Neg Rps

UMKC SDI 2008 Kearney/Ross Lab – RPS Neg
RPS Negative
RPS Negative....................................................................................................................................................1
A2: Economy advantage...................................................................................................................................2
Uniqueness........................................................................................................................................................3
Uniqueness........................................................................................................................................................4
Resilience..........................................................................................................................................................5
Economy turns..................................................................................................................................................6
A2: Economic competitiveness........................................................................................................................7
Manufacturing turn...........................................................................................................................................8
Manufacturing turn...........................................................................................................................................9
Competitiveness = myth.................................................................................................................................10
A2: US-EU Trade war....................................................................................................................................13
Alternate causes..............................................................................................................................................14
No escalation..................................................................................................................................................15
Protectionism turn...........................................................................................................................................16
A2: Agriculture...............................................................................................................................................17
Volatility not a threat......................................................................................................................................18
Volatility not a threat......................................................................................................................................19
A2: Food riots.................................................................................................................................................20
A2: Water fights..............................................................................................................................................21
A2: Water fights..............................................................................................................................................22
A2: Judicial smackdown.................................................................................................................................23
Alternate cause................................................................................................................................................24
No spillover....................................................................................................................................................25
No solvency – inconsistency inevitable..........................................................................................................26
Clarity impossible...........................................................................................................................................27
No impact........................................................................................................................................................28
Solvency.........................................................................................................................................................29
Solvency.........................................................................................................................................................30
Solvency.........................................................................................................................................................31
Wind power link.............................................................................................................................................32
States CP.........................................................................................................................................................33
Plan is Popular................................................................................................................................................34
“Claim credit” – politics.................................................................................................................................35
Federalism link...............................................................................................................................................36
Topicality........................................................................................................................................................37
1
A2: Economy advantage
2
Uniqueness
We are not in recession – sectors have declined but consumer growth and other
areas have the US economy looking okay.
The Times (London), Anatole Kaletsky, “Two sliding sectors do not a US recession make” June 16,
2008 p. ln
But is America really in recession? Experts seem to think so, including Alan Greenspan, Warren Buffet,
George Soros and Martin Feldstein, the chairman of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the academic
committee in Boston that determines business cycle dates. But where is the evidence for this belief? To be sure, housing and
finance, two important parts of the economy, are in serious trouble. Yet housing now accounts for only 3.5 per cent of GDP,
down from a peak of 6.5 per cent two years ago, so most of the pain has already been felt there (in contrast to the situation in Britain
and Europe). The financial sector is bigger, employing 5.9 per cent of American workers, but only a small proportion of these are
employed in cyclically sensitive jobs related to mortgages or wholesale finance. These two sectors between them employ
far fewer people than the manufacturing and tradeable service industries that are benefiting from the
cheap dollar. And thus far the troubles in US banking and construction have been almost exactly offset by gains in America's
booming international trade. There is a world of difference between a dislocation confined to only one or two parts of the economy,
such as housing and finance, and a generalised economic decline. Remember the official definition of recession devised by the
NBER: "A recession is a significant decline in activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, visible in
industrial production, employment, real income and wholesale-retail trade. A recession influences the economy broadly
and is not confined to one sector." The difference between a general recession and a sectoral slowdown is
not just a semantic quibble. For businesses and workers, a slowdown is a period of weak growth, modest job losses and
disappointing profits; a recession is marked by mass unemployment and widespread bankruptcies. For the
financial markets, the two have totally opposite implications. In a recession, share prices collapse and the only safe assets are
government bonds; in a slowdown, there are big shifts in relative performance between stock market sectors, but equities generally
do well (as they did in the late 1990s and late 1980s) while safety first bond investors suffer enormous losses, as they did in 1994-95
and 1986 87. What, then, is the evidence of America moving into recession? Looking at the statistics used
by the NBER, there is little or none - at least so far. GDP has continued to grow, albeit slowly, in the past two
quarters and almost certainly will accelerate in the current quarter because of booming exports; industrial
production has been positive, as have real income and whole-retail trade. Employment has fallen slightly, but by
nowhere near as much as in the mildest of past recessions. Reliable high-frequency indicators, such as the monthly purchasing
managers' surveys, point to continuation of modest growth. Most importantly, consumer spending has remained
robust. American consumers, far from cutting back to bare essentials as was expected by bearish commentators after the credit crunch, are actually increasing their
spending. The evidence of this, contained in the strong retail sales figures for May published last Thursday, was by far the most important economic news of the past few weeks.
Yet these figures received almost no media coverage and little market attention. Yet May's retail sales figures revealed a picture completely at odds with conventional wisdom
about the US economy. Despite the jump in energy prices and the related collapse in measures of consumer confidence, retail sales rose by 1.1 per cent on the month, the
strongest gain since last November. Sales adjusted for inflation and excluding food and energy also showed gains much stronger than expected. Also April's sales, initially
thought to have fallen, were revised upwards to show a significant gain - and the two-month average of these volatile figures suggested that growth in the US consumer
economy is now similar to the rate a year ago, before the sub-prime crisis and credit crunch. This conclusion is not based on one set of good retail sales statistics, but includes
stronger-than-expected recent figures on industry sales, stocks, imports, exports, purchasing managers' surveys and even home sales. But in saying this, am I not forgetting
about the dreadful employment figures published last Friday, which triggered the collapse of the dollar I mentioned at the start? Not at all. Despite the shock-horror headlines
about a terrifying leap in unemployment from 5 to 5.5 per cent, employment figures for May were quite strong and fully consistent with the message of economic acceleration.
Rates of unemployment are irrelevant in timing the economic cycle, since they are a lagging indicator, turning some six to nine months after the economy as a whole.
Meanwhile, the job creation figures, which do reflect current economic conditions, showed a modest decline of 49,000 in payroll employment, exactly in line with expectations
and consistent with the economy growing at about 1.5 per cent, just slightly below the 2 per cent trend rate of productivity growth. Of course May's strong retail sales were due
in part to the tax rebates of $600 to $2,000 per household from the US Treasury from last month. Many analysts, therefore, dismissed the gains as misleading. But this was the
wrong response. The role of tax cuts in boosting consumer spending is a reason for optimism, not scepticism, about the economic outlook. The tax rebates were designed to
boost consumer spending and that is why we have always expected (in line with the Fed and the US Treasury) to see economic recovery from this summer. Retail sales figures
have now shown that the US tax cuts are working as planned. They will temporarily boost consumption - and by the time that this temporary tax boost runs out around
Christmas, the US economy will be starting to enjoy the benefits of lower interest rates, operating with a lag of 12 to 18 months. In much of this discussion, my optimism on US
economic statistics has been qualified by the weasel words "so far". But this can change. Until this month, sceptics could predict that trouble lay ahead for America once
consumers finally realised that their credit had run out. But the strong consumer response to the $110 billion tax rebate programme changes the balance of this argument.
With the rebates flowing into bank accounts and boosting real disposable incomes, the period of greatest
risk for the US economy has passed. For the next two quarters, disposable incomes will rise at an annualised rate of 8 per
cent or more and, given the normal lags between money appearing in bank accounts and flowing into shop tills, the tax rebates will
guarantee decently strong retail spending between now and Christmas - maybe a temporary consumer boom. If there were
going to be a US recession in response to the credit crisis, it would have started by now. So let me stick
my neck out and say without qualification - the US economy is out of the woods.
3
Uniqueness
The economy is looking to continue rebounding and growing.
Investor's Business Daily, “What Recession?” June 2, 2008 p. ln
The fact is that real GDP, viewed on a year-over-year basis, increased 2.5% in this year's first quarter --
the same as in last year's fourth. (Year-over-year comparisons, not quarter-to-quarter, are most telling.)
Thanks to the weaker dollar, the U.S. factory sector -- excluding automakers -- isn't doing too badly
either. Believe it or not, we're in the middle of an export boom, with double-digit gains posted the last 16
months in a row. Last week's revision of first-quarter (month-to-month) GDP growth to 0.9% from 0.6%
was due almost entirely to trade. And despite the slowdown in the overall economy, industrial output is
still up 1.3% so far this year -- not a sign of disaster. As for jobs, it's true that, since the start of the year,
some 220,000 nonfarm positions have been shed. But even that is moderating. In April, analysts expected
nearly 80,000 jobs would be lost; the reality was a far-smaller 20,000. And year over year, the number of
jobs is still rising. This is key, since we've never had a recession in which jobs kept growing. Yes,
unemployment at 5% is up a little more than half a percentage point from its cyclical low. But it's also
below the 5.4% average for the last 20 years. In any other year, this would be called dangerously low.
And though weak, aggregate hours worked, another key indicator, are also still on the rise. Even some of
the most troubled parts of the economy show signs of bottoming. New-home sales surprised everyone by
rising last month (though they're still off sharply from a year ago). Core inflation remains a tame 2%. And
real disposable personal income -- what you keep after taxes -- is growing at a 1.6% rate. As for the stock
market, it still looks like it bottomed two months ago. In short, while a recession is still possible, it hasn't
happened yet -- and every day that passes makes it less likely, not more. Don't get us wrong, the current
gloom is not without reason. But it's just that: gloom, not reality. Fact is, we're still in an expansion, albeit
a weak one. And with last year's Fed rate cuts about to kick in and continued stimulus from President
Bush's tax rebate and cuts, we could see a surprisingly strong economy later this year.
4
Resilience
High oil prices are not cause for concern – economies are insulated from negative
effects.
Economist.Com, “Despite a dip, a record is on the horizon” October 24, 2007 p. ln
Despite such assurances, speculators continue to bet that prices will march upwards. But what would
$100 a barrel mean for the world economy? Price shocks can certainly cripple economies, but that does
not mean they always will do so. In the past, spikes in the price of oil have created a "waiting" effect,
where firms stall investment to see if prices will fall back. The impact can seep through the economy,
affecting everything from industrial production to credit cards. Worst cases can lead to recession or the
dreaded "stagflation", when inflation soars and growth sputters. This time, however, could be different.
Adjusted for inflation, the $100 barrel would not exceed the record set in 1980. Also, big economies
today are generally better insulated from oil-price fluctuations. Developed countries use half as much oil
per real dollar of GDP as in the mid-1970s, thanks to improved energy efficiency. This year the price of
oil has increased by about 70% since January without stunting economic growth in America. Not only
could the world withstand higher prices, some argue that further increases would be beneficial. A growing
number of economists suggest that pricier oil is healthy, particularly for the environment. But the rise
must be gradual and predictable so that economies can adjust. Large and sudden increases are the ones
that tend to create recessions.
The global economy is resilient.

