We list the responsibilities of different government agencies involved in implementation of MNREGA in the Table below.

Stakeholder Gram Sabha Gram Panchayat Responsibilities (a) recommending works; (b) conducting social audits on implementation every six months; and (c) functioning as a forum for sharing information. (a) planning works; (b) receiving applications for registration; (c) verifying applications; (d) registering households; (e) issuing job cards, (f) receiving applications for employment; (g) issuing detailed receipts; (h) allotting employment within 15 days of application; (i) executing works; (j) maintaining records; (k) convening Gram Sabha for social audit; and (l) monitoring implementation at the village level. (a) consolidating Gram Panchayat plans into a Block plan and (b) monitoring and supervision at the block level. (a) ensuring work to applicants within 15 days; (b) scrutinising Gram Panchayat annual development plans; (c) consolidating proposals into a Block plan and submitting to intermediate panchayat; (d) matching employment opportunities with demand for work at the Block level; (e) monitoring and supervising implementation; (f) disposing of complaints; (g) ensuring that Gram Sabha conducts social audits; and (h) payment of unemployment allowance. (a) finalizing district plans and labour budget; and (b) monitoring and supervising at district level. (a) ensuring that the scheme is implemented according to the Act at the district level; (b) information dissemination; (c) training; (d) consolidating block plans into a district plan; (e) ensuring that administrative and technical approval for projects are obtained on time; (f) release and utilisation of funds; (g) ensuring monitoring of works; (h) muster roll verifications; and (i) submitting monthly progress reports. (a) advising the state government on implementation; (b) evaluate and monitor implementation; (c) determining the preferred works to be taken up; (d) recommending the proposal of works to be submitted to the state government; and (e) prepare an annual report to the state legislature. (a) wide communication of the scheme; (b) setting up the SEGC; (c) setting up a State Employment Guarantee Fund; (d) ensuring that dedicated personnel are in place for implementation, including Gram Rozgar Sahayak, Programme Officer, and technical staff; (e) ensuring state share of the scheme budget is released on time; (f) delegation of financial and administrative powers to the DPC and Programme Officer if necessary; (g) training; (h) establishing a network of professional agencies for technical support and quality control; (i) regular review, monitoring, and evaluation of processes and outcomes; and (j) ensuring accountability and transparency. (a) advising the central government on MNREGA matters; (b) monitoring and evaluating implementation of the Act; and (c) preparing annual reports on implementation and submitting them to Parliament.

Intermediate Panchayat Programme Officer (PO)

District Panchayat District Programme Coordinator (DPC)

State Employment Guarantee Council (SEGC) State Government

Central Employment Guarantee Council

Ministry of Rural Development

(a) ensuring resource support to states and the CEGC; (b) regular review, monitoring, and evaluation of processes and outcomes; (c) maintaining and operating the MIS to capture and track data on critical aspects of implementation; (d) assessing the utilization of resources through a set of performance indicators; (e) supporting innovations that help in improving processes towards the achievement of the objectives of the Act; (f) support the use of Information Technology (IT) to increase the efficiency and transparency of the processes as well as improve interface with the public; and (g) ensuring that the implementation of NREGA at all levels is sought to be made transparent and accountable to the public..

