Volume 4. Applications. Chapter 1. Multiple Operators.

WARNING: It is not the intent of this text to describe the legality of what is expressed on this text. The text in the content should not be considered as legal advice. The reader is responsible for ensuring any action taken in relation to this document's content is legal in the reader's jurisdiction. The document is written for research purpose.

1. Multiple operators. This chapter is an examination about how effectively utilize the presence of more than one member of the same group to their advantage, by applying the principles from Volume 3. Exactly what method would be used depends on what a group of operators in a given situation are trying to achieve. In this volume, it is assumed that the goal of operations is to secure the safety of each operators. It is important for readers to understand what this is and what this is not. This is not intended as a guide for specialized unit that aims to serve a specific goal other than enhancing operators security. Operators in this context will only take calculated risk to avoid unacceptable probability of injury or death. Each operator might take action to benefit another person, but only under the conditions that the probability is avoided. They will not rush into a barricaded opponent when they would get shot before they can effectively attack the opponent in order to rescue someone. They would not take a bullet to protect someone. Operators do not consider themselves to be an instrument that can be sacrificed for their group's sake. Also, there is no assumption that operators are familiar with operational characteristics of each other, such as a case with two or more legally armed citizen being forced to defend themselves. This can also apply to police officers in a large department who never worked together before, or even met before, in an operation. It would not be a wise thing for them to be executing techniques that require high degree of coordination that requires great degree of knowledge of each others' personal traits in order to be properly coordinated. If this is a study of tactical principles, then it is pointless to suggest what works only with few people who extensively trained together as a general principle. However, none of the above assumptions are applied to the operators' opponents. The main goal as established above also establishes certain principles of multiple operator operations. All cooperative actions aims to increase operator's security. No operator's security is sacrificed for the sake of another. If the purpose of having multiple operators is to enhance security for each, then that would mean the minimum standard of security should be a level no worse than when an operator was working alone. Operator interaction design should avoid deliberately creating a situation where operator's safety is reliant on others' success.

1.1 Group of independent individuals mode: There are different modes a group of multiple operators can operate, with each mode differing from others in relationship of each operator to others in that mode. The basic default mode in this chapter would be Group of Independent Individuals Mode. In this mode, individual operators are independent, making individual decisions. Each individuals are only responsible for one's own security. There may be no-preplanned coordinated actions. Each individual have no responsibility to act on behalf of any other, and may join or leave the group at will. This is not presented as a model to be used for all type of multiple operator situations. It is used here as a model to build basic fundamental of multiple operator operations, because it is the form where nothing of situation specific assumption is added. It is not dependent on plan, coordination, and command and control structure, and many other elements that other mode of multiple operator group type relies on which is all subject to failure. When all or any of those elements fails, the methods and principles of independent individual mode operations can be utilized as a guideline for deciding course of actions. An operator's safety is enhanced by utilization of support from other operators. Support from other operators is utilized, but not relied on. The support is handled as a resource to be utilized upon availability which the availability is not under the operator's control. Each operators relies on their own course of action chosen by themselves to raise the availability of the support. An operator cannot control other operators in this situation, so an operator cannot demand another operator to support against the other operator's will. However, operators may take a course of action that would raise the probability of being available to support other operators, which may bring mutual benefit. The top priority for each operator is one's own security. Action may be taken voluntarily for the benefit of other operator, but it is usually for mutual benefit. Action for others are not taken if it risks one's own security without mutual benefit or if the risk is significantly high even if there is a mutual benefit. There are number of reasons why this is used as a basic principle: It is easy to adhere to, and makes decision making process very simple and effective. The effectiveness of decision making increases if there are less conflicts in priorities of decision making. Since priority of one's own security being on top minimizes conflict of being expected to take an action with a risk that would not be justified in terms of an operator's own security for the sake of other entity or cause, the priority is kept more consistent. If a risk is taken, it is because there is a benefit that is expected to enhance the action taker's security. Decision making efficiency also increases when decisions are made in regards to information that is more likely to be in the scope of what is available to the decision maker. In terms of scope of information

available to an individual operator, it is not possible for any operator to reliably know what action taken would be best for another operator. The principle would prevent an operator from taking action with erroneous anticipation of another operator's action or with erroneous assessment of another operator's situation on another operator's behalf. The principle limits responsibility, preventing an individual from being held responsible for what the individual cannot control. It also minimizes confusion, hesitation, misunderstanding, and all other undesirable things associated with blurring boundaries of responsibility. This makes each operator's probable course of action most predictable, even when there is no preplanned coordination, and aids each operator making a course of action decision that would increase the probability of mutual support. The understanding of an operator's course of action consideration and priories is important. In absence of a per-arranged plan agreed on, or when such plan fails, that understanding is what give operators idea of other operator's possible actions which makes utilization of support provided to or from other operators possible. That makes group response in independent individual mode very adaptable and flexible. It also makes it very responsive, since the reaction by group does not have to stop or slow in order to make planned coordination. Following is an example of how such principles properly applied can make a difference.

In the situation in this example, illustrated in the picture above, two operators came in contact with two opponents. Operator 1 is exposed to both opponents. Operator 1 responded to Opponent 1 and shouts there is an opponent in Operator 1's flank, Opponent 2 on the right side. If Operator 1 is relying on Operator 2 to respond to Opponent 2, then Operator 2 may have a dilemma. Operator 2's immediate threat is Opponent 1. If Operator 2 exposes oneself to Opponent 2, then Operator 2 is ignoring an immediate threat, and must rely on Operator 1 to incapacitate Opponent 1. If there is no guideline of individual responsibility principles, Operator 2's decision making process can be significantly harder and cause delay which can endanger both.

If Operator 2 maneuvered to attack Opponent 2, both Operator 1 and Operator 2 is exposed to two opponents which neither of them can effectively respond to at the same time. Either one of them failing to stop the attack of the opponent they chose to attack can easily result in the death of both. From Operator 2's perspective, Operator 2's security is now worse than if Operator 2 was acting alone.

With the responsibility principle of independent individual mode applied, the decision making process is simplified. The result is illustrated above. Operator 1 does not relay on Operator 2 for security. So, Operator 1's course of action is what Operator 1 would do to effectively respond to such situations if Operator 2 was not present, which in this case is attack Opponent 1 while maneuvering to move back to get shielded from Opponent 2. Opponent 2's course of action decision is even more simple: engage the only immediate threat, which is Opponent 1. If Operator 1 survived the initial attack of Opponent 1, this would result in Operator 1 and Operator 2 responding to Opponent 1 while both of them are shielded from Opponent 2. Even if Operator 1 does not survive Opponent 1's attack, Operator 2 never get exposed to Opponent 2. Either case, neither of the operator's security is at a risk higher than if they were acting alone. If both operators have the same understanding of maneuver and positioning and utilization of protection objects, Operator 2 would know what Operator 1 would do in order to get shielded from Opponent 2 and there is no protection available to be shielded against Opponent 1.