The Economist, “The turning point - The global economy” September 22, 2007 p. ln
Yet the global economy has taken some big blows during the golden age. In the last decade the rich world
has weathered the Asian financial crisis, Russia's debt default, the dotcom boom and bust, terrorist attacks
on America, sharp increases in oil prices and the uncertainty that came with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Still, economic volatility has not picked up. It is true that the abrupt curtailment of energy supplies to a
world that was highly dependent on oil was a unique and traumatic event. But economies were more
hidebound then: job markets were less flexible and producers more stymied by regulation. The painful
results cannot wholly be put down to energy dependency. The more likely explanation is that economies
have become far better at absorbing shocks, because they are more flexible. There are many structural
shifts that might have contributed to this, from globalisation to the decline of manufacturing in the rich
world. The academic literature keeps returning to three: improvements in managing stocks of goods, the
financial innovation that expanded credit markets, and wiser monetary policy. For such a tiny part of
GDP, the content of warehouses has had a surprisingly big effect on its volatility. When industries cut or
add stocks according to demand, that adjustment magnifies the effect of the initial change in sales. Stock
levels were once much larger relative to the size of the economy, so a small slip in demand could easily
blow up into a recession. But thanks to improvements in technology, firms now have timelier and better
information about buyers. Speedier market intelligence and production in smaller batches allows firms to
match supply to changing conditions. This makes huge stocks unnecessary and minimises the lurches in
inventories that were once so destabilising. The entire inventory of some lean-running companies now
consists of whatever FedEx or UPS is shipping on their account. Mr Cecchetti and his colleagues
calculate that, on average, more than half the improvement in the stability of economic growth in the
countries they studied is accounted for by diminished inventory cycles. That something so workaday as
supply-chain management could have so marked an effect might seem a dull conclusion. But dullness is a
virtue, because technological improvement is irreversible. This means the greater stability it provides is
likely to be permanent.
5
Economy turns
RPS kills consumer confidence.
EEI, Edison Electric Institute, 12/1/07. “Oppose the 15% Federal RPS Mandate in the Energy Bill.”
http://www.eei.org/industry_issues/electricity_policy/federal_legislation/EEI_RPS.pdf
Such a federal RPS mandate would raise electricity prices for consumers; upset ongoing renewable energy
programs in the states; create winners and losers among states, electricity generators and electricity suppliers; and
impose new burdens on electric reliability. Moreover, an RPS is not a solution to achieving energy
independence. The federal RPS mandate should be opposed for the following reasons: The RPS mandate could cost
electricity consumers billions of dollars in higher electricity prices, with no guarantee that additional
renewable generation will actually be developed.
RPS is economically unfair – it punishes poorer states.

EEI, Edison Electric Institute, 12/1/07. “Oppose the 15% Federal RPS Mandate in the Energy Bill.”
A nationwide RPS mandate will lead to a massive wealth transfer from electricity consumers in states
with little or no renewable resources to the federal government or to states where renewables are more
abundant. The RPS mandate is essentially an electricity tax, with the heaviest burden falling on states
without renewable resources.
6
A2: Economic competitiveness
7
Manufacturing turn
Federal RPS pushes domestic business overseas.
William Yeatman, Energy Policy Analyst at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and Myron Ebell, Director of Energy and
Global Warming Policy at CEI, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Gone with the Wind: Renewable Portfolio Standard Threatens
Consumers and the Industrial Heartland” June 12, 2007
Although 21 states have already passed a renewable portfolio standard, this is not an argument in favor of a federal RPS. These
RPS states tend to have a much higher potential for renewable energy, less energy-intensive
manufacturing, or both. In the RPS states that do have considerable manufacturing, the effect of adopting
an RPS has been to raise electricity prices and push manufacturing into states or other countries with
lower electricity prices. Therefore, a federal RPS would require states with low electricity prices and
proportionately lower renewable energy potential, such as is found in our industrial heartland, to raise electricity
prices to a level that would force their industries to migrate overseas to countries with cheaper energy
rates and no renewable portfolio standards.
State RPS systems do NOT force out countries – targeting low-cost regions with low-
wind-energy potential would be the straw that breaks the camel’s back.
Regions With a Comparative Disadvantage. By and large, states
that have adopted renewable portfolio standards
were already burdened with high electricity rates; most of them also have high wind potential. But not
every state suffers high electricity costs, nor is every state endowed with windy plains. For example, the
Southeast is a region where consumers enjoy some of the lowest electricity rates in the land, largely due to reliance on coal-fired
generation. On the other hand, the Southeast has the least wind potential in the country, closely followed by the Midwest. The
impact of a federal RPS on manufacturing regions with low electricity costs and low wind energy
potential promises to raise electricity rates considerably. (Map 4) Map 4 - U.S. Commerce Department Industry
Specialization Index, Manufacturing 6 According to the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis’ industry
specialization index, which measures states’ level of industrial specialization, the Upper Midwest and the Southeast are more
dependent on the manufacturing sector than other regions. Although manufacturers have moved their factories from
states with high electricity costs to these states with lower electricity costs, a federal RPS would then tend
to drive these industries to foreign countries with lower electricity rates. Conclusion. Depending on the current
cost of electricity and renewable energy potential, the economic impact of a federal renewable portfolio standard is
modest in some regions of the country and dire in others. State legislators have weighed the economic costs and benefits of an RPS
in their states and acted accordingly. Congress should not impose a federal renewable portfolio standard on those
states that have correctly judged that such a mandate would raise their consumer electricity prices and
destroy jobs in energy-intensive industries. While Members of Congress from some regions of the country may be
tempted to economically disadvantage states in other regions by voting for a federal RPS, they should recognize that it is not in
the nation’s interest to undermine any of our manufacturing industries.
8
Manufacturing turn
Manufacturing competitiveness key to the economy.
Jeff Faux, president of the Economy Policy Institute, "Why U.S. Manufacturing Needs A “Strategic
Pause” in Trade Policy" June 21, 2001
But as Figure 1 shows, job loss in manufacturing is a trend of two decades. It reflects the deterioration in the American industrial
base, which has now reached crisis proportions. Why does it matter? For several reasons: · Manufacturing is the
overwhelming source of productivity improvements and technological innovation in the U.S. economy. If
manufacturing were removed from the national productivity numbers, America would be left with a largely
stagnant economy. · Manufacturing is the traditional ladder of upward mobility for non-college graduates, who still make up the
majority of U.S. workers. It provides the high wage jobs that can lift people into the middle class. It is also a traditional means for
immigrants to assimilate into the economy. · It is critical for the diffusion of innovation. Without a healthy steel industry,
for example, the U.S. auto and aerospace industries would be laggards in the competitive race to produce new products with the
next generation of lightweight metals. · A strong industrial base has been essential for national defense throughout history.
Manufacturing competitiveness key to technological leadership.

RAND, Charles Kelley, Mark Wang, Gordon Bitko, Michael Chase, Aaron Kofner, Julia Lowell, James
Mulvenon, David Ortiz, Kevin Pollpeter, "High-Technology Manufacturing and U.S. Competitiveness"
March 2004
The charter of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) subcommittee on
Information Technology Manufacturing and Competitiveness is to examine issues surrounding the
migration of high-technology manufacturing from the United States to foreign countries. There is a
concern that an increasing share of manufacturing— especially high-tech manufacturing—formerly
performed in the United States is being done overseas with potentially harmful consequences to the U.S.
economy. In particular, the rise of the semiconductor industry in Asia has been at the heart of a public
debate: Should the U.S. government undertake steps to stem the migration of an industry that has meant
so much to the U.S. economy from moving offshore? The hypothesis that the nation’s long-term
economic security could be adversely affected by a migration of U.S. high-tech manufacturing to
overseas locations is based in part on the belief that a high-tech industrial base provides the financial
support and intellectual catalyst for innovative research and development (R&D). If that base stagnates,
or in a worse case, declines, support for R&D may diminish. With a less vigorous R&D base, it is feared
that the United States may not be able to maintain its leadership position in cutting-edge, high-tech
industries. As a result, fewer students might pursue higher-education degrees in the science and
engineering (S&E) fields because of reduced employment opportunities. A reduction in the number of
scientists and engineers could lead to the development of fewer innovative products with a seemingly
inevitable downward spiral of U.S. technological leadership and economic well-being.
Key to the economy.

