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Author(s) Imprint Extent Topic Subject(s) Language ISBN Permalink Pages http://books.scholarsportal.info/viewdoc.html?id=189015 1 to 1036 English Wells, Norman Joseph [1955]
Dniv
T
On i/
by
Nonman J. Wells
UNIVERSITY
OF
TORONTO
THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR
OF
PHILOSOPHY
of
11:00
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRANCIS SUAREZ
COAUUTTEE
Professor Professor Professor Professor Professor Professor Professor Professor Professor Professor
J.
IN
CHARGE
Chairman
R. O'Donnell,
F. H.
Anderson
P.
Dryer
A. Irving M. Kelly
H. Mehlberg D. Savan
BIOGRAPHICAL
1926 1950 1952 1950-55
--Born, Boston, Massachusetts --B.A., Boston College --M.A.. University of Toronto --School of Graduate Studies, University
of
Toronto
THESIS
The Distinction Between Essence and Existence
in the Phil osophy of
Francis Suarez
(ABSTRACT)
The name of Francis Suarez is a famous one in the history of philosophy, not mention the histories of theology and law. Indeed, his position on the question of the distinction between essence and existence in creatures, the subject matter of this thesis, is especially notorious. However, though his final position on this question is quite well known, the philosophical milieu surrounding that decision and undoubtedly influencing it, is, in contrast, rather obscure. This dissertation is primarily concerned with the latter aspect of the problem.
to
Suarez himself is our best guide since he lists the three famous traditions on this question up to his day and cites men and arguments on behalf of each. The first tradition, that of the "Thomists", is the real distinction which maintains, for Suarez, that the essence and existence of a creature are really distinct as duae res or two beings, and mutually separable, each being able to exist apart from the
other. The second tradition, that of the modal distinction, also holds for a similar real distinction in creatures as between a res or a being and its mode which are not mutually separable. The third tradition, the distinction of reason and the position of Suarez, rejects any kind of real distinction of essence and existence in a creature and affirms a distinction which is the work of the intellect and is not at all present in the thing.
Research into the sources of the five arguments Suarez attributes to the "Thomists" he lists has found that the first two are explicit in such "Thomists" as Giles of Rome, John Capreolus, Paulus Barbus Soncinas, Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara and Chrysoslomus Javellus. The other throe arguments are not found in the texts of these men noted b.v Suarez, But the common denominator of all the argtimenls is that the.v affirm a real distinction between an uncreated esse essentiae or essence and a created esse existentiae or existence. That is, for Suarez, these
men
distinguish what comes to be by an efficient cause, namely, existence, and what does nol come to be by an efficient cause, namely, essence. Thus Suarez sees that the "Thomist" school undergoes the doctrinal influence of Avicenna and this Neo- Platonic tradition through St. Albert, Henry of Ghent, and possibly Meister Eckhart.
On behalf
of the
modal
distinction.
according to Suarez, is a mode which is a positive existential entity in iis own right as in the first tradition. However, unlike the latter, it cannot endure apart from the essence of which it is the mode. Thus, the second tradition differs from the first, not so much on the notion of essence which is the same, but on the degree of reality each will attribute to esse existentiae. Of interest is the fact that no such position is found in the texts of Scotus and Henry of Ghent. The texts of Soto do contain a doctrine of esse existentiae as a mode of essence but do not describe it as a positne existential reality.
esse existentiae
third tradition is manifested in the texts of the sixteen men cited by Suarez exponents although there is a variety of formulation as to the type of distinction of reason in question. However, this tradition is one in interpreting the real distinctions of the first two traditions to be between duae res or a res and its mode. Moreover, this third tradition is It is also one in rejecting these two traditions. one in holding that the essence and existence in question is the actual existing essence and esse in actu exercito. It is between these that there is only a distinction of reason. However, these men agree that the essence abstractly conceived or essence as possible is distinguished from actual existence or actual essence as nonbeing from being. The basic reason for their rejectionof a real distinction is that something cannot be intrinsically constituted in the existential order by something really distinct from it. For. each is a being in its own right as distinct from the other. More basic than this is the fact that there is no _esse existentiae in addition to the esse e ss entiae of a creature. Existence means nothing more than the actual existing essence and in no way signifies an existential actus essendi nor any accidental accretion. The men of this third tradition are characterized for Suarez by the fact that they are all opponents to sonie extent of any kind of a Platonic realism within being which is the most manifest feature of the first two traditions on this
The
as
its
question.
explaining the principles behind this third tradition Suaruz first lakes steps actuality apart from the divine intellect since he sees very clearly that the first two traditions follow from their doctrine of the divine ideas. For them, the divine ideas are the essences of creatures endowed with an esse essentiae in themselves as in Henry of Ghent. In Suarez' eyes this looks too much like the divine ideas enjoying some eternal existential status apart from God or that they have been created from eternity. As his first principle, and that of the third tradition, Suarez maintains that the essences of creatures, prior to their creation, are absolutely nothing in the sense of enjoying no real existential status. Though a critic of this Avicennian tradition on the divine ideas, Suarez the still remains within that tradition since he endows the essences of creatures divine intellect with an esse possibile, an esse objectivum or an_ esse cognitum in much the same fashion as Duns Scotus in his critique of Henry of Ghent and as Durandus in his critique of the same doctrine. Thus, in his critique of any Platonic realism of essence Suarez remains within the tradition of Duns Scotus and Henry of Ghent but much farther along that doctrinal curve which leads to the nominalism of Ockham. Suarez, in his second principle, carries his critique of any realism of essence into the created order of existing things. For, this principle states that ens in potentia and ens in actu are immediately distinguished as non-being and being. In this Suarez counters those who maintained that ens in potentia or essence enjoys some positive mode of being, though diminished, within the existent creature and his critique follows the pattern of the defense of his first principle.
In
to
Suarez' criticisms even carry within the tradition on the distinction of reason, rejecting all except the one which enables him to deny that existence is of the essence of the creature. He finds this feature in what he calls a distinction of the reasoned reason -- a distinction of reason with a foundation in reality. Because a creature has been created or is contingent it can cease to be and can found a concept of itself as non-existent. This concept of a creature prescinded from existence outside its causes but apt to exist, unlike a chimera, is signified by essentia for Suarez. The same concept of that creature as existing and outside its causes is signified by existentia. Existentia is denied of essentia creaturae because the concept of the possible essence does not explicitly include what is signified by existentia or is included in the concept of the actual essence. In a word, the possible essence and the actual essence are mentally distinguished and the concept of the actual essence as possible and the concept of the same essence as actual are likewise so distinguished. Thus Suarez' distinction of reason is a result of a comparison between two concepts or rather, different degrees of contraction or adequation of one concept with respect to the actual existing essence, the one more confused and obscure and less contracted than the other. It is just such a distinction which enables
Suarez lo deny existcntia of essentia creaturae Hence, this distinction between essence and existence is said to be in the existent thing and founded on it by extrinsic denomination from the concepts of this one existent essence.
.
By way of this extrinsic denomination Suarez can maintain that the existent essence has some internal metaphysical structure of essence and existence. For, on the basis of the two concepts of essence and existence and their degrees of adequation 10 the existent essence, the concept of existence is said to contract and be contracted by the concept of essence. In this way existence is said to be added to essence. This conceptual structure of the contracted and the contracting is then imposed on the actual essence by extrinsic denomination from these concepts. Thus the constant insistence of Suarez on the intrinsic constitution of the actual essence by existence does not imply any metaphysical structure within the actual existent but is a conceptual structure imposed on this existent. Versus an order of essence Aithin being Suarez offers an order of a radically contingent essence which is be ng itself, impervious to any existential co principle as it is to any distinction within it. In this struggle against the Platonic realism of essence in the first two traditions, being, in the hands of Suarez, has lost its metaphysical dimension to the extent it has become an impenetrable, impervious, indistinct essence. Reality is only metaphysical by extrinsic denomination and the science of metaphysics itself becomt s nothing more than an analysis of concepts.
GRADUATE STUDIES
Ma.ior Subjeci:
Minor Subjects:
Systemaiic Philosophy- -The Staff in Philosophy Latin Palaeography- -Professor J. R. O'Donncll
Acknowledgements
Those to whom I owe a debt of gratitude for my academic career and its trappings are legion and xmfortunately they cannot be mentioned here. Their absence in no way signifies my Ingratitude.
I should like especially to thank ray director. Professor Etienne Ollson for obvious treasons.; Dr. Anton C. Pegls for some interesting conversations, the generous loan of a precious old printed edition of Durandus and equally valuable microfilms of Petrus Aureolus and Gregory of Rimini; the staff of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies and the University of Toronto.
The names of Dr. James H. Robb and Rev. Joseph C, Wey, C.S.B. must be alsc mentioned the first for his generous offer of assistance while a Pulbright scholar in Paris and then for his procurement of the films of the many early printed editions used in this dissertation, all done with dispatch, thoroughness and exactlti'dei the second, for expediting the procurement of these films by a letter of introduction for Dr. Robb to the photographic department of the Biblioth6que National. I should also like to thanlc Rev, John F. Stapleton, C.S.B. , Librarian of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies for \intold assistance in the use of his library.
3
Fir.ally, I should like to thank my wife, Lenore, who not only typed every wore. In this dissertation, a moniomental task in Itself, but who also endured the conception of It and its stumoling beginnings, an achievement which surpasses any acknowledgement I could attempt to render.
O^
9?0^
uaon
%*
er.5
jr:c:
TABLE OF CONTEOTS
Page
INTRODUCTION
PART I:
A.
REAL DISTINCTION
The Three Traditions
1
B.
First Thomistic Argument John Capreolus 1, Patilus Barbus Sonoinas 2, Cajetan 3, --'h, "Sylvester of Perrara Chrysostoiuus Javellus 5.
Second Thomistic Argument Giles of Rome 1. John Capreolus 2. Paulas Barbus Soncinas 3. Cajetan 4. Sylvester of Perrara 5. Chrysostoraus Javellus 6.
5 9 20 23 26
31
C.
3^ 36 39 42 45 46 48
50
D. E.
53 54
56
F.
G.
Fifth Thomistic
Problem of the
"
Argviraent
Duae Res"
H.
Critical Summary
59
PART II:
A.
MODAL DISTINCTION
Introduction
Basis for Modal Distinction
Critical Summary
63
B.
C.
72
76
PART III:
A.
DISTINCTION OP REASON
Introduction
79
i;
-li
H^*.X
V'
Ho
Page
B.
Page
PART VI:
A.
THE ROLE OP
"
ESSE"
Introduction
200 205
214
B.
C.
PART VII:
A.
Introduction
B.
C.
PART VIII:
" THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSE ESSENT'IAE" " AND ESSE EXISTSNTIAE" AS BWl'VllMi 'i'WO
"
RES"
A.
Introduction
252
B.
C.
253
269
PART IX:
A.
THE MODAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN " ESSE SSSENTIAE" AND " ESSE EXISTENTlJg"
Introduction
272
273
B.
C.
283
PART X:
A
"
ESSE
284
Introduction
TCJAfT
Page
Critique of the Distinction of Reason
Critical Summary
293 320
B.
C.
CONCLUSION
323
NOTES:
Introduction
PART I PART II
3^^
3^6 397
PART III
PART IV
^6
^16
^^8
PART V
PART VI
PART VII
PART VIII
^5^
^57
^65
PART IX
PART X
-
^^
^71
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
^91
.lOIJOXU
INTRODUCTION
Bom
in Granada in
15^
And
Thence
and in I585 is professor of theology at Alcala where he remains until 1593* at which time he returns to his "Alraa Mater"
Salamanca.'
'
"
Disputationes
lo
souir
r'.
(S)
O IC
one
fr;S
'
BS^
i'jrx
od
J-
V-r^T' i/-- r- -f
tnontl
lioXiiw
nl
"And because I have always considered it a great advantage for comprehending ind penetrating metaphysical realities if they are examined and considered according to a suitable method, something I could pursue with difficulty or scarcely at all if, after the fashion of the commentators, I turned my hand to all the questions which arise by-the-by and almost willy-nilly from the text of the Philosopher, for this reason I have thought it would be more useful, and in keeping vjlth the procedure of such a discipline (servato doctrinae oixilne), to raise those questions for my reader's consideration which are usually Investigated and^sought in regard to the whole object of this wisdom,"^ '
As he says elsewhere the subject matter of the
"
"
knowledge is concerned.'''
his
"
two volximes and how the first disputation of the first volume
In the other
what he calls
"
'
esse "
approached this text of Suarez through the men and works cited
arguments reported by Suarez in his explication of their position, as well as the argxiraents for the second and third posi-
crrr
-i:::^
p
3
-1-
PART I
REAL DISTINCTION
A.
Suarez
I S.Th. q.3 a.
b.
c. d.
2.
II
CO.
cap. 52
Capreolus: Text A
a.
3.
Cajetan: Text B
a.
b.
4.
In II
CO.
cap. 32
lolee
^
ii
2-
5.
Soncinas: Text D
a.
In IV Metaph. q.l2
6.
Chrysostoraus Javellus:
Text E
a. 7.
In I Sent . d.2
aA
a.l^^'
b.
c.
8.
St. Albert:
a.
9.
Avicenna:
a.
V Metaph. cap.
b.
Suarez
Text G
a. 2.
3.
a.
2 Phys. q.2^^^
b.
"^vrT.
n'
f'^>a.-;'>f '^
.:-lf )
-3-
c.
The
'
7 Metaph. ad textxara 22
'
2.
Aureolus:^ Text K
a.
3.
Quodlibet I q.9
4.
b.
5.
& 2
Quodlibet 5 q.9
$.
7.
8,
Quodlibet 7 q.8
9.
iSI
io Hv
xo SJfxs-xoqc
1*1
?>C
m',:;
ii^b
.J.
e.p
oni-
f
S
fi
:po
1
:pi>
i:
ai
Xi-
^^^'
;r;in-'?LO^
.-^'
.i>
.J.
;xx)
r.
hn
"^
.
-4-
10.
4 Metaph. q.3
11
Lychetus Text T
a.
In 3 Sent, d.6
12.
13.
Text V
a.
14.
Joannes Alensls:^
a.
15.
l6.
4 Metaph, q.3
''
17.
These are the positions, the men and their works, which will
constitute the subject matter for discussion and analysis in
the first part of this presentation.
j.b
988 "7
r^-'^^'^^t
jOOJtaoXc..
Iliw
&amn
-rr
~".
rii
^n9w lo
-5-
For the
B,
'
Suarez reca-
;AiiTI-vJ
->
lo
r;f
?rfc
-6-
man Is a rational animal. But existence does to say not belong to a creature except in virtue of an efficient cause. Axul for this reason a creature camnot be said to be in act unless it has been created (nisi facta sit). Consequently the esse of the creature Is a thing distinct (res distincta) from its essence because one and the SMJe thing cannot be and not be by an efficient cause." vl9;
' '
this "But if you say, when the creature comes to be, not only the esse comes to be but also the essence of the the essence does not creature the reply comes back come to be but rather the essence comes under esse or that the esseiice becomes existing. Thus, it does not follow that the created essence is absolutely distinguished from essence except by reason of existence, which It, created essence, adds to essence." v^O)
' *
'
'
causality.
trrn:rn
:f--
-7-
esse"
example of
essential predicates of a creature i.e. the predicates which belong by nature to the very essence
per
OJjij^
bfus
i^
:n:'
feij
iuu^viiut
to 1
t'^:ao
-8-
cation as
This is a most
this argument .
g.
T5ie
'
stating
tirnt
Hence, in taking
Lastly, we must be
aiifare
of the qualification
based on something intrinsic to the nature of each. Rather they are distingiiished relatively in as much
as created essence is related to something extrinsic
to the order of essence, namely existence.
oris
zl
lo
rtc
-9-
1.
He
v/ell
Echard.
classic ones.
^'
A part of
well as novel, task Capreolus sets for himself at the veryoutset of his famous work:
"In this question (a. I) there will be two articles, in
}n
-10-
the first of which conclusions are osited and ' objections are moved in the second.' But before I come to the conclusions, I premise this one remark which I vrlsh to have understood (haberi volo pro supposito) throughout the whole reading (lectura) and it Is that I Intend to put forth nothing of ray own (et est quod nihil de proprio intend influere) but I intend only to reproduce the opinions which have seemed to me to have been according to the mind of St. Thomas. Nor do I intend to adduce any proofs for the conclusions but his own word, with rare exceptions. But the objections of Aureolus, Scotus, Durandus, Joannis de Rlpa, Henricus, Cuido de Carmelo, Gan:*o, Adam and other opponents of St. Thomas, I propose to set down in their places and to solve by the words of St. Thomas." (25)
Thiat
"
esse "
"
"
Utrum
His
'
and
in opposittoa"
(^'
"
esse"
the
subsisting creature
n
i>tiii
anc
ill
-11-
here.
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
to give some Justification to those who identify the notions of composition and creation. ^33)
Howver, without any attempt
a long citation from St. Albert, since, for him, ot. Albert argues in a manner similar to St, Thomas (consimiliter arguit
Albertus).^
(34) '
Instead, he
J^
-12-
"It will be said, perhaps, that this argumentation is not conclusive because its major premise is false, namely, the essence of a thing belongs to it per se i.e. without any efficient cause. But this is denied (says the object-r) because Just as man owes the fact of his existence co an efficient cause (homo habet a causa efficiente quod existat vel quod sit in actu), so does he owe the fact that he is man to a cause, and the essence is not something per se and without any cause. Whence, Just as man was not existing before the creation of the world, so neither was there man (i.e. any essence 7%^) ^^*^ that proposition was false man is man."^-^-''
'
'
'
"
a seipso "
without
oh so
that any essential predication wherein the essence is predicated of itself, e.g. man is man, is false if no man exists prior
to its formulation. ^^'
diiv
'
-13-
And Capreolus
'
For this is an
perpetually true,
"Prom these quotations it is manifest that every proposition of the first and second mode of predicating per se is necessary and is perpetually true. Consequently, since the quiddity of a rose belongs to the rose in the first mode of predicating per se , it follows that it necessarily belongs to it. And also Qrosseteste shows that the quiddity of a rose does not belong to a rose by some extrinsic efficient (agentem) cause, so that some. efficient cause is the cause that a rose is a rose." '39;
'
' '
by an efficient cause.
famous one^'^^' and
vrill
Capreolus.^
'
V,xt:o ruco
sxi
^xi.
ik.
iir:.
.zj.
xo
'.
je:xi
no?
.XamloB
orf:t
el nam
'a
nr^
-,,
.-icx;.-
cc;
lo sooji
ij
ilowB Ji:j
axes Sdn
a o^
10
jw ;tan;J
^-^^^^.tj-'
-14-
the men Suarez had in mind, let us see if Capieolu5 can add
"
"And for this reason, I reiterate that man always is man is a rational man and this is immutably true animal, and its tnath Is eternally in the divine intellect, as St. Thomas holds in I S.Th. q.lO, a. 3* ad 3 pd in De Veritate q.l, a. 5, adj.''^^^^
and
Hence
Capreolus concludes:
"Just as the first -attempt at refutation was worthless, And so the second attack^^' is of no consequence. this is obvious. For if Grosseteste intends that in such propositions in the first mode of predicating man is a rational mortal per se of this type animal, the predicate is the precise (praecisa) formal cause of the subject, yet it is not the precise (praecisa) cause that it inheres in the subject, but demands an extrinsic cause in order that the predicate belong to the subject, it follows that that cause causes something after it already is, nay that such a thing is its effect and is not its effect. For even when that cause is causing nothing, the predicate still belongs to the subject, since, whether the subject is or is not, it is no less that which it is, as a rose is a rose. Hence no cause is the cause that the quiddity of a rose belongs to a rtsse for it was shown above that such propositions (i.e. 'per se' in the first mode) are eternally necessary b because their truth arises once the
' *
son
18
Ji
-15-
divlne ideas have been posited. For when the divine idea of man Is posited In God, at once the definition (ratio) of man is identical with the definition (ratio) of man, and so immutably man Is man. Likewise when that idea of man is set down, at once the definition |ratio) of animal is included within the definition (ratio) of man, and so man is an animal; so of the rest. To be sure, if any cause effects that man is an animal, that cause will be the cause why the idea of man includes the definition (ratio) of animal, which can be done neither by God himself nor by a creature. Consequently, it is clear that man is an animal, is per se * in this sense, that man is an animal by no extrinsic efficient cause. For its truth, it is sufficient that the predicate be of the definition of the subject. But this is immutably true and ineffectibly so, unless we imagine that the. divine ideas are effectible by some efficient cause." (^7)
'
esse"
say that the divine ideas are created, if that is what one
says when one states that essence has an efficient cause.' We shall have occasion to go into this more in detail later,
so for now let us be content to notice the whole trend and
'
paid to
"
"
per aliud" ;
;j.jii.
Jt^JV/W,
"8
SW
3<I
-16-
truth of
"
intellect and its ideas, and the fact that the answers to the
For
iny
such presentation in
someone before him has set the pattern for this particular
"
esse"
In addition,
^dqqB
bciA
a*ob
'A
-17-
However,
"Hence it is clear at first glance (prima facie) that althoiigh no created essence has been a being(ens) from eternity, speaking of being (ens) as it designates the actus essendi ' or actual existence, still any essence has been always what it is now essentially and per se for example, man always is man, always is animal, always is a body, always substsmce, always essence or being (ens) which signifies essence. And this is in accord with the mind of Albert and many others. Also of this opinion is St. Thomas."
'
'
'
He is
Capreolus remarks that this is the argvunent and then cites St.
Thomas' reply (Ecce argumentum.
Sequitur responsio):
'
"From the very fact, he (St. Thomas) says, that esse is attributed to the quiddity, not only esse' but the very quiddity is said to be created, because before it has esse ', the quiddity Is nothing, except perchance in the intellect of the creator where it is not a creature but the creative (creatrix) essence."
*
'
'
-18-
candid comment:
"And I think that this second way (St. Thomas' answer) Still the other way (the Is safer (securlor). "argumentiim" ) is not erroneous nor even close to error, except to the degree (pro quanto) it is seen to uphold that essence has some esse and not from God. But we should not feel disturbed over this (sed hoc non debet movere). For, just as Henry sa^s, and says well in my estimation (et bene raeo Judicioj, essence has a twofold esse' viz. esse essent lae and esse ex.. '.stGntiae *, and it has each of them from God. But the Tirst ^esse essentiae), it has from God as he is an exemplar cause, granting to each essence by his act of knowing (per suim intelligere ) , an intelligible and quidditative esse (esse intelligibile et quidditativum) ; he gives the second esse (esse exsistentiae) as he is an efficient cause. Thus, it does not follow that a creature has some esse * which is not from God, but it follows only that the creature is not said to be created in regard to the first (es'-e essentiae) but only in regard to the second (esse exsistentiae). On another score (item), there is no need for argument, for as v<as touched above, possible esse , since it is but a qualified esse (c\am non sit esse nisi secundum quid) it is not in vi3?tue of a creation, but it is sufficient that it be through the agency of divine iniellection, in the order (in genere) of formal cause." v53/
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
''
esse
esse"
V/hat is
-19-
then a creature
essentially such?
The
"
esse
xvxu
to
VI
-20-
'
2.
bom
of a
He numbered the
"
^yjiiv<
; auiSJB^i
jti Il5
,S
aa
-i^/v.'
io
--'
.^ISi^i
Jr
-iJw --a.
dn;
Plfl n'^orriB
dm sum
3 jaOL'
no
.0
^-
-21-
(55) ^^^'
As nis second conclusion, Soncinas states that in all things beneath the prime cause is an entity really
"
esse "
follows
the thlrni place it is a principal argument (principaliter arguitur) that what belongs to something perse' is really distinguished from what belongs to it 'per aliu d' , But esse belongs to things per aiiud ', namaly by tiie prime cause granting esse to thera. However, essence belongs to things per se because it is aaid of them essentially. For this is in man is a the first mode of predication per se rational animal 2_. Consequently esse and essence are not the same . " V 5
Jin
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
"
-..
-..-
;-
>
r>.
cfiiQ
no ^iaw
o;t
no
.e,u
-i&o
ml
.j.;.
.'ft*A i.N^y
v^iv
^.^jw^^^jAA^
J. \l.
-^>,
.-
-tJJ
l-v
Ir
it
jii
t:
rL6
9ri
-J 9cli
nl bsllqml
-22-
"Essence belongs to things per se in the order of formal cause (formallter) but per allud in the order of efficient cause (effective). f*or there is an efficient cause that man is an animal." v5o)
' '
' '
'
'
..^ -Vi
-23-
then
Let us keep
Thomistic argument.
He argues:
"Thirdly; if man is an animal, has an efficient cause, it vfould follow that something would come to be after It already is. But this is false, otherwise it would twice receive ' esse * . Hence etc. The consequence (consequentia) is proved: when God* 3 efficient causality has ceased, this is still true man is an animal. Consequently If man is an animal, is from an efficient agent, it follows that it comes to be after it already is. The consequence (consequentia) is cleai'. The antecedent is made manifest.
That which results when the divine ideas are posited must be, though all causality has ceased. But when the idea of man and the idea of animal is posited, their connection (connexio) results iDecause the idea of man necessarily realizes (repraesentat) aniraallty. Hence etc."(^^0)
Again, in expounding a man's teaching on the distinction of
essence and
"
3.
Text B: Cajetan
o,--l
;jp
-ff-lr,*
^;c
;5.,.;
r?f,-,r,;*
3l
:.3A
hn
^4
/%
-24-
Bom
Later
Rome.
a cardinal.
that much of it was accomplished while he was the covinselor of several Popes, even to fulfilling many missions for them, as well as general of his order.'
'
commentary on the
"
"
esse ".
"In regard to the s'fecond step in our procedure: the position (opinio) of St. Thomas, talcen by him in II Contra Gentiles (cap LII), is that in every creature, its quiddity and its actual existence (esse actualis existent iae) are really distinguished. And though this conclusion has already been made clear in the text (i.e. of the De Ente et Essentia) still (attamen), for a fuller exposition I shall excerpt (adducam) three proofs from St, Thoijias in that olace (i.e. the Contra Gentiles)." (027
iiiqoc.
'?"*ftaii...
I low
vri
-25-
capitulation.
"
,;fc
ta
oe Bt
iMy
fii
-26-
no efficient cause.
4.
Bom
The
in
Cajetan is to the
Suirnna
'?nm
2r.
rrt
I'irt
JB bJ
..A**n
-27-
great worth.
convents in France.^
per se "Fifthly. Substance belongs to each thing cause. But esse ' belongs that is, not by a productive Hence etc. The to substance (sibij per aliud . by an argument from opposition emtecedent is made clear (ex opposite): for to be actually illumined is not of the substance of air because it belongs to it per allud '.n^J
'
'
'
'
"
with-
And just as
esse "
-28-
essence of something has a productive cause and it Is another thing to say that the essence belonss to a thing hy an efficient (effectivam) cause. For the first is true and the second is false. Since every production is teiminated to actual existence (ad esse act\aalis existentiae), everything which has esse from another And thus, since is said to have a productive cause. every created essence has esse from another, it is necessary to say that every created essence has a man is an productive cause. But when it is said animal, no actual existence (esse actualis existentiae) is expressed, but merely the composition of predicate and subject and the relation (ordo) of one to the other. For it is an order or relation which belongs to a thing whether it really exists or not, as Avicenna, Algazel, whether man is or is not, Alpharabi, and Albert hold man man is an animal. Hence this is always true man is an animal, has no productive cause, but this Nor is it any obstacle that is, does have such a cause. sometime the Doctors say that God made man rational beas if God made cause it is not said for this reason rational belong to man, but because He produced the intellective, soul of man vrtience man formally (foiroaliter) is animal." (^o)
'
'
'
'
Slti
M.O
>.
-29-
We shall have
man is
an animal.
presentation.
The objection
"But someone may be able to say to the argument of St, Thomas that substance in truth (quldem) belongs to a thing 'perse* in the order of formal causality (formallter) but not so in the order of efficient causality (non aute effective). And for this reason, it (substantia) belongs to a thing in viii^ue of another just as esse does."T69)
' *
Thomists
"But against this refutation (responsionem) it is ai^gued by the Thon^ists on these grounds. First, because when all causality has ceased, it is true tliat man is man and man is an animal. Otherwise, predicates in the first mode can be understood not to be present to the thing and the definition is separated from the defined. All of iirhJ.ch are contrary to every philosophy, (cf. Cajetan). Second, because something would come to be after it
9VI
fIS
'
',"
"to
yrcraO
.;re
.8 it
oi
J J.
J J
-30-
Because when all efficiency is removed, it would still be true that man is man, since the predicate belongs formally to the subject of itself and for this reason is of eternal truth. And thus if some cause makes man to be man, it follows that it causes something after it is. (cf. Capreolus and Soncinas). Third, because these are equally necessary man is man and God is one, since their opposites are equally impossible, viz, from the iii?)lication of contradiction. But that God is one, is established to have no efficient (effectivam) cause, (cf. Soncinas' note #39). Nor is it valid if it is said that pix>positions of this sort are necessary when the existence of the subject is supposed. Because then this two and three are five is no more necessary tlian this es.rth is. Heaven is and the like, which are established to be conditionally (ex suppositione) necessary. But this is both contrary to philosophy and contrary to Augustine de Libero-^bitrio (Lib. II cap VIII)." (cf. Capreolus note yTHl)K(^)
Is.
how "per se" propositions (in the first way) are eternally
true;
"But for evidence of this how the already-mentioned propositions in which the predicate is of the definition of the subject are eternally trnie, and hov; (quoniara) they do not have an efficient (effectivam) cause of the inherence of predicate in subject, it must be pondered that, since a nature is subject to a threefold consideration viz. absolutely, abstracting from every esse both in an intellect and outside an intellect, as it has 'esse' in an intellect and as it has esse * outside an intellect in things themselves, the quidditative predicates belong to a nature not from the esse it has in an intellect, nor from the esse which the nature has in things but in itself (secundum se) as it abstracts from every esse . For when no intellect is considering or even when there is no man really (in rerum natiira) existing, man is a rational animal. Indeed, I say that predicates belong to a nature, not in respect to actual predication, because that does not come about except by the operation (opus) of an intellect, but fundamentally and in reality (quantum ad rem). But although such predicates do not belong fundamentally and in reality (secxindura rem) to the natuj^e by reason of (ex)
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
./
JET
-31-
esse which they have in an intellect, as, namely, if the intellect were not, man would not be a rational animal, neverthless such an inherence of predicates in a subject is able to be known by an intellect, divine as well as created. And for this reason propositions of this type are eternally true in two ways. First, because for eternity (aeternaliter) the thing is what it is (talis) essentially and it is its true nature to be understood with the attribution of such a predicate. Secondly, because they are known eternally by the divine intellect to be true, not only on the part of the act of understanding (ex parte intelligent is) but also on the part of the thing understood (ex parte rei intellectae) For, since the ideas of all natures are in the divine mind eternally, when these ideas are posited, the connection of a substauitial predicate v;ith a subject results. For this reason (ideo) such propositions are known to be true from all eternity by the divine intellect, And, as a consequence, no efficient (effectiva) cause is required to make predicate belong to subject." (71)
the
'
of essence and
"
5.
bom
in Piedmont
auid
bom
In 1513 he is a
-32-
bachelor at the same convent and two years later, along with
his famous colleague at Bologna, Sylvester of Ferrara, receives
the title of master.
Indeed, his
vrtiole
Pomponazzi's
"
"
He has left us an
"
Totius
"
prime cause,
"
in concrete"
.
namely as
"
9i
:1
-iJlOl
?J
9iii
bt\B
:f3
1^
v-
lo
9.
iw 3aj
:.
rr J. i_ -J -f i f
I .
'
-fvi^
.
- ^
.
3ri,-t
Mi^
dA
a^
n
slxu IC
"otfvionoo ni
ai
;t"
-33-
"The first conclusion is proved a second time as Esse tias a productive cause, because it is follows. the effect of an agent which gives esse to its product. But essence does not have a productive cause. Hence, they ai'e not the same in reality (realiter). The consequence ( consequent ia) is clear. The second part of the antecedent is proved in many ways, for if the essence has a productive cause, then (ergo) the quldditative and essential predicates have a productive cause. But these predicates belong to a thing without any (omni) productive cause. For when all productive causality in relation to the rose is removed, I ask whether this is true a rose is a corporeal substsuice. If so I have ray point; if not, then one can have no science of the rose absolutely taken, but only of the rose as it exists. Yet this is fsdse, for, as it is had in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, science But the rose is of incorrupt ibles and necessary things. as it exists is corruptible and contingent. Hence, in order that there be science of the ixDse, this must be /k' the rose is a corporeal substance, perpetually true even though all productive causality is absent (remota)."^'
* ' *
'
esse "
.4
,-J
.
1 o-
t.
-34-
C.
Now that
v/e
by Suarez following the same method of approach by beginning with Suarez and working back.
The second argument is presented in the first person
(argumentor), indicating that Suarez is summing up these argu-
'
"The esse * of a creature is an esse received in something. Hence in the essence, for no other can be conceived into which it is received. Therefore it is a thing distinct from essence for the seune thing cannot be received into itself." (77)
"The first antecedent is proved because an imreceived esse is an esse * subsisting by itself, in virtue of its own actuality, for it is wholly abstracted from a
' ' '
VJiS
b)
-35-
subject or potency in which it may be received. Such an esse is therefore most perfect and the most supreme (suiiinuin)'^ and thus pure act and some thing Infinite in the order of being (infinitum quid in ratione essendi). Hence it is repugnant that the esse of a creature be altogether unreceived. Such a proof is confirmed because such an ' esse i.e. esse Irreceptum does not have any principle of limitation. For it is not limited by a potency in which it may be received, if it does not have any potency (si illam non habet). Nor is such an esse limited by an act or a difference which is related y mode of act vjith respect to existence ( existent lae). The reason is that since existence is the ultimate actuality, it is not constituted by an act by which it is limited. Therefore, in order that the 'esse' of a creature be finite and limited, it is necessary that it 1> the act of the essence which it is i*eceived, and ( by which it is limited." '^)
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
;ji,n
Created
"
esse" is a received
"
"
esse"
b.
The relation of
receiver.
c.
An unreceived
"
ii
-36-
e.
That an unreceived
"
it might be received.
"
esse "
1.
With Giles, we
are dealing with one of the famous students of St, Thomas who
studied under him at Paris between 1269-1272, and yet one whose
Henry of Ghent.
TM-fr
^i..3
t.
Ifi
-37-
magni ", who oppose the real distinction, cite against them-
"Versus themselves they offer three argtunents. The first If a creature were its esse ', then (c\jm) a creature would be something subsisting (quid subsistens). Hence the esse of the creature would be a subsistent But such an esse' is pure esse ' which belongs esse to God alone. Thus etcT "The second 2u?gument amounts to this. Since an esse of this sort is not something limited if the creature were its ' esse ' , the creature would not be something limited. And thus it would not be something finite, which is unfitting. . ."(80)
is this.
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
(cf. d).
And that it is
"Further, in the same book (De Hebdomadibus) it is said 'id quod est accepta essendi forma est atque subsistit*. But what is received is really other (aliud re) than what receives. Hence the essence v^lch receives esse is really different from esse ." (ol)
' ' '
'
That Suarez has made this same point I do not think can be
lo uax3w
u.v^^ Jijno
i.ono
;;r,
;:>*;;
oi:
txi
Jl J
:*onio
srii
oriw
^"^
Cf fcXtfOW
.0
aA
srf^
si
sa&a odi ni no
fun
8i ^ailall
q89
;tAriw
3uE
;jxiio(i
'
aiOBf;
alnJ
dl>4i.i
cb
lo)
JiiiT
nl inloq smca
9xi:f
asX
-38-
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
a^mix
-39-
2.
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
and records
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
rf;ttw
^lo ?b9
aiQ^I
..J
-40-
would not be received, it would have no distinctive formal or material principle. Thus it could in no way be divided. Consequently, it could in no way be contracted, for every contraction of something common finds that what is common (ipsugi) is in some way divided into many. Contraction cannot even be understood without division. Yet if it were in no way contracted it v/ould be subsistent in the second way and absolutely Infinite. But that esse cannot have any formal differences is clear because ens cannot have them as is manifest in Hence by much less can 'esse' have 3 Metaphysics c.lO them since the concrete is more divisible than the abstract just as man is more divisible than hiimanity. It is also clear because difference is such (cujusmodi) that it implies a lesser degree of purity and elevation than all outside its own order (ratio)." VoT)
' ' ' '
.
"
"
esse "
esse" in question
"
"
esse"
God.
ing the dictum of St. Thomas into question, in turn calls forth the interpretation of Capreolus.
It is the point of the
"
from its essence, then the dictum of St. Thomas is not clear
(quia non apparet magis evidentia in ilia propositione, esse
./
>i
lo
:1
one
'
4>.,
>
-Ul-
argumentum procedit).
"
esse
"
of being.
"
holds no real
"
esse"
ceived, otherwise, if
esse
subsistsns "
"
esse" to subsist
"
ceui
'^.
iB
IS
U8
J.
moil
Ih
!r.
-42-
Is receptive of it.
a limited or created
esse
''
is a received
"
esse" is an Infinite
"
esse ".
I do not
3.
by Capi*eolus.
stating that
"
'
'
'
'
'
'
J ^(i&
OO
i)
*
fnri:t
Etr'i
'.
o.?.
-43-
every *esse* subsisting per se is infinite In the order of beinn; (in rat lone essendi) but the esse of an abstract substance Is not Infinite in being (In essendo) otherwise it would have in itself all perfections (omnes perfectlones rerum) Hence it is not subsisting per se The minor is clear. The major is proved: when every principle of limitation is removed, the thinr; remains unlimited and infinite just as when a precise (praecisa) cause is removed, the effect would be removed. But every principle of limitation is removed from an esse ' subsisting per se . Hence It would be infinite. Tha major is clear. The minor is proved: no act is limited except by the subject in which it is received or by the differences which contract it. In the first way, whiteness in a subject is said to be limited to a certain grade because the subject does not receive it to every possible degree of intensity to be found in its cause. In the second way, the nature of heat is limited by blackness (in nigredine) because blaclcness does not have heat except as it is contracted to this determined level and degree (speciem) which is blacloiess. But subsistent esse is not determined in the first way since it is not received in anything, nor is it determined in the second way because it does not have differences. Hence it is absolutely unlimited." (3S)
' * '
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
objection in defense of the text of St. Thomas, Soncinas begins his development with that very objection.
For, as in
"
is a
"
esse"
angel is subsisting
"
per se "
3l
-44-
esse " is
"
However, Soncinas
Capreolus applied to
"
subsisting
"
"In-
"
"
esse" is a received
esse "
^>i>^v^
*> .-r
'
I-
::>
jb
:n oa
JOB OB
I kfj
-45-
4,
Text B: Cajetan
As we have seen, Cajetan, though comment ing on the
"
cap. 32 .
So, in
this way:
"Eveiy xinreceived ' esse is absolutely infinite (infinitum simpliciter). But no ci'eated esse (esse creaturae) is absolutely infinite. Hence, no created 'esse' (esse creaturae) is an vjireceived esse The minor is per se nota . The major is proved as follov/s: ever^' pure esse is absolutely infinite. But everj.- unreceived ' esse is pure esse Hence overy imreceivsd esse is absolutely infinite The major is clear from the terms themselves (in short, esse is limited for this reason -- because it is not pure but mixed with the predicaments). For esse is limited by the predicamental natures whose deprivation will result in its lacking all finltude and it thus will stand absolutely infinite (a quibus, si depuretur, omni finitate carens Infinitum omnino restabit). But the minor is also clear from the preceding argument and from the argi^raent made above in the text. Even so it is clarified by wai'' of example (exemplariter declaratur). If whiteness is posited as not received in something, it is pure whiteness and would have nothing besides Itself. In addition it would be Infinite in the species of whiteness, as is clear. For no one sound of mind can imagine a separated whiteness as limited to some aegree of vjhiteness. Indeed, everything which is essentially such (per se tale) has every perfection possible to its nature just as the separated msm for Plato has every perfection possible to human nature." (89)
*
' '
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
38
Jn<s
t'lig
..ak
ajx.-
ii
an ah
tJiuua
-46-
For
"
esse "
An unreceived
esse" is
"
5.
Text C
Sylvester of Ferrara
Thus he
second argument:
"Third. If it were so (i.e. if esse and essence were not really distinct but only distinct 'ox natura r-ei' as the objection maintains) there would be given many (multiplex) absolutely Infinite esse's *, since subsistent esse * must be infinite in as much as it is not limited (teminetur) by any recipient. But this is impossible because that whereby one would differ from another v/ould not be since an Infinite ' esse comprehends every perfection of being." \90)
'
'
'
'
>ij
iiJn.
ir.
orfw
t'Mft- :*-^r,-a
tA'Miia
-47-
"
'
'
"But this refiTtation (responslc) does not destroy (tollit) the argument. For, since esse cannot be limited by formal differences by reason of the fact that nothing is more actual than it, it is necessarv, if it is to be determined to sane grade, that it be limited by a recipient (susceptivura). Hence if it is posited to have no real receiver (susceptivum) and, since this is not divisible by differences, it must be that it is limited to no grade of being (essendi) and consequently it is necessary that it be pure and infinite 'esse'. "(^2)
' '
"
"
^r-
V N#
:-
31 _-
8lri;t
no
<
.io6
-q,
nl
etf
-48-
of It.
auid
Suarez reports it as
infinite
"
esse
'
6.
Text E:
Chrysostomus Javellus
"
in cone ret o
**
as
"
'
' '
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
s ^1
t.
-;t
')0
: OWJ
-49-
argument of St. Thomas in mind, the very one cited by Capreolus. Like Soncinas before him, whom we have seen echoing Capreolus,
Javellus begins by stating the contrary position on the question and in his refutation of that position makes his own
stand clear,
esse" and
ind
"
Related
created
"
"
esse"
lation of essence to
(cf. b).
"
any way and is thus infinite (cf. d and e). any good to argue that
"
Nor will it do
esse"
nao
ta-icT'Y'P'**
id
'jrii
no
St.
O^
>
si
^I
A
i%
-50-
Metaphysics
the same place in Ai^istotle and the uses the same text in the
same way, though glossing it with a fuller comment.
^^'
Again Me find that, in substance, the Thomists referred to initially by Suarez bear out his recapitulation of
their argumentation.
C.
follows
"Every creature is composed by a true and real composition. But the first and general real composition can only be of esse and essence. Hence, every creature is composed of essence and esse , as of act and potency, which are really distinct , The major (i.e. every creature is composed by a true and real composition) is proved because if there were given any creature in which there were no real composition, a creature altogether simple would be given. Just as the substance of an angel existing in act, if it were not composed of essence and esse would be substantially and wholly simple and thus in some way (quodaramodo) would be equal to the divine perfection." V 95)
'
' '
'
'
'
It presupposes that
lo n
''
*^^
:xir:,ij ,:r>i
jn
'tf
fc
i".
do
-51-
'
'
'
o;>
?mo!>
"ify
bni-if Sfpoe
nt
iijxi
.:ff
ue to i:
1/8
3-
at m9ciy ^o
,
bnB
ie Xb9t
r'088'7'V
JO
-J. i
9fflS8
'irte
lo JiBQ on
Xi
won
4.
ai ^l
;tii^
tS
q as ;7es9l
cfs
i(
q
)
^ani
3.
