieve initial targets, the contribution of the Orange River inter-basin transfers remains on its own account significant, with one source suggesting that
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90% of water used in the Fish-Sundays basin comes from the Orange River. If the bulk of demand for non-Orange River water is reflected in the five-sixths of Port Elizabeth demand that is met from within the basin, then this estimate is correct.
Findings on Municipal and Industrial Water Supply:

Due to changes in project design that appear to have reduced the importance of ORDP for municipal and industrial water supply in the Orange River Basin, the inter-basin transfer of water to the Fish-Sundays basin and Port Elizabeth has become the largest allocation of water for municipal and industrial uses. Inter-basin transfers from the Orange River to the Fish-Sundays have leveled out at around 560 Mm3/yr in the 1990s of which some 80% is destined for irrigation. Due to lack of data no precise findings can be offered as to the total amount of water being used for municipal and industrial water supply, however, it appears that as of 1994 the project had met only 16% of its expected final target with regard to inter-basin transfers for municipal and industrial water supply to the Fish-Sundays basin.

Additional data on trends in water supply and demand, particularly the Fish-Sundays basin would be useful in improving the understanding of actual performance of the project and the distribution of these impacts between the different basins and socio-economic groups. Estimates of the value of urban and industrial uses of water or the costs of alternative sources of water supply could be used to estimate the rough value of these inter-basin transfers.
3.6 Hydropower
The South African power system had an installed capacity of about 5 000MW at the time Gariep hydropower station was implemented in 1972, and about 7 000MW when Van der Kloof was added in 1978. The power system has been predominantly thermal with over 90% of the generation provided by coal-fired steam plants.
3.6.1 Installed Hydropower Capacity

The 1962/3 White Paper planned for the construction of hydropower stations at several places, including at Gariep Dam and at Van der Kloof Dam. The original total installed capacity projected from all the dams was approximately 200MW at phase 6 in the 1962/3 White Paper, of which 35MW was allocated for pumping to meet irrigation and water supply needs. With the proposal to raise the height of Gariep and Van der Kloof dams in the 1964/5 White Paper, the focus of hydropower generation shifted to these two facilities and many of the other (14) stations were never built. Even the 1964/5 White Paper provided an underestimate of the final installed capacity at Gariep and Van der Kloof, where final installed capacity totals 540MW or some 200% more than the initial projection in 1962/3 and 125% more than projected for the two facilities in the 1964/5 White Paper. Table 3.11: Projected Installed Capacity of Power at Planned Stations in 1962/3 White Paper (in MW)
Station Gariep Van der Kloof Total* 1962/3 40 between 14 and 23 200 White Paper Projections 1964/5 120 120 nv 1971/2 320 220 nv Actual 320 220 nv
Source: Various White Papers and Eskom yearbooks.
Note: *Figures from the 1964/5 White Paper citing installed capacities as projected in the 1962/3 White Paper seem to be at odds, thus there is some confusion about the original proposal.
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Given resource limitations for the pilot study, complete information on the actual developments for all the power stations proposed in the initial White Papers were not collected. Rather the analysis in this section focuses on Gariep and Van der Kloof, which are the two most significant hydropower developments of the ORDP (as seen in Table 3.11). In the following sections the actual power generation and benefits derived from the two largest components of the ORDP, Gariep and Van der Kloof, are examined. In the case of hydropower, the benchmark for project performance will be the figures from the 1964/5 White Paper.
3.6.2 Projected and Actual Hydropower Generation from Gariep and Van der Kloof
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show actual energy generation at Gariep and Van der Kloof dams and compares it with the projected estimates from the White Paper of 1964/5 (the 1962/3 figures are also included as a point of general information). The predicted power generation figures for the two dams recognised that the output would decline as a result of increasing irrigation demands over time. This would, in turn, lead to ever greater drawdowns of the reservoir, leading to a lower average head and increasing diversions directly out of the reservoirs, leaving less water for power generation. Figure 3.5: Predicted and Actual Hydropower Generation at Gariep Dam
2 000 1 500 1 000
Energy Generation (
GWh/a) actual !
! ! ! !! !
500 0 1970
62/63 WP 64/65 WP
!!
!!
! !
1990
!
1975
!! ! ! !!
1980 1985
! ! ! !
! ! !
1995
Year Source: Eskom yearbooks. Source: Eskom yearbooks.
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Figure 3.6: Predicted and Actual Hydropower Generation at Van der Kloof Dam
Energy Generation (GWh/a) 2 000 1 500 1 000 500 0 actual 62/63 WP 64/65 WP
1970
1975
1980
1985 Year
1990
1995
Source: Eskom yearbooks. In the case of Gariep, the project was commissioned one year later than originally planned. Actual energy generation was roughly equal to the production predicted in the 1964/5 White Paper. For the period 1971 (the first year of operation) to 1998, the average output was 660GWh per annum, whereas the White Paper predicted 620GWh for the first 28 years of operation, which is a 6% increase in terms of actual versus predicted. In order to compare predicted vs. actual hydropower production the predicted and actual annual power generation totals (in GWh) were discounted to the year of inception using a 10% discount rate. In terms of present value, the predicted value for the first 28 years of operation for Gariep was 12% higher than the value actually achieved. Much of this is attributable to the low output in 1971, which was caused by the turbines coming available only toward the end of the year. The station was officially opened in March 1972. Comparing predicted vs. actual for the period 197298 in terms of present value, the predicted value was only about 4% lower than the actual value achieved. For Van der Kloof the situation is more complex as the construction was completed six years later than projected. The predictions in the 1964/5 White Paper stated that power generation at Van der Kloof was to decrease as demands for irrigation and water supply increased over time. In the analysis of predicted and actual output, it was assumed that the predicted values for 1970 to 1992 would be representative for the period of operation 197698. The average predicted output was 725GWh per annum, whereas the actual production was 710GWh, which is 98% of predicted generation. Applying the same methodology as above, the actual production was 7% higher in net present value terms than expected. The long-term fluctuation in the output of the two stations is quite significant. In some years, there was not enough water to run the stations at full capacity during peak hours.
3.6.3 Economic Value of Power Generation

Quantitative estimates of the economic benefits derived from hydropower were not offered in the 1962/3 or 1964/5 White Papers. However, when the decision was made to install power plants in the dams, a comparison was made with the thermal alternative. This comparison was based on a predicted coal price of $3 per ton, which was not expected to rise. In fact, as noted in the section on predicted and actual assumptions above and as discussed further below, coal prices have risen dramatically, which in turn has increased the benefits from the hydropower component above those expected at the time of planning the ORDP.
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The seasonal variation of the output is high, but would normally offer at least two hours per day of peaking power. Because of the large reservoirs, the power plants can, in times of emergency, always produce their full available output. It was therefore assumed in the following calculations that Gariep and Van der Kloof offset the full 320MW and 220MW of coal-fired capacity respectively. (No adjustments have been made for differences in the availability of thermal versus hydroplants.) The equivalent coal plant was assumed to have the following characteristics: capital cost $1000 per kW; costs for operation, maintenance and repair: fixed 1% of capital cost per year, variable 2% of capital cost per year at plant factor of 100%, else proportionally lower, fuel consumption: 0.70kg/kWh in 1970, linearly declining to 0.65kg/kWh in 1998, constant thereafter; calorific value is 21MJ/kg on average; heat rate (related to power sent out) declines from 14 700 to 13 650kJ/kWh, equivalent to an efficiency of about 25%.
The coal price before 1970 was rather constant at about $3 per ton. Predictions of power generation in the 1964/5 White Paper were based on a constant price of this amount, whereas the actual price of coal rose to $6 to $10 per ton soon after the implementation of Gariep and Van der Kloof dams. Prices started to rise during the world oil crisis in the 1970s, and reached their peak in the early 1980s. The price then stabilised around $8 per ton. The coal price in South Africa in 1999 was about $8 per ton for coal with a calorific value of about 20MJ/kg.9 By virtue of their characteristics, hydropower plants have the ability to govern and stabilise power systems. They contribute, amongst other things, to a number of tasks that thermal plants or other facilities would otherwise have to perform. These include frequency control, voltage control, and synchronous condenser operation. In using the cost of an alternative thermal plant as an indication of the benefits of hydropower production it is important to include these additional dynamic benefits in the calculation in order that the comparison adequately represent the substitution of hydropower for thermal power. The dynamic benefits attributable to hydropower projects vary from case to case, but in a predominantly thermal system in which hydropower is used for system control, the benefits will be in the order of $2050/kW/yr.10 In this study, the lower estimate has been used, and the results are incorporated in the calculation of the benefits of hydropower production. Again, as no economic calculations appeared in the 1964/5 White Paper it is not clear if these additional benefits were expected or not, although they would be implicit benefits of hydropower generation. Using the parameters specified above a present value calculation of the benefits of hydropower generation in terms of the alternative thermal plant is calculated for the period from inception to 1998. Table 12 summarise the results for both Gariep and Van der Kloof plants. In order that these figures be comparable to those presented in the section above on costs, the annual benefit streams are combined into a present value by capitalizing these historic flows to 1998. Again, there is a broach range of estimates produced by employing a range of rates of from 5% to 15%. Examining the results for the 10% rate it can be seen that the estimated benefits are just over $9 billion. A comparison of these figures with the cost figures presented earlier is provided in the table to illustrate the use of the present values. As the figures on costs and hydropower benefits are comparable, the results of a direct comparison of estimated powerhouse costs and power generation benefits indicate that the power generated to date is worth almost four times the powerhouse costs. Power generation is, of course,
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made possible not just by the investment in turbines, etc. but by making water and hydroelectric head available to the powerhouse. A comparison of the hydropower benefits with the larger infrastructure costs of the ORDP reveal that across the range of capitalization rates, the power generation benefits cover between 26% to 40% of the infrastructure costs, with 31% being the central estimate produced using a capitalization rate of 10%. Note that these comparisons are for illustration of the method only as they are necessarily incomplete, insofar as the cost estimates omit operations and maintenance costs. Table 3.12: Economic Value of Hydropower Production from inception to 1998 (1998 US$ millions) Capitalization Rate 10% 5% 15% Capital Cost 6,610 2,186 20,473 Fixed OMR 513 249 1,121 Variable OMR 337 157 760 Fuel Costs 714 349 1,531 Dynamic Benefits 1,045 505 2,289 Total 9,219 3,448 26,175 as % power costs 376% 379% 370% as % infrastructure costs 31% 40% 26%
Note: Present values are referenced to 1998. OMR stands for costs for operation, maintenance, and repair. The effects of hydropower on the atmosphere are covered below under environmental impacts. OMR stands for costs for operation, maintenance, and repair.
Findings on Hydropower:
Final installed capacity totals 540MW at Gariep and Van der Kloof or some 200% more than the initial projection for the entire ORDP in 1962/3 and 125% more than projected for the two facilities in the 1964/5 White Paper. In terms of total power generated from inception, hydropower generated varied from 98% of predicted at Van der Kloof to 106% of predicted at Gariep. In terms of discounted power generation, hydropower generated varied from 107% of predicted at Van der Kloof to 96% of predicted at Gariep. Large fluctuations in power output from year to year contrast with the stable generation pattern used in the project proposal. The direct economic benefits of the hydropower generation from Gariep and Van der Kloof are higher than would have been assumed in 1964 due to the upwards trend in the price of coal. The economic benefits of hydropower are substantial and have been realised because of lower than expected irrigation requirements, which made more water available for hydropower production. The frequency and duration of wet and dry cycles of river flow heavily influence the economic viability of the power component, yet no risk analysis was undertaken.

The actual capital, operations, and maintenance costs of generating the power benefits is required.
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3.7 Flood Control

The 1962/3 White Paper proposes that the scheme will achieve flood control along the whole course of the Orange River downstream of the proposed Gariep Dam, reducing the occurrence of damaging floods by 50%, with a stated value equivalent to a capital asset of R1 000 000. The effect of the 50% reduction is not further defined or quantified, but it is assumed in this study that the term incidence relates to the return period of flood events. Further predictions of potential savings from averted flood damage were not provided. Data were not collected on flood occurrences nor were they available on flood damage for this study. However, a modelling study carried out as part of the ORRS in 1994 reviewed the effectiveness of the reservoirs in attenuating flood peaks: (i) with an operating restriction in place, and (ii) with no restriction, which would allow the reservoir to fill before the wet season. The study simulated four major floods that exceeded a critical discharge threshold of 4 500m3/ (it was considered that above this significant damage would be experienced). The four floods occurred in March 1967, February 1974, February 1988, and March 1988. The simulation model demonstrated that in all cases, the reservoirs had a significant impact on attenuation of peak flood in the Orange River, both above the Vaal confluence, and below the confluence at Upington. Table 3.13 shows the level of attenuation in the Orange River for cases with and without operating restrictions. In each case, the flood peaks were considerably attenuated (by more than 50% of the flood peak) by the presence of the dams even if reservoir levels had been full at the onset of the flood. Table 3.13: Comparison of Flood Peaks With and Without Dams
Flow in Orange River above Vaal Confluence (m3/s) Without Dams Dams 100% Full 5 853 1 654 5 855 1 802 10 212 3 992 6 821 3 446 Dams 80% Full* 230 280 2 100 1 440
February 1967 March 1974 February 1988 March 1988
Source: Flood Management Policy Study, BKS 1994.

Note: *Data for this column were extracted from a graph.
In the BKS study, an operation rule for flood management was incorporated by limiting reservoir levels to less than 80% of storage capacity during the critical period at the beginning of the flood season. The implementation of this restriction should have resulted in a shorter duration of the peak and should have had a marginal impact on further reducing the peak flow according to the simulation analysis. The additional benefit of the further reduction achieved with the 80% of full supply level operating restriction was questioned in the report as flood peaks could be reduced below the required threshold level even with the reservoir full. The report cited that of the four floods studied, the March 1988 flood was the only flood analysed which indicated an economic advantage in maintaining the dams at a lower (than full) level for flood control and this related to the combined flood effects of the Orange and Vaal rivers below the Vaal confluence (ie Upington). The report also noted that more complex modelling would be required to determine the extent of reducing damage to agriculture under various operating scenarios. Given the lack of more precise objective statements for flood control and the lack of more detailed analysis of actual conditions, it is not possible to make a direct comparison with the stated expectations in terms of economic benefits derived from flood control achieved. The simulation study, however, did identify economic benefits that could be achieved by relaxing operation rules. In terms of the opportunity cost because of maintaining the 80% level reservoir operating constraint, the report assessed that the loss of water yield was 29% if irrigation was considered as the primary objective or
34
30% if power generation was the primary objective. However, the use of benefits lost as a consequence of changing operating rules is not a useful indicator of benefits, but is simply an indicator of the costs of maintaining the operating restraint, which in turn should be weighed against the perceived benefits of the measure.
Findings on Flood Control:

The reservoirs appear to have significantly reduced flood peaks in the Lower Orange River. Based on the simulation analysis, it can be inferred that the flood peaks have been attenuated by more than the predicted 50%. Modelling demonstrates that changing operating rules to maintain an 80% level reservoir operating constraint for flood protection may result in a reduction of 29% of irrigation benefits or 30% of power benefits.

More data collection is required to allow a direct comparison with the stated expectations in terms of the economic value derived from flood control achieved.
3.8 Recreation and Tourism

Recreation and tourism are mentioned in passing in the 1962/3 White Paper as secondary benefits of the scheme. There was no assessment of their potential economic value nor were any costs, such as those for land expropriation, explicitly linked to this benefit in the planning documents. At the time of construction, there was limited economic activity in this sector in the region due to the poor infrastructure and the seasonality of the Orange Rivers flow. Today, the area along the Orange River has become one of the more important tourist areas in South Africa. This area includes wineries, water sports venues, and game reserves and serves as an important site for fauna and flora research. A total of 18 recreational facilities were identified. Water sports such as canoeing, yachting, whitewater rafting, angling, netting and commercial fishing, water-skiing, and rowing, as well as land-based activities such as hiking, mountain biking, 4x4 routes, bird and game viewing, hunting and culling, camping and overnight accommodation facilities are now being offered throughout the entire basin. The dam reservoirs themselves are also an attraction for tourists, although quantitative data are not available to further substantiate this finding. The recreational facilities that have developed since dam construction have at least 1 000 beds, employ 200 people, cover an area of at least 60 000ha and host about 200 000 visitors per annum. Since the majority of the facilities in this region of the Orange River Basin are small and medium private operations,11 they do not employ a lot of people. The average employment figure for this region is seven people per facility (compared to 19 for the facilities at the dams). A total of five nature reserves, including what is considered one of the countrys best game areas, the Oviston Nature Reserve, are run by the different provincial nature conservation authorities. These reserves are established on land that was expropriated as reservoir area and provide recreational and hunting opportunities. Angling, as is clearly the case with the Doornkloof Nature Reserve, is the most popular water sport in this area. According to the manager of the Doornkloof Nature Reserve, about 60% of the total number of visitors to the reserve are keen anglers. The 1980s have seen a boom in organised fishing all along the Orange River. From interviews with operators downstream, we can conclude that the Gariep and the Van der Kloof dams have affected the recreational industry downstream in a similar way. Downstream there are three national parks (game reserves) and seven water sports operators that were identified. The first operations began in 1983/4. These facilities mostly offer angling, rafting, and canoeing. Whitewater
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rafting and canoeing are now possible throughout the year due to the constant water flow facilitated by the dams. Major private entrepreneurs such as Felix Unite need the constant flow for their water safaris. However, the large fluctuations in the river level due to dam releases can flood some of the camps and erode the riverbanks. Furthermore, such a release negatively affects the rafting activity, as operators are of the opinion that people do not like to raft when the river level is high.
Findings on Recreation and Tourism:

It can be concluded that the predicted but unspecified increase in recreation and use of the reservoir areas by tourists has in general been achieved. Costs for generating the predicted recreation and tourism benefits were not estimated in the original planning of the project and actual costs have not been collected.

More data that is systematic is required to quantify in detail the actual economic benefits of the recreation and tourism. Data is needed to estimate the actual costs, such as land acquisition, of the recreation and tourism component of the ORDP.
3.9 Ecosystem Function and Biodiversity

3.9.1 Description of the Natural River System
The environmental impacts of the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams can only be fully assessed in relation to the existing natural situation before the initiation of construction. A range of driving factors that in this case were largely linked to the natural inter-annual and seasonal variations in natural flow determined the natural ecology of the undammed river. The Orange per se had a more reliable preregulation runoff than the Vaal but with pronounced seasonal variation, as illustrated in Figures 8 and 9. The main catchment lies in the summer rainfall region of southern Africa and only approximately 25% of the annual runoff occurred in winter (May to October) (Kriel, 1972a, 1972b), with the minimum during August (eg Chutter, 1973). The remaining 75% occurred in summer (October/November to April/May). The erratic peaks of maximum flows, which transported high silt loads and usually occurred during February (eg Cambray et al, 1986) are illustrated in Figure 8. Interannual variation has also been exceptionally large (see Figure 9).
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Figure 3.7: Natural and Regulated Flow Regimes of the Orange River
Source: Chambray et al, 1986. Figure 3.8: Median Monthly Flows at Boegoeberg Measured before (a) and after (b) Major Impoundment
Source: Chutter et al 1997.

Note: Vertical lines indicate the 40th and 60th percentiles and horizontal bars the 20th and 80th percentiles. Periods where the Orange River has ceased to flow entirely have been recorded between 1862 and 1863, and in 1903, 1912, 1933, and 1949. Davies et al (1995a) have described the riverine ecology of this part of southern Africa as ... predictably unpredictable...: driven by stochastic climatic events.
The natural flow patterns provided a framework (ie flow, temperature, oxygen, turbidity, TSS, minerals, and probably also pH) for biotic community development, with episodic flood events and minor- to medium-sized maintenance floods driving the ecological functioning of the system (Benade, 1988). Pre-impoundment data on the key physical and chemical variables are virtually nonexistent, making it impossible to assess adequately the pre-regulation water-quality conditions of the
37
system. The mouth of the river received aperiodic, large discharges, resulting in limited tidal exchange and irregular scouring such that permanent sediment deposition is reduced. The mouth remained fresh for several months every year and, according to Brown (1959), experienced extreme seasonal flooding, high silt loads, and turbidity. The river has no substantial floodplain and runs in a channel or steep gorge for much of its length. Within the river itself, high turbidities generally prevented the formation of fully submerged plant communities. Indeed, only canopy-forming species can survive such conditions (eg Palmer, 1996). Judging from the limited available literature on macrophytes, the section of the river from Gariep, and downstream, appears to have possessed a characteristic riparian community with relatively few invasive species, while reed beds, essentially Phragmites australis, were limited to small patches of floodplain, usually in association with indigenous willow species, such as the Cape Willow, Salix mucronata. Photographs taken before 1976 show an almost complete absence of Phragmites. Descriptions of the river indicate that it was of a sandbank nature (Jackson, 1961), where grasses and herbaceous communities grew sparsely on the alternately flooded and parched sandbanks in the channel and which presumably provided shelter for juvenile fish during bank-full conditions (eg Cambray et al, 1978). Despite low species numbers, the Orange invertebrate communities were specific to the Orange. Chutter et al (1995) write that ... the invertebrate assemblage during low and very low flow was typical of many rivers in southern Africa. However, during high flow, the river was characterised by several unusual species endemic to large, turbid rivers. It is these species that make the invertebrate assemblage in the Orange River unique. The current fish community is, like that of the invertebrates, sparse and species-poor, with only fifteen indigenous species, of which five are endemic. Three of these last are listed in the South African Red Data Book for Fish (Skelton, 1987). Despite the unusually low diversity of fish species, the extant fish communities are biogeographically interesting due to their tropical and southern temperate affinities (Skelton, 1986). No studies of the occurrence of reptiles or amphibians seem to have been made before impoundment. At present, there are 12 species of amphibian in the Middle and Lower Orange, none of which are endemic, although the marbled rubber frog, Phrynomerus annectens, occurs in South Africa only in the Augrabies Falls area. Of the six amphibian species listed for the Orange Mouth, one, the desert rain frog, Breviceps macrops, is listed in the South African Red Data book as restricted (Bickerton, 1993). The mouth of the Orange River constitutes one of the six most important coastal wetlands in South Africa in terms of avifaunal diversity. It acts as a halfway station for migratory birds along the arid south-western coast of Africa. Between 20 000 to 26 000 individuals of about 50 species, 14 of which are endangered, use the mouth and its poorly developed estuary (Chutter et al, 1995). The river mouth is thus an extremely important coastal wetland conservation site and in 1991, it was declared a wetland of international significance (200ha) under the Ramsar Convention. Hippopotamus amphibius was once numerous in both the Orange and Vaal rivers and probably disappeared from the Lower Orange around 1925 (Shortridge, 1942), as did a leech that fed on them (Palmer, 1996). Elephants were also present along the river at the turn of the century but rapidly disappeared as colonisation increased.
3.9.2 Habitats Affected