Legislature versus Judiciary The doctrine of separation of powers implies that each pillar of democracy the executive, legislature and the judiciary perform separate functions and act as separate entities. The executive is vested with the power to make policy decisions and implement laws. The legislature is empowered to issue enactments. The judiciary is responsible for adjudicating disputes. The doctrine is a part of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution[1]even though it is not specifically mentioned in its text. Thus, no law may be passed and no amendment may be made to the Constitution deviating from the doctrine. Different agencies impose checks and balances upon each other but may not transgress upon each others functions. Thus, the judiciary exercises judicial review over executive and legislative action, and the legislature reviews the functioning of the executive. There have been some cases where the courts have issued laws and policy related orders through their judgements. These include the Vishakha case where guidelines on sexual harassment were issued by the Supreme Court, the order of the Court directing the Centre to distribute food grains (2010) and the appointment of the Special Investigation Team to replace the High Level Committee established by the Centre for investigating black money deposits in Swiss Banks. In 1983 when Justice Bhagwati introduced public interest litigation in India, Justice Pathak in the same judgment warned against the temptation of crossing into territory which properly pertains to the Legislature or to the Executive Government[2]. Justice Katju in 2007 noted that, Courts cannot create rights where none exist nor can they go on making orders which are incapable of enforcement or violative of other laws or settled legal principles. With a view to see that judicial activism does not become judicial adventurism the courts must act with caution and proper restraint. It needs to be remembered that courts cannot run the government. The judiciary should act only as an alarm bell; it should ensure that the executive has become alive to perform its duties. [3] While there has been some discussion on the issue of activism by the judiciary, it must be noted that there are also instances of the legislature using its law making powers to reverse the outcome of some judgments. (M.J. Antony has referred to a few in his article in the Business Standard here.) We discuss below some recent instances of the legislature overturning judicial pronouncements by passing laws with retrospective effect. On September 7, 2011 the Parliament passed the Customs Amendment and Validation Bill, 2011 which retrospectively validates all duties imposed and actions taken by certain customs officials who were not authorized under the Customs Act to do the stated acts. Some of the duties imposed were in fact challenged before the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs vs. Sayed Ali in 2011[4]. The Supreme Court struck down the levy of duties since these were imposed by unauthorized officials. By passing the Customs Bill, 2011 the Parliament circumvented the judgment and amended the Act to authorize certain officials to levy duties retrospectively, even those that had been held to be illegal by the SC.

Another instance of the legislature overriding the decision of the Supreme Court was seen in the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Ordinance, 2009 which was passed into an Act. The Supreme Court had ruled that the price at which the Centre shall buy sugar from the mill shall include the statutory minimum price (SMP) and an additional amount of profits that the mills share with farmers.[5] The Amendment allowed the Centre to pay a fair and remunerative price (FRP) instead of the SMP. It also did away with the requirement to pay the additional amount. The amendment applied to all transactions for purchase of sugar by the Centre since 1974. In effect, the amendment overruled the Court decision. The executive tried to sidestep the Apex Court decision through the Enemy Property (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 2010. The Court had issued a writ to the Custodian of Enemy Property to return possession of certain properties to the legal heir of the owner. Subsequently the Executive issued an Ordinance under which all properties that were divested from the Custodian in favour of legal heirs by a Court order were reverted to him. The Ordinance lapsed and a Bill was introduced in the Parliament. The Bill is currently being examined by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs. These examples highlight some instances where the legislature has acted to reverse judicial pronouncements. The judiciary has also acted in several instances in the grey areas separating its role from that of the executive and the legislature. The doctrine of separation of powers is not codified in the Indian constitution. Indeed, it may be difficult to draw a strict line demarcating the separation. However, it may be necessary for each pillar of the State to evolve a healthy convention that respects the domain of the others.

[1] Keshavananda Bharti vs. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461 [2] Bandhua Mukti Morcha AIR 1984 SC 802 [3] Aravali Golf Club vs. Chander Hass (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 289 [4] Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs vs. Sayed Ali (2011) 3 SCC 537 [5] Mahalakshmi Mills vs. Union of India (2009) 16 SCC 569 Governments cannot take the legislative route after failing in courts:When a government is confronted with an inconvenient court judgment, there are three common ways in which it tries to dodge the blow. The risk is indeed high, but the gamble must be played to save face. The first is to ignore the order, as in several public interest cases. However, the Supreme Court has long arms and memory. It can press on and call chief secretaries of states who do not implement its directions. For instance, the court has called some of them in person this month to explain why primary schools in their states do not provide drinking water to children as directed. Another stratagem is to invoke legal technicalities by filing a review petition, which is normally dismissed in minutes in chambers before the judges concerned take their quick lunch. After that there is a provision for filing a curative petition that also meets a similar fate. The diehard litigants and lawyers then clothe the same issue in a new writ petition and brave a third time, with the same probability rating. In between, they move applications for clarifications or modifications of the earlier orders, which are guises for review by other names. The government is currently trying a combination of all these in its bid to sidestep the knock of the recent black money probe order. When the governments stakes are very high, it resorts to legislative powers. The latest instance was the political row over the Tamil Nadu textbooks allegedly glorifying the DMK supremo. It was given the euphemistic garb of a legal issue involving the uniform system of education. The Madras High Court and the Supreme Court had approved the old law. However, the new government passed an amendment to

