A Touchy Subject People Factors In Simulations

Elyssebeth Leigh
Faculty of Education, University of Technology, Sydney Elyssebeth.leigh@uts.edu.au Abstract. The paper considers how those involved in simulation experiences deal with issues of learning, reality and simulation. It is concerned with intellectual and emotional responses rather than simulation structure. Possession of the truth, control of fidelity, definitions of reality and capacity to draw lessons from the experience are considered. Umpires and learning facilitators are required to be aware of, manage, and draw learning from emotional, factual, political and practical factors enmeshed in any simulation. How important is it for them to balance competing views of reality? What happens if intended learning goals are subverted by any one of the parties involved? 1. INTRODUCTION some individuals, charged with management of learning contexts, to impose their versions of reality on the results of the experiences being produced by the simulated action. It may include perceptions that desired/intended results are not being obtained (apparently the case in the US military case) or that emotions, not suitable to the learning context, are being engendered by the experience. This latter is often the initial perception of participants in some of my tertiary simulation environments. 21st century uses of simulations are more varied than they have ever been before, the variety of their forms and uses is increasing in complexity and postmodern awareness of the fragile (and contested) nature of reality is a fertile ground for learning through representing aspects of wider realities, especially when those realities are too complicated to capture in conventional learning formats like lectures and instruction. Demands for learning managers to enact their roles in entirely new ways, are not being matched by attention to the ways these changes are altering power relationships, roles and responsibilities. This paper is presented as a step towards drawing attention to the unlearning and relearning [4] that must occur, if the teaching/learning potential of simulations to support innovative and effective change and development is to be extended. 3 A DEFINITION

The idea for this paper was sparked by a news item concerning the resignation of a senior US military officer (retired) implying undue interference by umpires/games directors in the internal workings of a simulation process in which he was playing the part of Saddam Hussein. His ire, as his moves were overruled and/or altered, led to a very public debate about the interpretation of simulation practices, and is a powerful example of what can happen when the core precepts of simulation usage are subverted. His stance supports my contention that any interference by the G.O.D.s [1] after play has commenced create a new simulation/game while destroying the designs and intentions of the one that was begun. This paper uses my experiences in managing an organisational behaviour simulation called XB [2] to explore wider issues in the management of learning through simulations. Participants expectations, clients needs, designers creativity and facilitators capabilities are all factors in influencing the degree to which any particular iteration of a simulation achieves intended results and generates desired learning outcomes. 2. UNLEARNING AND RELEARNING

When intentions and desires come into conflict with the realities of what is being created and experienced in specific contexts, the resulting conflict can be difficult to unravel, with uncertain consequences. This can engender aversion to such apparently unstable contexts, especially on the part of those distrustful of learner centred learning sometimes it seems because of archaic anxieties anchored in negative childhood experiences [3], or perhaps because of unexpressed fears of revealing current ignorance about issues they believe they should know about. Instability (which may be more apparent than real and open to widely differing interpretations) in simulation-based learning environments can also lead

The field of simulations is both complex and contested. What is in and what is out, what are and are not simulations, how to manage, design, learn from and behave in simulations - are all subject to debate and disagreement. While preparing this paper I was invited to complete two electronic surveys about the field. Neither site provided a definition of simulation, both apparently assuming that anyone completing the survey shared their own (un-stated) assumptions about what is meant by the term. One was for SIAA [5] and the other for the MASIE center [6].

The evident assumption, that there is no problem about the meaning of the term, reinforces the importance of providing a definition of what I mean by the term, to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding. My working definition for this paper [7] therefore, is that Simulations and games include all interactive representations of perceived reality past, present, future - used for learning purposes 3. CONTEXT

The organisation is intended to produce participants learning (rather than merchandise) through a structured process of reflection in and on the action. The apparently intangible nature of such a product is sometimes too difficult for the literally minded, and the process of managing successive groups through the transition from concrete thinkers to abstract generalisers and analysts of human interaction has taught me a good deal about human nature. 5. REALITY AND SIMULATION