There is little baseline data on biological communities before regulation by the dams. With the exception of a few expeditions, where species classification and identification were the major objectives, no ecological studies were undertaken before construction. Three main habitats have been
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affected: the dryland habitats lost as a result of land colonisation and development along the river, the riverine ecosystem itself, and the estuary. 3.9.2.1 Dryland Habitats The vegetation bordering the Orange River is not directly affected by changes to the river itself. However, development of the river can indirectly affect the surrounding lands via the knock-on effects of the development of irrigation schemes, which in particular lead to the loss or degradation of large tracts of indigenous veld communities. River developments have not been entirely responsible for this degradation for the Upper Orange crosses a severely overgrazed and eroded region. Acocks said as early as 1953 that The conversion of 20 000 square miles of grass veld into eroded Karoo can only be regarded as a national disaster. However, veld types along the length of the Middle and Lower Orange (Acocks, 1975) comprised several vegetation types of conservation importance such as the Richtersveld, a noted centre of plant endemism, which contains what is likely the worlds greatest diversity of succulents (Van Jaarsveld, 1993, cited in Chutter et al, 1995). In terms of riparian habitat, there was no extensive floodplain development within the basin, due to the deeply incised nature of most of the riverbed (eg Allanson et al, 1990; Davies et al, 1993; Palmer, 1996). There have, however, been losses in biodiversity of the riparian vegetation along the Orange River. Such losses appear mainly to be secondary consequences of river regulation, ie when land was cleared for cultivation, and when invasive foreign species became established after settlement. At present, several invasive riparian plants are of concern along the Orange. These include mesquite (Prosopis spp), which was introduced as fodder at the turn of the century, Sesbania punicea, which is toxic and noted since 1993 at Upington, Port Jackson (Acacia saligna), castor oil bush (Ricinus communis), wild tobacco (Nicotiana glauca), cocklebur (Xanthium spp), syringa (Melia azedarach) and thornapple (Datura innoxia). Blue gum (Eucalyptus globulus) occurs but only grows densely at one site near Prieska (Chutter et al, 1995). 3.9.2.2 Flow Regime The major changes to the flow regime are illustrated in Figures 8, 9, and 10, and comprise changes in: the quantity of annual runoff down the channel; the inter-annual variation in runoff; the marked seasonality of the pre-regulation flow regime.
Floods from the catchment area above Gariep are largely contained by Gariep and Van der Kloof (closed in 1978), thus reducing the frequency of small to medium floods (3000m3/s) and cutting the maximum flood (31 000m3/s) by 65% (Kriel, 1972a). This leads to: stabilisation of the flows within and between years (reduced variability); higher winter flows and lower summer flows; fewer major flood events with influence on geomorphology; loss of small flood events that stimulate fish breeding; stabilisation of temperature changes for 130180km below Van der Kloof Dam; reduced turbidity as the dams capture sediment; loss of nutrient-rich silt to the river mouth and estuary.
A second element in the equation is the consequence of hydropower generation by the power stations at Gariep and Van der Kloof. Although their capacity is small in national terms (1.67 % of the total national generating capacity; 1.93 % of the actual energy generated during 1989), they operate as peaking plants (often in emergencies to supplement the national grid). Such demand can be sudden
39
and increases during winter. Winter months are naturally low-flow months, so hydropower releases create rapid pulses in flow and reverse the natural hydrological regime (eg Chutter, 1973). Optimum utilisation of Van der Kloofs generating capacity, for instance consists of: releases of up to 400m3/s for weeks during the winter; weekly and/or daily variation in water releases; emergency releases.
Figure 3.9: Variation in Monthly Runoff at the Orange River Mouth
Note: Runoff before (solid line) and subsequent (dashed line) to impoundment by Gariep and Van der Kloof dams.
This leads to pulsing of flows over periods shorter than any previous natural regime and increased flow during winter when flows are usually lowest. The most significant conflict, and the one most difficult to reconcile, is the fact that low winter flows are required for maintenance of natural biological communities while higher winter flows are preferable for and beneficial to power generation. If power generation is reduced during the winter, economic losses may be incurred, due to both under-utilisation of equipment and to excess water having to be released through the floodgates during the summer for flood control. On the other hand, constant winter flows can be detrimental both to aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems and tend to aggravate the blackfly and reedbed problems (see below). The single largest impact on and threat to the Orange River Mouth lies in the reduced and altered pattern of runoff experienced in the estuary subsequent to completion of the major dams. Figure 3.7 illustrates these changes. The total natural, or virgin, annual river flow at the mouth is estimated to have been some 10 670 million m3 (Prins, 1990). In 1991, the flow was measured at 5 340mm3 (this includes 330mm3 as natural runoff from the lower basin and 470mm3 as runoff from the Fish River in Namibia (Prins, 1990).
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3.9.2.3 Water Quality Issues There are reports of water quality changes in the Upington area, such that Upington Municipal Water Works has had difficulty in maintaining standards. This is mainly due to cyanobacterial blooms of Microcystis sp and Anabaena sp in Van der Kloof Dam (Allanson & Jackson, 1983). Blooms appear to be a result of clearing of water due to sedimentation in dams. This occurs because the major area of sediment contribution to the river appears to be in the upper catchment, so sediments that settle out in the reservoirs are not subsequently replaced. Evidence suggests that algae growth in the Orange is limited and that drops in turbidity could promote blooms. Organic matter content in the Orange River is at present very high, as is indicated by the overwhelming abundance of filter-feeding invertebrates downstream of the Orange-Vaal confluence (Chutter et al, 1995). It is not known whether this was so before impoundment, but major factors that would contribute organic matter to the system are likely to be decay of reeds, coupled to phyto- and zooplankton injection from the reservoirs. While some water quality changes can be attributed to the dams, concurrent changes in catchment land-use and inflows of agricultural chemicals or treated sewage effluent will also affect nutrient levels and the biotic functions of the system. It is therefore not possible to determine cause and effect. 3.9.2.4 Changes in Biodiversity Fluctuations in flow caused by hydro-electric releases are known to reduce the abundance and diversity of benthic invertebrates (Fisher & Lavoy, 1972, cited in Palmer, 1996). Chutter et al, (1995) describe the river between Gariep and Van der Kloof, and directly downstream of Van der Kloof Dam, as an ecological desert due to the effects of twice-daily flow pulses for hydropower generation. Stabilisation of river temperatures below impoundments are also known to reduce the biodiversity of benthic fauna (eg Ward & Stanford, 1979; Davies, 1979), although these are localised and extend for 130180km downstream (Chutter et al, 1995). Temperature is second only to discharge as a factor that affects aquatic invertebrates. In 1992, invertebrates of various biotopes were sampled upstream and downstream of Gariep Dam. The faunal assemblages directly downstream of the dam were noticeably depauperate (Chutter et al, 1995). A further 42km downstream, the invertebrate fauna showed a partial recovery from the effects of impoundment. In addition, there are indications that the threatened blackfly Simulium gariepense has been replaced by the nuisance S. chutteri as a result of the changed conditions in the river, which is caused by impoundment (Chutter et al, 1995), although it appears more likely that S. chutteri has simply benefited from the stable flow conditions. Palmer (1996) further identifies the disappearance of two species of mayfly, Baetis bellus, and Pseudocloeon vinosum, from the river itself. Because the dams on the Orange River system, such as the Gariep and Van der Kloof, act as sediment traps and flood attenuators, the seasonal pattern of runoff, water quality, and sedimentation has been disturbed, resulting in changes in breeding habitat and spawning behaviour of fish. Perhaps the most important direct impact of impoundment on the fish fauna has been the absence of a spring flush. Fish spawning tends to occur in spring and summer, particularly in response to increases in-flow (Chutter et al, 1995). The dams now capture these flows. Another impact of impoundment on fishes is the fact that reduced turbidities have increased the photic depth (light penetration) of the water, allowing increased colonisation of bottom substrata by benthic algae. Likewise, sandy substrata have become increasingly colonised by reeds. Since spawning of several fish species takes place on clean gravel or sandy substrata, this has reduced the area available for spawning (Benade, 1993).
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3.9.2.5 Expansion of Reed Beds Reeds, mainly Phragmites australis, but also P. mauritianus, Arundo donax (the Spanish reed) and Typha spp (bulrush) form the most characteristic component of the present-day riparian zone along the Orange River (Chutter et al, 1995). Reeds are pioneer species, quick to establish on disturbed sites, and have expanded from virtually none in 1976 (as determined from aerial photographs) to coverage of an estimated 41 000ha (Chutter et al, 1995). The reasons for this expansion are clear-cut. It is a classic response to the stabilisation of a previously fluctuating flow regime (eg papers in Ward & Stanford, 1979). They also provide habitat for the pest bird species Quelea quelea (red-billed weaver birds) and the larvae of the pest blackfly Simulium chutteri. However, the means by which reeds stimulate blackfly development is more likely to lie in the provision of fine particulate organic material as a food source for the larvae (see below). The annual production of P. australis amounts to about 90 tonnes of dry mass per hectare per year (Chutter et al, 1995). Burning and decomposition of reeds along the river must contribute significant amounts of organic matter to the river water. Reeds are also thought to slow channel flows and increase the risk of flooding. 3.9.2.6 Increase in the Blackfy Simuliidae12
The large increase in biting blackflies due to stabilisation of the flow regime has caused substantial livestock, and thus economic, losses along the valley. Blackflies are small biting flies belonging to the dipteran family Simuliidae. The female adults (only) feed on mammals or birds along river valleys and, in large swarms, they can inflict suffering and loss of condition on livestock (and humans: Howell & Homes, 1969; Chutter, 1973). Thirty-three species of blackfly occur in southern Africa, of which four are serious avian or mammal pests Simulium chutteri, S. damnosum, S. nigritarse, and S. adersi and one is an endangered, endemic species S. gariepense. Non-nuisance species of blackfly (eg S. gariepense) appear to rely mainly on birds for their blood meals and so are less economically important (Chutter et al, 1995). There have been outbreaks of the pest Simuliidae (mainly S. chutteri) throughout South Africa, particularly since the construction of large impoundments (Davies 1979; Howell et al, 1981; Agnew, 1986; De Moor, 1986; Davies & Day, 1998). Before regulation of the river, their populations were low and outbreaks were infrequent (Chutter et al, 1995). However, changes to flow patterns appear to have led to a persistent pest blackfly problem, which causes an estimated R88 million annual loss in livestock productivity and a control operation costing of R2 million per year (1996 Rand values). When they are extremely abundant they cause sheep to stop feeding, resulting in loss of condition and the abortion of up to 25% of embryos. The flies can feed up to 50km from the river and around one million sheep are estimated to occur within their range. In addition, the flies harass farmers and tourists visiting the Augrabies Falls National Park (90 000 visitors per year) and can cause visitors to curtail their stay, and even to request refunds. The blackfly larvae live in fast-flowing waters where they attach themselves firmly to bottom substrata and filter organic matter from the river water using fine cephalic fans. Their food preference is fine particulate organic matter (FPOM) swept downstream by the current. Larval densities on hard substrata can reach over 500 000m-2. On the Orange River there are some 148 known breeding sites, mostly in rapids, in the 850km stretch between Hopetown and Onseepkans. Blackflies do not abound in the stretch upstream of Van der Kloof Dam due to fluctuating river flows between Van der Kloof and Gariep, and due to a more natural flow regime above Gariep.
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The following factors strongly influence blackfly populations: River flow: stable flows increase the available area for larval attachment, whilst rapidly fluctuating flows kill larvae by desiccation. There is a significant decline in blackfly habitat when releases from Van der Kloof Dam are less than 10m3/s. A regular flow of above 300m3/s significantly increases habitat availability and massive outbreaks can be expected. Abundance of organic matter: the levels of organic matter in the river are at present relatively high, perhaps largely due to the presence of reeds (Chutter et al, 1995). Larvae thrive in water that is rich in organic matter. Biological interactions: this includes competition from other filter feeders (eg the bivalve Corbicula fluminalis, the mayfly Tricorythus discolor, the sponge Ephydatia fluviatilis and even water hyacinth Eichornia crassipes). Another biological interaction that may influence population relations is predation by, eg, caddisfly larvae. The way in which flows also influence populations of these species makes the interactions with blackfly populations complex. Presence of suitable substrata: larvae attach themselves to hard substrata and hang in the current with their heads trailing downstream. The trailing roots of reeds may have multiplied the area of available substratum significantly. It is possible that predators cannot feed on larvae in these situations with the same facility as in the stones-in-current biotope (originally the most common pre-regulation biotope for blackfly), which could also act in favour of blackflies.
The primary consequence of the dams has been to alter the flow regime in the Orange River. The river used to peak during the summer months, and reach its lowest levels during the winter, when flows would sometimes cease altogether. Post-regulation river flows have been stabilised and the river flows strongly even in winter. The previously fluctuating riverine habitat has thus become more predictable and perennial. This change suits the habitat needs of some species of blackfly, especially Simulium chutteri, which have become pests due to their rapid population increase. This increase may also be linked to increased stocking densities because of agricultural development. In the Great Fish and Sundays rivers, similar changes have taken place, although without the increase in reeds noted on the Orange River. In these catchments, however, increased FPOM from primary production in the Gariep reservoir provides additional food. In both catchments, outbreaks of blackfly were unknown before the introduction of Orange River water in 1977. Indeed, the Great Fish was once a seasonal system, but is now perennial, with an 800% increase in flow generated from the IBT (OKeeffe & De Moor, 1988; Davies et al, 1993; Snaddon et al, 1999). On the Great Fish, 48 breeding sites along 165km are known, whilst on the Sundays River some 35 sites occur over 41 km. 3.9.2.7 Orange River Mouth The silt-laden river is quite sterile (Winterbottom, 1978) and only the estuary is species-rich (in terms of avifauna) (Plowes, 1943; Grindley, 1959; Courtenay-Latimer, 1963; Frost & Johnson, 1977; Siegfried & Johnson, 1977; Manry, 1978), where sandbars provide ideal roosting and nesting sites for pelican, cormorant, gulls, and terns. Courtenay-Latimer listed 172 species from Holgat to the mouth, but the influence of the regulated river on the avifauna of the mouth is little understood. Previously, floods would have destroyed nests and inundated roosting sites, but with the reduction in the seasonal flood and drought cycle, the mouth is possibly more stable for birds. Extensive development of the area around the mouth at the towns of Oranjemund and Alexander Bay has also had a large impact. The effects of these developments must be considered apart from those due to upstream regulation. While the known impact of reduced floods on the ecology of the river mouth ecosystem is restricted to the observed spread of reedbeds, and reduced flooding of small saltmarsh areas, the build-up of sand bars at the mouth of the river is a more tangible geomorphological consequence. The sandbars disrupt exchanges with the sea, and if closure is complete, cause the river to back up. This is clearly a variable and dynamic process whose consequences on the avifauna of the river mouth, the principal motivation for the Ramsar listing, is unclear.
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The impacts of reduced flow on the ocean ecosystem is probably negligible because of the nutrientrich offshore sea at the Orange River Mouth, which is fed by upswelling cold ocean currents. The importance of river flow is probably far less important for the maintenance of oceanic productivity than on the east coast.
3.9.3 Mitigation Measures

3.9.3.1 Blackfly Control Programme Some sporadic blackfly control operations were carried out in the 1950s using DDT, and again in 1984 (Howell & Homes, 1969). Although some control was achieved, as Chutter (1973) points out, there were few data on non-target organisms. It is, however, known that some fish species (eg Labeo) were killed during the operation. In 1988, major flood flows caused a massive outbreak of blackfly and led to the establishment of an annual control programme from 1990. Two main techniques have been used. Firstly, manipulation of dam releases in order to reduce flows in the river over four-day periods kills the larvae by desiccation for a limited distance downstream (Howell et al, 1981; De Moor, 1982, 1986). Howell et al (1981) noted that by manipulating the water flow from Van der Kloof and Boegoeberg, a drop in level of the Orange of up to 73% could be achieved, with control of simuliidae by desiccation up to 370km below Van der Kloof. The second technique involves the use of larvicides. Two types of larvicides are used Bti (Bacillus thuringiensis var israelensis), a bacterium that kills blackfly larvae, or insecticides (Vectobac, Abate, or Tecnar) according to situation. Treatment is carried out either from cars on bridges or from helicopters and aims to treat each breeding site approximately every two weeks during the summer season. On the Orange River, the government runs the programme. On the Sundays and Great Fish rivers, the state veterinarian provides larvicides to local farmers who then treat particular rapids along the river. Of the two techniques, the flow control programme was ultimately judged to be least preferable, partly because the impact of the flow regulation extends only a few hundred kilometres downstream (as far as Prieska), with attenuating value, and farmers along the river were deprived of irrigation water during the drawdown period. It was also more expensive than larvicide application and was discontinued after an experimental period. The larvicide programme has been effective in reducing annoyance levels significantly, although effective co-ordination with farmers in the Sundays and Great Fish Catchments is essential to generate the benefits. The larvicide programme costs an estimated R2 million per year (1996 prices). Calculations show that it is seven times more expensive to treat the 290km to Prieska by control of flows than with larvicide. The loss of power generation over four days of closure amount to R384 000; using larvicide on the same stretch costs only R50 000 (1996 prices). 3.9.3.2 Environmental Impacts of the Control Programme Blackflies are an unexpected secondary consequence of the dams due to the latters influence on the (suspected) primary regulator: the flow regime. A tertiary consequence is the knock-on effect of the larvicide programme on the other components of the river ecosystem. Bti is thought to be an effective and safe larvicide, with non-target impacts restricted to a few species of related nematoceran (Diptera) flies. Impacts on the wider invertebrate community may include leaving some predators of blackfly larvae without a major food source. However, changes in predator abundance are within recorded natural seasonal and spatial variations. A recent WRC report by Channing (1998) quotes figures of the toxicity of a variety of commonly used aquatic-pest control agents on the development and morphogenesis of amphibian tadpole larvae.
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Bti was the most toxic of all agents tested by Channing, with a teratogenic index (TI is the ability to cause morphological defects during embryonic development) eight times stronger than the most potent pesticide tested (for Fenthion the TI = 1 305; for Bti the TI = 8 160). Clearly there are problems here that urgently require field research, including testing the effects of this agent on other vertebrates (and invertebrate morphogenesis). Bti can also have a significant impact on populations of the endangered S. gariepense although refugia for this species are expected to remain (subject to altered flows due to LHWP). However, it appears that the control programme is the main reason why S. gariepense is now considered by some to be a threatened species (Chutter et al, 1995). 3.9.3.3 Quelea Increase Farmers have reported increased Quelea populations. These birds predate ripening crops during the summer and autumn and many are migrants from further north, although there is a small resident breeding population. The Directorate of Agricultural Land and Resources Management has put a substantial control programme in place and annual control operations limit population numbers. Quelea are primarily attracted to the food source created by the irrigated farmlands in an otherwise arid area. The increased Quelea populations can thus be attributed to a combination of the proliferation of reeds in the river and a ready source of food in the irrigated areas.
3.9.4 Atmospheric Impacts

One of the key arguments advanced in favour of hydropower over thermal power generation is the avoidance of emissions that may influence global warming through combustion of fossil fuels. Practice in the quantification of emissions is well established, but the economic valuation of these impacts continues to evolve and as such there are, as yet, few hard-and-fast rules concerning how calculations should be made. By including this aspect in the case studies, we recognise that this is a potentially important issue in the planning and implementation of dams.13 When the ORDP was built, no explicit values were attributed to savings in thermal plant emissions because of the operation of Gariep and Van der Kloof. It should be noted that the coal plant considered as an option to the project would have been equipped with efficient electric dust filters. The specific emission levels per kWh would have been as shown in Table 3.14.
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Table 3.14: Emission Levels from Steam Coal Power Plant

Parameter CO2 SO2 NOX PM10 (dust) Specific Emission (mg/kWh s.o.) 1 440 000 13 500 1 600 160 Main Impact Global warming Acid rain, respiratory problems Acid rain Respiratory problems
The cost incurred due to the impacts of emissions of SO2, Nox and dust will vary according to site conditions, which determine the actual impacts of the emissions on downstream populations, vegetation, infrastructure, property, etc. For this pilot study, no effort was made to assess the likely impact of additional thermal plants in terms of such damage estimates. Less CO2 emission, however, is a global benefit and the source or site of the emission does not affect its potential economic impact on global warming. That said, there is no widely accepted figure for the economic value of avoiding the emission of one ton of CO2. Instead, widely varying values are used by analysts, ranging from $2 per ton (reflecting the costs of less expensive ways of sequestering CO2) to hundreds of dollars per ton (higher estimates of actual damage due to climatic change). For the purposes of indicating the potential economic importance of emissions a central figure of $7 per ton (1998 US$) is used, which is the current value applied by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). The results suggest that over the period from inception to 1998 the present value of emissions avoided from the Gariep and van der Kloof plants using a 10% capitalization rate would approach $1516 million (1998 US$) or 16% of the direct economic benefits of hydropower generation (as calculated above). The effect of using a range of prices is easy to simulate as the net effect is linear a value for CO2 of $2 per ton would lead to benefits of $433 million. A value of $25 per ton would lead to benefits of $5 414 million. Under a high value scenario, then, the emissions avoided may be more than half as important in economic terms as the power generated itself. Again, these calculations are provided merely as indication of the potential economic benefits associated with power production at the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams. The precise values attributed to this effect are unknown, and there is not yet agreement on what role they may play in assessments of the costs and benefits of hydropower and its alternatives. As recent evidence has emerged that some reservoirs may be producing methane emissions that would have negative effects on climate change, it must be stressed that the first step in such an analysis is to identify the net effect of all changes in emissions that contribute to climate change as versus alternative options for meeting power demand. Findings on Ecosystem Impacts: The lack of ecological data on the state of the riverine ecosystem before impoundment, and no regular monitoring of key parameters and species, has hampered both the objective assessment of impacts and the definition of remedial measures. This has been compounded by lack of detailed knowledge concerning the ecology of keystone species and their responses to changes in driving variables. Two species of mayfly have disappeared from the river. The spread of reeds, Phragmites, due to stable river flows, has fundamentally affected the architecture of 40 000ha of shallow riverine habitat, and increased organic matter in the river. Reduced turbidity due to the dams has probably affected fish spawning habitats, species composition, and increased primary productivity of floating algae, some of which may be noxious. Some of these changes cannot be dissociated from changes in catchment land-use, inputs from agricultural chemicals, and increased inflow of treated effluent without further study. The dams may have contributed to the loss of riparian vegetation due to clearance for irrigated agriculture. Degradation may have occurred anyway due to livestock grazing. The riverine areas downstream of the impoundments are an ecological desert due to fluctuating river levels. The dams have contributed to the degradation of the Orange River Mouth Ramsar site (and this has been a primary motivation for establishing an IFR see Chapter 6).
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The proliferation of blackfly due to stabilised flows has led to livestock losses estimated at R88 million per year ($13 million) and an extensive control programme (R2 million/yr). The blackfly control programme leads to treatment by larvicides that may have secondary ecosystem impacts. Reedbeds provide excellent roosting habitat for millions of red-billed weaverbirds, Quelea spp. The Quelea are attracted by extensive irrigated wheat fields, which they may extensively damage. The potential economic consequences of changes in emissions of greenhouse gases as versus the use of alternative power sources may make a significant contribution to the analysis of benefits or costs.

The bank erosion caused by the Orange-Fish Tunnel along the Sundays River and mitigation measures to address it should be examined.
3.10 Regional and National Effects

The 1962-1963 White Paper identified stimulation of regional development in the form of agricultural, iron, steel, and water-intensive industries as well as communication facilities, schools, hospitals, and road and railway extensions as goals of the ORDP. As noted in other sections of this paper, the ORDP was also designed to bolster South Africas reputation abroad with the associated benefits in terms of attracting direct foreign investment and upholding the value of the Rand. To calculate the actual effect of the ORDP on the regional and national economy of the ORDP it would be necessary to construct a detailed macroeconomic model such as input-output model, social accounting matrix or a general equilibrium model. Another approach would be to focus on a number of regional centres and prepare a case history that describes the nature and scale of agriculture related development in the area. Neither of these options were possible within the scope of the present study and indeed the data to do so may not be readily available. Instead a brief review and analysis of the predicted benefits is presented. As this suggests that many of these expected benefits are not exactly what is typically implied by regional effects a brief discussion of general equilibrium effects is provided with some indication of what these might have been in the case of the ORDP.
3.10.1 Predicted Impacts

The regional and national benefits predicted in the 1962-1963 White Paper included: replacement of wheat imports; supplementing Karoo grazing in droughts through the use of lucerne and maize which would provide for 18 million sheep, increase wool production by 18 000 tons (16 330 metric tons) and increase lamb production by 20%; increased meat and milk production resulting from availability of fodder supplies near to the stockraising areas . . . to provide on a long-term basis for the needs of the increasing population and for the raising of the standards of living of the people; and agricultural production keeping pace with increases in population.
Employment generation was also predicted in the White Paper. This is taken up in the next section of this chapter. Up to 1969, national wheat consumption exceeded production. Wheat exports were recorded annually from 1970/71 to 1985/86. From 1985, with few exceptions, annual imports of wheat were again necessary. The agricultural censuses produced such erratic results that it is not possible to clearly
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determine the extent of these factors, but the significant increase in cereal production indicates that the project probably did assist in achieving the goal of reduced imports. However, since these increases flowed from agricultural policies regarding import restrictions and guaranteed domestic prices for local production, it came at a cost to consumers. The total area planted to lucerne in South Africa increased from 253 000 ha in 1961/1962 to 468 000 ha by 1981 but had declined to 214 000 ha by 1994/1995. Increased production from the ORDP would have reduced the hazard of drought for livestock in the project area, though it has not been possible to measure the effect. An important unexpected benefit was derived from utilising irrigated forage crops for the raising of angora goats and subsequently ostriches in large numbers. Increases in livestock production as a result of additional fodder crop production can be seen as a significant contribution to the overall benefits of the project that are not captured by simple crop production data. Livestock remains the dominant enterprise in most areas which have benefited from the ORDP with two exceptions, namely the Sunday River (Kirkwood) and the Lower Orange district of Gordonia. Red meat, milk, and dairy products per capita consumption nation-wide declined from the early 1970s. While increased production did materialise under the project, it is not possible to disaggregate this component and determine the extent, if any, that this contributed to raising the standards of living of the people. From 1965-68 to 1994-97, the volume of food production in South Africa increased by 87% while the population over the same period increased by 110%. Food production increased rapidly up to the early 1980s by 60% from the mid 1960s but thereafter by less than 20% over the same number of years up to 1996/1997. Non-food production increased up to the early to mid 1980s by about 20%, but thereafter decreased by 30% (Abstract of Agricultural Statistics, 1998). However, disaggregating the role of the ORDP in this area would require a detailed input-output model. This brief review of the predicted impacts suggests that the performance of the ORDP in terms of reaching its agricultural objectives is mixed and any firm conclusions would require further research. It is worth making two points regarding these impacts. First, these predicted impacts cover only the agricultural sector and do not pertain to the hydropower and water supply functions of the ORDP. Second, the extent to which these impacts represent regional economic impacts is limited. This observation can be expanded upon by working through each of the four impacts reviewed above. Regional or national economic impacts refer to the indirect economic impacts that occur as the effects of a project ripple through the economy. Thus, in the earlier sections in this paper the direct impacts of the project on hydropower production, agricultural production, water supply, the environment, etc. are discussed. The economic benefits of replacing wheat imports should, then, be included in the calculation of agricultural production benefits of the project. Typically, this would be done by employing the price of imported wheat as the opportunity cost or economic price of wheat in an economic analysis of project benefits. If there is an additional benefit in terms of avoiding the use of foreign exchange then this may also be included through the use of the appropriate opportunity cost of foreign exchange. If there are further benefits, apart from the direct economic benefits, of being more self-sufficient in wheat production that accrue regionally or nationally then these would need to be specified explicitly, as otherwise it is not possible to monitor and evaluate project performance in this regard. The extent to which the increase in fodder production leads to increased sheep and wool production is potentially an example of a regional effect. Ideally, the price received for fodder, as employed in the analysis of direct impacts of irrigation reflects its marginal contribution to sheep and wool production. However, the knock-on effects of changes in the quantity of sheep and wool production in terms of consumer welfare (i.e. lower prices for meat and clothing) would not necessarily be captured by changes in prices and quantities in the market for fodder. This of course assumes that the fodder is produced and sold to other producers in the region, as if it is simply exported then the indirect benefits leak out of the region. The third predicted impact is not substantially different in economic terms
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from the second, insofar as the way in which increased meat and milk production raises living standards is by lowering the consumer price of these items so that they are more affordable. As demonstrated above it is possible to monitor to what extent the ORDP has achieved the objective of agricultural production keeping pace with increases in population. Yet, the manner in which this represents an indirect economic benefit of the project is not clear. As with the example of wheat above, the calculation of direct benefits derived from agricultural production should capture the tradeoff between imported and locally produced foodstuffs, so that any indirect impact is likely to be more social in nature. That said, the isolated situation in which South Africa found itself in the 1970s and 1980s might have led to an increased sense of urgency in this regard. However, the practical implication of isolation would likely have been an increase in the cost of procuring imports, which, once again, could be included in the analysis of direct impacts. If there is a larger political or social dimension to such an objectives then this might be better accommodated as par of a wider, multicriteria analysis of the project, rather than attempting to internalise it within the economic analysis of indirect impacts. An important assumption of the 1962-63 White Paper also bears mention: that the Paper implicitly assumed that there would be no effect on prices of agricultural commodities produced under the project. In some cases the additional volume of production would have been very modest, e.g. an additional 2.3% to the volume of maize production, but in most cases the predicted impact would have been significant. In the case of cotton and lucerne, the predicted volume increase was 1.6 and 1.4 fold, respectively, that of the total production for South Africa. Under the latter conditions this assumption of constant prices would appear questionable. Nonetheless, it is important to stress that the incorporation of price changes in markets directly affected by the project are direct, not indirect, economic impacts. In todays context, the estimation of economic impacts of project outputs should accommodate potential price responsiveness of these products, ie how the price would rise or fall in order to achieve a new balance between supply and demand. To the list of impacts identified above must be added the objective of bolstering the Rand and increasing external confidence in the economy. No specific analysis of this objective of the project was undertaken by this study; only an approximate indicator is available. Annex 3 charts the Rand/Dollar exchange rate from the 1950s to present day. While the rate demonstrated considerable stability during the period the ORDP was under construction in the late 1960s a gradual and inexorable decline in the purchasing power of the Rand begin in the early 1970s, as the supposed indirect benefits of the project came on line. By the end of the 1980s the value of the Rand against the Dollar had dropped to 40% of its pre-ORDP value. Clearly, many other factors have had a significant impact on this indicator and it is not possible how to analyse whether (and to what extent) this decline may have proceeded faster (or more slowly) in the absence of the ORDP. Nonetheless, if the Rand is an accurate indicator in this regard it appears the project met this objective in the shortterm. However, with hindsight it is clear that in the longer term even if the project met all its original targets it was unlikely to have had its intended impact on external opinion and confidence given the overwhelming nature of the political predicament in which South Africa found itself in the 1970s and 1980s.
3.10.2 Actual Regional and National Impacts