Opportunistic approach to support and minimizing dependency: Operators should take course of action that would increase the probability of support being available, whether if it is mutual support, giving support, or receiving support. However, this is done to increase the probability of available support in an opportunistic sense, not locking any operator in a position where they would always be able to support another and always depending on each other. The idea of making operators always move in a coordinated manner that they are always in position to support one another may be appealing to a lot of people. So appealing that it has followers who should know better. It is a bad idea for a number of reasons. Maneuvering and positioning that affects tactical advantage of an operator and whether if an operator is giving or receiving support to or from another is largely depends on geometrical relationship of everyone in the fight in a given situation. That means no matter how an operator is positioned or maneuvering, there will always be an area one operator is exposed to that another cannot see or fire at. If the idea is to be followed, the best that can be done in that regard is for both operators to position themselves in manner that area that has high likely hood of opponent's appearance or area they are handling first to be visible to both operators as much as possible. But, that kind of positioning may require both operators to be very close, or the positioning that makes it possible may require one or both operators to be in a position of disadvantage. So, there always is some sort of risk assessment course of action decision going on. That decision would be even more difficult with less safe possible options if operators' course of action is limited by always required to be in a position for mutual support. Operators should avoid use of tactics or techniques that requires coordination without a very specific and justifiable need, because the coordination effort itself, such as communication, can be a distraction and can limit an operators course of action to maintain a planned coordinated action which may even increase risk compared to when operators are flexible in their response options. Even if there is such a need, the amount of coordination required and complexity of it should be kept as low as possible. More complex a plan gets, there is higher risk of misunderstanding and failed coordination. More components there are in a plan, more the probability of one or more of the component failing. The purpose of cooperative action is simple: to enhance security through giving or receiving support. Almost any action taken by an operator in combat will affect the operator's security in some way. Same applies when a support is given to another operator, but then security of both is more directly affected. In some situations, an operator may not be able to give any support unless a significant risk is taken. Not being able to give or receive support might make operators' risk level not any different than if those operators were acting alone. That might give a

sense of incompetence or other emotion of insecurity to people with certain personalities, and it may provoke them to take risky actions or coerce others to do so. However, not making situation worse than if operators were acting alone may be the best that can be accomplish in some situations. Some terrain might only allow one operator to examine unrevealed areas, and there can be variety of causes and situations where it might be that way. The base line of security in regards to cooperative action taken by an operator is that whatever action taken for cooperative action should not make the operator's security any worse than if the operator was acting alone. Otherwise, the whole purpose of having multiple operators is nullified. In reality, no matter how much effort an operator put in to support another, support is not always available. Any plan should reflect that reality and make no assumption of its availability.

1.2. Information. Tactical significance and characteristics regarding operational information remains essentially the same as covered in Tactics section of Volume 2. However, in multiple operator environment, an operator will have other members of a group one can send and receive information from through communication. Communication efficiency, information distribution efficiency is a concern. Another concern is with awareness of other operators' location and their situation in order to give and receive support and coordinate action as necessary. How to avoid making mistakes in identifying same group members is also a concern.

------------------------------------------------------------------------Standard of communication: Communication must be clear. The length of verbal or text information should not be any longer than necessary, but it should not omit any necessary information in order to make it brief. Any instruction, command, or information sent should have a complete meaning. Let's look at an example. A squad leader in a military told his subordinates that he would tell them which building to shoot at and which building friendly forces are moving into. The squad leader yells, "On 1!" This is simply unacceptable form of communication. Exactly what is "On 1" supposed to mean? Is he referring to a building designated as "building1"? Does he want the squad to fire at building-1 or is he trying to say friendly forces has moved in to building-1? Can you see the disaster that can happen if it is misunderstood? Let's look at another example. A police surveillance unit met with uniformed officers to get additional support. After an officer who belongs to the surveillance unit told the uniformed officers what they were needed for and where to stand by, he says "40" as he is walking away. Uniformed officers had problems communicating with the surveillance unit until they found out that when the officer from the surveillance unit said "40," he meant "We're communicating on radio channel 40." That's another example of unacceptable communication practice. Communication needs to be no longer than it needs to be, in order to keep the burden of transmitting and receiving minimal. However, to say it should be short would be an error. It has to be concise. That means it is no longer than it is necessary while still containing all core ideas that needs to be conveyed. It also needs to be clear who the recipient of that information is intended to be.

------------------------------------------------------------------------Information distribution and communication effectiveness: More information shared to make correct decision is beneficial. Taking actions to send or receive information, communicate, adds burden that distracts and reduces operator's effectiveness. Design of course of action, methods, and techniques should aim to increase information shared but minimize communication. Large amount of communication being transmitted and received does not mean there is a large amount of information being distributed. Only thing that is sure in that condition is large amount of effort is used to communicate and that drew mental resources away from parties of that communication to process other tasks. Efficiency is increased when: -Same amount of information is conveyed with least amount of communication. -The communication is effectively received. -The information conveyed is accurate. -The information conveyed is relevant. -The information has least distortion during communication, and conveyed in a manner that has least likelihood misunderstanding. Communication being understood is important, and this should not be sacrificed for the sake of speed. Speed of communication means absolutely nothing if the information is not conveyed. To limit the duration of communication to avoid distraction and exposure, what operators need to achieve is conciseness not speediness. Prioritize information, and only send what is relevant and necessary enough that the risk of transmitting the information by available means is worth the risk of possible distraction or exposure, etc. From of communication can make a great difference in communication effectiveness. For example, indicating an opponents direction physically would be usually faster than describing an opponent's direction. Indicating an opponent's location by beam of light or laser pointer would be usually faster and more accurate than verbal announcement. Information obtained through each operator's own sensory input can be more effective than indirect input through communication. For example, if there is an operator looking down a hallway who needs to let others know how the hallway is structured to others, simply letting others see it can be more effective than verbally describing it with words like, Long hallway, open door right, closed door front... This also helps avoid situations where an operator trying to verbally convey something that is very lengthy or hard to verbally describe. More emphasis on individual

situation awareness information collection and less reliance on communication is required to facilitate that. That also helps operators to have a picture of one's own group member's location and situation which cannot always be communicated between members. That also reduces need for verbal communication of operator's intended course of action or status which increases their risk by opponents being able to hear it. This can be integrated as one of individual maneuvering and positioning decision factors so that each operators maneuvers and positions oneself in a manner that is easier to maintain visual contact when feasible. This also increases the chance of giving operators option to communicate visually rather than verbally.

