Logical Fatalism Although the word fatalism usually implies an approach of resignation towards a future event or an event that

is inevitable, philosophers utilize the term to express that we as human beings are powerless and possess no control over anything. It actually implies that one has no control of their future, how it unfolds, and even their own actions. A lot of arguments exist which speak about fate and most seek a definition through comparing it to determinism. Determinisms main idea is that every occurrence has a cause. It implies that everything that happens can be explained in causal terms. Fatalism, however, implies that everything will happen regardless of an agents control. The arguments for fatalism are great in number, some even include determinism, and others the application of Logic (http://web.nmsu.edu/~philosophia/Fatalism.pdf). When the latter is argued from the logical perspective it is called Logical fatalism. Mainly Fatalism dictates that whatever the result or happening, it was necessary, and beyond the control of an agent. Many have discussed this notion including Aristotle, Diodorus Cornus, and Richard Taylor, in attempt to identify if we, in actuality, have free will. Aristotle A classical Argument for logical fatalism happens in Aristotles De Interpretatione, chapter 9. Where he basically addresses the question of whether in relation to all questions it is necessary for the affirmation or negation to be true or false. What he says can be presented in an argument similar to what follows: Suppose the 1) k is true or k is false and 2) that not-k is true or not-k is false

Then k is true or not-k is true Now lets suppose that in 1990 someone said Susan will have a turkey sandwich on the 16th of March in 2012, another person says Susan will not eat a turkey sandwich Hence either what the first person says is true, or what the second person says is true But now either it is necessary in 1990 that Susan eats a turkey sandwich on 16/3/2012, or it is necessary in 1990 that Susan does not eat a turkey sandwich on 16/3/2012 Note that the actual date is irrelevant and whether a prediction was made at all is also irrelevant So it is necessary, at all times, that Susan eats a turkey sandwich on 16/3/2012, or it is necessary that Susan does not eat a turkey on 6/3/2012 This argument can be generalized So basically, everything that happens is out of necessity Before going into further discussions, we should identify what the term necessary means here. It does not pertain to logical necessity. It, however, pertains to inevitability. When it is said that it is necessary that Susan eats a turkey sandwich at a certain date, it is actually implied that nothing can prevent Susan from eating the turkey sandwich at that date; particularly no one can prevent Susan from eating the turkey sandwich. Aristotle says, What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarily is not, when it is not (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/#2). Aristotle accepts that at 16/3/2012 if Susan is

eating a turkey sandwich, the latter is occurring because of necessity. Nothing can stop that occurrence, because it is occurring. What Aristotle establishes via this article is not only that if Susan eats a turkey sandwich on 16/3/2012 it is necessary; he also establishes that it was always necessary. Nothing or no one could have stopped it from happening. And this applies to anything happening, so basically, no one has the power to do anything but what they actually do. Looking deeper into this argument can show that there is a slight logical fallacy to it concerning the move from necessary to truth, from it is necessary for Susan to eat a turkey sandwich on 16/3/2012 thus it is true, to it is true that Susan ate a turkey sandwich at 16/3/2012 hence it is necessary. Aristotle founded a solution to this. He accepted that what is necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarily is not, when it is not. But he then says, But not everything that is, necessarily is; and not everything that is not, necessarily is not. So instead of denying the move from necessity to truth (which he did at one point), he denies that it is necessary that the affirmation or the negation is true or false when this relates to things that do not happen of necessity. Basically saying that neither what the first person said, Susan will eat the turkey sandwich, nor what the second person said, Susan will not eat the turkey sandwich are true. Also we can extend this to saying neither statements are true and false. And this poses a rejection to the law of bivalence which dictates that every declarative sentence including a proposition has one truth-value, it is either true or false (Lou, p.309). And this poses as problematic since the principle of bivalence is a fundamental one of logic. Hence this theory is flawed. Richard Taylor