As revealed above the predicted regional and national impacts were focused on agriculture. For an indicator of the potential indirect impacts of the project on the South African agricultural economy it is worth noting that the overall predicted additional amount of $168 million of agricultural production from the ORDP would have added 14% to GVAP of South Africa as a whole in 1962. Other indicators of scale for the project are that the final capacity of hydropower generation from Gariep and van der Kloof was equivalent to 10% of national capacity when Gariep was commissioned in 1972. Water supply to Port Elizabeth, one of South Africas most populous cities, currently meets one-sixth of the urban and industrial demand. In each and every one of these cases as with other less
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prominent benefits such as those of recreation and tourism, indirect economic impacts at either a regional or national scale are likely to have occurred. These effects are reflected, as stated above, not in the markets directly affected by the project, ie the markets for these outputs and the inputs consumed in their production. Instead it is the effect of the project on markets that receive the knock-on effects of price and quantity changes in these originating markets that must be considered. In agriculture, the indirect impacts would be felt in a number of ways including: changes in the cost of production for other end use products, where the agricultural output from irrigation serves as an intermediary input; changes in prices and quantities in crop and livestock markets that are substitutes or complements to products whose production is altered by the introduction of increased irrigration and subsequent changes in cropping patterns; downstream markets for the processing of crops and livestock; changes to consumer prices for cereals, meats and other livestock products; and stimulation of local markets for consumer goods through the effects of employment creation and increase in demand for agricultural inputs in project areas.
This assessment of how upstream and downstream markets are affected by the project could be extended to the other products and services affected by the ORDP. However, as the pilot study did not investigate these effects in any detail the discussion below continues by turning to secondary evidence regarding indirect economic impacts of agricultural projects in South Africa. A study by Tarr (1975) for South Africa concluded that the multiplier from investments in agriculture would be somewhere between 1.5 and 2.2 depending upon the farming enterprise mix and the technology employed in the agricultural and other sectors. Kassier et al (1988) used 1.8 to indicate the additional economic activity created by forward and backward linkages, i.e. increased activity in the provision of services, transport, processing, packaging and marketing, and the provision of inputs (machinery, equipment, seed, feed, fertiliser, finance, etc.) for each unit invested in agriculture. These studies provide evidence that significant multiplier effects may have been associated with the ORDP, though further study would be required to confirm this viewpoint. Although it is not possible to extend this analysis further in the pilot study, future WCD case studies will need to examine the extent to which predicted indirect impacts were met, and identify what unexpected indirect impacts arose. Analysis of actual indirect economic impacts is also important for the distributional analysis. In this study it is not possible to say more than that multiplier effects are likely to be observed in downstream agricultural processing, in local towns that have prospered in the new command areas. Similar assumptions may be made with regard to the urban and industrial uses of water in the Fish and Sundays basin. With regard to recreation and tourism comments of this nature are limited by the lack of a clear view on to what extent the ORDP itself has led to these developments as opposed to simple trends in the demand for outdoor recreation and nature tourism. It is important to stress that the use of information regarding indirect impacts must be considered carefully. For the purposes of the case study, investigation of predicted and actual impacts to date is a useful endeavour in terms of identifying levels of project performance and the actual distribution of these wider benefits. It must however be made clear that the benefits in such cases are the gross indirect economic benefits and as such should not be taken as evidence of the economic worth of the project within the context of project appraisal and evaluation.14 Findings on Regional and National Effects: Difficulties with the agricultural census data prevent a clear determination of the ORDPs role, however, the increase in crop and livestock production under the ORDP indicates that the project
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probably did assist in part in achieving the goal of reduced imports and increased agricultural production. However, since these increases flowed from agricultural policies regarding import restrictions and guaranteed domestic prices, it came at a cost to consumers. With hindsight, the intention of the project to bolster the Rand and external confidence in the country appears to have been overtaken by events, as socio-political factors overwhelmed any influence the ORDP might have had in reducing the economic and political isolation of the country in the 1970s and 1980s. Many of the regional and national effects specified in the 1962-63 White Paper are not true indirect economic impacts, but rather reflect pricing issues related to the outputs of irrigated agriculture. While many indirect economic impacts were probably generated by a project of its size, it is probably not possible to quantify these and further.
For Further Investigation: Case histories of the affected areas might be the most cost-effective method of generating a qualitative assessment of the regional impacts of the project and identifying their distributional impact across different socio-economic groups.
3.11 Social Effects

In the pre-dam context, access to resources, especially in the agricultural sector, was highly unequal among racial groups. Agricultural lands were almost exclusively under the control of white farmers and the land targeted by the ORDP was declared a white area long before the project was launched. The marginalisation of other communities was already complete. Almost all of the farmworkers were coloured or black, and women provided about half of the labour force. For more details on the predam social context, see Annex 6. If other racial groups, specifically coloured and blacks, had any real stake in the ORDP, it was thus as labourers, especially farm labourers. It was therefore mainly as paid employees that coloured and blacks had a real economic role in rural areas targeted by the ORDP. They constituted almost all paid workers, and served as regular or seasonal farmworkers or as servants. Coloured communities enjoyed a better status than blacks, but overall they also occupied a marginal position. In the planning and design of the ORDP, the predicted changes were more physical (e.g. surface area to be affected) than human. The 1962/3 White Paper contained detailed estimates of areas to be irrigated and where they would be located, but there is only limited information on, e.g., the number of farmers to be settled and resettled, the number of jobs to be created, or the profiles of beneficiaries. The 1962/3 White Paper on target beneficiaries of the ORDP refers to the irrigation potential of the programme, and to the employment opportunities through the following statements (1962/3, 267): There are large areas of land which can be developed for White settlements by the Department of Lands in terms of the Land Settlement Act. The White Paper also anticipated: that 4 000 morgen out of the 360 000 morgen planned to be made available for irrigation would be reserved for Coloured communities. Except for the reconstruction work in the Cookhouse area, which is near Bantu Reserves, the Project will largely make use of Coloured labour and will offer an additional avenue of employment for the Coloured population of the Western Free State and the Northern and North-Western Cape Province.
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In addition to the benefits which will accrue to the Coloured community consequent upon certain land being made available for Coloured settlements, the Project, when fully developed with 360 000 morgen under irrigation, will create an additional demand for farm labour in respect of 40,000 units, involving a total Coloured population of 160 000. It can be inferred from these excerpts that the irrigated land to be made available by the ORDP was reserved predominantly for whites, and that employment to be generated, on irrigated farms as well as on construction sites, would be primarily reserved for coloured families. The black (or Bantu) labour force would be used only if unavoidable. It is also clear from the quotes that a substantial increase in farm labour was anticipated. The question is then to determine what has changed in the lives of these peoples, and whether these changes, if any, can be attributed to the ORDP. The following examination addresses the social effects of the scheme.
3.11.1 Settlement
The 1962/3 White Paper identified settlement possibilities for white families on 230 000 of 360 000 morgen of projected irrigated land and the settlement of 600 coloured families on 4 000 morgen. According to the Agricultural Census of 1971, there were nearly 6 400 farmers in the magisterial districts affected by the ORDP, of which 70% were to be found in districts below the Van der Kloof Dam. These statistics indicate the total number of farms in those districts rather than those within the boundaries of the ORDP. Average farm sizes in the Sundays River (ie Kirkwood district) averaged a little over 400ha in 1971 (see Table 3.15). Farms in other areas largely suitable for extensive livestock grazing were larger, ranging from 2 000ha along the Fish River to 4 000ha along the Orange River. A direct comparison of the census data would indicate that by 1993, the average number of farms declined to about 4 800 a 25% decrease with average farm sizes increasing by 7% to about 3 642ha. This implies that the recurrent benefits of the project now accrue to a smaller number of people, although presumably the price of any land sold reflected the added value of reliable irrigation. The general trends of decreasing farm numbers were not explicitly foreseen during project planning, although the government policy of the day was to support the development of large capital-intensive farms. Table 3.15: Number of Farms and Average Sizes (ha), 1971 and 1993
Reach Upper Orange River Lower Orange River Fish River Sundays River 1971 237 4 492 1 254 409 Number 1993 182 3 371 994 240 Size % -24 -25 -21 -41 1971 3 958 4 004 2 142 413 1993 4 446 4 239 2 239 465 % +12 +6 +5 +13
Source: Derived from Agriculture Census, 1970/71 and 1993. In the Upper Orange River area, gross farm income (GFI) had increased from R33.5 million in 1971 to about ten times that amount by 1988. In 1998, prices thus amounted to a real GFI increase of R278 million or a 38% increase. For the area served by the Gariep Dam and the Fish River, the increase from R394 million by R94 million in constant 1998 prices from 1976 to 1988 amounted to a 24% real increase. For the whole area, GFI increased by a peak of 45% in real terms from R1 084 million in 1971 to R1 568 million in 1988. There was an overall increase of 15% from 1971 to 1993. In constant 1998
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US$, GFI peaked in 1981, with only a marginal increase of 5% to 1993. The marginal increase in GFI could be contributed to the price squeeze of the 1980s, which was typified by rising costs of inputs and declining real prices. After accounting for direct expenditure (but excluding allowances for depreciation on capital items) we can conclude that farmers enjoyed a real increase in gross margins of 16% (in 1998 Rand equivalent) between 1971 and 1981, but a decrease of 40% up to 1993. The decline in the US$/Rand exchange rates influenced the profitability of capital-intensive farming operations due to the need to import machinery. The Agricultural Census reports issued after the completion of Gariep and Van der Kloof dams do not contain information on the racial profile of tenants and proprietors of farmlands, neither do they contain any data on the status of irrigated lands. It is therefore impossible to quantify the extent to which the control over farmlands has evolved in the post-dam period. From investigations conducted thus far, it is not possible to give an estimation of how much of the land currently irrigated in the command area of the Orange River is owned by each different racial group.
3.11.2 Displacement and Resettlement

Census figures indicate that the vast area of the Karoo adjacent to the Orange River, and specifically the reservoir sites, was relatively sparsely populated and included a number of small towns prior to construction of the ORDP. The known population levels are given in Table 3.16. Table 3.16: Social Context Prior to Land Acquisition Farmers and Farmworkers in Districts Affected by Gariep and Van der Kloof Dams, 19623 and 19645
Average area of land owned (in ha) Gross value of livestock and farms sold in 1964/5 per farm average in Rands* Average family size of the farmer Average number of workers per farm: Coloured Black Details related to farmworkers Average number of worker family members per farm: Coloured Black Average number of cattle and livestock owned by workers per farm: Cattle Sheep and goats Fowls Note: * Rand values to be converted to U$. Bethulie 2174 8446 3.2 1.0 (13%) 5.0 (85%) Colesberg 3955 12750 3.1 2.2 (31%) 4.9 (66%) Venterstad 2087 7924 2.5 1.4 (26%) 3.9 (63%) Philiptown 4431 11148 2.8 3.5 (32%) 1.8 (67%) Philippolis 2679 8137 3.5 2.0 (30%) 4.5 (69%)
3.0 17.2 6.4 6.0 12.2
7.6 18.7 1.7 14.3 6.7
4.9 14.4 3.1 6.0 13.1
10.5 5.7 1.7 8.8 9.0
6.9 14.8 2.4 17.8 16.5
Source: Derived from Agricultural Census, 1962/3 and 1964/5. It was announced in 1962 that 30 farms owned by white families in the Orange Free State and the Cape Province would be expropriated to make way for the construction of the Gariep Dam (South, 1990, Table 3.17). Further estimates and planning for compensation and resettlement of affected and displaced peoples were not provided in either the 1962/3 or 1964/5 White Papers, the planning documents for the ORDP, which were authorised by the South African parliament. Although most farmers interviewed agreed that about 30 white farmers were affected by the Gariep Dam on both sides of the Orange River, they felt that there were probably far more farms involved, since some of these white farmers owned more than one farm. In addition, other components of infrastructure development included in the ORDP, such as the power transmission lines, also affected
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several farms. The total number of farms affected and quantum of lands acquired and the prices paid have not been obtained from government sources for this report. After the ORDP was sanctioned in 1962, the white farmers heard rumours about the governments intention to move them from the reservoir sites area. The DWA analysed soil and water samples to assess the value of the farms. The DWA started acquiring lands from 1963, and farmers started moving out from 1964. However, most farmers continued to farm with Merino sheep and a few cattle and were only required to move in 1967. When the move finally happened, however, they were given just three months notice to vacate their farm. The Van der Kloof expropriations occurred later than the Gariep reservoir site as late as 1970/1. There were only two white farmers on the Cape side and four white farmers on the Orange Free State side who were affected by construction of the Van der Kloof Dam. Discussions with affected farmers reveal that only six farmers were expropriated in toto at the Van der Kloof site (see Table 3.17). However, several farms were partially affected. The Van der Kloof reservoir occupied a smaller area and the steeper valley sides thereby caused submergence of more limited area. The reservoir required acquisition of all or most of the lands owned by a few farmers, while some of the other affected farmers were simply compensated for a minor loss of steep land and did not have to relocate. In cases where the DWA expressed its wish to acquire only a small section of the farm that fell within the flood danger zone, many insisted that the entire farm be purchased. Often the sections to be submerged included the heart of the farm, namely the homestead and the irrigated lucerne lands. In the end, the DWA acquired whole farms. Most white farmers interviewed felt that the construction of the dam was the best thing for the country and that it signified progress for all and sacrifices from some. Since the affected farmers were confident that the government would suitably compensate them, resistance to land acquisition did not occur. Any discontent that might have existed was due to the feeling among a few farmers that their farms were not properly assessed. Table 3.17: Number of People Displaced by Gariep and Van der Kloof Reservoirs
Number of farms Reservoir Gariep Van der Kloof Fully Acquired 30 6 Partially Acquired Not known Not known Number of Worker Families Displaced 150 30 Total Number of People Displaced (related to) Farmers Farmworkers 100 1 050 20 210
Note: Data is based on interviews with people and local officials.
A farmers committee was formed in order to ensure that the individual farmers received a good deal from the Department of Lands by presenting a united front. The farmers recalled that fairly regular meetings of this committee were held in 1960/1 in both Venterstad and Bethulie. Thereafter the frequency of meetings dropped, reportedly because individual farmers preferred to negotiate on a bilateral basis. All but two or three farmers were able to buy new lands with the money paid to them as compensation. The farms bought were more or less equivalent to the one they were leaving. When the new farms were finally paid for, the price paid might not have been totally fair, as the land prices increased in the area. A few farmers moved out to other districts where lands were cheaper compared to the affected areas. However, farmers generally bought lands within the same district or in adjacent districts. When asked about the adequacy of the compensation, only a few farmers expressed dissatisfaction. Most farmers interviewed felt that they received a very fair compensation and that all the farmers were well paid for their loss. The Gariep Dam expropriations, which happened first, generally provided very generous compensation to the farmers.
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A few farmers felt that the DWA could have separated the sum of money paid for the farm from any monies given as compensation for the inconvenience of dislocation. In any event, this was not done and, although the sums paid out were supposed to be confidential, prices of equivalent farms in the vicinity rose sharply. Given that farmers appear to have been generally satisfied with the amounts paid out to them, it is conceivable that some allowance was made for the inconvenience of being dislocated, and was perhaps built into the payments which they received, without being made explicit. Those few farmers dissatisfied with the assessed value of the land took the DWA to court but all of them lost their cases. The court ruled that the DWA had paid very generous compensation. Moreover, when dissatisfaction did arise, it did not concern the level of compensation paid, but rather the manner in which the compensation was disbursed. The farmers recalled that the DWA officials had not been very approachable when they were engaged in the valuation of their farm. They felt that they had been unsympathetic in summarily rejecting any suggestion of compensating farmers for sentimental value some farmers had been on their farm for a few decades and had built up the farm from rudimentary beginnings; other farmers were the fourth generation of their families in possession of the same farm (see Annex 7). The farmers were also critical of the manner in which officials from the Department of Lands dismantled the equipment (pumps, sheds, etc). As part of the expropriation agreement, local farmers were allowed to buy the equipment removed from their farms, but they were not allowed to dismantle it themselves. The farmers expressed anguish at the unprofessional behaviour of the officials and their work teams in dismantling equipment, which made them unfit for re-use (eg an irrigation pump was removed by fixing it with a chain behind a lorry, cracking the sump in the process). On the other hand, because the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams were designed to be increased in height should sediments fill part of the active storage, the expropriation of land for the ORDP included areas far above the current water level. As a result, several of the displaced families could actually have stayed where they were until today and this area has since been converted to a nature reserve. In stark contrast to the white farmers and families stood the black and coloured farmworker families who were also forced to relocate because of the construction of the two dams on the Orange River. They did so without any compensation and were left with the choice of moving to wherever it was that their employer had purchased another farm, or to remain in the area (although not on the expropriated farms) and attempt to find employment in an area and sector that was shedding jobs. The coloured and black workers continued to remain on the farms looking after the cattle while the farmers moved out to acquire and settle on new farms or settle down in urban areas. The workers managed the farms and faced uncertain futures without fully knowing and understanding what would happen to them. Neither project authorities nor the farmers informed them of the submergence schedule. Thus, the last to move out of the farms were the workers as most moved out to open corridors just before the filling of the Gariep reservoir. A few short notes on what happened to some of the displaced farmworkers are given in Annex 8. The cases described give some indication of the uncertainty, dislocation, and trauma endured by people living and working on farms affected by the two reservoirs. In a sense, the dislocation farmworkers and their families suffered as a result of having to make way for the dams may not have been substantially different from the dislocation they experienced due to regular farmworker dismissals whenever farmers desired. Ultimately, although the root cause of their dislocation was different this time (namely, the inundation of the affected farms), the effects and chain of events that were set in motion were identical to any other dismissal. The workers lacked rights and entitlements in both cases.
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In interviews, farmworkers displaced by the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams cited the following losses that they had incurred: They lost their jobs by being moved off farms en masse. They all had to go in different directions in search of work, so that families and other networks were upset. Whether they moved to another farm or into township areas, they were forced to sell their livestock (one of their very few tangible assets and probably their most potent symbolic vestige of independence from the farmer) at low prices. They lost their dignity by having to live in the corridors along the roadside while searching for other employment opportunities. They lost their history when the graves of their ancestors were lost under the water. While the white farmers had the opportunity to transfer the graves of their forebearers (because they knew about the pending move); workers noted that, this is still a dark cloud hanging over us even now. Some people who were employed on the dam construction sites lost limbs and even died, for which no compensation was ever paid. There were very few jobs on the sites for the displaced farmworkers, because most of these jobs went to amajoyini (temporary work seekers) from the Transkei and to local coloured people. Practically the only difference in the case of the dam-induced dislocations was that, for those people who had been working for successive generations for the same farm family, the opportunity to continue doing so and decades of familiarity (and the patronage built up over this time) were lost (Mike de Jongh, pers. comm.). This was not always so, as some farmers gave their workers the choice of moving to their newly acquired farm and continuing to work for them there. One of the frequently mentioned disadvantages of having lived on farms is that these workers were not educated, nor did their children have the opportunity to attend school. In fact, the children of workers were partially owned by the farmer as they often had to work on farms without recompense, simply to ensure that their parents would not be evicted. According to those interviewed, although the life in townships was hard and painful, it was far better than on the farms in terms of dignity. The fear of arbitrary dismissal and life on egangeni/corridors were too much for some of the workers to deal with. Even the generalised threat of forced removal in earlier years in the townships did not compare to this. Furthermore, on the farms, their freedom of movement was very restricted: in order to visit family or friends on a neighbouring farm, they would have to ask the permission of the farmer there. Those farmers that agreed generally gave people very limited time to make their visits, considering how far they may have had to travel by cart or by foot to get there. Life on farms was slavery with considerable risks. In contrast, the urban areas offered an opportunity to live closer to their own ethnic group (due to a concentration of black population in townships), which provided confidence and voice. Since damrelated displacement was not equivalent to an eviction order served by the farmers that had a punishment factor, the dam-displaced workers had the better option of moving to urban centres without violating pass laws. This was one of the unintended effects of displacement caused by the ORDP. Annex 9 provides further analysis of displacement outcomes and consequences for the farmers and workers.
3.11.3 Employment16
The 1962/3 White Paper identified the creation of an additional demand for farm labour of 40 000 units, involving a total population of 160 000 coloured South Africans. Available Agricultural Census data contradict the general perception that additional jobs have been created on farms situated in the
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irrigation command area of the ORDP. Based on these data, the ORDPs projected employment generation did not materialise. Farm employment in fact dropped significantly from the 1960s to the late 1980s, and has more or less stabilised since then. From a population of 84 417 individuals in 1964 on farmlands situated in the Fish-Sundays District and in downstream adjacent districts, the number of workers, all categories included, dropped to 66 483 in 1988 and rose again to 71 104 in 1993. This phenomenon was part of a nation-wide trend, and was the result of the modernisation of the agricultural sector in South Africa. The inherent assumption of constant levels of employment in the without project scenario turned out to be over optimistic as, during the study period, the number of regular labourers country-wide declined from the mid-1960s in all but the winter rainfall area (the western Cape). Regular farm labour declined by 22% nationally and by 11% in the northern Cape and the Orange Free State between 1965 and 1972. The total permanent agricultural employment for South Africa declined from 834 000 in 1965 to 734 000 and 683 000 in 1972 and 1976 respectively (Antrobus, 1984). This constituted an 18% decline between 1965 and 1976. Between 1976 and 1993, farm labour employment further declined by 17%. Given that the projected quantitative increase in job creation in farms did not take place, we investigated whether or not the dams helped attenuate the trend in employment losses. This question was addressed by comparing the trends in areas directly affected by the dams with those that were and were not expected to benefit directly from the irrigation component of the programme. The data gathered are limited to the northern Cape and to regular workers (unpaid and paid labourers).17 The following observations can be made from these data (see Tables 19 and 20): No significant difference was noted in the trend in unpaid labour, ie labour provided by proprietors, tenants, and their family members. In both impact and non-impact zones, the unpaid labour force fell by 70 to 80% from 1964 to 1988, and by 5 to 10% from 1988 to 1993. Regarding paid regular workers, the drop in labour force observed in impact areas of the ORDP was much less than in non-adjacent districts, especially from 1964 to 1988 where these latter zones experienced about a 40% reduction in regular farm employment, against only 15% in adjacent ORDP districts. Based on the assumption that without the dams, employment losses in adjacent districts would be of the magnitude of losses noted in non-adjacent districts, ie 40% instead of 15%, it can be inferred that the project has saved 25% of the 18 000 inventoried regular jobs in 1964 in downstream adjacent districts. This represents 4 500 jobs in downstream areas (which do not include the Fish-Sundays section18). It is probable that if geographical units smaller than districts were used, for example enumerator areas, a lower percentage of losses of regular jobs would be noted in irrigated zones. Some of the big grape-producing farms around the city of Upington employ up to 400 permanent workers, and the banks of the Orange River in this region are continuously occupied by commercial farms that are rapidly expanding laterally from the main stream of the river.
Table 3.18: Trends in Labour Force Provided by Proprietors, Tenants, and their Family Members in Downstream Adjacent Districts and in Non-adjacent Districts of Northern Cape
Province Northern Cape Northern Cape Spatial Unit Adjacent districts Non-adjacent districts 196488 -79.43% -67.74% 198893 -5.09% -9.53%
Table 3.19: Trends in Regular Employment (Regular Farmworkers and Domestics/Servants) in Downstream Adjacent Districts and in Non-adjacent Districts of Northern Cape
Province Northern Cape Northern Cape Spatial Unit Adjacent districts Non-adjacent districts 196488 -15.05% -38.33% 198893 -10.27% -13.60%
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Regarding seasonal/casual employment, the impact of the irrigation component of the ORDP is impressive. In the project irrigation zones (the Fish-Sundays and downstream districts), the number of seasonal workers increased by 78% from 1964 to 1988 and by 34% from 1988 to 1993. In downstream adjacent districts, the number of seasonal workers increased three-fold from 1964 to 1993, compared to only 16% in non-adjacent districts of the northern Cape (see Table 3.20). The phenomenon of seasonal labour is a tangible reality in the northern Cape, and is mainly related to the rapid expansion of commercial agriculture, and especially of export grapes. Some of the big grape-producing farms may employ 8001 000 workers in peak seasons, in November/December for harvesting, and during the pruning period in June/July. One of the farms visited employed about 1 000 employees during peak seasons, and 400500 permanent employees.19 Table 3.20: Number of Seasonal and Casual Workers
Upstream adjacent districts Reservoir site districts Fish-Sundays districts Downstream adjacent districts (northern Cape) Non-impact areas (northern Cape) 1964 8 134 2 184 7 381 9 039 9 659 1988 12 153 4 327 8 816 20 479 12 149 1993 10 245 3 178 12 892 26 400 11 220
Source: Census of Agriculture. In sum, the ORDP did create additional jobs, but these were for seasonal/casual labour. These additional seasonal jobs (about 29 000) could not be translated into labour units, given that the lengths of these seasonal and casual workers contracts are not provided. During the planning phase of the ORDP, the drop in farm labour that the entire country experienced during the following three decades was not foreseen. Therefore, the ORDP did not meet its anticipated objective of increasing farm labour units. However, available data suggest that the ORDP has helped reduce the loss of regular paid employment in irrigated areas, in the downstream region, and probably also in the Fish-Sundays region. In addition, the project has had very significant impacts on the creation of seasonal labour, which has tripled in downstream districts since the early 1960s. The combined figures regarding seasonal and regular employment suggest that the ORDP has certainly saved a number of jobs towards its initial target of 40 000 job units, but has probably not reached that objective if formulated in terms of additional jobs. Coloureds constitute the only community explicitly mentioned in the ORDP design documents as beneficiaries of farm employment to be generated. However, the time-series data available on farm labour in the downstream districts and in the Fish-Sundays areas do not show any significant privilege for coloured communities. Their current proportion among regular farmworkers (52%) is the same as their proportion in 1964. Regarding seasonal workers, their share has even decreased from 60% in 1964 to 47% at present. Given that coloureds represented 54% of the population in the ORDP impact area in 1991, these figures mean that coloureds are far from being the exclusive or even dominant beneficiaries of employment generated by the ORDP. Based on the language of the 1962/3 White Paper, it was not anticipated that black populations would benefit much from employment to be generated from the ORDP. Existing demographic and agricultural census data show that contrary to initial plans, blacks are labourers in farms situated in ORDP impacts areas. While the proportion of black populations in impact areas (not including former black reserves in the Ciskei) varied from 43% in 1960 to 34% in 1991, their proportion in the labour force paid and unpaid, regular and seasonal combined increased from 30% in 1964 to 44% in 1993. Blacks represented more than 50% of seasonal workers in 1993. A small number of black people in the command area were therefore unexpected beneficiaries of the ORDP.
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Regarding the impact of the project on gender, the data on farm labour from the 1988 and 1993 Agricultural Censuses are not disaggregated by gender, which makes it impossible to determine if the relative gender balance regarding the access to farm labour, noted in the pre-dam context, was maintained. Anecdotal evidence suggests that women continue to represent a very significant and increasing proportion of farm labourers. For example, the manager of one of the biggest farms upstream of Upington estimated that women comprise 50 to 60% of his workforce.
Findings on Social Effects:

A direct comparison of the census data indicates that by 1993, the average number of farms declined to about 4 800 a 25% decrease with average farm sizes increasing by 7% to 3 642ha. This implies that the recurrent benefits of the project now accrue to a smaller number of people, although presumably the price of any land sold reflected the added value of reliable irrigation. The general trends of decreasing farm numbers were not explicitly foreseen during project planning. After accounting for direct expenditure (but excluding allowances for depreciation on capital items), white farmers enjoyed a real increase in gross margins of 16% (in 1998 Rand equivalent) between 1971 and 1981, but a decrease of 40% up to 1993. The decline in the US$/Rand exchange rates influenced the profitability of capital-intensive farming operations because they had to import machinery. Economic diversification of farmers started before dam construction with younger members of farmers families already being employed in the mining, industrial and service sectors. Most farmers had houses in urban areas. For the displaced farmers, the dams thus offered an opportunity to consolidate the economic diversification already taking place. Once the initial pain of losing farms built up over decades was absorbed, dislocation for white farmers was manageable. The earlier expropriations around Gariep Dam appear to have gone off smoother and the sums of money paid appeared to have been more generous. Later, once the financial situation became difficult, attitudes towards farmers affected by the Van der Kloof Dam seem to have hardened and compensation was not as generous. Because the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams were designed to be increased in height should sediments fill part of the active storage, the expropriation of land for the ORDP included areas far above the current water level. As a result, several of the displaced families could actually have stayed where they were until today. For a few farmworkers who managed to move to townships, the severity of conditions experienced compared to those on the farms may have diminished. But in terms of access to basic services and living conditions, the families faced serious economic, social, and health hardships. The level of morbidity and mortality on the farms was low (based on interviews with health workers who visited the farmworker families regularly in the past) compared to the townships from the 1960s to early 1980s. Farm labour dropped severely throughout the country, including in the Orange River Basin, from the 1960s through to the 1980s. The ORDPs planned objective of creating additional jobs thus became unattainable. However, farm jobs declined less in the ORDP, where at least 4 500 regular jobs have been created or saved in downstream areas. In the larger command area, the number of jobs created or saved (regular and seasonal labour) is likely to be close to the initial target of 40 000 units. Unpaid labour provided by farmowners, tenants, and their family members declined severely in similar levels in impact and non-impact areas, which suggests that the factors behind this decline are unrelated to the ORDP. Despite forced removals undertaken throughout the country to implement the apartheid Group Area Acts, and despite the fact that black spots were primary targets of these removals, the pattern of access to farm labour among racial groups did not change in a significant way in the project impact zones. Coloureds and blacks continue to have access to farm jobs in proportions
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similar to pre-dam contexts. A small number of blacks can therefore be considered as unanticipated beneficiaries of farm employment because of the ORDP. Regarding other potential unanticipated impacts of the ORDP, the prevalence of water-borne diseases (eg malaria) has not increased significantly, and the nutritional status of the population has showed no clear changes.

Ascertain the total number of people and farms affected as well as the quantum of lands acquired from all components of the ORDP. Assess the context with respect to access to drinking water and to electricity. Calculate the level of employment in other sectors that would have been positively or negatively affected by the ORDP (eg the industrial and mining sectors, and trade and communications). Although other indicators of economic and social well-being were analysed for differences between ORDP and non-ORDP districts, no health or nutritional differences were identified. However, further investigations are required to determine the validity of this finding. Assess the effects of the ORDP on employment in the Fish and Sundays Catchments.
3.12 Interactive, Cumulative and Basin-wide Impacts

Although this report is principally concerned with the ORDP, the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams are only 2 of the 23 dams that effect the ecology of the Orange River system as a whole. This section looks at the nature of the cumulative impacts of the many dams within the catchment, firstly on fish and secondly on the driving variables of the riverine ecosystem. Isolation of fish populations has increased with the number of weirs and dams on the Orange. This is likely to cause unnatural genetic and reproductive bottlenecks, which promote extinction and lead to an impoverished fauna (Benade, 1993). The provision of fish ladders in all new weirs is being promoted in order to safeguard existing anadromous species. While these structures appear to be expensive, their cost may be less than 2% of the total cost of each weir (Chutter et al, 1995). Such fish ladders may lessen the impact of new weirs, such as the one built at Neusberg in the 1990s, but the division of the river into discrete segments of fish habitat by existing impoundments is a continuing concern. An outline method for assessing the cumulative impacts of the major dams on the driving variables of the riverine ecosystem is laid out in Annex 11. It essentially looks at each of the variables that can be modified by dams and asks whether the variable recovers as the water flows downstream or whether the variable is permanently affected. For example, in the case of temperature, the water may leave the dam reservoir cooler than ambient in summer, or warmer in winter, yet by 200km below the dam the temperature has usually recovered its normal value. If there are ten dams in the catchment, more than 200km apart, then the variable temperature has been modified for 2 000km along the total river length. Table 3.21 summarises the results for the main variables identified. For an insight into the role of each of these driving variables, see section 3.9 above. Table 3.21: Cumulative Impacts of Dams in the Orange River Catchment on the Variables Controlling Riverine Ecosystems
Controlling Variable Flow volume Flow height Flood pulse Flow seasonality TSS Sediment load and seasonality Kilometres 3 652km Minimum 2 300km 3 652km 1 8753 652km ? 1502 350km 3 652km Cumulative Affected Distance (km) for Orange River 100% 63% 100% ?50%/100% 3169% 100%
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CPOM/FPOM ratio PH N all forms P all forms Daily temperatures Seasonal temperatures Trace metals Biotic keystone inputs Dissolved gases
2301 150km 115690km 115690km 115230km 1151 150km 2 300km? ? 2303 652km 2.5110km
6% and 31% to less than 80%* 319% 319%* 36%* 3 - 31% 63% ? 6100% 0.063%
It is assumed that the estimated recovery distance for each variable will be the same for each of the 23 dams on the Orange-Vaal system. Given this untested assumption, in the final column of Table 22 the affected distance is multiplied by 23 and then expressed as a percentage of the total length of the river. This provides an approximate estimate of the total proportion of the river for which that particular variable has been altered by regulation. This protocol, however crude, at least gives us a framework for looking at cumulative impacts along river reaches at catchment level. Despite the shortcomings of the protocol, and the major assumptions that we have been forced to make, it is clear from Table 22 that the cumulative impacts of dams on the system have been considerable. Two major hydrological components (flow and sediment regime) have been 100% affected, a third (temperature) by 63%, and others by between 50% and 100%. From these figures alone, it is likely that the Orange-Vaal is the most seriously disrupted river in the sub-continent. Sediment loads have also been profoundly influenced by regulation and, whilst flow may be catered for in IFR regimes, sediments remain trapped in the dams on the system. Of the other driving variables we have listed in Table 22, the CPOM/FPOM ratio (coarse particulate organic matter/fine particulate organic matter), pH, temperature, and species components are heavily affected and, consequently, major changes in biotic community structure will have occurred. The remaining four components are variable and difficult to assess, but as we have remarked in the footnotes to the table, the nitrogen and phosphorus components are probably under-estimated owing to other community changes caused by regulated discharges (eg reedbed formation and encroachment will influence N and P inputs to the channel this is an indirect effect of flow regulation). CPOM/FPOM ratios are important due to their impact on biotic community structure. Injection of fine organic particulates in the form of plankton from reservoirs (or decaying products from encroaching reedbeds that have become established through flow regulation) has profound implications for the organisms of the receiving river. Filter-feeders are provided with very much larger quantities of food than were available in the pre-regulated river and this is almost certainly a primary driving force behind the massive outbreaks of pest blackfly throughout the system. Changes in CPOM/FPOM ratio have concomitant effects on all other riverine biota.
Findings on Interactive and Cumulative Basin Impacts:

Isolation of fish populations has increased with the number of weirs and dams on the Orange. This is likely to cause unnatural genetic and reproductive bottlenecks that promote extinction and lead to an impoverished fauna (Benade, 1993). Fish ladders may lessen the impact of new weirs, such as the one built at Neusberg in the 1990s, but the division of the river into discrete segments of fish habitat by existing impoundments is a continuing concern. Despite the shortcomings of the protocol, and the major assumptions that have been made, it seems that the cumulative impacts of dams on the Orange River system have been considerable. Two major hydrological components (flow and sediment regime) have been 100% affected, a third (temperature) by 63%, and others by between 50% and 100%.
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The interactive effects of interaction between the Wellbedacht, Gariep, and Van der Kloof dams need to be examined. An examination is required of inter-basin transfers into and out of the Orange Catchment. The cumulative economic and social impacts of developments within the Orange River Basin need to be examined. Interactive effects between the ORDP and the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) should also be examined.
3.13 Summary of Impacts and Performance

Working from the available data and sources, this chapter has tried to assess the degree to which the aims of the ORDP have been met.
3.13.1 Predicted versus Actual Outcomes

Table 3.22 provides an overview of the main findings with respect to the predicted, actual, and unexpected outcomes of the ORDP. Project infrastructure was substantially modified during implementation, and regular design changes meant that some features of the planned scheme were not built as the context evolved and other options were explored. Additions unplanned at the outset, such as the Wellbedacht Dam, affected the assumptions made and the actual construction of the planned components. The construction of the upstream Wellbedacht Dam for municipal water supply effectively, but unexpectedly, reduced sediment inflows into the Gariep reservoir, thus prolonging its life.
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Table 3.22: Predicted, Actual, and Unexpected Outcomes of the ORDP

Schedule Design Sedimentation Project costs Irrigation and irrigated agriculture Predicted Gariep Dam Van der Kloof Dam Three dams One diversion tunnel Feeder irrigation canals 0.8 % of run-off US$ 571 million (1998 prices) 243 000301 000ha irrigated Production of crops Actual Broadly on time 6 years late Two dams One diversion tunnel Left bank canal not built Reservoir has lost only 10% of storage since construction 438% 4657% of area 300% for summer cereals 457% for winter cereals 211 % for other field crops 166% for vegetables 2767% Insufficient information 106 % 98 % Flood peaks have been more than halved No data on value of damage avoided Around 200 jobs have been created in tourism all along the river Recreational use of the reservoir has occurred Insufficient information Unexpected Additional dam at Wellbedacht Wellbedacht has captured sediment predicted to accumulate in Gariep
Value of production Municipal water supply Hydropower generation Flood control 100 million gallons per day Gariep Van der Kloof dams will reduce the incidence of damaging floods along the lower Orange river by 50 per cent Unquantified
Lucerne provided food for ostriches and angora goats as these markets developed Insufficient information Value of power was 9% greater than planned with a further 13% for dynamic system benefits
Tourism and recreation
Social impacts
Most lands reserved for white settlement; 4 000 morgen of irrigated land reserved for coloured community Creation of 40,000 additional farm labour jobs Compensation for white farm owners at current land values
Around this number have been saved as farm labour declined nationally due to mechanisation All farmers were compensated adequately, although the Van der Kloof Gariep appeared more generous 1 260 workers and their families displaced Stabilised flows have led to increases in blackfly, and modification of the riverine ecosystem. No health impacts recorded. Bank erosion from the Orange-Fish Tunnel
National development Environmental impacts
No provision for compensation for black or coloured workers Stimulation of national economy None predicted
The study shows that the outcomes of the ORDP are less than the principal expected benefits for irrigated agriculture, both in terms of area (4657% of planned) and value of production (27%), and that the project cost four times more than originally expected. Outcomes are greater for predictions of agricultural productivity (166457%) and for the value of hydropower generation (107%). Actual hydropower generated is broadly as predicted (although from an installed capacity over twice as large
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that which was originally envisioned). The generation of dynamic system benefits for the grid from hydropower unexpectedly added 13% to the overall value of hydropower generation. Benefits, costs, and impacts for other major areas of predicted benefits, such as for flood control, recreation, regional, and national development, are hard to identify due to lack of quantified predictions and little monitoring data to assess their actualisation. A preliminary analysis indicates that although 40 000 additional seasonal and permanent jobs were probably not created by the ORDP, the scheme may have saved this many from on-farm rationalisation as farming practice intensified nation-wide.
3.13.2 Unexpected Impacts

The original White Papers did not make provision for impacts on black and coloured farmworkers displaced by the reservoir, nor for any environmental impacts of the project. Black workers either moved with their employer or settled in local towns, with different outcomes for each group. In all cases, however, this caused social upheaval and the disruption of social networks that were important for livelihood security at the time. White farmowners were, however, with few exceptions, adequately compensated for the value of their land and assets, but not explicitly for any additional costs of displacement. Unanticipated environmental impacts include the proliferation of biting blackfly that cause damage to livestock and the tourism industry, and requires an annual control programme of around R2 million ($330,000).
3.13.3 Cost Recovery

An extensive analysis of cost recovery for capital or recurrent costs of the ORDP was not carried out under the study, although this will be an important part of future studies. It appears, however, that there was no intention to recover a portion of capital costs of the scheme and that irrigation charges have been significantly lower than necessary to cover operation and maintenance costs, although they are now being increased to meet this objective. In the 1962/3 White Paper, it was stated that farmers would be charged 4% of gross income per morgen of land, which was calculated to be approximately R12/morgen. But calculations of the annualised capital, operations, and maintenance costs for the irrigation component of the ORDP provided in the 1962/3 White Paper estimated a required annual payment of more than R50/morgen. A new upper limit for water rates for agriculture, which would recover the annual operating and maintenance costs plus redemption of two-thirds of the capital cost of the scheme, were announced in 1984/5. Data collected from the 1993 Agricultural Census gives a value of R10.5 million that was collected from farmers, which for an area of 138 000ha equates to R76/ha. Rates levied in 1999 by the DWA are in the range of R270/ha, which is said to cover about of 80% of operating costs. After the decision to raise the heights of the dams was taken in 1964/5, it was agreed that Eskom would pay the DWA a fixed monthly tariff of 40 cents per kW of installed capacity in regular use at every dam and a fixed amount of 0.125 cent per unit of electrical power generation delivered into the distribution system. Whether or not this tariff was more, equal to, or less than Eskom was paying for power at its other installations is not known. Notes
1
The 1962/3 White Paper only approved the construction of a canal, together with distribution canals, to command 8 565ha by gravity and the construction of a pump station, rising main canal,
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10
11
12 13
14
and subsidiary canal to supply water from the Van der Kloof Right Bank Canal to the Riet River Valley near Koffiefontein in order to provide supplementary irrigation water for existing irrigation for about 3 426ha of land for a total area of 11 991ha. A review of DWA yearbooks confirmed the expenditure figures for 196379 contained in the 1984/5 yearbook. Actual expenditure data was found only for 1981. Infrastructure to feed these areas, including the Graaff-Reinett Tunnel, were not constructed. Upper Sundays (13 380ha), E.Riet/Kaffir River (20 065ha) and Carnavon/Sak (25 080ha). ORRS. Data from the ORRS excludes 7 119ha in the Riet and Modder river systems that are fed from water outside the Gariep-Van der Kloof system. An additional 5 067ha was listed as scheduled irrigation area but yet undeveloped for irrigation. An area of 8 262ha in the Colesberg and Philippolis areas has been deducted from the census data as outside the canal area. As a backdrop to the cropping pattern developments in command areas of the focal dams, it is interesting to note the decline in the total area of major crops under production in South Africa between 1962 when the predicted areas were published in the White Paper and 1994/5. For example, the area under maize declined from 4.3 million to 3.5 million hectares. Land under wheat remained relatively constant at around 1.4 million hectares during the period, but was reported in 1999 to be down to 0.6 million hectares (Sunday Times, 1999). The area under deciduous fruit has similarly declined from 71 000ha to 52 000ha and for citrus fruit from 61 000ha to 47 000ha. Significant increases, however, were recorded for vines (nearly doubled) and cotton. Cotton nevertheless only covered a total area of 67 000ha nation-wide in 1994/5 compared to the prediction of 48 000ha made for the project area alone. It should be recalled though that there has been an increase in area planted to citrus since 1994 approximately 2 200ha in the Sundays River region. The overall decline in production areas is partly explained by the decline in the real prices of major products. Data reported by the Sundays River Citrus Co-operative, which processes about 90% of citrus production in the Sundays Valley, shows an increase in citrus production to 120 000 tonnes in 1998 from 6 500ha compared with 56 000 tonnes in 1978 from 4 000ha. The yield increase implicit here is 32%. In this case, the agricultural census data appears consistent with these figures with 5 600ha devoted to fruit production in 1988 (was anything for this predicted ?). Horticultural crops are generally assumed to include intensively cultivated vegetables, which are often of higher value that field crops. The latter include extensively cultivated crops, including dried beans and pulses, as well as small grains. Potatoes and onions could be included in either of the groups depending on the analysis. This value is so low for various reasons, including: predominantly open-cast mining, low labour costs, and waste coal taken out of export coal is used by Eskom. Symposium on the dynamic benefits of Energy Storage Plant Operation, Boston, May 1984, Electrical Power Research Institute, USA. Small operators employ about 3 people, medium-sized ones employ about 12 people, and the very few large ones employ about 40 people. Much of this section is drawn from Palmer (1996, 1997). The methodological issues surrounding this topic will be addressed in a separate WCD thematic review on global change. This section has therefore been drafted using preliminary figures that require confirmation and may change in the light of the conclusions derived from that review. As with other inputs and outputs of a project, in economic appraisal or evaluation the indirect economic impacts should be scrutinised in light of their net contribution to the economy as versus the likely alternatives. Economic assessment of a project implicitly calls for either a direct comparison of investment options or the incorporation of opportunity costs in the pricing of inputs and outputs, such as land, labour and capital. Regardless of the method employed, the opportunity costs of the resources employed in the project are included in the analysis of the direct costs and benefits of the project. A full analysis of the project would also need to incorporate indirect effects. As with other outcomes of the project this would involve, either explicitly or implicitly, the comparison of the opportunity costs of the project, in terms of lost indirect economic impacts, with the actual indirect benefits to be realised under the project.
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In project evaluation (ie after the project has been initiated) how such net impacts or benefits can be determined is difficult, particularly with a project of the age of the ORDP. This as it is necessary to take a view on what the without project scenario would have entailed in terms of indirect impacts. In the case of the ORDP, the project was financed locally, thus it is likely that in the absence of the project another project or suite of projects would have been funded. Given the focus of the ORDP on agriculture one option may have been a series of smaller investments in agricultural production or perhaps a series of projects that aimed to increase agricultural production, power production and water supply to Port Elizabeth and other urban centres. The difficulty of course is that any one of these projects would also have yielded indirect economic benefits in these sectors. If it is possible to attribute a multiplier of 1.8, for example, to the agricultural production under the ORDP, the same assignment is also possible to another, different agricultural investment. As indicated earlier, estimation of the indirect economic impacts is difficult and costly, but evaluating the impacts without the project would be even more difficult. In the case of an assessment of the ORDP, it is clear that such an evaluation is exceedingly difficult if not impossible.
16
17
18
19
With project and without project scenarios are considered to assess the changes that have taken place in the target areas of the ORDP, and to discuss the extent to which identified changes are attributable to the ORDP. Seasonal/casual workers were not included given that it was not possible to convert their numbers into labour units. The meaning of the figures on seasonal workers is, however, discussed in the text that follows. Due to time constraints, we could not include the Fish-Sundays section of the command area in this part of work, which would require the entry and analysis of data on all the districts of the Eastern Cape province. In such a context, the fact that field visits coincided with the harvesting of wheat and table grapes made it difficult to arrange for meetings with farmers and farmworkers.
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4. The Distributional Effects of the ORDP

The 1962/3 and 1964/5 White Papers make little explicit reference about who would be the beneficiaries of the ORDP. However, objectives found in various sections of these two planning documents do provide a general orientation of the distributional intentions of the scheme. The operational experience with the ORDP since 1970-71, moreover, provides a long time period during which the distributional outcomes, both anticipated and unexpected, have become manifest. Because of data and time constraints, in addition to the steep learning curve for establishing an appropriate methodological framework to examine distributional effects in the WCD case studies, a full distributional analysis was not conducted for this pilot study. Nevertheless, it is possible to provide an indicative sketch of the distributional aspects of the ORDP based on the analysis of who received the various impacts identified in the preceding Chapter.
4.1 Anticipated Distributional Effects of the ORDP