Hii
tj
i.
la
as
iix
luajx ici
iiiHiiioqs
jx&j
eriu.
-52-
obscure.
"
essence and
"
esse "
Admittedly, it is an
worth.
esse" is an accident
But for
As we
have seen before, we can usually find a facsimile of an argument used hj Suarez either in B'onseca, Aureolus, Alexander
Achillinus or in some of the others, but in this case of the third Thomistic argument there is silence.
This may point to
lo n
-^9
a"
:m
LIB
KB
ocf
I
si
nl
-53-
gax*d
D.
Suarez presents a
similar problem.
"In a substance composed of matter and form, * esse * is something distinct from matter and from form and from the nature composed of both. Hence, it ia a thing distinct from the whole essence of such a substance. Therefore it will be the same (i.e. esse will be really distinct) in the case of the rest of created beings." v 990
'
'
from the
fiQ
sw as
oaQ
-^
~-r
II
nc7
or:o,,i;'-^ y,;
31
i.
-54-
be alleged
wliy It is
For
'
and yet not identified with form nor matter nor with the
"
E.
,-.
r, -!
(^--f
"
-V
.al
iUi'J
qsioo
-55-
and
"
Investigation.
"
It reads as follows:
"Fifth, in addition to metaphysical arguments, we can offer a theological one, viz. because created essence Hence, is really (in re) separated from its existence. it is really distinguished from it. The consequence is proved from what has been said above about the distinction of things (rerum) (102) The antecedent is usually proved by saying that when creatures (res cre'dtae) are corrupted or annihilated, they lose existence but not essence. Whence by corruption of the thing existence is separated from essence. But that antecedent is better proven from two mysteries of Faith. One is the mystery of the Eucharist in which, through consecration, quantity loses the natural existence by which it exists in bread and acquires another which exists per se and can sustain other accidents. The other is the mystery- of the Incarnation in which the hiAmanity of Christ lacks a proper and natural existence and is assumed in order to exist by the uncreated existence of the Divine Word." (1037
.
'
Suarez recounts an
J'^ Ji.tr;
^Y
Ban
-56-
P,
tinie I thlnl<
"
and
tiriat
the
"
esse" of a creature is a
1.
''
duae res
'"
^ ^ '
In
Disputation VII which discusses the vaiious kinds of distinctions and it is none of the places mentioned in the
thirty-first Disputation.
'"'^^^
2,
Johannes Capreolus
3a
o"
";Jofii.
9ti;S
;..,J
axr tfsJ
-57-
"To the first argument of Aureolus it is said first that esse and essence are not properly called two things ( duae I'es) or two beings (duo entla). For Just as St. Thoinas in I Sentent. d.25 q.l art. 4 says and Avlcenna alleges, 'this name " res and this name " ens" differ in as much as there are two aspects (duo) to consider in a thing, namely, its quiddity or " ratio" and its " esse " And this name " res " is taken from the quiddity and from the " esse " of the thing, this name " ens " is tal<en.' It must be '.cnown also, as was touched above (p. 31 4b) that ens can be taken in two ways, namely as it signifies the essence of the thing and so It is divided into the ten predicaments, or secondly, as it signifies the act of being (actum essendi). Whence It Is clear that the esse of actual existence (esse actualls exsistentiae) is not a thing (res) properly speaking since it is not a quiddity, and consequently it is not another thing (alia res) from the essence of the creature. Likewise, it follov/s that it Is not properly an ens In as much as ens signifies the act of being (actiira essendi) since it is not what exists (cum non sit quod exslstlt) nor is it ens strictly spealcing as ens signifies essence. Yet it Is said of a being or of a thing (entls, vel rel). And for this reason it is not properly said to be another being (allud ens) from essence unless ens is said to be that which exists in its own esse '' or Is a principle of being (essendi) or is a disposition of being (entls) as has been mentioned above In the solution of the second argxiraent. But properly speaking It Is not another being (ens) especially as ' ens asserts the act of .existing (actum exslstendl) and is a substantive." (^^9)
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
^'
but what we
of what this text states, we can say that Capreolus for one,
Is not guilty of the exaggeration of saying essence and
"
esse"
3.
6W
Cf
lb sriR
I-
-58-
Capreolus does.
and
"
4.
Cajetan
His commentary on the De Ente et Essentia merely
"
Summa Theologiae"
res "
For,
in Interpreting the
question asked by
as follows:
St.
"In the title the essentia * signifies 'deltas' which would be meant by the definition of God if He were to be defined. The esse means what is signified by the and the est' as second adjacent when we say Deus est like, homo est etc. The idem means resil identity. So the sense of the whol?> question is: Whether the thing (res) signified by the * Deus * is the thing (res) (113) signified by the est when it is said Deus est ."
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
On
"
.nc
mubttuoe^
9'
9d;r
"
i no
iddB
1.
ion Ob
^UO
.*^
(211)
!i;f
''r --':):)
no
-^'>tB
")r^
A?;
i-tMfi
DW
Vtix^
'<&.Xj O'
ftii4
.s,1;^n3aaS ^9
sia^
'^acfnemr"'^'"
'x^BevI-^S nl
ni It
lo
-59-
description.
G.
Critical Summary
We have but briefly referred to the degree of fidelity
look at it as a whole.
Existence for
A rose is
Its
i I.JL
w a
#\
!i-
r rTf>
:0Ci
[Ji^.
'
r*
I-
r-
Bt r
ol
no
fam
<
rcti
-60-
"
actus
esse
Why
Indeed,
"
"Whether esse ' and essence are distinct things (distinctae res) or only differ logically, I answer that essence is always more perfect than the esse of such an essence. And I say this (i.e. talis essentiae) because a particular esse , i.e. esse of a substance, is more perfect than a particular essence, i.e. the essence of an accident. Bxxt I intend to say that any essence is more perfect than its own proper esse e.g. the essence of Socrates is more peif^c'c than the ' e ss e of Soci^tes. For if they are really distinguished^ "the reality of essence is more perfect than the reality of its 'esse' But if they are only logically distinguished or conceptually, the
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
Q 8S 9
Ic
;'
''
fl,"l;
..fT,'
.'
0^ BB nr
^I.V(.
;
.
on
Am
-61-
concept of essence is of higher dignity than the concept of ' esse . And when this second is proved, the first proof is also concluded in as much as a more noble entity demands the nobler concept. By way of proof it is argued first as follows: The concept which belongs to something primarily and in itself (per se primo) is raoi?e noble than that which belongs to it accidently (per accidens). But the concept of essence belongs to a thing primarily and in itself, yet the concept of esse ' belongs to it accidently. Therefore. The major is proved because what is more intimate and intrinsic to something is to that extent more perfect. But that is especially intimate to something which primarily and essentially belongs to it. The minor Is also proved because what is pr-edicated of something quidditatively, is predicated of it in the first mode of per se predication. But essence is predicated quidditatively of what has the essence, yet esse is not predicated quidditatively nor in the first mode of ' per se predication since it is not signified by tlje definition nor by any part of it. Therefore etc."Tllc>)
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
Rather than bearing a striking resemblance to St. Thomas, which one might expect from this Thomist, this doctrine of
Soncinas closely resembles Avicenna's doctrine of essence.
That this is its ancestry is seemingly corroborated by its
influenced by Avicenna and a Henry of Ghent, whose relationship to Avicenna needs no mentioning.
If then in this Thomist ic defense of the real
a lo
o:*
b':>^ct^.ni&e
?>
i^iHJl;
Jin
-62-
traditlon?
"Plusieurs scavans Theologians, apres avoir admire un ouvrage, qui sembloit devoir finir les disputes, et reunir tous ceux, qui n'etudient que pour connoitre la verite, ont entrepris de le coramenter, et d'ajouter leurs reflexions k celles du Saint Docteur: mals le Commentaire na pas toujour repondu au texte. Souvent 1' explication a paru moins intellisible, que les paroles qu'on pretendoit expliquer. Et 1 'experience de plusieurs si^cles nous a enfin convaincus, que pour bien entendre S. Thomas il ne faut consul ter que S. Thomas meme: 11 na pas^besoin d'lnterprete, ou il est lul-meme son Interprete le plus clair, aussl-bien que le plus fiddle. A lui seul semble avoir 4te reserv^ le secret, ou d'abaisser les matieres, s'll est peirais de parler ainsi, et de mettre la verlte' a la partee des esprits les plus comraunsj ou d'elever les esprits a la qv connoissance des verites les plus sublimes. "Iil/
Cts
XOM lO
i-.
t**.*
-63-
PART II
MODAL DISTINCTION
A.
Introduction
Now that we have seen something of the Thotnistlc
following manner:
"The second position holds that created esse is distinguished from the nature of the case (ex natura rei) or (as some say) formally, from the essence whose esse it is, and it holds that created esse is not a proper entity altogether really distinct from the entity of essence but it is its raode."^^'
' ' '
' '
'
iiriiich
is not between
"
II
TflA"!
^ITOt;.
.,.-..-
,.~'^'
sr
3d
X9nc
^IIol
I
\
a)
IS9'T
'CTl
fl
-64-
certain real modes that are something positive and of themselves modify the very entitles by conferring on them something that is over and above the complete essence as individual and as existing in nature. This is established by Induction. Thus in quantity, for example, v/hich inheres in a substance, two aspects may be considered: one is the entity of quantity itself, the other is the union or actual inherence of this quantity in the substance.... The second aspect, inherence, we call a mode of quantity. ..." (2)
"
ut alii loquuntur,
tinction.
"A second opinion (as to whether or not there is an Intermediate distinction between a real and mental distinction) is this: there is in things prior to intellectual activity a certain actual distinction, which accordingly is greater than a mental distinction, but still is not so great as the real distinction between thing and thing. This theory is commonly attributed to Scotus, In I Sent., d.2, q,7, last paragraph; dist. 5> q.l; dist. 8, q.4j In II Sent., dist.3, q.l. The doctrine is also brought cut in innumerable other texts wherein Scotus discourses on the distinction between God's attributes, or the distinction between \miversals, and similar matters. In such passages, however, Scotus does not explain with sufficient clarity whether this distinction which he himself calls formal, is actual in the real order or merely fundamental or virtual. Sometimes he refers to it as virtual, and so there are various interpretations eiraong his followers. Some think that for Scotus himself the formal distinction is no other thsin the distinction of the reasoned reason, in the sense and manner explained by us. (3) They say that it is called formal because various definitions or formal aspects are conceived in it; and they say further that it Is called a distinction from the nature of the case because it has a foundation in
-J
oa
^r>^:tr-t-Tr '--rtnt
,-ts'TT'^r
??rf:t
:tn
E:
J.
-65-
in things themselves and is virtually in them^ although actually it does not precede mental operation. According to this interpretation Scotus does not favor the second opinion; nor does there seem to be any doubt that in some passages this is the mind of Scotus, especially when he is treating of the divine attributes. Other disciples of Scotus understand him to speak of a true and actual distinction which is verified in reality antecedently to the advertence of the mind, and they think that it is found not only among creatures but also in God, at least between the divine relations and essence. In this matter Durandus holds the same opinion. In I Sent., dist.l, part. 2; d.5* q.2, ad.4j and at greater length in d.33* q.l. A number of others defend this view, but it would take too long to recount their explanations. In favor of this same opinion many could be cited who admit a distinction from the nature of the case, but not a real distinction, between various things, for example between essence and existence, nature and suppositxim, quantity and substsince, relation and its foundation, and the like, as we shall see later when treating of these topics." (^)
There can be no doubt that the men whom Suarez has in mind as
adherents of the modal distinction are this second group of
Scotists.
HI
-66-
'modal distinction'. For, as I shall explain, this distinction is Invariably foiind to Intervene between a thing and its mode."v57
"The term formal distinction' is not much to my liking, as it is excessively equivocal. It is frequently applied to things really distinct, inasmuch as they are essentially distinct if they differ specifically; such objects have different formal unities, and hence differ formally. Even individuals of the same species may be said to be formally distinct, inasmuch as their individual formal unities are distinct as we said above.... Thus a formal distinction is of wider extension, and can be greater than the distinction from the nature of the case, of which we are speakinc. From another point of view it can be a lesser distinction, and this is the more common acceptation, for it is frequently applied to formalities as conceived in a state of precision by our minds. In this latter senta the dlstinctlon^does not exceed the level of a mental distinction." ^^
Thus, of the two traditions on the formal distinction of
ex natura rei
or the
modal distinction.
Bltii
.<
-67-
from the thing in question; therefore there; is a distinction in the veal order that is less than a real distinction. In other words: whatever aspects a3?e distinct by definition and objective concept, aire distinct by the nature of the case and prior to intellectual consideration; but many aspects are thus distinct, althoTogh they are not distinct as thins from thing; therefore. These and like arguments are advanced by Scotists, since this is about the way Scotus himself seems to propose his formal distinction. However, if we closely examine such arguments, we find either that the question is begged or that the formal distinction is substituted for the distinction of the reasoned reason through inadequate concepts; only virtually or fundamentally can this distinction be said to be based on the nature of the case." (7)
Does
existence
in
o^
(7!l^t^f reflect
.i-Z/i''JUy
tJu
oJ ai nolr
ssriBuZ
lo
-68-
"So thlnl-cs Lychetus in 2 d.l q.2 where, in the first place, he says concerning the mind of Scotus that * esse existent lae and esse essentiae are the same and altogether Inseparable, although Scotus there Quantum ad istuia articulu?, does not say they are the same but that ^ esse essentiae is never really separated from esse existentiae Neverthelass., probably enough, this is concluded from the mind of Scotus, for when he says there that essence is not separable from existence and in 3, dist.6 ex professo ' teaches that the humanity of Christ has not been able to be existing; or be assumed without a proper existence, he plainly thinks it is not distinguished in the thing itself ."\9)
'
'
'
'
'
'
"
3,
di3t.6"
of Suarez' contemporaries
the
"
modemi"
maintain this
own behalf.
That something like this has happened is borne out
ci"';ed
we find a
-69-
essence,
modal distinction, he maintains in that place, as he clearly tells his reader, what he calls an "intentional" distinction.'
'
distinction
"
ex natura rei" ,
"
formallter" or
"
modal iter"
^rf^
cx,<i
ill
^^ ^#
*.
^*
H lo
I
o.t
'o,,
?-->r.
?^
-70-
An forma artificialis
siore
'>i:*.w4
c> <i.^
JJ\J
_^
^^i^K^
\J
i V.
-71-
Secondly, there are modes which not only are not distinct entities but are in no way really distinct from the things they are said to modify, but are only mentally distinct, as for example the modes whereby being is contracted to its inferiors. But we pass over these two classes of modes; the latter ar^.not modes except by intellectual perception. .. ."U*^)
"
For, the
In a very
^^'
The important
'
r,''.1
.'-.-)?
bfUS
R
<^B
^ns^r
f'-'^
-72-
to be (ut sit) even thoxigh (quippe cxan) before the creation of the world, man was a rational animal, but of this elsewhere', by which words he does not contend to establish a distinction from the nature of the case (ex natura rei) between essence and existence as between a thing and a mode of a thing (inter rem, et modiun rei) because he does not have a distinction of this sort in mind, which would be frora the nature of the case (ex natura rei) and not of reason, but rather some distinction of reason. But In 4 Sentences , d.lO, q.2, art, 1 and 2 he also teaches nothing in behalf of the intermediate position. If he is rightly appraised in article 1, he says only that ' esse per se is a mode that belongs to the quiddity of substance, but esse in alio is a mode belonging to accidonts. He teaches the same thing in the second article concerning the mode of existing in another which belongs to accidents, and he says it is not a thing distinct (rem distinctam) from the subject, but THhezher it is distinguished 'ex natura rei , he does not determine. Furthermore, he is not concerned with existence absolutely, and of essence but of existence with the mode per se , we however, dispute of existence absolutely and not of that mode per se ,"(lo)
raan
'
' '
'
'
'
his position
B,
#< r
r .-^
/V"*-! f f
<^
r^'
"r
j*
-t.
90
vji
'.ijj
jt.
iiouai
sxij
iKXw'tajjp siiv
-73-
between the essence and esse of a creature is seen to be absolutely necessary. But still it need not be greater than this modal or formal variety. Hence no greater must be affirmed since distinctions are not to be needlessly multiplied." U?)
' *
Wliat
esse" as between
.
res" and
"
"
ex natura rei"
However, the proponents of the second position, while agreeing that the distinction between essence
"
uad
existence must be
res" and
"
"
res" and
"
modus rei"
"
"
res"
between a
"
would not seem to have a middle position between a real distinction and a distinction of reason but rather a comparison
of two kinds of a real distinction with a distinction of
reason but as Suarez tells us it all depends on how you understand "ensreale".^ '
il
/3WOH
:isc{i
i^lb
"19^
-I:JC.
'u;
itc.;.,*o,
-'lODrjj
uo^i
"..'Oil
ac
3e
-T4~
"In the second place it is effectively proven by the fact that what is outside the essence of a thing raust be distinguished ex natura rei at least formally (saltern fonnaliter) froa the essence of the thing. But esse is outside the essence of the thing, which is clearly evident since it is separable from it, vnience this proposition (enunciatio) Creatura est is not 'pervse' necessary and essential but contingent. Therefore." (20)
*
'
'
'
'
'
Suarez has told us that these men make use of the argviments
ex natura
"
ex natura rei"
"
OUL
Ol SB
>-.*.
8d^ 101
I.
Tncoe MTioe
i:-:.'..
:j
caajsiK
jiio
xsio;
,i9Vj.;:
i-rccw^9r
3 cav<nq
-75-
would be its ovm esse and hence pure act. But this is to attribute to a cr^eature what ic, proper to God. Whence Hilary Bk. 6 De Trlnitate attributes to God as proper to Him quod esse nonaccidit illl but Kis is subsistent ' esse itself. And Boethius in his Ds Hebdomadibus cap.l says, in rebus oreatis diversum esse id quod est, ab esse* ." (21)
'
'
'
* ,
'
'
But let us note that though using arg\iments which we have seen
"
"The minor Is proved because this distinction (modal or formal) suffices in order that one be outside the essence of the other (22) and it is sufficient for true and real compositionj because wherever there is a distinction in things, (in rebus) a trje composition exists of extremes so distinct. Also that distinction (modal or formal) suffices that one extreme be separable from the other by divine power although it does not suffice for the mutual or convertible separation mentioned above." (23)
"
res ",
.4
Fa
-76-
how a
r.iodal
"Wlionce this position can be coivflnned, for although a created essence is separable from a proper ' esse * rieverthclcss, the reverse (e converso) is not true, for 'esse is not separable from the essence of a creature. For up to now it has not happened,, noi* is it likely that
*
it can happen, that the existence of whiteness be conser-y'Cd v;iicn v;laiteness is not conserved and that roan have the existence of a white quality and not be white, and so with other exanpleG. Accordingly, the sign is that there is not a real distinction between essence and existence but only modal. I omit the other arguments that are wont to be put forth in behalf of this position because tiiey do not have a particular difficulty which the arguments cited do not contain." (2^)
What
out the other but not conversely, i.e. created essence can
"
esse"
but
"
That this is
30 is exemplified by the fact that the existence of whiteness is not conserved when the essence of whiteness is not
conserved.
-*'
C.
Critical Summary
&2W
n^
satAuS
til
-77-
in the instance of the Thomlsts, even to citing Anthony of Brindisi, dspending on how he vrould understand "Intrinsic
mode"
.
either a
proper entity, a
"
res"
or a mode.
vrtiat
it is.
For these
tliat
oi n
St 1
lixj^e-s^f
:w
-^i
-78-
-79-
PART III
DISTINCTION 0? REASON
A.
Introduction
At last we have reached Suarez* account of the
He re-
"The third position (opinio) asserts that the essence and existence, when proportionally compared, are not distinguished really (real iter) or ex natura rei as two real extremes but they are diEtin^^uished only in reason (distingui tantiiin ratione)."(lT
' '
qualification
"
.A
&1 SH
.a.*.
ciOk.Si
ds-:,
is
oc*
i:.-.
8;
ed
0.
:ii
ai.
aii
>i>j.
&7itJUjB,
^_
LBUP
lol
-0 /!
-So-
very
"
We shall
see very soon whom Suarez thinks may well be comparing essence
consider to be utterly
It amounts to this:
"And the foundation for this is, briefly, because something cannot be intrinsically and formSLlly constituted in the order of real, actual being by something else (per aliquid) distinct from it, for the following reason: By the very fact that one is distinguished from the other as being from being (ens ab ente), each is characterized by the fact that it is a being (utrumque habet quod sit ens) as co-distinct from the other, and hence, one is not formally nor intrinsically a being In virtue of that other (et cons^quenter non per illud formallter, et intrinsece)."(^^J
Thus, the shortcoming which Suarez perceives in the first two
positions is that
arid
"
thereby make it actual, since each is a being and is so distinguisiied fixjm the other.
the
"
esse" as
"
metaphysical
T\n
f.-tr? r V.-.
'.rrcit-.^'
- :
'
-'.
-f
^%^l
k\
'
\^
lOl
ow:t
ii.,^iIJ'
-Sl-
"
ens" , which is
"
ens" in
of the other?
of our research.
of the third position help us to keep this in mind: "The validity (vis) of this argiaioent and the complete determination (pleiia decisio) of this question, with the solution of the arguments, depends on mar.y principles. Tnus, to proceed raoi^e distinctly, aiid without any equivocation of terms, which I fear to be frequent In this laattei", one must proceed ^.radually and individual, principles must be explained in distinct
t>ection3."(o;
s.
.0
.0
\0
ro
..4
-82-
existence or
"
c, A distinction of reason alone saves the principle that " esse" formally and intrinsically constltures essence in the order of real actual being.
Siaima
'
.-di-'J^JS
9:tr
**T'-
-83-
produced by Its cause and to be extra nihil , it is understood to have some esse which it did not have from eternity, ffiierefore that esse is an esse exlstentiae .... But the consequence Is proved because that esse is not an esse essentlae , as such, because th:; esse essentiae which is sometimes distinguished by St. Thomas from the esse existentiae in creature 9. is said to be eternal and Immutable and inseparable from essence. And further, it is said to be distinfjuished from the existence. But, indeed, this ne;' esse which a thing has, when it is first produced, or by its production, is temporal and separable from essence, for a thing can lose this ease although the essence of a thing always remains the same. Therefor tore this is not 'esse essentiae' but 'esse existentiae .."(10)
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
esse essentiae"
"
From our
Suarez
"
And
esse
"
of Ghent.
esse "
which is not
necessary to discuss here as we shall meet it again in an objection that Suarez confrxjnts.
Howver, it is most impoiiisuit to realize that the
9iii
)d^
no
iij
-QH-
Suarez
"
the
"
"
be intrinsic to cr'eated thinps, gmd it cannot be by reason of an absolute necessity, for the very nature and existence of
such an
"
"
The Avicennlan
created
"
esse"
.Is
tribution
"
esse
existent iae ", in terras of any kind of a real composition or in terms of being really distinct from one another.
Let us
B.
Text J:
Alexander of Alexandria
IB
Ji'^VOViS il
m
-so
i^'L tU
J.'Xitj
r-^IA
'
-85-
^'
ll2)
"
been called
"
bom
3,
131^.
-^'
In addition,
cind
Ramon Cenal.'
"
and discussed:
"Whether objective becoming (fieri objectlv^jra), which we call creation, requires a real distinction (seciindum rem) between essence and esse or one of reason (secundiira ratlonem) only?"'^^)
>
'
tvio
i'R'flx
nv
nf:
' .i
.tA
ao'fi
>,^
-86-
reason.
He defines his
b^/
by
this very fact, it is not necessary to think that this becoming or creation is impressed on something else like essence.
?or, if this were so, the essence would somehow p3?ecede its
b<.^;
'
'
'
'
'
i'J2.xJ .L-^"'
-87-
And in
"
'
each state as a
"
res " or
"
"
non ens" ,
"That fieri' can be saved because no more is required for it than that the same total reality first be in a state of possibility (sub natura possibilis) (which we call 'ens non prohibitum') and afterwards be in act. But some call this nature (rationem) as it precedes, essence, but as the same thing is the terminus of divine action they call it esse For we shall so imagine it that that reality, existing as a possible (sub natura possibilis), still is not being in act (ens in actu) but a certain similitude of the divine intellect and, on this basis, it can be called essence.
' ' .
\tOB
rtw
iS
ia
nl
.?'j
a.;,L...lJ.;
i.rjijn.s-j
VSi
t>
U^
9l>OB
10
riBO J
-88-
But that same essence, which first has been a similitude, afterv/ards has been the term of divine action and hence is called esse Therefore, we shall not imagine that that fieri has esse from the fact that essence receive s'"''sse' as something really diverse (quoddam diver sum re) tut from the fact that the same reality which first falls xmder the concept of doing or making (sub conceptu faciendi) is the term and object of the ssune action of making or doing. And from the fact that it first has been able to be and afterwards is the terra of this action it can be said to become (ootest dici fieri )."T227
'
'
'
'
'
'
Nor
But in the
stand of Alexander of Alexandria there is no twofold causality, one of essence and one of "esse", in fact there Is no
All we have is essence here and essence there.
"
esse"
Essence has
completely devoured
"
esse"
res"
"
esse"
aund
amy sort of
question?
i9
uB
-89-
2.
In 1321, he is
'
He dies in 1322,'
However, Suarez does not cite him according to his own works.
Miho
had cited
He merely cites
"
Prima
flfl
tf
.t
998 C*
-90-
"Concerning our third division (where it is said affirmatively how 'e tsae and essenct are related) It is necessary to considerThat it is sufficiently clear what it is not (quod negative satis apparet), i.e. that there is no real distinction betv/een essence and esse , But how essence and esse are actually related (quomodo vero Be habeant essentia et esse affirmative) ia a difficult thing to see." ^ 27)
' '
'
'
'
. ^
^^ ^
Capreolus
writes "Aureolus also argues (l Sentent., dist.S, a.l, art. 2). First. No thing is other than that by which it is formally outside nothing (nulla res est alia ab eo quo formaliter est extra nihil) because granted that the opposite is true (date opposite), i.e. it is other than that by which it is outside nothing, it follows that, in as much as it is one thing (alia) it is outside nothing and in as much as it is another (alia) it is not outside nothing; for it is not one thing in as much as it is nothing, but if one (alia) is outside of nothing, still it is not outside nothing in virtue of the other; other** wise by that it will not be oxitside nothing. (29) But It is set down that essence is outside nothing by esse actualis exsistentlae' . For, by actual existence (per
'
^11ortB
111b
cf
at
al
OiiW
lUm A 10
HfJe
A lo 9as9
iv
'Qtb
MT r
r
w nt
BtfXoe^'
1
-
y.
A:-i.vii 1"- ci ti
V*
t-m^l:.;
ad^lmi
:/5
obIb
e'r;
oi/p
r.
o-=
'
-91-
actualen exslstentiam) we understand nothing else than a position in reality (nisi positioner! in rerun natura) which is to be posited outside nothing. But every essence is formally posited outside nothing by a position outside nothing. 'n\ej:'efore, the position outside nothing will be actual existence and consequently, essence is posited outside nothing by actual existence. Accordinglyj it is necessary that the position outside nothing, or actual exititence, not be another thing (res) from, that which is posited outside nothing and exists by it. Nor is it valid, he says. If it is said that essence is some other thing (quaedam alia res) which is fonnally outside nothing by esse ' but subjectively it is outside nothing bv itself. Flor is it necessary that it be one thing (res), just as a tsiibject and that to which it Is subjected are not one thing (res). That, I say is not valid. Because the *esse' which perfects essence acting as subject and posits it outside nothing, subjectively on the part of the latter, i.e. essence, and formally in virtue of itself (esse); that esse ', I say, either perfects nothing as its proper subject and draws nothing outside nothing or it perfects the very essence which is outside nothing. But the first cannot be granted, otherwise nothing (nihil) would be under ' esse and nothing (nihil) vrould be drawn to ' esse * which is inpossible. If the second is granted my point is made Jhabetur propositum) because that substrate is a thing (res) pofsited outside nothing by itself. And consequently in a stone, the essence of stone (res lapidis) is not outside nothing by an added esse but it is formally outside nothing by itself (sed seipsa formal iter)." 130)
'
'
'
'
bl
'
'
jIo
ai
^Jt
-92-
esse ", but for Aureolus this is Just another way of saying
For
there is no
"
in reraa
no more
anid
no less, just as we
"
esse in
existlno essence?
nothing
5.
He is a secular master
^on
Bnoc
:S'"Tr,'i
.!
-93-
his
Influence is great.
And it is
Capreolus reports
Henry as follows:
argues as q.g follows.... Secondly. Because, if that esse is some thing (res allqua) added to (super) the essence of the creature, and since one does not grant that it is God and an uncreated thing (res increata), then it would be a created thing (res creata). But any created thing (res) of itself has non-being (non esse), but if it does have esse , this is a participated and an acquired
'
'
'-^-^'
'
'
:o
91
srriM
.
'JiIJ.V^
-^XJ-lsl
BA
-94-
Therefore if a participated and acquired 'esse' esse' . is always really other than that to vrtiich it accrues (semper aliud re est ab eo cui acquiritur) and by which it is participated, of that ' esse ' of that thing (de illo esse illius rei) added to the first creature and by which it had ' esse ', I ask whether it is really other (aliud re) than the ' esse ' of that thin^; to which it accru.es (cui acquiritur} . And then either it will be a case of proceeding to infinity (aut erit procedere in infinitum) or a stand will be taken (status erit) in some essence to which 'esse' accrues (cui acquiritur), which esse ' is in no way really other (aliud re) than that essence to which it accmios (cui acquiritur). And in virtue of the argument by which a stand is teOcen in
'
one created essence and nature, by that same argtoraent a stand is taken in any nature." (34)
Again
"we
"
esse" of
"
"
"
res"
(de illo
esse illius rei additae primae creaturae per quam habuit esse
essence and
affirmed.
"
esse" as two
"
h.
Text
?^i:
Godfrey of Fontaine
as 3.;3xi
:;OijS
fix
Jl scsa vinsh
-ic
xsan sa oj
oi
YllBaa at
ofT.'
rb)
'
ilXi.1
&C9
St
TR "
""
'^R
91001
-95-
It Is at least certain
bom
He was a master
in the Faculty of Theology at Paris and a contemporary and foe of Henry of Ghent.
It is likely that he died in October,
I306.
Aureolus' recapitulation.
"
^^^^
'
"Seventh. If esse differs from essence as another thing (i*es alia}, it is either a creature or the " creative essence, as Boethius says in his book De Ortu Scientiarum" . (37; Biit it is established that existence is not the creative essence. Hence, it is a creature.
lO
ni
J^qBO
-90-
Accordingly, It is asked of that existence whether it If it is an essence, my point is an essence or not. is made (habetur propositiim) that essence and esse * are identical in the creature. But if it is no essence it is absolutely nothing according to Augustine. Hence 'esse' and essence cannot be really distinguTsKed." V3c5)
'
"
exemplified as in
tlie
any notion of
seems lost.
"
For, if
esse"
5.
"Eight, he argues as follows. The resolution of a thing conies to a halt (stat) at thofic principles of which the thing consists. But an existing thing is not resolved except by the resolution of the principles belonging to its nature and quiddity. Just as the corruption oT Socrates v/hence he comes to be non-existent, consists only in the separation of the soul froin ths body. Accordlnsly, Socrates exists by nothing other than by the union of soul and body. Whence, for the exlGtcnoc of the thing no inore is required than the real entity of essential actuality
->9
HA ^
ijsi
-97-
(nlsl realls entitas essentialls actiialltatis). For, how is it (Quare) that the rose does not exist? because it is not a real entity according to its proper essence and nature but it is only in the potency of its causes. For which reason it is not a real essence except in potency. So that, the rose is according to esse existentiae in that way in v;hich it is according to esse essenfiae Vfhence, Just as a rose is an essence and a thing (i*es) not in act but in potency, so it exists in potency and not in act. Yet, because existence has more of the aspect of act than essence (exsistentia magls concemit actum quam essentia), for that reason essence, according to its rati o' (secundum rationem) is more verified of being not in act (de non ente actu) than 'existere' ." (^0)
'
'
'
'
'
of an existing being.
"
Rather,
"
6.
bom
at
He enters the
-jnp.
s lo
'^'.':'.!\-i-^
'
r~i,
Tt
fi'
aaami
;tB
al
-98-
He
real iter ", and, save for the argiments affirming that this is
so and his answer to them, we have no explicit appreciation
BMlOtfT
tin
ilJ
lo
dr.J
to
nnfcff-'^-'T
;rf:t
lo
fc-^
-99-
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
-100-
intiraates (innuit) this in 3 Metaphysics by distinguishing being outside the soul (ens extra) into the ten predicaments. He says so because then of the predicaments, one signifies substance (alia quid est significant), another quality (quale), one quantity (quantum), another relatioii (ad aliquld) one action (facere) another passion (pati) one place (ubi) another time (quando). .. And for each of these, esse' signifies the same thing." C^3)
.
'
esse ',
Hence, it is
This will
7.
bom
Mainz.
But
aoesyx
lo
L.-tn,/
-101-
Sentences"
he clearly
states that he tiikes Occam for his master and guide throughout
his commentary.
tiiat
were known as
Qabrielistae"
(45) '
"
esse"
sends his
did
"
discussion in regard to
"
esse"
essentia"
"In regard to the first subdivision, it must be noted in reference to the term esse *, that esse , ens and 'essentia do not differ according to the thing signified (secundum rem significatam) because the esse of a thing, its entity and its essence, are really identical (quia idem est in re esse rei, entitas rei, et essentia rei). Otherwise, a thing could be, and not be nor have an essence, which is something unintelligible and implies a contradiction. For whatever is not a being (non est v^ns), is nothing. Likewise, what does not
'
'
'
'
'
'
AS
i>rai
9? aw
"AUneae^" boa
4 J.
(("^lA
-102-
have an essence is nothing, and what is nothing, does not exist. And so if something were and were not a being (ens), it would be and it would not be. Also, of whatever being (ens) is denied ^of that, every positive predicate is denied in as much as nothing is more common than being (eo quod nihil est comratinius ente). But nothing is being (ens) without essence, since essence is that by which something is formally called a being (ens). But ' esse is called everi'-thing vriiich has some reality outside its cause and outside an intellect. Or more properly speaking, esse * is a reality outside its cause and outside an intellect." v^^)
*
'
Durandus.
esse"
is
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
to^^ssentia ^.M^V)
But we shall have occasion to see whether this type of a distinction between
"
"
"
.bnmua
X^
'<tr:T\
OBI
-103-
8.
who was
bom
Further, he engages in
Dominican order in which capacity he works for the canonization of St. Thomas.
Narbcnne.^^^J
In the case of Hervaeus we have an explicit treat-
J,
I323, at
Utrum esse et
Herein he outlines
three positions on the question, the first is the real distinction, the second is the position of Henrj' of Ghent, wherein
'\r>
:|f^
".^f*^ fOQ[
tJL<l OO.!.'
0>fl!
ri-i
-104-
"'
*
both of which he rejects, and the third is a familiar explanation of a distinction of reason:
"And for this reason there is a third position vrtiich seems to me to be more probable, namely, that ' esse ' and essence differ accordinc to diverse modes oT signifying, by the mode of verb and by the mode of noun. For whose evidence it must be ioiown that just as 'lux' lucere ' aind ' lucidum differ, so do ' essentia , esse and ons , so that essence says that by which something is a being, just as light says that by which something is lighted (lucidum). And esse is ' habere essent lam just as lucere is habere lucem ', but ens ' is habens essentiam Just as ' lucens is habens lucem . Or more specifically, in regard to creatures ( specificando autem istud ad creaturas), the essence of the ci^eature is that by which something is a created being (ens creatam). But the esse of the creature is to have a created essence (habere essentiam creatara) and ens creat^ora is habens essentiam creatam ." v50;
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
essence and
"
9.
Alexander was
bom
iO
iUou
.-^.^f.
C;ea9eds
^OB
^r<^ ra
-105-
of the Church,
Alexander of Aphrodisias.
He dies August 2,
Our man wastes no time in setting forth his views, for immediately after asking this question in the place cited:
"
he says
'
'
"
^
"
"I answer that 'ens* and esse are separated by a grammatical distinction alone which is wont to be (afferri) between a participle and a verb, for ' ens is Likewise, that ens a participle but esse is a verb. say essence or existence (ens dicere essentiara et ens dicere existent lam) differs by the sole difference (alietate) of verbs. For 'sun' and 'existo' are substantive verbs which do not differ in re;;:ard to the thing signified. For Averroes in 2 Physics com. 71 has said that metaphysics considers existent s in as much as they exist. Whence (Ipso autem), quid and allquid must be used as synonyms. But ens ' and ' allquid ' are convertible In signification, yet separated by a grammatical difference, for aliquid ' is not a participle but a noiin. But ens ' is a psLrticiple and not a noun, for those who have wished ' ens * to be a noun, have no But on respect for grammar (grammaticara contempserunt) basis of 7 Metaphysics com. I accept ' ens as dethe rived from esse '. For there ought to be no question in anyone's mind (nulli enim dubium esse debet). that a participle has been derived from a verb."(>2)
' ' ' ' '
' ' '
'
'
'
'
'
'
essentialized or formalized.
"...it must be seen whether the form is esse (an forma sit ipsum esse) and I say, yes, (sic) because all that
'
'
3/
al Q^li
l^r/^
-106-
by which something is, is a form. It is clear from the definition of form, but esse (Ipsum esse) Is that by which something is. Hence ' esse (ipsum esse) is the form. "(53)
'
'
'
esse" up to a
10.
cuid
Perugia,
Sentences " at a
convent of his order as well as to receive his doctorate. This he does receive in 13^5 on the particular recommendation
of Pope Clement VI.
his order and dies at Vienna in Austria a few days after November
20 in 1358.^^^^
"
io ar
IB
.'
alii
i'>'-fr:.-t-
-107-
of an objection of Aureolus
reads
"
:
creatlone a se distincta"
esse ",
"
esse
'
As we shall see,
-OQ
...
-.
BliUi.
XOftOO AftfU/C
h'iST
as
'en ai'
'9
if'-;
TTi*!?"-
^.-c
art s'
iv;
>.
9W 8A
lb
.r
-Jo
.T',.
-1:1
P
^^:
-108-
11.
"
The absence
He was
bom
1320.
Metaphysics" of Aristotle, as
te>:t.^-^
'
V7ell
as
"
He does con-
a^
3l
S^P'
la
iJ^UB
30
iO
'
-109-
of
"
ena" and
"
'
unum "
to the
the
"
"
This
12.
"
Scotistae"
bom
"
He taught
"
of.
"
In that text the Doctor Respondeo, quod in ista etc says many things. First, that esse can be taken in many ways. In one way, for esse essentiae ', just as we say that essence is said from esse (dlcitur ab esse), as wisdom (saplentia) is said from sapere , And then such an esse and essence differ in reason alone because they differ only in the mode of conceiving, for esse is taken in the concrete and essence in the abstract. It is also clear from the Doctor in I, dist.8 quaest. penult., concerning man and humanity, and of God and deity (Deus et deltas) which differ mutxially in this sense, which is concrete with respect to the abstract which is essence, as many essences there are in Christ,
' ' '
'
' '
'
'
'
'
;rxaa:
-3^a
-lie
.a&qi>i^^
ft
ei;t
no
^
.....
.
'\Q|oXoe;i:t
crediifeong
"
w'r''.-,'"i
*fVrMrl''
C:
-ti^r,'
.,^,^^
ilCiit
<iS
-110-
there are that many esse And there is no difficulty here because in Christ there is a divine. ^d human nature and so there are as many esse ."(o^T
'
'
'
'
"
esse "
for
"
"
Intellect or as it signifies the relation of predicate to subject, only to make this point:
"Of these esse mentioned above, it is not the intention of the question to ti^at. Rather, the question is concerned with the esse actualis exlstentiae which is really Mentical with the essence to which such an esse belongs (est realiter idem cum essentia cujus est), as is sufficiently clear in 2 dist.l. See there the gloss on essence and existence (vide ibi glossain de essentia et existentia.)."^^^;
'
'
'
'
'
'
But other
and
"
esse"
But
another place:
"Some posit a distinction of i^ason between esse exlstentiae and esse essentiae because one is conceived as concrete (per mod\n;i concreti) and the other is conceived as abstract (per raodum abstracti). So thinks Lychetus in 2 d.l q.2 where, in the first place, he says concerning the mind of Scotus, that 'esse exlstentiae and esse essentiae are the same and altogether inseparable, although Scotus there, Quant\im ad Istuia articulum , does not say they are the same buf"
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
om&B
9ti^
r.
>t
o*
-111-
that esse essentlae is never really separated from Nevertheless, probably enough, esse exlstentiae this is concluded from the mind of Scotus, for when he says there that essence is not separable from existence and in 3 dist.b ex professo teaches that the humanity of Christ has not been able to be exist or be assumed without a proper existence, he plainly thinks it is not distinguished in the thing itself. Whence Lychetus above (in 2 d.l q.2), in a marginal note which is his " gloss adds: '" esse essentiae" and esse exlstentiae" signify one and the same reality and they are the ssune really and formally and are distinguished as concrete .^. which are only distinguished in reason." v^^^ and abstract
' ' '
'
'
He is Ildephonsus
"For this position of Francis Lychetus, one of us, is represented in 2 d.l q.2. Quantum ad istum articulum . In which place he says of the mind of Scotus: 'Here the Doctor posits his own position, saying that God can create something from nothing, i.e. not from something according to " esse exlstentiae" and consequently not " according to " esse essentiae"^ because esse essentiae" " and esse exlstentiae" are identical.' But these words express only a real lack of distinction (solum realera indiscretionem), unless the express testimony of Lychetus in this matter is to be sought in the marginal notes which are seen to assert that position clearly in " these words: '" Esse essentiae" and esse exlstentiae" say one and the same reality, they are really and formally the same and are distinguished as concrete and abstract which are only distinguished in reason.'. But this marginal annotation seems to be that of Cardinal Constantius Samanus who revised (recognovit) the works of Lychetus and glossed them for the schools (et scholiis
.- .tt
>
-112-
illustravlt). Yet Suarez, in the second tome of his Metaphysics, disp.31 sect. 6 and Vazquez tome I 3 part, disp.72 cap. 2 maintain this position which /g^N ' the modems commonly accept, and it can be proved."^
However, the fact that Lychetus himself has referred to a gloss
"
Sentences ",
But we shall
13.