Tony Friscia and Kevin O'Marah, AMR Research, "The Hidden Backbone of U.S. Manufacturing"
May 8, 2007
Manufacturing is essential to the long-term prosperity of the United States. As a driver of innovation and
provider of millions of highly paid jobs, U.S. manufacturing remains a cornerstone of the American
economy as well as a source of essential products for consumers. Productivity gains, which have annually
run in the 3% to 5% range since the mid-1990s, are only the most recent chapter in a story of
advancement, problem solving, and value creation that reaches back to the earliest days of
industrialization in the United States. But there are clouds on the horizon as the 21st century opens.
9
Competitiveness = myth
Competitiveness does not equate to corporation domination – market success is not
zero-sum
Paul Krugman, Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Foreign Affairs
March, 1994 ln
Moreover, countries do not compete with each other the way corporations do. Coke and Pepsi are almost
purely rivals: only a negligible fraction of Coca-Cola's sales go to Pepsi workers, only a negligible
fraction of the goods Coca-Cola workers buy are Pepsi products. So if Pepsi is successful, it tends to be at
Coke's expense. But the major industrial countries, while they sell products that compete with each other,
are also each other's main export markets and each other's main suppliers of useful imports. If the
European economy does well, it need not be at U.S. expense; indeed, if anything a successful European
economy is likely to help the U.S. economy by providing it with larger markets and selling it goods of
superior quality at lower prices.
The economic competitiveness hypothesis is wrong – overwhelming contrary

evidence proves
March, 1994 ln
Unfortunately, his diagnosis was deeply misleading as a guide to what ails Europe, and similar diagnoses
in the United States are equally misleading. The idea that a country's economic fortunes are largely
determined by its success on world markets is a hypothesis, not a necessary truth; and as a practical,
empirical matter, that hypothesis is flatly wrong. That is, it is simply not the case that the world's leading
nations are to any important degree in economic competition with each other, or that any of their major
economic problems can be attributed to failures to compete on world markets. The growing obsession in
most advanced nations with international competitiveness should be seen, not as a well-founded concern,
but as a view held in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence. And yet it is clearly a view that people
very much want to hold -- a desire to believe that is reflected in a remarkable tendency of those who
preach the doctrine of competitiveness to support their case with careless, flawed arithmetic.
10
International market competition has little effect on the economy
March, 1994 ln
It's important to notice, however, that the size of this lag depends not only on the amount of devaluation
but on the share of imports in spending. A 10 percent devaluation of the dollar against the yen does not
reduce U.S. real income by 10 percent -- in fact, it reduces U.S. real income by only about 0.2 percent
because only about 2 percent of U.S. income is spent on goods produced in Japan. There is no reason,
however, to leave this as a pure speculation; it can easily be checked against the data. Have deteriorating
terms of trade in fact been a major drag on the U.S. standard of living? Or has the rate of growth of U.S.
real income continued essentially to equal the rate of domestic productivity growth, even though trade is a
larger share of income than it used to be? To answer this question, one need only look at the national
income accounts data the Commerce Department publishes regularly in the Survey of Current Business.
The standard measure of economic growth in the United States is, of course, real GNP -- a measure that
divides the value of goods and services produced in the United States by appropriate price indexes to
come up with an estimate of real national output. The Commerce Department also, however, publishes
something called "command GNP." This is similar to real GNP except that it divides U.S. exports not by
the export price index, but by the price index for U.S. imports. That is, exports are valued by what
Americans can buy with the money exports bring. Command GNP therefore measures the volume of
goods and services the U.S. economy can "command" the nation's purchasing power rather than the
volume it produces. n3 And as we have just seen, "competitiveness" means something different from
"productivity" if and only if purchasing power grows significantly more slowly than output. Well, here
are the numbers. Over the period 1959-73, a period of vigorous growth in U.S. living standards and few
concerns about international competition, real GNP per worker-hour grew 1.85 percent annually, while
command GNP per hour grew a bit faster, 1.87 percent. From 1973 to 1990, a period of stagnating living
standards, command GNP growth per hour slowed to 0.65 percent. Almost all (91 percent) of that
slowdown, however, was explained by a decline in domestic productivity growth: real GNP per hour
grew only 0.73 percent. Similar calculations for the European Community and Japan field similar results.
In each case, the growth rate of living standards essentially equals the growth rate of domestic
productivity -- not productivity relative to competitors, but simply domestic productivity. Even though
world trade is larger than ever before, national living standards are overwhelmingly determined by
domestic factors rather than by some competition for world markets. How can this be in our
interdependent world? Part of the answer is that the world is not as interdependent as you might think:
countries are nothing at all like corporations. Even today, U.S. exports are only 10 percent of the value-
added in the economy (which is equal to GNP). That is, the United States is still almost 90 percent an
economy that produces goods and services for its own use. By contrast, even the largest corporation sells
hardly any of its output to its own workers; the "exports" of General Motors -- its sales to people who do
not work there -- are virtually all of its sales, which are more than 2.5 times the corporation's value-added.
Trade is not a determinant of competitiveness

March, 1994 ln
One might suppose, naively, that the bottom line of a national economy is simply its trade balance, that
competitiveness can be measured by the ability of a country to sell more abroad than it buys. But in both
theory and practice a trade surplus may be a sign of national weakness, a deficit a sign of strength. For
example, Mexico was forced to run huge trade surpluses in the 1980s in order to pay the interest on its
foreign debt since international investors refused to lend it any more money; it began to run large trade
deficits after 1990 as foreign investors recovered confidence and began to pour in new funds. Would
anyone want to describe Mexico as a highly competitive nation during the debt crisis era or describe what
has happened since 1990 as a loss in competitiveness?
11
Your “competitiveness” argument is based on meaningless rhetoric for three
reasons: 1. It is exciting, 2. It overlooks tough factors critical for solvency, and 3. It
is a useful distraction tool
March, 1994 ln
The competitive metaphor -- the image of countries competing with each other in world markets in the
same way that corporations do -- derives much of its attractiveness from its seeming comprehensibility.
Tell a group of businessmen that a country is like a corporation writ large, and you give them the comfort
of feeling that they already understand the basics. Try to tell them about economic concepts like
comparative advantage, and you are asking them to learn something new. It should not be surprising if
many prefer a doctrine that offers the gain of apparent sophistication without the pain of hard thinking.
The rhetoric of competitiveness has become so wide-spread, however, for three deeper reasons. First,
competitive images are exciting, and thrills sell tickets. The subtitle of Lester Thurow's huge best-seller,
Head to Head, is "The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, Europe, and America"; the jacket
proclaims that "the decisive war of the century has begun . . . and America may already have decided to
lose." Suppose that the subtitle had described the real situation: "The coming struggle in which each big
economy will succeed or fail based on its own efforts, pretty much independently of how well the others
do." Would Thurow have sold a tenth as many books? Second, the idea that U.S. economic difficulties
hinge crucially on our failures in international competition somewhat paradoxically makes those
difficulties seem easier to solve. The productivity of the average American worker is determined by a
complex array of factors, most of them unreachable by any likely government policy. So if you accept the
reality that our "competitive" problem is really a domestic productivity problem pure and simple, you are
unlikely to be optimistic about any dramatic turnaround. But if you can convince yourself that the
problem is really one of failures in international competition that -- imports are pushing workers out of
high-wage jobs, or subsidized foreign competition is driving the United States out of the high value-
added sectors -- then the answers to economic malaise may seem to you to involve simple things like
subsidizing high technology and being tough on Japan. Finally, many of the world's leaders have found
the competitive metaphor extremely useful as a political device. The rhetoric of competitiveness turns out
to provide a good way either to justify hard choices or to avoid them. The example of Delors in
Copenhagen shows the usefulness of competitive metaphors as an evasion. Delors had to say something
at the Ec summit; yet to say anything that addressed the real roots of European unemployment would
have involved huge political risks. By turning the discussion to essentially irrelevant but plausible-
sounding questions of competitiveness, he bought himself some time to come up with a better answer
(which to some extent he provided in December's white paper on the European economy -- a paper that
still, however, retained "competitiveness" in its rifle).
International trade is not zero-sum – major nations are not competitive with each
other
March, 1994 ln
International trade, then, is not a zero-sum game. When productivity rises in Japan, the main result is a
rise in Japanese real wages; American or European wages are in principle at least as likely to rise as to
fall, and in practice seem to be virtually unaffected. It would be possible to belabor the point, but the
moral is clear: while competitive problems could arise in principle, as a practical, empirical matter the
major nations of the world are not to any significant degree in economic competition with each other. Of
course, there is always a rivalry for status and power -- countries that grow faster will see their political
rank rise. So it is always interesting to compare countries. But asserting that Japanese growth diminishes
U.S. status is very different from saying that it reduces the U.S. standard of living -- and it is the latter
that the rhetoric of competitiveness asserts.
12
A2: US-EU Trade war
13
Alternate causes
Alternate cause - Boeing and Airbus.
The Globe and Mail (Canada), “Canadian hopes, global risks” July 14, 2008 lexis
Bombardier Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking Searchesis flying into some turbulent airspace as it
seeks to take on Boeing Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking Searchesand Airbus, the battling
powerhouses of the aerospace market. The U.S. government and European Union have been engaged in a
nasty trade war involving accusations and counteraccusations over subsidies for years. The World Trade
Organization is expected to rule on both trade actions later this year.
Alternate cause – bio-fuels.