undo the judgment (State of Tamil Nadu vs K Shyam Sunder). The amendment was struck down last month. The court stated that a judicial pronouncement of a competent court cannot be annulled by the legislature in exercise of its legislative powers for any reason whatsoever. The legislature, in order to revalidate the law, can re-frame the conditions existing prior to the judgment on the basis of which certain statutory provisions had been declared ultra vires and unconstitutional. The court was following the dictum of a seven-judge Bench in the famous case, Madan Mohan Pathak vs Union of India, that bringing legislation in order to nullify the courts judgment would amount to trenching on judicial power. No legislation that is meant to set aside the result of the courts mandamus is permissible. Even if the amending statute may not mention such an objective. The rights embodied in a judgment could not be taken away by the legislature indirectly. Though this declaration is 35 years old, governments consistently breach the barrier. There are several other instances in the recent past in which even the central government tried to circumvent court pronouncements. Some time ago, aquaculture farms were being set up along the eastern coast, violating coastal-zone regulations. Writ petitions were moved alleging violation of the rules and destruction of ecological balance. The Supreme Court ruled that industrial activity could not be carried on along the coast. The government then brought a law declaring that aquafarming units were not industries, but agricultural enterprises. The move failed. In another case, the Orissa government lost its case in arbitration and had to pay a huge sum to a contractor. Instead of paying it, the state legislature passed a law to get over it. The Supreme Court struck it down (G C Kanungo vs State of Orissa). Sometimes those who opposed a government action in court would find themselves in power after an election. In MRF Ltd vs State of Goa, the electricity rebate given to some industries were challenged in a public interest litigation. The court ruled against it, and a law was passed to overcome the judgment. The government changed meanwhile but the court stood constant in its order. Some time ago, the Supreme Court declared in the Peoples Union for Civil Liberties case that voters have a right to know the antecedents of candidates. The political class ran like a headless chicken and got an ordinance promulgated, and later passed a law with few nays to cancel out the judgment. However, the issue was back in the court and it stood its ground. A similar drama was enacted on the question of the infamous single directive for protecting senior babus from corruption charges (Vineet Narain vs Union of India). When the Karnataka government perceived the Supreme Court judgment in the Cauvery water dispute as against its interest, it passed a law that gave overriding effect to its decision over that of any court or tribunal. The court struck it down observing that such an act of the legislature amounted to exercising judicial power of the state. The urge to rise from a judicial defeat, whichever way, is irresistible. When the government clambers up with a new-fangled law with the same warts, it usually returns from the court with a bloody nose. Regulation of media in India A brief overview Media in India is mostly self-regulated. The existing bodies for regulation of media such as the Press Council of India which is a statutory body and the News Broadcasting Standards Authority, a selfregulatory organization, issue standards which are more in the nature of guidelines. Recently, the Chairman of the Press Council of India, former Justice of the Supreme Court, Mr. M. Katju, has argued that television and radio need to be brought within the scope of the Press Council of India or a similar regulatory body. We discuss the present model of regulation of different forms of media. 1. What is the Press Council of India (PCI)? The PCI was established under the PCI Act of 1978 for the purpose of preserving the freedom of the press and of maintaining and improving the standards of newspapers and news agencies in India.

