International Expert Meeting (19 22 March 2012)

Chairs Summary : Safety of Spent Fuel

Looking back at the events at Fukushima, the design and circumstances of the spent fuel pools, combined with the actions undertaken by the Japanese prevented any significant release of radioactivity from the spent fuel. The centralized storage facilities, both wet and dry, also performed well. However, during and after the accident, there were significant concerns regarding: Loss of cooling; Loss of water; Re-criticality; Hydrogen production; Zirconium fires; and consequent damage to the fuel and large release of radioactivity. All of these concerns, even if they did not materialize, need to be addressed if we are to assure the public of the safety of nuclear energy. One year later, with the benefit of reviews and analysis by experts around the world, the concerns that have been brought out during this meeting can be summarized as follows. Main concern is for fuels of LWRs stored under water in storage pools. In recent years, capacity of existing fuel pools has been increased using high density storage racks. Enrichment in fuel has also gone up to provide for longer cycles and higher burnups. Further many fuel pools along with All these factors NPPs now have extended life of 60 years and more. increase the vulnerability of LWR fuel pools. Some specific technical issues to be addressed are as follows:

High density fuel pools provide little grace time (few hours) if active cooling gets interrupted. Loss of water would reduce shielding making any physical

intervention difficult. Risk of re-criticality needs to be considered. Progression of the accident sequence may give rise to hydrogen generation, explosions and subsequent release of radioactivity. The question of zirconium fires also needs to be addressed. These are particularly important issues for fuel pools that are located in buildings not designed for confinement of radioactivity or mitigation of hydrogen explosion.

The main recommendations for addressing these concerns are: Reassessment of fuel pool structural integrity for revised value of seismicity and other external hazards. Improving cooling arrangements by providing redundancy and diversity in equipment and power supply. Making alternate provisions for adding water. Providing portable water supplies/power supplies. Providing hardened instruments for monitoring condition of fuel pools (water level, temperature, radiation field, presence of hydrogen and fission products, etc.) Providing means for management of hydrogen and confinement of radioactivity where it does not exist. Reassessment of accident progression to estimate time available for various mitigative actions during accident management phase. Research in areas related to better understanding of various phenomena in accident progression such as properties of irradiated fuel mechanisms of heat transfer under accident condition metalwater reaction and hydrogen generation, release of radioactive products and their transport/dispersion.

Dry storage appears safer due to use of sealed containers and passive cooling by atmospheric air. Serious consideration should be given to decongesting the reactor spent fuel pools. The meeting also discussed some needs specific to the Fukushima site, such as the challenges in inspection, defueling and clean-up of the reactor pools and the management of damaged spent fuel and corium.

Shridhar Chande