^""
Disputationes" on the
"
Sentences ",
al
'J.
xxQ^ *A
iM
-113-
But he begins his quest for the answer to this on the level
of created essences for the following reason:
"No one, neither Theologian nor Philosopher, is unaware that the hidden things, such as are the invisible realities, are more to be sought out through the realities more known and familiar to those who are seeking. Wherefore, one must first consider created essences with their existence (Propterea opus facto est) in order that we may mount from them as on a step in the measure (promodulo) of our Infirmity to the superexcellent nature of God (ut in illis facto prius gradu, ad superexcelsissiraaui Dei naturam scandere ' promodulo infirmitatis nostrae liceat.)*"'
"
esse" is intrinsic to
.in
tttotn
Sffl
-114-
"
It would
14,
"
de Janduno ",
"
de Genduno ",
"
de Ganduno "
This famous
Averroist was
century.
bom
13 of the same year. Pope John XXII makes him canon of the
chapter at Senlis,
cJo
T.
'io
;.JX'.
*noo
9ri;t
lo ei
-115-
Perlpatetlcs and distinguishing between corruptible and incorruptible creatures, says that existence is distinguished
Suarez says
(72) '
esse"
"
still in
And the
"
esse" in question
.15
.to
'33a
;i,
ta9up
.it,'iaflj5l
daae
V9
;i8
ji
-116-
esse "
'
"
esse "
ment of the third position: "Gainful note must be taken in regard to that position that. Just as being (ens) is distinguished by being in act (ens in actu) and being in potency (ens in potentia), so essence is distinguished by essence in act and essence in potency. But when it is said that in generable and corruptible substance, esse differs from essence, it is not true if it is understood uniformly (i.e. as esse in actu and essentia In actu * ) because actual essence does not participate actual esse Rather, that actual ' esse is identical with the essence because actual essence is identical with the form which is esse and act. Similarly, potential essence as matter does not participate in potential ' esse ', but it is identical with it. Rather, the potential essence as matter participates actual ' esse as form, because, unless form were participated and received in matter, then in one species there would be but one individ\ial, which we see to be false .because there are many individuals in human nature." (75)
' * ' '
'
'
'
'
'
'
"
esse" really
.ta
nL itsdt
-117-
for Siiarez.
"But if the question (utrum esse et essentia differat) is asked of generable and corruptible substance, then it must be answered as before, that if esse and 'essentia are not taken uniformly, (difformiter) then they differ as actual esse ' which is the form differs from potential esse * which is matter. The proof: because that esse is either subsistent per se * or participated^ Tf it is subsistent per se then in one species there is not but one individual because the multitude of Individuals of the same species is only by matter per se . But we see that there are many individuals in one species. But if that esse is participated then ray point is made (tunc habetur propositum) because the participant really differs from the participated if it is true participation as was seen before. But if esse and essence are taken uniformly, as ' esse in act and essence in act and esse in potency and essence in potency, accordingly (sicut), they do not differ really because they are one, for essence in act And thus, essence does is the fonri which also is ' esse not participate ease since the same thing does not participate in itself. But essence and esse in act are participated by the matter which is essence in potency.... For if ' esse in act were to differ from essence in act there would be a process to infinity ...."( 76
' ' '
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
I do not
our analysis
of the previous text, for this last text reiterates the same
For,
"
viffti'T ta*>
Ob I
1C
kO^kAW
^^JV-
-118-
Will
15.
^^"^'
"
esse" asking:
His
in oppositura"
The second
ratio" by
Kirtiich
esse" is
':ln<^
e.f.
'
?d^su8
.Ui
Jjiyv
.:.>.,
-J
..(
t/-Jiil...i
.Lfi-LiV^i
O;^
:V
S:
..'
roa
:
lo 788 aw t9f
b el
'^^-JJ^vV
*Jt
to
tiJ units i
Jll>J
will
itUii
dd;^
A aairtwf
fid
s^itTV
lo aMrtow
-10
Ito i:
nl aaaiixA
sflj
lo
fflslcfcnq
affT
i'i>-axaj.vj
>ii^
L--.^.
ctj.-ijHj
^
.. ^
'^^^
nl b^ow lioAd
!io<;)qAiio
c.
s^
-119-
whlch is caused as a
"
"
cjuod" ,\^^^
Caput Posit ionum " and consists of four conclusions, the first
"
stating that
the second affiiTaing that they are not really distinct, the
ex natura rei"
agrees for various reasons and thus omits this last position,
stating that his question has to do with the proper essence
"
esse existentiae"
^'
"
junlores"
This brings
,
"
the heart
chapter called
"
eight arguments posited in the beginning. In order to see just how Niphus corroborates Suarez*
Caput
0"
A,,,.-).
>;ra
'.I'i.
w^ ^ H
9riJ n-
-120-
"But because this disputation cannot be clarified except by distinctions and suppositions, let us first start with the distinction. And let us say that essence, according to common usage (apud usura gentium), usually has a double acceptation. For, sometimes it is taken for possible being (pro ente possibile) whence a thing is said to be possible, and this the yo;inger philosophers (juniores) call being in objective potency (ens in potentia objectiva). Such an essence the rose has now. For the rose now, in the winter, has no essence except the esse which is in the objective potency of its efficient causes (causarum agentium). But the esse opposed to this is ' esse actualis existentiae by which esse * a rose in the summer is said to be absolutely, and not to be relatively, in the potencies of its causes (et non secundxim quid in potentiis causarum) . In the second place, essence is taken for the nature, in keeping with which (ad quem sensura) some say that humanity is the essence of man and Averroes makes the form of man the essence of man. The esse distinguished from this is esse subsistentiae (esse huic condivisum est esse subsistentiae^ which belongs to the individual which is a subsistent substance (quod est hoc aliquid et subsistens),"(oO)
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
of Carmel.
esse" to
esse" to matter:
'
'
"Accordingly the fiist supposition is that esse in objective potency is identical with esse in the subjective potency of matter and they differ in i^ason alone. For the potency of matter, by which a rose is said to be possible, as it respects the agent is called subjective potency because in virtue of that potency the rose is transmutable by am agent. As it respects the form which is the object or thing intended it is called objective potency. Hence, as the potency of matter respects the agent by that potency it is called subjective; as it respects the object of the agent it is called objective. This we have explained in our
'
'
J w ,
i-'
:)
ruiou
xb
V*
nOiJitsqaioo
ijsL
lo
.ol
I
r
I
i1
9ir
e.'.-if
..i
-121-
Commentary on the Physics and we now presuppose it. Whence, it rollows that at the time when form is educed from the potency of matter a twofold composition results, one of matter and fomi whence something is called a composite of matter and form, the other of essence and esse because the composite of esse and essence is called existent (existens appellatur). It is proved because, since the potency of matter as subjective differs from potency as objective and the forai is the terminus of both the objective potency suid the subjecti'.ve potency, as esse it is the terminus of the objective potency (ut esse quidem objectivae) and as form inducible by an agent it is the terminus of the subjective potency, there have been in reason at least, in such a composition, two compositions, one of q essence and esse * and the other of matter auid forra."^^-'-'
' ' ' ' ' ' '
'
esse" or
esse" in
"
"
esse"
"
For, as we shall
"
esse"
oT
8fllM
-.901
fii.
narlvr
-122-
which 13
"
Jan<i\in,
Niphus
conclusion of Niphus.
esse"
"
esse" do
"Third conclusion: in substances composed of matter and form, esse and essence, taken in either of its two senses, differ. This is demonstrated first if essence is taken in the first way (i.e. as ens posslblle or as ens in potentia objectlva ) because then essence is being in subjective potency, to which matter alone corresponds and nothing else. But ' esse * is in the act of existence (in actu existentlae), which, as it respects objective potency is called esse , and is called fonii as it Inspects subjective potency. Hence, they differ by as great a difference as matter differs from form. If essence is taken in the second way (i.e. as 'natura' or forma * ) esse * and essence also differ, for according to Averroes, essence is the forai and the esse is of the individual composite. But forro differs from the esse of the Individual composite. Whence, it follows that in amy individual composite there is a threefold composition, one of matter and form, another of individual and nature, and finally one of essence and esse ' . Yet all these compositions are one in subject and differ in reason (differunt ratione) because. for Averroes, ' esse , form and natur*e are Identical." (2)
' ' ' '
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
or
"
.969
JO
on
3l
-123-
"
esse" reduces to
"
form respectively.
"
However, the
ens possibile"
"Secondly it Is clear (i.e. the distinction between essence and ' esse ) in regard to essence if taken for the nature or quiddity, since thus, essence is the form and esse * is the composite or at least the composite corresponds to esse (vel saltern Ipsl esse compositum correspondet). rience essence taken in this manner differs from esse For in a substance, essence is the form, the * esse is the individual composite (Ipsum esse est compositum individuum)." (o3)
' ' ' *
' '
"
esse"
esse ",
es
] efi
CK-
.j.-,i.i
li^-X'
It
-J
i.';
't
io
'tfi'fT<r's
ctofi
eeo!)
,f
10
i- nI
/rrso*^
Ic
OiJlv*
iv'iixvc
^,.!,'
::.:lb
9;
,lo
saoe
5
UVj
,
.UL?
iv
"icb ejsu-xi;-w.i
cLb
ol aB
*)fl
8B
nrro'i
boB anol
9 lO
-124-
newly caused,
"
esse" as form
"...further, the distinction of reason in newly caused (noviter causatis) beincs is greater than in eternial realities. For, in the latter this distinction is not founded on diverse parts, in the former it is fo\inded on diverse parts. Wherefore the younger philosophers (Juniores) call this distinction in the former a real distinction of reason (in his distinctionem rationis real era), in the latter they call it an intentional distinction of reason (in illis distinctionem rationis intent ionalem) . Thus, thei^fore, 'esse' and essence in new composites differ in real ratio and in subject (differunt ratione reali et subject) to the extent (pro quanto) they are the same in subject separably. But in eternally created things (In rebus vero causatis aetemis) ' esse * and essence differ only in intentional reason and in no way differ in subject. (8^)
' '
of reason Suarez
form and the composite is likely the basis for Suarez' charge
that Niphus differs in the wording of the problem.
As to
"To the rest of the arguments, it is answered tliat they Also their arguments are worthless are in our favor.
JiJBq
-125-
(nulla) for they all conclude that essence if taken for the nature, and esse if taken for the individual, do not differ absolutely, (simplicitor) yet according to Averroes they differ in the way in which form differs from the composite. And you must know that, perhaps, they do not differ from the expositors (ab expositoribus) since they would not deny that, when taking essence for esse In objective potency or for matter which corresponds to It guid esse for form outside the potencies of its causes, these differ really (secundum rem) in the way in which matter and form differ. Nor would Thomas deny that, when taking essence for the nature, nature is identical with the esse ', tal^en for the existence of the individual. And this is the understanding of those men (et hoc ad intellectum lllorura). For, Thomas would not say that that nature and esse differ in the way in which two things with diverse existences differ (eo modo quo differunt duae res diversarum existentiamim), but he would say that distinction is real in as much as it is outside the operation of the intellect, which they call real. And thus they conclude^to the same thing though they differ in their words." Vo::?J
' '
'
'
'
'
'
'
essence and
"
esse"
and Averroes.
esse" are
agree that they are identical and yet, both would agree that
nature and
"
-:t
-^i
9-
ir.:*:}
ZAOBB
LaSI
,nr>?'^l no.
-126-
16.
bom
at Cortizada in
"
Portuguese
'
"
esse"
,ll
ol
OB
al
u:
-127-
mentions John of Jandun and Augustlnus Niphus, only to prescind from their nuance.
found in Suarez,
suid
'
found in Fonseca.^
"Some say that existence in no way (nullo pacto) is distinguished from essence even though existentia is distinguished from existens and also essentia from esse and ens by a grammatical distinction alone, as abstract from concrete and verbal nouns from verbs and participles, which is a distinction found not in the things signified but in the manner of signifying and conceiving (sed in modo significsuidi et concipiendi). existentia auid ' essentia , as they say, signify For, the nature alone of any thing, but ' existere emd esse signify habere essentlam ', and finally, ' existens * and 'ens', if taicen as participles, signify habere essentieun in present time, but if they are talcen as nouns they signify habens essentiam absolutely, i.e. without the consignificatlon (sine adsignificatione) of present time . " (897
' ' ' ' *
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
by Fonseca.
"Others say that created existence is truly (quidem) distinguished in some way from essence to such a degree
"..s
nifboAT,
.S_J"i
U^-lJ.-
Off*
r'?
e-.l'.'
ivxt;n
.J^tj%(jb3-iw
uxis
i?.it)r>^t
^Q Si
;1
-w
-128-
that it is a real distinction (atque adeo distinct lone inventa in ipsis rebus) but still not as one thing from another thing (sed tainen non ut rem unam a re alia)." v 91)
esse" really
"
duae res"
causes.
distinguished.
In regard to a positive stand on this third position,
iW
ixfod^
iw
j.iliU,
-129-
For
"
no
zriv
-.
'Ir.
-130-
texttira 22)^
"
and
"
"
interpretation is one we
this qualification:
"But this * ens non prohibitum (i.e. esse possibile) and ' esse in actu ' are not two beings but one and the same thing, first under one mode amd then under another, which neverhteless, one and another mode is not one and another thing (non sunt duo entia, sed unum et idem, sub alio et alio inodo qt'-i tamen alius et alius modus non est alia et alia res)." (97)
*
Fonseca makes use of the arguments he has catalogued in behalf of the real distinction, a practice alluded to by Suarez
-'
c.^.-yTt
^Tr^t
_..
"sflao" Firm
nt
a-
'
e^a^B
r"
.
"Sat
-131-
"The first part of this conclusion (exlstentia creaturarura distlnguitur ab lllarura essentia ex natura rel) can be proved by the argijments for the second position (the real distinction as between two res * ), reduced to their true sense. For, these arguments conclude only that the existence of creatures Is distinguished frHjm their essence when every operation of the Intellect has been excluded, as will be clear from their solution. But this Is to be distinguished * ex natura rel * . The second part of the conclusion (non tamen f ormaliter) Is proved from the end of the above section." (98)
'
"
something of interest:
"The third part of the conclusion is proved, because whatever is distinguished from something ex natura rel and not really (et non realiter), is either distinguished from it by reason of some reality, as man Is distinguished from animal by the addition of a difference, or it Is distinguished from it by reason of an intrinsic mode, as whiteness of a certain intensity is distinguished from vrtilteness, absolutely taken, by the addition of a detennination, or it is distinguished from it by reason of both (i.e. by some reality and by an intrinsic mode), whence, (quo pacto) similitude is distinguished from the whiteness in which it is groimded (fundatur), for it has not only a diverse reality or entity, but also a diverse mode of being since it belongs to amother predicament (i.e. ad aliquid). But the existence of creatures is distinguished from their essence ex natura rel and not really (nee realiter) as has been shown, and especially (insuper), it is not formally any reality or entity as may be formally distinguished from essence. Hence, it remains that it be distinguished from essence as an intrinsic mode of the latter. But that it be distinguished as the ultimate mode, is clear from this because whatever among creatures is conceived under any entity or mode of entity which is not actual existence, still in the order of some nature It can be conceived under actual existence (adhuc alterius naturae ordlne concipl potest
*
' * '
ur\;i
.V
-132-
sub actuall existentia). Read St. Thom. In tractatu And this is the reason why the de formls q.3 art, theologians (among whom are St. Thomas, I S.Th, a. a. 4, Scotus, 2 Sent. d.3 Aegidius, quodl. I q.7) and the philosophers say that existence is the ultimate actuality of every form. I would rather say more generally, of every entity, because every entity has its own existence, as the entity of prime matter, as will be clear in the eighth book. But these, in part, speak more precisely of existence in that axiom and in part they are of the number of those who think every existence proceeds from form." (99)
' '
"
esse" is distinguished
something is distinct
of an intrinsic mode.
"
ex natura
determination.
ex natura
It would
Alexander of Alexandria
vriiere
^j
al
3
o
as
oi
nr.
W'
.1W
*-'r*r.,-tsb
'f fl
lA
'^|'ft
Ig
vi,i^ii;f
-133-
"
esse" as
"
additio " of
"
esse" is distinguished
"
"
esse"
We
c.^^ect
-13^1-
out a proper existence, since that position cannot be correctly foxonded except in the identity of the essence and the
'
C.
Critical Summary
In the men cited on behalf of the distinction of
In
view of this the pressing question is, though Suarez agrees with the conclusion of these men and their various traditions,
does he agi^e with the formulation of each or is his
.!
LXiQc:i.i.
--
Vi-i-
to
r.
tstcn'i
al n^
TTQ f.v
^cfnrrol
-J.
J^-
Further,
"
esse " or
"
existence or actual
"
In what
have to be seen.
that the weighty tradition of these men, cited by Suarez on his own behalf, on what it means to be really distinct, as
two
"
res ", counts for more with Suarez than any specter like
Giles of Rome.
5s
sr'
d.^ftiv Ar.rTQSP.a
-. ' v."Arrjf^
,r-.-t
.tftr',-t
-136-
PAIxT
IV
or
"DE ESSENTIA CREATURAE UT POSSIBILI"
A.
Introduction
statement of his first principle his reader again finds himself back in the 13th century, but this time embroiled in the
.-^c,
Ttiryrtf-
_1 3'7_
and the strength of the foe, if Suarez comes armed to the fray
with weapons and strategy which history has shown to result in a particular outcome, nc matter
\-ihsX
osophy goes back as far as John Scotus Erigena, but for our
immediate purposes we need only go back to Henry of Ghent wherein he parts company with the tradition from St. Augustine to
St, Tho.n-^s which identifies the divine Ideas with the very
"
esse
divine
from
tlie
ideas
...\-Oil.
.x</:
-138-
It is
an
"
"
muj
w-<i.w-;
bBUisBi'
^4i
u^ijiw
bc^ '"
^'"'
ij.';>^
..lilXvXO
"**ti* in^ii
i^ii\<
V.J
.Jil.
^^d^
'jiilV
VW
.'w
'
^ in^eljC8
iJLjj:'-
l,li/l.
^v
m
y):j.'-i}i,^i
3W
an
'.i..
i.
9n
-139-
sees Duns
B.
gins.
we saw the
',:
<,.IU..|_
^0:\Z!liU
^....l>._,Jj
Jv
->ilX
t-
CiAl..
> VJi-'
:;>
A V^
J-tMliA V
^'i.'A^
tO
'Zi
.ii
-JJiJi^i-v)
JJIjH
.W.r-y-
Hiixipob
ai^juua
ai-
^ J c-il.
-140-
areat^C beings.
as we have noted.
"At the outset it must be established that the essence of the creature or the creature of itself, and before it comes from the hand of God, has no real, true esse in itself. And in this sense, when ' esse existentiae ' is prescinded, it must be established that essence is not some thing (rera aliquam) but is absolutely nothing. This principle is not only true but also certain according to faith." v5
'
'
"
esse"
"
"
as objective, or the
v?
iO
i ax
nt
Pi:t?rs
.t
fi.-t
)"??"'(-
F;fTT
nu3l'
i.
-b
<
til
mliiT
Llo'i
.o*":
'
a
n
od
^-
3,
<-
/: .1
pr
'1-^ f
r,-r-,.MT'
?,?
."tftiT.-;
)" ileil;f
81
fi
lo
.&
-141-
"
esse cognittun"
"
esse"
tention that Scotus held no such doctrine and that all this
"
dissensio in modo
f3?ee
efficiency of God,
Thus, creatures
Hira.^
(12)
./
c3J3
iV
3i.-'/^0wUi; A?J.U
i,3^ii^
!-;:t.tw
J.J
-142-
he calls a real
"
esse"
esse" is said to be
of this, they can be objects of that divine knowledge which the theologlsms call, simple intelligence.'^'
At this point Suarez very cleverly notes that Scotus
is not alone in his opposition to Henry of Ghent, for, the
on St. Thomas.'-^"'
And
already seen.
?-fr.
'i/l
it
'i
ri9H
"^jjJJ^^/jcPiKi
:m:
l^^rf^rf
-\
it
f <i7**fc\r
ci\'i^
OoJjB
f.-f
/^ifrr^ny.
^w S'l..
o:i
-143-
"
^ "
'
Capreolus says
'
'
'
Godfrey
Thus, we have the "Prince of Thomlsts", citing with favor, the doctrine of Heni^ of Ghent, himself the target of Tliomist
criticism.
rif^TXTt
.LiiW
iO
^W
.L.
-144-
to be has
"
This sundering of
Further, we
the problem
and existence.
The comments of Suarez on his citation ai^ interesting.
esse essentiae"
Is
some true
thing apart from any causality of God and distinct from Him,
as existing absolutely outside of nothing, as we have seen
'
K-t
-F->f^;^
OM
IBl 1
**
- .
,L.
vJ
X9 a
T^sJi
J^'
l'
-145-
by God.
Rather, creatures
In brief,
Accord-
--:^^.'
racrrn
Off
o:f
:0
19WOC
ins
..,j3
i;vJ
nl iua
et
ion
fi
33
aa
:;r
nl
-.'ri#
"io
el
:^i
;ti
-.
'
'1.
:[
siriT
o:t
to
,(:
9)
"e
:^
-146-
It Is by way of
in
creatable essence.'"'
certainly true to say that Capreolus is not holding any heretical position.
It seems that Sxiarez is glossing Capreolus'
characterize the
"
in the mind of God, an expression which can easily be accepted in Scotistic frame work.
Thus, S\iarez would then be in-
-^'
"
in itself but only by an extrinsic denomination, i.e. creatures in God, prior to creation, are real essences in potency or
potentially, not by an intrinsic potency, mind you, but by
This viould
^V*
'..*
^-
rf'S
-^^^
.-.J^t
-^
JL>.^wA<fN^[
;;toci
3d
oo^
mit9
o jnt^ri-i
-147-
"
esse"
esse"
esse" in the
"
Capreolus ultimately
text we saw Capreolus affirm the influence of Henry of Ghent and the doctrine of the exemplary causality of and the efficient causality of
"
"
esse essentiae"
.
However,
"Prom the vevj fact that esse is attributed to the quiddity, not only the esse ' but also the quiddity is said to be created because, prior to existing, the quiddity is nothing, except perhaps in the intellect of the creator where it is not a. creature but the creative (creatrix) essence." (27)
'
'
'
uti^i
ba&
-148-
"
Without Him
In
"
Next,
de fide " certain that God has not made created essence
things were created from all eternity, they would have been
"
esse" to another
esse "
ii-
Tn
f\'^',:^f^r'!S
-149-
then God has not created all things absolutely and sin^jly
"
ex nihilo"
of that
"
esse"
and unproduced.
io
-lO
kT
f- f
I--'
tn
^"5r4:i
-150-
Consequently, no
"
iny
true, real
^-^^^
"
For
from existence
auid
In
greurited,
essentiae humanitatis), according to that whole which is conceived in it after existence has been prescinded, has that
entity in act fiom eternity and only a union to the Word was
lacking to it, and to every other existence.
Otherwise, it
OU 61 i&ttH
iBe^
90.
X-LS:'.-;
i_U-
r,f.afci-ja
Jcta
;ii
9 v.
a^i
/^Ux^
ax
;;&
*.!
^t!j-.'.o
^sousiitss
aa;;^
10
i.
cXxOT*c)in
YQ
joo/iojaj.:'
aonseaa
.bT>
1I
lo
-nor.
ivxdo
o^ noXau
>/6
o;J
o;t
2n.*'^fosI
10 aJDi.aw*Jo
v^J-'J^i-
i^
i;ilJC
ICC )
too
*1
3d
cfajjUT
-151-
absolutely nothing.
he began.
from actual existence, so much so that it can be separated from existence and still be in some way.
We have seen the
the
Further, we have
Thus,
.-.ir."t<fi!'f
yj\)
\Mb
e'>
v.^
nw
<]f'
-152-
"
"
for Suarez to reject the real distinction as so formulated, and consequently, he lays dovm as his first principle the
opposite of
vriiat
distinction
esse
'
esse
that they both agree that creatures have real essences in the
That is they
to the essences of creatures in the mind of God, Suarez can always accuse the Thomists, in the person of Capreolus, with
to Capreolus the same teclinlque Scotus uses on Hen:.^ of Ghent who, with his doctrine of "esse essentlae" simdered the bond
9r<
^w
ex'-u:'-
tiii:..
S.a^n o&'i 1
-,?
ri
:as
9ri;t
laei
9Vfirl
lO
t:
-153-
For,
is,
Rather,
the
.Ws^r;c9SrTl ^te
r.-r^-^;Ja2x9
r^
c ow ca 'TBSlo
y
;ic>
hodoLi.
Si
-15^-
actus essendi"
Notice
Let us
But
To be
su3?e,
though
iO -ZODIC
lO
e--
3fiJ
-155-
before the face of God Himself and notice that any fonnal
"
possible"
real ",
"
denomination.
the essences of
How else
If this is
If this
Oclchara
built. ^^^'
Bb
'p.'vt'
*^.:fn f
'F
-:n
TrTrt
OB
laacri
fTn^'B'^
<X9
-156-
C.
against his stand and his answers to them for whatever light
his thesis of little weight (quae parvi raomenti sunt) but for
the benefit of his readers he cites them
five in number.
answer thereafter.
1.
First Objection
With this objection we are again faced with the same problem alluded to at the outset of this part and S\iarez is
cognizant of this fact at the very outset of his answer.
For,
Gtod
"
au ^dJ
tf5nrf
erf
vr.
3ff:t
alfl
OS
:>U
ili.%
C
-
;a
rtn rr''v
eiii
3x1;?
'f.^r
i
Tr.:
.c-t.-fr.
'tti.
1-,
r<f
-137-
(^1)
SupKia"
'
remaj.^ks,
a torm that is
It means that
'
aiid Hiitiself
creatures.
(44)
"
esse" is
objectum
infoi?inans"
of Kenr;/ of Ghent,
^'-^'
requires no real
"
terminare" is neither
esse "
Rather it is a
-:tn-.f
31
vrr
bd'i&a
1-1
ff
Joii^ ill
'tr
;> ?
!( r.-f.V' i'
4rr!f
i>oO
^.qi
-158-
" "
esse"
An ex-
seen" because
"
seen" is
not to posit any real entity in it. Just as to characterize the possible creatures known by God as
"
entity in them.
esse intelli^ibile"
That is to say,
esse" as is known by
have been nor ever will be, does not know creatures as they have some real
"
Suarez, in a rather
-led
.:id
-159-
"
esse" suffices,
That is the
of its cause.
For
existing things and what are not now existing but have been
and what will be,
^
'
the being
real
"
no real
"
esse" in themselves.
And
iSXoUttuOtt jiiUu
J.,
-ig-jf
9rl:t
.-i^ja
V
.
ii 3-
xxi&jr.x
10
wor
30
XX
J.".:
j-iAiW ZMUl
ia lo
ssob
xu
dffi^c
snj 10 I
3
r.i
ai
biQi^ii
X'
:j
2i 101
.ox;
ei
hrrA
'5
nl
ofc
o/j
:*S3
asoi:
;u;i^i
i:l
J..
-1 So-
Even Capreolus,
Suarez is maintaining
an
"
real ",
"
possible" ,
can
his doctrine, let him ponder that both Scotus and Henry of
Inn
^.
-?'"'={
AV
..^
W 4UJ
alri;^
OiiZ
'9889
srlCi
v.'v.
T;^i;
'''''rfalUSr'
>ir
ttTfl
-yna
r\re^
rrtr*
'
-161-
^^'
He has
2.
Second Objection
aTttiqB^Qff 'r>o.
^,-"
-yr<r
KT)
>:}
rc
'X-
o as
"io
1:911
^11^
4I'
Ifil)Offi
edi lo
s.
Bfl
r^w
oct
bttri
v
4
,'
^V
>.^4
jlUlh
^1 8
avB
.;
lo
"
-162-
But, again,
"
esse" in act
"
proposition
actual real
"
esse"
"
esse"
at
i^J
.UJ.3v>UJ.
k-Hi^UlU
JOB
v3 j
-lOJ-
reo.!
"
esse"
"
esse "
Nevertheless, such
This
"
proposition, wherein
'
intrinsic
"
esse"
<<^
_i:
iiA
Jl
^0
*-f
o-Ai
a
B
.:
;'..l.
CXI J
iO
asw
-164-
necessity.
To be
fIC.
to
:tKi;+
snoEnr,-
z-'.
voTn^
t'
TO 9
"io
:"
ir^i'i
'i.i^t
\ii
-165-
For, Suarez
conditional necessity by extrinsic denomination, to that extent is it driven to be radically contingent, which determination
in its turn remains ultimately unintelligible because it is but
3.
Third Objection
'
ii^i
al
io
ifc.
*>
./
J^iVJ LKj
.\J
-166-
esse ".
esse" or an
"
or as they can exist and terminate objectively the knowledge by which they are known to be necessarily of such a nature or
essence with a conditional necessity, if they come to be (talis naturae atque essentiae esse debere si fiant).
Thus the point
"
esse"
Possible
"
esse"
created thing
ai?e
'
I'eal
produced thing are not two things but one, nor do they have
B9Ct
9V<^iSi
:iq
0<^XA9
9^iS
-tv
9ti^
no enu^&ft
^
iw
J. <',
vri
A ^-sJ
dSTUcfsn
'jy.i
.)
-
i.'oi..
A 9i
9f<:r
'^Xiiauju A^-wu^ie
i/iiii
^j..
Dnct sflorzi
Li:
OW3
;:fon
-167-
This should bring Alexander of Alexandria to mind who, as we have seen, held that a possible and an actvial are one emd the
same being \mder different modes and who equivalently said
But
ew
JiX-J.
-r
c- ^.
:*'/?!
omis
an
-?:
.6
C"*
-168-
on the condition
But
that a producible thing and a produced thing are not two things as the proponents of a realism of essence would maintain, but
one, nor is It a case of two species or two essenoBBj there is
a 96
3
otol
carlo
iJ:
boO lo
e.i^
to
I9W as
;9<l%
"J ii^
Vpax-i^u'i:-
Xi
-169-
\mity of the existent being and to save this Suarez can only
maintain that in the thing these two extremes of the comparison
are only one
one.
^'
;
4.
Fourth Objection
'
'
Is
iliij
-on;
-170-
"
"
'
r^eal
being
It is taken in one
It is under-
existing in act.
"
no way apt to be, but not in the second way, i.e. in act,
Wherefore, if the
"
neither including
existence nor excluding it, and in itself and not yet created,
n::.
cfl
iU.
:%-t
on
.aw
-Dw
-171-
consldered In itself but in its cause, ^' and does not have
a real
"
"
it be considered as having
If it possesses any
"
But
"
esse"
of possible essences is an
a chimera or fiction is an
to real existents it is an
"
"
"
suid
in
the same way it can have a real exemplar in God, none of which
"
as Ockham held.^
"
'
esse" is an
"
In
Jon LLlv
CIS iiX
j;ti
it i
-rr
'i'srf -^-'o
b^^Mtpaoi^ w^.iw
*-/ j
i.
-^
rt*
"
f
*-r\r*
o-
*?v
o ?\ rr
^'
^Y /\1
-172-
"
rediviva "
(72)
.
Here Suarez
"
thing creatable, and how that essence can have a true exemplar
or exemplar cause when they have no place in
"
ion
-r
3,
-T
r:
Tr
-TO
r-n
;:r
^n
fyl-rov:
-173-
rationis" or possess an
"
Suarez*
"
entia
properties.
possessed of a real
"
esse "
ens rationis"
"
It is just there,
And is
GJ
9>
-174-
5.
Fifth Objection
objection is obviously that begotten of Henry of Ghent, maintaining a realism of essence to the extent that it is subject
to no efficient cause or causality, as such.
In the face of
esse essentiae"
which allows him to use it and yet not with the connotation
of any intrinsic
"
maintained.^
(77) "
esse
j:
o;t
'-
Jo
V vJ
.H..Z>i
-175-
in act which would seem to be the very position of Henry of Ghent himself.
For, as we have seen in Suarez* gloss on the
Henry of Ghent,
true
"
"
esse "
"
possible
esse "
"
esse" of the
esse" in
"
The
esse
"
"
"
is that the
esse veritatis
"
entia rationis" is
we have seen.
However, only
esse
'
apt for
existing.
-re*
^r
^nn
irr
.-f
-176-
"
to waiit.
esse;
"
esse essentlae"
esse"
"
Indeed,
Puns Scotus too much like existential bein^; for them not to
refuse
it
wa;>
that any
esse essentlae"
In
existing.^
'
This
in reason.
acnl
ibeebrtl
-177-
"
esse" of
"
esse"
do not thinlc they would allow Suarez to conclude from this, as he does, that the essence does not liave this actuality
qualification.
"
esse
esse essentiae"
"
"
esse"
this
"
esse " In
"
Ci
3
i
If
Oir:
-170-
It is Just
this doctrine of essence which Suarez offers as an answer to that realism of essence which has compromised the unity of
"
esse"
?.
?Jo
rtfic
?nnlasr
-179-
PART V
or
"
A.
Introduction
divine intellect of any order of real essences in themselves, Suarez must now remove any such entity from the existent
creature.
"In created things, being In potency (ens in potentia) and being in act (ens in actu; are distinguished immediately and formally as being and non-being absolutely (simpliciter j ." \^'
\H.
afa'T
-.o
ao.titt>Lbon$tiX
J
ew
7Hr(;t
woH
olil
ni
Laliii til
s,Bi^
-180-
"
other is not.^
(2) '
"
ens
Such
tvro
creatable Peter.
order of essence,
"
ens in potentia"
:.i
Bi.
r '.r^-f-
'-^rl.:
d JO
1
i-^A.-*
:
TTi^
^!
;3
lO
WiO
.,;;
-181-
"
esse"
really
ens in
is said to be in potency
"
diminished being, an
esse "
"
"
by
"
JU^IXl
"
cj ns.
a aJ
;5
C^
(^
nc^-;
-182-
^-^'
For this
reason
eyes.
possible creatures, that Scotus never uttered such a con.Qlusion nor is it true in itself.
For, Scotus never under-
It is
(T)
Scotus
"
I-*
Oiia
iMJlX 43'JJiiii-JnUii
no* Of
aA
ji ccf c;
'jCf
cU/XU
w &i
ill
lav.
-183-
Trfhence,
ens
potent iale " the only point of disagreement between the two
It arises
'i
>
K'J,
'
-.X
iJ.
JiO J
J^ A.rJ
XJ
..-^jWi.:
'Tl
:.'!::
IL'
l_'l!i
-184-
against a realism of essence has even been indicated with respect to Henry of Ghent,
^'
B.
The reason is
of the real.
Thus, it is no wonder
\ie
::
Iso:
IBS'?
SXi^
lO
C.
'
.'. P*r-
eeae ev aael io
-
ili
^t*^
-ju
^i-
'
..
x^llldlL
nvc
"isfrroo
?>
*.
^i.f^x:
VC*!/.^..
on^
^i-'
\^
".i3:t;fii
^ttfiAt)
.jO
.85-
the absence of it
back at once to his remarks explaining his first principle, for, an interpretation is placed on
"
potency and that this is evident in the first place from what
he has said in defense of his first principle.
For, either that potency is produced or altogether
xinproduced.
the Creator.
T^v^
t ^,i
i*
lli^'
IWk^
;.
t,\.
ni ed
o;t
-186-
The same
Consequently,
\^
-187-
By way of corroboration
wherein Suarez says he
fij
9:
O^
-133-
rather to the action or causality of some potency or power. But a thing csmnot be an object (objici) to itself, just as
it cannot come to be by itself, but by another.
For this
"
,o8
-189-
the position of those who affirm that the existing essence is not distinguished
'
"
esse"
is to be
Accordingly, if
essence not two; one essence in two states and any addition
^fioaur
10
er ;toB
-B
O^
JOM
JiAii3
: .:sr{
9'
Or.
;truB
nl
'
-190-
sald that the dictum means that the existing essence adds
existence to essence in act according to the position of those
who affirm that the existing essence is not distinguished natura rei " from its
"
"
ex
esse"
essence and
"
esse ",
111) '
^
to the actual essence, the actual essence is constituted in actu " and is distinguished from
"
ens
"
(18)
As representative of this
Esse
'
"9}
,r,r*'^:^r'
'
'f^
..f
^iO
-f
.-'
rfT'
-191-
But
v/e
Giles of Rome, and ones like it, be true in some sense, according to those who think that
"
esse" is distinguished
"
ex natura
esse ",
t)iat it
Such a
similar point where he too, ruled out any real order of essence
prior to creation.
We now embark on a procedure of drawing out the
"
esse" is distinguished
ex natura rel" from the essence of the creatures, and who hold
ad
no.
;t
B nous
^e.
tl
..
a itL
'
"'
; III
ii^i^poanor
5 Bt
jTOA
i>
taciii
-192-
lated to
"
immediately
fix)ra
would say.
We now see
bio\Agl'it
interpretation of
"
as is "per se nota".
>
-\
} f\t\
C'.
'txz/Ci
W.J
V-
-1
-193-
"
esse
esse
because the actual essence did not have that actuality, i.e.
"
Such a position
or in the
"
esse " or an
"
actus
given
tliat
entity, i.e.
'
^t-*
Ic
d;^
-194-
objectlve potency.
To bolster
(22)
Consequently,
"
esse
Therefore,
that hiunanity as an actual entity of essence differs from itself in potency by its very own created entity of essence and
"
^c
.^iu
-?
XJB
u'xai.ii.ii
'ix&Jaxi-aLi:.x
&afi&cit;u
xt^j-Jti
-195-
in the
"
"
Yet,
whole composite of
"
But this
"
iri'j:frr:
o.
-196-
and existence.
tinae
according
"
ens" or essence
For, it is the
r nr.
onorx
'<5vn
'r:rrr:taft3
nsff
^i
-197-
a realism of essence.
C.
Critical Summary
It remains to rechart this intricate and extremely
important passage.
lias
been to remove
"
res " or as
'
This
the
r.
rftira
^.-t
as
d.
SIS
-198-
"
entia "
his opponents
tioat
they
roust do
These
last are the terms according to which the Thoraist and others
And if these
men accept these terras they must then suffer the consequences
to their original position that the actxial
essence differs
"
or by reason of existence.
"
esse " or an
Such
was not the case when the actual essence was considered in
objective potency.
esse essentiae
'
or
"
esse actualis
':.>
fvk
ft
ct t
'
^? <*
_fJV^C^
seas"
::;
wf
i ^-
10
o;t
nqo
oct
"
-^JUl:
-199-
day iB his.
2i rjBt
-200-
PART VI
or
"
PORMALISSIME CONSTITUITUR"
A,
Introduction
At the outset of this discussion the reader is
reminded of
wliat
Thus, it remains to
mention that
"
esse essentiae"
or
"
positions.
(2)
"
esse
This follows clearly from what has been said, for every real entity is constituted by some real "esse", since "ens" is said
TT
rti"'
ii
1
to &f.
3 P.
-A
ion
i..
.;J
lO
fiU5
XXSW
xo
;tl
n2
-201-
frora
"
"
"
esse"
Hence, when a
esse"
from
"
Therefore, it
"
esse "
communicated*
(3)
constitution
(4)
esse" with
that actual
"
This can
or not.
esse "
But if it is
8.
:i
nO
n el
U.I.'.i.<J3
-Bib Bt
lO
"j
-202-
tlnguished
"
"
position must be so explained that a comparison is made between an actual existence which they call
exercito " and an actvial existing essence.
"
esse in actu
Thus,
if the
"
an infinite regress.
"
ex
res"
"
res"
by no means distinguished
second or third
that
"
This is Indeed interesting for It Indicates clearly what Suarez has done to the doctrinal positions opposing him
and malntinlng some .autonomous and necessary order of essence,
J.OXCQU flBoq
;i'
i-i>.-J
si-
CrUBdti.x
:;.
M.
3 njj
r.?,;
jy
iic
J,
o v- ijfj a i;j
ii,yi
*i
li
5ij!,j
-203-
"
between
''
"
"
esse essentlae"
Suarc2,
disputation.*"
"
"
esse essentlae"
For Scotus
Thus, both men i^ould subject the total belnc to the efficient
(9)
>
lo
niiitko
%-*.-. %^
is^alx es#"
f-^f
ta/ir*
fro
f.d;t
.T,
Id
-s^^ilfcf''
'
r,^
"^.'1
-r
c g a fja
W ^1
^
^3 aaag
"
Wi^
iVA^
->
'^w
:-^^
bfijS
aaud
^^
^asloJ^'
^
.ic
.Jlij.^j
Oi
iiO.
I.
.,VJJU. i-.<,
.J^iX
-204-
"
is possible or actual.
esse" by
esse exlstentiae"
/Jith
This is
this third proposition if they speai: logically (consequenter) and are aware of their own position.
el
a-.
o:t
, .
-205-
B.
"
is that this
"
By a proposition of
the verb
"
which they meant to signify nothing more than that the subject
exists
"
in rerun natura"
Sometimes
"
"
per se"
Such a pro'
position is said to be
we put Suarez'
"
"
de tertio adjacente"
Thus, when
"
existential predication.
"
esse" in act
"
in rerum natura"
"
which all
"
existent la" or by
a
'I
nt
:*T'cr
QV
-206-
"
"
"
duae res"
above and is the very point that Suarez keeps pounding home,
oifever, the objector wants to say that the essence does not
have this
"
"
"
adjacente,
essence,
tsiken,
For, by this
"
esse" of actual
such an essence is
For, it is rightly
Inferred
it is "ens actu"
J on
.ts
X9
J^9 .9"
9CII
rrt'
'.i
il
.iTliiw
n*
-ifsrtf
-207-
est'
'
includes.
(12)
still
esse
',
i.e.
'
ens actu'
'
from
"
esse "
just as
"
esse
"
is said to be
"
"
ens actu"
in a subject so that without it, it cannot exist naturally. So much for the objection and its autonomous order of essence.
"
ad hoininem"
esse " of
vrtiich
are
The
on account of
esse'
of actual essence.
"
Again
.
In
proof of the direct argument, namely, that all the characteristics usually ascribed to
" exist entia"
belong to his
OB
-208-
"
that this
esse"
"
distinguished from
"
Hence,
actual
"
esse "
i.e.
"
which the men in the first two traditions think that existence
is to be distinguished from essence
"
For,
(14) '
^
as we have
Thus, we
"
that this
"
esse" is existence
(15) '
bxit
from essence,^
In
JOfl CixS
-209-
"
existentia" by
"
pointing out
is a characteristic of this
esse " of
"
esse existentiae"
"
existentia "
this
esse"
conditions by
vrtiich
"
a real
esse
existentiae"
negation or a relation, it is not a condition essentially required for the "esse" of a thing, but rather, it is something
10
bl
it
:M
<s
-210-
"
esse" of a thing.
Thus, a distinction
"
the
esse
"
esse existentiae"
"
proper
'
esse existentia"
"
"
esse
"
esse " by
-211-
"
ens in potentla
"
For, a
Therefore, that
"
Consequently, that
"
esse existentiae " The implication here is that the proponents of the
esse
'
"
ens existens
which
esse existentiae"
tvio
It is Suarez puiTpose to
"
reintegrate the
ens actu" or
.