In his book Fatalism (1962) Richard Taylor argues that generally accepted suppositions hold evidence to fatalism. He believed in the principle of bivalence, that was visited earlier, which states that any proposition is either false or true. The common beliefs that he initiated with are numerous and they involve the following: if an event is sufficient however is not logically correlated with the following event then the occurrence of the latter is not possible. In addition, time is not considered as a variable that changes the quality of occurrence of an event through another. This last argument is countered by an example that strengthens the theory that in fact, the time of an event past or present actually affects the occurrence of another succeeding event. One of Taylors other presuppositions states that no cause can occur if a necessary condition of this agent is non-existent. (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/#7) Let us take the example of Susan eating a turkey sandwich on 15/3/2012. Based on this event, either condition R which is seeing Susan eating the turkey sandwich will occur, or event R which is not seeing Susan eating the sandwich will occur. The latter is applied to the concept of bivalence. The argument here is related to the effect of time on the occurrence of events. If Susan had eaten the turkey sandwich yesterday on 15/3/2012 instead of today 16/3/2012 then event R can no longer occur and only event R will occur; because it is not in ones power to see Susan eating the turkey sandwich yesterday. This is due to the fatalists argument that states that it is not in our power to do anything than what we are actually capable of doing. The latter argument amends the previously stated presupposition of Taylor that relates to the non-occurrence of an event due to a lacking necessary condition (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/#7). The amendment involves adding to the presupposition that any event that is lacking a necessary

condition for its occurrence does not occur not only because of the physical lack (one being present yesterday thus not seeing Susan eat) of given situation but also because it is not within the persons choice to make it occur (one chose to not be there yesterday to see Susan eat). Meaning that a person can influence the occurrence of an event, thus there is the presence of choice and free will. Diodorus Cronus Diodorus Cronus debated the necessity of the past as a contributive argument to Fatalism. His argument was known as the Master Argument. Cronus believed that the premises are always known however, the intermediate steps cannot be known. In a sense, he debated the ontological status of the possible. (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/#2) His argument built up to the conclusion that the possible is that which either is or will be. He built a relationship between Actualism that states that the events that do happen are the only possible events that could possibly have happened (http://www.informationphilosopher.com/afterwords/glossary/#Actualism). He observed that the occurrence of an event in the future means that the event was true in its occurrence in the past; consequently this means that if an event in the future will not happen then it is true in the past that it will not happen. (http://www.informationphilosopher.com/afterwords/glossary/#Actualism). This argument can be falsified and countered in the following manner. Within the logic of Cornus, if Susan is eating a Turkey sandwich in 15/3/2012 it means that in year 1000 A.D it was said that she will be eating a sandwich in 15/3/2012. However, the mistake that he made in his logic is that he

molded the future as being pre-determined which is not the case. If Susan is eating a turkey sandwich today, it does not correlate with the fact that it was said in the past that she would be eating a turkey sandwich in the future. Much like the Aristotelian concept of bivalence any proposition is either true or false. The notion of time that he used is not without flaw. In a way it can be related to the presupposition that Taylor believes in which is related to the notion of time as being non-determinant of the magnitude or the ability of the occurrence of an event. However, the determined future is not timeless; hence a true event occurring in the future is not related to the possibility of it being truly stated in a distant and non-specific past. Therefore his argument about the past being a necessity is flawed in a sense that the occurrence of an event in the future is true regardless of the necessary statement of its occurrence in the past. Why? Simply because an individuals choice of making an event occur in the future while he is still in the past actually does make it occur, however that choice in acting upon an event cannot be timeless, as he believed. Most arguments formulated by fatalists concentrate less on how the conclusion may be avoided, and focus more on whether the question is true or not. Fatalism, through its arguments, proved that free willed or predisposed by a metaphysical force or the like, one does have a choice, and ones choices do influence the outcomes of events. The fatalist wants to show that whatever happens one cannot have had influence, on the other hand, the flaws in the arguments posed here imply that wherever one goes, free or determined, will played a major role in the voyage and in ones fate.

References Lou Goble (2001). The Blackwell guide to philosophical logic. Wiley-Blackwell. p. 309. ISBN 9780631206934. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/#2 http://web.nmsu.edu/~philosophia/Fatalism.pdf