By taking the 1962/3 and 1964/5 White Papers as a unit, it can be inferred that hydropower was prioritised over irrigation and municipal water supply for the early period of the schemes operation phase. The intended uses or beneficiaries of the hydropower generated were not fully elaborated but it was stated that the power was to be used for peaking purposes during periods of high demand in the country. But as the capacity to deliver greater amounts of irrigation on the upper Orange River increased (with the completion of canal, distribution and drainage works) and as the inter-basin transfers increased due to water needs of Fish-Sundays basin for irrigation, and urban and industrial uses, hydropowers share of water utilisation from the ORDP was planned to be reduced. In terms of irrigation and irrigated agriculture, there was a clear objective of increasing the production and living standards of White farmers who were already settled or were planned to be settled on most of the command areas of the ORDP, with a small amount of lands being set aside for Coloured families. White farmers whose lands were to be submerged or would otherwise have been negatively affected by the project were to be compensated. There was also an employment objective of increasing the number of farm jobs which was directed at Coloured farm workers. The irrigation supplied through the ORDP was also expected to contribute significantly to ensuring that agricultural production would keep pace with the population growth in the country. Water supply to municipalities and industries was to become an increasingly important objective of the ORDP over time, with towns in the Orange Basin and water-intensive industries in the region targeted as the primary beneficiaries. Flood control and recreation were always considered secondary objectives of the scheme and were to be constrained by the demands for hydropower, irrigation and municipal supply. The anticipated beneficiaries of flood mitigation were the households and industries to be afforded protection within the basin, while the beneficiaries of recreation were both the new businesses that would be generated and those individuals who would use the newly created facilities. In terms of financial cost recovery, it was expected that the South African Government through its Department of Water Affairs was to provide most of the funds for the project. The South African Government was also to pay for the compensation to affected peoples (primarily White farmers) and for the purchase of lands that were to be set aside for recreation purposes. Most of the costs of the ORDP were thus to be born by the population and taxpayers of South Africa. In addition, the South African Government electricity agency, ESKOM, was to pay for the capital costs of additional infrastructure necessary for power generation. It is likely that these costs were to be passed on to the consumers of electricity. Farmers were expected to pay a small portion of the costs of the scheme while household and industrial consumers were to pay subsidised rates for water
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supply. Finally, it was suggested in the 1962/3 White Paper that households and industries would pay a portion of the costs of water supply but exact figures were not provided.
4.2 The Actual Distributional Effects of the ORDP

A schematic representation of the actual distribution of benefits, costs and impacts is displayed in Table 24. The columns correspond roughly to the types of actual project impacts identified in Chapter 3. The rows of the table differentiate between those receiving gains and losses at two levels. First, different spatial or geographic scales are employed. These range from the impacts felt by those displaced by the flooding of the reservoir all the way to interests at a global level. Second, within each area a distinction is made between producers (farmers), households, firms and government. The impacts themselves are indicated in the cells of the table. This is accomplished in three ways. Impacts which are simply identified but for which no quantification of the impact was possible simply have dollar signs in the cells. For those distributional impacts on which the study team obtained some quantitative indicator of the extent or size of the impact in non-monetary terms this indicator is listed in the extent column or indicated by a comment box in the table. The extent column is divided into two in order to allow for a representation of changes over time in these values. Finally, where indicative annual figures were obtained they are specified in the cells (in $1998 million). As the case study methodology limits itself to examining past performance these figures are derived from current estimates of annual flows of costs and benefits as calculated in Chapter 3. Present values for impacts as presented in Chapter 3 might also be integrated into the table, however, in order to make the table more accessible to readers and to avoid any confusion between annual and present value figures, only the annual figures are employed here. The table is, therefore, another way of summarising the information on the actual impacts of the ORDP. To facilitate a visual view of the distributional impacts the benefits are listed on the left side of the table and costs are presented on the right side of the table. In the case of government at its different levels and in terms of different agencies, transfers are recorded as all government gains and losses are transfer payments. For households, firms and producers only the gain or loss associated with a given impact is recorded. In other words, both inflows and outflows are not recorded, but rather the evidence is assessed to identify if a clear gain or loss is incurred in which case it is registered in the matrix as such A brief explanation of the matrix is given below, moving down the rows in the table, i.e. from impacts at the reservoir site to international impacts.
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Table 24 Distributional Analysis of the Orange River Development Project
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In terms of the effects of flooding the reservoir area the expropriations around Gariep Dam appear to have gone off smoother and the sums of money paid appeared to have been more generous. Later, once the Governments financial situation became more constrained, attitudes towards farmers affected by Van der Kloof dam seem to have hardened and compensation was not as generous. In this context compensation was paid to these farmers but as this was simply a transfer to enable them to purchase additional lands it is not considered as a gain in the matrix. To a few Coloured and Black farm workers who managed to move to townships, the severity of conditions experienced compared to those on the farms may have diminished. But in terms of access to basic services and living conditions, the families remaining faced serious economic, social and health hardships. The level of morbidity and mortality on the farms was low (based on interviews with health workers who visited the farm worker families regularly in the past) compared to the townships from the 1960s to early 1980s. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the number of affected families probably came to just over 200. Findings on the distributional consequences of downstream ecosystem impacts from the ORDP were limited by the availability of baseline data. However, the emergence of a persistent blackfly problem has negatively affected farms with livestock production downstream and has also negatively affected the recreation industry, particularly in the Augrabies Falls National Park, as the flies have greatly harassed visitors. No impacts on downstream fisheries were specifically identified but this is not conclusive, particularly as considerable modification of downstream riverine habitat and changes in flow quality occurred as a consequence of the project. Property owners and farmers downstream clearly received benefits from the flood control function of the upstream dams. While the tourism and recreation industry along the river has prospered this can only partially be attributed to the ORDP. Specifically the creation of new lakes and the regulation of flow were identified as beneficial to the growth of the tourism industry. Indirect economic benefits are likely to flow from tourism, although more data on the structure of the local industry would be needed to assess whether the benefits remain in the area or leak out to major urban centers. In the basin context the primary beneficiaries are those farmers who have obtained water from the ORDP for irrigation. In addition, the average number of farms declined by 25% but average farm sizes increased by about 7% and thus the recurrent direct benefits of irrigation accrued to a smaller number of beneficiaries. It is also likely that White farmers were the predominant beneficiaries in this category and Coloured farmers benefited very little, if at all, but data constraints limit further inferences from being drawn out at this time. Since Blacks were not allowed to legally own land, they certainly did not benefit directly from the irrigation supplied by the ORDP. Coloureds and a small number of Blacks, however, did benefit from regular and seasonal jobs created by the ORDP because farm jobs declined less in the ORDP, where at least 4500 regular jobs have been created or saved in downstream areas and 40,000 in the basin as a whole. The inter-basin transfers enable a number of groups in the Fish-Sundays basin to benefit from Orange River water and the ORDP. Irrigators are a prime beneficiary, but municipalities and firms using water for urban and industrial uses have also gained through the project. Indirect impacts in agricultural processing are likely to be found in the two basins affected by the project, as well as at the national level. Spill-over benefits may also be generated for the Fish-Sundays basin due to the availability of water for industrial and urban use. Note that the only negative distributional impacts for those stakeholders in the Fish-Sundays basin are the user fees assessed on irrigation farmers. Little in the way of negative social, ecosystem or biodiversity impacts can be expected to affect the basin either. At the national level, South Africans interested in recreational activities, nature tourism and conservation were affected both positively and negatively by changes in ecosystem function and biodiversity. In terms of biodiversity, South Africa lost two species of mayfly from the ORDP.
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The South African consumers as a whole (to the extent that they had purchasing power) may have experienced indirect effects from the increase in agricultural production supplied by the ORDP, even though the schemes total contribution to national agricultural production was small. However, consumers may have paid a higher cost because of South African Agricultural Policy, which set minimum prices for some of these agricultural products. With the limited information that was available, it also seems that the South African power system was provided a key source of peaking power from the ORDP. One of the potential benefits generated in this regard would be the avoidance of emissions from coal plants that might have effects on human health, agriculture, property, etc. These, and indeed, all of the benefits however came at considerable cost to the government purse. As noted earlier, the study did not estimate the degree of cost recovery attained under the project but it would appear to be minimal, implying that the costs of capital investments, operations and maintenance, and resettlement were borne largely by the government and, therefore, implicitly by the larger tax-paying South African public. At the supra-national level the figure includes Namibia as a basin country simply to note that there may be impacts on Namibia as the Orange River forms the border between the two nations before emptying into the Atlantic Ocean. Finally, the global community benefited from the avoided thermal emissions that can be attributed to the hydropower generated by the ORDP and the increased nature tourism opportunities. On the negative side, tourists are affected by the blackfly and international conservation interests by the loss of species. The ORDP produced a number of results that went counter to those expected and a number of these have distributional consequences. For example, the predominantly White farmers who were targeted to benefit from the irrigation supplied by the ORDP prospered during the initial decade of project operation but were less fortunate the following decade. These farmers enjoyed a real increase in gross margins of about 16% between 1971 and 1981, but a decrease of approximately 40% up to 1993. The decline in the $/Rand exchange rate influenced the profitability of these increasingly capital intensive operations because of the need to purchase imported machinery. On the other hand, these farmers were given a large subsidy in that they were charged approximately 25% of the capital, operation and maintenance costs of the ORDP irrigation works. The 1962/3 and 1964/5 White Papers envisioned that increases in demand for municipal and industrial water supply, particularly in the Fish-Sundays basin, would be met by a curtailment of the irrigation component of the ORDP. Likewise, increases in demand for irrigation on the upper portion of the Orange River were to be met by the curtailment of releases for power generation from Van der Kloof dam. The decline in hydropower due to increasing irrigation demands since operations began has not been as large as was originally expected. Whereas a total irrigation area of 310,000 hectares was predicted in the 1962/3 White Paper, the total command area actually developed is approximately 138,000, leaving more water available for hydropower production. Thus, the intended beneficiaries of irrigation benefited less than was anticipated while the intended beneficiaries of hydropower have benefited for a longer period of time than was originally expected. Findings on Distributional Effects: White farmers already settled or subsequently settled in the ORDP command areas benefited greatly from the irrigation supplied by the project while bearing very little of the costs as a result of highly subsidised water rates. However, the increased incidence of blackfly did cause damage to those farmers with livestock, White farmers who lost their lands to submergence were fairly compensated for their economic losses (more for Gariep than Van der Kloof) but did not receive payment for the psychological costs associated with relocation, Coloured farmers who were settled on the lands set aside for them on the command areas of the ORDP are likely to have benefited from the irrigation supplied to their farms,
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The Coloured and Black farm workers were not compensated for being displaced as a result of the ORDP, Some Coloured and Blacks who may or may not have been those displaced by the project benefited by securing employment in the jobs generated by the increased agricultural production contributed to by the increased supply of irrigation from the ORDP, The recreation industry benefited from the business opportunities generated by the new recreation resources created by the scheme but some businesses were negatively affected by the increased incidence of blackfly, Municipalities and industries in the basin most likely benefited from the water supplied by the ORDP although the access of different municipalities, social groups, and industries to the water supplied was not determined, The South African population as a whole benefited from the increased agricultural production, added supply of peaking power, and recreational opportunities generated by the ORDP but also bore most of the schemes financial costs, The global community benefited from the thermal emissions avoided by the generation of hydropower by the ORDP.
For Further Investigation: Additional data collection on actual beneficiaries of water supply, power, flood control benefits from the ORDP over time, Further examination of direction and amounts of cross-subsidisation among irrigation, power and water supply for costs of the ORDP
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5. Options-Assessment and the Decision-making Process

This chapter offers an examination of the options-assessment and decision-making process that shaped the planning and implementation of the ORDP. It also provides further explanation for the findings identified in Chapters 3 and 4. First the ORDP is placed in its historical context, and the chapter is then divided into sections based on temporal periods that closely mirror the stages of the project cycle: planning and appraisal, design and construction, operation and monitoring. Although the broader policy frameworks that conditioned the planning, implementation, and outcomes of the ORDP are referred to where necessary in this chapter, further elaboration of these changing criteria and guidelines is reserved for Chapter 6. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the key events and decisions that influenced the trajectory of the ORDP. Table 5.1: Chronology of the ORDP
Timeline of Context Events and Legislation Amended Land Settlement Act The Population Registration Act and Group Areas Act Increased majority for the NP in elections Water Act State of emergency following Sharpeville Cabinet committee for ORDP appointed Commission of Inquiry into Water Matters Large flood Commission of Inquiry into Water Matters Third Supplementary Report on the ORDP Social and concerns stated environmental Year 1929 1944 1950 1953 1956 1960 1962 1963 1966 1967, 1969 1970, 1971 1972 1974 1975 1976 1977 1979 Early 1980s 1984 Announcement of ORDP Timeline of Important Developments in the History of the Orange River Bloeberg Dam completed
Cabinet approval for construction of Van der Kloof Dam Gariep Dam completed Construction started on Van der Kloof Dam Orange-Fish Tunnel completed First phase of Tugela-Vaal completed Second two 80MW hydropower sets installed at Gariep Van der Kloof Dan completed; two 100MW hydro power sets installed Publication of the first book on regulated rivers Usutu-Vaal Tunnel completed South Africa becoming aware of the need for environmental water allocation to regulated rivers. This awakening was heightened by the multi-disciplinary Limnological Society Conference Water Year + Ten, and Then?, held at Rhodes University in July 1980 Memorandum of Agreement signed between DWAF and Eskom on hydropower and water releases Publication of report on first assessment of water requirement for the Orange River Mouth. This report was commissioned by the DWAF and carried out by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in order to determine possible effects of the proposed LHWP on the mouth Steering committee created in Pretoria to conduct Orange River Environment Impact Study driven by impending LHWP and awareness of the serious lack of knowledge on the systems
1985 Commission of Inquiry into the Management of Water Resources in the RSA Seventh Supplementary Report on the ORDP 1986, 1987
1988, 1989, 1990
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1991 1994 White Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation Policy Water legislation Growth, Employment, and Reconstruction Strategy (GEAR) 1995
ecology First ever workshop on instream-flow requirements of rivers held at Skukuza, Kruger National Park Appearance of the first critique of IBTs with special reference to the LHWP and the Orange River, amongst others (Petitjean & Davies, 1988) First IFR Workshop for the Orange River Mouth
1996 Constitution White Paper on a national water policy for SA Water Services Act National Water Act National Environmental Management Bill 1997
1998, 1999
Wetlands Conservation Bill National Water Utility Bill
1999
First IFR Workshop on the Orange River between Van der Kloof Dam and the mouth Orange River Mouth declared a Ramsar site Two Orange River Environmental Task Group (ORETG) meetings were held where new information came to light, criticism of the IFR settings from previous workshops were levelled, and a decision to hold another IFR workshop was taken Final IFR workshop and refinement of the previous IFR for the whole of the Orange River downstream of Van der Kloof The World Bank announced that further funding of LHWP requires an investigation of the environmental needs of entire Orange River Basin, per se. Since this had not yet been done for the river above the Gariep Dam (up to RSA/Lesotho border), a study team as set up and a workshop was planned Fourth IFR workshop. IFR workshop for the Orange River between the Lesotho border and Van der Kloof Dam; (also ROIPs for dam sites in this area). IFR study a requirement of the World Bank for continued funding of LHWP. The report documenting the outcome of this workshop was not available at the time of writing
5.1 Historical Context

Stone Age artefacts show that humans have populated the Orange River Basin for at least several hundreds of thousands of years (Smith, 1995). There is relatively strong consensus amongst ethnographic historians that the San, otherwise known as the Bushmen, are the aboriginal inhabitants of the area. The San were hunter-gatherers who lived on wild vegetation and game hunting. As water has always been central to human existence, so was the Gariep River (the San name for the Orange River) to the San. The availability of fish and water from the Orange River, as well as the adequacy of wild game and rich vegetation, determined the movement of the San along the Orange River Basin in family units. By the early part of the 18th century, the Khoisan (the Khoikhoi and San) numbers, as well as the Bantu tribes, had been greatly reduced by epidemics and intertribal strife. From that time, white colonists penetrated the entire region (Nel & Retie, 1952). This involved areas in possession of and used by the Khoikhoi, the San, and the Bantu tribes. Among the Bantu tribes, a few groups were almost exterminated and expelled by other tribes and the survivors obtained protection by entering the service of the border farmers. Voortrekkers north of the Orange River, which was, for the most part, uninhabited, met similar conditions. They found scattered native tribes, driven by the Matebele and other Bantu tribes, on the higher lying ridges and mountains where they had sought shelter from their enemies. Initially, white frontiersmen or trekboers only crossed the Orange River in times of drought to secure more grazing for their livestock. By the 1820s, however, these crossings had become seasonal and from 1825, they started to settle permanently across the Orange River. It was between the years 1825 and 1860, during extended periods of conflict, that the areas of Bethulie and Philippolis were first inhabited by trekkers and progressively divided up into discrete farms by them, thus displacing and subjugating the San and Khoikhoi in the process. During punitive expeditions, the farmers and their commandos systematically hunted down the San.
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Those San who were not hunted down and who did not succumb to foreign diseases like smallpox were absorbed into the burgeoning white dominated agricultural economy as farm labourers from the 1860s. Most of the white farms had a complement of San workers, many of them who were captured as children by the farmers. These people were the forebears of the present-day itinerant karretjie people and other coloured farmworkers, including people of Griqua origin, who still comprise the majority of the local population in all the districts along the Orange River to the west of Colesberg. With the declaration of the Orange River Sovereignty as a Boer republic in 1854, Boers were granted permission to buy farms in Griqua territory and this they promptly did from the increasingly impoverished Griqua people. However, some of these people continued to own land under white farmers title after the middle years of the 19th century (Davenport & Hunt, 1995). Subsequently, the 1913 Land Act and the 1936 Native Land Trust were two of the many pieces of legislation aimed to limit non-white land ownership. Under these two laws, lands that were considered to be of economic importance were reserved as white areas where black people were not allowed to subsist. Such areas inevitably included the long narrow stretch all along the Orange River Basin where the Khoisan once lived. Around this time, as early as the 1920s and 1930s, construction of labour-intensive, predominantly white irrigation settlements along the Vaal and lower Orange rivers were initiated. The idea may be traced back to 1928 when the administrative head of the Department of Irrigation (later to be renamed the Department of Water Affairs), Dr A. D. Lewis, proposed a scheme to link the Orange and Fish rivers by means of a tunnel. Although diversion projects to the Fish and Sundays rivers were revived on several occasions through the following decades, a major storage initiative was not seriously considered for the Orange River until the mid-1950s. Preliminary surveys and investigations including drilling for potential sites for dams were initiated in 1944 but did not yield any concrete options. Subsequently, a project to pump water from Lesotho, which at the time was still a protectorate of Britain, to the Orange Free State in South Africa was mooted around 1955. Both this project and the proposals for a Fish-Sundays River scheme were considered too costly to undertake at the time. However, the development of the entire Orange River increasingly became a priority for the government of South Africa by the late 1950s. A key to understanding the changing historical conditions that eventually gave rise to the ORDP is the period 194860, which has been characterised as the age of the social engineers (Davenport, 1977: 2576). While the policies during this period differed in degree and direction, rather than in kind (Davenport, 1977: 254) from those that had preceded them, they were pursued with an enthusiasm and systematic thoroughness that heralded a new period in South African history. This historical period marked the establishment of the foundations of apartheid, the political platform upon which the NP waged its campaign for the 1948 election in South Africa. The NP had won the 1948 election with a parliamentary majority of only five seats. Shortly after the election, it set about consolidating its hold on power. In 1949, whites in Namibia were given the right to elect six members to the South African parliament, and the rights of Indians in South Africa to elect parliamentary representatives was withdrawn. From 1951, the government began working towards the removal of coloureds in the Cape from the common voters roll. These measures, together with its manipulation of constituency boundaries, ensured an increased majority for the NP in the 1953 elections. When the NP came to power in 1948, half of its members of parliament were drawn from agricultural backgrounds (Greenberg, 1980:88). As an important part of its subsequent 1953 election campaign, the NP courted white farmers, who were experiencing labour shortages and rising agricultural wages as a result of the large-scale urbanisation of the non-white population.1 The NP promised to curb this black urbanisation, and offered farmers state support, including higher prices for their products.
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Within three years of the NPs coming to power, the maize price increased by 50%, allowing the doubling of farm profits (Greenberg, 1980:89). In addition to the political importance of white agricultural interests to the NP, commercial agriculture was also of importance to Afrikaner business people and urban elites both as consumers of manufactured products and as a source of capital. For example, agricultural savings were increasingly used by financial institutions such as Volkskas and Sanlam to finance Afrikaner businesses during this period (Pampallis, 1991: 177). By the end of the 1950s, the ORDP would come to be seen as a means to support white commercial agriculture and thereby key constituencies of the NP. With the NPs progressive hold on government, state intervention into the economy also increased. The NP government pursued economic policies that can be best described as economic nationalism. The aim was to defend the integrity of the state whilst at the same time ensuring better living standards and improved welfare among key constituencies such as white farmers and Afrikaner business people. The government poured substantial sums of money into the agricultural sector through drought relief, investments in irrigation, and a plethora of subsidies and tax relief schemes for the benefit of white farmers. In line with the increasing promotion of decentralised industrial development within the country, Afrikaner business people benefited from protectionist trade policies, lucrative government contracts, appointments to official economy boards, and incentives to locate outside existing industrial areas. South African mining houses also started investing heavily in manufacturing and an additional boost was given to the economy by the development of the newly discovered Orange Free State gold fields. The ORDP was both shaped and contributed to this set of economic policies promoted and implemented by the NP government. The consolidation of political and economic power by the NP and its constituencies, however, was being persistently threatened on two fronts. On the one hand, these developments took place alongside increasing protest and resistance from black political groups and trade unions. Before 1948, the liberation movement had experienced almost a decade of growth in size, militancy and level of organisation (Pampallis, 1991: 180). The coming to power of the NP, with its more explicit racial policies, and the nationalist governments implementation of repressive laws, increasingly compelled the African National Congress (ANC) and other related organisations towards an even more militant stand. Throughout the 1950s, various protest campaigns and other actions were taken against the increasingly repressive apartheid policies and structures. These included the boycotts associated with the campaign against the Bantu Education System, the Congress of the People in 1955, the formation of the South African Trade Union Council (SACTU), as well as a series of protest actions by communities (both urban and rural) and the ANC Womens League. The NP government responded to these pressures with a series of draconian actions culminating in the shootings of protesters at Sharpeville, Langa, and Nyanga in March 1960, the institution of a state of emergency, and the banning of the ANC and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in April 1960. Laws specifically aimed at restricting political activity, including the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953, and the 1953 Public Safety Act, were also passed. Restrictive laws were imposed on black and coloured peoples vagrancy, pass, poll tax, master and servants laws, compulsory services, etc. In addition, those blacks and coloureds still owning or possessing land in white areas were finally forced out by the Group Areas Act of 1960. The blacks and coloureds moved from the position of possession of lands to sharecropping to land tenancy to wage labour. This included those located in the Orange River Basin. Thus, by the time the ORDP was initiated, virtually all non-whites in the schemes command areas had been dispossessed of their lands and rights. However, mass protests against the proposed ORDP did not occur.
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On the other hand, the rise of the NP government and corresponding apartheid policies had resulted in increasing pressures from outside South Africa. The growth of anti-colonial movements after World War II and the granting of independence to African colonies in the 1950s and 1960s not only raised the hopes of the opposition in South Africa, but also changed the international context, making white domination less acceptable to the international community. The various domestic protests also drew international attention to racial domination in South Africa and attracted condemnation in the United Nations. In particular, the massacres at Sharpeville and in the Cape in 1960 (and their aftermath) attracted strong international attention and condemnation. Even before Sharpeville some foreign investors had become nervous that the South African government would not be able to contain the growth of resistance and had begun withdrawing their investments. After Sharpeville, this process accelerated, and between January 1960 and May 1961, gold and foreign exchange reserves dropped by 51% (Pampallis, 1991: 214). In a bid to stem the outflow of capital, the South African government introduced tighter currency and trade controls in 1961. Early in 1962, Prime Minister Verwoerd announced that the Transkei bantustan would be granted self-government in the following year. An underlying intention of this move was to counteract international criticism of the NP governments policies. South Africas progressive international isolation and the increasing outflow of capital from the country were instrumental in the decision to embark upon the ORDP. A triggering objective of the scheme was clearly the desire to restore international confidence in South Africa in the aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and the political repression that followed it, as well as South Africas withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961. Besides demonstrating that South Africa was capable of undertaking a scheme of this magnitude, the ORDP also provided considerable opportunities for co-operation with foreign governments and business interests. Internally, the ORDP was in line with the government policies of economic nationalism and satisfied several of the NPs key constituencies. The governments support for agriculture and thus white farmers was clearly served by the scheme. It provided major opportunities for South African firms as well as employment for both skilled and unskilled (primarily white) workers.2 The government of the day also saw the ORDP as being important for attracting and supporting industry and white settlement into the region as part of its plan for decentralising development. Thus, it was at the beginning of this period of economic nationalism and suppression of political opposition within the country, sometimes referred to as the golden age of apartheid, that the ORDP was planned and executed. Within its historical context, the scheme can be seen as one expression of the increasing confidence of the NP.3 The ORDP was also understood to be a monument in the grand scheme of apartheid and an important symbol of Afrikaner nationalism.4 Findings on Historical Context: Some proposals for water resource projects in the Orange River Basin were proposed from the 1920s but were considered too costly to implement through the 1950s. Development of the Orange River became more of a priority after the successive electoral victories of the NP in 1948 and 1953. The ORDP was in line with the NP governments interventionist policies of economic nationalism and satisfied several of the NPs key constituencies. In particular, the governments support for white farmers and agriculture as well as decentralised industrial development was clearly served by the scheme. The decision to embark on the ORDP was triggered by the objective of the government to stem the outflow of capital from the country that was the result of the increasing domestic resistance and international criticism against South Africas apartheid policies.
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The decision to embark on the ORDP was also motivated by the NP governments goal of building a political symbol to Afrikaner nationalism and a monument to the grand scheme of apartheid. Non-white peoples in the Orange River Basin and across South Africa had been almost completely dispossessed of their lands and rights by the time of the sanctioning of the ORDP.
For Further Investigation: Additional research is required on the options assessed and studies should be undertaken on the development of the Orange River Basin before 1960. Additional research is required on the relative importance of objectives not stated in the planning documents of the ORDP, such as the halting of capital flight from the country and the goal of building a symbol for the apartheid system.
5.2 Planning and Appraisal