The simulation context for this paper is a semester long subject, in the final year of an undergraduate degree for adult educators who are Workplace Trainers, TAFE/ Vocational Education teachers and Learning Facilitators in workplace contexts of all types. It replicates any entity involving formal human organisation of effort to produce results and achieve goals. It is also a sudden and serious contrast with the comfortable familiarity of lecture/discussion formats, and requiring participants to undergo full immersion in the experience. A requirement that is resisted strongly by some, repudiated altogether by others, while providing the majority of participants with a learning experience that is . . . very inspiring . . . VM, 2001 [7] . . . teaching and learning . . inextricably intertwined and integrated, [where] the whole is equal in strength to much more than the sum of the individual strands of which it is comprised. HJ, 2001 [8] 4. XB-MANUAL FOR A LEARNING ORGANIZATION (aka XB) XB is presented as a detailed and fully referenced book in the form of an operations manual for creating a learning organization [9]. Participants are allocated (or self-select) into four Departments each with specific responsibilities, with titles indicating their focus viz: Responsibility, Doing, Observing and Understanding based on the action learning cycle of David Kolb [9]. Since everyone has both sequential and simultaneous tasks to complete, Chaos quickly arrives. This is the Chaos from which creativity and original thought can emerge. It is also the Chaos that can generate dis-orienting dilemmas [10] providing participants with learning opportunities not available from conventional information input modes. Participants responses to the resulting uncertainty, disorder and complexity bring to life the inanimate, abstract theories, comprising the bulk of the XB Manual. That is, it follows a conventional simulation/games design format [11], providing a simplified replication of aspects of human endeavour, coupling this with sufficient information and uncertainty to ensure that participants must find their own way forward with minimum recourse to external leadership from the (e.g.) teacher.

What is real and what is simulation quickly become unclear as participants attempt to adjust taken-for-granted assumptions about how to behave in a learning context. As with any effective simulation, XB replicates aspects of reality without using excessive detail. Some participants find the experience intensively real and have difficulty separating one from the other. Suspending disbelief [11] is a useful term for considering simulation-based learning processes and responsibility for management of this process lies with the facilitator/umpire. As moving points on a cycle of learning, reality and simulation are never actually interchangeable but can become painfully close. When participants in XB fail to distinguish between the two I know I am about to encounter resistance, and face demands for a return to reality as if sitting passively still in a classroom could in any way represent the reality of the activity in their real workplace! 6. EXPECTATIONS

When participants expectations, about their own power and roles and that of the facilitator, do not coincide the resulting conflict can spill into the world beyond the simulation and create painful consequences. Conversely a clients expectations about the outcomes of a simulation process can position facilitators in impossibly difficult positions, as they try to maintain the fidelity of a particular representation while being asked to produce specific desired results that are not consistent with the process of the action. This seems to have been the case with ## and the amazing remark from Lieut. Gen. William Wallace that the enemy were fighting is different from the one wed wargamed against [12]. Choices available to a facilitator wishing to identify and address conflicting expectations, may be entirely of their own choice or highly constrained, depending on their particular context. I will not criticise those who fail to create realism of the kind Lieut. Gen. Wallace wanted, but do want to drawn attention to the dilemma I am assuming the relevant facilitators (umpires, managers, G.O.Ds) must have (I hope) been experiencing at the time of the relevant activities. Skill levels, individual capabilities for understanding simulation activities as teaching/ learning events,

were/are always among the uncertainty factors influencing processes and outcomes. What is expected of players, umpires (etc) and outcomes will always be more (and other) than what can be listed regardless of assumptions made in competency-based learning strategies. For a facilitator to be unaware of the possible dilemma of conflicting expectations in simulation contexts is highly dangerous for all concerned. Such purblind-ness can seduce a facilitator into taking actions that conflict with the very nature of the simulation they are running. Commanders of the Japanese navy who ignored the reality of their battle fleet condition after Midway, preferring to accept the unreality of their battle plan simulation, provide an enduring model of what happens next. Yet the apparent inability to separately identify real/unreal is repeatedly encountered across time. 7. AVOID CERTAINTY

being used in both contexts my preference is for discovery and creation of independent thinkers. And this, of course, underlies my exhortation to avoid certainty. 8. RETURNING TO THE PEOPLE FACTOR IN SIMULATIONS The list of people potentially involved in some way in a simulation includes: Players/Learners Clients Managers Umpires Guides Facilitators Those represented Observers Members of each group contribute to the whole event, and all have a stake in the action and the outcomes. Since human beings are only marginally predictable in any situation, managing the unpredictability in a simulated environment is inevitably difficult. All have emotions, beliefs and values influencing their perceptions and actions. All are (more or less) certain that they possess the truth about the context and some are willing to go to extremes to enforce acceptance of their ownership of it! All this contributes to the risky nature of facilitation of simulations. Managing the process to support emergence of new insights will strain any facilitators capabilities to the limit. When others involved are more senior, appear to possess superior (inside) knowledge, are determined to impose their view of reality or are simply unable to conceive of the existence of alternatives to their point of view the facilitator may be in an un-winnable situation. 9. WHO POSSESSES TRUTH?