Angus Robertson, Research Recap, “Transatlantic Trade Dispute Adds to Biofuels Woes” May 30,
2008 lexis
Sometimes it seems like biofuels are more trouble than they are worth. In addition to being criticized for
contributing to higher food prices and being environmentally questionable, a trade war between the US and the
European Union is bubbling up. In a new report Oxford Analytica looks at the decision of European
biodiesel producers to file an official complaint to the European Commission (EC) about subsidies to the US
biodiesel industry, which they regard as unfair.
A long full scale trade war is coming now.

Tony Glover, Business & Money, “Europe and America on flight path for trade war” September 23,
2007 lexis
The European Union and the US will this week move closer to a full-scale trans-Atlantic trade war. Only
this time, it won't be about bananas but aeroplanes. Europe's Airbus Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking
Searchesand the America's Boeing Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking Searchesboth argue that the other has benefited unfairly
from tens of billions of dollars and euros in state subsidies. Both have solicited government support for their case and neither shows
any intention of backing down. They admit the possibility of the hostilities developing into a full-scale trade battle. On Wednesday,
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) will hold its first dispute-settlement hearing on the European Commission's aircraft subsidies
case against Boeing. Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking SearchesThe EC alleges that Boeing Click for Enhanced Coverage
Linking Searchesreceives government subsidies in the form of US federal, state and local programmes that could total $23.7bn
(£12bn). Brussels argues that these give Boeing Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking Searchesan unfair competitive advantage.
The US government previously presented a similar case to the WTO relating to Boeing Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking
Searches's complaint that the France-based Airbus Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking Searcheshas benefited the most from state
subsidies in the form of at least $15bn in "launch aid" - an amount that grows to $205bn when compound interest is taken into
account. This weekend, both sides were squaring up to go the distance. Bob Novick, legal counsel for Boeing, Click for Enhanced
Coverage Linking Searchessaid: "The losing government has to decide what to do. If it fails to come up with compliance, the next
step from the winning government would be retaliation with the imposition of duties." But the EC is not afraid to fight its corner. A
spokesman Peter Mandelson, the European Trade Commissioner, told The Independent on Sunday: "Given the strength of our case
against Boeing Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking Searchessubsidies, we believe the EC could also impose sanctions. Any
sanctions imposed by the US ... will be met euro for dollar by the EU." Both sides are accusing the other of supplying inaccurate
information. Boeing Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking Searchessays that the $23.7bn figure cited by the EC is well wide of the
mark. "The $10.4bn that the EC claims Boeing Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking Searchesreceived from Nasa bears no relation
to reality. The real figure is about $750m," said Mr Novick. But this is disputed. A source at the EC said: "Although Boeing Click
for Enhanced Coverage Linking Searchesis claiming a figure of $750m, it is not backing up that number by showing us any actual
contracts and is simply asking us to take its figure without question. That is not a credible rebuttal." The EC also claims that Boeing
Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking Searchesreceived $2.4bn in subsidies from the US Defense Department. Mr Novick says that
figure is inaccurate as the contracts are not open to public scrutiny and that, in any case, research work carried out on jet fighters is
of little practical relevance to a company that specialises in civilian aircraft. According to Boeing, Click for Enhanced Coverage
Linking SearchesAirbus Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking Searchesalso benefits hugely from indirect subsidies in the form of
support from state-funded infrastructure projects. It claims that the city of Hamburg, for example, has provided more than ¤750m
(£525m) for the extension of Airbus Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking Searchesproduction facilities and that the A380
production site in Toulouse gains from infrastructure loans and grants totalling more than ¤180m. Despite an official line from both
sides of the Atlantic that a tit-for-tat trade war would be in no one's interests, both sides are becoming entrenched. "We would prefer
to reach a mutually acceptable solution than engage in a trade war," said Mr Mandelson's spokesman. "This is why, for two to three
years, we tried to negotiate with the US government to establish a new framework for support to large civil aircraft manufacturers.
However, it has not been possible to agree on realistic and balanced terms for such a negotiation." With a
judgment from the WTO not expected until well into next year, and with an appeal likely, both sides are
starting to dig in for a long winter campaign.
14
No escalation
EU’s trade commissioner will not sanction over climate change.
Financial Times, Vanessa Houlder, July 1, 2004 lexis
New calls for trade sanctions against countries that spurn the Kyoto global warming treaty have been
rejected by Pascal Lamy, the European Union's trade commissioner. Such action would risk sacrificing
the EU's long-term climate goals "for uncertain and short-term benefits", he said. He also warned it would
be "counterproductive to contemplate retaliatory action" when Russia had said it would speed up
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.
Even if the EU moved on the US over Kyoto, it would not sanction.

The Hill, Jonathan Kaplan, March 5, 2003 lexis
Now, the EC has threatened to slap tariffs on such U.S. goods as jewelry, textiles, electronic equipment,
steel, toys and sports equipment. The Hill obtained the list, which has not been made public. It includes
45 pages of goods subject to a 100 percent tariff. Some believe that the EC could target goods made in
states that could prove crucial to President Bush re-election hopes in 2004. Pascal Lamy, the EC's trade
representative, told The Hill that the commission "of course tried to put together a clever list...tariffs are
not that intelligent a trade policy but when we do it, we try to do it cleverly. My experience in the past is
that lists like this get more attention if people care deeply about the products listed." He added: "Even if
the European Union were [enough of a high power] to develop such a list, I would not
Empirically, trade conflicts do not go violent between the EU and US.

Public Utilities Reports Inc., August 2004 lexis
Nor is there any reason to question that the EU will use trade sanctions as a hammer when it finds that the
U.S. has garnered an unfair competitive advantage by subsidizing exports. Two recent examples, the sales
corporation/extraterritorial income (FSC/ETI) and the steel import cases, demonstrate that the EU will
use trade sanctions when necessary to force a change in U.S. behavior. In both cases, the EU successfully
implemented countervailing duties of several billion dollars that were upheld by the WTO Appellate
Body. In both cases, the United States underestimated the EU's resolve to impose trade sanctions, and the
sanctions prompted the United States to act quickly to remove the subsidies. n9
Current interdependence checks escalation.

AScribe Newswire, December 7, 2001 lexis
A country on the verge of hostilities with another country already knows the monetary value of its trade
with that other country. Therefore, the researchers say, the risk factor in terms of trade is not an unknown.
However, what each country doesn't know is how strongly the other country is willing to fight over some
other issue beside trade: a slice of territory coveted by both countries, a military build-up perceived as a
threat, the exposure of a spy network or the mistreatment of an ethnic or religious minority, they note.
"Interdependent countries are in a better position to test the resolve of economic partners because they
can more effectively exert non-violent [i.e. economic] pressure, and then observe the consequences," Li
notes. "By taking commercial measures that represent both a clear and credible threat, a state can signal
to economic partners that it is prepared to make considerable sacrifices. If, however, these sacrifices are
too critical, the country could lose bargaining power in future conflicts."
15
Protectionism turn
US climate change policies increases protectionist sentiments in the US toward non-
regulated countries.
Christopher Berendt, Director of Environmental Market Services, Pace Energy Services, "Are We
Reaching the Sum of Carbon Federalism" April 2007
Other major hurdles for Congress to consider involve the role of emerging nations such as China and
India in the future scheme as they are now major global emitters of greenhouse gases. Historically, the
U.S. has been responsible for almost a quarter of the global emissions of greenhouse gases. However, by
the end of this year, China is expected by many to become the world’s largest annual emitter of climate
changing gases. In a competitive trade environment between the U.S. and China, already labeled by some
as inequitable in terms of currency valuation, market controls, and manufacturing bases, will the adoption
of a U.S. constraint on carbon further the divide? The potential for trade sanctions to be used to level the
carbon playfield is growing. In fact, precedent from a World Trade Organization (WTO) Tribunal exists in
support of tariffs based on environmental programs.
16
A2: Agriculture
17
Volatility not a threat

Price volatility is not a threat.
Compete, Complete Coalition, “High Natural Gas Prices, Price Signals, and the Value of Competitive
Markets” May 15, 2008
Thus, energy markets must be appropriately monitored to ensure that price signals are the result of
legitimate market forces. There have been situations in which “bad” price signals occurred. For example,
the data integrity of natural gas price indices, used as a reference point for pricing in contracts, was
undermined in 2002- 2003 by the inappropriate activities of a number of gas traders. However,
government intervention, namely FERC’s positive actions in connection with standards for price
reporting and the enforcement efforts of the CFTC, have restored market confidence.20 The indices now
have sufficient liquidity, transparency and accuracy to represent the true value of natural gas and thus act
to moderate the effects of price volatility.
Supply projects check volatility.