2. What is the composition of the PCI and who appoints the members? The PCI consists of a chairman and 28 other members. The Chairman is selected by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha and a member elected by the PCI. The members consist of members of the three Lok Sabha members, two members of the Rajya Sabha , six editors of newspapers, seven working journalists other than editors of newspapers, six persons in the business of managing newspapers, one person who is engaged in the business of managing news agencies, and three persons with special knowledge of public life. 3. What are its functions? The functions of the PCI include among others (i) helping newspapers maintain their independence; (ii) build a code of conduct for journalists and news agencies; (iii) help maintain high standards of public taste and foster responsibility among citizens; and (iv) review developments likely to restrict flow of news. 4. What are its powers? The PCI has the power to receive complaints of violation of the journalistic ethics, or professional misconduct by an editor or journalist. The PCI is responsible for enquiring in to complaints received. It may summon witnesses and take evidence under oath, demand copies of public records to be submitted, even issue warnings and admonish the newspaper, news agency, editor or journalist. It can even require any newspaper to publish details of the inquiry. Decisions of the PCI are final and cannot be appealed before a court of law. 5. What are the limitations on the powers of the PCI? The powers of the PCI are restricted in two ways. (1) The PCI has limited powers of enforcing the guidelines issued. It cannot penalize newspapers, news agencies, editors and journalists for violation of the guidelines. (2) The PCI only overviews the functioning of press media. That is, it can enforce standards upon newspapers, journals, magazines and other forms of print media. It does not have the power to review the functioning of the electronic media like radio, television and internet media. 6. Are there other bodies that review television or radio? For screening films including short films, documentaries, television shows and advertisements in theaters or broadcasting via television the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) sanction is required. The role of the CBFC is limited to controlling content of movies and television shows, etc. Unlike the PCI, it does not have the power to issue guidelines in relation to standards of news and journalistic conduct. Program and Advertisement Codes for regulating content broadcast on the television, are issued under the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995. The District magistrate can seize the equipment of the cable operator in case he broadcasts programs that violate these Codes. Certain standards have been prescribed for content accessible over the internet under the IT Rules 2011. However, a regulatory body such as the PCI or the CBFC does not exist. Complaints are addressed to the internet service provider or the host. Radio Channels have to follow the same Programme and Advertisement Code as followed by All India Radio. Private television and radio channels have to conform to conditions which are part of license agreements. These include standards for broadcast of content. Non-compliance may lead to suspension or revocation of license. 7. Is there a process of self regulation by television channels? Today news channels are governed by mechanisms of self-regulation. One such mechanism has been created by the News Broadcasters Association. The NBA has devised a Code of Ethics to regulate television content. The News Broadcasting Standards Authority (NBSA), of the NBA, is empowered to

warn, admonish, censure, express disapproval and fine the broadcaster a sum upto Rs. 1 lakh for violation of the Code. Another such organization is the Broadcast Editors Association. The Advertising Standards Council of India has also drawn up guidelines on content of advertisements. These groups govern through agreements and do not have any statutory powers. 8. Is the government proposing to create a regulatory agency for television broadcasters? In 2006 the government had prepared a Draft Broadcasting Services Regulation Bill, 2006. The Bill made it mandatory to seek license for broadcasting any television or radio channel or program. It also provides standards for regulation of content. It is the duty of the body to ensure compliance with guidelines issued under the Bill. Two Law Commission Notes on Khap and Dowry Cases Report on Khap Panchayats The Law Commission has drafted a consultation paper on caste panchayats. A draft legislation titled The Prohibition of Unlawful Assembly (Interference with the Freedom of Matrimonial Alliances) Bill, 2011 has been attached to the consultation paper. The Bill prohibits people from congregating together to condemn a legal marriage on the ground that the said marriage has brought dishonour to the caste or community. Every member of such a group shall be punished with imprisonment of a minimum term of 6 months and a maximum term of 1 year. The member may also be liable to a fine of up to Rs 10,000. Under our criminal justice system, the presumption is that the accused person is innocent until proven guilty. This Bill reverses this presumption. It provides that if an accused person participated in an unlawful assembly, then it will be presumed that the accused intended to commit an offence under the Bill. Report on compounding of offences including Sec 498A of IPC (harassment for dowry) The Law Commission has also submitted its report on Compounding of (IPC) Offences. Compoundable offences are offences which allow the parties to enter into a private compromise. The Supreme Court in some recent cases had asked the Law Commission to identify more offences which could be treated as compoundable. Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists the offences which are compoundable. Currently under the section there are 56 compoundable offences. Certain offences can be compounded only with the prior permission of the court. The Commission has recommended that Section 498A of the IPC (cruelty against a married woman by her husband or relatives) should be made compoundable with the permission of the Court. It has recommended that the magistrate should give a hearing to the woman and then permit or refuse the compounding of the offence. This has been recommended to ensure that woman is not coerced into compounding the offence. The other IPC offences that the Commission has recommended should be made compoundable include (a) Section 324 (simple hurt); (b) Section 147 (rioting); (c) Section 380 (theft in dwelling house); (d) Section 384 (extortion) and (e) Section 385 (extortion by threat to person). The Arms Act Mandatory death penalty declared unconstitutional The Arms Act, 1959 governs matters related to acquisition, possession, manufacture, sale, transportation, import and export of arms and ammunition. It defines a specific class of prohibited arms and ammunitions, restricts their use and prescribes penalties for contravention of its provisions.