------------------------------------------------------------------------Issue of identification and location tracking of operators: Properly identifying people who comes into contact and knowing where all parties are as much as possible are always important issues whether if an operator is operating alone or not. However, when operators are planning to operate together, establishing a way to make identification and tracking of at least the operators who are cooperating more efficient will be helpful. Each operator communicating their actions, movement may help in that regard, but that should be limited. All operators trying to tell everyone each and every action they are doing would be very distracting to everyone and raise risk of exposure. However, each operator can assess the situation and communicate their location or action when the risk of communication is justifiable: such as situation where an operator would emerge from a location where another operator is likely expecting to see an opponent emerge. But, operators should be aware that such communication may fail for various reason. They should also be aware of the possibility of coming into contact with another operator on the same side emerging from an unexpected location. Uniform may be helpful in identification when wearing uniforms is feasible. However, in various combat organizations, camouflage uniform is the norm, and many such camouflage uniform is hard to distinguish from one another. Other distinguishing marks may become necessary for that reason, and it is better if it is something only operators on the same side would recognize.

1.3. Maneuvering and positioning - Multiple Operators. Nothing about the basic principles of maneuvering and positioning shown in chapter 2 of volume 2 changes. What is described here is an explanation of how the principles can be applied when an operator's maneuvering and positioning decision also involves how to effectively give or receive support to other operators.

------------------------------------------------------------------------Individual space occupation and support: Main benefit of having more than one operator is being able to give and receive support, however it is not without its own risks. A significant risk as that each additional operator occupies a space, and certain volume of space is required for each operator to be able to perform tasks such as assuming a good shooting platform and fire weapons. That space will be referred to as "individual work space" from now on. The space is about the volume a single operator in stationary position can occupy and be able to form a shooting platform and orient the shooting platform in any direction without obstruction. There are limited amount of space an operator can maneuver or position to have tactical advantage. For example, there are limited amount of space behind an object that provides protection from gun fire, and if the amount of space operators occupy exceeds that amount of space, then there may be operators in that situation who are taking a more dangerous position than if those operators were operating alone. Also, reaction to threat may require immediate adjustment in position or evasive maneuver, etc. An operators adjustment in position or maneuvering can be hindered if another operator is occupying a space the operator needs to move in to. Maneuvering and positioning plan in regards to multiple operators should be done with the consideration to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks. In order to minimize the probability of obstructing another operator's maneuver, operators should generally keep a certain distance between individual work spaces. There can be time when such distance cannot be kept, and operators can be close to a degree that individual work space overlaps, in which case both operator's motion range within the individual work space would be limited. However, when operators deviate from the general principle of keeping certain amount of distance between individual work spaces, there should have a specific reason. Whatever they are doing must have a benefit that outweighs the risk of such close proximity, and they should have a plan on how to adjust position or execute emergency maneuvers from the close proximity position.

In order to avoid being in a situation where an operator is rushed into an area where areas other than position of tactical disadvantage is all occupied, operators should assess an area to examine if desirable path or position is available to them prior to entering an area. That is to avoid overcrowding tactical advantage points which would even lower the effectiveness of operators occupying those points. Area protected by objects that can shield from gun fire is limited, and such area where operators are also able to attack opponents from is even more limited. If such positions are already occupied by other operators within a certain area, an operator not in that position can seek option to move to a different area where acceptable attack position is available when a path is available. Otherwise, the operator either has to hide behind the protective object without being able to attack opponents or move into exposed area in order to attack opponents. In the operator chooses to move into exposed area for attack, it would result in the operator being in more of a risk than if the operator was acting alone,

which nullifies the purpose of having multiple operators in the first place. If an area only offers an option of either inaction or action with unacceptable risks, then best course of action may be to move to a different area. If the situation is so dire that contributing to attack in position of disadvantage may not be more of a risk than inaction, then the operator may consider the option at one's own accord, but it would be very stupid to choose to predictably become a casualty if the operator's side had the advantage which would make the operator being a casualty a needless waste. Another aspect of multiple operator positioning to consider is line of fire. An individual occupation space by each operator inhibits another operator to fire at a target if the line of fire is on or very close to that space. Generally, operators positioned in a manner that a line between two or more operators pointed to or near the direction of a POEZ or an opponent should be avoided. Not only does that kind of positioning makes opponent's attack more effective, it can also result in an operator's line of fire being obstructed by another operator.

When more than one operator has to occupy a narrow area where there is not enough space for each operator to have an individual work space, individual work space has to be overlapped. Certain restriction of movement range would result from that. However, each operators should execute it in a manner that it gives each operator field of view of the area each operator is working on and ability to respond to gun fire against any threat that emerges from that area. That would be done by having the upper body offset from one another in various ways. Horizontal and vertical displacement can be used for it.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Methods of support: Support is usually given by being available to respond to an opponent or possible threat emerging from a POEZ that a supported operator is exposed to. The operator being supported may or may not be able to respond to that opponent or the POEZ a threat may emerge from. If the supported operator can respond to it, then the support may increase the probability of successful response by both the supporting and supported operators. If the supported operator cannot respond to it, then the more opponent or threat emerging from POEZ is processed. The security of the supported operator is enhanced either way. However, the threat level posed by each of those opponents or POEZs may not be equal, so the supporting operator has to choose the priority of how the operator maintains readiness or responds to in regards to each one. Although that would be the decision of the supporting operator, supported operator can request or suggest which one should be handled with higher priority. There are different ways to provide support. A few types most often used among them will be explained here. When an operator executes maneuvering and positioning, areas unexamined will be revealed as it comes in to view. POEZs in those area will be known to the operator and the operator makes proper adjustment to the path so that some or all of those POEZs will be processed in the safest way possible or avoided. *****When to trail same path with no support role or let lead go alone due to no alternate path of similar safety level.

Offset: In this mode, an operator supporting another operator maneuvers or positions oneself in a manner that the supporting operator's position is offset to the supported operator in relation from the point of view of the POEZs the supported operator has to process. So, the POEZs will be observed by the operators from two different point of view. This requires a space in the area the maneuver paths goes thorough that is wide enough for a two parallel path that is offset to exist. Also the offset path the supporting operator takes should not pose more risk to the supporting operator than a path the operator would have taken if the operator was acting alone. For that reason, the offset path is often an alternate path to the path the supported operator has taken with similar risk a lone operator can choose from in order to go through an area.

Path filling: In a single operator's path, there are positions of tactical advantage in relation to unexamined POEZs in the path of the operator. The position of advantage is left because th operator has to reach a certain destination or other necessities. Supporting operator tailing the operator taking that position that holds a tactical advantage in relation to POEZs the supported operator is exposed to, while the operator advances through the portion of the path where the occupation of the position by the supporting operator would help, would be of benefit. Also, an operator can only effectively observe a limited range of direction in field of view at a given moment. When maneuvering to reveal unexamined area, the operator's priority of focus would be on the new revealed areas. It's not always possible to process and clear every POEZ that is connected to revealed areas. As the operator advances thorough a selected path, examining new revealed areas or processing a POEZ, the operator may have to look away from the examined area along with any

unexamined POEZ that the operator is exposed to that connected to the examined area. If there is a supporting operator is a position to observe those unexamined POEZs the supported operator is exposed to, but cannot act upon immediately, it would be of benefit. The supporting operator can simply trail the supported operator and maintain position to observe unexamined POEZs the supported operator is exposed to when the supported operator is unable to immediately act upon those POEZs. In this mode, a supporting operator simply moves or positions along the path of the supported operator has taken or will be taking, and fills in a role the supported operator was doing or would do.