The unavoidable inability to list everything to be learned from a simulation makes them both successful and difficult. And can also make them appear unstable and undependable. My years of experience with simulations of many kinds have convinced me of the futility of searching for absolute certainty in simulations as learning tools. It is not possible to predict everything that lies ahead. Used effectively, simulations are most powerful when they guide participants towards flexibility and responsiveness in the moment creating a degree of adaptability that moves ever further away from dependence on received wisdom. In this respect being able to avoid certainty is one of the most powerful aspects of a well designed simulation. It has been my experience that those most able to avoid grasping for certainty in times of unpredictability, make more effective simulation leaders and independent thinkers. They are also likely to be more successful as facilitators of complex simulations. As guides and observers they assist participants to create and discover rather than merely helping acquisition of new information through rote learning. The less that is known before hand the more likely it is that participants will experience the need to become self reliant and turn inwards for solutions rather than seeking vainly for someone else to tell them what to do next. In some respects the desire to create learning contexts that aim to achieve freedom from distraction in learning [13] appears to be influencing the high tech simulation environments that I expect to see on display at SimTecT 2003. However human achievements will always exceed our ability to anticipate everything, and I expect that we will continue to exist in a tension of choosing between creating learning contexts that tell and those that help to discover. While simulations can and are

The designers and facilitators of a simulation have their truth about the use of specific artefacts to create a scenario, direct the sequencing of participants behaviour and choosing methods for identify learning outcomes once the action is ended. When they impose their designed outcomes on the action they have in my opinion stolen the participants. truth. Yet it is tempting to say to a group which somehow does has not produced the usual results: Well you did . . . but the real outcomes are like those produced by group O who did . . . thereby proving the validity of the design. Facilitators must always be alert to the importance of avoiding imposition of a truth other than that which is available for analysis right in front of them. Participants in a simulation act in concert to implement the rules and procedures as given and, in enacting their version of the design, begin to produce

outcomes which provide the basis for learning through analysis in the debriefing. Their truth is that they did it. While individuals may be unable to explain the thinking/feeling underlying their actions, nonetheless they own the truth of their intent and may resist hearing about how their behaviour did not produce what was intended. Participants must be open to alternative interpretations, however unappetising this may be [13], and facilitators must encourage and sustain exploration towards achieving acceptance of the possibility of alternative truths a tricky path indeed. A variety of external forces may also wish to influence the results, requiring particular outcomes and unable/ unwilling to learn the lessons produced by the interactions of particular groups of participants. This appears to be the case in the two examples quoted at the beginning of this paper, but is by no means confined to military contexts. Political expediency, ambition, hate and fear, and economic considerations may all be drivers of these external forces. Some may remain unknown to participants and the facilitator but still shape interpretation and enactment of the results of their creation of events in a simulation. From my perspective, the most dangerous misuse of truth in simulation contexts occurs when others not directly involved take over the outcomes and drawn their own conclusions in accord with their needs, without appropriate reference to those who created the experience. Those directly involved have had an emotional commitment to achieving resolution, while others not involved, but intending to use the outcomes, have no such visceral experience on which to draw when considering next steps. With great reluctance I have come to accept this as one of the unavoidable risks inherent in the field of simulations at its broadest extension. As such, it is to be guarded against but not considered as cause for denying the power of simulations. 10. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN . . . 10.1 Participants adopt behaviours that subvert the intentions and purposes of the exercise? At such times the facilitator may be obliged to stop the action, identify the sabotage and use the intervention to pinpoint the learning that is emerging about motives, intentions and disconnections between the action in the simulation and in the real life context being represented by it. This may be a high risk strategy depending on the motives of those involved, but an even higher risk concerns the potential failure to surface intended outcomes and the consequent loss of the learning potential for which the activity was selected.