His
Lsan lo
*xe
ssj^i a
r..v.>v -.i.^^v'
^yM09
Btii
t.-
-tetirT'
,',J --
'^
.-'N/
,-
.-
--v.^
-212-
"
esse"
"
"
per
esse"
is sufficient to distinguish
It is also sxifficient
on one.
that an
is,
"
"
esse"
"
This
"
esse actualis
For, if
.y
oa
.10
.di
xjij
-213-
"
esse"
It does not
matter first, because, although Suarez may admit this dependence, that
"
"
"
"
ex natura rei " from the essence at the very outset of Suarez*
If therefore, that other
(l3)
id
^-J
Xll-^fl
io
^liC
^ -^
-^^\
j1
^ai'^
'
-v V
/ f r-r-.
.
rf
V -
%^a. ..
H.
-\
f-..^
\.-
aJL
>
r*
> -J'-
,VVl.-'
r-.-^,
XO Si
11
^ >.'v
ijjjs>a.s siiwi-;
Ji;j>'>i .sttn
-214-
Further-
that this
"
distinct
"
esse
(20) '
^
such
Ein
words .
(21)
question along
Thus,
Consequently,
C.
Critical Summary
Tliere
-V
-215-
"
esse
existentiae "
and not necessary, it is subject to the efficient causality of the Creator, it is sufficient to ground the tnith of an
esse
existentiae "
an indistinguishable, indetenoinate essence, iaipervious to any intellectual analysis 'oecause it is a doctrine of being
whose purpose is to root out
being.
ari^^
The paradox is
tiiat aii
.j;^
.b
&l
-215-
PART VII
or
A.
Introduction
We have seen thus far the amazing success Suarez has
from the divine intellect, and then from the finite existing
creature, all in the rwime of his impenetrable contingent essence,
Fxirther, we nave seen that the
"
"
"
esse actualis
il
y&i-iy
- -f
r[:i
yd
>
X rw
Li.
c-
-217-
Suarez prefers
His adversaries,
f3?orn
the
ceirap
"
subsistentia"
Basically, sub-
That is, it is
in se " or
"
per se ", as
he says.
in modo
essence as a
R no
lH?-'~-
psrcr:
"a"):
unTtA.
LiJOU
ic T
tp.r'iri
to
n.
-?,:t3^^,
'
Si*;}
iu>
-218-
"
esse "
(2) '
^
their position.
esse
condition
"
"
subsistentia "
"
ens in actu"
<)0?
J ,;^
r.
,_^
^i
^JD;
.j-.
JO J.-.%
.jliJOi
(_J
'
-W&
4**
iwiijr
-219-
B.
The Thoraists
In this
we have seen.
a.
'ja
r/
-220-
or not
'
"
compositio ">
a word which, in the theological and philosophical sphere of his day, need not imply a composition^"^' in the sense of a
"
de facti' here and now existing, for they are one and
lO
.19
IC
ow a
7t
'.
SB
.IX*'
:i.
-221-
But what
existence is escapes
hlra
However,
On the
contrarj'^,
reason for Suarez' insistance on it and his plea for its careful consideration is that some Thomists of his day seem not
"
res"
and if an
13
bna onoLa
ail
fli
oi
on
so
(7)
an entitative act.
/Q
form.
im|]ll^^
.i>d
.-.n-c-
*;*.
^^.
i'
-.-.'-ten
3yi;tB^I;fn9
-
ns
3^06
.i) ^
JIX
.mol
iii
i.iv
a J. A=> &;
*^
"J'^i-r
-^i-
,u:.JO.iirqd'
ktf^^<^
.}^lw'->
OliJ
.flT[0
V
rlu'
-.1
'
^Ci -3v/i/l
-223-
the Word,
depend on subsistence as on
essence and
"
of essence and
"
esse"
TB
JVi,v<J
10
-224-
"
esse"
as we
in rerum natura"
TiGrr
art
cm
tarn
Bias
^aB"
moil
.^9XqBUBC9
.1
'io
Ijb
-225-
eind
"
own real
"
esse essentiae"
"
From
Thomistic
"
esse essentiae'
'
as well as Suarez'
"
esse existentiae"
both distinct
"
"
esse existentiae"
by an
"
some
evident examples.
Of.
cii
no
J -.
' -/s^
;4r
~>j-j'-. v'.<xJD
jJSw
ebon
JfiXJ'i
v'Q.>^
AV
-'i-i.v'v.
.us
10
j^i^ui
-226-
(12)
'
But if the
the consecrated accidents exist, as almost all the Theologians of Suarez' day taught, the fifth Thomistic argument and Cajetan
notwithstanding.^
~^'
Therefore
he can Justly conclude that the inherence is not the existence of an accident but a certain mode of it, by which mediant that
existence naturally depends on, and is conserved by its subject.
Ctod
"
liave
already seen.^
(Ik) '
^ OB
:-.
to
y.
Si
r.
'^
.^"Tfl*^'^.T
I'^f, f
.,.^R
rift
^n
w LB
crrol
o^
exists
"
terra as this
^^'
although there are some who speak in such a way that they call
this term or this subsistence
can only differ from him in a manner of speaking since substantial existence would seem to be nothing more than what
However, as if sensing
he may have granted too much, Suarez adds that it still can
brrc
Oi
x^
uj
as
XJ3
fi
I.
=?no
:ac
j:;:
3a oj
es^^aeqqjL'e
csxbjjS
li
>or
snj
ex
iv
'^io
unsj
fsr.^
90
tifl
-LL)
li--
-228-
they truly think that the substantial essence, is first and formally constituted in the
"
esse" of
"
tinguished from
"
"
ex
other.
.iJ
oo
.'OB
bJi
i'-
)0
-229-
"
esse" by v^lch it
On this
(19)
'
In addition
2tnd
If
:>o
ai
r -
.L
"a
'Sf...
:;^
j_
:i
v&of
^^o
ex
-230-
"
"
esse existentiae" of
existence
or
vrtio
"
"
differ only
correctly?
"
d^
"Mid
.1
al boM
:8
i-K
;_y.t,'
uiib
-231-
constituted
but
"
"
ens_ln_actu"
'
is not called
"
esse essentiae
only.
does not suffice for constituting the existing thing, yet it does suffice for constituting the essence of the thing.
This
called
"
the thing and when this has been posited, it suffices that the
thing exists.
esse" of
'
"
ens
esse existentiae"
but is rather an
"
esse
"
esse essentiae"
J,XXJ^
-V-Oi
1.
.'<.9.
^ i..i\J
iilv
^J ! i^
yj^%4
^i.j.y.
Joa
at
n^*V,
i.^'iJM
'I
.V-V**
.'
OS"
iuu.wuj.ui:
-232-
"
"
esse
(21)
esse
of the thing
"
esse
.^v
--\
.; ^ji-a.
~^Azy 11911W
,J
v.iiA
^CiiU
l-,'s
,W
^Ci-ii.-j
ler^S^fl*
sitk'j
liii
iisijLiiy,
^^
wi;j
jjiu^-a ..yvu.'
:ua
jjjU
^ -iX^wVJ
J J
-<^
jjiJ*,
ii
juj:;jJU^_ ji-^
dut^i-jiw
ts
Aii;
yuiiyeaa
-233-
Is all that without which the actual entity of the thing cannot
the actual entity of the substantial essence cemnot be said to exist by subsistence, and consequently Suarez must conclude
that it cauinot be called existence.
his
"
existing thing outside its causes for this again would leave
intact an autonomous order of essence within being and some-
of speaking is found
and thus, since the actual essence of an accidental form depends for its natural existence on its subject, the subject
is its existence.
i;Oj
-234-
By holding that
"
esse existent iae " for this latter position entails an essence
a
9
XiJb
ill
9r(;r
fw
r\
lo ^n9u;ti^8noo
Bi^
*i
.*
t^
^uf^ rtrf
io 9r
j.i'.i
s^t
jCK>i^0^t
-235-
"
extraneous (allena)
unsatisfactory because subsistence is so related to the substantial nature as inherence is related to the accidental
For
"
per
Just as
-'4
ii
Ji.
;tB
;:>
9<i ttso
..'
-O.
WS*V
fi
driJ
".
LAiJ^iMi
-236-
"
did err by maintaining the real distinction between them. The second interpretation has the virtue of maintaining the
same number of principles as Suarez' position, i.e. besides
"
per se"
"
"
.\l
^luOo
nt
rj
-237-
are untenable because each holds for a real distinction within the actual existent
"
essence of the
"
essence.
Suarez
esse"
esse
^'
And the
Hn
01M
nt al
al
aifiw
'lo'l
j>6
nl
LB'
,ir,-
-238-
allud esse exlstentlae ex natura rel dlstlnctian ab his " , is clear because the arguments which are offered to prove a distinct
"
esse
assert this who even slightly grasps what these words signify.
"
because if there
wei*e
per se " or
"
.-
-.
-.
*-,
>
:ion
8i SI
-239-
existence confer?
At this point, however, there is a possible objection
esse essentiae" ,
existere "
"
existens "
"
ens in
-.c*.-J
-"^
-240-
ens in
"
ens in
exist ens" signify the same thing and the same formal
ratio"
"
plainly impossible.
Hence, if it is not
been said.
on
oys? "
'to
io'i
ill
Qfi
-oA
-241-
"
"
esse"
But
"
ens creatum et
eind
in se " and
"
sustain it in its
"
esse ".
"
by which it is supported.
As to the foiroal effect of existence, Suarez insists
lO
VU J
-242-
an existence which is an entity distinct from the very being or essence which it constitutes in act, as we
iiave seen.
For
this reason Suarez can only say that the mode which is sub-
"
essence, is easily grasped, but that such is not the case with
foiro.
man is rational, or
man is an
auiiraal,
is another.
It has the first from existence, it has the second from the
<.-!
fans
lo
aJb.
to nORJM'l
-243-
and the completely existent thing and Is holding that the total
actuality of essence springs from existence.
Let it be noted at once that the position of the
esse"
Versus
esse"
esse "
is the
actualitas" or
"
actus"
a
For,
"
"
ens actu"
i."4
-.08
\j ..
..^;
IB
bl
liJOil
txsa
il
-244-
"
esse"
of
"
actualitas " or
"
between
for a real distinction for form is not an act apart from matter
In answer to
according to reason because it is conceived as if it is received in a genus, for between a superior and inferior grade
there cannot be a real relation of act and potency since "in
re" these grades are not actually distinguished.
Thus, the
How-
:j5
xo
anj
;"
lo
ijxt;
f
CIO
Q 0$
rs
TO
Lnn
-'
ss^fl^a
rn<jn
it .T9V3
-245-
'
tinguished in reason.
forro,
be such an
"
esse"
a Bi
Jj8
lo
vta
J8 r
as
rit
>
aa
.jmol
Bl
^if
:
'.V
M.^a
.'
uj
-245-
He first
Whereas
the objector had said that form is the actuality of matter in the order of essence in virtue of its entity of essence and
corrects him and says that form is the actuality of matter not
actuality or his
"
which is Suarez*
"
sa<s
r.'frt
'Ji
'lo
*t
ITl
n-f
rj?-
>.rr:trifi
-.(
r^
\ Ai'-rNrf'^in
-u-T.-t
rvt
-247-
niust
esse"
to be a form,
For, denying
true that
"
"
ens in
esse
irrettrP
r-
;i
lo
V. -J
ii^.^
nl i>l8c
'.'iu.'>i
en
beta
lO
/^
k--
li
1
vftp
at il BB
jmol
Bad il
ffol/lv;
-248-
exlstentlae "
"
"
esse
on the
"
"
"
est"
"
homo est animal" etc. because all these are the same in reality.
Wherefore, from the same actuality and fix>m the same thing (res)
all these predicates are taken whether that thing (res) is
"
"
esse" is
"
both the
resil
"
esse"
tlO
-.-^
.-(jiys,
re...
^...Oti
uZ
Cisf
-'4J.i.g
-249-
of reason.
C.
Critical Summary
It is Suarez intention to show that no other
"
esse "
than his
"
esse"
doctrine
"
esse essentiae"
"
whereby the
thing exists,
constituted as
"
esse " of
"
This
esse"
"
caui
ens"
in its own right and thus one cannot formally constitute the
.0
wi.
e;;i -sex
-250-
other as existent.
ens in aotu" by
"
"
esse essentiae"
dependent on
esse existentiae"
It also has
esse
"
in
voce " from Suarez, by his own admission, for what they call
"
Suares calls
"
"
subsistentia "
,
However,
esse existentiae"
belying a mis-
would affirm an
"
ex natura
3?ei "
For
zt}
^T
"it-T.
93Sf(:t
-251-
any doctrine maintaining an order of essence within being which can withstand its onslaughts.
Yet, for all this vaunted
^ich
fi
C\/
III
TJ^I
/
i:^.'-ia f'
^nr.ft
>
",
4*11-17
<-
r .o^.
vY6f T^.
lo
,-f
-5,-.
:
-r+
'
liX.
-252-
PART VIII
THE DISTINCTION
A.
maintain.
"
Indeed, on the
"
res"
we must presuppose the meaning of the terms given at the outset of this thirty-first Disputation and which we have seen used
throughout.
iOl
il
ilb 3d ion
^di
9 oaas"
cteun
f-.r.r.i:
9W
lo
.lEne
n^rRri
sv:
rtrjirfw
trr.c
n->_*-d'R:,
fj
alr!^
ens"
"
B,
'
ens" con-
"
'
this text that some Suarezians have maintained that St. Thomas
sn
ilo
-25^-
between essence and existence and cannot justly be alleged for or against it.^
'
"
essentia in
"
essentia in
actu " , as
v;e
"
properly
"
"
existens " or an
.
essentia in actu"
i'
n<
^:<f.
f^Ttn
!".
(.
i^.i,
tV
^d^:
<. C
IT
"^
Xll
o>
iq
f.
no
&
fxiB
no
-255-
from it as one
"
ratio" of
"
which such an entity as this existence may have and that no other function of it has been conceived nor does Suarez feel
it possible to do so.
It does not exercise the first function
ens
tinction of
"
"
ens in actu"
itself. ^^^
.11
SC
iC
So
J*
Grtrf
S2-fD-.-xo
:trrr
k.
c-c
cfc
o:f
nldlneocr ^1
an
'^p'T:t^T^s.'
/-
-256-
Yet
would say that essence is a composite of matter and form, it would not be a component part but the whole composite which
Suares finds obviously repugnant in the real composition of
TO
bfta ctl
in
XI
aw
-257-
composed of that act and some other thln^ (ex illo actu et
hiave seen.
.ia
oe.
&j
CTiiii
.so
-258-
fix)m it.
And this is
The
reail
"
ens
What is
S^i.iJi.i
-.
ill
>
'
"*
n.i
-259-
fix)m
the
It is simply a
"
"
essence as parts of the whole and hence is not the total entity
of the composite.
So, there is no real distinction on this
ro
;o
Jl
lb
Laen
io
ot)
eii3
iui/i'i
.1
sna
'.-t.lrvfr
OfM^p'-f
Tf,-
;^&x.
^ii& J
v;
4 (in 0*1
.^8iX9 Oi
9ri;t
rJm C\OiJ&
3ife
J6
XBrr
on el 9^
lo
-260-
basls.
in Itself.
entities.
composite Itself.
In addition,
that
ver^' act
*^^
-261-
"
ad Infinitum"
Suarez' conception of
the
"
remarks where we
"
esse essentiae
And if the
soioe
.0_ JiiJ
iujiifcjs-
.ja
3909R
lO
-262-
esse
exlstentiae" of tliat actual essence because it does not constitute that essence in the order of
"
ens in actu"
On the
"
esse
exlstentiae ", each and every other condition or thing, vrithout which the essence could not remain
"
"
Jll
O ..
Cf'X lij
-liit:
^3 MJIIUQ
iBcis
-263-
existence.
( f>\ '
ens in
"
esse" by
At this
which it is
"
'^
for it can
the composite.
another relation
of matter.
'J-^J
-jav
4lJ
-264-
by constituting an
"
esse"
As well, a
This formulation is less improbable than the rest for Suarez, since he can agree with what it says of formal
cause on the basis of his own remarks above, but he also admits,
it suffers from the same difficulties as the others and can
ens actu et
"
esse
finds it most tmie that that existence of the Thomists cannot be a formal cause intrinsically constituting the actual entity
necessary.
ic* rl^
r*
t-
r--
- r"
o V
I'
rl^
62 vxu^AeriD Milt
dV^V^L^:
J,
^^y'. r-z-A
ecT oc^
9Oft00
^esi
erio'
..-.iiv-
-j.Jscfo^tii..
rt{t
no
w.:.-^
..
-..
3^ri^C
i-J
on iBbnsrt
;t9
uc
ruf^^tcm i.o VI
i;
;rj.(
o;t
1-
-.i
^t
V j.c.v>.i
uj.^ o
ji.1,
u;
kJ
'.
1'
,li^
ij
VI
^T
i,'^'^ i-^j'.J
-iXH'sl
^;J>ll'^
VI
sbitUt
,s*
J/
li^'JV
j.iii'jy
ui
-265-
"
ens actu"
i.e.
Thus, if that
constituting
"
ens existens"
.tP.rfrsD
.ff"i:?
-266-
fonnalem, ad existendxan)
esse"
Rather, intrinsically
"
Hence, his
foxmded on this
in the effective
.i^L-n
vIIfiOlM
Ij-CT
i^RT
-267-
entltatlve
"
actual
"
as we shall see.
of that entity of existence to exist in act nor even to constltute the existing thing in act.
(9)
"
versus the
"
ens in potentla"
"
His opponents distinguish these two orders but for Suarez they
are identical.
in this problem of their distinction must be between the entity of actual essence
euid
"
"
esse
esse
3t
f:i
Cii
-r.oo
oj novs
^ioii
oiiiu
ia
.,3
uu;u
nso S9'Xu^
-,.,
*0
CjC
io
-268-
"
potentla absoluta"
Gtod
cannot stand in
already mentioned.
As a
"
.,
-k
.^
..-,*
nso
,Jv'
ia^icJ-JJSi.
..s/.i
cton
Ob
-269-
formally and intrinsically, so much so that the intellect cannot separate one from the other by way of a precisive abstraction,
his general principle that it is impossible to conceive some effect as formally constituted by some fonn or an intrinsic
act similar tc a
it,
fom
Thus, if
csui
tinction is rejected.
C.
Critical
Stunroary
^.
o1
.v.;
ol
rtt
yt
-270-
res"
namely, the
Also,
order of
"
"
the order of
esse
For, indeed,
esse essentiae" is
"
existentiae "
"
esse
ens in actu"
"
ib
^ij zl
oa
"^
''
as
rftf
^x
<v>j.aik,<i;.
JLriir
bos
9tU
;B9r
?f.CfU8
aesl
JL:
:/8
8J5
no
II lO YC
no 8l
ion
-271-
-272-
PART IX
A,
Introduction
We have
coiae
tinction of reason.
of the real distinction, we are about to see the rejection of the modal distinction.
own right.
In other words,
.4
art,:
i'-'
nx
i:;r
lo
r.
Offl
b Bl
'.9
a
X
lo
flWO
>
t.-,f-r,P,
:t
v:t^.-t(t
-273-
between
"
"
tinguished
fi'om
B.
Rejection of
t?ie
Modal Distinction
can come to play here also, for, to his mind, this initial
conclusion follows* from the preceding conclusion.
For this
reason, Suarez thinks that they who, while denying the first
logically.
cannot, still,
<f
OJt
o jS 3
;-
.a
JiJU
-i-Ja.-jjjxL':.y;
iJ^iic:
-274-
that such an existence is absolutely nothing or, what amounts to the same thing for Suarez, that besides the actual entity
"
ex natura
rei
(3)
positive and real in keeping \<ith the notion of the real distinction.
If such is not the case, the distinction will be
'
for then one of the extremes would not be positive and real,
Hence, if essence as it is
"
"
:.!
:n
''ft
li
,^
i:.i.r:'i
39
-275-
true
"
third composite.
Suarez will readily agree with the proponents of the
modal distinction that from these entities which are distinsuisheci
"
ex natura rei" as
"
vrtiich
that
"
ex natura
ss
zi
\6 x;mn
r.Jts;
9M
lO 8v
9Ai tiitH
^sib Isboin
;tflxi;t
IS
iisE
.xi;f
i^jj-fiT
aaoqmoo
SS ^iBcl^ OS
to
i;ti^fid
LbuSob
9tti
3 lAl ae onoo el
tUB 'IC
tq bA
.ti.-rn9
-rrMrf
J-o'IOC./i*OJ
on CSM BB
o bnB
-276-
ex natura rei"
essence.
entity.
For this
of the simple yet paii;ial entity of the form and the simple
Thus, the
"
j3
39
am
-277-
"
esse existentiae
'
which is his
esse essentiae" , in
auid
entitative
esse " suffices, and to it alone can be added the mode of subSo it is that every other entity or real
sisting or inhering?
previous argument.
force one to hold this laodal distinction it is especially because the essence of the creature can exist or not exist.
But, as we saw him argue against the proponents of this existence
as a
"
will be a distinction
"
esse"
the mode and it will be said that it too can be and not be and
that there will be a distinction
"
M *1
dboffi
Tr^
so
bom
eri^
-278-
"
can only ask why the same thing could not apply in the case of
the actual essence.
As If to stifle the possible impression that he is
knoclcins dovm straw men in the position asserting a distinction
"
"
esse"
esse " of
"
actus
indistinct ion.
"
vniat
But, as
"
esse "
"
esse ".
However, a more
another is.
telling the Thoraists what the real distinction should mean for
br.B
3i>
'^&9
.f5Po.>,r.r
rs:feal
ai
afiea"
'
-279-
tMs
"
more generally
si^eeilving,
with
"
ex natura
I'ei"
"
esse"
In addition, such an
"
Consequently, for
'
tiiat it
"
quo"
namely, that
iJ^t.
.-.
r,r-!
Ofi
^<^i.^i^
.^
1 *'_c**-
te
^'^ix^b
t.<*tmsB
*/ Ik
^oi/
Ifo
ao
ve^ i\
-' .1.
-230-
"
"
ex
However, it is
ratio " is
I Lb
nl
J
-lUJ^
J'JjX
a..
^^l^w'O^.'
r-y
:i
nl
l-
o.:^
j.uvo>
owct
n
<^
UX>
(1^.
e s
;tofT
brta
aaa
.i.ij
^y.^ja.ij..
.^i^iiysas
ioti
bfifl
a;H mcnl
ocf
cf
.rrteaes
n-
1C
i3
sd nB3
am^
oci
Uxii
C;3XlXX_-;-P
i-'
Otl
JjC-i3JllA
Sf
"i
"191
-281-
the kind called a real negative distinction, though it is also called a distinction of reason as we have seen because
it is a distinction between what is real in one case suid what
"
actual essence.
essence in act.
this basis between that which exists and that by which it exists,
-JN
J^
iU
ill
:o-aw
Jii.
us
a-isn
-282-
distinction
"
(8)
the
"
tiiat
that
frxsra
And if it
whereby a distinction
"
'10
..
O'XQ 9tii
OS
UM
-283-
C.
Critical Suianary
As we have seen, this rejection followed much the
For,
esse essentlae"
Thus,
"
Rather, the
..
(10)
.
S O*
.'
^o
*h
-284-
PART X
A.
Introduction
Not content with the rejection of the two opposing
order to make precise once and for all what sort of distinction there is between an actual essence and its
actu exercito "
,
"
esse in
remarks which Suarez makes in order to clear the air and re-
"
have seen, or, if each are taken in act, i.e. actual essence
.ii-ijiv;
Jf-Tce
oi
1^-.
Ja
iiiOi3
fiJ
'io
-285-
fundament um In re "
"
in re" , is sufficient
essence as actual.
have seen which holds that, fi^om the fact that an essence can be actual and possible, there must be a distinction
"
ex natura
"
an infinite regress.
Again, lest there be any further question that he is
1 al
bc\A
3!n08
,> f -J.
-:
'
jci
dv&fi
teib
3889
.:^B
9Vf(
iq
o;t
at
/S^d as
.
XXiX
ti-
-286-
of reason and the propositions founded on it, it is necessary to suppose what is beyond dispute
"
cept God has of itself its own entity "in so far as it is true entity".
On the
part of the creatable thing it signifies non-repugnance or logical potency, as we have seen.
efficiency of God.
actual
"
it
'5
'0
w.
Ml
il-^0
SJ.
-287-
"
ease "
So this
"
vrtiich
this
"
esse" or rather
It does not
"
which it belongs.
Lurking in the backgroimd and against which Suarez*
remarks glance, is the Thoraistic position, as clearly set
forth in Capreolus of the two
"
"
esse ",
"
lo
1:t
^cf
:tt
irr
a*
XGux
.ATTtjl
o.
-288-
Thus, the
*'
per se "
"
al il
I'-r
f^rfR
finr-T;?
s'sriAns-^
"^a ^/-tf.-trfn
OS &bsen
UB
r.i/^tr
r
I'db'so eci:^
el
ac
i-tii
^v<a
'r.
ddi
-rUBO
l>.ijjL^
l>fu
<jiJL\J
;*
-:.
J''.-'
c.
t.\
-^r-
r"
*-:
f ir-rt
"^'^He^fil
"ri/o
aoaBO^
o;^
;tf
iT
V.
--
A,j":
^j..v.^>J>ii
.t
:^i
jv^rjvi.
^j>tf
**
#>t
i^
.j.i:xsaa9S9n
ii.
ii'i^ri
J.
9^.ij
..'<:
--.^
\:l8*9r
:, i
i>>
c;>
A -J
Cji
9d;
'i '
o4 ai Xr!T
.
SOS
-289-
creatures from
Thus, the
BVZ
rt
TO
9.
.TO^
est
ad
-290-
(3)
These
the essence of the thing because without it, the thing cannot
be conceived.
JJl^Hi.'i
T7ir.
v. .
&XOVXiU3
iJO
6 %f Q "j; *J -'
^iJJviivJ^
istti.
^ivyj-trfiik-'y
oa
ti'-ii
XH
C'.
viiuuaa
yi
i-^jntjaea
uui
-291-
"
actu existere" or
"
actu existere"
"
de facto"
"
per modum
For
this reason,
"
actu existere" ,
-292-
To conceive essence as actual is to do nothing more thsm conceive existence for Suarez, as he has said actiml entity cannot be prescinded from existence. And as Suarez has also said,
To con-
ceive the same essence now as essence in act is merely to conceive that same essence in potency but now as it is
nunc" outside its causes.
"
hie et
"
exlstere ".
This
That is,
But since it is of
oT
o
J
aarf
ijjj.^c
lot
on
c;
LLb
-<!
-tec
ni
.:e
^f,
2I
11
00
SBIS3
ld^ Vl0
^
-rid
^i-.^a
laflrtsO ^"
:*0B
^cf
lo
ix.-_L__
Ict'Jrs orf*
f>;t
rrerfcfo
'*rf^
r_
.i'
j.-.o
-:
81
lo
ajt
"
>
'jsj'
CUB
.as's
ti_..j
-293-
B.
For this
"
&
usiz
LQX'^a, SIS
dqo
i
.'jo'i
.ftsbsdn
-.
cnw
siEii-
3^^^ -tl
rfl
ntElax^
nlff:f
rrt^
^-
in
*:
nrx
f nocra
T.rnfc Kjrfrf
'*
:fA
^ii
,!A-i2
rifircit;
:tT
tii lol
-
.ryTn
"
\T ft *
1 rr
fwr^ f f r%t
-29^-
come to grips with the problem nor understand the sense of the
question.
and
"
It Is asked how it
In addition, existence
and particular.
from essence is not the same as the distinction of the Individual from the specific nature.
However, for Suarez, this latter
"
^"^^
aind
vnieras,
xnn^j '
8fi
-s
ric
.Ji.y
^ixXJ
fcfn
ajJ
Otf
C^
JlOfl?
-295-
'
It is altogether
mystifying how Suarez could cite Henry for the second tradition and then include him here in the third tradition.
Suarez' critique of this is lengthy and interesting.
It seems that this exposition either does not make the matter
In short, this
"
esse
For
wlien
"
If
"
.xi:
ofa
r\'
iw
81
.'.J
BtiUMt
-296-
ereatures are
rAtd
to God as
act since
ar^
r.ct:-.lr-:
i.
a.;:.
i'-
::3lble
But in potency or
exesarpLar-/
'
in actu priap
ar.
_,
.-all*
ther
efflclert cau-se
Me
tj::^!
see
this
"
esse essentlae *
his second principle renoring it as it has an gieanlar cause, for nhcn causality or a relation or
a.".-l-:a-i:r. ^:
-r-a-
:au5ir:
''
l3
Ici
--as
tr.e
ratlones*
::rr.jer
crJ./
tlie
wV-.er.
are not for that reason Mieh aa they are or have soeli a
ratlones* or
fsmrf
aar
o^f
bT>:}At
siiiixiiBi;
5*i.t.
-Ox
doa
^li'ler-.r
'xo
"iciiijwoq
r-i.
3uc.
.^.uiifossno
d
,^
.-.
jii'ixi.
'^aiBuci janj
3&L'0
.6
JX
Oi
aanoiJ.3'
Ci:.
Si/8 TO'J
fct
Vino
aoonse'
nsrte
:?on 9TtB
-297-
of
"
nothing
except
"
esse
"
in rerum
natura "
"
we turn to their
esse exlstentiae"
essence only
.a
creature.
.3
TO
X &! Oi
s oc
cton
dai
,"
.-tn
'.
.^'"
lo
:.'.
lis
SO V^-^<|BIX
;i
-d
i.
'91.- \i_y-VJ^
i'V/'..
"j8i;j;tj8n
J
o;t
o4
->w
ehhr.
^^
io
='.J
9.'
r.9
n
;tos
/
lOl
i-^C
xQi n
il 3
-298-
"
ex natura rei"
esse
"
in re" nor
larrc
?inJ
sdao
!>ti<.-i
;tcr''t
:tff*rjff
A-^rt
^I'-if^'j
!>-.-
r.rrT
hrrP,
rr.n
32
i ml
?-".<r
rjfff -1
P..-"
K-x
'
;tl;
riA
as
.-jvOv
Ov
t~
;rq90>
r^ |S '
"t P.
' .-/
Ir.'*
%<
-r r
J-
ot
-rai-.
.fr-c.:
-f
alii J
no
;iBf
'
'"''
'
"fllBlqxs
sc:
;?f"^-'
9-\I
Ci'*
*ftA
.-il -^V4 V
r\
% \x
'/" /x
rrif<I-*
1JS
s<
8i K
"tW
*^
'
IV^.V \IA
l^\J
i.
SiriflliJ^^
2 *
*vx w A*
:
'^a
r*
i-^
-
sfliiVAo
tW rrr rt /^f
ftCf
a&O
oaXlMtiid
-299-
as distinct in reason and not by relation, the point Suarez has been maintaining all along.
Thus, Suarez clearly removes
of reason between
"
"
conceived
"
according
The
essentia" and
"
"materia" and
"
potent ia"
whereas
esse" and
"
essentia"
However, if we speak of
essentia" and
"
"
"
esse essentiae"
and
1.
-^ -*
iyu
1.
lu
ii'.J
JJtUj*/
-Jii.'
'
'
'
'
,^
ii_JJi>iiw'^
nss
"oj
'^om o
L.:
9
'
;-,''
'^
...16
-300-
"
"
exist entla"
This
Latins.
"
"
actus essendi"
but it
currere" ,
"
"
"
concrete
(essentia),
"
(CI)
iw
.^
jr*' i*
i-'-.Qv;
i-.
lo
^a.^
Cm*
rrs'^ti.
dw
-;jft
f>rr-r.'
Ic.
Lb
-301-
(ens) and
"
sapient la" ,
"
"
That is, as form, formal effect and constitute. to this kind of distinction,
"
But
essentia" is
"
esse
'
but by identity.
"Just as ' sapient la is called. from esse', ' essentia ' is called.""^/
'
sapere
' ,
so from
and in
"
"The nature (Ipsa natura) is nothing else than what is understood to be something in its genus. Accordingly we now call it by a new name for, fi?om that which is esse we call it essentia which we also commonly call substance, so the ancients who did not have these names, were using the name nature for essence." (12)
' '
'
'
"
Dictlonarlum
word
"
"
although
"
"
esse" or
"
"
essentia" and
"
-rf
*trrf
w-'U.
-TV
adi
-302-
"esse" and
"
For,
"
"
existentia"
have also been the same and differ only nominally, because
just as
"
"
essentia " has been said by the Latins from the verb
"
existo" and
"
because
"
"
mutually compared,
as "essentia" and
mutually compared.
"
esse" ,
"
ens" ,
"
essentia" do
similarly
"
"
:i
^\J^^^-
K* ^-
11 W
MKnl
'
'I
LI
^O v'
>
i.
.'
s/
* t^ 1
-1
...Jjja
91/3
sMow
>.s>.-.j
.i..j...
i>^
sctqeofloo
":
aoqx9
.'
n*rf
oaI
9wi
"
il ii e
J8
"fla/8
OS
'
bnc
ic
lo
-303-
"
"
existent la"
essentia "
Itself.
"
essentia "
existentia "
(%f.\
existentia'
'
"
existentia" and
identical In the modes of conception and signification and in the thing signified.
"
existentia" differ in
'
tr
1-
-'i-r^
>
lle.o
;>aiis>;
*., .ires
*^.
'
-f
at\
lijL.
djjfit*
lix
nt t
-304-
thing as It has
"
existere "
or it is to have received
This, indeed, is
something leading up to
ipsum esse"
Finally, it is that
tinguished from
"
And this
"
esse et non
essentia" and
"
existentia ",
^^. W
s-..
-^
-I^.
shid
^"i
-305-
" existentia"
and
"
existent la"
was only in the potency of Its causes before the thing came
to be.
Hence, Suarez must say that in this fifth way the
"
difference between
established.
"
existentia" cannot be
essentia"
uid
"
them by extending
"
"
similar signification.
"
"
in actu exercito" or
Whence,
in actu exercito" ,
"
existentia" adds
"
position maintains.
xs
X^3
-306-
"
of actual essence.
position if
if the noun,
"
But
lociira)
with
"
"
essentia" in act.
In
it takes
"
sura,
essentia"
and
"
existentla"
Consequently,
"
tinguished fix>m
"
eo rigore sumpta) as
"
"
"
"
extremes.
"JM
OCf
b:
\t
;tofi
til
o.t
\-r
jrr-t
becit
:.
fil
(.
Avj
a8
lo n
-307-
extremes are conceived as positive smd real yet are not con-
"
"
the p3?oper
"
we even distinguish
"
exlstentia"
tinguished In reason.
But before treating this clarification let us recapitulate what has transpired during Suarez* critique of the
various distinctions of reason offered to him in the tradition
In succession.
-rrn-
TOf
?iTS
v^t
r,
as
fc-r.-
t5rnrr
j-tc
ccmntrd^s
diS
^q
.9
48
bciB
^be:^eB Ill^a ml
!lfW
JO
o;t
fc
-30-
"
esse" be of the
"
"
de essentia
"
exlstentla"
exlstentla" is not
exlstentla" is
This
-fid
"RV
38
&ftri
Oi
j'
;tq99xi
""*ii_
Ito
t/iCt
blM9
-^UV^-
can say that this status, namely, existence does not differ
from the entity of actiial essence because is signifies nothing
mox^ that the essence conceived as actual.
Suarez' solution
tinction between
as
"
essentia " as
"
"
existent la"
existent la " are the same thing in reality but this thing is
"
above,
'
Si
J.
'C
nt
HBO
ril
.9
Jo
n.
iB
o a ifijj^os ml
br.B
to
F.
s.*3*rr
1o
n-
OJ MIA brs
nocflsrt
tizi.r..
bciM
lt:an
n.'i
vc/aixs"
Oft
lo aoa&aa
bnr.
ic
.
..VOOJB
-310-
In each particular being its essence is called that by reason of which it is constituted in such a grade or order of beings,
essentia "
"
With respect to
conceived under the
"
" "
ratio" of
ratio" of being
existentia"
"
in re ",
existentia "
lO
o:i
^raan
,,
-"
T^
'^('BB 9tii
.t
-^
^ iT
L:C9'
>r:
\<
.^o
JBffi
:'ii..i>;',;v.-j
vxiis
y<i ii
-311-
On this basis,
esse*
or
'*
although the
"
ratio" of essence to be
"
ens in actu"
although when it is
ens in actu* he
ratio" of essence as
existentia"
means nothing more than the essence here and now actual.
influence of Fonseca, and Alexander of Alexandria is here
The
"
fundamentum in re"
"
in re "
J.itiV
i.
o:f
ss y:
vleonoo sw
(I:,
dw neriw novs
.-tA'M
uri
:tn.i;t
morel
ctl
o^
"
fig-
n x"
:t
ai
riolifw
-312-
"
ciun
creatura"
with a real
"
"
esse"
jVILb
cf
Sor
tfm
c^?;j3
"
l^
3 od o^
aI
eb
a.'
-313-
de essentia" for as we
ex se" and
"
a se" but
"
ab alio "
Hence, it can be
But, since
"
"
"
de essentia
creaturae ",
prescinds from
"
creatura creabilis" ,
-!r
fifXG
r-,
rfft*'-
t.'^'
aJl
,-'4
-ir'.-tjff
-<-.t:
k./
\J
-^1^
.v.'i-J.'-f
.V
-314-
this then
amounts to is that
"
essentia"
ind
"
in rerum natura"
(23)
.
And
"
in re"
denominat ion .
(24) '
*
tween the acttial essence and its actual existence finds the
tinction of reason in the fact that the essence does not exist
of Itself but comes to be by an efficient cause.
Equlvalently
.?
ai
'
-9d
cl r
qlori
ttji
fioijfii
aA
c.^
bt
-315-
raodes of
"
in re"
makes his
a se ", i.e. it is
^^'
essentia ".
by the word
"
efficient cause.
possible essence or
actual essence or
"
"
or founded on it by extrinsic denomination because the concepts are of this one thing and on the occasion of the
Existence is then.
lo
3X1J
'Jw
SXiJ
CiJ
Oo
Ms.":
9ri;t
fcnA
GiiS
nc
^r.'^r'j'Y't
-316-
In this way
the actual essence is not the possible essence, for one really
exists, the other exists only conceptually.
For, such a
stance as distinguished into a metaphysically incomplete substance and a physically incomplete substance. v ^7'
sail
n
'Bt;
sld^
n."
a-TtGs
sflcf
hn,-:
one
:
ow^ ~b
JO-i
\j*9rl:t
siw
'id
i.
...
-,
ui
i>c
.a
^asas
no
r.
". ,
axi9a on "(d al ?
\SinB
I.R''. ^"^'ffr^i'.rt'wrT
15
*i
t";,-^,.-fp
*ff."t
fffl[
,c
sac
lo
j"i:iq
AtfOIJk^k?
..
'-.
;,i IVJ,
CSA
.Jl^iisi
t j-^ .L.^
^^
i t.
-JIY-
Unlike a physical substance, complete or incomplete, the metaphysical substance, complete or incomplete, is in the
Intellectual order.
It is that which is conceived as a meta-
physical part.
It is in this fashion that Juarez can agree with
By such an
'
or metaphysical act in the same sense as Suarez calls incomplete being, the differences by which genus is contracted^-"
'
(32)
(34) '
or con-
That is to say.
9^
exiii
i-ijE'
-5
^^XLbs'x
.-
c> f
vr'i^'iw
'Qi.
w~_
.;li5;/iiX
-;-* '-,.,
.*(
<;..'>:
R'\
^P.^R
bsJ
llX
5^
>
!.%.
mcrtl
OCT flilK
^
-.-
^<
'.it*
sJ
ct
bns
.i^,.,-.v
^ vArf^^\^>^
al ija
jLi.
lo
"
at
UtA
Uii& 9>
-318-
But in each
suid
"
Thus, "existence
1M
.51
XO
;tofl
TO
9&0BI srfw
-319-
'
admits that Fonseca only differs from him In that the latter
calls a distinction of this sort, formal or
"
ex natvra rei"
"
in re "
And, if there by any doubt that Fonseca differs from him only
Alexander
"
teaches Suarez* own position, better and more clear than the
rest of the authors declar it, in Suarez* opinion.
We have now come about in a full circle and having
the
-320-
C.
Critical Summary
called
existens in actu"
impervious essence.
its concepts can, in the sense that they can be compared and
Even the
6v.
Jit
lO
iT;;;i.l31
.10
.'50
in
ftn*
J-
IIA
-321-
Rather, It
In this respect It is
conceptual analysis.
Indeed, reality is only metaphysical by extrinsic
denomination.
and confusion,
auiy
v^J
v.4i
^4,-'
Wll
Hi
iJlIlJ
^i>.'
VXiWilVi'
!^"
9ffl
j.:uL.
LVi'^-
fi
9Cf cfe.
rtfl
lo
IB
x>rjkS
Ovt
^'^
rtso
^:ja.JiiiJc
JlXf
ns al (S
^'"-a
Ji:o
:il.j11J
x;.
'
e<f
o;^
01996 f)Xxxow
-322-
price to pay for a world free from essence and the problems
It raises.
-323-
CONCLUSION
stem
"
"
on the question.
And in
.:}.
"io
BlBMa
oqqo
'^f.i
iPCf'Jr
rro
"
oi nof.^natS
cfeBdX
;td
no
lo \
9ffi08
aaoq
9fi:t
lit
tfcc'^
'"O'
"io
Ti
^:t
n^ TO tc-3
Ir-
^>^r'J
rimii "^or::??
.iX9
v.'c
ooJ a^ool
.i
3.
j.v
I
I--
no
o
3*1
ofc
cr.>-t
ret
9r
na ai ^1
nfll
o^:
889
tiB
-324-
efficient causality.
Soncinas,
All of these
As in the case
For
possible
"
esse"
vrtiich
is in no
j:b
'.
.
,e,'
i ill
Bl
cisliim
boO
trw
'
;irs
an J
If
.X8
l^d
.-".tD
'Tff.-t
"^n
rrnn
-325-
his in Capreolus,
distinction between
"
does not hold that the essence of the creature does not come
to be by an efficient cause.
is accusing the Thomists,
and does not have amy existential reality in itself, then the Thomistlc position would seem to amount to nothing more thsm
a distinction between the essence as possible and the same
But
rrsorr
si.
>rf:f
c.-t
:ton
lo
,-i;
ri
',,-,1
frjTtR
n.-t
n\:
rati'
'I'^^c-'T
?=TR
fiw
'
ntrf:? rtl
rc-.'^-
?.'*'
fh
tr;
"^Tvrf
-'V:
qxs
-326-
r*eal
"
Thus, if
Thomist
grant that such is the data of the problem, i.e. that the real
more than the essence as, here and now, actioally existing.
Thus, if the Thomlsts agree with Suarez on his first two
aoob
fcoB r
^1
nl
.^1
10 i^jxjaa
u
9ri;t
fliorrl
.:i^
iiv
aoXwCiXJ3XO
lo asawo
-327-
now attacks them wherein they are seen to inaintain the real
distinction between the actual essence and its actual existence
and not between an essence as possible and actual.