In the example in the picture above, an single operator can move from Position 1 to Position 2, then move to Position 3. When operator is in Position 2, the operator would not be able to act upon any POEZ or opponent emerging from area that is observable from Position 1 or Position 3. If there is a supporting operator tailing, it would be

beneficial for the supporting operator to be in Position 1 while the supported operator is maneuvering between Position 1 to Position 2 and Position 2 to Position 3.

Also in the example in the picture above, a single operator can take a path from Position 1 to Position 2, then Position 2 to Position 3. It would be beneficial for an operator in Position 3 if there is a supporting operator in Position 2 to observe POEZ 2 while the operator is examining POEZ 1. It is also possible for a supporting operator to move to Position 3 while the supported operator remains at Position 2.

Overwatch: In this mode, a supporting operator positions oneself where some degree of protection exists or take a position of advantage in relation to POEZs in area the supported operator would maneuver through. However, it is different from doing the same in Path Filling mode because the supporting operator is not maneuvering or positioning oneself along the path of the supported operator in an effort to fill in a role the supported operator was doing. The supporting operator may not be maneuvering with the supported operator at all. For this reason, the supporting operator may not be able to see all POEZs that are observable from the point of view along the supported operator's path.

Supporting operator would change between various modes according to situations. When supported operator took a certain path to traverse through an area, and there is no alternate path through that area that has equal or better security, supporting operator may have to trail the supported operator and support by path filling whenever there is an opportunity. However, there are many situations where only one path through an area exist or where all path except one has significantly high risk to move through. There's also many situations where path filling is not feasible. So, even if there are multiple operators, there are many situations where an operator cannot give or receive support. When there is an alternate path that has equal or better security, supporting operator would now have an option to offset or move into a position where some protection exist and provide overwatch.

Principles of support effectiveness assessment and utilization: The manner and degree of support and its effectiveness available will vary greatly according to situations. There are conditions that needs to be met in order to make support highly effective: -Supporting operator is able to observe and any opponent emerging in area the operator is acting on and able to deliver effective fire. -Supported operator moves only in the area where any emerging opponents would be exposed to supporting operator before being able to attack supported operator. -Supporting operator's effective fire can be delivered before emerging opponent is able to deliver effective fire on covered operators. Not all of these conditions can always be met. Also, even within a same area where support is provided, the support can be effective in denying an opponent's action emerging from some POEZs, less effective in denying an opponent's action emerging from some other POEZs in different locations within the same area, and not effective at all in regards to some other POEZs. Supported operator's maneuvering and positioning can affect how much effective support can be, even it is regarding same supporting operator in same position. When an operator is receiving support, it's the supported operator's responsibility to assess the effect of any support provided, and take action according to it. It is only the supported operator who is in the position where all POEZs or opponents, terrain, and other things in the supported operator's environment the operator is exposed to is visible. Some of those POEZs or opponents, terrain, and other things in the supported operator's environment would not be observable to a supporting operator. Operator receiving support should rely on their own assessment about one's own situation, including how effective support received would be in regards to one's plan of actions, to make course of action decisions. In this case, the support may not be ineffective, but the effectiveness is reduced.

One basic form of utilizing support is an operator maneuvering through areas that most POEZ the operator is exposed to would have another operator ready to respond to things emerging from those POEZs. The picture above is a simple example of that. Operator in the middle is maneuvering through zone where the other operator can respond to any opponent emerging from POEZ A before the operator is exposed to that opponent. The hallway example in the picture below illustrates a similar situation.

Denial of use of area in more than one location: Another mode of support is for an operator to indirectly benefit the group by denying opponents from using areas or paths in areas other operators are not present. Multiple operator enables the team to simultaneously observe and deny the opponent use of more than one area. This give the operators more options, because they can exert control over more than one area at the same time and one or more member can be left in certain location to keep important areas observed. Simple example of that can be an operator in a concealed location standing by to respond to any opponents emerging on a path that leads to where operators are. The effect is higher when the number of path or area the operator has to cover is smaller and the area is narrower. Another example is something like a sniper in a concealed location with a wide operation area in field of view attacking any threat that emerges by

opportunity. While that may not completely stop opponent's activity or eliminate the probability of operators in the area being attacked by opponents, it will diminish opponents' effectiveness by discouraging them from utilizing area they consider to be exposed to the sniper fire. And, it may also force them to use some of their resources to locate and attack the sniper. Multiple areas or paths of tactical significance opponents need each being controlled by one or few operators in position of tactical advantage can force opponents to give up those areas or use significantly higher resources and take significantly higher risk to take control of those areas. Speed of maneuver: Assuming no effort to give or receive support, speed of maneuver would be as same as a single operator operation. However, an operator who wants to utilize support would maneuver as a phase that would give supporting operators opportunity to provide support. An operator who desire to support another operator would maneuver to where one can provide support, and would need to maneuver according to the phase of the supported operator to achieve that goal, however the phase would be limited to where one's own security would not be sacrificed for the sake of the supported operator. If an operator wants support from another operator is maneuvering faster than the speed operator expected to provide support determines to be sound, then the operator should either slow down or not expect support availability. Operators with problematic personality may coerce others to move faster than what others determine is appropriate. And, some of those with problematic personality may get hyper and tries to continuously increase the phase of the action with no sound tactical basis. Points to be cautious about.

------------------------------------------------------------------------Efficiency of utilizing multiple operators: There are often situations where a single operator approaching a certain area is exposed to multiple POEZ that is difficult for the operator to effectively be ready to respond to events in all of them at the same time. The risk is raised when directional dispersal of those POEZs is large. Having another operator to support by being in position to be able to respond to events in some of those POEZs may be helpful. However, there are situations where the other operator getting in position for that support would result in invading each others' individual work space. Some times getting into position for support may be obstructed by the

presence of each other. There are also situations where the other operator cannot get into a position for that support without getting into a position where the supporting operator would be in the very same danger the supporting operator is trying to get rid of for the supported operator, nullifying the purpose. Maximizing the number of operators actively providing support does not equate increase in security. Support contributing to increase in security depends on the manner it is done. If done in a wrong manner, it can decrease security. So, operators need to evaluate the situation and decide between providing support in a proper manner or seek options other than providing support that cannot be provided in a secure manner. That can mean letting an operator go through situations as an individual, or provide less than optimal support for another while maintaining security for one's own. There are various causes that create those kind of situations. Many structures have access ways, such as hallways that connects multiple rooms, that are not wide enough for more than one operator to have individual work space, and often not even enough to allow an optimal work space for even a single operator. That often results in a single operator in front doing most of the examination of new revealed spaces. Also, there are situations where examination of new revealed area has to be done from a very small area that can occupied by only one operator and there's no other place another operator can place oneself in order to support the operator without being in more danger than if the other operator was operating alone. Here are some examples that illustrate the points:

This is an example of where Area 1 and Area 2 has to be examined. The picture above illustrate an example of how a single operator would maneuver to complete the task. If there is another operator available to support the operator by Path Filling method, the supporting operator would try to control the area the supported operator is exposed to that the supported operator has already examined but is no longer oriented toward to observe, in order for the supported operator to examine new areas. The supporting operator would take a position where one is not exposed to areas the supported operator has not examined yet. However, in the above example, when the supported operator is in position from Position 3 to Position 4, there is no place a supporting operator can place oneself in such manner. Supporting operator in Position 2 trying to be ready to respond to even from unexamined area in Area 1 would be obstructed by the supported operator. Also, a supporting operator trying to get to Position 3 to guard both operators from

opponents in Area 2 can be obstructed by the supported operator in Position 4. However, when the supported operator moves into Position 5, the supporting operator can move to Position 3 for support.