Section 7 of the Act forbids the manufacture, sale, and use of prohibited arms and ammunition unless it has been specially authorised by the central government.1 Section 27(3) prescribes that any contravention of Section 7 that results in the death of any person shall be punishable with death.2 Section 27(3) of the Act was challenged in the Supreme Court in 2006 in State of Punjab vs. Dalbir Singh. The final verdict in the case was pronounced last week. The judgment not only affects the Act in question but may have important implications for criminal law in the country. Legislative history of Section 27 When the law was first enacted, Section 27 provided that possession of any arms or ammunition with intent to use the same for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment up to seven years and/ or a fine. This section was amended in 1988 to provide for enhanced punishments in the context of escalating terrorist and anti-national activities. In particular, section 27(3) was inserted to provide for mandatory death penalty. The Judgment The Supreme Court judgment says that Section 27(3) is very widely worded. Any act(including use, acquisition, possession, manufacture or sale) done in contravention of Section 7 that results in death of a person will attract mandatory death penalty. Thus, even if an accidental or unintentional use results in death, a mandatory death penalty must be imposed. The bench quotes relevant sections of an earlier judgment delivered in 1983, in Mithu vs. State of Punjab. In this case, the court had looked into the constitutional validity of mandatory death sentence. The final verdict had ruled that a provision of law which deprives the Court of its discretion, and disregards the circumstances in which the offence was committed, can only be regarded as harsh, unjust and unfair. The judgment goes on to say that the concept of a just, fair and reasonable law has been read into the guarantees under Article 14 (Equality before law) and Article 21 (Protection of life and personal liberty) of the Constitution. A law that imposes an irreversible penalty such as death is repugnant to the concept of right and reason. Therefore, Section 27 (3) of the Arms Act, 1959 is unconstitutional. Section 27(3) is also unconstitutional in that it deprives the judiciary from discharging its duty of judicial review by barring it from using the power of discretion in the sentencing procedure. What happens now? Under Article 13 of the Constitution, laws inconsistent with the Constitution shall be null and void. Therefore, Section 27(3) of the Arms Act, 1959 shall now stand amended. Courts shall have the discretion to impose a lesser sentence. It is noteworthy that the Home Minister had also introduced a Bill in the Lok Sabha on the 12th of December, 2011 to amend the Arms Act, 1959. The Bill seeks to remove the words shall be punishable with death and replace these with shall be punishable with death or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. This Bill is currently being scrutinized by the Standing Committee. Notes: 1) Section 7 of the Arms Act, 1959: 7. Prohibition of acquisition or possession, or of manufacture or sale, of prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition. No person shall (a) acquire, have in his possession or carry; or (b) use, manufacture, sell, transfer, convert, repair, test or prove; or

(c) expose or offer for sale or transfer or have in his possession for sale, transfer, conversion, repair, test or proof; any prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition unless he has been specially authorised by the Central Government in this behalf. 2) Section 27(3) of the Arms Act, 1959: 27(3) Whoever uses any prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition or does any act in contravention of section 7 and such use or act results in the death of any other person, shall be punishable with death.