Incentives exist for new supply projects. Congress in 2004 authorized a variety of measures (loan
guarantees, accelerated depreciation, and tax credits) to encourage investment for the building, over the
next decade, of an Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline. Negotiations involving the state of Alaska, producers,
and pipelines are ongoing and there’s great promise that new Alaskan natural gas supplies can be tapped.
Congressional action in 2004, coupled with additional policies to minimize investment risk, would
provide economic benefits: not only lower gas prices, but reduced gas price volatility.”14 Another
relatively new source of natural gas is Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). This industry has been revitalized.
Import terminals in Georgia and Maryland have reopened after having been mothballed for more than two
decades. Additional import facilities, both onshore and offshore (using new technology), are being
developed. New market entrants are legion. The number of existing, proposed, and potential North
American LNG import terminals stood at 55 as of May 16, 2005. And Congress is giving serious
consideration to provisions that will facilitate this movement by clarifying jurisdictional issues that have
created uncertainty.
Markets will resolve volatility - domestic supply sources are increasing.

Total rigs operating (oil and gas) are now over 1,300. This level of total rig activity has not been seen
since early 1986. EIA reported that gas well completions in 2004 were 22,673; this total is an annual
record.11 It’s important to note that declining well recoveries and higher initial decline rates for new
wells are characteristics of many producing basins. This is the underlying reason that the annual rate of
decline for North American production continues to increase. Moreover, based on an analysis of the
lower-48 and Canadian resource base and on production performance data, the National Petroleum
Council has concluded that conventional gas production will inevitably decline, and that the overall level
... will be largely dependent on industry’s ability to increase its production of nonconventional gas.
Nonconventional gas includes gas from tight formations, shales, and coal seams. Given the relatively low
production rates from nonconventional wells, the analysis further suggests that even in a robust future
price environment, industry will be challenged to maintain overall production at its current level.12 The
problems associated with inadequate domestic supplies, however, “will eventually be resolved as
consumers and producers react to the signals provided by market prices.13
18
Volatility not a threat

No impact to volatility - hedging natural gas prices checks.
This series of federal actions in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in prices based on market forces, an
adequate supply of natural gas under contract transported over interstate pipelines, and the development
of new gas storage fields. In addition, it helped to usher in a North American natural gas market that is the
most liquid gas market in the world, with hundreds of suppliers and thousands of major consumers.8
Consumers and other market participants have the ability to hedge price and other risks in the face of
price volatility.9 And as set forth in more detail below, consumers have saved billions.
Prices have reached their height and will now decline.

The New York Times, James Kanter and Stephen Castle, “Rising Food Prices Sharpen a European
Debate” May 20, 2008 lexis
The European agriculture commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel sought to ease fears about the economic impact of rising food prices
in her comments Monday to agriculture ministers. She said global food prices were likely to decline, after recent
record highs in such crucial areas as grain and dairy, as supplies of basic commodities slowly began to
increase. Even though adverse weather in many regions over several seasons had hurt supplies, the
situation now seemed to be returning to normal and was set to take some pressure off prices, she said. Even
so, she conceded that higher food prices were not temporary. ''Prices are likely to fluctuate in the medium
term around a level that is higher than what we have seen in recent decades,'' she said. ''But we do not think
that the record levels reached in recent months are likely to persist.''
19
A2: Food riots

A complete food crisis is silly – in response to overproduction land use has been
reduced producing an inverse result. Efficient markets can allow for correction.
Ross Clark, author of How to Label a Goat: the Silly Rules and Regulations that are Strangling Britain,
The Times (London), “Of course we can feed the world - just look at all the unused space” June 26, 2008
lexis
The soaring cost of food over the past year and accompanying riots in some countries has raised the ghost of Thomas Malthus, the
19th-century reverend cum-economist who advocated birth control to prevent an incipient global food famine. Never mind Peak Oil,
a growing number of environmentalists are saying, we are close to approaching Peak Food: the moment that global food
production peaks before mankind slumps into a long, slow agonising death by famine. According to this thesis, the Earth is already
straining every sinew to feed us, but even this level of food production cannot be sustained as the soil degrades from the effects of
overfarming, and the Earth warms, turning swaths of productive land into desert. This thesis does not stand up to
examination. Have a look at this statistic: the total landmass cultivated for arable crops in 2006, according Food and
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), was 1.402 billion hectares - or 14 million sq km. In other words, all the
world's cereals and vegetables are grown on an area equivalent to the USA and half of Canada. A further 34 million sq km -
equivalent to the rest of North America, South America and two thirds of Australia - is given over to grazing, much of it
extensive, unimproved grassland. The rest of the world - equivalent to the whole of Europe, Asia, Africa,
Indonesia plus a third of Australia - is not used for food production in any way. Some of this land, of course,
is desert, mountain or rainforest, which either cannot be used for agriculture at all or would require irrigation, engineering or
clearance. But a vast amount of it could quite easily be converted into agriculture, but has until now not been
needed. Take Russia, which, apart from its northern fringe of tundra, spans the temperate belt. Just 7 per cent of Russia is turned
over to arable crops, and another 5 per cent to grazing. Moreover, the quantity of agricultural land in Russia is shrinking: 23 million
hectares of arable land - equivalent to the whole of Britain - have been abandoned since the end of communism. For Russia, read the
world: the background to rising food prices is the shrinkage of global agriculture over the past decade and a half. Globally, less
food is being produced on even less land than was the case in the early 1990s. Take the US, which according to
the FAO was producing 1,210kg of cereals per person per year between 1990 and 1992 and 1,104 kg between 2001 and 2003. Or
Canada, at one time the "world's bread basket", where cereal production fell from 1,905 kg per person per year in 1990-92 to 1,384
kg in 2001-03. The reason for the fall in cereal production over 15 years has not been soil degradation or climate change: while
crops yields are not increasing as fast as they were doing in the 1960s, they have still risen by 1-2 per cent per annum over the past
15 years. Rather, the decrease in production has been a straightforward response to overproduction. Remember the
grain mountains of the 1980s? They resulted in a collapse in prices that in turn persuaded grain producers to contract their operation.
Now that prices are rising again the opposite has happened: the FAO estimates that this year's wheat harvest will rise by 13 per cent
as a result of extra planting, putting downward pressure on prices next year. That, of course, will come too late to stop food riots and
hunger among the world's poor. But contrary to the Marxist view, this year's spike in food prices is not "market
failure". The main reason that the price of rice on international markets has surged by 141 per cent since January is the attempt of
rice-producing countries to control inflation in their own economies by banning or restricting exports. Hardly surprisingly, net rice
importers have suffered as a result of the collapse in rice available on international markets. Moreover, the restrictions worsen the
situation by deterring rice producers from increasing production because they are unable to benefit from high export prices. A little
belatedly, the EU did at least suspend its set-aside scheme last September, meaning that European farmers will not be forced to leave
10 per cent of their land fallow. But still, quotas and subsidies distort the marketplace. According to the Washington-based think-
tank the International Food Policy Research Institute, 30 per cent of food inflation is down to biofuel subsidies, which divert land
from food production: 80 million hectares worldwide have been turned over to the crops. There may be a case for governments to
invest in converting the by-products of food crops - the straw and chaff - into biomass, but to pay farmers to switch from food
production is a highly irresponsible policy at a time of rising food prices. Biofuel subsidies have added to the mix of quotas,
subsidies and price controls that have been perverting agricultural markets for decades, giving us glut and now shortage. The very
worst thing that could happen now is for the world to shut down global trade in food in the name of protecting food security. It is
societies dependent on local food who are only one bad harvest away from starvation. World markets, if only they are
allowed to operate efficiently, will make sure that the world's vast additional capacity for food production
can be realised.
20
A2: Water fights

No water wars for the next 100 years- experts and academics agree-- agreements are
in places now.
Thalif Deen (.N. Bureau Chief since 1992, covering political, economic and social issues related to the
United Nations and U.N. agencies) August 25 2006 “"Water Wars" a Myth, Say Experts”,
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34465
STOCKHOLM, Aug 25 (IPS) - The world's future wars will be fought not over oil but water: an ominous
prediction made by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the British ministry of defence and even by some officials of
the World Bank. But experts and academics meeting at an international conference on water management in the Swedish
capital are dismissing this prediction as unrealistic, far-fetched and nonsensical. "Water wars make good
newspaper headlines but cooperation (agreements) don't," says Arunabha Ghosh, co-author of the upcoming Human Development
Report 2006 themed on water management. The annual report, commissioned by the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), is to
be released in December. In reality, Ghosh told the meeting in Stockholm, there are plenty of bilateral, multilateral and
trans-boundary agreements for water-sharing -- all or most of which do not make good newspaper copy. Asked about
water wars, Prof. Asit K. Biswas of the Mexico-based Third World Centre for Water Management, told IPS: "This
is absolute nonsense because this is not going to happen -- at least not during the next 100 years."
Water Shortages cause cooperation not war.

Deudney (Center for Energy & Environment Studies at Princeton) 1991 Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, April, p.26)
Water wars. The most frequently mentioned scenario is that disputes over water supplies will become acute as rainfall and runoff
patterns are altered by atmospheric warming. Many rivers cross international boundaries, and water is already becoming scarce in
several arid regions. But it seems less likely that conflicts over water will lead to interstate war than that the
development of jointly owned water resources will reinforce peace. Exploitation of water resources
typically requires expensive - and vulnerable - civil engineering systems such as dams and pipelines. Large dams,
like nuclear power plants, are potential weapons in the hands of an enemy. This creates a mutual hostage situation which
greatly reduces the incentives for states to employ violence to resolve conflicts. Furthermore, there is evidence
that the development of water resources by antagonistic neighbors creates a network of common interests.
History proves- no war over water - nations will resolve difference.