The NP government of South Africa requested that the DWA prepare a plan for the ORDP that would contribute to the goals it had set for South Africa.5 Although many dams had been constructed in South Africa by the early 1960s, the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams were larger and more technically challenging than any that had previously been envisioned (see Figure 5.2). Table 5.2: Number of Dams Commissioned in South Africa (by decade)
Number of Dams Commissioned (By Decade in 1900s) in South Africa

150
125 124
Number of Dams
100
61
104
50 0
7
to 1910
11
26
22
44 15
191019
192029
193039
194049
195059
196069
197079
198089
The DWAs hurriedly prepared planning document was submitted to the senate and parliament in 1962, a year after South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth and became a republic under the leadership of Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, the grand architect of apartheid. Because of the scale of the ORDP, it was proposed that the scheme would be planned in phases so that the appropriate changes could be made as implementation proceeded. The 1962/3 White Paper correspondingly outlined the objectives, predicted benefits and costs, as well as components planned for each of six phases of the ORDP. But given the rapidity with which the scheme was planned, few of the assumptions and baseline information underlying the proposals included in the White Paper were thoroughly examined. On the one hand, quite extensive treatments of projected water requirements (or water demand) for irrigation, municipal and industrial supply were offered. On the other hand, the suitability of soils in the command areas for irrigated agriculture was not adequately investigated, the impact of price changes or inflation was not included in the analysis of the schemes financial or economic viability, and environmental impacts were not assessed.6
199099
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A somewhat incomplete White Paper was submitted to parliament as part of the vote on the total national budget but the ORDP was still viewed as one of the few positive developments against a rather gloomy picture of the immediate future of the country due to international threats and domestic black resistance. During his 1962 budget speech, in which he announced an allocation of R2 million for the ORDP, the then Minister of Finance stated: The Orange River, Mr. Speaker, is one of our most valuable assets, and yet by reason of the large variations in its flow from year to year and from season to season ... it causes periodic flood damage. Moreover, 80 per cent of its water runs unused into the sea. By the turn of the present century our population will have doubled. This calls for a steady expansion of food production. Likewise rural development, the decentralisation of industry, and the provision of rail transport facilities will generate an increasing demand for electric power. The need for harnessing the Orange and utilising its great potential is obvious. Because of the extensive lobbying that had taken place for providing relief to eastern Cape farmers by linking the Fish and Orange rivers, in addition to the domestic and international compulsions mentioned above, the parliamentary debate on the ORDP was relatively limited. Long before 1962, the local authority of Port Elizabeth in the eastern Cape had been pleading for a link between the Orange and the Fish and Sundays rivers to augment their water provision. This request was realised through the Orange-Fish-Sundays River component of the ORDP. In parliament, the opposition United Party found itself in a difficult position because some of its leaders had been actively involved in the lobbying for the project in the first place. Opposition members raised questions about the planning and economic rationale of the ORDP, but carefully avoided directly challenging the scheme itself.7 The ORDP was thus approved as rapidly as it was planned, and permission was given for the implementation of the first phase of the scheme at a cost of R85 million. Because the comprehensive scheme of six phases would take a number of decades to be completed and its total cost was more than what was feasible for the government to commit itself to at the time, parliament only approved implementation of phase 1 of the ORDP. Calculations in the White Paper also convinced many members of parliament that the government would recover some of the investment over time. It was assumed that the growth in agricultural production would enable irrigation farmers to pay adequate levies and that the country would earn foreign exchange (DWA, 1963: 18). From rates alone, the DWA expected to earn R2.59 million per year when the project was completed (Stallebras, 1963: 454). Furthermore, Eskom was to carry the cost of the hydroelectric power installations. Any amounts paid by Eskom would be paid into the general revenue account and thus back to the government. Parliament therefore accepted the responsibility of providing the necessary funding through the Loan Fund and partly through loan facilities provided by the international consultants that would tender for the construction (DWA, 1963: 36).8 Ownership of the ORDP was vested in government by declaring the full project area a government Water Control Area. Provision was made for supporting enabling legislation, such as the application of the 1935 Land Settlement Act (amended in 1949) for the settlement of white farmers in the new irrigation areas. Besides the DWA, several other departments were involved in the scheme, eg Lands, Bantu Administration and Development, Agricultural Technical Services, Agricultural Economics and Marketing, Commerce and Industry, and Mines, as well as the Geological Survey Office. After the approval of phase 1 of the ORDP by parliament, it was referred back to the DWA for implementation. Because the 1962/3 White Paper was incomplete in a number of areas, the next two years were used for further planning. Much time was initially spent on additional technical investigations such as drilling, geological testing, demand calculations, flooding estimates and land acquisition that had not been completed before the appraisal and authorisation of the ORDP.
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Most of this detailed planning was supervised by DWA, although the actual work was contracted out to consultants. For example, a consortium of three private South African and two French consulting firms was hired to complete the planning and design of the projects. The first assessments of these consultants revealed a large underestimation of costs in the original proposal. As one of the consultants later wrote, one thing that puzzled us in London was the fact that the estimates of cost seemed to be on the low side (Olivier, 1975: 110). It also became clear that DWA did not have the human resources to manage the planning process and thus 37 engineers and 10 technicians had to be recruited from overseas (DWA, 1964: 4). Other additional investigations were conducted through interdepartmental and technical committees, such as the Water Commission. In terms of Sections 62 and 63 of the 1956 Water Act, a cabinet committee for the ORDP was appointed in 1963. This committee was supported by an Advisory Council for the ORDP, consisting of specialists from the following departments: Water Affairs, Agricultural Economics and Marketing, Agricultural Technical Services, Transport, Finance, Countries,9 and Trade and Industry, as well as the Industrial Development Corporation, the departments of Planning, Coloured Affairs, and Community Development, and the provincial administrations of the Cape and Orange Free State. Eskom as the national electricity supplier was also represented. The Advisory Council was supported by a Secretariat and the following technical committees: Work Camps, Labour, Dam Walls, Coloured Resettlement, Geological Surveys, Tourism, Transport, and Research. The Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom) was the national electricity provider serving all authorities and users that did not have their own electricity supply system. In terms of Section 67(2) of the Water Act of 1956, Eskom was provided with the option of developing and distributing marketable hydroelectric power from Government Water Works. From the outset, the hydroelectric stations proposed for the ORDP were designed for the supply of peak power to offset thermal generation. Eskom used this opportunity to become a major stakeholder in the ORDP from its inception and remained part of the departmental management group. The DWA was to fund the costs of the water works, dams, and canals, while Eskom would build and equip all power stations and transmission infrastructure. At the time of project planning, South Africa was isolated politically and economically and had to produce oil products synthetically from coal as it the country did not have domestic oil or gas deposits. This made oil-fired gas turbines for peaking operation very expensive. The Gariep and Van der Kloof hydropower stations therefore were ideal candidates for peaking operation. The 1962/3 White Paper stated that: the hydro-electric power thus created will be fed into a grid or network which will be interconnected to thermal power stations ..., [and] peaks in power demand in a thermal network can only be met by firing additional boilers intermittently, which is wasteful and expensive, whereas such peaks can readily be met at low cost by arranging suitable water releases from storage through the turbines of hydro-electric power installations. The hydro-electric power which is generated will, therefore be very useful in helping to supply hourly, daily and weekly peak power in the grid system. The ORDP itself also needed power for the pumping of water for irrigation and water supply. It was recognised that this would offer an additional opportunity for exercising economy in that power for pumping could be taken at periods of low demand in the grid system and high-rated hydro-electric power could be fed back into the system at peak periods. Estimating an increased demand for power in the very near future, in 1963 Eskom convinced the cabinet committee to raise the elevation of Gariep and Van der Kloof dams immediately rather than during the second phase of the project as originally proposed in the 1962/3 White Paper. The Supplementary Report, published in 1964/5, proposed that the two dams would be increased in height
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by 60ft and 40ft respectively, which would increase fourfold the power generation potential at the two dams during the first three phases of the project. This planning change directly contributed to the first large increase in the cost of phase 1 of the scheme. The additional capital costs were projected at R33.3 million plus an additional R25 million over 40 years for interest and redemption. It was estimated that these costs would be recovered by additional revenue. The Department of Lands was involved with the ORDP through its Settlement Programmes for Whites in the 1950s and 1960s. Although most of the lands were allocated for white families, the Department of Lands expected to settle about 1 300 white families and 600 coloured families in the command areas of the scheme. It appears that the large land-owning white families that were displaced were not consulted nor did they participate in the planning of the scheme. They were offered what was deemed to be the market value for their lands based on the Water Act of 1956. At least a few of these families took the Department of Lands to court but it does not seem as if any of them was awarded redress. Coloured and black people affected by the project were not even officially informed about the scheme and its effects. Indeed, public participation in the planning of the ORDP was not extensive in general. Stakeholders made recommendations with regard to technical and non-technical matters, such as the importance of archaeological sites or the need for a single project authority, at the 1963 Orange River Development Conference, which was organised by the South Africa Association for the Advancement of Science (Biesheuvel, 1963: 309). Delegates at the conference agreed that there was a need to re-examine more fully the economic implications of the scheme with special reference to the relative value of water utilisation for a variety of purposes under the headings of agricultural, pastoral, hydro-electric, industrial, regional development (Biesheuvel, 1963: 306). They also pleaded for the establishment of an Orange River Development Authority, which would be similar to those that were established for the Tennessee Valley and Snowy River developments (Biesheuvel, 1963: 309). The effect of public involvement in the planning of the ORDP, when it did occur, was even more limited. For example, although the DWA delivered several papers at the Orange River Development Conference, it appears that the department implemented only those recommendations that fitted its technological approach, eg the ones on systems analysis, economic implications of the scheme, financial planning according to national fiscal capacity, labour recruitment, and soil conservation. Some attention was paid to recommendations on the need for botanical, biological, and archaeological surveys but little notice was taken of issues such as the development of coloured communities, postgraduate training schemes, public health, and recreation. Moreover, the suggestion that an Orange River Development Authority should be established was rejected and it was decided that control over the ORDP would remain vested in the national government, with the DWA as the lead institution responsible for its management. Findings on Planning and Appraisal: The initial planning of the ORDP was conducted by the DWA to meet the various goals set for South Africa by the NP government. Because of the rapidity with which the 1962/3 planning proposal was assembled, many of the baseline surveys were cursorily conducted and few of the planning assumptions were thoroughly examined. The ORDP was a much more complex dam scheme than had been previously promoted by the government of South Africa and was planned to be completed over six phases. After minimal debate, the South African parliament quickly authorised implementation of only the first phase of the ORDP at a cost of R85 million. A cabinet committee comprising all the government departments with a stake in the ORDP was established to co-ordinate the planning and implementation of the scheme after implementation of the first phase was approved by parliament.
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The rapidity with the which the ORDP was initially planned, as well as the complexity of scheme, resulted in the need for further detailed planning on the scheme after it was approved and the need to hire private domestic and foreign consultants to assist with additional investigations on the scheme. Based on more complete planning after parliamentary approval of the ORDP, the national electricity utility (Eskom) persuaded the cabinet committee to raise the heights of both the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams immediately to meet increasing power demand within South Africa. Although only R85 million was allocated to implement the first phase of the ORDP by parliament in 1962/3, the design changes proposed by Eskom and more detailed planning resulted in a significant increase in the cost of the scheme. The people affected by the ORDP were given limited information and their participation in the planning and appraisal of the project was limited.
For Further Investigation: Additional investigation is required of the planning assumptions and baseline information upon which the ORDP was formulated. Additional investigation is needed on the appraisal parliamentary debate on the 1962/3 White Paper. Additional investigation is required on public participation in the planning of the ORDP.
5.3 Detailed Design and Construction

A series of design modifications were made through eight successive White Papers prepared by the DWA during the implementation of the ORDP because of the complexity of the scheme and the rapidity with which the original plans had been assembled. Because the DWA submitted these subsequent proposals as amendments to the first phase of the scheme, it was not required to go back to parliament for further approvals. This enabled the Minister of Water Affairs to make decisions on additional funding through his general budget and little debate on the ORDP took place in parliament after 1962/3. Each application for additional funding was prepared by the DWA and integrated into the departmental budget for parliament. The amendments to the original design of the scheme in these White Papers often contributed to delays in construction. Two international consortiums of private South African and several French and British firms were appointed to work on the two dams because South Africa did not have sufficient local technical capacity to implement the ORDP. But rather than allocating one dam to each consortium, both were commissioned to undertake a part of the construction on each dam (Olivier, 1975: 113). All design and implementation decisions thus had to be negotiated as the consortiums disagreed on virtually all aspects. According to one of the consortium managers, One thing we had in common. We all disagreed with the White Paper designs for dams (Olivier, 1975: 113). As subsequent expenditures were projected for the various components of the ORDP, it became clear that original cost estimates were too low, and progress in construction depended on the availability of more funds. The reasons for the increases in costs provided by the DWA were as follows: (i) design changes to the overall scheme and various components of the project resulting from more complete planning and appraisal; (ii) schedule overruns with unaccounted for increases in construction and labour costs; and (iii) the need to address unexpected events and mitigate unexpected impacts of the scheme. An example of the first reason is the R45 million that was added to expenditures because of the 1964/5 decision to raise the heights of Gariep and Van der Kloof dams in the first stage of construction. The DWAs second Supplementary Report of 1968 subsequently reported the considerable underestimation of costs for the two major dams and the Orange-Fish Tunnel because additional expenditure on foreign technical assistance was required. The fact that the 1962/3 White Paper had
82
not included estimates for inflation almost brought construction on the Orange-Fish Tunnel component to a halt when the consortiums realised that they would incur huge financial losses if they continued. It was only after this third White Paper in 1968 that tenders for the Orange-Fish Tunnel were finally awarded. Originally, simultaneous construction of both Gariep and Van der Kloof had also been envisaged. But, because of a shortage of funds after the initiation of the ORDP in 1962/3, it was only in 1969 that the South African government finally decided to proceed with the Van der Kloof Dam and tenders for construction were invited. As the lowest tender was R7 million higher than available funds, the DWA decided to act as the construction manager itself in 1971. Consequently, a large number of new staff had to be appointed, which delayed construction and further increased the costs of the scheme. Another R18.5 million was added to expenditures on the ORDP with the addition of the Wellbedacht Dam/Caledon River Scheme in 1968/9, which was found to be more economical than the originally planned pumping station at the Gariep Dam. Design changes to the Van der Kloof Canals and FishSundays works were initiated as a result of more in-depth soil investigations and a new criteria after 1970 that irrigation projects should demonstrate a positive benefit/cost ratio (see Section 3.2 in Chapter 3 on projected and actual design changes). These design changes, along with rising labour, materials, and transport costs, as well as the additional work required to address the problem of large quantities of water found in the Orange Fish Tunnel, increased the total projected expenditure on the project to R385 million in 1971/2. Unexpected impacts and events required further design changes and mitigation measures that increased the costs of the ORDP. Approximately R16 million was allocated to address unexpected bank erosion problems due to more rapid water inflow from the Orange-Fish Tunnel scheme into the Sundays River Catchment during the mid-1970s. Severe droughts in the 1980s resulted in recommendations in 1990 for further additions to the ORDP, especially for the eastern Cape and Port Elizabeth, at a cost of R107 million. In addition, as mentioned in Section 3.11 on ecological impacts in Chapter 3, the blackfly infestation that was conditioned by the impoundment of the Orange River required mitigation measures. This escalation of costs made the ORDP increasingly unattractive to a South African government that was struggling with progressively circumscribed financial resources during the 1970s. Economic indicators for the period 196280 suggest that whilst the 1960s were a period of rapid economic growth and improving living standards in South Africa, the 1970s (especially during the latter part of the decade) were characterised by falling gross domestic product growth, less impressive sectoral growth in production, rising inflation, and a dramatic drop in the growth of investment (GDFI). Findings on Design and Construction: More detailed planning and appraisal, as well as the discovery of more economically viable alternatives, resulted in design changes and additions to the ORDP during construction. Increases in costs on the scheme are attributable to unplanned design changes, the need for foreign technical assistance with construction, an underestimation of costs, partly due to the noninclusion of inflation estimates in original planning projections, and unexpected costs for mitigation measures. Shortfalls in funding to meet rising costs resulted in further delays of the ORDP. Because design changes and rising costs were considered amendments to the original authorisation given for phase 1 of the ORDP, no further parliamentary debate was required for increasing expenditures on the scheme. Design changes and shortfalls in funding led to schedule overruns during construction of the ORDP.
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5.4 Operations and Monitoring

The 1962/3 and 1964/5 White Papers envisioned that increases in demand for municipal and industrial water supply from the ORDP would be met by a curtailment of the irrigation component of the scheme. Likewise, increases in demand for irrigation were to be met by the curtailment of releases for power generation. But the decline in hydropower due to increasing irrigation demands since operations began in the 1970s has not been as large as was originally expected. Whereas a total irrigation area of 310 000ha was predicted in the 1962/3 White Paper, the total command area actually developed is approximately 138 000, which leaves more water available for hydropower production. On the other hand, operations directed towards prioritising municipal water supply and social objectives such as job creation have increased during the 1980s and 1990s. Part of the reason for the continued prioritisation of the power component of the ORDP after commissioning was that the government increasingly set industrial development as a greater priority over agricultural production in the 1970s. A progressive focus on cost-recovery further undermined irrigation and water supply objectives as collecting levies from farmers and consumers was quite difficult. Finally, further studies of soil quality and new cost/benefit analysis resulted in the decision that some of the original command areas of the ORDP were not suitable for irrigated agriculture. The South African government progressively focused on the problem of unemployment and the most economic ways to generate jobs from 1980. As these economic factors increasingly formed the basis for assessment, the ORDP project was reformulated to accommodate the following principles: The highest possible yield per unit of water should be applied. There should be a balanced apportionment of water among the various consumer sectors. Only soils with high production potential were considered for new irrigation development. Water rates would be levied on a sliding scale to cover at least the operating costs of the ORDP.
A major external assessment of the ORDP was subsequently commissioned by the DWA. In 1988, the DWA commissioned the Orange River System Analysis, of which the first results were tabled in 1992. This assessment was primarily of a technical nature, and it assessed water inflow, abstraction and distribution, as well as infrastructure and demand. One finding was that by the year 2020 the potential demand for water from the Orange River in South Africa would by far exceed supply. The need for a comprehensive replanning of the ORDP was thus confirmed. Considering that the last overall reappraisal of the ORDP occurred during the early 1970s, the DWA commissioned the Orange River Development Project Replanning Study (ORRS) in 1994. The ORRS updated the Orange River Systems Analysis between 1994 and 1998, simultaneously with the Vaal River Augmentation Planning Study. The ORRS is the most comprehensive assessment study undertaken of water supply schemes in the Orange River Basin since the 1962/3 and 1964/5 White Papers. The investigation consisted of three components: an evaluation of the available resources that had already been used as well as an evaluation of options for future use; an evaluation of all water requirements and uses, and the efficiency of use; a reconciliation of the resource potential with the competing requirements for water.
The following development aspects were also assessed in the ORRS: water supply and demand, environmental water needs, regional planning and economics, water quotas, crops, water conservation, water pricing, social upliftment, and water rights. A multi-disciplinary consortium of consultants conducted the assessment. The team adopted an integrated biophysical and socio-economic approach. Public participation in the investigation was ensured through a wide consultation process, consisting of the following components:
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the ORRS Project Steering Committee, representing a broad cross-section of individuals from diverse disciplinary backgrounds; a reference group, consisting of representatives of many sectors, to assist the Steering Committee with the design of the public involvement process; workshops at national, regional, and local level; public forums and formal stakeholder meetings; communication through newsletters and the mass media.
The ORRS led to a number of recommendations, including: the building of additional dams at Vioolsdrift and Boskraai; increased water supply to Port Elizabeth; full cost-recovery of water; replacing water quotas with use allowances, the need for integrated management and operations of the ORDP and the LHWP.
The LHWP could be viewed as the latest extension of the ORDP for two reasons. Firstly, 15% of the Senqu River (the name of the Orange River in Lesotho) will be transferred to the Vaal River Basin, affecting the flow of the Orange River into Gariep and Van der Kloof. Secondly, the Orange River Basin and the Vaal River Basin are to be managed and operated in an integrated way. An extensive process of consultation also took place over the LHWP, which involved the governments of South Africa and Lesotho, various departments, and consulting engineers. The Minister of Water, Energy and Minerals of Lesotho and the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry of South Africa signed a treaty. In contrast to the ORDP, the LHWP treaty made provision for three autonomous governing bodies that would be responsible for implementation, operations, and maintenance: the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority for the project governance in Lesotho, the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority for South Africa, and the Permanent Joint Technical Committee to monitor the project. The treaty also describes in detail the agreements and arrangements for the project, including the funding that would be raised through international loans for which South Africa would provide guarantees. The total cost of the LHWP is estimated at $8 billion, of which $4 billion was allocated for phases 1A and 1B. The World Bank is lending $120 million for the first phase. Other funders are the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the African Development Bank, the European Development Fund, and commercial banks. The treaty and its four protocols concerning the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the project, caters for the large disparity in economic development between South Africa and Lesotho, while providing for South Africas financial and strategic interests, and the sharing of costs and savings. Financing and cost-recovery for the LHWP has been based primarily on the potential for revenue from electricity and water sales to the Witwatersrand (Gauteng) area in South Africa. From the beginning, continuous assessment was built into the LHWP project by the establishment of the Permanent Joint Technical Committee and by including terms of reference for assessment in the treaty. The assessment process included project management, finance, and social and environmental issues. Although no structured social or environmental impact assessment was conducted during the planning of phase 1A, this was corrected during implementation, as well as in the planning for Phase 1B. The latter phase includes a full social and environmental assessment programme, as well as resettlement and development components. Many interest groups commented on the LHWP, to a point where the Development Research Institute (DRI), a non-governmental organisation (NGO) representing 100 civic associations in Gauteng, formally opposed continued development of the project after Phase 1A. The DRI argued that the
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LHWP would lead to unjustified price increases for water. This could be prevented if the water was managed on the demand-side rather than by increasing supply. The DRI also argued that the scheme would impact negatively on the environment and inhabitants of Lesotho. It was estimated that about 30 000 people would be directly affected and it was pointed out that the resettlement arrangements were not being properly implemented, eg replacement housing was far behind schedule. The Rural Development Programme for the retraining of displaced people was said to be unsuccessful (Lorring, 1997). Although the World Bank inspector did not agree with the DRIs conclusions, the Bank appeared to be clearly aware of pitfalls in the management of the LWHP.10 Findings on Operations and Monitoring: A reappraisal was undertaken with the Orange River Systems Analysis between 1988 and 1992, which found that potential demand for water in the Orange River Basin would far exceed supply by the year 2020. The need for a comprehensive replanning exercise was thus confirmed. The ORRS, the most comprehensive assessment of the Orange River Basin and ORDP since the original planning efforts between 1960 and 1965, was undertaken between 1994 and 1998. The construction of the upstream LHWP, jointly planned by South Africa and Lesotho, will result in changes in the operation and effects of the ORDP. Trends towards greater public participation, stricter financial and economic analysis, as well as more in-depth examination of social and environmental issues in planning and optionsassessment can be gleaned from the decision-making processes around the ORDP and LHWP since the 1980s.
For Further Investigation: . Additional examination of the evolution in decision-making processes with respect to the operating rules of the ORDP is required. More in-depth analysis is needed of the decision-making linkages between the ORDP and other water resource activities in the Orange Basin and in particular with the LHWP. Additional examination of the Orange River Systems Analysis and the ORRS is needed.
Notes
1
World War II brought on a crisis in South African agriculture. The contradictions in labour tenancy, already apparent in the thirties, were exacerbated by wartime demand for agricultural products and the accelerating flight of African labour to the cities. But White farmers responded to the crisis, as they had in the past, not by generalising market relations, but by insisting on even more elaborate state measures to control the African rural population (Greenberg, 1980: 85). In the past, government contracts had been extensively used to foster the growth of Afrikaner capital, and with the inclusion of a large number of South African (as well as foreign) firms in the project team, it is likely that this was also the case with the ORDP. In the period leading up to the announcement of the ORDP, a government commission had recommended that a proposed irrigation scheme in the Pongola Valley should be completed before embarking on the Orange River scheme. On its own admission, the government decided to ignore this advice and to undertake both schemes at the same time. In addition, the government decided to think bigger in regard to the Orange River than had ever been done in the past and to look at the full possibilities of the Orange River. In a lengthy address to parliament in March 1962, Verwoerd highlighted the grand scale of the Orange River project proposed by his government. This, he maintained, was the image of a South Africa which is constantly growing. In the past 14 years we have actually brought into being a new State of which we can be proud, a country with a great future, a country which economically is as stable and as promising as it has hardly ever been before ... (Hansard, 29 March 1962: 3469). Through the years Afrikaner nationalism has evinced a strong attraction to the construction of massive monuments such as the Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria and the Afrikaans Language
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10
Monument in Paarl. During the budget debate of 1962, when the Orange River project was extensively discussed, the member of parliament for Kimberley North made explicit reference to the water scheme as a monument to nationalist rule. He maintained that although Verwoerd had been in office for only three and a half years, his government had already established three major monuments. These were the Republic of South Africa, the granting of self-government to the Transkei, and the harnessing of the waters of the Orange River (Hansard, 28 March 1962: 33923). The Departments name changed from the Department of Water Affairs to the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry in 1990. For example, project planning assumed a constant maize price of US$48/ton but between 1962 and 1975 the market price of maize rose to US$56/ton. On the other hand, over the same period consumer prices doubled, bringing the real maize price down to US$34 at 1962 prices or a decrease in real value of nearly 30%. Since then, the inflation was far higher, with the 1996/7 maize price in South Africa reaching US$121/tons. However, in 1962 prices, this equates to about US$29/tons. Thus, although inflation grew about 25 times over the 34 years to 1996/7, there was a real decline in prices of about 39%, although the reliability of census data for this analysis must also be questioned. Similarly, the 1964/5 White Paper proposal to raise the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams immediately was based on an assumed constant coal price of $3/ton. However, the actual price of coal increased dramatically over the years, which had a marked effect on the economic value of hydropower generated by the ORDP. Opposition spokesperson D. E. Mitchell used governments poor performance in the planning and execution of the Pongola-Makatini Flats scheme to raise questions about the planning and rationale of the ORDP. He also questioned the wisdom of expanding food production (a principle argument for the Orange River scheme) at a time when agricultural production was being subsidised at R34 million a year, and when agricultural surpluses were being exported at a loss (Hansard, 28 March 1962: 33843390). Interestingly the DWA representative at the 1963 ORDP conference emphasised the foreign contribution: ... the tenderers will be asked to offer loan facilities. This, it is expected, will finance the greater part of (this) stage (1) and the government of the Republic of South Africa will finance the balance by means of cash payment (Stallebras, 1963: 448). This department managed issues related to international relationships. Its inclusion shows an acceptance of the international implications of the scheme, something that is not really reflected in the 1962/3 White Paper (except for the international tenders). Report by E-G Guenther Groeder, Chairman Inspection Panel, 18 August 1998. See Lorring, 1997.
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6. Criteria and Guidelines: Policy Evolution and Compliance