10.2 Clients require specific outcomes and refuse/deny actual outcomes? For all those involved, the overall result can be anywhere from simply failing to connect with the learning potential to disasters arising from implementation of perceived results that did not actually occur. The risks arising from ignoring actual outcomes may be acceptable, in the minds of those making the decisions, but when they fly in the face of the evidence, are unlikely to be justifiable when things come unstuck. Stalins reaction to his Generals plans for defending Russia against a German attack in the 1930s is a case in point. 10.3 Facilitators interfere directly in the action, denying participants rights to their own experiences? For the facilitator the results are seldom pleasant. The speed with which participants identify that You made us do this. We are not like that reflects a human need to avoid guilt. Human ability to deny the consequences of actions is renowned, and in a simulation where actions are likely to create stresses and demand re-thinking of familiar stances, the chance to deny culpability will be seized quickly. For participants the results may be more pleasant in terms of the deny-ability of actions, but similarly disastrous in the long run, if important learning goals are subverted through taking the easy option to blame someone else! 11. HOW TO BALANCE COMPETING VIEWS OF REALITY? Actually achieving any kind of sustained balance among competing views of what is real, is unusual in simulation contexts of the kind with which I am most familiar. More common in these contexts are temporary agreements to accept various points of view as valid for the holders and to focus on how difference might arise and be resolved for specific situations. It is also useful for all involved to consider how adverse consequences might attend continuing inability to allow differences to co-exist. Facilitators who can guide participants towards greater understanding of, and insight into, their own beliefs and behaviours without imposing conditions are creating opportunities for continuous learning to become part of participants future growth. Conversely, facilitators who impose a pre-determined analysis of the outcomes, and define what has been learned are inhibiting future capacity for independent thought. The responsibilities of facilitators of simulations are complex and varied, but I believe that this is the most important of all. Learning for adults is simply a logical continuation of childhood and adolescent learning. An important difference lies in the way that adults have more opportunities to analyse things for

themselves, but may remain dependent on others to do their thinking for them in contexts like simulations if the guidance they receive is not sufficiently encouraging of independent thought. 12. A TOUCHY SUBJECT I began this paper with a comment about two very public expressions of concern related to military simulation experiences. I am suggesting that both comments indicate failings on the part of participants, facilitators and/or clients. But this is can be a touchy subject. It is easier to criticise the form of the simulation than it is to acknowledge the emotional content of such experiences. And it is certainly easier to speak and write from the bastion of hindsight than it is to challenge in the moment. If simulations fail to convey the complexity of the learning they offer, it may be because the facilitator is unable to elicit honesty about observed behaviour and emotions, avoids drawing out the participants experiences or deliberately (or unintentionally) interferes in the learning process. Failure to achieve effective learning may occur because participants are unable to articulate their experiences, are unwilling to concede that they have had an emotional response to their experience, or prefer to deny the implications of what occurred. Finally if parties external to the simulation choose to direct the outcomes for their own ends the results can be far removed from appropriate or useful learning. REFERENCES 1. G.O.D.s Games Overall Directors those who design, and manage the learning experience while remaining separate from the direct experience of its enactment.

2. Putzel, R (2001) XB manual for a learning organization, St Michaels College, Vermont 3. Heron, J (1989) The Facilitators Handbook Kogan Page, London 4. Lewin, K (1973) Resolving Social Conflicts, Souvenir Press, London 5. SIAA - Simulation Industry of Australia at <http://210.9.174.34/surveymanager/login.asp?an om=234x2x1 > 6. The MASIE Center, Inc. http://www.masie.com/survey/ 7. I reserve the right to change my mind (and alter this definition) in light of discussion and greater understanding. Being stuck with a patently inadequate definition, is not my idea of useful learning. 8. Unpublished records of XB class - 2001 9. Unpublished records of XB class - 2001 10. Senge, P (1990) The Fifth Discipline, Currency Doubleday, New York 11. Kolb, D (1979) Organizational Psychology, an Experiential Approach Prentice Hall, New Jersey 12. Mezirow, J (1990) Fostering Critical Reflection in Adulthood: A Guide to Transformative and Emancipatory Learning, Jossey-Bass, London 13. Ellington, H (1999) Games and Simulations Media for the New Millenium, SAGSET 14. Boud, D (1988) Developing Student Autonomy in Learning Kogan Page, London 15. The Generals Revolt in The Nation Wednesday 2 April, 2003 as quoted in http://www.truthout.org/docs_02_printer_040503 E.shtml 16. I accept that this is a wish rather than an achievable outcome on every occasion. It is, however, something that a professional approach to facilitation must continue to strive for.