Alister Doyle (Environment Correspondent BONN) September 18 2006 “'Water wars' loom? But none in
past 4 500 years”, http://www.mg.co.za/articledirect.aspx?articleid=284294
With a steady stream of bleak predictions that "water wars" will be fought over dwindling supplies in the 21st century, battles
between two Sumerian city-states 4 500 years ago seem to set a worrying precedent. But the good news, many experts say,is
that the conflict between Lagash and Umma over irrigation rights in what is now Iraq was the last time
two states went to war over water. Down the centuries since then, international rivals sharing waters such
as the Jordan River, the Nile, the Ganges or the Parana have generally favoured cooperation over conflict. So if history can
be trusted, things may stay that way. "The simple explanation is that water is simply too important to fight over,"
said Aaron Wolf, a professor at Oregon State University. "Nations often go to the brink of war over water and then
resolve their differences." Since the war between Lagash and Umma, recorded on a stone carving showing
vultures flying off with the heads of defeated Umma warriors, no wars have been fought and 3 600 international water
treaties have been signed, he said.
21
A2: Water fights

No water conflicts- scarcity is not a problem- sharing will happen- historically
proven.
Thalif Deen (.N. Bureau Chief since 1992, covering political, economic and social issues related to the
United Nations and U.N. agencies) August 25 2006 “"Water Wars" a Myth, Say Experts”
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=34465
He said the world is not facing a water crisis because of physical water scarcities. "This is baloney," he said.
"What it is facing is a crisis of bad water management," argued Biswas, who was awarded the 2006 international Stockholm Water
Prize for "outstanding achievements" in his field. The presentation ceremony took place in Stockholm Thursday. According to the
Paris-based U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), one-third of all river basins are shared by more than
two countries. Globally, there are 262 international river basins: 59 in Africa, 52 in Asia, 73 in Europe, 61 in Latin America and the
Caribbean, and 17 in North America. Overall, 145 countries have territories that include at least one shared river basin. Between
1948 and 1999, UNESCO says, there have been 1,831 "international interactions" recorded, including 507 conflicts, 96
neutral or non-significant events, and most importantly, 1,228 instances of cooperation. "Despite the potential problem,
history has demonstrated that cooperation, rather than conflict, is likely in shared basins," UNESCO
concludes. The Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI) says that 10- to 20-year-old arguments about
conflict over water are still being recycled.
22
A2: Judicial smackdown
23
Alternate cause
Alternative causality to a low rule-of-law.
Federal News Service, Hearing at the senate judiciary committee, "How the Administration's Failed
Detainee Policies Have Hurt the Fight Against Terrorism" July 16, 2008 lexis
Unfortunately, many of our detention policies and actions in creating the Guantanamo military
commissions have seriously eroded the fundamental American principles of the rule of law in the eyes of
Americans and in the eyes of the rest of the world.
24
No spillover
Any court rulings would be narrow- no spillover.
Daniel A. Brownt, J.D. candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2008; B.A., Spanish & Portuguese
Studies, University of Washington, 2005, 31 Seattle Univ. L. R. 707, Spring 2008
Yet inaction by Congress would unquestionably have profound effects. Professor Hellerstein, another
prominent tax authority, contends that if Congress does not act, thereby leaving the validity of state tax
incentives to the mercy of existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence, judicial uncertainty and
inconsistency will continue to undermine the legitimacy of state tax incentives. n200 He argues that it
would take decades for courts to definitively determine the general validity of the tax incentives that exist
in practically every state. n201 Moreover, even if the Court were to choose to squarely address the
question, it is unlikely that this would lead to a comprehensive resolution of the issue: the Court typically
confines its decisions to the facts of individual cases, thereby avoiding questions closely related to those
presented in the case before it. n202 Touching upon this very point almost fifty years ago, Justice
Frankfurter wrote: At best, this Court can only act negatively; it can determine whether a specific state
tax is imposed in violation of the Commerce Clause. . . . . . . Congress alone can provide for a full and
thorough canvassing of the multitudinous and intricate factors which compose the problem of the taxing
freedom of the States and the needed limits on such state taxing power. n203
25
No solvency – inconsistency inevitable

Procedural word games by the Morrison majority make inconsistent rulings
inevitable.
Robert J. Pushaw Jr., James Wilson Endowed Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law, 9 Lewis
& Clark L. Rev. 879, Winter 2005
The Lopez and Morrison opinions built upon the logically unassailable premise that, in our constitutional
system of limited and enumerated powers, the Commerce Clause cannot be interpreted in a way that
effectively leaves Congress with absolute discretion. n109 Furthermore, the Court usefully redirected its
attention to the pertinent constitutional language, which speaks of "commerce" that occurs "among the
several States." The majority did not, however, define those terms in a legally precise way. This failure
resulted from the Court's conflicting desire to keep all its cases intact, n110 but to avoid their plain
implication: that Congress has plenary power under the Commerce Clause. n111 To achieve this delicate
balance, the Court creatively reinterpreted its precedent as revealing three general limits on Congress.
26
Clarity impossible
Clarity on the commerce clause will never happen.
Simon Lazarus, Public Policy Counsel to the National Senior Citizens Law Center, and Senior Counsel,
Sidley Austin LLP, "FEDERALISM R.I.P.? Did the Roberts Hearings Junk the Rehnquist Court’s
“Federalism” Revolution?" January 2006 http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/SL_Roberts_Federalism.pdf
To begin with, the task may simply have been undoable. The Rehnquist Court’s Lopez-Raich 180° was not the first failed attempt to
draw judicially manageable boundaries between federal and state spheres in the post-New Deal, post-World War II universe. In
1976, in National League of Cities v. Usery, the Burger Court, with then- Associate Justice Rehnquist writing the opinion, overruled
a Warren Court decision only eight years old, and declared state and local government agencies that performed “traditional
governmental functions” immune from federal minimum wage and maximum hour requirements.81 Nine years later, almost
precisely as fast as the Lopez-Raich turnabout, the Court junked this states’ rights initiative and overruled National League of
Cities.82 Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun, who had concurred in the 1976 Garcia decision, explained that the “attempt to
draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of ‘traditional governmental function’” had spawned so much confusion
as to be “unworkable.”83 From this perspective, the bold venture on which Rehnquist persuaded his four colleagues to embark in
1995 simply repackaged an idea that, like its predecessor, didn’t work because some allies soon concluded that it couldn’t work.
Despite contemporaneous favorable reviews by prominent academic conservatives of the value of
Rehnquist’s Lopez enterprise of establishing judicially enforceable state/ federal boundaries,84 the
undertaking was, simply, a fools’ errand from the get-go. These repeated failures to formulate durable
doctrinal solutions reflect deeper incoherence and inconsistency in the theoretical underpinnings of the
Court’s federalism efforts. Indeed, this foundational weakness has led to multiple reversals and anomalies
in “federalism” line-drawing exercises, of which the National League of Cities-Garcia and Lopez-Raich fiascos are only
the most widely noted. One example is the Rehnquist Court’s 2000 retreat in Reno v. Condon85 from Justice Scalia’s thunderous
1997 ukase against federal “commandeering” of state agencies and officials in Printz v. United States.86 Another, also discussed
above, is the longstanding disconnect between the Court’s hospitality to Supremacy Clause “preemption”-based suits against state
and local governments – usually brought by or on behalf of businesses – and its hostility to Fourteenth Amendment-based private
civil actions and §1983 suits generally – usually brought by or on behalf of traditional civil rights plaintiffs or entitlement
beneficiaries. Still another was the similar disconnect between with Rehnquist’ proclamation in Lopez of categorical limits on
Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, and his and the Court’s persistent refusal to apply similar reasoning to constrain spending-
clause authority – an area where, indeed, the font of effectively unconstrained congressional power is a decision by Chief Justice
Rehnquist himself.87
Court consistency regarding the commerce clause is impossible – the standards can
and will be used to tear legislation apart or be applied at random.
Robert J. Pushaw Jr., James Wilson Endowed Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law, 9 Lewis
& Clark L. Rev. 879, Winter 2005
At bottom, then, Lopez and Morrison rest upon the subjective conclusion of five Justices that certain
activities were not "commercial," did not "substantially" affect interstate commerce, and were historically
of "state" rather than "national" concern. Grant Nelson and I have long argued that, although the Court
reached correct results in Lopez and Morrison, its decision to apply three vague standards on a case-by-
case basis would have two negative consequences. n126 First, this methodology would lead to
inconsistent results that could easily be characterized as driven by politics or ideology. n127 Indeed,
several scholars suggested that Lopez and Morrison were arbitrary decisions motivated by five
Republican Justices' antipathy toward liberal laws that limited gun possession and that expanded women's
rights. n128 That accusation gained credence when the same five Justices, who are perceived as skeptical
of environmental laws, cast doubt on Congress's power to regulate certain aspects of water pollution.
n129 Conversely, conservative Justices might be more inclined to uphold federal statutes which
implement policies they support, such as tough criminal laws and bans on partial-birth abortion. n130
Second, and relatedly, Professor Nelson and I predicted that such common law development of malleable
standards would prove inadequate in the long run to sustain genuine doctrinal reform. n131 On the one
hand, if the Court so desired, it could easily cabin Lopez and Morrison to the trendy and largely symbolic
laws at issue in those cases (perhaps adding some similar recent "feel [*897]good" federal statutes, like
the prohibition on carjacking). n132 On the other hand, the conservative Justices could invoke the
standards of Lopez and Morrison to tear down major legislation that previously had been upheld, such as
that concerning civil rights and the environment. n133 Finally, the Court could steer a middle path,
proceeding on a case-by-case basis with no clear pattern.
27
No impact
Other countries no longer model the United States government structure.
Newsweek 1/31/2006 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6857387/site/newsweek/
Once upon a time, the U.S. Constitution was a revolutionary document, full of epochal innovations—free elections, judicial review,
checks and balances, federalism and, perhaps most important, a Bill of Rights. In the 19th and 20th centuries, countries around the
world copied the document, not least in Latin America. So did Germany and Japan after World War II. Today? When nations
write a new constitution, as dozens have in the past two decades, they seldom look to the American model. When
the soviets withdrew from Central Europe, U.S. constitutional experts rushed in. They got a polite hearing, and
were sent home. Jiri Pehe, adviser to former president Vaclav Havel, recalls the Czechs' firm decision to adopt a European-style
parliamentary system with strict limits on campaigning. "For Europeans, money talks too much in American democracy. It's very
prone to certain kinds of corruption, or at least influence from powerful lobbies," he says. "Europeans would not want to
follow that route." They also sought to limit the dominance of television, unlike in American campaigns where, Pehe says, "TV
debates and photogenic looks govern election victories." So it is elsewhere. After American planes and bombs freed the country,
Kosovo opted for a European constitution. Drafting a post-apartheid constitution, South Africa rejected American-style federalism
in favor of a German model, which leaders deemed appropriate for the social-welfare state they hoped to construct. Now fledgling
African democracies look to South Africa as their inspiration, says John Stremlau, a former U.S. State Department official who
currently heads the international relations department at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg: "We can't rely on the
Americans." The new democracies are looking for a constitution written in modern times and reflecting their
progressive concerns about racial and social equality, he explains. "To borrow Lincoln's phrase, South Africa is now Africa's 'last
great hope'." Much in American law and society troubles the world these days. Nearly all countries reject the United
States' right to bear arms as a quirky and dangerous anachronism. They abhor the death penalty and demand
broader privacy protections. Above all, once most foreign systems reach a reasonable level of affluence, they follow the
Europeans in treating the provision of adequate social welfare is a basic right. All this, says Bruce Ackerman at Yale University Law
School, contributes to the growing sense that American law, once the world standard, has become "provincial." The United
States' refusal to apply the Geneva Conventions to certain terrorist suspects, to ratify global human-rights treaties such
as the innocuous Convention on the Rights of the Child or to endorse the International Criminal Court (coupled with the
abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo) only reinforces the conviction that America's Constitution and legal
system are out of step with the rest of the world.
28
Solvency
29
Solvency
High natural-gas prices are pushing the market toward incentives even without an
RPS system.
Business Week Online, Robert McNatt, "Alternative Energy Vexes Autos and Utilities" July 11, 2008
lexis
The greening of the power business, or the move away from fossil fuels [coal at older plants and natural gas at newer ones], shows
up in the increasing use of renewable portfolio standards [RPS]. These state regulatory standards call for a certain share of energy in
each state to come from nonfossil fuels. The number of states with RPS has grown steadily, and now about 40%
of the U.S. electric load falls under states with them. The implementation of these standards is gradual, but, ultimately,
California is requiring 20% of its electricity to come from renewable energy by 2010 and is considering 33% by 2020, New York
has a 24% goal by 2013, and Illinois wants 25% by 2025. However, the costs of these mandates aren't immediately clear. "That
uncertainty could result in the chief credit risk for utilities -- that consumers could rebel at higher rates needed to bring power from
renewable resources online," says S&&P credit analyst Anne Selting. That risk increases in states that already have high energy
rates and have also imposed aggressive RPS. The high price of natural gas, however, is making investments in
renewable resources look better and better to utilities, even without RPS. "The higher the price of gas, the
higher the price of electricity will be and the better the alternatives look," said credit analyst Terry Pratt.
Subsidizing renewables discourages efficiency and the development of other