This is
cited no one who lived after 1538* ten years before Suarez
himself was
bom.
some
"
recentiores "
"
These
have noted.
an
"
esse
existentiae"
Yet, of these men Suarez has also said that they maintain
r>eal
distinction between
For, Suarez himself
ro
-328-
and function.
ens" and
"
but one and the same, and it is this point which remains the
this modal distinction to be a species of real distinction. That is, here existence is not a
"
Rather, it is
a mode.
VThat
position is that there are some who hold, for all intents
"
ex natura
rei" between essence and existence, and yet who give no entity
Qj^.-t
eLrfi 22
:t.^
*^r.B
.5trj5B
9rf:t
isfts
Sfno ttrd
no nolilbB^^
al sd'XAirC tSl
HMtffS
B
,_
lo noi;JlbB^^
alri
X;
*l5
i&bota
bM
lol
-T
-'.'if
firm
r-^iTRn?.
10"^
"i<j
.r:ot:tnr!*:f3lh
ai>x.
:
Ifi-rr
sa uc
.jc;x
Lsuotr^
sxnj
.ebon B
9aiiti;t
id diiO al
^.d
^'''
3^Bnl9oi;tfii __.._-.
_,
-329-
existence.
It is very likely he has taken these references from someone else's catalogue.
tinction to be between
d\iae res"
or
"
Each of these
duae res" or
"
i^^
WW
iT
z-j?.
lo
-330-
the grammarians
esse"
Suarez grants
However, in Suarez*
yet not a real distinction^ enabling him to say existence is not of the essence of the creature.
"
"
"
esse" or
exi stent ia " mesms nothing more than the actual essence, here
signified by
"
esse" or
"
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What has
which seems to be Suarez* contribution to the respective teachings of Alexander of Alexandria and Petrus Ponseca on the dis-
Like Alexander, he
"
essentia"
"
esse" or
existent la"
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is Intrinsically constituted by
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If I were to characterize
His presence is met first among the Thomists themselves in maintaining the real distinction between essence and
existence, as even Suarez himself attests when he explicitly
And, as we
by Sylvester of Ferrara.
In addition, the text of St. Albert which Suarez
Liber De Causis"
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Indeed, is it
Avicenna
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concerned.
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-335-
essence and existence, only one treats of the composition of essence and
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-336-
allegiance to the
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and
"
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existence
Scotistae "
esse"
that being.
way invalidated.
"
esse"
But the
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-338-
both positions would hold the first Thomistic argument that the
essence of a created being does not come to be by an efficient
cause.
"
termlnistae" or
"
su:'e
all men, therefore this man runs etc. and so of all other men.
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However, they disagree on the validity of the reasoning process of concluding from a iiniversal proposition to all its singular
The
"
The
"
reales"
such a proposition the "is" does not say the e^iistence of the
subject but rather the relation of subject and predicate.
the "is" says the existence of the subject and the relation of
subject and predicate as well.
"
reales" seems to
be the same one at work in the case of the Thomists and proponents of the modal distinction, namely, the withdravial of
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because essential predication as based on his contingent essence cannot be absolutely necessary and absolved from all
contingency.
Thus, Suarez* position on essential predication
"
suid
totally
an absolutely contingent
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-341-
entity is to deny any kind of real distinction between essence and existence and to deny any order of essence within being.
Moreover, it is worth pondering whether or not the
being contains such an element, it is an ever present temptation to reduce any real difference between essence and
existence to that between a possible essence and an actual
essence and to that of two kinds of causality seemingly demanded
Thomist
"
"
esse
e::.'
f tentlae"
For his
o^
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niW
-3^2-
Incorapatlblllty.
ari
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esse
auid
Indeed, if Suarez'
'
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-343-
Disputationes Metaphysicae"
an
ABBREVIATIONS IN NOTES
AHDL
DTC
DTP
DTP
OR
JPST
Jahrbuch
B
LTK
NS
New Scholasticism.
J. Qu^tlf and J. Echard, Scriptores Ordinis Pi'aedlcatorum
.
QE RNSP RT
JOHA
"
-344-
NOTES
INTRODUCTION
1.
Cf. R. De Scorraille, S.J., Francois Suai'ez de la Compasniede Jesus d'apres ses lettres, ses autres fecrlts ln6dlts et un grand nombre de documents nouveaux , (Paris: Lethielleux, 1913J. Vol. I, Bk. I,
Chapter I.
2.
Ibid. Chapter II, p. 53, #9 et seq. as well as Chapter III. Ibid. Bk. II, Chapters I, II, IV.
3. 4. 5.
6.
velutl casu circa textura Phllosophi occurinint, pertractarem: idcirco expeditius et utilius fore censui, servato doctrlnae ordine, ea omnia inqulrere, et ante oculos Lectoris proponers, quae de toto hujus sapientiae objecto investlgari, et desiderari poterant." Cf. Jesifs Iturrioz, S.J., "Fuentes de la Metafisica de Suarez", Pensamiento , IV, 1948, pp. 31-89 for an interesting article on Siiai^ez' opinion of Aristotle's method among other things.
7.
D.M., 2, Prooemium: "Ut enim majori compendio ac brevitate utaraur, et conveniente methodo uni versa tractemus, a textus Arlstotelici prolixa explicatione abstinendum duximus, resque ipsas, in quibus haec sapientia versatur, eo doctrinae ordine ac dicendi ratione quae ipsis magis consentanea sit, conteraplari . D.M., Ad Lectorera.
8.
.e
.<!
9-1
II
>-^
tt>v'
-i
y;K.j
.!
-345-
9.
10.
D.M., 31, I, #2
Cf. L. Mahieu, Francois Suarez, sa phllosophie et le^ rapports qu*elle a ^vec sa theologle , (Paris: liesclee, De Brouwer, 1921 j, pp. 331 et seqT; P. Descoqs, S.J., "Le Suar^zisme", Archives De Phllosophle,, II, 1924, pp. 123-154; 187-219; "Thomisme et Suar6zisme", Archives De Philosophle , IV, 1926, 4, pp. 434-544; IV, 1527, I, pp. B2-l^^: M. Del Prado, O.P., De Veritate Fundainentali Philosophiae Christlanae , (Friburgi, Helv . 1911). esp. L. II, C. XI; E. Gllson, Being and Some Philosophers , (1st ed.; Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 19^9), PP. 96-10?.
11.
D.M.,
31,
I,
#3-#12.
Sv
IX
-346-
PART I
1.
2.
The scope of this thesis is such that we cannot go into the much discussed problem of whether or not St. Thomas held for a real distinction or a real composition between essence and " esse " . We take it as established that he dd on the basis of the textual investigations of Etienne Gilson, Le Thomisme , (5th ed.j Paris: Vrin, 19^7)* pp. 43-68; Being and Some Philosophers , {1st ed.j Toronto; Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), pp. 154-189 j G.M. Manser, Das Wesen des Thomismus, (Freiburg, Schweiz, 1932), pp. 491-550; Martin Grabraann, Doctrina S. Thomae De Dlstinctione Reali Inter Essentiam et Esse Ex DocujTientis Ineiitis Saeculi xiil Illustratur", Acta Hebdomadae Thomisticae , (Roma, 1924), pp. 131-190; Joseph De Finance, gtre et agir dans la phllosophie de saint Thomas , (Paris; TB"eauchesne et ses Flls, 19^5)* pp. 79-liy; Louis De Raeiinaker, Metaphysica Genera,lis , (Louvainj Wamy, 1931), PP. 255-252; 2b5-2tS7 Aim^ Forest, La structure metaphysioue du concret selon saint Thomas d'Aquin , (Paris: Vrin, 1931 K PP. 12b-lb5, with Fathers Descoqs and Chossat notwithstanding. However, we will note how faithful the Thomists listed by Suarez are to the doctrine of their master. For, the four texts of St. Thomas cited by Suarez are texts which have acquired commentaries in the course of history, e.g. Cajetan has commented on both the " Summa " and the " De Ente et Essentia ", Sylvester of Ferrara has commented on the " Summa Contra Gentiles" , and Soncinas while not actually commenting on St. Thomas* commentary on the
;
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-fc
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Ji:
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Jii
;ji:ij..^ :'j;
>.
v'
'JJS
-3^7-
Metaphysics" of Aristotle, comments on the same text by In this way in Aristotle as his master before him. the doctrine of relating their thought to St. Thomas St. Thomas will be alluded to with the relation of his followers to that doctrine. The further question as to whether Suarez thought St. Thomas held for the real distinction is at issue in view of his use of " exlstimatur ". For he speaks of the real distinction in regard to St. Thomas as follows: "De hac igitur existentia creaturae varie sunt opiniones. Prima est, existentiam esse rem quaradam distlnctara omnino realiter ab entitate essentiae creaturae. Haec existiraatur esse opinio D. Thomae, quam in hoc sensu secuti sunt fere omnes antiqui Thomlstae." Why this " existimatur" ? Does Suarez imply by it that some think so, but he himself does not and is reluctant to come right out and say so? The answer will have to
"
wait upon our subsequent analyses but the contrast between this indirect mode of expression here and his very definite and direct approach when relating the same or a different doctrine to another raan is indeed interesting.
3.
Let this be the first, but not the last indication that the V1V6S edition (Paris, 1877 ) of Suarez' Metaphysicad Disputations Is far from being a critical text. This seems to be a wrong reference and I do not know just what text of Giles* commentary on the "Sentences" Suarez had in mind. It is Interesting to note that Fonseca in 4 Metaphy. cap. 2, sect. 2, col. 751 cites the same place in Giles: "Eandem sententiam amplectitur Aegidlus Rom. In priraura Sent, dist.2 a. art.l."
4.
The reference to Giles of Rome and his Quodlibets should read, Quodllbet I, q.7 instead of Quodlibet q.2
I,
5.
Let us note here that both St, Albert smd Avicenna " are cited, not so much as Antiqui Thomlstae" but as " men who have been themselves cited by some Antiqui whether What is at issue is twofold Thomlstae" Suarez thinks that these men hold for a real distinction or not and whether the Thoraists mentioned have been Influenced by the teaching of these two men on essence and "esse" and whether Suai*ez Is right in perceiving the presence of this Influence or not. Suarez alludes " to this Influence in his use of Cltatur etlam" and as we shall see Capreolus is one of the Thomlsts who does
.
so.
-ii
'fHB
-348-
6.
The Paris edition of 1877 reads I Phys. quaest. 2 which is incorrect, Suarez thinks that Alexander of Hales is the author of the commentary on the " Metaphysics" of Aristotle which he has at hand. In reality, the work is that of Alexander of Alexandria (/ 1314). Cf. L^on V^uthey, Alexandre d'Algxandrle^ maltre de I'lmiversite de Paris et ministre gfreral des freres minexirs , (Paris; Soci^t^ et Lihrairie Saint-Francois D"Assise, 1932), p. 15. This first appeared in Etudes Franc iscaines , beginning in 1931 with volume #43*;; Cf. also Comelio Fabro, "Una Ponte Antitomista Delia Metafisica Suarezisma" , Divus Thomas (Piacenza), 50 (1947), pp. 52 et seq.; Ramon Ceftal, "Alejandro de Alejandria: Su Influjo en La Metafisica De Suarez", Pensamiento , 4 (1948), p. 93 et seq. This article takes into account the previous contributions made by Veuthey and Fabio, handling the latter rather roughly. Cf also Ueberweg, Grundriss de Geschlchte der Phil. , II Teil, S. #37, P. 437j G.M. Manser, Das Wesen des Thomlsmus, (Freiburg, Schweiz, 1935),
.
7.
p. 522.
8.
Note that Suarez source here is not Aureolus, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaine, Gerard of Carmel, directlyj rather, it is Capreolus vrtio cites them in the section urtiere he treats the " Objectlones" . Cf. Johannes Capreolus Defensiones Theologiae Divl Thomae Aquinatis , ed. by Paban-P^dues, (Turin: Alfred Cattier, It 1900;, I, Distinctlo VIII q.l, a.l, p. 315 et seq. is noteworthy that Suarez lists the men cited by Capreolus under the third position though there is no such threefold division of positions in the text of Capreolus, And in doing so Simrez has Henry of Ghent incongruously residing in both the second and third positions.
These are the references where Godfrey actually takes up the problem of the distinction between essence and "esse". Cf. Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaine , edit. De Wulf-Pelzer, Quodl ibe 2, quaest. 2j Quodlibet 3, qq. 1 and 2.
The Vives edition carries as the reference to Durandus In I Sent, d.?, q.2. The missing numeral is #8 so that the full reference reads In I Sent, d.3, q.2. The reference to Hervaeus Natalis in the Vives edition reading Quodlibet 7 q.9 should be corrected to read Quodlibet 7 a. 8.
10.
11.
JtssC oi it
.8
.e
:j
.->
IX
-349-
12.
This is also cited incorrectly in the Vives edition where the reference reads In 2 Sent, d.6, a.l. This is another faulty reading. Instead of Liber I De elementis dubium 3 the reference should read Liber I De elementis dubium 23,
13.
14.
This is another faulty reference to add to our already large list. Instead of In I Sent, d,8 disputation Ij read disputation 2.
This man still remains unknown to me despite all my efforts to unearth him. The best I could do was to turn up a certain Joannes Altenstaig or Altensteig. Cf. Fabricius, Bibliotheca Mediae et Infimae Latlnitatis , Lib. IX, pp. 130-132; Hugo Hurter, Nomenclator literarius theologiae catholicae ^ (Oeniponte, I906 )
III, col. 555/^457.
15.
16.
This is another faulty reference. Instead of C.3 the fully correct citation should be 4 Metaph. q,3 instead of Chapter 3.
This, too, is a faulty reading. Whereas the Vives edition has 4 Metaph. C.3* q.4, the correct reference is 4 Metaph. C,2, q.4,
Cf. D.M., 31, I, #3.
17.
18.
19.
Suarez is not alone in attributing this kind of an argument to the Thomists as the following texts attest: 1st Thomistic Argument according to Michael de Palacios, In I Sent, d.8 disput.2: "Quarto praeter haec essentiae praedicantur aeternae. Autore nanque Augustino aetema est haec Veritas, tria et duo s\int quinque. Ergo similiter haec est aeternae veritatis, homo est animal rationale, et in alias definitiones essentiales excurras, quae omnes eandem sublbunt legem. At existentiae sunt temporales, ut quod homo existat, aut equus temporales est. Caeterum aeteruum et temporale, re ipsa secemiintur." 1st Thomistic Argument according to Petrus Fonseca, In 4 Metaph. cap. II, q.4, col. 752: "Quintum. Id, quod convenit alicui non per ullam caussam effectlvara, distinguitur re ipsa ab eo, quod non convenit eidera, nisi per aliquam: atqui praedicata essentialia conveniunt creaturis non per ullam caussam effectivam (siquidem hujusmodi propositiones. Homo est animal. Homo est substantia, et similes semper fuerunt verae, etiam
,Sii alia
.51
.cl
io
10
,81
.91
.-t:-
-350-
antequara Deus quicquam efficeret) praedicatum autera, quo de rebus creatis affirmatur existentla, non convenlt creaturis nisi per caussam efficientem, ut patet: non est igitur dubiuiu, quln essentia, et existentla ci^aturarum re ipsa distinguantur." 1st Thoiaistic Argument according to Niphus, In h Metaph. disp. 5: "Sexto omne citra prlinum est conrpositum ex actu et potent ia. Sola enim prima intelligent ia est liberata a potentia, Averroes. 3, De Anima, Essentia competit rei ex se: esse vero ab efficiente, igitur essentia differt ab esse. Antecedens patet, quia orani agente circurascripto homo est animal et homo, et tamen homo non potest esse illis omnibus circurascriptis, ut patet 8 (?;. Omne lllud cujus esse non differt ab essentia, non est plus uno in specie, secundum peripatetlcos. Sed omne quod est citra primum est plus \.ino in specie, quod saltern est de generabilibus nemo dubitat, igitur in nullo citr^ primum esse et essentia sunt idem." 1st Thomistic Argiiment according to Alexander Achillinus, Bk. I De Elementis Dublum 23 fol. 104B: "Quarto. Omne habitum a causa effective est re distinctum a non habito per causam effectivam, sed essentia non habetur per causam effectivam, et esse sic, ergo etc." 1st Thomistic Argument according to John of Jauidun, In 4 Metaph. q.3: "Item ilia non sunt eadem realiter: quorum unum potest corrumpi alio remanente: quia ilia quae sunt eadem siraul generantur et corrumpuntur. Alioquin esset idem et non esset: sed essentia potest manere corrupto esse: quia rosa in hyeme manet quoad essentiam: et tamen ejus esse est corruptum. Et quod essentia rosae maneat in hyeme, probatur: quia nisi reraaneret rosa in hyeme et nix in aestate: et similiter meteorologica ut grando: t\jnc scientia libri meteorarum periret: sed hoc est falsum quia philosophla secTindura omnes partes ejus est perfecta vel in raajori ejus parte, ut dicit Commentator, 3. De Anima. Consequentia patet quod de non ente non est scientia, primo posteriorum," 1st Thomistic Argument according to Aureolus, I Sent. d.8, q.21, a.l, p. 257A: "Praeterea: Quandocuraque aliqua realis actio terminatur ad aliquid, et non terminatur ad aliud, ilia non possunt poni eadem res. Si enim sunt eadem res, quandocumque actione reali unum attingitur, et reliquum; sed creatlo realis productlo est. Non attlngit autem essentiam, quia Deus non faclt hominem esse hominem, sed homlnera esse, et essentiam esse, secundum quod dicit Auctor de causis in quarta propositione, quod prima rerura creatorum est esse. Ergo non sunt idem realiter essentia, et esse."
W9^
6i.
-351-
Note further that Descartes also uses the terms " essence" and " eternal truths" as synonymous. "Vous me demandei: in quo genere causae Deus disposult aetemas veritates. le vous repons que cest in eodem genere causae qu'il a cvei toutes choses, cest k dire ut efflciens et totalis causa. Car il est certain qu'il est aussi blen Autheur de 1* essence conme de 1 existence des creatures, or cette essence n*est autre chose que cesj veritez entemelles, lesquelles ie ne concoy point ^raaner de Dieu, comme les rayons du Soleil; raais ie scay que Dieu est Autheur de toutes choses, et que ces viritez sont quelque chose, et par consequent qu'il en est Autheur." Cf. A.T. I, p. 151-152, 2? Mai I63O. Cf . also Correspondance edited by Adam and Mllhaud I*>P. 139j Cf. alsoPGarin, Theses cartesiennes et theses thomiste , p. 11? et seq., Cf . ^also E. Gilson, La doctrine cart^ienne de la liberte e t la th^oloKie, p. 37-3y n.3.
20. 21.
22.
Cf. D.M., 31, XII, #38 et seq. where Suarez discusses this 1st Thomistic argument exactly in the context of the eternal truth of "^per se" propositions.
Cf. Paul Wyser, O.P., Per Thomlsmus, vol. 15/16 of Bibliographische Einfuhrungen in das Studium der Philosophie, ed. I.M. Bochenski, p. 24-25 #33.32-#33.351 for bio-bibliographical references to Capreolus. Of interest for our needs are T. Pegues, KH 7, I899, 317-334, esp. 317. 319-21, 324j M. Grabraann, DTP 22, 1944, 85-109, 145-170; A. Krempel, La doctrine de la relation chez saint Thomas , (Paris: Vrin, 1952), PP. 29-30.
23.
2h.
It is noteworthy that a change in the stnicture of the traditional " quaestio" has taken place. Instead of a
"
^J* ^ ^.
r^
.12
2S
.10
-352-
takes place, the conclusion is posited initially and argximents are then marshalled in its defense. This would seem to indicate that Capreolus is not so much establishing his positions as defending positions which are to him a philosophical heritage. And that this should alter tlie basic stmacture of the " ciuaestio " is
only natural.
25.
Cf, Capreolus, Defensiones Theolociae , I, d.l, q.l, a.l. Vol. I, p. la. Pertiaps this approach is the one which has incurred for its practitioners " Thomatistae " Cf, R. Villoslada, La uniyersidad de Paris durante los estudiosde Francisco de Vitoria O.F ., (1307-1522), (Rome, 193^^ P. 255: "La palabra tpraista para designar, en el sentido hodiemo, a los sequidores de Santo Tomas, la vemos por primera vez empleada por el franciscguio Pedrjo de Aquila (Scotellus 41361); si bien ya antes la habia usado en esta otra forma "Thomatista" . Amaldo de Villanova (fl31l), quien di rigid hacia 1304 a su amigo Jaime Blanch (Albi) un opusculo que empieza y se titula asi: 'Gladius jugulans Thomatistas' , en el cual, acusa a estos de preferir la suma de Ssuato Tomas a la Biblia. Ehrle, Amaldo de Villanova e i 'Thomatiste', Gregorianura, 1920, 475-U90. Menendez Pelayo, Historia de los heterodoxos t. Ill p, 208. La forma Thomatista reaparece in el documento de los norainales par-isienses aducido en el capitulo III, n.8."
'
'
26.
27.
I,
p, 301b,
Cf, Capreolus op. cit ., I Sent., d,8, q.l, a.l. Vol. I, p, 301b: "Et aj?guitur quod non nam Doctores antiqui
negant illud concorditerj igitur illud est simpliclter Tenet consequentia per locum ab auctoritate. negeindum. ABSuii5>tvun probatur. Nam Philosophus, seciindo Poster. (t.c. 7> 92b 9-11) dlcit quod esse non est substantia -- Et Avicenna, quinto suae Metaphysicae, cap. 1, rei. (1508 edit. fol. 86va-87rb) et prime Physicorura, cap. ultimo, et ubique, est istius sententiae, quod esse accidit enti in omnl alio, praeterquam in necesse esse. Huic concordat Algazel in sua Logica, ubi multipliciter probat quod esse nostrum sit accidens, Huic consent it Boetius, de Hebdomadibus (PL 64, 1311 dicens: 'Diversun est esse, et quod est; ipsum vero esse nondum est; at vero quod est accepta forma essendi est atquG subsistit'." For Algazel Cf. Algazel's Metaphysics .A Mediaeval Translation , editT J, T. Muckle, p. 29-30. A striking similarity in the citation
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of authorities on this question is found in Petrua Aureolus, In Quatuor Libros Sententiarura , (Romae: Ex Typographia Vaticana, 139bj, Liber I. Distinctio VIII q.l, p. 256. He writes as follows: "Et videtur quod in omnl alio esse, et essentia realiter distin^^uantur. Illud enim videtur esse communis animi conceptio, et per consequens verura, quod Philosophi et sapfentes enunciant, secundiun quod Boethus dicit Libro suo de Hebdonadibus . Sed cranes Philosophi, et sancti concordant quod esse sit accidens essentiae, et distincuatur realiter ab ea. Hinc quidem Philosophus concordat, qui dicit 2 posteriorum quod essentia (esse) non est substantia rei; huic concordat Avlcenna 5 Metaphysicorum et ubique est istius sententiae, quod esse accidit enti in rmni alio, praeterquam in necesse esse; hiilc concordat Algazel in Logica nostrum sit accidens; huic concordat Hilarius quinto de Trinitate (PL 10, 208) qui dicit quod esse in Deo non est accidens, sicut in CMnni creato; huic concordat Boetius de hebdomadibus dicens quod diversum est esse, et illud quod estj ipsum vero esse nondum est, aut vero quod est accepta forma essendi est, atque consistit." That Capreolus has the coranientary of Aiireolus at his hand as he writes his Defensiones Theologiae. . there can be no doubt, as we shall have occasion also to see in Capreolus' citation of the a3?guments of Godfrey of Fontaine. Tliey are almost word for word the recapitulation of Aureolus. Nor has this escaped the editors of Capreolus. Cf . Defensiones Theologiae. p. XXII "Hoc tamen notatu dignum est: non semper ex libris auctorura argioraenta deprompsit Capreolus, sed prout in praecipuo adversario, Aureolo scilicet, exposita invenerat. In arguiaentis ergo e Scoto v. gr. assumptis, hujus Doctoris utique sententiam liabes formam vero sub qua praesentatur, apud Aureolura invenies."
.
28.
Cf. Capreolus, op. cit ., I Sent., d.8, q.l. Vol. I, Quia quandocumque p. 301b: "In oppositum arguitur.
aliqua sunt realiter distincta, uniim potest per divinam potentiam ab alio separarl. Sed esse non potest separari ab essentia; alias si separaretur, esse esset sine essentia, et essentia esset sine esse. Ergo non distinguuntur realiter." Soncinas, Ponseca and Dominicus Soto bear witness to the same appreciation of what it means to be really distinct, for Soncinas in setting down one of the many positions on this question says: Alii dicunt quod esse et essentia non distinguuntur realiter quid isti habent hoc principium quod distinctio realis non potest esse nisi inter ea quorum unum potest
J--V e.ek
Mr.
3S
-35^-
esse altero non exlstente. Essentia autem non potest esse sine esse. Dicunt tainen quod dlstlnguiintur ex natura rei quia de eis verificantiir praedicata contraditoria. Nam esse accidit essentiae, essentia vero non accidit essentiae. Item, essentia potest esse in potentia objectiva, esse non potest esse in potentla objectiva. Dicunt praeterea quod distinguimtur etiam modal iter quia esse est modus intrinsecus ipsius essentiae. Dicimt tamen quod esse et essentia non distinguiintur formallter quia homo in potentia non dicit aliara formalltatem ab homine in actu." Cf. Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphyslcales , (Venetiis, 1498), Bk. 4, q.l2, fol. B5ra, Dominicus Soto in Super Oc to Libros Physicorum Quaestiones Bk, 2, q.2, fol. 32 va makes it clear that this is what the real distinction means to him, for he states: "Eodem arg\iraento convincor dicere quod esse existentiae non est res alia seciinda distincta ab essentia, ut discipuli raulti Sanct. Tho. (nescio an S. Tho.) habent pro comperto. Nam certe si existentla realiter distingue re tur a me, illam Deus posset corrumpere me salvo, et per consequens tunc ego existerem sine re ilia, atqueo adeo vanum est ponere allud praeter me et rael partes quo ego sim. Sed dicitur esse distingui ab essentia sicut sedere ab homine quia non est de essentia hominus, ut sit quippe cum ante mundi creationem homo erat animal rationale. Sed de hoc alias." Fonseca also aligns himself with this stand on the question: "Verum hujusmodi sententia (the real distinction) non videtur probanda. Primixm, quia si existentla creaturarum dlstlngueretur ab essentia, ut res a re, posset ab ilia separari divina potestate, praesertim cum neutra qulcquam includat alterius. At nullo modo videtur fieri posse ut existentla v.g. hujus lapldis permaneat in rerum natura pere\mte essentia ejusdem lapldis, aut conservata separatim sub alia existentla, quenadmodiun 1111 conservarl posse arbltrantur, argxamento surapto ab existentla naturae assumptae a verbo dlvlno." Cf. Fonseca, Commentariorum in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis , tFrancofurtl, 1599"lb05j/Bk. 4, cap. 2, q.4, sect. 2, col. 753. But the immediate source for Capreolus in all likelihood is the man he has at his Petrus Aureolus Cf. op. cit .. In I Sent., elbow d.8, q. XXXI, a.l, p. 258b: "Praeterea, Quando aliqua sunt distincta realiter, iinum potest per Divinvun potentlam ab alio separari. Sed esse ab essentia separari non potest, alloquln si separaretur essentia erlt esse absque essentia, et essentia absque esse. Ergo non potest ponl quod realiter dlstinguantur." That Suarez is of the same opinion may be learned from
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D.M., XXXI, VI, #8 Cf. P. Descoq's reference to both texts of Soto and Suarez in his Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis , Tome 2, p. 701. For another appreciation of the text of Soto, one may consult L. De Raeymaeker, Metaphysica Generalis , Pars II, Sect. I, p. 130. That Giles of Rome is at the bottom of this business about sepai^ability is very likely Cf, Theoreroata De Esse et Essentia , edit, Hocedez, p, 67-68 and in the Introduction p. l52)-(63) but it is by no means evident that he has dravm it out to the personal conclusions of Soto, Fonseca and Suarez,
29.
These are the headings of each of the five conclusions: " (1) no subsisting creature is its ovm esse" , which is the act by which it (the subsisting creature) exists in " reality. esse" of a creature is not re(2) That the " lated to the quod-est" or quiddity of a creature in the way in which substantial form is related to matter. " (3) That the esse exlstentiae" is not related to the substance or essence of a creature in the way in which an accident is related to substance, provided that " accidens " is taken in the predicaxaental sense. " esse " of a creature by which it actually C^n That the exists is not God, nor is it properly a creature, nor is it properly a creature, nor is it strictly speaking " an " ens" or " quod-est" . (5) That a certain esse" is the very essence of the creature and a certain " esse " is the actuality of that essence and there is a certain " esse" that has neither characteristic.
Cf, Def enslones Theologiae. . I., D.8, q.l, a.l. Vol, I, 301b and a. 2, p. 31pa et seq. "In secundo p. (articulo) vero, adversariorum objectiones." As a rule
:
30.
Capreolus divides the " Objectiones " of his adversaries and his own " Solutipnes " according as they concern each of his conclusions . Sut in this instance Capreolus cites only the argvunents against the first conclusion. For example, in regard to his first conclusion Capreolus examines the objections of Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaine, Gerard of Carrael and Petrus Aureolus, The reference to Henry of Ghent in " primo Quodlibeto q.7 " is incorrect and should read " primo Quodlibeto, q^g Cf , Henry of Ghent, Quodlibeta (Paris; Jacobus Badius Ascensius, 15l8)j I* q.9* fol. 6v-7r. Note also that the argvunents of Godfrey of Fontaine are not taken directly from his own texts but rather are cited almost verbatvim from Aureolus' recapitulation, Cf , Petrus Aureolus, In I Sent., d,8, q,l, (Romae: Ex Typographia Vaticana, 1595), p. 258a et. seq. Just for comparison.
,
i.j.;*-ii-i
.es
.10
.0
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let me cite the first argument of Godfrey as summarized by Aureolus: "Ulterius videtur, quod solumraodo dlstlnguantur modls g3?ainmatlcalibus. Abstractiua enim, et concretum solum gramraaticallter distinguuntur. Sed essentia et esse distinguuntur, sicut abstractum et concretum, essentia namque est nomen abstractum ab esse, sicut htunanitas ab homine. Ergo videtur quod solummodo graramaticaliter distinguantur. Compare this to Capreolus, opcit ., I. Sent., d.8, q.l, a. 2, Vol. I, p. 317a: "Arguit etiam Godofridus, in Quodlibetis , Primo sic. Abstractum enim et concretum, solum graramaticaliter distinguuntur. Sed esse et essentia distinguuntur sicut abstractum et concretijm: essentia namque est nomen abstractum, sicut hvimanitas ab homine. Ergo videtur quod soliim graramaticaliter distingueintur."
31.
Capreolus* treatment of this first conclusion is a composite of seven separate arguments interspersed with counter-arguments and his answers to them, with each argu33ient Jtmiping off from an authoritative text usually St. Thomas. So it is that his finished product is much like a mosaic, consisting of Aristotle, Averroes, Robert Grosseteste and St. Augustine, as a sampling from only the first argument attests. From a remark of Fr. Pegues, Revue Thomiste , 7, I899, p. 330, I gather that I am not the first to make the cliarge, nor need it be taken in a derogatory sense, for a mosaic can be and often is a work of art. Indeed, Capreolus' synthesis is all of a piece rather than being an artificial juxtaposition of texts, for these citations are quickened from within by that very personal existence which the intelligibility of such texts has in mind of Capreolus. The difficulty that such a mosaic offers to any analysis goes without saying. But when Capreolus literally hides behind his authorities and gives but sparingly of his commentary, the difficulties of analysis are appreciably enhanced. Still, to grasp in some way tliat personal existence which these texts have in the mind of Capreolus, we must lift each piece out of its setting, scrutinize it carefully and replace it again within the complete design of the whole. Added to these obstacles is the fact that we are probing into three massive metaphysical problems whose overtones mingle and blend throughout this one particular they are the " ex professo problem of the argument distinction between essence atnd " ess e" , the problem of the divine ideas, and the problem of creation. The presence of the latter two will become clear as we proceed. The difficulty is to do justice to the first
te
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and allude to the others without letting them dwarf and dominate the main point of discussion.
32.
Cf. St. Thoroas, Svmgna Contra Gentiles Bk. II, Cap. 52. The difficulty in analyzing this terse and cryptic text is to say no more nor less than 3t, Thomas himself is actually expressing here. It is one argxoment within the larger context of other arguments, all purporting to show that " esse" and " quod-'est " are not identical in the angels (in substantiis Intellectualibus creatis). Clearly, the first point to be made is that " substantia" here stamds for " essentia " as the conclusion itself attests (nullius igitur substantiae creatae suura esse est sua essentia) and the sense of the passage requires. The second characteristic to notice is the contrast between the essence and " esse" of a creature, indicating that " esse" is not the essence itself nor an essential attribute . If such were the case, namely, if " esse" were the very essence of a ci^ature or an essential attribute, it no longer v/ould be a creature, i.e. Its " esse " would no longer be " per aliud " but " per se " and it could never come to be because it would be always. The third noteworthy feature is St, Thomas* use of " per se" to characterize the essence of a creature and " per aliud " to characterize " esse " to set off the contrast of these two metaphysical principles. It is important to realize that the stress and major emphasis is laid on " esse " and its " per aliud " 'characterization. The preposition present in each case, namely, " P^^" > obviously indicates a causal relationship, Cf. St. Thomas In I Post. Anal., Lectio X, edit. Leonine, Cf. also Capreolus, op. cit ., II Sent., p, 175-l7t>. d.19, q.3, ad. 5* Vol. 2, p. 163b --and consequently the contrast is one of causal relationships. The pressing question which will not be suppressed is Does the oer se" as applied to essence mean that there Is no efficient cause of the essence but only of " esse" ? or Does this to ask the same question in another way mean that " esse" alone is properly cieated and that essence is not? This question is an intriguing one in view of a remark of E. Brehier, Histoire de la philo Sophie , Tome II, Fasc. 1, p. bb-57 as follows: ^Lon connait les vues platoniciennes que nous avons, rencontrees si souvent et qui otit traverse le moyen a!ge et la Renaissance; 1 'essence d'une chose cr^e est une participation a 1 essence divine, si bien qu'il n'y a pas d' autre connaissance que celle de 1 essence divine, connaissance qui, d^grad^e, effac^e, inadequate en s'appliquant aux choses crees,ne se perfectionnera.
.
3c
no
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autant qu'il eat possible a ime creature, que dans la II s'ensuit aussi que Dieu est le createur des existences, raais non celui des essences qui ne sont que des participations k son essence etemelle." and in view of Suarez' summation it is the important question. It is not unlikely that St, Thomas is using " per se " to indicate an intrinsic foxroal cause and not necessarily the total lack of an efficient cause after the fashion of this text which, however, explicitly refers to " esse " . Cf. St. Thomas, In I Sent., d.o, q.l, a.l, ad. 2: "Ad secundum dicendtan, quod esse creatum non est per aliquid allud, si ly " per" dicat causara formalem intrinsecvira; immo ipso formaliter est creatura; si autem dicat causam foiroalera extra rem vel causam effectlvam, sic est per divintun esse et non per se." The following text from the first redactions of the second book of the Contra GerHles found in the Vatican autograph helps to bolster our Interpretation, for it reads: "Amplius. Orane quod est per se inquantura hujus modi non est per aliud, potest autem id quod est per se secund\ara \mum, esse per aliud secundum aliud, sicut homo est quidem rationalis per se, sensibilis autem inquantum est animal, et aer est quidem subtilis per se, lucidus autem actu per allud. Unuraquodque autem separatum est per se secundum quod separatiun est, haec est enim sua substantia, quae est per se uniculque. Illud igitur quod est separatum in unoquoque separate inest el per se et non per aliud. Si ergo esset aliquid in quo natura h\itnana esset separata, sicut plato ponebat ydeam hominis, non esset homo per aliud quasi aliud participans, esset autem animal per aliud et ens per allud, quia natura aniraalls et entis in eo non esset separata. Si igitur aliquid est quod est ipsuia suum esse separatiira, hoc nullo modo est per aliud. Non ei^o est causatum, hoc enim causatum dlclmus quod est per aliud. Nulla igitur substantia causata est suum esse." Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles , edit. Leonine, Appendix p. 56b. Let us note however, that this text does offer difficulties. Be that as it may, to ray mind the initial text of St. Thomas from II C.G., cap. 52 is saying no more than this other text from the " De Ente et Essentia" which, oddly enough is in the same context of the " Intel ligent laef "Omne autem quod convenit alicui vel est causatum ex ptlncipils naturae suae, sicut risibile in homine, vel advenit ab aliquo prlnclpio extrlnseco sicut lumen in aere ex influentia soils. Non autem potest esse quod ipstun esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma vel quidditate rei causatum dico sicut a causa efficlente; quia sic aliqua res esset
vision, illuminative.
r-.
4.r
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causa sul ipsius et allqua res selpsam in esse produceret, quod est impossibile. Ergo oportet quod omnis talis res cujus esse est aliud quam natura sua habeat esse ab alio." Cf . St. Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia , edit. Rolauid-Gosselin, cap. 4, p. 35. Note that the very example of air and light is used as is the case in II C.G. It would be an interesting study to see how many of the various commentators on the "De Ente et Essentia" read this in the light of the text from the Contra Gentiles or vice versa. Interpreting "perse" as applied to essence to meem without an efficient cause. Cf. also the remarks of J. Bittremiexjx, D.T.P., 1929 from II C.G. cap. 52, pp. 403-405 on this fifth argument. We shall have occasion to return to them when treating Sylvester of Ferrara, Indeed, even the words of E. Cilson In Being and Some Philosojphers , p. 102 C2U1 be interpreted in the sense that essence is per se" , meaning without an efficient cause. For there he says: "Here is a possible essence, then God creates it; what has God created? Obviously, God has created that essence. And as we already taiow, for that essence to be actualized by God and to exist are one and the same thing. What Suarez fails to see, unless, perhaps, his adversary is himself suffering from double vision, is that, when God creates an essence. He does not give it its actuality of essence, which an^" possible essence enjoys in its own right; what God gives it is another actuality, which is that of existence. Taken in itself, the essence of man is fully actual qua essence.... Creation thus does not actualize the essentiality of the essence, but it actualizes that essence in another order tlrian that of essence, by "granting it existence"."
33.
Cf. E, Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, p. 62-63. Cf. also A. D. Sertillange, "ti'idee de creation et ses retentissement en philosophic", (Paris, 1925), P. 44, n.l.: "That all beings, except God, need to be created because they have not in themselves the cause which make them to be, is the meaning of the famous distinction between essence and existence.
34,
Cf. St. Albert, De Causis et Processu Universitatis, I, 1, 8, ed. A. Borgnet, (Paris, 18^0-185$), X, p. 377. Let us say initially that the presence of Av^icenna in this text has not gone imnoticed as witnessed by A. Maurer, "Esse et Essentia in the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant", Mediaeval Studies , 8, 19^6, p. 75; de Fineince, op. pit ., p. 93; Roland-Gosselln, op. cit ., And thus his presence to the thought of p. 178.
G^ RITil
fri
XT^r.
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Capreolus must be evalioated in the final analysis. We shall do well not to forget this first meeting with Avicenna in the light of what is to come. Also, we must recall that this text of St. Albeit is complementary, at least for Capreolus, to the text cited from St. Thomas and in that sense almost a commentary on St. Thomas* argument, for it helps us to clarify just how Capreolus is understsuiding that short cryptic argument of St. Thomas. But note that in the text of St. Albert more emphasis is given to the " per se" character of essence than the text of St. Thomas contains. Thus, we may well ask if the presence of Avicenna intrudes in this way into the text of St. Thomas. Linguistically speaking, St. iSbert is here wedding the metaphysical thought of an Avicenna to the philosophical terminology of a Boethius (cf . M.D. Roland-Gosselin, O.P., Le "De Snte et Essentia" de St . Thomas . . , p. I78) to point out that " esse" is other than essence (illud-quod-est) which was the burden of the text of St. Thomas and whose context also made use of the Boethian terras " esse" and " quod-est " . But the question to be asked is whether or not the metaphysical thought of Avicenna is also present in St. Thomas' text. In short, it is not too difficult to see how Capreolus might have interpreted both texts in the same identical way. But to get back to St. Albert. Thus, every creature is something composite, consisting of " esse" and "illud-quod-3st" (Hoc igitur quod est ab alio, habet esse illud-quod-est) and we can say that " esse" , coming as it does from a first cause, happens or is accidental (accidit ei) to the essence. And yet, the essence is not in virtue of anything else which flows in upon or is superadded to it (St sic est id quod est non per siliquid aliud quod influat super ipsumj. Hence, the essence is what it is whether it exists or not (homo est homo... homine existente et horaine non existente secundum actum). And whereas St. Thomas sets off the comparison of essence and its " esse" by contrasting the " per se " characteristics of the one with the " per aliud " characteristics of the other, St. Albert makes use of " a seipso " in regard to the essence " and " ab alio " in reference to esse " (ab alio ergo habet essej a seipso autem quod sit hoc quod est;...) to point out first, that a thing is what it is in virtue of itself, and secondly that, the fact that it is, is due to an extrinsic agent. But the question is whether, here in the commentary of St. Albert, the contrast is between am intrinsic formal cause and an efficient cause, extrinsic to its subsequent effect, as is likely the case with St. Thomas' text. In short.
-361-
does St. Albert clearly distinguish these two orders of cause in this text? It is by no means certain that he has as the witness of Siger of Brabant will attest. For Siger' s point is that Avicenna and St. Albert equivocate in their use of "ex", and "per", Cf. Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la metaphysique , edit. C.A. Graiff, Introduction q.7, p. 14-15. Cr. also A. Maurer, "Esse et Essentia in the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant", Mediaeval Studies 8, 1946, pp. 68-86, esp. And thus we may well ask if this text of St. p. 76. Albert means that there is no efficient cause of the essence but only of " esse " or that the essence is uncreated and only " esse " is created? And if this is the case, is it the basis for that otherness between " esse " and essence in creatures? Such would seem to be the case. But whatever St. Albert's personal position may have been in regard to this text, the same doctrinal Immunity cannot be valid, for Capreolus, Cf. St. Albert, OP. cit ., II, 5* 24, p. 619 as well as M. Choasat, AP, lA, p. 159. That is, if Albert is merely the coratnentator on Aristotle and not coraraiting himself personally in regard to the truth or falsity of this fonaulation, the same consideration cannot be tendered to Capreolus, as we have no evidence that he is merely a commentator, in the manner of St, Albert, Rather, is a defender. Note for a text similar to St, Albert's interpretation of predication in view of the non-existence of the subject one may consult M, Grabmann, Acta Hebdomadae Thomisticae , (Rome, 1924), p. 143.
35.