The situation illustrated above is a situation similar to the first example. But, it is a situation more difficult for operators to process. If an operator gets in Position 4 or Position 5 to examine Area 1, the operator would be significantly exposed to a space in Area 2 that is not examined. Attempting to examine Area 2 first is possible. However, that would also result in a similar risk by exposure to unexamined space in Area 1. So, with a single operator, the space in Area 1 that is examined by getting in to Position 4 and Position 5 in the first example may have to be instead examined by momentary controlled exposure technique, such as quick peak motion, from a small area on or near Position 3. It is impossible or very difficult for another operator, if present, to get in any position to support the operator when the operator in front is on or near Position 3.

There are some coordinated movement techniques that has been used to deal with the problems presented in the first example. One example of such technique is operators quickly moving to mutual support position such as illustrated in the above picture. In order to deal with being exposed to multiple new revealing areas in multiple directions, operators use quick motion to expose themselves to unexamined area for observation while each operator relies on others for protection from threats in other operator's new revealed area the operator is exposed to but not oriented toward. Example such as in the above illustration is often used by some operators to process going through a hallway that intersects with the middle of another hallway. There are some problems associated with such techniques. Each operator's survival is reliant upon other operator's success in coordinated movement and able to deal with any threat once an operator get in to an intended position and orientation. If any operator fails to execute the motion can endanger other operators executing the technique with the assumption that all others would succeed.

Another risk is that even if all operators executed the motion successfully, if one operator fails to stop a threat the other operators rely only on that operator to control, all operators are in danger. And, since operators are suddenly exposing themselves to new revealing area with significantly less control compared to controlled exposure methods, there is no way for them to know if each operator would be able to reliably protect all operators from threats that might be in the new revealed area or what each claims as their area of responsibility. So, to some degree, it possess the same dangers of blindly entering unexamined spaces. Also, operators may expose themselves to more amount of unexamined area that has to be examined and processed very quickly in order to quickly move to one's designated position in such technique. That increases the risk of missing details in the larger amount of new revealed area that is processed in a hurry.

Compared to Momentary Exposure method that does not allow opponent enough time to observe the operator and take action to attack involved in controlled exposure technique, the above technique requires operators to lock themselves in a position even if they find the position indefensible which cannot be known until the technique is executed. The risk in the above situation would be overwhelmingly higher.

All of the above risks sharply rises even more if operators choose to execute a simultaneous blind entry into multiple spaces to deal with the multiple direction multiple new revealing area problem, such as illustrated in the following picture.

In the picture above, multiple operators execute simultaneous high speed blind entry into Area 1 and Area 2 in the second example to deal with the problem of being exposed to one of the area while maneuvering to examine the other. Considering the high risk involved in fast phased blind entry into unexamined spaces, this can create more risk than the risk operators were trying to avoid. This does not mean those who use such mutually reliant coordinated techniques are always wrong. There are situations where such measures are needed or justified for some type of operators. But, it should not be a common approach for type of operators who are the subject of this research.(****More details on Tactical Critic section) The situation where lack of maneuver space for more than one operator, lack of acceptably secure location from where an operator can support another being a limitation increases when operators insist in being in close proximity and all taking a single path to a destination area.

Utilizing multiple maneuver path can reduce that limitation. When there are multiple maneuver path in an area to examine the area or get to a certain destination, there are situations where a certain space one group of operators intend to pass can be better controlled or examine from an area accessible by different path. There are also situations where an area accessible to one group of operators is the best position to control or examine a space a different group of operator intends to pass. So, utilizing multiple maneuver path can allow one group of operators to control or examine spaces another group needs to pass when it would pose an unacceptable risk for the other group to examine the area from their path.

For example, if the structure in the second example had a window or a doorway that gives access to Area 1 and Area 2 other than from the center hallway, as in the picture above, operators would have more option to control both areas with operators positioned on those access points compared to trying to examine and control Area 1 and Area 2 from maneuvering through the center hallway alone.

Simply concentrating number of operators in a certain area will not always result in superiority, and is very likely to result in decrease of security. Tactically sound maneuvering and positioning options in a given environment is limited, because factors such as objects in area that provides protection form gun fire, maneuver space, etc. are limited. If concentration of operators in a given area exceeds options available in a given environment, the risk will increase significantly. When an operator finds oneself in a situation where tactically sound maneuvering or positioning options in a given space are already used by other operators and no more option is available, the operator has an option to trail the other operators from a relatively safe distance to make oneself available when an option do becomes available or seek an alternative space to maneuver through. A thing to be cautions about trailing other operators in that context is that operators can be coerced out of it to join in a space where no sound maneuvering or positioning option is available when working with people with problematic personalities or ignorant of sound principles because those people may see operators being present without a visible role as taboo when there's no better option. Operators with low knowledge level being educated about trailing as an option may reduce this risk, but it will likely remain a problem with operators with certain personalities until they're replaced. Effectiveness of multiple operator utilization in terms of maneuver and positioning depends on maneuvering and positioning of each operator done in a manner that gives each most advantage. As obvious as that may seem to be, it is not always understood.

1.2 Basics of Coordinated Efforts Coordinated action plan means each operators action has to be within certain parameters in relation to status of other operators as a part of a group plan. The plan can be something that is prepared specific to a certain operation, a certain action format with great complexity, or a generic simple sequence that can be improvised to adapt to a given situation, or something new made up during an operation. People may be easily led to a mistaken belief that team action that requires operators to coordinate their actions with others would enhance their security by itself. That belief is false. If not done in proper manner, it will result in operators being restricted by that coordination requirement to be tied to a action plan that would actually endanger them. That situation can get manipulated by opponents which will allow a lone or relatively very few opponents to inflict large casualties on operators who does not have expert level skill who often responds with a very predictable and commonly known team techniques. As of now, with the exception of specialized unit that consists of very few people, that is the case with many organization that may conduct operations that involves combat as a team. In order for a coordinated group action to be helpful, the action plan has to be a good one, and operators actually have to succeed in executing the coordination action at a minimum. For their action to be coordinated, each operator has to perform a specific action at a specific time frame at a specific space in relation to others. Tracking that status requires mental processing power, diminishing the amount available for other tasks, which increase risks. The risk is taken under the assumption that security enhanced by the coordinated action is greater than security diminished. Failed coordinated team effort may result in diminishing both, individual and group security. So, it should be recognized that individuals not trained for coordinated team operation or have not worked or trained together may be better with avoiding sophisticated form of coordinated action plans. Operators needs information for that coordination which they obtain by direct sense such as visual observation or communicating with other operators, so that the operator would know what action is needed, how to take the action, and when and where to take action, etc., in relation to others to carry out the action plan.