alternatives.
Energy Washington Week, “RAND Study Backs Fossil-Fuel Tax As Key Part Of Climate Strategy”
July 16, 2008 lexis
As for subsidizing renewables, the report goes on to state that "while the pricing of renewable fuels can
be used to insulate consumers from price changes, this approach directly affects energy efficiency and the
development of other alternatives and increases the pressure on the federal budget from subsidizing
higher-cost fuels."
Renewable subsidies with an RPS would lead to an overall increase in C02

emissions.
Energy Washington Week, “RAND Study Backs Fossil-Fuel Tax As Key Part Of Climate Strategy”
July 16, 2008 lexis
Renewable subsidies in conjunction with an RPS would also likely have the effect of increasing overall
energy use while lowering world oil prices, Toman noted, which could presumably lead to an increase in
global CO2 emissions. "Where we're using a subsidy, we actually end up having a small increase in total
fuel use. Because when we require 25 percent renewable, and the government steps in to buy down its cost, and the price of oil
drops because of the reduction in demand, we actually end up using more fuel, which is sort of crazy," he said. He added that a
fossil fuel tax would lead to a 17 percent reduction in motor fuel use.
30
Solvency
Uniformity is impossible – a federal one-size-fits-all policy breaks down due to the
deviating renewable capacity across the country.
Determinants of RPS Impact. While a one-size-fits-all
federal RPS would impose uniform requirements
nationwide, the costs would be far from uniform. The effect of renewable energy targets on electricity cost is
determined chiefly by two factors—the cost of conventional generation and the renewable resource potential of the area in question.
The relationship of each factor to the marginal cost of an RPS is straightforward. It costs more to generate electricity from
renewable sources than from conventional sources. That is why significant renewable capacity is
currently being added only in states that have already passed renewable requirements. This is the case even
though most forms of renewable energy have received large federal subsidies for decades. For example, wind generation receives a
1.9 cents-per-kilowatt-hour production tax credit. (In 2006, the average cost of electricity was 8.37 cents per kilowatt hour.) The
first factor affecting the price of electricity in a state with an RPS is the state’s current mix of conventional sources which, as can be
seen in Map 1, varies considerably between the states. Map 1 should be compared with Maps 3 and 4. The regions of the
country that rely most heavily on coal-fired generation are generally also the regions with the lowest
electricity rates and the highest concentrations of manufacturing. This is not a coincidence.
Even if renewables can be developed they can’t be disseminated

Sam Schoofs, Intern for the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. 8/6/04. IEEE, “A Federal
Renewable Portfolio Standard: Policy Analysis and Proposal.” http://www.wise-
intern.org/journal/2004/WISE2004-SamSchoofsFinalPaper.pdf
The main technological question surrounding a federal RPS is whether or not the current power
transmission grid could handle the added transmission from renewable sources. In many cases, building new
renewable generation sources would require supplemental transmission lines to be built, adding cost to an
already expensive technology [23]. Oftentimes the sites that are the best for renewable generation are located far from where
people want to live, for example with wind generation, “people don’t like to live where it’s windy enough to be of commercial
significance” [23]. This means that new generation is often built where the resource is best, but far away from where large densities
of people—and the best transmission lines—are located [23]. These new transmission lines can be quite costly and can
face lengthy permitting delays [18]. In some cases, it is possible that the rapidity of renewable development
could outpace the ability of the transmission lines, leading to available capacity with no technological
ability to be used [23]. In order to prevent such delays, careful planning must be done to make sure proper local and state
procedures have been followed.
31
Wind power link