Note the similarity of this objection to Siger of Brabant's positions in " Utrum Esse in Causatis Pertlneat Ad EssentjLam Causatorum " in Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la metaphysique, edit. C. A. Grairr, O.S.B., Introductlo, q.7, p. 15 and in " Quaestio utrum haec sit vera: Homo est animal nullo homine existente? " in Siger de BiTabant et I'averroisme latin au Xll me si^cle , edit. Mandonnet, 2nd part, p. bb and p. b7-btt whei^ the Cf, also A, Maurer, position of St. Albert is opposed Med, Studies 3, 1946, p, 83-84. But let it be noted that the reason for his opposition is that the possibility of no man existing in an eternal world is ui absurdity. (Cf. Mamdonnet op. cit ., 1st part. Chapter VI, p. II8; \rtiich is not the case with the objector in Capreolus. Yet, the common denominator between Siger and this they both assert an anonymous objector is this existentialized essence and thus both affina an order of created or existential truth. Also, Cf . A. Forest, La structure metaphysique . , Ch. V, pp. 145-146. Let
-362-
U3 also note that Thierry of Fribourg contains an echo of this objection: "Sed terminus posltus ex parte praedicati designat raodum actus et propter hoc homine non existente ista est falsa: homo est; et non solum lata: homo est, sed etiara ista: homo est homo, sicut est falsa: homo ratiocinatur, homine non existente. Sicut etiam ista, si sic diceret hanc, scilicet: homo est homo, resolvere in istam: homo horainat, esset falsa homine non existente." Cf. E. Krebs, "Le traite "De Esse et Essentia" de Thierry de Fribourg", RNP, 1911, p. 533.
36.
Here is one jwssible interpretation of the texts from St. Albert and St. Thomas. To the questions: Do these texts mean that there is no efficient cause of the essence but only of " esse" ? or Do they mean that the essence is not created whereas " esse" is? the objector would unquestionably reply. Yes! both texts affirm that there is no efficient cause of the essence and inasmuch as it is vmcaused, it is uncreated. It is this premise he explicitly denies. And notice that the burden of this whole objection bears on the existential order of efficient cause and how the requirements of this existential order assert themselves within, and have repercussions on, the essential order of " per se" predication
37.
Capreolus chides his adversary for not knowing of such texts as (sed qui sic dlclt non advert it quod dicit Aristoteles) those he cites from Grosseteste and Aristotle. Actually all the texts come from Grosseteste, for the text of Aristotle is the lemma cited by Grosseteste prior to his commentary. Cf . Robert Grosseteste, In Arist o tells Posteriorum Analecticorum Libros, (Venetiis, 1537;, Bk. I, Cap. b, rol. bva et
seq.
The text from Aristotle reads as follows: (a) "Demonstrative knowledge must rest on necessarj'^ basic truths j for the object of scientific knowledge cannot be other than it is. Now attributes attaching essentially to their subjects attach necessarily to them; for essential attributes are either elements in the essential nature of their subjects, or contain their subjects as elements in their own essential nature." A little farther on, Aristotle also states: (b) "It is also clear that if the premises from which the syllogism proceeds are coramensurately \miversal the conclusion of such demonstration demonstration i.e. must also be eternal. in the \mq\ialified sense
ui-
-1^ Ji^im'^i
lA
><
.C13
i^--
v*m^*S
^ v>
,^Li.
-363-
Therefore, no attributes can be demonstrated nor Imovm by strictly scl9ntlflc knowledge to inhere in perishable things," And Grosseteste's commentary reads thus: (c) "Aristotle in Chapter 6 demonstrates to us the conclusion of this knowledge, namely this demonstration is a syllogism made up of what inheres per se in a subject. And this conclusion follows from tne conclusion of this knowledge shown above in Chapter 4, namely this demonstration is a syllogism made up of necessary propositions. And this sixth conclusion is explained in this way: every demonstration is a syllogism consisting of wliat is necessary. But each and every (omnia et sola) per se * inherent is necessary. Hence, every demonstration is a syllogism consisting of ' per se inherents." In commento 7 Grosseteste continues: (d) "The ninth conclusion is as follows: It is necessary that the conclusion of a demonstration be absolutely perpetual. But this follows from the seventh conclusion of this book. For it was explained above that demonstration is a syllogism consisting of what is \iniversal. But every universal is perpetual. Hence, demonstration must be a syllogism consisting of vihat is perpetual."
'
'
'
'
38,
Cf, Capreolus, op. cit ., I Sent., d.8, q.l, a,l. Vol, I, p. 303a: "Ex quious patet quod omnis propositio de primo modo dicendi per se, et de secundo est necessaria et perpetTJiae veritatis." The first text (a) in the preceding note is on the plane of the deriionstrative
syllogism and necessary premises, consisting of subjects, and the predicates, which are essential attributes of these subjects or vice versa. The second text (b) adds to the characteristic "necessary", the notes of universality and eternity. Grosseteste in the third text (c) completes the comprehension of the first text (a) by stating that a syllogism consists of propositions, the predicates of which inhere essentially or necessarily (per se) in their subjects since this is the characteristic mark of necessary propositions and because " per se" inherents are themselves necessary. The fourth text (d), again Grosseteste's commentary, reiterates the content of the second text (b) in regard to the universality and perpetuity of demonstr'ative premises. Notice that Capreolus, in lieu of a frontal attack, has come at his foe obliquely; instead of meeting him on the existential level of efficient causality, he meets him on the essential level of " per se " predication. For the objector, in keeping with his rejection of " per se" as signifying the absence of an efficient cause.
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had stated as a corollai'-/ to his stand that the proposition man is man, is false if no man exists. It is this corollary which Capreolus confronts, no doubt taking his cue from the previously cited text of St, Albert, wherein Albert remarks that there is no cause of this man is man, or animal is animal, each of which is true whether man or animal is existing or not, for its truth arises, not from the prior existence of man or animal, but rather from the fact that " illud-quod-est " is said of " illud-quod-est " . However, Capreolus does not refer his opponent back to St. Albert; instead, he bolsters this text with four others from two other authorities, each text of which has to do with necessary, eternal, universal propositions wherein " per se " means "essentially" or "necessarily" (quae autem per se s\int, necessarlo insunt rebus). Explicitly in these four texts there is no mention or Inference to efficient causality or its absence in regard to the essence or the essential attributes,
39.
Capreolus here for the first time, is making a direct and explicit comment, though he does not elaborate at length, before citing more textual authorities. And let us note that this text contains two phases; it continues the oblique attack on the objection and then suddenly shifts to a direct frontal assault. In its first phase, Capreolus draws out the implications which "per se" predication has, as an answer to his opponent. Since the first and second modes of " per se" predication predicate " per se inherent " or essential attributes, on the basis of the foregoing authorities, Capreolus can say such propositions are necessary, i.e. cannot be otherwise then they are, and that they are perpet\ially true. Thus, since in this proposition a rose is a rose, we have an example of the first mode of " per se" predication, we can say that the quiddity of a rose necessarily belongs to the rose. Riglit here, the first phase shifts and blends into the second when Capreolus says that, as for an efficient cause of the quiddity, Grosseteste shows that there is no such thing. Now the frontal attack begins. For, having made his initial asaault on the essential level, he must still co\inter the existential portion of his adversary's argument in regu:'d to efficient causality. Thus, in Capreolus' rebuttal we have the complete reverse of the adversary's approach. With the latter, the essential order of " per se " predication v;as subject to and dependent upon the demands and requirements of the
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existentlal order. Thus, he could say that man Is manj is not true because the existential pre-requlslte for such a proposition and for its truth is lacking, viz., there is no man existing, Capreolus comes the other way around, that is, he begins in the essential order of per se" predication and what he finds there act as pre-requisites for the existential order. Hence, Capreolus can say that since a rose is a rose necessarily, and because it is perpetually true, then these facts demand the conclusion that there is no efficient cause of the essence. In short, he is arguing from essence to existence, i.e. if this Is what essence is then existence must be such and such. His adversary reverses this, for he is saying if this is what existence is then essence can only be such and so. Lest we seen to be
'I
getting out of touch with the overall argumentation, let us reintegrate these last points into what we have seen thus far, before going on to treat the texts of Grosseteste on essence and efficient cause. The whole focus of the argumentation at this point is upon the objection and its consequent rebuttail. Capreolus is clearly accepting the " per se" as used in the text of St. Thomas and echoed by the a seip so" used by St, Albert, as meaning without an el'ricient cause, the very point irtiich the objector refuses to grant. The adversary also refuses to grant that man is man, is true if there is no man existing. Consequently, he rejects the absolute necessity and perpetuity of such " per se" predication in favor of a conditional necessity, as we shall see. This strong negation is met by an equally strong affirmation or Capreolus* part. In order that man be man for the objector, a man miist first exist, i.e. that man be man, an efficient cause is demanded^ just as one is reqviired in order that man be. For Capreolus also, in order that man be, an efficient cause is needed but that man be man or that a rose be a rose, does not necessitate an exercise of such causality. In this latter case each is what it is aind thus eternally true, for there is no efficient cause of the necessity nor of this eternal truth. In short, for Capreolus, " per se" has a positive and negative aspect; positively Iz denotes the characteristics of necessity and perpetuity or eternity i negatively it designates the absence of any relation to an efficient cause, Capreolus cites first a text from Grosseteste 's commentary wherein on the first book of the "Posterior Analytics" he distinguishes the modes of perselty as follows: (a) "What I call per se * excludes a co-participating
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(compartlclpem) cause." A little later,he adds: (b) "But something is per se * of somethine else (de altero) and one thing Is said per se * of another when the quiddity of the one essentially, and not accidentally derives or proceeds (egreditur) from the quiddity of the other. But that whose quiddity essentially, and not accidentally, derives or proceeds (egreditur) from the quiddity of another, has its esse * from that vrtience it derives or proceeds, as from an efficient, or material, or formal or final cause. But that whence esse* is had must be received in the definition which says ^ quid est or ' quid est esse Therefore, one thing is said * per se * of another when one receives the other in its definition." In commento 7, he states: (c) "The seventh conclusion of this book is as follows: the first inheres in the middle Inheres in the third on account of the first (propter ipsura). And it follows immediately from this: demonstration is a syllogism consisting of * per se inherents. The meaning of the seventh conclusion is as follows: the major extremity of the demonstrative syllogism inheres In the middle term, and the middle term inheres in the minor extremity, so that in each proposition, the subject is the precise (praecisa) cause of the predicate or e converso * . And by precise (praecisa) cause I understand what is not dimlrlshed, just as figure is the diminished cause of the condition or state (habitus) or three right anjes equal to two right amgles. Nor is It something which has in Itself a condition which is not a cause, just as isosceles has in Itself a condition which is not a cause in respect to the condition of three angles equal to two right angles. And this pronoim * lpsum * notes this precision of the cause ivhen it is said: the first, inheres in the middle ' propter Ipsum * And this pronoxin ipsian' is referred to this word or expression(dictlonera) ' the first is cause of the prlmum * when it is said middle; and to this expression medium * when it is said the middle is cause of the first; and similarly the middle is in the third on account when it is said of Itself (propter ipsiun)." Let us not forget that in these texts Capreolus finds Grosseteste saying tliat there is no efficient cause of the essence (quod etlan quidditas rosae non conveniat ipsi rosae per aliquam causam agentem extrinsecara, ita quod aliquam efficients sit causa q<Aod rosa sit rosa, ostendit Llnconlensis )
' ' ' ' * * . *
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The first text (a) is another example of a surface neutrality, doctrlnally speaking, which was mentioned in regard to the text cited from St. Tliomas. It merely states that " per se signifies the exclusion of a co-participating (comparticipan) cause, and no more nor no less. Just what this means in itself is by no means clear. However, when one goes to the context in Grosseteste himself, it is clear what has happened. Capreolus has cited the first sentence of Grosseteste 's coimnentary, suppressed a section of it with the words " Et allqulbus interpositis subdlt . . " and picked up the same text aigain farther on. The suppressed section reads as follows: "But that is said to be * per se which is not effected by an efficient cause {per efficientera causam non est) and thus only the first cause in ' per se . Secondly, that is said ' per se ' which is not effected by a material cause, and thus the intelligences are called ' per se * beings or ' per se * substances (stantes). That, too xs called per se^ which is caused by no subject and thus each and every substance is said to be ' per se . ..." Cf. In Aristotelis Post. Anal . Bk. I, Ch. 4, fol. Wa. Now at least we can see wiiat the text means. For it is time that " per se" does denote the exclusion of a co-participating cause and it is true that that " cogq>artlcipem causam" is in this case, an efficient cause >o per se" does signify the exclusion of an efficient cause but, and here is the rub, it has meaning only in regard to the first cause, and does not apply to the creature, nor to the essence of the creatvire. Capreolus, to make his point, iias tailored his texts to fit his solution, since, in siting the short text he did, he wished to have Gi*os3eteste say that there is no efficient cause of the essence. Note, however, that the deleted section is quoted in full when Capreolus replies to the first objection of Henry of Ghent. Cf . Defensiones Theologiae , I, d,3, q.l, a. 2, Vol. I, p. 32la. The second text (b) is Just as disconcerting as far as Its intelligibility for Capreolus is concerned, when it is taken, as it is, out of its original context. Grosseteste determines that " per se " denotes an essential relationship between quiddities, such that one quiddity is related to the other quiddity as effect to cause. And the " esse " that this one quiddity has, it has from Its causal source, viz., another essence, as from an efficient, or material, or fonaal or final cause. But the question is, what does this " esse" mean here in the
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context of definition and qnldditative relationships? Has it an existential connotation?, is it the Boethian " esse " denoting the specific essence?, or is " it the Aristotelean quod quid erat esse" ? It seems clear that it is either of the latter two, for the text tells us that what is received in the definition of something else is said " per se" of it. It goes on to say that the source of tnat esse" must be included in the definition of that quiddity since the definition answers the question " quid est" or " quid est esse If one goes again to the text of Grosseteste, he will see that in the large section of the text left out, Grosseteste goes on to talk of genus, difference, and species indicating that this is what he had in mind initially, in the first part of the ieference actually cited by Capreolus, For the text continues: "Hence, since genus or subaltemated difference from vrtiich subaltemately, and not accidentally, the quiddity of the species proceeds, is predicated of the species, it is the fii*st mode of being or predicating per se something of something else, for the species proceeds from the quiddity of the genus and difference, and the difference is the formal cause of the species and the genvis is that cause of the species, as a material form (forma material is) or as formal matter (materia . Cf. Grosseteste, In Aristotle Post. f orraalis ) . . , " Anal . Bk. I, Ch. 4, fol. 4va. Thus, it seems certain that Grosseteste is talking in the formal order or in the order of formal causality. " " For the " esse " in question is a quidditatlve esse as we have seen. But in order not to interpret this in the sense of a formal cause ultimately dependent on an efficient cause, Capreolus must in some way hold that this is an instance of efficient causality and thus self-sufficient to itself. In the third text (c), Grosseteste again mentions " per se" inherence in regard to the major, minor, and middle terms of a demonstrative syllogism. This is explained by the fact that the subject is the "precise" " (praecisa) cause of the predicate or e converso ", a qualification which would seem to denote the proper ca\ise of the quauLity of possessing three angles eqiial to two right auigles, i.e. it is triangle leather than figure which is the precise, proper cause or adequate explanation. As we shall see, Capreolus holds that by " praecisa causa" , Grosseteste means an efficient cause
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40.
On Abelard and the " Roses ", Cf. Beit rage. Band xxi. Heft I, pp. 1-32. Cr. also St. Anselm, De Veritate, 13; PL 153 j 485b.
Note that Instead of a helpful explanatory comment on the above texts mentioned in the notes preceding, Capreolus proceeds to outline a possible twofold refutation of what has gone before: "But to this it vrill be answered on two counts (dupliciter). First, that such propositions in the first and second mode of 'perse' predication ajce not necessary" except conditionallyj in as much as this is necessary man is an animal in this sense, that if man is, man is an cuiimal, but not absolutely. Secondly, it vjill be said that when Grosseteste says that in propositions concerned with ' per se ' predication, the predicate is the precise (praecisa) cause of the subject or 'e converso* , he speaks of formal cuase, not of effTcient cause, 3?or, although man by himjelf is formally animal yet he is not so by himself efficiently. On the contrary in order that man be einimal, an efficient cause is required, just as in order that man exist, a producing cause is required." The objector has developed the implications of his first objection on the plane of predication stating tl'^at essential predication, vrtierein the predicate is included in the essence of the subject or vice-versa, is only conditionally necessary on the condition that the subject exists. In the second point made by the objection an interpretation is given to the last text of Grosseteste cited above. For the objector understands " praecisa causa" to mean formal cause and not efficient cause and thus, though man is animal by himself in the order of formal cause, still he is not so in virtue of himself in the order of efficient cause. That is, the order of formal causality is ultimately dependent on an efficient cause. Just as an efficient cause is demanded if man is to exist. {Cf. J. Paulus, Henri de Gand , p. 309n., "Tous deux (Henry and Siger; enseignent que I'etre cree est ex seipso forraaliter, ex alio efficienter." ). Again let us notice how the objection sets the pattern of Capreolus' reply. Capreolus has to choose the interpretation he wants of these authors is it a conditional necessity that Aristotle and Grosseteste refer to? and does Grosseteste refer to formal cause in his use of " praecisa causa" or does he mean efficient cause? In his reply Capreolus notes that the conclusion of the first attempt to v/eaken his position
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(solutio) Is contrary to an authority in this case, St, Augustine. But before quoting the author, he sets the stage by
contrasting necessary and contingent propositions, with his choice of necessary propositions tending to the mathematical. For, if what the first " solutio" says is true, this proposition two and three are five, or this seven and three are ten, would no more be necessary than this the earth is, or this heaven is, nor would one of them be more immutably true than the other. And such would be the case with the other propositions which are the principles of the sciences, and which are " per se" in the first way. Such a conclusion is contrary to St. Augustine in 2 De LlbexK) Arbltrio , cap. 8 wherein he says: (a) "Whatever I sense bjr the sense of the body, as for example, this heaven and this earth, and whatever other bodies I may sense in them, I still do not know how long it will last. But I Imow that seven and three are ten, and not only now, but always; nor in any way nor at any time in the past have seven and three not been ten, nor will they at any time in the future not be ten. Hence, I have said that this incorruptible is common to me and to any reasoning being." Augustine is also quoted as asking: (b) "V/hence do we perceive that which we perceive to be immobile, stable, incorrupt, in all numbers? For no one attains all numbers by any bodily sense, because they are innumerable. Thus, whence have we known this to be in by v/hat phantasy or by what apparition so all cases certain? Is the truth of number throughout innumerable instances so unerringly (fidenter) grasped except that it is seen in an interior light?" Capreolus here interjects himself to remark that after noting many other propositions which Augustine states wisdom is to to be immutably true, as for example, be so\ight; one must live Justly; the worse is to be subordinated to the better; equals must be compared to equals; things proper to something are attributed to eqvials; the incorrupt is better than the corruptible, the eternal than the temporal, the immobile than the violable; incorruption is to be sought, corruption to be avoided, in Chapter 10, Augustine adds: (c) "I will not now ask more questions of this sort, for it is sufficient that you see as I do and that you concede that it is very certain that these, as it were, rules and ceii;ain lights of virtue are true and immutable and are present in common each or all to be contemplated by those who are able to conceive them each by his own
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reason and mind." And a little later on he continues: (d) "Just as, therefore, there are true and iramutable rules of numbers, the reason and the truth of which you said are present iBsnutably and in common to all who see them, so there are true and immutable nales of wisdom, ^ich, you replied a moment ago when you were questioned concerning a few of them one by one, are time and manifest," The common denominator of the above four texts is precisely the affirmation of the necessity, immutability and eternity of some propositions, with no qxialification stressing that the necessity mentioned as a conditional one, i.e. on the supposition that the subject exists. And this is the very interpretation made by Capreolus himaolf in the form of a three-stage critique of the first refutation: (a) "Whence it is clear that such propositions, formed of niombers are immutably and eternally true. For Augustine in the same book says: nothing is more eternal than the definition (ratio) of the circle and two and three are fi^re. Nor can it be said that he intends that such propositions are necessary suppositionally or conditionally, i.e. when the constancy of the subject of such propositions has been posited. In this case then this would be equally necessary Socrates exists, for I will say that it is conditionally necessary, viz., that if Socrates is, Socrates exists or something of the sort, which is ridiculous," (Note St. Thomas* opinion on this point in De Veritate , q.l,
a, 5, obj. 8, ad. 3). (b) "Likewise it follows (if what the atten5>ted
refutation says is true) that the words of Augustine are more false tlian true. For any of these propositions would have been false strictly speaking (sirapliciter) two and three are five, seven and three are ten although this would always be conditionally true if seven and three are ten, seven aiid three are ten." (c) "Also, it is established that not every specific definition (ratio) of a nioaber is posited in actual existence. Hence the definition of one-hundred may be (sit ergo ilia ratio centenari)." Let us see if we csui diagnose Just what is happening here. The objection had stated that " per se " propositions in the first mode, e.g. man is an animal are necessary on the condition that a man, Socrates, for It does not state that, granted example, first exist. the existence of Socrates, then this proposition " Socrates existit" is necessary in the first mode of predicating per"se ". Hence, Capreolus " reductio ad absurdum" on thfe point does not do Justice to his
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adversary's position. And also it is not clear that he is meeting his adversary's argument when he counters with examples of mathematical propositions to prove his point about necessary and limnutable propositions. It is true that Aiigustine says nothing about a conditional necessity in their regard but the adversary has never said that raathematical propositions are conditionally necessary such as Capreolus interprets (si septum et tria sunt J septen et tria sunt decern). Capreolus also infers from his adversaiy's position that not every specific definition (ratio) of a number actually exists. So on the supposition that the definition of one-hundred does not actually exist Capreolus counterattacks as follows: "If such is the case (sit ergo ilia ratio centenarii. Tunc arguo) this proposition onehundred is ton times ten (centum sunt decern denarii) is not true pioperly speaking (proprie) unless onehundred (centerarius) exists in act, according to that refutation. But one-himdred (centenarius) on the basis of the above-mentioned supposition (ex supposlto) does not exist. Hence, that proposition (centum svmt decern denarii) is not true. And this is versus what St, Augustine says, najnely, that it is at one time and at another time is not; but one-h\indred is always ten times ten. Thus, it is evident, that that refutation is flighty (non est nisi fuga). And for this reason, I reiterate that man always is man and this is immutably time man is a rational animal, and its truth is eternally in the divine intellect, as St. Thomas holds, in I S.Th. q.lO a. 3 ad. 3 and in De Veritate q.l a. 5 ad. 7."
42.
This last sentence is the key to Capreolus' whole position. For what has he done but trai^slated the whole argument of his adversary into the domain of uncreated truth where he cannot lose. For if truth is eternal anywhere, it is surely so in the eternal intellect of Ctod. But again we must ask if the adversary's position has been justly handled. The correct interpretation of the adversary's point must conclude that he Is not talking in the order of uncreated truths, as they exist in the divine intellect, rather his point is made on the level of created truth since the v/hole point of all argumentation thus far has been to show that " nulla creatura subsistens est suum esse quo actu exsistlt in rerum natura" and let us not lose sight of it. Thus, we at least began on the created level of reality and lo and behold we fiiid ourselves exploring the divine intellect. The objector has remained on the created or
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exlBtential " level by reason of his insistant demand that in order that man be man, man must first be (Unde, aleut ante mundi creationen homo non exsistebat, Ita nee erat homo: et ista erat falsa: homo est homo); and he is on the created level when he remarks that man by himself is formally animal yet he is not so by himself efficiently, for this intrinsic fox^aal cause is created, i.e. comes to be by an extrinsic efficient agent. But Capreolus, denying as he does an efficient cause of the essence, can only posit essential propositions and their truth in the divine intellect, if they are to be eternal, iiBBiutable and necessary. He has io end in the divine intellect because he can end no where else, havinc cut himself off from any created essential order. Let us see if the texts cited by Capreolus bear out this contention. Capreolus has sent us to St, Thomas in two different places (a) I S.Th., q.lO, a. 3, ad. 3, and (b) De Veritate, q.l, a. 5, ad. 7. Let us begin with the position that St. Thomas is answering in ad. 3. It reads thus: (a) "Everything necessary is eternal. But many things are necessau?y as all principles of demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Hence not only God is eternal." St, Thomas replies: "It must be said that 'necessary* signifies a certain mode of truth. But the true according to Aristotle VI Metaph., is * in intellectu Thus, according to this, true and necessazy propositions or principles are eternal because they are in an eternal intellect which is the divine intellect alone. Whence it does not follow that something outside God is eternal." The second text (b) reiterates the same point, asserting that only the first truth is eternal, or in other words, that eternal truth exists only in am eternal intellect. And this is exactly what Capreolus wants to say.
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43.
In Capreolus' mind this concurs with the texts of St. he has just cited (cui concordat Albei*tus in Post praedicamentis, 9 cap.). It will be interesting to see what Albert has to contribute this time: "According to Avicenna, Algazel, Alfarabi and truth, when the predicate is conceived in the definition of the subject, such a proposition is ti*ue whether the thing exists or does not exist. For whether man is, and animal is, or man is not, nor animal is, this is man is an animal amd animal is a always true a living thing is a substance, hence living being man is a substance. But if the inference is drawn out substance is being, hence man is a being further
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they say It does not follow because ' ens ' or to be beings' happens (accldlt) to man and "SiTmal and is not essentially contained in their definition. For when it is said man is an animal, the essential (substantialis) ordination of predicate to subject suffices for the truth of the proposition. But when it is added animal is bein<^ (ens), there is no essential (substantialis) ordination of one to the other because ' ens ' is not of the definition of animal or of man. And for this reason if man is being (ens) or if animal is being (ens), it is necessary that they be being in act, and this is contrary to the hypothesis, for we have posited that man docs not exist. But the ordinability of things into predicate and subject belongs to things existing and to things non-existent, provided that it is not impossible for them to exist. And, hence, b^re the world this proposition (man is an animal) has been true in the very ordinability of things, and if it is asked where this ordinability of things has been present, when there were no things, the answer mast be that it has been present in the very definitions of things. But if further, the same question is asked of these definitions, one must say that they have been in the wisdom of the one creating and ordering. But if it is inferred further that in the wisdom of the first intellect they have been as one, and not as related (ordinata) one to the other, it must be said that a thing, in the wisdom of the first cause can be viewed from two different standpoints, viz., as a thing considered and to be prodviced (ut res considerates et producendae) or as the conception (intellectus) by which they are understood. In the first way, to be sure, they are possibles in relation to plurality and order (possibiles ad pluralitatem et ordinera), not, to be sure, in the very act of the one ordering (in actu ordinantis) but because this first consideration looks at them as ordinable. In this way it is possible that truth be applied to them (esse de ipsis) and they are enunciations in potency to truth (entmtiabiles ad veritaten) although an enuntiable has never been uttered (fiat) and as enuntiables they reduce themselves to the thing itself (et sic enuntiabile ad rem reducent). Thus, too, a proposition can be from eternity and yet there be only one reality in act from eternity. And if it is asked whether such (a thing in the wisdom of the first cause) is created or uncreated, the smswer must be given that it is creatable, not created, according to the order of things; and this, though it is the Creator, still
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is not creatable nor created. But if v/hat are in the intellect of the one creating are taicen as conceptions, (ut intellectus) since the Creator does not imderstand except by Hinself, then it is true that things (res) in the Creator are there after the fasliion of the Creator and are neither one nor many, neither ordinated nor inordinated, but they are the same as Himself. And this is the doctrine of Avicenna, which is in agreement with Porphyry vhen the latter says that though no species of animal exists, an animated sensible substance can be imderstood. And it is definite (constat) that he does not spesdc of the conception (intellectu) of the knower because he would say nothing since if thei*e is no species of animal he will be understanding nothing. But he speaks of the understanding of the intelligible object since according to the order of natur-e, while no species of animal exists, still, in as much as it is in itself, it remains intellectually an animated sensible substsuice." Cf. J, Paul us, Henri de Gand , p. Ill for the doctrinal tradition behind this text with inspect to Henry of Ghent 44.
Note this same text appears again in Capreolus in the context of creation. Cf. In II Sent., d.l, q.2. Vol. Ill, p. 74b-75a; and note that these t\K> texts read differently in sections. Cf . Analysis in J. Paulus, Henri de Gand , p. Ill et seq. Cf . also M. Grabmann, Acta Hebdomadae Thomisticae , (Rome, 1924), p. 143 for a similar interpretation of Avicenna and Algazel. In the absence of amy immediate comment by Capreolus, we must ourselves comment on this commentary of St. Albert \^03e subject matter is very reminiscent of his other quotation and on some point supplements it. First to be noted is the fact that St. Albert reiterates what man Capreolus has been stressing before, viz., that is an animal, is a true proposition even if no man man exists nor any animal exists. But one cannot say is a being (ens), for ens is not included in the definition of the subject rather, being is what happens to it (accidit). In the one case there is an essential relationship between the subject suid predicate, in the other case there is no such an oixiination. And, again in keeping with the point that Capreolus has made before, Albert maintains that this truth and ordinability ultimately exists in the divine intellect. Thus, we again are exploring the divine intellect and following the divine gaze we see the divine ideas as interrelated possibles in the one case and as the very Creator
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Hlmself , -when considered in another way. Here is the basis for Capreolus* assertion of the truth imrautability, necessity and eternity of certain propositions, because the ordinability of the divine ideas, one to the other, ^pounds the truth of such a proposition as man is an Ihimal. Note M.D. Roland-Gosselin, O.P., op. cit ., p. 15^ where he remsirks on the doctrine of Avicenna; Supposons par consequent 1 'existence de l'\me de substances. II y a quelque chose en elle qui est delle-m$rae (a savoir sa nature) et quelque chose en elle qui n'est pas d'elle-ra#me,mais qui lui vient de letre n^cessaire {k savoir I'esse).
45.
Without comment Capreolus adds more weight of authority to his point by complementing this lengthy text of St, Albert with a pertinent quotation from St. Augustine and an equally pertinent comment on it by St. Thomas himself. For Augustine in " 4 Super Genesim ad lltteram cap. 7" states: (a) "It is easier for heaven and earth which have been made according to the number six, to pass away than that it come to pass that the number six be lacking its parts. Wherefore we cannot say that the reason the member six is perfect, is because God completed his work in six days, but rather the x*eason God finished his work on the sixth day is because six is a perfect number. Hence, if these works never existed, that rnanber would still be perfect, but \mless it were a perfect niunber these works would never have become perfect according to it." Capreolus then couples St. Thomas' coraotentary on this in Quodlibet 8 (a.l, art,, ad. 3) wherein he comments that: "Augustine's intention is not to say that if heaven and earth pass away and the rest of creatures also, that the number six will remain in some state of created existence. Rather, he is saying that if all creatures cease to be, such, as the nature of the number six is, will remain so that perfection belongs to it as it abstracts from any esse ' of this sort, i.e. created, which this number may possess (remanebit adhuc talis natura senarii, prout abstrahit a quolibet esse hujus, quod ei jjerfectio competat:) jtist as human nature will remain such that rationality will belong
'
to it." Note that Capreolus uses this again in the context of creation though it reads somewhat differently. Cf In II Sent., d.l, q.2. Vol. 3> P. 74b. In Capreolus' estimation, this whole article is noteworthy because it contains many remarks appropos of the point at issue. Again Capreolus has transported his reader to the
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no
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oc
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-377-
uncreated level, for Augustine is saying that the nvuaber six is perfecr though no creatures exist, or as St. Thomas remarks, Augustine does not say tliat the number six will remain in some state of created existence. Rather, it is the absolute consideration of the number six as it abstracts from existence in things and from existence in an intellect but such that it is considered without the universality consequent upon its existence in an intellect. And this Intellect can only be the divine intellect if the number six is to have the notes of eternity, immutability and necessity which Capreolus >^as emphasized heretofore, (Cf. C3rard Smith, S.J., Natural Theology, pp. 42-45, and Cf. Capreolus In II Sent., d.l, q.27 p. 73a). Without delay, Capreolus returns to his adversary, again talces up the cudgels and again says that the first attempt at a refutation is flighty argument (fuga). He remarks as follows: "Hence it is thus clear that the first refutation is but a flighty argument (prima responsio non est nisi fuga) when it says that this a rose is a rose, is as contingent as this a rose exists. And this results because there is no distinction made betv/een the 'est* as it is a second adjacent and as it is a third adjacent . In the first way, it signifies the actual existence of the subject. Such is not the case in the second way where the 'est' signifies the truth of subject and predicate. And this is obvious for sometimes some copula is true as affirmative of Inherence (inesse), in v/hich the same thing is predicated of itself and yet the subject is not existing in reality, nor on the contrary is it a substance (sdiquid). The this is true, negation is negation; proof is this privation is privation, non-being is non-being. And this is clear for it vrould seem that this is more to blindness is being, than this blindness be denied is blindness. But. the first of these (blindness is being) is conceded in 4 Metaph., 2nd particle where Aristotle says that, 'Somethings are called beings because they axe substances and others, because they are attributes and some are accidents and still others are ways to substance or to relation, either because they are non-being or because they deny one of the accidents of substance', on which the commentator, Averroes, coramento 2, comments, 'Even a privation of being is called being' . Later, he continues, 'Being is said to be l11 that which exists in a substance, and this is common to the other predicaments, for in some way being is said of all of them as it is even said of affirmation and negation because this name (nomen) esse * is said of first and second intentions (intellect is) which are logical realitiee. ."
'
'
a n
no.
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At the outset let us note that adversary has never said that this proposition a rose is a rose, is as contingent as this a rose is. Rather, he lias insisted that this proposition a rose is a rose, is true and necessary only if and when a rose exists. Since Capreolus understands the objector to say that there is an efficient cause of the essence as well as an efficient cause of " esse " he cannot help but think that the objector has reduced the necessary essential order to the contingent existential order. For what comes to be can also not be and what then of science, necessity, \iniversality and truth? This is what is haunting Capreolus, especially since he himself is talking on the level of uncreated truth and has failed to realize that his adversary s point is made on the level of created truth. But still failing to see his adversary's point, Capreolus continues his monologue by noting that his adversary has failed to note the important distinction of " est" as it is a second adjacent, e.g. man is, and " est" as it is a third adjacent, e.g. man is an suiimal. The one notes actual existence, the other denotes the truth of subject and. predicate. Capreolus now takes his reader out of the existential order of contingency and proceeds to talk of the second, non-existential use of the copula, for here the same thing can be predicated of itself and yet the subject is not existing, e.g. negation is negation, privation is privation, nor is the subject a substance. Clearly, we are in the domain of logic, which is by no means the divine intellect as previously, but herein also lies Capreolus* solution, for if he can show that something can be predicated of a non-existent subject, he feels his case is made. And he does Just that, for
both Aristotle and Averroes agree that even a privation of being is called being, e.g. blindness is being. Again the adversary makes his point in the existential order, in this sense that once man exists man is an animal, is a true proposition and again Capreolus answers from the non-existential order this time of logic. And again, never the twain shall meet. That this is Capreolus* point and, that he thinks he has made his point, is clear fr"om his very brief comment following after the above citations, for he says: "Hence it is clear that of that which is nothing in reality, something is predicated, viz., being (ens). So all the moreso is the same thing predicated of itself whether it is existing or not." Thus, to completely rout his opponent, Capreolus adds one more authority to his already long list. So, by
lo
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way of corroboration cf his point Just made, he cites the team of Aristotle and Averroes again; "Whence in 7 Metaph^ 3ics, c,39* Aristotle says that to ask why man is man is to ask nothing, by what cause whereupon the Commentator remarks: To ask the question per a\;iare * of one s.Lraple being (in xina re) is imjpossible; e.g. it is impossible that an^,^one ask why man is man unless one says because all are simple, and because each of them is a self-sufficient unit (unum per se) and because a unit is not divided into predicate and subject, is by what cause and thus the question per quare asked of them even though the essence of unity is indivisible. Thus, in that place Aristotle says: To the question why man is man smd why a musician is a musician the answer (seiroo) in these things and the because cause is one in all cases, unless one says each thing is inseparable from itself, and its being one Just meant this; but this is common to all things and is said of all." What is Aristotle doing here? He is clarifying the circumstances surro\inding the question "why , i.e. when And the "why" is a valid and meaningful question. question "why" is meaningful when the fact or existence of something is already evident. But in this case what is evident is that man is man and so it is meaningless to ask why man is man since that is already the evident fact. Yet, to be sure, some answer can be given to this question if one wishes, as Averroes and Aristotle each indicate. But the cause that Aristotle seeks is the formal cause as he says further on in the same text: "Therefore what we seek is the cause, i.e. the form." In view of this, it is not hard to see what is going on in the mind of Capreolus. For him, Aristotle is denying that there is an efficient cause of the essence since Capreolus understands the "why" as a search for an efficient cause, for to ask why a thing is what it is, is meciningless. Or if an answer is given to this because it is not divided into question, one can say subject and predicate, and thus it is inseparable from or as Capreolus itself. In short, it is what it is himself says in one of his short commentaries: "These remarks make it clear that according to him (secundum exm. - Aristotle) there is no other cause vrtiy man is man because subject and predicate except this common reason are undivided and the subject is one and the same as the predicate." So, we have the essence explained by itself since it is predicate relationship what it is, and any subject the predicated of it is an essential rdationship
'
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'
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i'
-380-
essence of the subject is the same as the essence of the predicate as in the first two modes of " per se" predication and whose eternal truth resides in the divine intellect,
h6, 47,
The objector had interpreted Grosseteste to mean formal cause in his use of " praecisa causa" , i.e. that the predicate is the formal cause of the subject. And he will grant that man is an animal in virtue of himself in the formal order or in the order of formal causality, but man is not an animal by himself in the sense that he is the efficient cause of this. Rather, what is independent, self-explanatory and intrinsic to the thing on the level of a created formal order is subordinated to an extrinsic agent which is its ultimate explanation, since it is a creature. So, this extrinsic agent is the efficient cause that man is an animal. And thus the essence as well as the " esse" is created. To Capreolus, this is a fallacious argument for if this efficient cause is required over and above a formal cause, it (the efficient cause) effects something after it already is and thus such a thing is its effect and is not its effect. Capreolus understands the objection to say that man is an animal, is the fact, i.e. that this is what already is and somehow this has escaped any form of efficient causality, yet nonetheless is and is a fact. Now, for an efficient cause to cause what already is, i.e. the fact that man is an animal, is for it to cause what already is an obvious absurdity. So Capreolus can say that such a fact is and is not its effect. What Capreolus has failed to see is that his opponent is arguing on two levels of cause, one of which is subordinated to the other. So, he will grant his opponent that man is an animal, yet Capreolus holding as he does that there is something in reality irreducible to an efficient cause and thus uncreated, will look upon this statement of his adversary as an affirmation of this very irreducible uncreated element. Thus, he colors his adversary's position with his own view. And seeing his adversary in this light and yet hearing him still talk of the relation of this irreducible, uncreated element to an efficient cause Hence, it is understandable is too much for Capreolus. how he can say that his adversary is saying that a cause is causing something that already is and thus what is its effect is not its effect since the predicate still belongs to its subject though the cause has not
-381-
acted and the subject does not exist. To the last Capreolus has consistently misread his adversary's position. In each and every case^ he answers in tez^s of vrt:iat is uncreated, i.e. essence or the divine ideas, inspite of the fact that his opponent is talking in terms of what is created. And how could we expect it otherwise since he is metaphysically blinded, by reason of a prior metaphysical commitment, to any such thing as a created essential order or an order of intrinsic formal causality. How else explain his recourse to the divine intellect and the ideas there? This is the uncreated order, reducible to no efficient cause, which proves Capreolus' point. That man be identical to man, and immutably so, arises from the very divine idea of man. Just as that same idea immutably contains the definition (ratio) of animal. But for a cause to effect that animal belong to man as the objector would have it, is tantamount in Capreolus' eyes to saying that something is an efficient cause of the divine ideas. Yet, for Capreolus, this cannot be done by any creature nor even by God Himself. Hence, what else can Capreolus " conclude but that man is an animal per se" , in the sense that man is an animal by no extrinsic cause (Et sic patet quod sic per se homo est animal quod per nullara causam extrinsecam efficlentem homo est animal). Who would dare say that there is an efficient cause of the divine ideas? To be sure, this position on the Are they divine ideas is open to many questions somehow distinct from God by more than a distinction of reason and is there somehow an ideal priority in relation to God's knowledge? Could it be that he is succumbing to an Avicenna christianized by a Henry of Ghent for as we shall see, Henry of Ghent is present to the thought of Capreolus. To be sure, these questions are outside the scope of this dissertation but offer a fertile field for future investigations. Indeed, Capreolus is following in the footsteps of Avicenna and Henry of Ghent in making the essences of creatures in the divine intellect to be the divine ideas. Cf. J. Paulus, Henri de Gand , p. 91* n.l.
48.
This problem of the creation of the divine ideas is an Cf . J. Paulus, old one, harking back to Scotus Erigena Henri de Gand , p. 107 .et seq., esp. p. 108, n.4. Cf. also A. Combes, Un inedit de saint Anselme? , (Paris: Vrin, 1944), esp. p. 320-321* n.2 v/here the author cites a text of Suarez which we shall have occasion to analyze. Cf. also E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages , pp. 117-119.
r.s
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49.
Let us note however this very interesting text from Quaestiones Disputatae De Esse et Essentia j (Venice, 1303}, q.9, i"ol. 20ra; "Quodlibet ergo ens creatura et est ens per essentiam et ens per participationera, nee potest dici quod sit ens per partlcipationera effective tantura. Sed oportet quod formallter dicatur ens participative quod patet, utrumque eniin verum est fonnaliter quod ens creatxiin est ens per essentiam et ens per participationem." Herein Giles seems to explicitly deny that the essence of a creature does not have an efficient cause, i.e. that by its essence also a creature is " ens pe r art Ic ipat ionem" . But note the Interesting remarks on fhe fainous example of the "rose" as the text continues. In addition, the text cited by E. Hocedez, Theoremata De Esse et Essentia , (Louvain, 1930), Introd., p. {bl), from Giles of Rome, Quaest. disp. q.l2, fol. 27v , offers an interesting parallel with dapreolus' position and Suarez' critique in D.M., 31, II.
Giles**
50.
51.
31,
II, #1.
Cf. Capreolus op. git .. In II Sent., d.l, q.2. Ad Argumenta Aureoli Contra Quartara Conclusionem, Vol. Ill, Let us note that these two contexts, that of p. 76a.
creation and that of the distinction between essence and existence are really one, for Capreolus, like the two sides of the same coin, as even the very citations will attest, for Capreolus uses a nuiaber of the same texts in each context.
52.
That this text should quote the Liber de Causis in defense of its position offers an interesting parallel with Capreolus citation of St. Albert's commentary on this same work. In each case the doctrine of an uncreated essence is concluded. Also, it is interesting that this argument finds its proper context in the Cf . G. Smith, S.J,, NS, world of Avicennian thoiiglit Vol. 17, 19^3, pp. 3^0-357 esp. p. 3^, and B. Zedler, "St. Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De Potent ia Dei'", Traditio, VI, (19^8), pp. 105-159.
53.