Minimum information and communication requirements: When an operator desires a coordinated action the request and should be communicated unless the action is something preplanned. In any case, whether the request is communicated or not, there should be an acknowledgment from at least the participants that has a significant role an operator considers would be participants that the coordinated action

plan will actually be executed. What action is planned or requested needs to be communicated, if not agreed upon by planning prior to the operation. If there is any alterations in the plan or problems in performing designated action by any member, it needs to be communicated. However, there should be an understanding that it operators may not be able to communicate information various reasons. So, the risk of communication and information gathering failure possibility should be a factor in coordinated action planning. Operators would need to know about all participants' tactical situation as much as possible. Action plan with operators placed in a way that they can easily observe each other and others' situation would be beneficial in that regard. Radio communication capability somewhat relaxes that restriction but come at a risk of distraction of operating the radio and elements in the environment that may hinder radio communication. Verbal communication is often used in audible range, but it has a risk of everyone in hearing distance receiving the information, so it has to be used with that in mind. Use of codeword may reduce the risk. An example of what not to do in executing coordinated effort is often seen in entertainment shows where an actor shouts Cover me! then moving through a zone exposed to opponent's fire without checking opponent's position, seeing of other operators are in a situation where such cover fire is possible, and without any acknowledgment from other operators. Other operators in those movies or TV shows know exactly what the protagonist mean and available for such support only because the writer said so in a script handed out to the actors. Such would not be the case in an actual operation. Another example of what not to do is too much verbal communication, especially when the content is readily recognizable. Some teams in certain organization emphasizes communication in a wrong way that members are used to shout almost every step of the action plan they're about to execute or what situation they're in. A team leader shouting Stack up! to prepare the team for a dynamic entry into an adjacent room that allows everyone in the next room to prepare for what is about to happen is not a good procedure. So is automatically shouting I'm out of ammo! or Reloading or Malfunction, advertising to everyone in hearing distance that the operator is defenseless when any help being available is not even known. For even a basic form of coordinated effort such as an operator moving through an area exposed to a POEZ that another operator is standing by to react to any threats emerging from it requires a number of conditions to be met in order to be executed properly. The supported operator needs to communicate the request for support and get acknowledgment from the supporting operator who is willing to provide the support. The supported operator also need to be sure if the supporting operator is in a tactical situation where one can provide such protection from the POEZ. The both need to be sure the POEZ or opponent the supporting operator is reacting to or standing by to react to is the same one intended by the supporting

operator. Even when those conditions are met, the supporting operator maneuvering through the zone exposed to the POEZ has to be ready to react to threats emerging from other POEZs the supporting operator cannot react to. And, to some degree the supported operator still has to be cautions about potential threats from the POEZ the supporting operator is guarding against, because the support may terminate when the supporting operator has to react to unexpected threat.

Fail safe: Security of executing a coordinated action plan is enhanced if the plan's success has less reliance on members' following of the coordinated plan. When operators are taking a group action, coordination failure would have the least impact if the coordination was purely a supplemental measure, meaning that each operators could have taken actions independently with no reliance on others part of the action for their security. When degree of that reliance increases, the risk of coordination failure rises. Also, when the degree of sophistication of coordination increases the probability of coordination failure rises. To minimize that risk and probability, all other factors being equal, less sophisticated plan with less reliance would be better. However, some degree of sophistication and reliance on another operator for security may be necessary in some situations. If those cannot be avoided, there is a need for a contingency plan for when such coordinated effort has failed. If there is a portion of the coordinated action plan where failure of a few or failure to follow a sophisticated script can be catastrophic, such plan either needs to be revised or at least there should be a back up plan in case of failure. However, often there may be no feasible contingency plan, and it is also not practical to expect an endless chain of contingency plan and a contingency plan for the contingency plan, etc. This in turn illustrates the importance of basics that started with Independent Individual mode operators can fall back into when all else fails, which would still give all operators an idea of what to expect of others even when not operating by an orchestrated plan. That is one reason why operators being a well disciplined individual is important rather than one who are only comfortable as a team player. There can also be situations where the coordinated action is interrupted or operators are not sure if the plan has been completed or terminated. This can happen in situations such as when operators lose contact with another. The following is one example of such situation. An operator is given an assignment to hold position and attack opponents emerging in a certain area as a part of a coordinated plan. Then the group was forced to abandon the plan and move away from the area, but that information was not conveyed to the operator holding the part of that area. There should be a plan as an individual operator and as a group regarding such

situation. Such plan would make operators be able to check and assess the situation and decide to terminate participation of the preplanned coordinated action on their own. In an organization, individuals should not be hindered from making such decisions or altering plan of action on their own, and such action should be expected since that is critical to their survival when an individual's contact with one's group is cut or the plan is not working. As an organization, such plan would ensure situational information is relayed properly to lower the probability of coordination failure. All of the risk associated with coordinated action plan is when such effort is executed in form of a script, which unfortunately consists a bulk of it. Automated scripted group response being adopted as a standard response to any threat is a wrong approach. Contact with an opponent is a dynamic event, and no one set of scripted action plan would be a proper response in all possible way a contact can occur. So, dictating an operator's action such as always return fire first while holding ground then execute a 'peel(a well known group coordinated action technique where majority of the group returns fire while holding a certain formation while members execute evasive maneuver one or few at a time)' or always run to cover first then return fire. Some times it may be safer to execute an evasive maneuver first, and some other times it may be safer to execute a gunnery process and attack opponents first. This issue is made further complicated because even in a single group in a certain situation, each operator's tactical situation is different. When a group of operators come into contact, some of the operators may receive hostile fire first while in the open which can make returning fire in a static position a reaction that is likely to get them shot first while some other operators in the same group are not detected by the opponents and have a good shooting opportunity which might make it more proper as an individual to attack by fire first before maneuvering to a protected area. Forcing all operators to follow a scripted action so that either all of them execute evasive maneuver first or all of them stand their ground and return fire first would be a dysfunctional approach. A situation should be processed by tactical principles, not by reliance on a set of scripted actions. Proper coordinated action require takes mental processing power, diminishing the amount available for self protection. The risk is taken under the assumption that security enhanced by the coordinated action is greater than security diminished. Failed coordinated team effort may result in diminishing both, individual and group security. So, it should be recognized that individuals not trained for coordinated team operation or have not worked or trained together may be better with avoiding sophisticated form of coordinated action plans. Additional benefits of team operation: Workload can be divided