The most important changes in criteria and guidelines that affected decision-making and outcomes of the ORDP occurred as a result of the recommendations of three new policy frameworks promulgated during the ORDP implementation process. These were the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Water Matters (1970), the Management of Water Resources in the Republic of South Africa (1986), and post-1994 water legislation. These documents highlight the gradual change from an emphasis on subsidisation to full cost recovery, from agricultural production to industrial development to employment creation, from technocratic to participatory decision-making, and from a technical approach to one that takes environmental and social issues into consideration that has occurred in South Africa since the early 1960s. Prior to 1956, the DWA focused on the regulation of irrigation schemes to farmers in river basins through the Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act of 1912.1 Where necessary, the government developed irrigation through government water schemes, while municipalities were responsible for obtaining their own water supply. Government had little control over the use of water (and probably little interest in direct control) as long as water resources were sufficient. Riparian farmers used river water for irrigation irrespective of the impact on users downstream. Where conflict around water use arose, cases were referred to the Water Court. The 1956 Water Act provided the legal and policy framework for the original ORDP proposal, and gave the Minister of Water Affairs extensive authority over the water scheme. It was in terms of Sections 62 and 63 of this Act that the White Paper proposing the ORDP as a government water scheme was submitted to the senate and parliament by the DWA. An attempt to statutorily recognise more user sectors than irrigation alone was made through the 1956 Water Act, as the use of water would now be linked to the public interest. The Minister had the power to define public interest, declare a Government Water Control Area in any river basin, appoint water boards, and initiate water schemes that would benefit the country as a whole. During the first few years after the Act was promulgated, irrigation was still considered a priority, although urban and industrial use were taken into consideration. In 1966, the state president appointed the Commission of Inquiry into Water Matters (the so-called Water Commission) to investigate the total water situation in South Africa. The commission made extensive recommendations, completely overhauling government policy on water resource management (DWA, 1986: 1.131.61). The 45 recommendations had a direct impact on decisionmaking with respect to the ORDP, and can be summarised as follows: increasing water rates on government irrigation schemes to recover costs; a more economic use of water to all sectors of the economy, with preference given to industry over agriculture; the application of cost/benefit analysis to determine the viability of new water projects; the development of conservation and water re-use strategies.
It is clear that over time the economic value of water became the dominant factor in water financial allocations. The recovery of at least the operating costs plus a part of the interest on and redemption of capital was one of the main recommendations by the Water Commission (DWA, 1972: 6). Because of these new criteria, moreover, several fundamental design changes were made to the ORDP (see Section 3.2 on design changes in Chapter 3). As economic criteria became more important to government, various stakeholders became more involved in decision-making with respect to the ORDP. For example, drafts of the policy document Management of Water Resources in the Republic of South Africa were submitted to all government
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departments and over 50 municipalities, unions, consultants, water boards, and research organisations during the early 1980s. The 1986 Management of Water Resources was not an official legislative document but did set out a new approach for water policy in South Africa. The many recommendations in the document formed the basis for the terms of reference in subsequent assessments of the ORDP, with specific attention given to: cost recovery; identification of the economic value of water; the reconciliation between water supply and demand; improved water management, including integrated catchment management.
The seventh Supplementary Report on the ORDP (1987), in which the ORDP was critically reviewed, reflected many of these changes. It proposed several new extensions to the ORDP with a detailed explanation of the economic justification of the proposal, referring primarily to job creation and boosting the local economy. Similarly, the eighth Supplementary Report on the Lower Sundays River scheme states that end-users will provide full cost recovery through their municipalities. Although irrigation remained a major objective, levies had to be increased. It was realised that the cost of irrigation exceeded the profits on agricultural production, and the emphasis was shifted to water supply for urban areas and industry through water boards and local authorities. After 1994, the new democratically elected ANC government gained full control of all national water issues. The new government used its authority to transform water laws and policies to reflect the priorities of basic needs, poverty alleviation, human rights, and environmental sustainability. Extensive consultations took place after 1994 in preparation for the new water legislation. The private sector, NGOs, communities, universities, and many more stakeholders were invited to participate and this resulted in a broad consensus on relevant parts of the following policy documents: Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994; Growth, Employment and Reconstruction Strategy (GEAR) of 1995; White Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation Policy of 1994; Constitution of South Africa (1996); White Paper on a National Water Policy for South Africa of 1997; Water Services Act of 1997; National Water Act of 1998; National Environmental Management Bill of 1998; Wetlands Conservation Bill, 1999; National Water Utility Bill of 1999.
After 1994, the DWAF also initiated an internal re-organisation in which water provision to disadvantaged communities dominated. The post-1994 water policy changes affected the assessments of the ORDP and the options for future extensions. There is to be less emphasis on irrigation and more on community water supply, employment creation, and environmental issues, and the development of infrastructure now has to reflect this new emphasis. The new water policy of 1998, which affects the ORDP in several aspects, can be summarised as follows: The government recognises that South Africa is on the threshold of water stress; sustainability of water supply must therefore be ensured. The DWAF remains the custodian of water at a national level as defined in the 1956 Water Act. The countrys water resources are an indivisible national asset.
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The protection of the public interest, covering all sectors, is the main guidance for all legislation; legislation is based on rights to water, not on ownership of water resources. The new policy is based on an integrated coherent socio-economic policy framework that seeks to provide every person with equal and adequate access to water. An integrated management approach will be followed, taking cognisance of users, the economy, and ecological and environmental needs. Economic imperatives require cost recovery on all projects. Basic human needs for water are the highest priority and should be satisfied first. Therefore, a national reserve will be maintained to ensure a minimum water supply to all people, as access to water is entered into the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Aquatic ecology is no longer seen as a user sector that has to compete for its share of the water. It is now recognised as an intrinsic part of the resource that needs to be protected. The reserve also covers ecological needs. Water conservation programmes may be far better investments than financing new dams, tunnels and pumping stations, weirs, and pipelines. Allocation of water for production processes should be directed towards obtaining the greatest benefit per unit of water used on a sustainable basis. Industrial development interests are more important than agriculture as they create more jobs per kiloliter of water. International water policy trends are taken into account, eg on sustainability, institutional reform, and conflict prevention.
The National Water Act (No. 36 of 1998) makes provision for the following institutional arrangements for implementation of these new criteria and guidelines: the establishment of a national water resource strategy after consultation with society at large, providing the framework for the protection, use, development, conservation, management, and control of water resources for the country as a whole; the establishment of catchment management agencies that will develop strategies and a water allocation plan in a participatory way; the formulation of measures to protect water resources; the determination of principles for regulating water use; the authorisation of water use and allocation of licenses for controlled activities; the development of pricing strategies for water use charges; the establishment of co-operative water user associations at a restricted localised level; the arrangement of binding international treaties.
The National Water Act also empowers the minister to formulate a pricing strategy, balancing costs of delivery and demands for equity. This strategy is based on a number of variables, such as geographic, water use, and waste discharges. The minister has the power to provide financial assistance to consumers who cannot afford even the most basic services. The new emphasis on universal access combined with cost recovery effects the financial considerations around the ORDP. Water supply to industry and urban areas2 yields higher profits than agriculture. This will make it difficult for emerging irrigation farmers from previously disadvantaged communities to make a living. Subsidies for irrigation to emergent small farmers are under consideration but are being criticised from other sectors, such as environmental conservation interests (eg wetlands). The attention given to environmental concerns has grown continually since the 1960s in South Africa and these issues have been increasingly required to be integrated in decision-making around the ORDP. In-stream flow assessments (IFA) are part of the environmental impact assessment (EIA) required for any proposed river development. IFRs are also now mandated for all water development projects and for systems with existing impoundments under the new Water Act, although some legal details remain to be finalised before implementation can occur.
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The DWAF initially recognised the link between the impacts of altered flows from the ORDP and ecological changes to the Orange River Mouth Ramsar site. South Africa has an international commitment to its conservation under the Ramsar Convention and initiated a study on the environmental water requirements of the Orange River Mouth in the mid-1980s. Separate IFRs for the Orange River Mouth and the Orange River channel downstream of Van der Kloof were determined during two workshops held respectively in 1989 and 1990. In 1995, these recommended flows were re-examined and it was decided that the IFRs required revision. A critique and argument for the re-assessment of these IFRs was offered in 1995 and 1996 (OKeeffe, 1997). In the light of these criticisms, and due to progress in IFA methods, it was decided that the IFR would be reassessed and a further workshop was held in Cape Town in 1996. This meeting produced the current recommended IFR for the Orange River, including the provisions for flows at the mouth. Two distinct aspects dictated the IFR settings: the determination of a baseline flow, below which the survival of desirable aquatic life forms becomes threatened; the maintenance of correct seasonal flow patterns to ensure long-term survival of the riverine ecosystem.
The process of determining this IFR appears to have involved the following steps: identification of the components of the system that need to be maintained; determination of the flow regime required for the maintenance of each component; combination of all the desired flow regimes to create a compromise flow, best suited to the needs of the entire system and its users.
The technical requirements for the IFR for the Orange River were finalised in 1996 (Venter & Van Veelen, 1996). The final IFR recommendations from the 1996 workshop led to flows that are slightly too high for the mouth in summer (mouth closure and inundation of the salt marsh) and slightly too low for the river channel in winter (spawning of the key fish species, Barbus hospes). These deviations were considered to be acceptable, however, because higher summer flows will contribute to keeping the mouth open, whilst being insufficient to cause flooding. On the other hand, lower winter flows occur in the cooler months, which alleviates some of the negative effects of isolated pools on fish and other riverine biota. The total IFR for the system came to 294 million m3 a-1 (Venter & Van Veelen, 1997). The recommended flow regime involves two categories of IFR that comprise a maintenance flow for years of normal runoff and a drought flow for years of low runoff. This recognises that the Orange River is a highly variable system with flows that vary naturally from year to year. The IFR maintenance flows would not be released during years when the river would naturally experience very low flows. The current status of the IFR indicates that an informal consensus appears to have been reached as mandated by the 1998 Water Act but the IFR has yet to be formally agreed or implemented. On 5 February 1999, the DWAF communicated the following for this case study: Although the DWAF had taken the initiative in determining the IFR for the Orange River and was party to the consensus reached at the relevant workshops and forums, the IFR has not been formally accepted by the Department. No instructions for the strict implementation of the IFR have therefore been given.
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Both the new Water Act as well as the Environment Conservation Act contain clauses which are aimed at safeguarding the natural environment. However, procedures for implementation of these stipulations are still being developed. Currently there is no formal procedure in place for the enforcement and monitoring of IFR releases. IFR releases have not been formally agreed upon between the DWAF and Eskom and are not specifically addressed in the current agreement between the parties. However, the monthly premium flows which need to be released for downstream use as well as additional releases which may be made for the purpose of power generation only, are regularly agreed upon between the DWAF and Eskom. Included in the downstream requirements are the IFR and EFR (estuary flow requirements). For most of the length of the river, the downstream requirements are well in excess of the IFR as determined. In the more downstream parts of the river below the major abstractions, the minimum flows in the river are determined by the combined requirements for the IFR and EFR. In practice and also attributable to the surplus yield still available from the Gariep and Van der Kloof Dams, flows in the river have until now been in excess of the IFR/EFR requirements. The problem has been the higher than natural flows released for power generation in winter as well as the perennial nature of releases which does not allow for the closing of the river mouth as occasionally occurred under natural conditions. (The shutting off flows at the river mouth and in certain parts of the river for selected periods of time, may largely be achievable should more control structures be built). An outstanding issue to be resolved, is the attenuation of flow surges released through the hydropower turbines for the generation of power during periods of peak electricity demand only. It is generally accepted that this can be achieved through the construction of a balancing weir downstream of the Van der Kloof Dam (at Havenga Bridge). The financial and implementation responsibilities still need to be agreed between the DWAF and Eskom. Potential difficulties in implementing the IFR thus include the following: Releases require careful prior calculation and must take into account downstream losses due to abstraction and contributions from tributaries, including releases from Bloemhof Dam (the lowest impoundment on the Vaal before the Vaal-Orange confluence) In addition, precipitation events in the Lower Orange, and feedback from monitoring, in order to achieve desired discharges at the mouth, must be evaluated. The river mouth lies about 1 400km downstream from Van der Kloof, the control point for flow releases. Water in the Orange River takes three to four weeks to travel this distance and, in the process, passes numerous irrigation schemes, legal and illegal extractions by pumping, towns, several further impounding structures, and the Augrabies Falls. In addition, the area has the highest evaporation rate in the country and evaporation losses in the lower Orange River are estimated to be between 630Mm3 a-1 (ORRS, 1999) and 1 000Mm3 a-1 (McKenzie, 1989). This represents about 1218% of the modified Orange River flow (Prins, 1990) and less than the total IFR allocated to the river. A further confounding factor is the LHWP. Although it may be possible to control the environmental impacts of hydroelectric generation at Van der Kloof Dam, the LHWP will have considerable impact on the flow patterns downstream, as the LHWP diverts to the Vaal catchment a substantial percentage of the total water presently flowing in the Orange River.
Despite these difficulties, the DWAFs commitment to the conservation of South African rivers, including the Orange River, is clear. It has become generally recognised that ...the riverine
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environment is not a user of water in competition with other users, but is the base of the resource itself, and needs to be actively cared for if development (and provision of water to the countrys people) is to be sustained (King & Louw, 1998). Further details on the IFR are given in Annex 10. Findings on Criteria and Guidelines: The most important changes in criteria and guidelines that affected decision-making and outcomes of the ORDP occurred as a result of the recommendations of three new policy frameworks promulgated during the ORDP implementation process. These documents highlight the gradual change in South African government policies from an emphasis on subsidisation to full cost recovery, from agricultural production and industrial development to employment creation and basic needs provision, from technocratic to participatory decision-making, and from a technical approach to one that takes human rights, and environmental and social issues into consideration. Some conflicts have emerged between these new criteria and guidelines, such as that between the prioritisation of cost recovery versus the goal of achieving greater equity in outcomes. Recently there has been a focus on altering the operation and management of the ORDP to improve the functioning of the scheme and to re-orient it towards generating outcomes that reflect the new values that have been internalised in South Africa policies after the 1994 transition. The attention given to environmental concerns has grown continually since project inception in 1962/3 and incorporating these concerns has been increasingly required in planning, appraisal, and operation. Environmental concerns have only recently been given force of law under the 1998 Water Act. Much effort, time, and money have been spent in setting IFRs. However, the process of implementation appears far less rigorous. In this context, the promulgation of the 1998 Water Act has provided the legal framework for the implementation of IFRs for the ORDP.
For Further Investigation: Additional examination is required of the evolution of criteria and guidelines, particularly regarding changing policy frameworks for economic transformation and environmental management. An examination is needed of the extent of compliance with changing criteria and guidelines, and the factors that have increased or hindered compliance.
Notes 1 This focus is reflected in the departments original name, the Department of Irrigation, until 1956. Even today more than 50% of the DWAFs work is focused on agriculture and irrigation works, and 58% of the ORDP water is still used for irrigation (BKS, 1998: 51). 2 The ORRS report estimates that agricultures contribution to job creation and GDP support is over 50 times less than gold mining, and a hundredfold less than beverages and glass products (BKS, 1998: 93).
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7. Issues raised and lessons learned for the project and planning cycle
The following illustrate some of the lessons raised by the Orange River Pilot Study. These provide some of the building blocks, and the rationale, for moving towards the Commissions outputs. As has been stressed throughout this report, the role of the case study is not to assess whether the project should, or should not, have been built, but rather having taken the decision to proceed with implementation, what lessons can be learned for the project cycle. The examples given are for illustrative purposes only, and it is naturally up to the Commission to decide whether and how to pursue the issues identified. The presentation follows the different stages of the project cycle including methods, procedures, tools and specific issues generated by the Orange River Pilot Study. The issues are structured around the project cycle of planning, design and construction, operation and monitoring, and decommissioning. These may provide some of the building blocks for moving towards development of the content of the Commissions Output 2 Framework for options assessment and decision-making. The issues raised for the different components of the planning cycle are drawn directly from the experience of the project and take no account of any changes there may have been nationally or internationally in current practice in planning, design and operation of dams. It is therefore to be expected that practice may already have changed to incorporate some of these lessons, which is not unexpected as the project planning process took place 35 years ago, for example. This is not, however, the case throughout. These lessons were submitted in a draft format to the participants of the final consultation meeting held on 28 October 1999. This comprised the final phase of the pilot study of the Orange River Development Project in South Africa. The stakeholders who attended the conference were asked to comment on the 18 lessons learned as was stated in the draft version of this report. The reponses were noted on a five point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree with the additional choices of no view and dont know. This offers a useful insight into the views held by different stakeholders in relation to the project and especially in relation to the findings of the case study. In the rest of this section we set out the principal lessons learned from the analysis of the ORDP and highlight the divergent views held by some stakeholders. The annex titled Workshop Proceedings and Comments from the Final Consultative Meeting contains the minutes from the workshop as well as the details regarding the convergent/divergent reponses of the stakeholders. It is emphasized that this being the pilot study, the methodology used is still in the experimental phase. The comments from the stakeholders does not have statistical validity and cannot be intepreted as being representative. Of the 18 lessons forwarded in the draft report, 2 were strongly contested. Therefore in the interest of time, only these two contested lessons, OR5 and OR14, were submitted for further discussion.
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1. Planning
Issue: Prediction of power benefits Component (s) of project cycle : Power Planning Lesson: There is considerable year-to-year variation in power generation that reflects the wet and dry cycles affecting stream flows. This impacts on the time during the project life when the actual capacity, firm and secondary energy benefits from power generation are received, and the net present worth of the benefit stream. While there are not yet techniques to accurately predict year-to-year variations in rainfall or statistical methods used to consider the time distribution of such benefits, the degree of variability in hydrology suggests the need for a range of sensitivity tests during the planning phase. These may consider the impact of wet and dry cycles on the estimation of capacity, firm and secondary energy benefits, Evidence. ESKOM records show that year-to-year variations in power were considerable. The average annual generation for the Gariep power station was predicted to be 620 GWh for the first 28 years of operation. In present value terms the actual generation was 4% higher than predicted; however, the drought and wet cycles meant that the highest and lowest annual generation over the period varied by a factor of 7. In years of the most severe drought, there was not sufficient water to generate for the full daily peak period. Views (convergent/divergent): A majority of stakeholders agreed with this observation (8 agreed, 4 strongly agreed and 1 person had no view of the matter.)
OR1
OR2
Issue: Flexibility in design to accommodate changes in water use priorities and impacts during the operations phase Component (s) of project cycle : Planning Lesson: Water resource projects, especially large multi-purpose dams projects may undergo changes in the use of regulated water for both consumptive and nonconsumptive uses over the long period of project operations. (eg. the allocation of water to non-consumptive power generation versus consumptive irrigation or industrial/urban water supply). To the extent feasible, provisions should be made during the design of the dam and its intake and outlet facilities to accommodate future changes in the intended use of the water for different purposes and evolving catchment-dependent water quality issues that may be difficult to anticipate (e.g. temperature of release, oxygen content). The costs of making such provisions for future flexible operation, and shifts in the priorities for water use should be identified and clear decisions made on their inclusion or rejection in the final project design. Evidence. Over the operating life of the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams the release of water to accommodate irrigation needs was lower that anticipated (for reasons cited previously), and as a consequence water releases were adjusted to coincide with the optimization of power generation (daily peak and seasonal). The ORRS is currently reviewing the use of Orange River water following policies for more equitable distribution. Similarly, over the operating life of the project not only have new environmental regulations have come into effect that require minimum releases to maintain ecosystem functions and water quality, but recreational and tourist uses of the reservoir and the downstream areas have emerged as legitimate water users. Views (convergent/divergent): The stakeholder response to this was similar as for OR1. Of the 13 respondents 9 agreed, 3 strongly agreed and 1 person had no view.
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OR 3
Issue: Project phasing and of risks of subsequent phases not being developed Component (s) of project cycle : Planning Lesson: As in the case of the ORDP, dams are often part of a lager basin development plan. The individual projects may be interdependent or mutually exclusive and as shown by the ORDP the developments occur over many years. When a larger project is conceived in phases, the extent to which the investment in the initial phases are economically and financially viable on their own should be clearly assessed. If the project is only economically and financially viable in conjunction with subsequent phases of a larger development scheme, the risk and implications of delay or cancellation of the subsequent phases should be clearly indicated during the approval stages for these initial investments. Evidence. The ORDP had a number of major components including the Gariep and Van der Kloof dams, inter-basin river diversion tunnels, power stations and irrigation command area facilities. Decision-making on the ORDP was divided into 6 phases, which were subsequently revised, implemented partially or cancelled; though all elements formed part of the original ORDP plan and justification for the initial investments. There was no publicly available analysis available for decision-makers to assess the extent to which the various components of the ORDP were independently viable in economic or financial terms. Views (convergent/divergent): 5 respondents agreed, 7 strongly agreed and one claimed no knowledge. Issue: Costs were underestimated and benefits overestimated Component (s) of project cycle : Planning Lesson: Rapid development of project plans can lead to hasty and inexact calculations of project costs and benefits. Either an internal or external review (or second opinion) as part of the regulatory process may be advisable as a check on such figures. Evidence. The costs of the Orange River project exceeded initial estimates by 200% and a number of project benefits have yet to reach their targets after 20 years of operation. However, the date by which each target was to be met was not laid out in the original white papers, and so post hoc evaluation is difficult. Views (convergent/divergent): Similar to OR3, 3 agreed 7 strongly agreed and 3 entered dont know.
OR4
OR5
Issue: Sharing of risk between direct beneficiaries and society Component(s) of project cycle : Planning Lesson : agricultural prices can fluctuate massively during the projects lifetime, hence endangering the financial viability of the scheme. However as the farmers are not paying the true costs of the scheme, much of this risk is therefore carried by the taxpayer. Evidence. Increase in gross margins of 16% between 1971 and 1981, followed by a decrease of 40% up to 1993. Views(convergent/divergent): The respondent exhibited a marked divergence in their acceptance of this lesson. One person strongly disagreed and 2 people disagreed whereas 3 people agreed and 2 people strongly agreed. Two individuals entered no view and three people entered dont know. During the proceeding discussion, the following points were made. (a) The need to consider the direct as well as the indirect benefits of irrigation (for e.g. benefits of commodity exports to the economy of the country); (b) the fact that irrigation farmers fulfil a major social and economic role (job creation, realisation of social infrastructures such as schools); (c) the risk of venture capital borne by irrigation farmers. It was felt that the lesson had not been clearly formulated which impacts on the clarity of the message it seeks to convey. They stated that it was not clear as to whether the lesson was to transfer the burden from the taxpayer to the farmer, or whether it was simply that in such a planning process price fluctuations should be considered.
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OR6
Issue: Project benefits from agriculture Component(s) of project cycle : Planning Lesson : need to test assumptions on the value of crops from the scheme more rigorously, through risk and sensitivity analysis. Evidence. Predicted benefits for total irrigated area have proved overly optimistic by a factor of at least two. There was an increase in gross margins of 16% between 1971 and 1981, followed by a decrease of 40% up to 1993. Views(convergent/divergent): the irrigation boards regard the Orange River project as a major success story in mobilising the countrys water resources for agricultural production, exports and promotion of rural communities in arid areas. Others regard the farming communities as having appropriated a large share of limited resources with little recovery of capital costs. As for the stakeholders, one person disagreed, 5 agreed, 2 strongly agreed. One person held no view and 2 people entered dont know. Issue: Definition of in-stream flow requirements Component(s) of project cycle : Planning Lesson : The ORDP illustrates how instream flow requirements became a legal requirement as the project matured and values evolved. To set meaningful instream flow levels 35 years after project inception requires adequate pre-project baseline knowledge of the ecosystem. Evidence. Instream flows are growing in importance and it has proved impossible to adequately define the objectives of the IFR due to lack of baseline pre-dam studies and no monitoring of key parameters Views(convergent/divergent): One person disagreed, eight agreed and 3 strongly agreed Issue: Role of independent review Component(s) of project cycle : Planning Lesson: It is desirable to undertake independent review of large projects to confirm feasibility and full options assessment before implementation begins. This is especially the case for project components subject to frequent cost overruns or where the predicted benefits may be uncertain and risk analysis is required. Evidence. The ORDP was largely politically motivated and was not subject to full independent review during planning. This in turn led to a series of design and phasing changes (and cost increases?) following the initial approval of Parliament as more detailed studies showed that some of the proposals were not viable. Views(convergent/divergent): One of the unstated objectives of the project was to reinforce public and international confidence in S Africa at a time when the regime was under pressure. It is believed in some quarters that it fully achieved this objective, although there is no clear macroeconomic analysis to justify this. Seven stakeholders agreed to this lesson (3 strongly). Two disagreed, one had no view and 3 did not know posses information to validate or refute the statement.
OR7
OR8
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2. Design and construction