Cf. Henry of Ghent, I QuodlilDet, q.9, fol. 6v-7r; "Et est hie distinguendum de esse secundum quod distinguit Avicenna in quinto in fine Hetaphysicae suae, quod quoddam est esse rei quod habet essentialiter de se quod appellatur esse essentiae: quoddam vero quod recipit ab alio quod appellatur esse actualis
.s^
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existentlae. Priraum esse habet essentia creaturae essentiallter, secvindura tanttim participative inquantum habet formale exemplar in Deo. Et per hoc cadit sub ente quod est commune essentiale ad decern praedicamente quod a tall esse in comrnunl accept inponltur. Et est illud esse rel deflnitivum quod de ipsa ante esse actuale solum habet existere in mentis conceptus de quo dlcltur quod dlfinltlo est oratio Indlcans quid est esse. Secundum esse non habet creatura ex sua essentia sed a Deo inquantiun est effectus voluntatis divinae juxta exemplar ejus In raente divina. Unde quia istud esse non habet ex sua essentia sed quadam extrinseca participatlone, Ideo illud esse modum accidentis habet quasi superv-eniens essentlae. Propter quod commentator super quinto Metaphysicae expcnens differentiae utriusque esse, dicit quod quaestio de esse uno modo ad praedicatura de accidente." Cf. J. Paulus, Henri de Oemd , pp. 293-295, and especially his enligiitening chapter otPthe Possibles pp. 32-103. On the basis of Capreolus* liaison with Henry of Ghent, one may well ask, if In holding the real distinction as he does, should not Capreolus, in Justice to the data of the problem, conclude to the intentional distinction of Henry? That he is not far from this position is manifest. Thus, it would be a fruitful field of investigation to see how Capreolus can avoid such a conclusion. It is interesting to note the remarks of M. Gratrnann in Acta Hebdomadae Thomlsticae , (Rome, 1924), p. 150 on this very difficulty of the possible intrusion of Henry of Ghent into the Thomistic tradition on essence and " esse " and their distinction, for he says: "Prustra a nonnullis philosophis, qui S. Thomam in sensu distinct ionis virtualis interpretatur (sic). Scholia SToramara Contra Gentiles , quae ab Uccelli sub nomine Godofredi edita sunt, allegantur. Quod in Scholio ad.l II, C.54, de distinctione essentiae et existentlae notatur, nihil aliud est qioan sententia Henrici de Gandavo. Svifficit hanc unicam propositiones afferre; Ideo oportet quod alia sit ratio esse et essentiae in creatura, ut dicitur essentia inquantum est natura quaedam alicujus pradicati absolute non implicans esse vel non esse, esse vero, inquantum est effectus Creatoris, ab eo ipso illud participans in effectu, ut sic ipsa creatura, inquantum est effectus Creatoris, habeat esse a sua essentia formal iter, sed a Iteo effective quia esse est actus ejus..' For a historical witness to this text of Henry of Ghent and its possible relation with St. Albert, one may consult Dionysius the Carthusian, In I Sent., d.8, q.T j
hlU
at;
vLLi
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9^
"
-384-
also Johannes Theutonikus makes use of a similar argxment: "Ad id vero, quod praeterea objicitur, dicendxim, quod essentia est esse possibile et ideo non exist it, inqusmtvmi essentia abstracte sed ut est effectus creationis. Non est autem effectus creationis ut essentia, quia sic non habet causam effectlvam sed soliom exemplarera." Cf, M. Grabmann, "Die lehre des Johannes Theutonikus 0. Pr. uber den unterscheid von wesenhsit und dasein", JPST, 17, (1903), P. 50-51 I have changed Grabmann 's reading of extra rem" , an obvious misreading, to read " exemplar em* . In addition to this explicit influence of Henry of Ghent, there is a possible presence of Meister Eckhart to the thought of Capreolus on the very point that " esse" is " ab alio" and essence is " non ab alio" and consequently really distinct. For one of the propositions which Meister Eckhart has to explain before his inquisitors in 1326 is the following: "Isti sunt articuli de quodam libro extract i magistrl Ekardi videlicet de scripto quod fecit super Genesim... #11. Item, in omni create aliud est esse et ab alio, aliud essentia et non ab alio." Cf A. Daniels, Beitrage, t. XXIII fasc. 5, P. 2? and p. 30. Meister Eckhart *s defense is as follows and very reminiscent of Capreolus' presentation, even to the quotation of the familiar texts of Avicenna and St. Albert: "Ad undecimum cian dicitur: in omni create aliud est esse ab alio, aliud essentia et non ab alio, dlcendum quod hoc verum est et est verbura Avicennae (Metaphysica, tract. 5, cap. l) et Alberti in De Causis (De Causis, trac. 1, cap. o. Opera Omnia 10, 377, Borgnet), Et ratio et necessitas veritatis est turn quia cum dicitur li enim 'est' non 'homo est animal' non praedico esse est tertiura adjacens copula praedicati est praedicatum sed non dicens existentiam sed solam inherentiam praedicati, tiam quod est animal, cvaa subjecto, quod est homo sit, causam habet, ab alio est, etlara quia quod homo a deo scilicet, primo esse; quod autera homo sit animal, a nullo est, nam quocvimque alio nolente aut non faciente haec est vera 'homo est animal', etiam homine non
p. 401 -4o8,
'
Ibid ., p.'ll. Cf. M. Chossat, AP, Vol. IX, p. 159. Note also Suarez, D.M., 25, II, #7 where he says that Henricus in Quodlib. 9, q.2 does not thinlc that the exemplar is reduced to the genus of intrinsic formal " cause, but to be per se" and directly a new genus of extrinsic formal cause.... "Ergo si exemplar est causa fomalis extrinseca, tam constitult novum genus causae sicut forma ef f iciens Cf. #8 for iuarez' own view.
.
-385-
54.
The extent of the Influence which Capreolus and his " Defensiones Theologiae. . ." have had may be gathered from the remarks of M. Grabiaann, DTF, 19^4, pp. 145-170. For a comparison between Avicenna and St. Thomas on their respective doctrines of the distinction between essence and " esse ", see M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, "De distinctione inter essentiam et esse apud Avlcennam et D. Thomara", Xenia Thomistica , III, (1925), 231-288.
Cf. Paul Wyser, O.P., Per Thomismus , Vol. 15/16 of Bibliographische Einftlhrungen in das Studium der Philosophie, ed.j I.M, Bochenski, (21 Vol; Vemj A. Francks A.G. Verlag 1943-1930), p. 23 #33.191 where one will find the references to QE I, o79 and H II, 997 helpful. Cf. also DTC, II, 387 and A. Krempel, La doctrine de la relation chez saint Thoinas, (Paris:
55.
Cf . Paulus Barbus Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales , (Venetiis, 1498), Bk. 4, q.l2, fol. b3 ra: "Secunda conclusio. Esse in omnibus citra primam causam est intitas secundum rem distinctajn ab essentia."
Ibid ., fol. B^ rb. It is noteworthy how this compares to the fifth argument of St, Thomas In II C.G., cap. 52 " and to Capreolus' interpretation of per se " to mean without an efficient cause.
57.
58.
59.
aa
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predicate, because by a negation of the definition the defined Is removed. Secondly, it is argued that that which belongs to being and non-being does not iiave an efficient cause since non-being does not have a cause. But the requirements (ratio) of such a necessity belongs equally to being and non-being. For this non being is non-being, is as man is an animal." Op. clt .> necessaiy as this fol. iP va. Cf. Capreolus, op. cit ., I Sent., d.o, q.l. Vol. I, p. 303a for an argument almost identical to the second one laid down by Sonoinas.
60.
Cf, also Capreolus, Cf. Soncinas, op. cit. , fol. B^ va. op. cit ., I Sent., d.3, q.l. Vol. I, p. 305b. Cf. P. Wyser, O.P., Per Thomismus , p. 28. Note especially the article by iV.. j. Congar in RT 39, 193^-35
61.
Cf. Cajetan, Commentarla in De Ente et Essentia D. Thomae Aqulnatis , edit., Laurent, cap. V, p. i;?b, #1 00 Note the remarks of Z, Gllson on this text and what follows in, "Cajetan et 1 existence", Tijdachrift Voor Philosophie, (2 June 1953), P. 2o8, n.l.
63.
Cajetan, ibid., p. 157. Let u:i say tiiat this text seems to lend volume to E. Gilson's extended query If (Cf. previous note) into Cajetan's "Tliomisticity" . this is what Cajetaui holds, can he have understood St. Thomas?
Cf. I Sent., d.8, q.l. Vol. I, p. 301 where these authorities are cited and p. 304 where the citation " from St. Albert refers to Avicennam, et Algazelem', et Alpharabum et veritatem" .
64.
65.
What, in effect, Cajetan is maintaining is that Plato is In some way holding for a real distinction. To be sure, the argument as stated by Cajetan could justly be called Platonic by reason of its emphasis on the necessary as opposed to the contingent, but just what text of Plato Cajetan may have in mind is not clear. Could it be that he regards Plato's position much the same as Michael de Palacios In I Sent., d.8, disput.2 , fol, 80rb? "Plato igitur quem denarrat disclpulus suus Arist. 7 Meta. text com. 5 essentias rerum tradidit esse idaeas, abstractas ve forraas ab individius, Juxta cujus placitura pervia est nostra quaestio, essentiara esse re diversam a rebus. Etenim idaea hominis non erat
bi
&ao
'-.;^,
..1
i:.
-387-
Petrus, vel Paulus^ at potlus Istl homlnura essentiam partlcipabant, et illius participlo fruebantur individua."
56.
Cf, Paul Wyser, O.P., Der Thomlsmus, p. 31 where reference is had to QE II, 59f and H II, 1212f . Cf . also DTC, 14, 2083-2087; A. Krempel, op. cit ., p. 35-36 as well as Summa Contra Gsntlles , edit. Leonine p. XLI. Note that here also we can expect to find a man obviously acquainted with the thought of Capreolus for at the conclusion of his commentary on the position of St. Thomas in II C.G, cap. 52, he tells us: Alia quae circa hanc conclusionera difficultatem faciunt, vide in Capreolo, vili distinctione I Sent; et in aliis Thomlstis." We shall see that included among " aliis Thomistis" are at least Soncinas
and Cajetan.
67. Cf. In SiMPna Conti^ Gentiles , edit. Leonine, (Rome, 1930), Tome 13, p. 3y9a, V. For anyone who may think that all of this discussion about the perseity of essence smd its lack of an efficient cause is pure mental archaeology, treating philosophical opinions long since dead and gone, never to be revived, let him consult J, Bittremieux, DTP, 1929, pp. 403-405 for his interesting exegesis of this argument. When he says: "Quod enim alicui convenlt per causam product 1 vara distinguitur real iter ab eo quod ipsi convenit non per causam productlvam: negata enim distinctione reali, sequeretur aliquid idem posse convenire alicui siraul per causam productivam et non per causam productivam, quod esset aperta contradictio" he sums up the very point of Suarez* original recapitulation. Throughout, Bittremieiix follows Sylvester and any of our i*emarks applied to the latter may also apply to the former without any extensive qualification. One may also note the exegesis of this same fifth argument by Franc iscus Petronius, In Summam Catholicae Fidel Co ntra Gentiles Divi Thomae Aquinatis Elucidationes, (Maples, 18yc>), Bk. II, Lect. 52, P? lb?.
68.
69.
Ibid.
70. 71.
Ibid
Ibid ., cf. also Capreolus, op. cit ., II Sent., d.l, q.2. Vol. Ill, p. 73b et seq., where he cites and comments on a text of St. Thomas, One may also consult Capreolus* reference to a text of St. Albert in I Sent., d.8, q.l.
.->U
-388-
Vol. I, p. 304a-b which is used again in II Sent,, d.l, q.2. Vol. Ill, p. 74b-75.
72.
Cf. P. Wyser, O.P., Per Thomisnius , the reference to M. D. Chenu, DTC, 535-537 Is very informative. Note LTK, V, (1933), 290-291. Cf. also p. 36.
73.
Chrysostoraus Javellus, Totius Philosophiae Compendium, (Lagdiini, 1568), Vol. I, Tractatus De Transcenaentibus, cap. IV, p. 46ob.
74. 75.
Ibid ., p. 466b-467a.
Another striking resemblance to Cajetan is instanced by Javellus when he adds: "Praeterea, si praedicata quidditativa non conveniunt subjecto, seclusa omni causa effectiva, ergo dlffinitio non semper conveniret Ibid., p. 467a. suo diffinito, quod est absurdum," Further indebtedness to Capreolus (Cf. note #45) also seems clear when he refers to Aristotle and Averroes: "Praeterea hujus propositionis, hoc est homo, nulla est causa: ergo nee hujus, homo est animal rationale, et haec est sententia Aristot. in septimo Metaphsi. textu quinquagesimonono, ubi tenet, quod hujus propositionis, homo est homo, nulla est causa, nisi forte, ut inquit illic Commentator aliquis dicat, quoniam quodlibet eorum est unum per se, et unum non dividitur in praedicatiim Et intendit Commentat. quod non potest et subjectum. assignari alia causa, nisi identitatis praedicati cum subjecto, manifest-urn est ergo: quod, si praedicata quidditativa non habent causam effectivam, nee essentia sxjnpta in cone ret o includens hujus modi praedicata, habet causam effectivam. Sx his ergo patet, quod essentia et esse in quolibet create distinguuntur realiter, et huic sententiae videtur assentire Aristoteles in secimdo posterior, ubi, tenet, quod quid est honinis et esse hominis non sunt idem (Cf . Capreolus note #27). Et secundum doctrinan Avicennae esse in omnibus, excepta prima caxisa, omnibus accidit, essentia autem nulli suicidit: ergo non sunt idem (Cf. Capreolus note #27)." Ibid . In this note I should also like to cite two texts taken from another work of Javellus, (Venetiis, viz.. " Logicae Compendium Peripateticae " 1541), which seems to allude to the predicational The first reads: baclcground of the featured arguments. "Secunda est. Ab universali affirmativa ad omnes suas singulares tam collective quam divisive est bona consequentia. Collective quidem, ut hie. Oranis homo
.iy
oela
i\
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cvuTlt, et isti sunt omnes homines, ergo et Istae homo currlt, et este, et sic de omnibus aliis. Divisive autem sic. Oranis homo currit ergo tu curris.,.." The second is: "Sed adverte quod reales et terministae in hac regula conveniunt et disconveniunt, Conveniunt quidem in hoc quod quando sit laiiversalis affirmativa in materia contingenti, regula valet cum debito medio, ut hie Omnis homo currit, et isti sunt homines, ergo iste currit, et iste, et sic de singulis. Nam sicut antecedens est contingens, sic et consequens. Disconvenivmt autem quando sit universal! affirraativa in materia r^turali ut omnis homo est animal. Dicunt enira terministae regulam non valei?e nisi gratia aliqtiando materiae, quoniam antecedens esset necessarium scilicet omnis homo est animal, et consequens contingens scilicet iste homo, et iste est animal. Nolunt enim aliquam singularem in rebus corruptibilibus esse necessaudum, quoniam quodlibet singulare corruptibile aliquando est et aliouando non est, Reales autem dicunt Bingulares in materia natural! esse necessarias, eo quod praedicatvmi semper verificatur de subjecto, posito qxiod subjectum non existat quoniam in tali propositione li est non dicit exlstentiam subjecti, sed habitudinem praedicat! ad subjectum. In materia vero contingent!, 1! *est dicit exlstentiam et habitudinem, quare non est simile. Tenet ergo regula universal iter, et non solum gratia materiae, et lianc viam sequimur in doctrina peripatetica," Op. pit .. Pars secunda, fol. 2l6r - fol. 2l6v. Note that he reitexates the same thing in his exollcation of the third rule Cf. Ibid ., fol. 217rv*.
.
76.
A good appreciation of the method of Suarez and the difficulties it entails for his readers is given by " Hlstoria de la compania de Jesus en la A. Astrain, Asistencla de 5spanal^l--lol" , (Madrid, 1913), p b4 which is marred by this rather unlilstorical remark, to say th^ least "Hubiera sido de desear que , . no se emi)enaFe tanto en x^sponder a razones y autores, que hoy nos parecen no tan dignos de etenclon. His appreciation reads as follows: "Hubiera sido de desear que el P. Suarez fuese algo ms met<^dico en su modo de escribir, que jpresindiese de algunas menimdencias que n^Jor estarian olvidadas y que no se empenase tanto en i^sponder a razones y autores, que hoy nos oarecen no tan dignos de attenclon. Algvinas veces redact sus tomos en la forma de coramentarios a santo'Toraas, presentado el texto del santo y anadiendo en forma de disputa, las aclEiraciones
.
:
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y explicariones propias; pero, por i^Cla reneral, presclndio de esta, forma y escriblo tratados completes enteramente por si. Su laodo de preceder es de ordinarlo el sigulente. Despues de enimciada la cuestlsn, presenta las opiniones de otros autores que dlt'^ei-en poco y mucho, de la siiya. Nos jobliga a saludar aqui a Escoto, all^ a Durando, aculla a Capreoio, al otro lado a Gregorlo De Rimini o a Gabi^iel De Biel, etc. Establece despues la doctrina que el sostiene, la expllca, la prueba, la apova con los argumentos de escrltura, samtos padres y raztfn, y cuando ha beiininado estas explloacionec r^ite la vislta a los autores anl^is citados y va dando solueioa a cada \ma de sus razones. Tal vez los doctor-es refutados no se satisfacen a la primera y vnelven a replicar y viielve Suare^ a insistir, hasta que queda agotada la materia. Este modo de proceder produce, como ve el lector, prolijidjades, y engendra en los principiantes alguna confusion, sobre todo cuando sucede, lo que no es raro, que et mismo Sviar^z urge los argianentos ajeaips como si fueran propios, y ann cuando nadie objete, el por su propia cuenta suscita objeciones que le parecen oportunas, y las refuta con toda detencion. Por eso es necesarlo tener \m ppco de paciencla y praetica en la lectura de Suar^, para sacar pronto la verdadera raente del autor, Se ha dicho de ^1 que, hablando con su lector, le dice las palabras de aquel deudor del evangelio: Patientiam habe in me et omnia reddam tibi. Effectlvamente: si et lector tiene paciencia, el padj?e Suarez le dara reunida en sus libros toda la teologZa que pueda desear sobr-e cada uno de los puntos."
77.
78.
Ibid ., this argument also appears in the catalogue of arguments for the real distinction in the following men: Fonseca, op. cit .. In 4 Metaph . Cap. II, q.4, Sect. 2, col, 732: Quart ^jm. Si exxstentia creaturae non distingueretur re ab essentia, non reciperetur in ilia. Consequens est falsi^i et absurdura. Ergo et antecedens. Major patet, quia nulla res dicitur rccipere se ipsam minor probatur dupliciter. Bairauin. . . Deinde, quia si existentia substantiae creatae non reciperetur in essentia, illud absurdum adraittendum foret, esse earn Infinitam. Nulla enira forma est limitata, et finita, nisi aut propter differentiara, qxia conti*alilt\ir, quo pacto color est finitus in albedine aut pix)pter subjectum in quo recipltur, quo pacto albedo limitatur ad certos gradus, quia recipltur liniltate in subjecto.
^'
^'>y^
i fc.^'
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.8T
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ergo exist entia creaturae non sit limitata, et finita per differentias (existentia enim, cum sit ultimus actus, non potest limitari per alios actus, cujusraodl sunt differentiae) efficitur ut, nisi sit limitata propter receptionem in essentia, necessario sit limitata (? illimitata) et infinita." Alexander Achillinus, op. cit. , fol. 104b: "Secvmdo. Omne recipiens est aliud a recepto sed essentia est recipiens esse a Deo dsmte esse essentiae. Tertio. Omne esse non receptura est Deus, quia ipsum est infinitum, punom esse, nihil potentialitatis habens, et per se subsistens, sed esse intelligentiae dependentis non est Deus, ergo esse intelligentiae dependentis est receptura, et non nisi in essentia." Durandus, In I Sent ., d.o, q.2: "6 Item solus Deus est esse subsistens et illimitatum. Sed si in creaturis esse et essentia essent idem re, creatura esset suum existens (quia quaedam creaturae per se subsistunt) haberent etiam esse illimitatum, quia esse secundum se niillam limitationem, habet. Tunc autem creatura esset purum esse nihil habens praeter esse admixtum, hoc autera est inconveniens . Ergo etc." Hervaeus, Quodlibet 7 , q.8, fol. 139rb: "Respondeo circa hoc sunt res opiniones. Prima est quae dicit quod esse et essentia differunt re absoluta, sicut subjectum substratum et actus sibi inherens et mo vent ur ad hoc rationibus suprapositis et c^uibusdam aliis, Qioarum prima talis est quia esse non receptum Sed si in et non participatura est esse in infinitvun. creaturis esse non differet ab essentia, esse creaturae esset esse non receptum praecise quantxira ad esse substantiale, et per consequens non participatum et infinitum. Sed hoc inconveniens. Ergo etc." Aureolus, In I Sent., d.8, q.l, a. 2, p. 257a: "Praeter^a. Omne illud in quo non differunt essentia et esse est necessario infinitxan, tale naraque est purum esse subsistens. Esse autera non est quid illimitatum, in conceptu enim esse non est aliquid determinatum nisi per essentiara aliquam deterrainetur, puta per humanitatem vel aliquid aliud. Restat ergo ut omne quod est pure esse, non habens aliquid aliud Sed omne creatum ab esse omnino sit illimitatxim. Ergo In orani creato liraitatum est, et nullvmi infinitum. est aliquid aliud realiter ab esse."
Ciim
79.
Cf. GR, II, p. 293-308; A Krempel, op. cit ., p. 27; E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy ... , p. 735, n. 87.
ST.
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80.
Giles of Rome, Quaestiones De Esse et Essentia , (Venice, One of the " maeni" TTIles has 1503), q.IX, fol. lra. in mind is Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I , q.9, fol. 6v: "In generall autem erat quaestio utrum creatura ipsa sit suum esse. Et arguebatur quod non. Primo, quia cum ipsa creatura sit quid subsistens, si ipsa esset suTjm esse^ ipsa esset subsistens esse. Subsistens esse est purura, quod non est nisi Deus. Creatura ergo esset Deus. Hoc autera falsur. est. Ergo etc, Secundo, quia si creatura non esset aliud re a suo esse, cum ipslim esse inquantum hujusmodi non est limitatum, et ita infinitum esset quaelibet creatura in natura sua infinita. Quod falsum est, ergo et priraum similiter."
81. 82.
Ibid .
Cf. Ibid ., col. l8vb: "Ubicumque enira esse est aliquid receptiua in alio, oportet quod sit re differens a
recipiente. . ." Ibid ., fol. 19ra: "Intelligiraus ergo quod ipsura esse divinura sit quoddam esse purum per se existens. Ipsura vero esse creaturae sit quoddam esse non purum in alio receptum. Et quod esse divinum secundum se consideratum est esse purura. Esse vero creaturae secundum se consideratura est esse participatxam. Ideo esse creaturae dicitur esse participatio divini esse quod Deus habet p\ire et essentialiter, creatura habet raodo receptivo et participative. Propter quod si tollatur quod esse creaturae non sit esse in alio receptum nee sit esse ab alio participatvnn tollitur quod esse creaturae sit participatii divini esse." One may also consult a lengthy text In q.x, fol, 23vb-24ra,
83.
84.
85.
86.
I Sent .,
Ibid .,- "Sed instatur forte contra hanc rationemj quia non apparet raagis evidentia in ilia propositione, esse subsistens oportet esse infinitum, accipiendo esse subsistens pro esse quod non recipitur in aliquo distincto a se, sicut argument\jm piocedit. Si enlm accipiatur esse subsistens pro esse nullo modo contracto ad specialera gradvjn essendi, vera est dicta proposltio. Sed ille qui poneret angelum esse suum esse, licet
,c
\J
Bill
;#&
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poneret esse smgell subsistere primo modo, non tamen poneret illud secundo laodo subsistere. Et sic argumentuia nihol penitus valere videtur." Let us note that this is an objection from a man vrtio does not distinguish really between the essence and " esse " of an angel.
^88. 89.
Ibid ., p. 305b-306a.
Cf. Soncinas, In 4 Metaph ., q.l2, fol. B^rb.
90.
91.
Ibid ., #2.
92. 93.
Ibid .
Cf. Javellus, Tractatus de Transcendent ibus , cap. 4, p. 466b.
94.
Cf. Capreolus, op. cit .. In I Sent ,, d.8, q.l, a.l. Vol. I, p. 30Da : " Quod autem esse non possit habere forraales differentias, patetj quia nee ens potest iilas habere, ut patet 3 Metapliysicae, t.c. 10; ergo niulto minus potest illas habere esse, cum concretum raagis sit divisibile quam abstraction, sicut homo quam hvinianitasj quia minoi^m puritatem et elevationem importat ab omni quod est extra rationem s\iara, cujusmodi est differentia." Cf. D.M., 31, I, #6.
95.
96.
Cf. Chauvinus, " Lexicon Philosophicum" , (Leovardiae, ITI3)* p. 597a: "Sequela: idem est quod consequent ia', est de qua alibi." Note p. 134b-135a: " Consequent ia: habitudo unius ad aliud, vi cujus infertur ex alio; vel oratio, in qua ex uno infertur aliud: ut, est animal, " Logicae Compendixim Cf. also Javellus, ergo sentit." Peripateticae" , (Venetiis, 1541), fol. 209v-210r: "Formal iter autem sic definitur. Consequentia est habitudo vera vel existiraata subsequentis propositionis 2ui praecedentem designata per notam lllationis, illative tentam. Primo dicitur habitudo, quoniam sequentia, et sequella, et consequentia dicunt formaliter respectum. . .
'
ftaa'j J
9ni
.T8 .88
L^^
.fit
.-f *'
.ae
iJ3
Ja.
Ji:
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Slc et consequentia est habltudo subsequentls propositlonis ad praecedentem, ut hie. Homo currit, ergo homo raovetur..."
97. 98. Cf. D.M., 31, I, #6. Cf. Gabriel Vazquez, In III S. Th. q.l7, a.l , Dlsp. 72, cap. 1, p. 481-485. Cf. D.M., 31, I, #7.
99.
This argioraent also does not appear Thomistic texts cited but its likely source in any of the is St. Thomas in 2 Contra Gentiles , cap. i?4,
Ibid.
100.
101.
102.
Ibid., #8-#9.
Cf. D.M., 7, II, #2, #3, #6, #9.
103.
note for a parallel of the text of a distinction " ex natura rei" of Vazquez on behalf between essence' and " esse in note #24 below in Pai^t II. For a collection of texts on this problem of the oneness of " esse " in Christ. Cf , E. docedeL, Quaestio de unico esseTrPChrlsto a doctoribus saecull X!il disputata , ^extus et Documenta, Series Theolofciea , (Rome, 1^33),
Cf. D.M.,
31, I, #10
''
1C4.
Cf Giles of Rome, Theoremata de Esse et Essentia , edit. E. Hocedez, (Louvain, 1930;, Theoreraa 12, p. 67-68. Suarez would Cf. also Ibid., Introduction, p. (63). in mind when he writes seem to have this work of Giles in D.M., 31, XII, #35: "Sed quaeret aliquis, qui possit separari hoc modo esse ab essentia, si in re sunt oranino In idem, cum plane rep\Agnet idem a seipso separari. essentiara hoc enim magnam vim faciunt, qui contendunt debere distingul saltern ex natura rei ab essentia creaturae, et praesertira Aegidius, locis supra citatis, et maxirae in suo opusculo de ente et essentia, contendens nee posse fieri creaturam, neque destrui, nisi essentia ejus sit aliquid distinctxim ab enus esse, cui possit et esse imprimi, et ab ea separari.
.
105.
Note also D.M., 31, HI, Cf. D.M., 31, I, #3 and #4. #7: "...nam si essentia et existentia sunt res diversae..." and D.M., 31, VI, #1: "Dicendum est enim priiao, essentiara C3?eatam in actu extra causas constitutaia non distingui realiter ab existentia, ita ut slnt duae res seu entitates
distinctae."
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106,
Cf . E. Hocedez, Theoreraata De Esse et Essentia, Introduction, p, [b4} that is/ he is the Innovator in the sense maintained by Hocedez that he has orientated minds towards such a conception. Indeed, though using the tenninology of "duae res", Giles of Rome does not seem to have held it in its strict sense. Cf. Ibid ., Introduction, p. (55)-(56).
107.
Cf . D.M.. 7, I, #19 where Suarez refers to Giles of Rome in De Composltione Angelorum. q.5" . He refers to this same place again in D.M., 7* II/ #2,
108.
The arguments of Aureolus aj?e found in Capreolus, oj; cit.. In I Sent ., d.9, q.l, a. 2, Vol. I, p. 317b-p. 321b.
Ibid ., p. 327a-b.
Cf. Ibid ., et seq. Cf. Thomas of Sutton, ftuaest iones de Real f Distinct lone inter Sssentlam et Esse , edit.~ J*. Pelster, (Opuscula et textus, fasc. V), Munich, 1929 XXVT, p. 35: "Ad. 6 dicendiom quod unumquodque dicitur existens per aliquid forraaliter, si large accipiaraus formam pro quolibet actuali. Si tamen accipiaraus formam stricte, non est hoc verura. Et ideo non sequitur quod esse, quo res dicitur existens, sit forma aliqua stricte loquendo. Si tamen quaracunque actual itatem voceraus formam, concedendum est quod esse sit forma; est enim actualitas rei. Unde cum voltonus significare aliquam rem esse in actu, dicimus quod ipsa est. Ad. 7 dicendiim similiter quod hoc nomen res* potest accipi proprie vel large sive coramuniter. Si accipiatur proprie, sic esse non est res, sed actualitas rei, sicut non est essencia, sed actualitas essenciae. Si autem res accipiatur comrauniter pro quocuraque reali, sic potest concedi quod esse sit res; est enim realis actualitas essenciae. Et ideo non sequitur quod esse sit aliqua essencia."
Cf. Soncinas, In 4 Metaph ., q.l2, fol. B^r. Cf. Cajetan, In I S. Th ., q.3, a. 4.
109.
110.
111. 112.
113.
114.
Ibid .
That this is the interpretation placed on the use of " res " in this discussion is evident in Suarez, D.M., 3T7~1, #13; III, #8 and in D.M., 7 passim.
91009
A e
"
-396-
115.
Cf. Cajetan, In De Ente et Essentia , cap. 5j edit. Laurent, p. 154, l^tJ the objection is as follows: "Praeterea. Quaecumque distinguimtur reallter se habent sicut res et res; sed essentia et existentia non se habent sicut res et res: ergo, etc. Patet ista, quia res proprie loquendo convertitur ovum ente in actu actualitate existent iae . And Cajetan replies: "Ad tertiura negatur major ad intellectian arguentisj non enim requiritur ad distinctionem realem quod utruraque eorum habeat propriam existentiam." Cf. also Cajetan* s reply to the fourth objection.
116. 117.
118.
'^^
ms:.
XX
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PART II
1. 2.
Cf. Francis Suarez On the Various Kinds of Distinctions ^ trans. C. Vollert, S.J., p. 2tt.
Cf. D.M., 1, I, #17.
Cf. D.M., 7, Ij #^, "...a distinction of the reason, because actually and formally it is not found in reality, but has its origin in the mind: a distinction of the reasoned reason, because it arises not entirely from the sheer operation of the intellect, but from the occasion offered by the thing itself on which the mind is reflecting." Cf. D.M., 8, I, #13. This second position Is also alluded to by a number of other men cited by Suarez. Soncinas in the place cited (fol. B^ra) notes this: "Alii dicunt quod esse et essentia non distinguuntur realiter quia isti habent hoc principiura quod dlstlnctlo
3.
4.
realis non potest esse nisi inter ea quorum unum potest esse altero non existente. Essentia autem non potest esse sine esse. Dicunt tamen quod distinguuntur ex natura rei quia de els verlficantur praedicata contraditoria. Nam esse accidlt essentiae, essentia vero non accidlt essentiae. Item essentia potest esse in potentla objectlva; esse non potest esse in potentla objectlva. Dicunt praeterea quod distinguimtur etiam modaliter quia esse est modus intrlnsecus ipsius essentiae. Dicunt tamen quod esse et essentia non distingtmntixr foraiallter quia homo in potentla non dlcit allara formalitatem ab homlne in actu." Javellus, In the place cited (p. 466a) designates Scotus in the very place referred to by Suarez as the proponent of the second position: "Secunda opinio est Scoti in tertio sententiarum, distlnctione sexta, et conslstlt in duobus. Priiao, quod sunt idem realiter, et sic probat. Duo abinvlcem Inseparabilia stmt Idem realiter. Hoc est velut principi\an in doctrlna sua. Sed esse non separatur ab essentia. Tvinc enim exlsteret essentia sine esse, quod est impossiblle et Implicans contradict ionem. Ergo sunt idem realiter. Secundo, quod distinguuntur ex natura rei, et probat sic. De quibuscianque praedlcantur et verlficantur praedicata contradictoria, distinguuntur ex natura rei, haec patet
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secimclum se ipsum ex dlfflnltlonis dlstlnctionis ex natura rei. Sed de esse et essentia verificantur praedicata contradictorla, nam haeo duo sunt vera; esse accidit essentiae, et non accldlt essentlae. Similiter haec duo, essentia potest esse in potentia objectlva, esse non potest esse in potentia objectiva. Ergo esse et essentia distinguuntur ex natura rei," Ponseca in the place cited (col. 74?) reports the second position this way: "Alii dicunt exlstentiam creatam dlstingui quidem aliquo modo ab essentia, atque adeo distinctione inventa in ipsis rebus, sed tainen non ut rem unain a re alia." Cf . col. 75^: "Alii denique dicunt existentlam creaturae distingui fonaaliter ab essentia, quo pacto similltudo distinguitur ab albedine poslta idemitate reali relationum cum siiis fundaraentis, Verum haec explicatio quae Scoto a qulbusdam tribuitur, nee Scoto tribuenda est, ut ejus quoque sectatores asserunt, nee videtur vera." Col. 755: "Aliter probant sectatores Scoti essentlam, et exlstentiam non distingui formaliter. Quia eadem, inquiant, est definltic hominis actu existentis, et horinis absolute..." " Q,v.o igitur pacto media sententia vera sit, trlbus conclusionlbus expllcandum. Prima conclusio. Existentia crea^uramam non est idem omnino quod essentia lllsirum, Qua-e conclusll ex irapugnatione prlmae sententlae perspicua est. Secunda conclusio. Existentia creaturarum non distinguitur ab essentia lllarum realiter, slve ut res a re, Haec Item patet ex Impugnatione secundae sententlae. Tertia conclusio. Existentia creaturarum dlstinguitiir ab lllarum essentia ex natura rei, non tamen formaliter, sed tanquam ultlraus ejus modus Intrinsecus." Nlphus notes op. cit . , p. Il8a: "Tertia conclusio existentia differt ab essentia slcut modus a quiddltate, declaratur, quia est indifferens ad existentlam et ad oppositum. Igitur differt ab existentia. Secundo quia essentia competit rei per se prirao modo, at esse existentiae per accidens. Ex his igitur sequitur quarta quod, videlicet, differunt ex natura rei, Haec ille." Note Alonso Brisefto, Controverslarura Scoti, Tome 1, Essentia et existentia p, 14, #13.' "Assertio secunda. distinguiantur forroaliter ex natura rei ea dlscretionis ratione, quam Scotus constltult inter gradus, qui ab eadem physlca entltae petit! in metaphyslcam conveniunt const itutlonem. Ita Basolius in 3 Sent. dlst. 6 quaest. unica, Martinus Meurisseus lib. I suae raetaph. quaest. 21 conclus. 4. Posnaniensls in I dlst. 2 art. 3 dub. 2
iJoit
Oj
it
)0
J-
.4t.
-399-
conclus. 1. Theodoras Smising. tract. 1 disp. 2 de essentia Del, quaest. 1 num. marg. 43 et 44 vldetur expressa sententla Scotl in 2 Sent. dlst. 3 quaest. 3 in fine. Per hoc patet ad arguiaentura."
5.
Cf. D.M., 7, I, #16; C. Vollert, op. clt .. p. 2?: "Nlhlloralnus censeo, slmpllclter verum esse darl in rebus creatls allquam dlstlnctlonem actualem, et ex natura rei, ante operatlonera Intellectus, quae non sit tanta, quanta est inter duas res, seu entitates omnino distlnctas, quamvls senerall vocabulo i)ossit vocari realls, quia vere est a parte rel, et non est per denomlnationem extrinsecam ab Intel lectu, tamen ad dlstlnguendum 111am ab alia majori dlstinctlone reall, possuraus illani appellare, vel dlstlnctlonem ex natura rel, appllcando 1111 tanq\;iam imperfection generale nomen (quod usltatum est J, vel proprlus vocari potest dlstinctio modalisj quia, ut expllcabo, versatur semper inter rem allquara, et modian ejus. Nomen autem distlnctionls forraalis non Ita nihl placet, quia est valde aequlvocumj saepe enlm convenit rebus reallter dlstlnctls, quatenus inter se dlstinguiintur essentialiter, si specie differant; habent enlm diversas unitates fonnales, et ita etiam foiroaliter dlfferunt." Note also D.M., 31. XI, #30-31. Cf. Vazquez, Disp. 115, cap. V, #25; "...sed oranem dlstlnctlonem esse realera, aut rationis. Non negaraus* esse latltudinem in ipsa real! dlstinctlone: nam quaedam reallter dlfferunt, ut duae res, quarura quaellbet esse potest per se sine alia; quaedam ut res et modus, quorum alterura, scilicet sine alio esse nequit; sed el novlter advenire potest... Porro autem dlstlnctlonem realem, non solum eorum, quae Invicem simul separari possunt sed eomim etiam quorum unum saltern sine altero esse potest, licet non contra..."
6. 7.
8.
9.
-400-
10.
Cf. John Duns Scotus, Opus Oxonlense , edit. Vives, Tome IX, p. 304, et seq.
11.
Cf . Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet I , q.9, fol. 7rv. Cf also J. Paxilus, Henri de Gand , pp. 220-237. Suarez himself knows that Henry holds for an intentional distinction as can be seen in D.M., 31, VI, #18 which makes one wonder still more why Suarez cites him for a proponent of the modal distinction.
It would Cf. Soto, In 4 Sen t., d.lO, q.2, a. 2, p. 274a. seem than that he is holding a modal distinction as he takes " esse existent iae" to be a mode. But Suarez him-
12.
self has warned us of the inconstancy of Soto in asserting this position. Cf . D.M., 7, I, #9: "Si ergo dicti authores priori tantum sensu negant distinctionem raediam inter realem et rationis, solis terminis differunt ab his qui illam admlttunt, non tamen constanti modo loquuntur, qui nunc illara negant nunc vero ilia utuntur: quod maxime in Soto videre licet cltatis locis et in Cf . critique of the first cap. de Relatione, et aliis." text of Soto in Vazquez, In III S. Th ., q.l7, a.l, disp. Yet in another place while 72, cap. 1, p. 482a-b. attributing this doctrine again to Soto, Suarez makes no mention of this text from In 4 Sent ., d.lO, q.2, a. 2; Cf. D.M., 3^ rv, #32: "Dico secundo: id, quod supposit\am creatum addit supra naturam, distinguitur quidem in re ab ipsa natura, non tamen oranino realiter, tanquara res a re, sed raodaliter, ut modus, rei a Posteriorum partem sequuntur multi ex recentloribus re . . . disclpuli Divi Thomae, illi praesertim qui existimant existentiam substantialem esse modum ex natura rei distinctum ab essentia separabilem ab ilia, quo sensu videtur lianc sententiam tenere Soto, in Dialect ica q.3 univers., et cap. de Substant. quaest. 1, et 2 Phys. q.2." Cf. also Donat, " Ontologia", (oeniponte, 19^0), p. 60: "Dominicus Soto O.P. (li^bo) vir celeberrimus, scribit: De distlnctione inter essentiam et exsistentiam nihil certi apud Aristotelem habemus: sed S. Thomas saepe hanc const ituit differentiam inter Deum et creaturas, quod in solo Deo esse et exsistere sit de quidditate et essentia sua, quia, cum sit prima causa, si de se non haberet esse, nullo modo posset ab alio habere. Sed tamen in creaturis esse non est de essentia, quia essentiae sunt perpetuae, sed tamen esse Id solum addiderim, quod recipi\int ex tempore a Deo... non est res tanti nramenti hanc distinctionem aut concedere aut negare, duramodo non negetur differentia inter nos et Deum, quod esse sit de essentia Dei et non
i
.1
.1
.SI
-401-
slt de essentia creattirae; slcut qui negaverit, sesslonera dlstlngui a sedente, nihil macnum negatlt, dumraodo non concedat, sedere esse de essentia hominls; hanc enira antiqui appellabant distinctionem realera et This text is from I, Praedic, q.l. foirbe docte."
13. Cf. Soto, In_2_Phys., q.2,fol. 34vb. This could also be taken as an arfimiatlon of the modal distinction as Suarez in D.M., 7, II, #6 uses the same example of the comparison of sitting with the sitter on behalf of the modal distinction. Cf the critique of r,he modal distinction. Cf . the critique of this text of Soto in Vazquez, In III S. Th ., q.lT, a.l, Disp. 72, cap. 1, p. 482a-b"^::'^^ Note John of St. Thomas* critique of this argument of Soto in Phllosophia Naturalls , I, p. q.7, a. 4, Tome 2, p. 122b-l23.
.
14.
D.M., 7, I, #19.
15.
Cf . Garbiel Vazquez, In III S. Th. , q.l7, a.l, Disp. 72, cap. 1, p. 482a-b: "Caeterura Recentiores quidam inter hanc opinionera, et earn quam sequnti capite ut probabiliorera subjiciraus, median allam excogitarunt, nempe essentiam, et existentiara distingui ex natura rei, non sicut praedicit Doctores pro praecedenti sententia commemorati dicebamt, sed alio modo: putant enim, Autores citatos pro praedicta sententia exist iraasse essentiam, et existent iam distingui inter se ex natura rei, sicut distinguitur res a re, non autera sicut res, et modus rei distinguuntur, de quibus distinctionibus satis superque dictum est a nobis 1. part, disputatione eadera: Recentiores igitur praedicti mediam sententian secuti dicunt, essentiam, et existent iam distingui ex natura rei, non autem sola ratione, ut sequens opinio asserit t\m etiam non distingvii ex natura rei, sicut res et res distinguuntur, ut Doctores praecedentis sententiae affirmant, sed sicut res, et modus rei. Hanc vero sententlam tribimt Scoto in (p. 482b) 3 distinct ione 6 quaestione prima, Henrico quodlibeto primo, quaestione 9 et 10 et Dominico Soto secundo Ph;:,'^slcorum q\iaestione secimda et in qxiarta distinctione 10. quaestione secunda, convictl autem videntur primiun Recentiores, qui hanc sententiam docuerunt rationibus superius allatis, ut assererent, inter essentiam et existentiam constltuendam esse distinctionem ex natura rei, deinde ne raajorem distinctionem const ituerent, quam earn, quae modalls a Recentioribus vocari consuevit, inde existimarunt, quia cum hac sola distinctione recte omnia constant et
rt.-.