Normal means for RPS is wind power.
The second factor is the potential for renewable energy being spread unevenly across the country. For example, the southern and
middle parts of the country have low potential for wind power, which is the renewable energy resource that is closest to the market
costs of conventional energy, given current federal subsidies. And although wind energy produced, for example, in Oklahoma could
be transmitted to Georgia, the additional transmission costs greatly increase the total costs of that energy to the receiving state.
Renewable Energy is Wind Energy. The notion that an RPS will include a “portfolio” of renewable energy
sources is misleading—wind energy is the only economically viable renewable energy source given
current technologies. Although other renewable sources, such as biomass and solar, have long-term potential,
they are currently no more than niche technologies. Even assuming that these technologies improve
significantly in the next decade or two, a major logistical obstacle will remain. The technology to convert
biomass into electricity remains prohibitively expensive and uncertain. Huge investments will be needed to build
infrastructure to gather and transport large quantities of biomass to generating plants. With solar energy, the near-term
potential is almost certainly at the consumer level rather than large-scale generation, again because of cost and
reliability issues. In other words, the potential for photovoltaic panels is greater on rooftops than across deserts. Wind power, on
the other hand, is an established technology. In an analysis of the impact of a 10-percent nationwide RPS on the energy
industry, the federal Energy Information Administration (EIA) found that “non-hydro electric technologies such as
geothermal, solar thermal, solar photovoltaic, and ocean technologies are not projected to have net
capacity additions.” As of 2004, of the estimated 2,335 megawatts of renewable energy use attributable to state renewable
standards, 2,183 megawatts (93 percent) were generated by wind. 3 Thus, a renewable portfolio standard is, in reality, a
mandate for wind power. Economic Conditions Shape RPS Debate. Virtually every state that has implemented a renewable
portfolio standard has had relatively high retail electricity rates. According to a 2005 EIA survey, consumers in states with
renewable portfolio standards pay 42 percent more for electricity than consumers in states without them (Table 1). Because the
margins between conventional and renewable electricity were smaller, the comparative viability of renewable energy sources was
greater in the states that eventually chose an RPS. Table 1 Retail Rates of Electricity, 2005 Average Retail Price Electricity (kWh),
States with a Renewable Portfolio Standard 9.73 ¢ Average Retail Price Electricity (kWh), States without a Renewable Portfolio
Standard 6.80 ¢ Average Retail Price Electricity (kWh), Southeastern States 6.74 ¢ Moreover, many RPS states possess abundant
wind energy generating capacity. Compare Map 1, which shows the potential for wind energy in the United States, with Map 2,
which depicts those states that have adopted an RPS. Roughly speaking, the prospects for wind energy are greatest in the Upper
Midwest, the Mountain West, the Northwest, the Southwest, and the Northeast. Not coincidentally, these are precisely the regions
where we find states that have adopted an RPS.
32
States CP
States can solve internationally - they are setting the stage now.
Barry Rabe, ASAP, Oxford University Press, Publius, June 22, 2007 lexis
Long before Arnold Schwarzenegger and Tony Blair joined forces to discuss possible cross-continental
collaboration on climate change, states had emerged as the dominant American players in climate policy
development. A small number of states began to explore this issue during the 1990s, but the proliferation of state engagement
clearly accelerated after the Bush administration decision to abandon the Kyoto Protocol and oppose significant policy proposals at
the federal level. As of 2007, more than half of them have active climate programs, many of which involve multiple
pieces of legislation. Collectively, these state efforts involve all of the climate policy tools that have been employed by the European
Union and other nations that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. In the area of renewable energy, twenty-three states
representing more than 55 percent of the American population operate renewable portfolio standards that
mandate a steady transition from conventional electricity sources to renewables (Rabe and Mundo 2007). In
carbon emissions trading, ten Northeastern states are part of an interstate body known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) that is constructing a carbon cap-and-trade program for that region. California and neighboring western states are exploring
the prospects for developing their own version of such a system or even establishing a partnership across the continent. In the area
of vehicular emissions, California in 2002 became the first Western government to impose carbon emission standards on new
vehicles. This legislation is designed to reduce carbon emissions by approximately 30 percent over the next decade and has been
formally embraced by eleven other states. Eleven states have established statewide targets to reduce overall greenhouse gas
emissions, including California, New Mexico, and New York. In California, for example, the 2006 Global Warming Solutions Act
requires statewide emissions to return to 1990 levels by 2020, with steep reductions in subsequent decades. The legislation
authorizes creation of multiple policy tools to seek emission reductions from every major sector, building on the extensive climate
policy infrastructure that was already in place (Adams 2006). Many of these programs remain in early stages of implementation,
making it difficult to assess their ability to stabilize emissions in a cost-effective manner. But states have clearly responded to
growing concerns about localized impacts of climate change and also frame their policies to achieve multiple benefits, including
economic development from cultivation of renewable energy and related environmental improvements such as reduction of
conventional air contaminants (Rabe 2004). Although much climate policy activity is concentrated among coastal states, an
increasingly diverse set of states have become active, reflected in the passage or expansion in recent years of renewable portfolio
standards in such states as Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Montana, Nevada, Texas, and Wisconsin, among others. In turn, multiple
states are increasingly working collaboratively, establishing common policies and seeing potentially significant advantages in
advancing regional strategies that operate across state boundaries. Consistent with the Schwarzenegger-Blair entente, states have
also begun to see themselves as players on the international climate policy stage, entering into discussions about
possible collaboration with Canadian provinces as well as members of the European Union. It is increasingly recognized that many
states generate substantial levels of greenhouse gases; if the fifty states were to secede, 13 would rank among the world's top forty
nations in emissions, including Texas in seventh place ahead of the United Kingdom and Canada. In many respects, this climate
policy innovation builds on existing state powers and experience but is tailored to the particular greenhouse gas emissions mix and
opportunities for blending emissions reduction and economic development in a given jurisdiction.
33
Plan is Popular
Numerous polls prove plan is popular.
Joshua Fershee, Professor of Law at the University of North Dakota School of Law. 2008. Energy Law
Journal, Vol. 29, No. 1. “Changing Resources, Changing Market: The Impact of a National Renewable
Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry.”
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1126729
Often lost in the debate about the value and appropriateness of a national RPS is that there is little dispute about the value and
appropriateness of renewable energy itself. Awareness that energy issues intersect with other key issues like national security and
climate change has never been higher. Support for renewable energy, at least as a concept, is overwhelming.198 A
recent poll indicates that 85% of those polled believe that existing federal incentives for renewable energy
technologies should be extended.199 Other polls have indicated support across the political spectrum for
renewable energy200 and, more specifically, a renewable portfolio standard.201
34
“Claim credit” – politics

Everyone tries to "claim credit" for climate change policies.
Barry G. Rabe, professor of public policy at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at University of
Michigan, "Second generation climate policies in the United States" January 2, 2008
Extending such resources and powers into the realm of climate change is a fairly incremental step in some
instances, such as electricity regulation, where state governments have been dominant for decades. But
the burgeoning state role must be seen as not merely an extension of existing authority but rather a new
movement of sorts driven by a set of factors distinct to the issue of climate change. These factors have
proven increasingly influential in a wide range of jurisdictions, overcoming inherent opposition and
building generally broad and bipartisan coalitions for action. In some jurisdictions, this dynamic has
advanced so far that one of the greatest conflicts in climate policy innovation is determining which
political leaders get to “claim credit” for taking early steps. The following factors appear to be pivotal
drivers behind action in numerous states.
35
Federalism link
A federal RPS undercuts state rights.
Edison Electric Institute, 12/1/07. “Oppose the 15% Federal RPS Mandate in the Energy Bill.”
The RPS mandate undercuts or preempts the state renewable plans that already exist in 26 states and the
District of Columbia. If states choose a lower percentage requirement, a more measured timetable, or qualifying
renewable resources that do not comply with the federal mandate, they will be preempted. Every state with an RPS
program has chosen renewable resources that qualify for credits under their state program that would fail
to receive credits under the federal program. States also can modify their state programs to adjust to changing
circumstances, unlike the rigid, one-size-fits-all federal program in the House RPS provision.
36
Topicality
RPS isn’t an incentive it’s a regulation – prefer this evidence it has an intent to
define.
Sam Schoofs, Intern for the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. 8/6/04. IEEE, “A Federal
Renewable Portfolio Standard: Policy Analysis and Proposal.” http://www.wise-
intern.org/journal/2004/WISE2004-SamSchoofsFinalPaper.pdf
There are two main categories of renewable energy policies. The first category gives some financial
incentives to encourage renewable energy that includes tax incentives, grants, loans, rebates, and
production incentives [13]. Tax incentives cover personal, sales, property, and corporate taxes and they help to reduce the
investment costs and to reward investors for their support of renewable energy sources [12], [13]. As an example, 24
states currently have some form of grant program in place that ranges from as small as $500 up to $1,000,000 [13]. The second
category of renewable energy policies is called rules and regulations, which mandate a certain action from
an obligated entity. Included within this category are renewable portfolio standards, equipment
certification, solar/wind access laws, and green power purchasing/aggregation polices [13]. As an example,
equipment certification allows the states to regulate the performance criteria that equipment is required to meet in order to be
eligible for financial incentives [12]. Seven states currently have equipment certification programs in place [13].
37

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UMKC SDI 2008 Kearney/Ross Lab – RPS Neg

A2: Economy advantage

The global economy is resilient.

RPS is economically unfair – it punishes poorer states.

A2: Economic competitiveness

Manufacturing competitiveness key to technological leadership.

Key to the economy.

The economic competitiveness hypothesis is wrong – overwhelming contrary

Trade is not a determinant of competitiveness

A2: US-EU Trade war

Alternate cause – bio-fuels.

A long full scale trade war is coming now.

Even if the EU moved on the US over Kyoto, it would not sanction.

Empirically, trade conflicts do not go violent between the EU and US.

Current interdependence checks escalation.

Volatility not a threat

Supply projects check volatility.

Markets will resolve volatility - domestic supply sources are increasing.

Volatility not a threat

Prices have reached their height and will now decline.

A2: Food riots

A2: Water fights

Water Shortages cause cooperation not war.

History proves- no war over water - nations will resolve difference.

A2: Water fights

A2: Judicial smackdown

No solvency – inconsistency inevitable

Subsidizing renewables discourages efficiency and the development of other

Renewable subsidies with an RPS would lead to an overall increase in C02

Even if renewables can be developed they can’t be disseminated

Wind power link

“Claim credit” – politics

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