Issue : Water quality Component(s) of project cycle : Design : Lesson: Maintenance of water quality is an important design consideration. Some downstream water quality concerns (e.g. temperature, dissolved gas content) can be improved by incorporating variable level intakes in the dam structure, hence reducing some of the cumulative impacts of dams on the riverine ecosystem. Evidence. The cumulative impacts of dams on the Orange River have modified the water quality of hundreds of kilometers of river affecting some of the driving ecosystem variables for a significant proportion of the catchment. Views(convergent/divergent): This is an unnecessary expense. Variable level intakes are an essential mitigating factor for maintaining a minimum of ecosystem health. Nine stakeholders agreed (two strongly). One each disagreed, didnt know and had no view. Issue: Compensation and resettlement Component (s) of project cycle : Design and construction Lesson: Compensation levels for farms and property flooded by the reservoir that are less than replacement value cause difficulties for reinsertion of displaced farmers. OR10 Evidence. The farmers displaced by Van der Kloof dam found it difficult to re-establish compared to farmers displaced by Gariep dam as the former received below replacement level compensation compared to the latter. Views (convergent/divergent): Some felt that compensation for farmers displaced by Van der Kloof dam was entirely adequate. Others point out the number of failed farmers from Van der Kloof dam as evidence to the need for proper compensation. Seven stakeholders agreed (one strongly). One disagreed, two didnt know and two had no view. Issue: Compensation and resettlement Component (s) of project cycle : Design and construction Lesson: Displacement introduces high levels of economic, social and psychological uncertainty among rich and poor. Thus, in farmer - worker relationships, displacement makes it difficult for the farmer to support the worker when the farmer is himself struggling to re-establish his livelihood. OR11 Evidence. Less than one-third of the farmers took their workers with them to the new farm, leaving the workers face considerable social and economic hardships. Views (convergent/divergent): In the South Africa of the 1960s and 1970s, the State and the farmers were not obliged to pay compensation to the workers; Workers had considerable opportunity for work on the dam site and thus displacement due to the dam was not a serious disturbance. However, workers said that loss of large areas of farm land, and their displacement just before filling of the reservoir meant no employment in dam activities left them without work and forced to live on the road for a prolonged period. At the consultative meeting eight stakeholders agreed to this statement. No one disagreed, two didnt know and two had no view.
OR9
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3. Operations and Monitoring

Issue: Changing water uses during operations: Monitoring and replanning Component (s) of project cycle : Operations Lesson: The use of water regulated by dams, particularly for a multi-purpose project is subject to change over the long operating period of the dams - typically more than 50 years and in many cases longer. This reflects changing priorities for water use, which may evolve in the basin and the society more generally. It also reflects changes in government regulation on water use practices. Ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the various use of water and the environmental and social impacts of the operation of the project, and re-planning exercises, are thus vitally important to guide future decisionmaking on changing operations. Evidence. The ORDP provides an illustration of changing priorities and uses of water from the dam. The initial motivation was to increase power generation when the development of the full irrigation scheme proved not to be viable. Additional pressures for changes in operation are noted in the Orange River Re-planning Study that reflects a mix of more recent issues and concerns relating to the development of instream flow releases for environmental needs, and the priorities for use of water by different groups in the changing political context of South Africa as well as the implications for water supply to riparian countries. Views (convergent/divergent): Everyone but three agreed (four strongly). Three entered dont know. Issue: Accommodation of changing legal framework Component(s) of project cycle : Operations and Monitoring Lesson: The definition of an instream-flow requirement for the Orange River is made obligatory by legislation defining an environmental reserve. Over the life of a facility, operations will need to be modified to conform with the designated flows Evidence. Water Act 1998 that made an environmental reserve a legal requirement. Views(convergent/divergent): One person disagreed, eight agreed (one strongly), one person had no view and two entered dont know. Issue: Rights of workers Component (s) of project cycle : Operation and monitoring Lesson: The lack of compensation and rehabilitation measures for the displaced workers, and consequent hardships, are still being viewed by some affected people as a violation of their rights. This lingering bitterness is to some extent being addressed through more equitable policies in the new South Africa. Evidence: Current text stays - add The ORRS has proposed a redistribution of water resources, costs and benefits from the ORDP to correct imbalances of the past. Views (convergent/divergent): In South Africa of 1960s and 1970s, the State and the farmers did not have obligation to pay compensation to the workers and thus the question of reparation does not arise; According to some sources, compensation for workers was included in the compensation paid to the farmer which was not passed on to the worker. This aspect could not be verified. The stakeholders exhibited a very divergent reaction to this lesson with two strongly disagreeing and three agreeing. One person had no view and six entered dont know. Due to the divergent views held by the respondents a discussion was initiated on this lesson learned. The stakeholders stated that although the move towards more socially equitable policies of New South Africa is a step in right direction, it cannot be considered as retrospectively addressing the issue of inadequate or non-existent compensation and rehabilitation measures of ORDP. Some emphasised the need for direct compensation from the government. This was said to be an issue of human rights, not one of benefit sharing.
OR12
OR13
OR14
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OR15
Issue: Reassessment of project operation Component of project cycle : Operations and Monitoring Lesson : A formal review of operational rules and sectoral priorities is necessary after project implementation, and on a regular basis thereafter, to accommodate differences between predicted and actual conditions and changing circumstances and priorities. Evidence. Actual development of irrigation area was considerably less than predicted, resulting in additional benefits that could be gained from hydropower. Additional releases have been necessary to control river salinity. It appears that the operation with respect to flood management could also be changed without detriment to the stated levels of protection. Availability of water for farmers was not identified as a major constraint indicating that efficiency gains could be introduced to release water for other purposes. The Orange River Replanning Study covered a number of these aspects approximately 20 years after dam completion. Views(convergent/divergent): The operation of the system has evolved through a series of changes made by DWAF and ESKOM over the life of the project. More optimal operation could have been achieved through a formal reassessment of demands on the project at regular intervals after project completion. There was general agreement on this matter, with four agreeing and six strongly agreeing. Two persons entered no view on the matter. Issue: Monitoring achievement Component(s) of project cycle : Operations and Monitoring Lesson: Project evaluation for objectives such as "improving the rural economy", promoting national development are impossible to evaluate post-hoc unless a deliberate monitoring system is designed and implemented. Evidence. Data to support or refute this goal are unavailable and can not be generated post hoc for the ORDP and there was no systematic monitoring of benefits that could lead to corrective actions. Views(convergent/divergent): Issues where there are no data lead to proponents and opponents being able to defend their qualitative appreciation of the project situation and ends in a sterile, politicised debate if there is no information to support either view. Nine agreed (four strongly), one person disagreed and two claimed a lack of knowledge on the issue. Issue: Post-Project Evaluation Component (s) of project cycle : Operation and Monitoring Lesson : the ORDP represents the single largest public infrastructure investment for water resources in South Africa, yet there was no formal post-project evaluation of the Orange River Development project to inform ongoing planning and decision making. In view of the large investment represented by such developments and their scale, post project evaluations are increasingly required by Governments and by International Agencies where international financial assistance is involved. These include full assessments of the original planning criteria, costs and outcomes and the effectiveness of mitigation and monitoring programs. Evidence. DWAF is not currently required to undertake such evaluations. While the preparation of the Orange River Re Planning Study did not include a detailed postproject assessment of the main dams in the Orange River scheme, the re-planning study was however of considerable value in informing decision makers and wider interests on the range of issues and options for the future.
OR16
OR17
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Views (convergent/divergent): Some aspects of the experience with large projects are captured in ongoing policy and planning work undertaken by Ministries and Departments. Opportunities for seriously assessing where the experience with large projects is lost in the absence of a rigorous post project evaluation. This too elicited general agreement (eleven agreeing, four stronlgy) with one person entering dont know. Issue: Impact and Compliance Monitoring Component (s) of project cycle : Operations and Monitoring Lesson: A formal impact monitoring programme can help to identify, assess and rectify unforeseen adverse impacts of the project that may occur over the longer term, or to identify opportunities to enhance positive impacts of the project. Monitoring also provides a more credible basis for new operation criteria, standards and regulation. Evidence. The historical data available to this study was limited and sometimes conflicting, particularly in the agricultural sector and the social and environment sectors. Views (convergent/divergent): Some aspects of the experience with large projects are captured in ongoing policy and planning work undertaken by Government Departments. Opportunities for assessing and building on the experience with large projects are missed in the absence of a rigorous post project evaluation and appraisal system. All of the twelve respondents agreed to this lesson.
OR18
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8. Stakeholder Views on Development Effectiveness

One of the key factors currently driving the debate about the costs and benefits of impacts of large dams is the differing perceptions of interest groups concerning the development effectiveness of the project. The WCD case study procedure seeks to capture these views through structured interviews as a basis for reviewing the development effectiveness of the project at the final consultation meeting. These views will be important in informing the work of the Commission as it gathers together worldwide experience from the global work programme. The Secretariat, through this pilot study, also introduced an exercise to assess development effectiveness at the final stakeholder meeting. The account given here is that from the wide range of stakeholders interviews. For a less complete, but complementary, assessment from the stakeholder meeting, see the minutes in Annex 14.
8.1
Interview approach
The interview questions are formulated in such a way as to oblige the interviewee to look at the project as a whole, and not simply to focus on the issues of direct concern to him or her. The questions asked include: 1. How did the construction and operation of the project affect you? 2. Overall, would you say the project affected you positively or negatively? [Probe for clarification] 3. What other groups were affected by the project? [Probe for clarification] Would you say they were they positively or negatively affected? [Probe for clarification] 4. Considering the project as a whole, do you feel that the project's negative impacts are acceptable given the benefits generated by the project? 5. Do you feel that major project decisions were made in an equitable manner? 6. To the best of your knowledge, did the project comply with applicable policies and law in force of the day? 7. In your opinion, what are the major lessons that we can learn from looking back on the project ? In all, 22 individuals drawn from a range of backgrounds and interests were identified for the interviews. However, only 15 interviews were eventually completed. The interviewed persons came under five broad categories: affected workers (6); NGOs (2); affected farmers (2); beneficiary farmers (3); government officials (2). The interviews with respondents are intended to illustrate the range of views that can then be submitted to, and discussed by, the final consultation meeting. The selected respondents were called to request their willingness for the interview. Once an agreement to the interview was obtained, a time was fixed for the telephone interview. Prior to the interview, the questionnaire was faxed to the respondents. A few respondents filled the questionnaire and returned it to the secretariat prior to the interview. The interview started with clarification of each of the questions. Thereafter, while interviewing prompting was done only when it was absolutely required. As far as the displaced workers were concerned, these groups are not English speaking and not contactable by telephone. We therefore identified a facilitator based in Colesberg who was trained to administer the questionnaire. The facilitator was familiar with the ORDP pilot study as she supported the study team during field work with the affected workers in November - December 1998. She randomly selected 6 workers - 3 women and 3 men - displaced by Gariep and Van der kloof dams. She traveled to the place of residence / work of the selected respondents for the interview.
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8.2
Interview results
In analysing the responses we can identify the following general conclusions that summarise the views of the people consulted. Responses by group are given subsequently (Table 26 ): 1. Everybody was positively impacted by ORDP - there were no losers YES, because: displaced farmers were consulted and were fairly compensated displaced workers who followed farm-owners settled down happily, and those who did not found easily alternative employment in other farms or other sectors land owners in the ORDP command area (white farmers) are positively affected, especially by the irrigation component of the project: availability of more farmlands, increased value of land, increased crop production. emerging farmers (mainly traditionally disadvantaged groups) positively impacted through availability of new farms in downstream areas farm workers benefited from increased availability of employment and increased wage levels in the agricultural sector Orange River basin and receiving basins (Fish-Sundays) positively impacted through increased employment opportunities, expansion of tourism facilities, trading stores and other small business enterprises, and through increased access to water for domestic and industrial use, improved communication infrastructures, increased education and health facilities. This translated into the general economic uplifting of the Northern Cape and the Eastern Cape. State-Government positively impacted through water levies from farmers, and tax paid by the flourishing business sector the Nation as a whole benefited from expanded water availability, and experienced overall economic progress to which ORDP has significantly contributed NO, because: farm labour cannot be considered as a benefit, it only perpetuates the near-slavery condition of workers and their dependency to whites farmers traditionally disadvantaged communities continue to be denied access to the benefits of the ORDP because of their lack of access to land 2. The positive impacts of the ORDP outweigh its negative effects YES, because: water is vital, and ORDP makes it available the ORDP had had very few if any negative impacts, and helped achieve self-sufficiency in food production NO, because: the impacts of the ORDP are too unequally distributed the resettlement component benefited only landowners and excluded farm workers.
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3. The major decisions taken were equitable YES, because: farmers were consulted the valuation of farms to be submerged was equitable and well executed. the project was discussed at Parliament the basic motivation of ORDP was not to let water be wasted; the reservoir areas is used more equitably and efficiently to store water. NO, because: workers were not consulted in cases where some consultation took place, being consulted without being given an alternative is not equitable most of the area affected by the project is totally vacant and used for anything except sheep farming for the Whites the ORDP increases the productive capacity of only those who are already privileged. 4. The ORDP complied with the policies and guidelines of the day YES, because: farmers were given enough notice the compensation provided to displaced farmers was fair and respectful of the law the project complied with the 1956 Water Act, which made provisions for inter-basin water transfers NO, because, worked were not consulted Workers were forced to move without alternative accommodation or employment (NB this is a summary of the views of the interviewees, yet it seems clear that the laws of the time did not require this consultation or compensation to occur, however unjust that may have seemed at the time) 5. The ORDP is an effective development project YES, because: ORDP is a good project it is the result of a right vision in the past ORDP is a worthwhile investment It would be worth doing it even today, but it would be very difficult to develop today given the tremendous financial problems the country is facing If the project was not built we would have much less food today, the country would face major development problems NO, because: ODRP benefits those who already have, and ignore poor communities ORDP excluded the majority and the poor, and perpetuates the power of the oppressors. A summary of the responses received per group is given in Table 8.1 that illustrates the manner in which each different interest group perceives the project.
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Table 8.1: Summary of questionnaire responses by interest group

Question No 1 Objectives of the project Workers, - water supply - energy Community Based Organisationss -water supply, -irrigation - energy supply Farmers - Agricultural development. Irrigation. Food production - Transfer of water from OR to Fish river and Eastern Cape (PE) - Electricity generation - From the Scoping Meeting now knows that ORDP had also political objectives Farmers Associations - Stop loss of water and turn SA greatest river into a national asset - Supplement water supply to existing irrigation schemes (along the Fish and Sundays rivers) - Ensuring food to millions of people - Areas - Agriculture - Industrial developement - Domestic water use - Job creation - Tourism and recreation - The diversion of water from OR to Great Fish river resulted in an economic uplifting of towns like Cradock, Summerset East, Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown. The jobs created maintained farmers in rural areas: for example, before the ORDP the Fish river was dry log periods of the year despite the fact three dams operating on the river - Cannot imagine what would happen to some towns along the Fish river without ORDP - The overall impact is defintely positive: I have a job in Cradock. Cradock has a land bank, and other services - Farmers: positive impacts: sustainable agriculture in Eastern Cape, the biggest economic activity in this region - Households: positive impact: access to water for domestic use - Industry: positive impacts with water availability (especially PE) - Positive on the ecology, wildlife, fisheries: availability of perennial water Gouv officials - water for irrigation - electricity - food production
2-3. The way interviewees were affected by the projects. Overall impacts of projects
- Were displaced without notice: lost jobs, household goods, and livestock. Had to squat near the road without job after having stayed working in the farms for more than 40 yrs - Negatively affected despite the fact that the owner consulted us on time, which allowed us to move voluntarily. We received no compensation, benefits - It was a shock for us to stay for about a week without finding accomodation - We squatted near the road for one and half years. I gave birth to a baby there.
- Affected us as citizens of the country - Project such as ORDP very important (allowed conservation of water and expanded water availability including increasingly for disadvantaged communities
- Did not have land in the region before. Bought land in the ORDP irrigation area and engaged in commercial farming - Farmers benefited a lot from increased value of land (due to irrigation) - ORDP positively affected everyone - Improved communications in the regions (roads) - Local town (near the dam) benefited during the construction stage: employment, businesses - We were adequately compensated and moved to better farming areas. The compensation was very fair - Farm workers were positively affected as they went with farmers to new locations - Black workers moved with farmers: they were very happy. They settled down very well - Coloured workers were negatively affected given that they lost their jobs because did not want to move - Farmers. Were positively
-Indirectly impacted, because living in the area developed, and benefited from the wealth and employment generated - Positively because of increased water availability in this arid land, because of expanded tourism and recreational activities
4. Groups affected by the project
- Landowners (white farmers): Positively affected, especially by the irrigation component. However, these groups who used to benefit alone (Whites) do not feel happy about new trends in expanded access for all. - riverine populations: positively affected because of direct and year-long access to water
-Farmers positively affected: good compensation, availability of more farmlands -Farm workers positively affected: more jobs through new farms and increased availability of employment - emerging farmers: new farms available downstream (some of which are small) - Business sector positively
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Question No
Workers,
Community Based Organisationss - Landless (Black populations) have benefited a little (only access to water). Farm labour cannot be considered as a benefit because it is way of perpetuating the dependency relationship between whites and blacks. Living conditions of farm workers are terrible
Farmers affected. Some decided to retire and/or converted to other activities. Those who stayed did very well - Shop keepers: More or less benefited. Shops flourished during the construction phase and most of them collapsed afterwards - Downstream fisheries dependent families were positively affected as other opportunities came up to compensate for any losses of fisheries - All groups very positively affected for example through employment before, during and after construction - For all, the displacement process was a traumatic time - Increase in employment; agricultural productivity and agricultural production increased; creation of new towns - Locally: " Small businesses have been attracted, which generated employenent, expanded tourism and recreational facilities, " Rural populations attracted: schools, trading stores and small business -- Regionally: An unknown area has gained interest -- nationally: Internationally recognized progress. - Because canals not lined, seepage of water has become a serious problem. Saline water is diverted to the river and tail end farmers receive saline water. Productivity of land will decline unless proper lining of canals takes place
Farmers Associations - State-Gov: positive with water levies from farmers; with water for ESKOM power generation - No negative impacts
Gouv officials affected: more money available in the area
5. Effect of the project on local and regional and national development
- The benefits of the projects would be more tangible for our constituency (black populations) if land access was resolved for the majority of the population of the country
- Increase in recreational activities: Gariep and VDK are very big attractions
- irrigation expanded bringing development to the community, local business improved, wage employment and wage level improved
6. Benefits and impacts over time
- Water supply - Hydropower - Water supply
- Supply of water to disadvantaged groups is increasingly important - More importance if given to the ecology by the new government
- Cumulative impacts have been very good, Food production improved considerably and the electricity supply got big boost. With the spread of irrigated agriculture, more employment became available
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Question No
Workers,
Community Based Organisationss
Farmers - The benefits of ORDP will become more and more important because of growing water scarcity - yes. The project had all round benefits. Not many farmers affected (by displacement) because of the low population densities - Yes. Very few if any negative impacts. Few people were displaced, and there were no tribal land affected - Yes the building of the dam was in the interest of the country. No negative impacts - Yes it was discussed in Parliament - Dont know but one can presume that decisions were equitable: there has been very little adverse publicity regarding project decisions - Yes, for example the valuation of the farms was well executed and was equitable - Dont know - Yes - Yes, for example the compensation provided was fair and respectful of the law. - Farmers were given enough notice before they had to move. It was very professionally done - If this project happened to densely populated countries like India or China, the negative impacts would be higher than the positive impacts (because would required many people to be displaced) - ORDP is a good project. It would be worth doing even today - Storage of water is important in
Farmers Associations
Gouv officials
7. Positive impacts of the ORDP project outweigh negative effects
8. The major decisions taken were equitable
- yes because we depend on the water - Yes because the owner consulted us on time - No because it only profited the people who had plots rather than those employed on contract basis in the farms - No the water is sold to people by farm owners - No the area is totally vacant and used for anything except sheep farming for the Whites - No were not consulted - Yes because the area is used more equitably and efficiently for storing water - No, even in cases where some consultation took place with workers. Being consulted without being given an alternative is not equitable - No, not consulted, forced to move without alternative accommodation - No, government officials consulted with workers but gave not alternatives for accomodation, jobs, etc - People need to be consulted in good time, and the displacementrelocated process need to be well planned - All displaced people, including workers need to be compensated for their losses - All people to be displaced, including those who accept to move voluntarily need to be
- No, there is a too unbalanced distribution of the benefits, and the only opportunity it gives to disadvantaged populations is to perpetuate their dependency situation. This will continue to be the case unless access to land is solved for these communities
- Yes. The project had no negative impacts. Without Gariep and VDK what would happen to SA. The ORDP is vital for the country
- yes, negative impacts are negligible. The very few farmers who were affected received compensation. The impact of blackfly is also negligible. Water draining issues are being addressed. Self-sufficiency in food production was achieved
- No, because of the unequal access to land. Many major projects such as ORDP generally benefit the minority, not poor people. They increase the productive capacity of those who are already privileged
- Yes. The basic motivation behind ORDP was to not let water be wasted.
- Yes, farmers were consulted
9. ORDP complied with policies and laws of the day
- Yes, clearly and extensively
- Dont know. But a New Water Act is in place. It is a good one. The previous one was more to serve the views of the previous government.
- yes, farmers were adequately compensated, support to farmers to settle down was implemeted,
10. lessons learned
- This project might end up benefiting only those who have and not poor communities. During the apartheid era, outsiders were pumping money in the country in order to perpetuate the power of the oppressors. The ORDP partakes of this process and was not considered as a development
- Somebody had the right vision in the past. Without that vision, the country would face major problems today. Vision is import.
- Irrigation is very important for the land in question, and the decision to built the day was a good decision. It would be very difficult to make such a projects now because of the tremendous financial difficulties the country is facing - The project was a worthwhile investment which is still possible
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Question No
Workers, eligible to benefits
Community Based Organisationss project, because development cannot exclude the majority and the poor.
Farmers SA: all life will be centered around water sources - If the project was not built we would have much less food for humans and animals
Farmers Associations
Gouv officials to restructure to bring other benefits
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8.3
Comments
The distributional matrix for ORDP (Chapter 4) shows there are many positive impacts and benefits and rather fewer quantified negatives in terms of impacts. This analysis is borne out by the views of the stakeholders who broadly feel the project delivers benefits to them and to the region. However the case study analysis diverges from the perceptions of the stakeholders in two key areas. Firstly, the starting point for the WCD analysis is the vision that the government set out to achieve at the time (the predicted benefits from the scheme) this, as the study shows, proved to be an overoptimistic, and highly politicised choice, that the engineers experienced difficulty in delivering. Few, if any, of the respondents may be aware of the scale of the original project intentions of 35 years ago, and this will naturally affect their perception of the project which is based more on what the project delivers today, than on what was originally intended. Secondly, the study estimates the actual cost of delivering these benefits, that shows that the capital costs of the project are substantially greater than those foreseen at the outset, and that the overall delivery of benefits in the form of gross agricultural production have been less than envisaged. This divergence between the perceptions of the people interviewed and the results of the case study (that tend to indicate a level of under-performance in delivering benefits, coupled with a substantial cost overrun compared to that predicted) is an important finding that shows that the views and perceptions of the project affected people may not necessarily coincide with an assessment of project performance based on the predicted costs and benefits. .
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8. Bibliography
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Acocks, JPH, 1953. Africa, 28, 192 pp. The veld types of South Africa, Memoirs of the Botanical Survey of South
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WCD Pilot Case Study*

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Prepared by the World Commission on Dams (WCD) Secretariat

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

The WCD Knowledge Base

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

The Study Team

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Financial and in-kind Contributors:

Germany - BMZ: Federal Ministry for Economic

GTZ - Deutsche Geschellschaft fr Technische

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

The Distributional Effects of the ORDP......................................................................66

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Options-Assessment and the Decision-making Process .............................................72

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Note on Pilot Study

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

1. Overview of the World Commission on Dams Global Case Study Programme

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

2.1 Orange River Basin

2.2 National Context at the Time of Project Planning

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

3. Projected and Actual Impacts of the Orange River Development Project

3.1 Time Schedules for Implementation

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Findings on Schedules for Implementation:

For Further Investigation:

3.2 Design Characteristics

Double Curvature Arch Dam

Integrated Spillways and Outlets

Double Curvature Arch Dam

Integrated Spillways and Outlets

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange-Riet River Scheme Orange-Fish Tunnel Orange-Fish Tunnel Fish-Sundays Scheme

1971/2 1968/9 1971/2 1971/2

Fish-Sundays Scheme Fish-Sundays Scheme No component

1973/4 1984/5 1974/5

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

Findings on Design Characteristics:

For Further Investigation:

Orange River Development Project, South Africa

3.3 Financial Expenditure

Orange River Development Project, South Africa