Increased lethality when firepower is concentrated Additional risks of team operation: Freedom of selecting course of action may be limited. Individual freedom of position, maneuver path, utilization of shielding selection may be limited due to team responsibility. Individual operator does not have freedom to choose speed of action The tactical principles applied that makes individual operator secure will be in effect regardless of number of operators involved. Tactics of multiple operators should aim to enhance the benefits of having multiple operators and reduce the associated risk. For coordinated action to be a benefit and not a liability, operators need a correct understanding of what each coordinated action is intended for and what it can realistically achieve. For that goal, let's examine a well known existing coordinated action technique. One example of a well known coordinated action technique is a way many units in various organization tries to utilize Bounding Overwatch. There are many ways to execute a Bounding Overwatch method, some correct and some are wrong. The way it is utilized in many organizations would be similar to the following example:

In this scenario, there is a group of 4 operators who need to approach a structure. The group is divided into two elements. Specific individual is assigned to each 2 person element for those 2 specific individual to always work in a pair. Their plan is for an element to take position in Position 1 and protect the other 2 person element to maneuver to Position 2. When the element moved to position 2 takes position, element in Position 1 would maneuver to Position 3 while being protected by element taken position in Position 2. When element from Position 1 take position in Position 3, they would provide protection to element in Position 2 while element in Position 2 maneuvers to Position 4. Each element is supposed to know when the other element is in position to protect them by the other element shouting In Position! which would dictate when the element can start to maneuver. The other element is supposed to know that the element has started to maneuver when the element shouts Moving!

It's a basic form of technique that appears fancy, and demonstrates discipline when well done since it requires heavy effort with a lot of communication for coordination, especially under contact. These type of technique probably originated from military drills, and it provides an easy reference with those who tend to mimic those kind of military drills when they need a team action plan. However, the plan as presented above is a classic example of what not to do in a coordinated action efforts for a number of reasons. First, it dictates two specific individual to always work in pair when there are great probability that one individual from each element reacting together would be better, forcing them either split up from their designated two person element or keep working together with their designated two person element with lower effectiveness. This is just a minor problem because most organizations have learned to adopt to the situation and allow operators to join and work with an element that the operator was not originally assigned to. Critical problems with the plan is explained in the following:

First critical problem with the plan is the false premise that operators in the left side position can protect operators maneuvering in the right side and operators in the right side can protect operators maneuvering in the left side. The above illustration clearly shows that operators in Position 1 or Position 3 cannot provide any protection from Opponent 1 when operators is Position 2 maneuvers to Position 4. They're also ineffective against Opponent 2. Let's review the basics to see where this plan went wrong. Operators are moving forward in a two parallel path that is offset. This is a basic form of offset method for giving and receiving support. One of many reasons for offset is to provide different view point so that an operator can observe what operators in other position cannot. It also increase the probability that opponent would be forced to respond to operators in multiple direction. There is no guarantee that an operator would be protected by another operator in an offset position. Operators should strive to know why certain actions are done and what outcome can be reasonably expected.

Second critical problem is that they're wasting their energy and restricting their maneuver options by letting it be dictated by the coordinated action script for no benefit in return. As long as operators take caution to not get in another operator's line of fire, which can be done without such plan, there is no reason why any operators can't move to any of the above position for the sole reason that another operators are not in some pre-planned position. For example, if there was contact with opponents, there's no reason why operators in Position 2 cannot move to Position 4 for the sole reason that Operators in Position 1 has not moved to Position 3. Another problem is that on top of the operators demonstrating the team play script for the sake of team play script syndrome, they are announcing what they are doing and what they intend to do and when that action would take place in a loud voice for every opponent in hearing distance to know. Especially considering that these type of team play script is well known, it would aid opponents to execute a hasty ambush or other counter actions.

Principles of support: Enough separation for free maneuver, but not too far for effective communication of support. Concentration of operators in a space to a degree they would be making body contact obstructing movements should be avoided unless there is a specific need, such as stacking together to make near simultaneous movements through a narrow entry point. Different location resulting from the separation allows an operator to observe area other operators cannot see. POEZ can be divided among operators, and each operator can take position to effectively observe POEZ other operators are not immediately observing or cannot observe. However, an operator observing a certain POEZ does not mean other operators are safe from opponents emerging from the POEZ. In order for an operator to guard other operators against potential opponents appearing from the POEZ, the operator has to position oneself in a manner that other operators will not be in the opponents view before the opponent be exposed to the operator to attack. Proper assessment of risk vs. benefit of dividing and distributing areas or opponents to be processed and concentrating operators processing ability on an area or opponent should be made. Relational positioning with consideration to field of view, field of fire, and maneuvering needs to be a factor in maneuvering and positioning.

Lets examine the above points in more depth with an example: The following example is a hypothetical situation where two operators are advancing forward and needs to handle threats that emerge in their front 180 degree direction. It's a very simplified situation where all parties are in open ground.

In the above picture, operators are positioned very close side by side. This would restrict their movement and visibility. Is there a specific need that justifies this? In this example it is unlikely there is a reason that would justify the risk. However, some organization trains people to do maneuver forward this way without a proper reason. Some of them bay do it because they are training for a specific situation where there is a justifiable reason for that method, but that condition is often not explained leaving the trainee to use the method even outside of the context of what makes the method justifiable.

This positioning gives both operators individual work space and also some room to execute evasive maneuver. An operator's unpredictable maneuver can result in the maneuvering operator to get in a position that obstructs other operator's line of fire causing the other operator to lose an opportunity to attack an opponent or even the operator who did the maneuver getting shot by accident, so each operator should keep awareness of other operator's position and situation as much as possible to maneuver in a position that would cause that problem. In any cause, all operators should have the ability to adjust position and maneuver to address such problems even when such problems to arise. Some may advocate operators keeping themselves close, even maintaining body contact, to avoid such problems, but that has a risk of increasing opponent's hit probability because it would likely make a missed shot by on opponent aiming one operator hit the other operator next to the intended target increasing effective target zone nearly twice. It also make operators even more easier targets because operators would be slower

in making any necessary maneuvers while trying to rigidly maintain that contact with each other. These risks are inevitable with such approach, while the risk of operators interfering with each other when they can maneuver independently is avoidable. The above positioning in the picture allows both operators to fire in most of the direction except for the direction that would come close to where line of sight would come close to another operator, so they can respond to any direction without taking extra time to change position with the exception of direction where both operators would be close to being in line. When an emerging opponent is in a direction that would make both operators positioned close to being in a line toward the opponent, one or both operators can maneuver to adjust their field of view. If direction one operator is unable to fire is hypothetically said to be 20 degrees, then the probability of that occurring out of possible 180 degree fan of direction would be 1/9. Positioning oneself in a certain relationship to another with the above tactical factors in mind creates what is known as formation. However, formation should be understood as merely a means to raise the probability of operators being in position where they would be effective when a contact occurs that can be abandoned as an operator sees fit, not something that gives an advantage just because it is maintained. Purpose of a formation is to serve operators security, operators should not sacrifice security in order to maintain a formation.

There are two approaches as to how the operators in this example process the front 180 degree space they are advancing toward. One is for both operators to monitor all the space. Another is to divide the space and each operator only monitor space that is assigned to oneself, such as dividing the space in half by left and right and operator in the left monitoring only the left side space and operator in the right monitoring only the right side space. The divide space approach has a risk that if the operator responsible for it fails to observe a threat, no operators would detect it that would lead to elimination of both. Another risk with that is in some cases operator who is assigned a different sector may be the only one who can observe a threat in a sector of another, and also the one exposed to any attack from the threat possibly emerging from that other sector. However, the divided sector approach helps operators to get more detailed observation in the sector they're assigned. So, it can be a good method in situations where the risk associated with it can be minimized. Another issue is regarding who reacts to a threat and how. Either

approaches regarding monitoring space can be taken. Both operators can respond to any opponent emerging in the entire space concerned, or they can take the divided sector approach with an opponent emerging in a certain sector only being responded by an operator assigned that sector and other operators guarding against threats that may emerge in their sector. With Independent Individual mode this would not be a question, since all operators would monitor all space and POEZ that may contain a threat and react to any opponent in any space that is a threat to them. With a divided sector approach in coordinated plan mode, the situation is different. If only the operators assigned a certain sector responds to emerging threats in that sector, then them failing to stop a threat in their sector can result in elimination of all operators who are exposed to that threat. There's also a risk that the threat may not be detectable to operators assigned the sector the threat is in when the threat can effectively attack other operators. If all operators react to opponents emerging in a certain sector, the probability of the opponent's incapacitation and time it takes for it to occur would be enhanced. But, it comes at a cost of the operators assigned other sectors being in less readiness to respond to threats that may emerge in those sectors. So, whether if the operators processing ability should be concentrated in one sector or divided and maintained in each one's assigned sector depends on assessment of all of the above mentioned risks. When two operators exposed to an opponent who can easily shoot both of them, it would be hard for an operator to ignore the threat only because the threat is not located in one's assigned sector. With skill and tactical situation assumed to be equal, the probability of other operator successfully stopping attack from the opponent is only 50%, and the operator depending on something that has a 50% probability of success to keep one alive would be unacceptable. But, if there are multiple operators already concentrating attack on a single opponent and an operator is in a location where one is not in immediate danger, it may be more prudent for the operator to keep monitoring one's assigned sector.

Area denial: There was an explanation earlier about small number of operators in position of tactical advantage controlling areas or paths of tactical significance. Although it being done in an opportunistic manner can be effective in denying opponents from use of those areas, or forcing them to use more resources to counter it, or take high risk actions to gain control over those areas, that being done in a coordinated manner can significantly increase those effects.

With coordinated effort to deny areas, operators can restrict opponent's safe maneuver path and even contain it within path or areas operators control. It is also possible to contain a safe maneuver path within zones under operators' control. Containing opponents safe maneuver path in zones operators control would be generally used in an operation area that is controlled by operators. When opponent's location is unknown, this can be used to divide areas into multiple sectors that each sector will act as a containment when opponent contact is made. Once opponents are detected, operators can maneuver into the area in a manner that gives them advantage and shrink the containment until the come in contact with the opponents which should be designed to occur in a manner that gives the operators advantage. Otherwise, operators can hold position there they have advantage and wait for opponents to make contact. The approach can also be used to isolate opponents in different sectors from each other. Containing operators safe maneuver path within zones operators control is usually done when operators are guarding themselves from an possible threats in area they do not have positive control that surrounds them. It is designed to make any threat having to maneuver through zones operators control in order for the threat to reach operators, and operators would try to maintain that containment until whatever they are trying to accomplish in the relative safe zone in the containment is completed. In a escape situation, the containment is to create a safer evacuation path. In some cases, full containment is not feasible and operators may chose to control only limited areas. In any case, for that coordination to be effective, operators need to know what area is controlled and how. Information about what area is controlled by another operator and how, especially regarding other operators and areas out of operators view, somehow needs to be obtained. If it's not obtained through direct sense such as visual observation, it has to be communicated. A single operator can barricade oneself in a certain location if the area behind the operator is physically contained. Operators working as a team gives them an option to place one or more of their member to observe access points other members left behind, so the area behind those members who continues to maneuver can do so in a more flexible and secure way. However, if operators are separated, it is done at the risk of diminished communication effectiveness. If the separation allows a POEZ that is not guarded against between separated operators, it will be a risk. So, it may be required that the trailing operators advance with the operators in the front of the groups movement, not to leave any POEZ in between. Or else, the groups movement may have to stop until more trail team is available.

1.3 Tasking characteristics / efficiency: Human factor: BE CAUTIOUS OF WHO YOU CHOOSE TO WORK WITH: People an operators choose to work with should have an objective oriented mind set. Losing sight of the objective or disregarding it is one common reason why some personalities become a problem. The professions that involves armed confrontations tend to attract more machismo driven domineering ego type characters more than others. People with personalities that desires to dominate others for ego should be avoided. Also, that type of personality should be clearly distinguished from other personalities that is capable of being assertive for the right reason in proper manner. The difference is that sociopath ego driven people assert themselves to serve their ego, while the desired type of personalities assert their demand with a specific purpose of reaching a justifiable objective and what they assert is also justifiable. Another personality to watch out for is people who are interested in causing opponent casualties than operators' safety. Course of action to maximize opponent casualty is not always same as course of action that would maximize operator's safety potential. This can be seen as another ego issue. The difference with the ego issue examined earlier is that the earlier is a case of competition against peer while in this case it is a case of competition against opponents. Another risk is associated with operator's intelligence level. An operator who lacks intelligence will fail to comprehend tactical principles. Proper tactic involves examining a situation and selecting the best course of action which may be a rehearsed technique or such technique adjusted to fit a situation or even totally new course of action according to their understanding of tactical principles. Lacking that ability, those with less intelligence will often resort to just memorizing a set of techniques to deal with a limited type of situations they're expected to commonly encounter, then equate that with tactics. When coupled with a sociopath like personality, such an operator will create conflict with anyone taking course of action that is not consistent with their set of memorized techniques. Their way of dealing with combat is to go through a fixed sequence of actions of their memorized techniques, and they consider how well someone executes those fixed sequence of techniques as the most important and often the sole measure of tactical proficiency. Their thought process that determine their course of action is filled with rhetoric than principles. For example, sound principle will tell an operator to control their maneuver speed according to what would be appropriate to the situation. For people who use a garbage rhetoric like If you move slow, you'll die. to guide their action would always make hasty movement even when inappropriate. Because of that reason, their idea of security revolves around keeping the appearance of satisfying the set of rhetorical idea of security rather than actual security being achieved.