:9
3
.ex
.*il
o
3
-1
/ii 1
slu u
-402-
atque infidel iter pro ea praedicta Autores allegantur. Priraum, quia qui in priori sententia docuerunt, essentiam dlstlngul ab exlstentia ex natura rei, non dixerunt distingui ab ea sicut rem a re, sed solum in universum docuerunt distingul ex natura rei, aut real iter, quod quldem recte constare posset cum distinctione solum rei, et modi rei, deinde quia nullus hactenus ex citatls Auctoribus docuit, neque ulla specie probabilitatis, docere potuit, exlstentiara ita dlstlngul ab essentia, ut ab ea separari, et sine ilia perinanere posset, hoc autem necessarium erat, ut dlceremus essentiam, et exlstentlain dlstlngul ex natura rei, sicut res dlstlnguitur a re, ut constat ex doctrlna tradita prima par. dispT'tatio, 116. caplt. 5. quod enlm Recentlores allqui asseruenuit, hoc tempore manere exlstentiara substantlalem panls in accldentibus altaris separatam ab essentia panls, ex quo sequltur dlstlnctlo realls inter essentiam et exlstentiara, taraquam inter rem, et rem, neque probablle est, neque ex allegatis Doctoribus ullus asservit. Postrerao ex citatls Autorlbus pro hac secunda sententia Scotus nihil Henrlcus veix) quodllbeto lllo primo oranlno dixit. quaestione 9. potius docet essentiam, et exlstentiara non dlstlngul ex natura rei, sed sola ratlone, et ita pro sequent! opinione Ipsum allegabimus. Sotus. vero in 2 Physlcorura quaestione ilia 2. solxim dlcit, esse existentlae non esse rem distlnctam ab essentia, ut disclpuli (inquit) S. Thoraae exist imant, eo quod si hoc raodo distingueretur, posset Deus corrumpere meam exlstentiara salva mea essentia, quod ipse putat imposslbile, subdlt vero postea haec verba, 'Sed dicitur esse dlstlngul ab essentia, sicut sedere ab homlne, quia non est de essentia homlnls, ut sit, qulppe cum suite nuradl creationera homo erat animal rationale, sed de hoc alibi*, quibus verbis non contendlt ipse constltuere dlstinctlonera ex natura rei inter essentiara, et exlstentiara quails est inter rem, et modura rei, quia hujus distinctionis, quae esset ex natura rei, et non ratlonis, nunquara ipse In 4. vero raeralnit, sed aliquam dlstlnctlonem i^tlonis sententianim d.lO q. ilia 2 art. 1 ft 2. nihil etiara pro media sententia docet, si recte inspiciatur in artlculo 1. solum dlcit esse per se, esse modura convenlentem quldditatl substantlae, esse autem In alio esse modura convenlentem accldentibus: idem docet in acticulo seciindo de modo existendi in alio, qui convenit accldentibus, et inquit non esse rem distlnctam a subjecto, an vero ex natura rei distinguatur, non deflnit: praeterea ipse non agit de exlstentia absolute.
.
J-
no
-HUJ-
et de essentia, sed de exlstentia cvaa modo per se, nos autem hie disputaraus de exlstentia absolxite, non autera de modo lllo per se." As we *iall see, Suarez himself disputes this question in the same manner, i.e. " de exlstentia absolute" .
16. 17.
18.
Ibid .
Cf. D.M., 31, I, #11.
Ibid ., that is to aay, that some real distinction between essence and existence is demanded but not of that type as between two " res" .
19.
Cf , text of Vazquez quoted in note #5 above as well as the text of Suarez from D.M., 7, I, #l6. Cf. also D.M., 7 1 #20. For the problem of how this modal distinction can be considered as intermediate between the real distinction and the distinction of reason, let us cite this text from D.M., 7, Ij #27^ "Etemim, si ens reale in sua amplissima conceptione sumatur pro omni eo quod non est omnino nihil, quodque potest esse in rebus sine fictione intellectus, sic verum est non dari medium inter ens reale, et rationis, et in eodem sensu concedo non dari medium inter distinctlonera realem et rationis; nam omnis distinctio ex natura rei potest in hac araplitudine dici realis; et ita locuti fere sunt antiqui scriptores. Alio tamen modo potest suml ens reale pro eo quod ex proprio conceptu, seu ex vi suae rationis formalis potest propriam entitatem afferre seu constituere, et hoc sensu falsura est non posse dari medium inter ens reale et rationis: datur enim modus entis, qui neque est merum ens rationis, ut perse constat, neque est ens reale in eo rigore et proprietate sun^itina, ut a nobis declaratura est; et ita etiara datur distinctio modalis media inter distinctioneia rationis, et realem rigorose sumptam."
Cf. also D.M., 1, I, #15: Cf. D.M., 31, I, #11. "Ratione solet potissiraum haac sententia suaderi; nam, quidquid est extra definitionera essentialem rei, est aliquo modo in re distinctum ab ilia; sed multa simt extra essentiam rei, quae non sunt res distinctae ab ipsa re; ergo datur distinctio in re minor distinctione reall. Vel alitor, quae distinguimtur definitione et conceptLi objectivo, distinguuntur ex natura rei, et amte intellectum; sed raulta distinguuntur hoc modo, quae non distinguuntur ut res a re; ergo. His et
20.
.e
.OS
"
-404-
nodls vldetiir Scotus dlstinctlonem fomialem declarare; tamen si quis recte consideret, vel in eis petitur principixiin, vol in eis petitur principivim, vel sumitur distinctio formalis pro distinctione rationis ratiocinatae per conceptus inadaequatos, quae virtualiter tax\t\m seu fundamental iter dici potest esse ex natura
rei."
21.
22.
Ibid .
Cf . text from D.M., 7, I, #15 cited in note #20 above. Thus, in both the real and modal distinctions existence is outside the essence.
23.
Suarez discusses the problem of Cf. D.M,, 31, I, #11. mutual separation of essence and existence in D.M., 7 His discussion of the non-mutual separation II, #9. as characteristic of the modal distinction is treated in D.M., 7, II, #6. Cf. also ,f3 in the same place: "Si autem duo ita separantur in re, ut unum existens maneat, et non aliud, necesse est ut saltern modaliter dist inguantvir .
Cf. D.M., 31, I, #11 as well as the further references in note #23 above, Vazquez gives a very clear sumnation of the arg\jment involved here. Cf . In III S. Th ., q.l7, a.l, Disp. 72, cap. 1, p. 482a: "Secundo (potest suaderi) quia essentia separari potest ab existent ia, nen^?>e cum res corrurapitur, et nisi ita esset, nunquam res corrunq)! posset, ergo esse et essentia aliquo modo dlstinguuntur ex natura rei, quae enim aliquo raodo separantur, licet utrumque seorsim separatum manere, non possit, sed alterum tantum dlstinguuntur ex natiira rei, saltern ut res et modus sicut diximus I p. disputatione 116 cap. (?) porro autem licet existent ia rei non maneat corrupta re ipsa, manet tamen essentia, quia essentiae rerura perpetuae sunt, et incorruptibiles, cum ab aetemo esse dicantur."
Cf. D.M., 7, II, #6: "Dico secundo: separatio unius ab alio, quae solum est non mutvia (ut v\ilgo appellatur), id est, in qua unum extreraum potest manere sine alio, non tamen e converse, est sufficiens argumentum dis-
24.
25.
tinctionis modalis, non tamen raajoris, seu realls proprie sumptae. Prior pars satis probata est in praecedente assertione. Posterior probatur, quia ex hujusmodi separatione non mutua recte convincitur, earn rem, quae potest manere destructio alio extrerao, habere per se suam realitatem independenter intrinsece et
9i-
-405-
entltative, seu essentiallter ab lllo extremo, quod destrui potest, ipsa manente; non vero potest Inde concludi, aliud extreinura, quod destrul potest, habere ex se propriara entilatem, quia, ut supponitur, illud extreramn tale est, ut manere non posslt sine altero; sed ad hoc sufflclt ut sit modus ejus; imo hoc est intrinsecura, ut diximus, entitatl modali, ut per se manere non possit, nee separari actu ab eo cujus est modus; ergo ex praedlcta separatlone non potest concludi major distinctio quain modalis."
*>
-406-
PART III
1.
2.
This is a very technical word for Suarez. It notes a precisive abstraction at work which is characterized as follows in D.M., 2, IV, #9: "...ens enim in vi nominis suraptun significat id quod habet essentiam realera, praescindendo ab actuali existentia, non quidera excludendo illam, seu negando, sed praecisive tantura abstrahendo. . ." Cf. also Ibid ., #11, In addition, one may note a similar technical value in Scotus. Cf. E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot , p. 325, n.l: "II est h. peine besoin de noter que praecise a ici valeur technique; il signifie: concevoir 'humaniti' precision faite de toute determination accidentelle k 1 essence." Note p. 109 also.
'
*
3.
Ibid., #13. Hence, Suarez will agree with any Thomist who assert that essence and existence are really distinct in the sense that the essence as possible is really distinct from the essence as actual. But as we shall see in D.M., 31, III, #1 it is a real negative distinction for Suarez since one of the extremes, the essence as possible, is nothing. Suarez will fight the Thoraists on this score if they insist that the essence as possible has some reality. This vjill be precisely the point of Siiarez' second section of his thirty-fli*st disputation, as we shall soon see,
4.
That is, Suarez is not comparing essence in an intellect to essence as it is " in rerum natura* although he will grant that in this comparison one is really distinguished from the other by a real negative distinction, Cf D.M., 31, III, #1.
,'
5.
Cf. D.M., 31, I, #13. Because Suarez conceives the real distinction to be between two " entia" he must refuse it for the reasons stated,
6.
7.
Ibid ,
Michael de Palacio, In I Sent ,, d.8, disput, 8, reports the arguments for the real distinction in precisely
.1
~
3r>oa
.5
VI
,i^
i
T
-407-
these terras. Cf. fol. 80ra: "Vldetur autem esse creatvun essentiae creata non esse intrinsecum, imo accidentiarluin llli." And his " sed contra " confronts these arguments on exactly these terms: "Contra vero est, nam substantia habet substantlale esse, ergo est sibl intrinsecum." Cf. also fol. 81 va: "Caeterura Arabes Isti et Avlcenna, et Algatzellus ejusdera Avicennae collectarlus lllo tendunt suls assertlonlbus (quas audlsti) ut Indlcent esse creatum quidera, non esse intrinsecum creatls rebus." Thus, it is important to notice that the tradition against x^/hich he reacts is precisely that of Avlcenna, since Suarez seems to be In the same tradition as Michael de Palacios.
8. 9.
10.
11.
/"
:*
ot ,10
.at.
,10 9
..
n.
.
A
uc .8
-,
j.
^ i>.'
.Oj
a .3
t
io
.11
.9
a
-J
T
'0
.9
ia9
i.
90
9;
-408-
,^7
above in Part I.
13.
14. 15.
That is, Suarez does not cite the place in the fourth Book of Aristotle's " Metaphysics " where Suarez says in "Index Locupletissimus " to ^ Disputationes Metaphysicae" , Vol. 25, p. xivb: "Q.20. Hie etiam tractari potest, an existentia creaturae distinguatur ab ejus essentia, de qua re est copiosa disp. 31, quae plures contlnet quaestiones, quae txira ibi, turn etiam in indie disputationura disp. 31, vlderi possunt." For Alexander's treatment of this problem in its usual place Cf , L. Veuthey, op. cit ., p. 137-138.
Cf. Alexander of Alexandria, p. 207rb.
"
16.
17.
Cf . Giles of Rome, " Quaestiones Pi sput at ae De Esse et Essentia ;, q.9, f ol 20vb-rol . 21. Cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodllbet 10 , q.7, fol. 153v-159v where he discusses the question: Utrum xxanens essentiam creaturae esse idem cvim suo esse potest salvare creationem? " Note the analysis of this by J. Paulus, " Les disputes d' Henri de Gaud et de Gilles de Rome sur la distinction de 1 essence et de 1 existence" , AHDL, 13* P. 334 et seq.
. '
18.
19.
Ibid., p. 207vaF. Ibid., "Imaginabiraur ergo sic aliter, scilicet quod tota natura rei prirao fuit tota sub natura potentiali, et tota postea fuit in aetu, non quod nos imagineraur, quod tota res praecesserit et fuerit sub natura potentiali, quae postea suscipiat actum; sed quod tota res, quae praecessit, et fuit sub rem, ut praecedit, vocant aliqui, et bene, esse non prohibitiam; hoc est esse possibile, cui non repugnat esse in actu..."
20.
21.
Ibid ., note this text carefully for it figures largely in Fonseca's affirmation of the modal distinction,
Ibid,
22.
.s
.w
"
-409-
23.
Cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodllbet I, q.9 s fol. 7v-7r: "Alius vero est raodus intelligendl creaturajm particlpare
esse intelligendo Ipsara eseentiam creaturae ut allquid abstractum per intellectum, Indifferens ad esse et non esse, q\iod de se est quoddam non ens, habens taiaen forraalera Ideam In Deo per quam in Deo est ens quoddam amteqtiam fiat ens in propria natura ad modura quo quaellbet res habet esse ens in Deo seciindum illud Joan. I: Quod facttun est in ipso vita erat. Et tunc fit ens in actu quando Deus ipsum sua potentia facit ad similltudinem sviae ideae foiroalls quam habet in se ipso; et ex hoc dlcitur particlpare esse, quod est ejus similitudo expressa in effectu ab illo esse puro quod Deus est. Q^iae quidem similitudo cadit in ipsa essentia rei quia ipsa essentia rei inquemtura est quidam effectus Dei est quaedara similitudo esse Dei. Non autem est ipsa similitudo Deo qua esse participat creatura aliquid praeter essentiara ipsius creaturae differens re ab ipsa et ei impressa."
24. Cf. DTC, Vol. 12, col. l8ll et seq.; E. Gilson, History... , p. 476 et seq,; F. Copleston, A History of PhilosopF^F, p. 29 et seq.
Cf. Petrus Aureolus, In Quatuor Libros Sententiarum , (Romae: Ex Typographia Vatlcana, l'j9b), Bk. I, d.a, q.l, p. 256 et seq.
25.
26.
Cf. Aureolus, op. cit ., I, d.8, q.l, a. 3, wherein on p. 264b he cites the first of three propositions stating his position: "Quod esse addit ad essentiam conceptum af firraationis secxmdian Philosophum, et Conanentatorera. His second proposition on p. 265b reads as follows:
"Quod essentia significat totum conceptum entis per modum actus, et operationis immanentis, et per consequens sub certa duratione." And Aureolus explains this as follows: "Secunda vero propositio est, quod ens, et esse, sive lapis, et esse ejus, et sic de aliis differunt quidem conceptibiliter, unde habent duos conceptus, non quidem differentes per aliud, et aliud conceptiblle, aed per alium modian concipiendi." The third proposition on p. 267b: "Completa etiam differentia constituitur inter conceptum essentiae,
et esse." He explains this: "Tertia propositio constituitur ex praemissis. Est enim completa differentia inter conceptum essentia, et entis, quod sunt duo conceptus
ai
"
-410-
ejusdem rel, et sub eadem ratione, modi tcunen conclpiendl differunt in duobus, vel trlbus."
27.
28.
Ibid ., a. 2, p. 26la where in explanation of this proposition: "Quod esse non addat ab essentiam rem absolutam" says: "Prima quidem propositio, quod esse et essentia non svint duae realitates," What follows is the text cited by Gapreolus in op. cit ., II Sent,, d.8, q.l, a. 2, Vol. I, p. SlTb-SlSa!^
29.
Tha Latin of this difficult text is as follows: "Nulla res est alia ab eo quod formal iter est extra nihil; quia, dato opposito, sequitur quod, in quantum alia, est extra nihil, et in quantum alia, non est extra nihil; non enim est alia in q\iantum nihil, iramo si alia est extra nihil, non tamen est extra nihil in quantum aJ.iaj alloquin, non per illam erit extra nihil," Here Aureolus interprets the real distinction to mean that, of the two " res", one is and one is not, i.e. the essence as really other from existence and is not, and existence is, or that essence is and existence is notj thus, one cannot be in virtue of the other because this other is nothing.
Cf, Gapreolus, op. cit ., I Sent., d.8, q.l, a. 2,
p. 317b-3l8a.
30.
31.
32.
That is, Suarez does not refer to Henry's intentional distinction. However, Suarez is not \maware of it as we shall see in our analysis of D.M., 31* VT, #l8. So, he is content in his irtfcial citation to refer to Henry of Ghent as he is an opponent of the real distinction.
In this citation, Capr*eolus erroneously cites, " Henri cus, primo Quodllbeto, q.7
Cf. Gapreolus, op. cit., I Sent ., d.8, q.l, a. 2, Vol. I, p. 315a.
33.
34.
^35.
Cf . M, De Wulf, "Un th^ologien-philosophe du XIII si^cle. Etude sur la vie. les oeuvres, et 1' influence de Godefroid de Fontaines , Meraolres, Academie Royale de Belgique, (Bruxelles, 190b;, Tome I, Chap. II, pp. i3-5li GR I, pp. 396-399* E. Gilson, History,..,
^i
.^c
b
>
lo
" til
.0
-411-
p. 739a, n.95.
For the reference to M. Grabmann, consult "Doctrlna S. Thomae de distinctlone reall inter essentiara et esse ex doctanentis ineditls saeculi XIII lllustratur" , Acta Hebdomadae Thomlstlcae^ (Roma, 1924),
p. 150.
36.
37.
This is not a work of Boethius but belongs to Alfarabi. Cf Beitrage, Band XIX, Heft 3t ed. Bauemker, (Munster,
.
I9I6), p. 17.
38. Cf. Capreolus, op. cit ., I Sent., d.8, q.l, a. 2, Vol, I^ Godfrey's position maintains a granmiatical p. 317b.
distinction between essence and existence as can be seen in Quodlibet 3, a.l (Longa) "Ad declarandum sciendum est enira quod omnia Ista, ens, entitas, essentia idem significant realiter differentia solum in modo slgnificamdi in abstractione vel concretione vel hujusmodi, et hoc apparet per simile in omnibus aliis sic acceptls, puta currens, cursus, cur re re." Cf. Les quatre premiers quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines , edit. De Wuir-Pelzer, Tome II, p. 154. In Quodlibet 3, q.l (Brevis) we also read: "Noraen concretum et nomen abstractum et verbum non dicunt diversas res, sicut patet de istis: currens, cursus et currere. Ergo a simili nee ista: essentia, ens et esse, quae se habent sicut nomen abstractum et nomen concretum et verbum." Ibid., p. 303-304. Cf, E. Gilson, History..., p. 745, n. #118-120. Conqpare the use of "currens, cursus, currere" to Suarez in D.M., 31, VI, #20.
39.
40.
41.
Beitr&ge zur Geschichte de Philosophie und Theologie deg Mirtelalters, Band XXVI, Heft 1, ed, BauemkerT ^Munster i W, 1927), PP. 389-394, 395-436; DTC IV, 1964-1966; E. Gilson, History..., p. 473 et seq.
42,
Cf, Durandus, In Petri Lombardi Sent ent las Theologicas CommentariorunfXlbri Quatuor , (Venetlis, 1571 J, l7 d,a q,5, fol. 35rb #11, Versus those who posit an eternal
.T
.TV
.04
.1*
ii
-412-
esse essentiae" , Durandus in #13 makes the same accusation we shall see Suarez make versus Henry of Ghent in D.M., 31* IIj #2: "Ratio autem prima eorura per quam probant aetemltatem essentiarum (quod est praeter propositum) est contra eos. Si enim oporteret illud quod a Deo est intellectura ab aetemo, habere veram entitatem ab aetemo, cum Deus ab aetemo cognoverit res non soliun quoad essentiam, sed quoad earum existentiam consequens est quod creaturae fuerint ab aetemo, non solum quoid esse essentiae, sed etiam quoad esse exlstentiae quod est contra eos, Dicendum est ergo ad majorem quod cognitio Dei qua cognoscit res ab aetemo, teiroinatur ad veram non qxiae sit ab aetemo in actu, sed tantum in potent ia, non rel nisi objective sed Dei, ex hoc enim solum creatura potuit esse, quia potuit esse objectum vel terminus operationis divinae." This coupled with Durandus* doctrine on the divine idea as beirig the created thing as secondary object of the divine intellect according to I Sent., d.35, q.3, n, 10-13 and in I Sent., d.36, q.4, n. 4-6 as cited by Gilson, History . . . p. 775a n. 82 will compare very close to Suarez' ultimate position.
43.
"
Cf . E. Gilson, History... ,
prT74-775 n.82.
44. 45.
Cf. D.M., 31, VI, #19 as well as Part X, p. 303.
Cf. J. 0. Riedl, A Catalogue of Renaissance Philo sophers (1350-1650) , (Milwaukee, T540), p. !>%] DTC II, 814-825; K. Copleston, A History of Philosophy , p. 150; E. Gilson, History..., p. 792b, n. 3t>.
46.
Cf . Gabriel Biel, Collectorium Circa Quatuor Sententiarum Libros , 3 Sent., d.b, q.2, a.l. fol. 253vb.
Ibid., fol. 253vb-fol. 253ra.
47.
48.
49.
(Venice, 1513),
50. 51.
Ibid ., p. 139va-139vb.
Cf. J. Riedl, op. clt ., p. 42 j P. Copleston, A History. p. 221 j Giuseppe Saitta, II pensiero italiano nell' umanesimo e nel rinascimento, (Bologna, 1930 )i Vol. II, p. 32b-334.
.
^C^A
in
-413-
52.
Cf . Alexander Achllllnus, Opera Omnia In Unum Collecta (Venice, 1345), "De Element! s", Sk. 3, dub. 23, fol. 103vb,
,
53. 54.
55.
Ibid .
Cf. D.M., 31, VI, #20.
Ibid .
Cf. DTC VI, 1852-1854; E. Gilson, History... and p. 794, n.44.
,
56.
p. 502
57.
Cf. Gregory of Rimini, In Secundo Sententiarum , 1503), d.l, q.6, a. 2, fol. 22rb.
(Venice,
58.
Cf . DTC I, 1180 H. Hurter, Nomenclator literarius theologiae catholicae . Tome 2, p. 455, et seq.^ E. Gilson, History... , p. 7bi5, n.73.
Cf . E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot , p. 674
59.
60.
Suarez refers to Antonius Andreas as follows: ",.,ut patet ex Anton. Andrea, 4 Metaph., quaest. 3..." And this place is the usvial context for the discussion of the distinction between essence and existence as can be seen from the text cited above in note #15 in this Part.
Cf. J. Riedl, op. cit ., p. 39; Hurter, Nomenclator...,
61.
62.
Tone
3,
p.
nop.
Cf. Lychetus, Opus Oxoniense, Bk. 3, d.o, q.l (J. Duns Scoti, Opera, ed. Viv6s, T. XIV, Parisiis, p. 306, I893).
63. 64.
Ibid ., p. 307.
Cf. D.M., 31, VI, #19.
65.
Cf . Alonso Briseno, Controversiarum Scoti, Tome I, Appendix Metaphysica, p. 9-10. Unlike Suarez, Gabriel Vazquez does not mention Lychetus though he, Vazquez, maintains a " distinctio rationls ratiocinata" between essence and eistence, which is what Alonso Briseno means when he says, "Hanc tamen sententiam tuentur Soarez 2 tomo suae Metaph. disp. 31 sect. 6 et Vazquez tom. I 3 part. disp. 72 cap. 2 quam modemi communiter reciplunt; et comprobari potest." Cf. Hurter, Nomenclator... , Vol. II, col. 10, Ab Anno 1664-1763 "Alphonsus Briceno O.S. Franc, americanus, chilensis ob ingenii acumen alter Duns Scotus dictus, Liraae theologiam docuit, dein
:
.Ckj
.S(^
.
.4i.
-414-
eplscopus Nicaraguae provinciae et urbis 14, Nov. 1644 fuit renunciatus; gmno vero 1559 ad sedeci Venezuelae provinciae sive de Caracas translatus (fl667). Rellquit' celebrloruin controversiarura' in I sent, Scoti 1, admixtis potissimis dissertationibus raetaphysicls, Matriti I638. 1639 in f ."
66.
Cf . M. Grabraann, "Die Disputationes Metaphyslcae des Franz Suarez in Ihrer Methodischen Eigenwart und Portwirloing", Mittel^alterliches Gelstesleben , I, p. 534-535.
Cf. Hujrter, Nomenclator llterarlus . Tome III, col. 143. Cf . also Nicolaus Antonlus, feibfTotheca Scriptorum Hispaniae , Tome II, Nova 2, p. 143a-b.
67.
68.
Cf. Michael de Palacios, In Prlmum Llbrum Maglstrl Sententiarun Disputationes^ (Salinanticae, 157^)* d.8, dlsp. 2, rol. 79vb-fol. ttOra.
69. 70.
71.
72.
73.
John of Jandun, Q^laestiones in XII Libros Metaphysicorum , . (Venetiis, 1554), Bk. 4, q.3, fol. 47vb-fol. 4bra. For his references to St. Thomas, Cf. fol. 48ra: "Et ista opinio est antiqui expositoris in tractatu suo de ente et essentia, et in 8. phy..." Cf. M. Grabrasuin, "Circa historiam distinctionis essentlae et existentiae" Acta Pontlf iciae Academiae Romanae S. Thomae Aquinatis , (Rome, 1534), p. 74, n.l for the justification of interpreting " expositor" to mean St. Thomas. Cf
Ibid: "Tertia est opinio, quae iterum raagiE restringlt quaesltum. St est opinio, quod non in omni causato, ut dixit prima opinio, nee in omni ente subsistente, ut dixit sec\inda opinio esse differi; ab essentia, sed in omni substantia generabili et corTTuptibili esse differt ab essentia. Et ilia videt\ir esse probabilior diiabus opionibus aliis."
74.
75.
.iki
.0-
.IT
-415-
76. 77.
Ibid .
Cf. J. Riedl, Catalogue of Renaissance Philosophers. p. 41 F. Copleston, A History...! p. 1^0. g2IT Cf. A. Niphus, Metaphysicorum pisputationum In Arlstotells Decern eh Quatuor Llbros Metaphysicorum. (Venetiis, 1^5$) , Bk.\, Sap. ^, p. 118a-p.llBb.
78.
79.
Ibid ., p. 119a.
Ibid ., p. 119b. Ibid . Ibid ., p. 120a.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
Ibid ., p. 120b.
Ibid., p. 121b.
85. 86.
Ibid .
Cf. J. Riedl, op. cit ., p. 105; "Pedro da Fonseca o
Aristoteles Portogues I528-1599", Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia , Tome IX, fasc. 4, 1953.
'
87.
88.
f
Cf. Fonseca, Commentariorum in Llbros Metaphysicorum Arlstotelis , (Francofurti, 1599-lbQ5J Bk. 4. cap. 2. q,4, col. 746 et seq. Just as S\iarez, Fonseca cites Hervaeus Natalis in "Quodlib. 7 q.9" whereas it should be "q.8". Also Fonseca refers to Giles of Rome "In prlmum Sent, dist. 2 q.4 art.l" which is one of tHe references Suarez makes to Giles of Rome and which I have been unable to find. It is very possible that Suarez may have cited this as one of the catalogues of
91.
92.
Ibid .
In Fonseca. this erroneously reads: " Scot. 3. Physi. q.2 et in 4 Sent. d.lO quaest. 2..."
Ibid., col. 753-col. 754.
93.
-415-
94. 95.
96.
97.
Note that Ponseca refers to Alexander of Alexandria as Alexander of Hales. Cf. col. 756 " Alexandri Alensis "
Ibid., col. 755-col. 756.
Cf page 87 above as well as footnote #21 above in this same Part III.
.
98. 99.
100.
101.
Cf. D.M., 31, If #12. For an introduction to the history of this problem one must first consult E. Hocedex, S.J,, "Quaestio de Unico Esse in Christo", Textus et Documenta , Series Theologica, (Rome, 1933)* #14.
1^1
.XOV
-416-
PART IV
1.
Cf. J. Paulus^ Henri de Gand, p. 91, n.l, p. 98-99; A. Pegis, "Dllenona of Being and Unity", Essays in Thomlsm edit. R. Brennan, (New York, 19^12;, p. 175-176; E. Gllson, History..., p. 450-451, p. 761, n. 43. For a background of this whole controversy, one may consult A. Combes, Un iin'^dlt de saint Anselme? , (Paris, 1944), p. 320 wherein pairtsof this section of Suarez are cited; A, Pegis, "The Dilemna of Being and Unity", Essays in Thomlsm, edit. R. Brennan, (New York, 1942 j, p. l51-ltJ3 especially p. 175; J. Paulus, Henri de Gand, pp. 82-103; E. Gllson, Jean Duns Scot , p.279-306; Gerard Smith, S.J., Natural Theology , pp. 22?^248.
,
2.
Cf. J. Paulus, op. cit ., pp. XXI, XXII, 117 n.2, 121, 122, 381.
E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot , p. 291, n,3.
3. 4.
5.
.S
.Xoc SSX
el
'-o
.Xoo
>b
r>neb
Vw-
J. .'.-,'
\.
i -
- "a
.,
VI
JO
W^
.J4
"
-417-
dlvino. Deinde an possibilltas entis sit posito, vel mera negatlo? Circa priravmi ergo Henricus Quodl. 6 q.3 quem citat Scotus in I diQ q.l n, marg. 2 assrruit possibilitatem entis peti a potentia Dei.... Siinilia habet interpres Henrici Vi talis, Zuccolius. Henrico siiffragatur Petrus de Lorca I, 2 torn. 2 disp. 10. Sed hanc doctrinam ubi oppositan sententiara nee veram, nee ab inconvenientibus, et absurditate liberam censet. Consentit etiam Basilius Legionensis professor Salmanticensis Note also p. 508: "In qua re (Utrum creat\ira in quantum est fundamentxrai relationis aeternae ad Deum ut cognoscentem, habeat vere esse essentiae, ex hoc quod est sub tall respectu Scotus I d.35 q.l) Henricus in pluribus suae doctrlnae locis, quae citantur a raarginatore Scoti in hunc locum, assemerat, ens possibile ab aetemo verum esse reale positivum essentiae nancisci." Also cited for this position along with Henry of Ghent are the following: Martinus Meurisse, Basilius Pontius Legionensis, Pranciscus Albertinus, Jacobus Granadus and Petrus Hurtadus. In his solution to this controversy, Alonso Briseno notes the following and refers explicitly to Siiarez in this place on p. 5l4b: "Quara sententiam (no real potency or that this * esse essentiae Is not a true and positive real esse'H sustinuit' uni versa theologorum auatiquitas; eamque ex modemls defendit Pranciscus Soarius in sua Metaphysica disp. 31 de ente finito sect. 2 praeclpue sub num. 3 ubi oppositura placitiim, 'in raentem alicujus Catholici Doctoris venire non posse, Judicat*. Quod a sit abs re dictiim viderint alii; cum ego ab orani censura abstined\Ara consultius aestime." Another contemporary, Bartholomaeus Mastrius cites this same section of Suarez In the context of the divine ideas. Cf. " Disputationes Theologicae In Prlmiun Librum SentenETarum , Disp. 3> q.2, De Divinls Ideis, #52, p. liab: "Hie autera nota quod exam Scotus ponit creaturas in esse cognito, quod habuerunt ab aetemo ab intellectu divino, esse ipsius ideas, per tale esse cognitum non intelligit esse quoddam diminutxim medium inter ens reale, et rationis, ut ei tribuit Bannes loc. cit. (Cf. p. Il6b Bannes p. I qu. 15 art. 1) ubi proinde appellat hoc raerum Scoti figmentum parvan fidei catholicae consentaneum, coincidens cum errore Wiclef lib de ideis, a qua calumnia piisslmum Doctorem satis vindicavi disp. 8 rael. q.l art. 2 non Inquara, per tale esse cognitum intelligit Doctor aliquod esse reale actuale, diminutum tamen, et secvmdum quid medixom inter esse reale, et rationis, ut Bannes inteirpretatur, et Zumel cum ipso.
. . . .
'
-418-
et Penottas lib, 3 c.l. Scotum non Intel ligentes, esto clarissime loquentem, sed per tale esse aliud non intelligit, qiiara ipsian esse possibile creatiirarumj quod ab aetemo creaturae habent ex se ipsls quldem formaliter non tamen a seipsis, sed principiative ab Intellectu divlno, quod appellat Doctor esse dirainutiira, et secundina quid, et ab intellectu dlvino productum, ut illud distingueret ab esse reali siinpliciter, quod postea in tempore reclpiunt per veram, et physicam productionemj et appellat esse cognitura, non quia sit solvua ens rationis raateriale et derelictura, aut sola extrlnseca denominatio ex tenninatione divlnae cognitionis in creaturis derelicta, sed quia est illud ipsum esse possibile creaturarura non simpliciter, et absolute suraptum; sed quatenus substant divinae intelligentiae, et ex ejus terminatione denoniinatur a passiva cognitione cognit\im, sicut paries ex terminatione visionis denominatur visus; quae omni concedere in Deo ab aetemo tenetur q-LvLlibet catholicus, et Theologus, nam de fide est res ab aetemo habuisse esse possibile, seu in potentia logica, quale non habuerunt chimerae, et figmenta; item fuisse in potentia objectiva id est in virtute omnipotentiae Dei, et secundvun tale esse fuisse ab aetemo cognitas a Deo, qui ab aetemo cognovit esse reale actiiale in tempore eis non repiignare, unde ut bene inquit Suai^z disp. 31 Met, sec. 2 n,2 eadem necessitate fatendum est esse cognittun sic explicattira creaturis ab aetemo convenlre, qua convenit ipsi Deo ab aetemo scire creaturas esse possibiles, et hoc eodem modo Scotum intelligit Aversa q.l4 sec. 9." Compare this to the text of John of St. Thomas cited by J. Maritain, The Dream of Descartes , p. 142 et seq. " Siiarez himself notes the following in his Commentaria Partem D, Thomae"T>e Deo Uno ac Disputationes in Primam et Trlno" , Bk. Ill, cap. 5, #^1, p. ^^02a: "Supererat hoc loco dlcendum, quomodo creaturae possibiles terminent cognitionem Dei, vel quod esse iiabere Intel ligantur, ut illam scientiam terminare possint. Sed haec quaestio Metaphysica est, quam attigi, disp. 30 Metaphysicae sect, 15s n. 27, et late tractavi, disp. 31 sect. 2, Ideo breviter dicitur, nullum esse reale, verum et actuale poni in creaturis sic cognitis, sed tantiira esse possibile, quod ab aetemo non est actu, nisi in potentia Dei: esse autem in tempore in se ipso per actionem ejusdera potentiae Dei. Et hoc est satis, ut per ipsam scientiam ita cognoscatur, ut in se objective tenainet cognitionem Dei, et hoc modo declu*at hanc sententiam D. Thomas, diet, quaest. 15 (14) q,9 ubi vocat scientiam non entium, de. qiia appellatione aliquid.
-419-
capite sequent! adderaus," Suarez is here reacting to an eternal " ease essentiae" in the same fashion as Dui-andus did in note f^42 in Part III.
6,
Cf. D.M., 31, IV, #1: "Dixinius de essentia creaturae, ut possibili et ut in actu, et de distinctione eorura qualis sit; superest dicendiam de esse, quo essentia in actu formalissime constituitur . " Cf. also M. Rast, S.J., "Die Possibilienlehre Des Pr, Suarez", Scholastik , X, (1935), pp. 340-368.
7.
(Natter), Doctrinale Antiquitatum Cathollcae Bcclesiae , (Venetiis, 1357J> Bk. I, cap. ti, Tom. I, p. 32a et seq. Chapter eight bears the following title: " Res in Esse Intelligibili vel in esse potentiale in causis secundis antequjMi sit In proprio genere, sit slmpliciter non esse" . The following remiarks are noteworthy: "Supponit fides ecclesiae cum beato Aiagustino quinto super Geneslm ad lltteram c.l4. triplex esse creaturae. Esse ejus intslligibili in Deo, esse ejus potentiale in causis ejus secundis, et tertio esse ejus existentiae in genere proprio extra Devua. Hac distinctione abusus Witcleff ampliavit esse slmpliciter per haec tria, non praevldens forte quoraodo triplex non esse comitatur haec tria: qualiter tamen Aristotles et Commentator praeviderunt 11. Metaphysicae comraento 10. non esse, scilicet in conceptu, non esse in secimdis causis, et non esse existentiae.... Ubi plane confundltur Aemulus (Wlcleffus) dicens in libello * de Ideis esse loicam August Ini, quod res aetemaliter fuerunt, prinsquam esse coeporunt. Nam Augustinus hie dicit (De Civit. Del lib. XII cap. XVII): et hoc eglsse Divinam voluntatem, ut prius aetemaliter non essent, quamdlu non fuerunt: et hoc (p. 33a) prius non esse, et posterius esse non in Deo dicit, sed in rebus prime non existentibus, et post existentibus fuit." Gabriel Vazquez has a long treatment of Wycliff amd the problem of the divine ideas In " In I S.Th. q.l53 a.l" , Disp. 70, Also he cites: "Waldensis I to,, 11, I, cap. I and II. ar,I, c.l usque ad 9 asserebat in proposi. 217 et 219 has duas propositiones veras esse: 'Ctamis creatura est Ref eruntur autem hae duae Deus-: et quodlibet est Deus . propositiones in Consil. Cost. sess.l5 inter errores Hus dlsclpull Joan. Wlcleffi, quae schedula quadam Joa. oblata Concilio contlnebatur." Indeed, though he seems to think Thomas of Walden* s critique is justified in this place, Suarez elsewhere does not think Wycliff said any such thing nor does he think such a position ever entered anyone's head. Cf. In I S. Th., Bk. Ill,
Cf Thomas of Walden,
' '
;1
9ia
al
Cl-
io
rrrrrcr
-420-
cap. 5* #5! "Per hanc etiain resolutlonem inqpro^atur facile error trlbutus Vuicleffo et Impugnatus a Viialdense, torn. 1, c.5 et 8, qiiaetenus dicebat creaturas secundum esse ideale esse aliquid aetemum et distinctum ab esse Dei. Hie enira error intellectus in hoc sensu, quod extra Deura habeant ideae aliquod esse reale verum et aetemum, contra fidem est, et ilium sufficienter Impiignavi in Metaphysica, disp. 31, sect. 2, valde autera dubito, an Jlla haeresls in mentem alicujus venerit. Nam, ut ibidem VuaJdensis refert, Vuicleffus potius errabat vocando ci^aturas DEUM, quia sunt In Deo secundum esse ideale, quod magis pertinet ad ineptvua et erroneura modura loquendi, quam ad rem ipsam: et ideo necesse non est in hoc Immorari. Maxime, quia in Concilio Constantiensi, sess. 18, ubl errores Vuicleffi referuntur, nihil de hoc dicltur, et in sess. 15, cum proponuntur errores Joannis Huss, inter alios ponuntur hae propositiones: 'Quodllbet est Deus, quaelibet creatura est Deus, ubique omne ens est, cum omne ens sit Deus'. St postea lllarum mentio non fit, cum referuntur articuli damnati. Quia forte non constitit, illas asseruisse, vel quia solum errabat appellando absolute et sirapliciter
Ideas Divinas nomlnibus creaturarum, cum constet creaturas non esse in Deo formaliter, et ideo nee creaturas simpliciter posse vocari Deum, nee Deum creaturas, licet cum addito, creatura secundum esse quod habet in Deo, sit Deus, ut Augustinus et sancti loquuntur, et in seq,.ienti puncto explicabitur." This should also settle the question whether S\xarez thoiigit Henry of Ghent held any such doctrine. Cf. J. Paulus, Henri de Gand , p. XXII, Cf . also E. Gilson, p. 117, n.#2, and p. 121, n.#3. La doctrine cart^sienne de la liberty et la th^ologie , (Paris, 1913), P 3^-39; Jean Duns Scot^ (Paris, 19^2 J, DO. 289-291. On Wye 1 if cf. S. Gilson, History... , 771-772. p.
8. Cf. E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot , pp 279-306, esp. pp. 292-296; A. Maurer, "Ens Diminutxam: a note on its Origin and Meaning", Mediaeval Studies , XII, (1950), pp. 216-222; R. Dalbiez, "Les sources scolastiques de la thiorie cart^sienne de letre objectif". Revue d*histoire de la philosophle, Oct. Dec, (1929J, pp. 4b4 et seq.
9.
The reference by Suarez " in Cajetano e'c aliis recent ioribus, 1 part., guaest. 17, art. 3" , as contained in the Vives edition Is incorrect as Cajetan's critique is found in " In S.Th. I, q.14, a .5 , cf also note #5 In S. above where Bartholomaeus Mastrius cites BaSiez
.
li
-421-
"
esse
11.
Cf. D.M., 30, XV, #27: "...quia de essentia creaturarum, antequam sint, de quo disputat Henricus, dlcturi suraus infra, tractando de ente finite, et de distlnctione essentiae et existentiae in illo; de esse autera cognito
creaturarum, de quo ti^ctat Scotus, solum potest esse et revera est dissensio in modo loquendij dicuntur enira creaturae esse cognitae ab aliquo esse reali, non quod in se habeant, sed in Deo; Deus eniin cognoscendo oreaturas, habet illas peculiar! modo in esse repraesentativo seu ideali, ut siimitur ex D. Thorn...."
12.
To corroborate his interpretation he cites the following places in Scotus: "Ut videre licet in ipso Scot., in I, dist.35. Ad Ista , et dist. 36. Ad secundum dico , et in 2, dist. 1, quaest. 1, articulo secundo, et in Quodlib. quaest. 1, et 14, art. 2" Suarez in his defense of Scotus on this point. Joins forces with Alonso Brlseflo and Bartholomaeus Mastrius, cited in note #3 above. Gabriel Vazquez also contains a defense of Scotus on the " esse objectivum". In I S.Th. q.l5, a.l , Disp. 70 cap. #7-j7ii Tom. I, p. 277: "Hoc esse dlniinut\n c-um Scoto concedit Walden, c.illo I. 2S:3 quare frustra laborant Gabr, in I d.35 q.l praesertira veix) art. 3 et plures Thoraistae, ut contra Scotim probent, res ab aetemo non habuisse esse illud diminutura intelligentes illud esse aliquid reale extra causas existens quod Scotus non somniavit; neque docuit esse aliquam existentiam actu medlaia inter non esse rei et existentiam illius extra proprias causas sed solum esse illud possibile creaturarum secundiirn quod ab aetemo objiciuntur intellectui divino virtute suae intellectionis, ratione cujus dicuntur ab ipso divino intellectu produci, hoc repraesentari." Suarez in another place refers to Scotus on this problem. Cf. D.M., 54, II, #7: "Et Juxta hanc sententiam sequitur primo, entia rationis non tantura resultare suo modo in rebus cognitis per intellectum humanum vel creatum, sed etiam per intellectum divinum, quia etiam prout illi objiciuntur, denominantur cognitae. Qiio fere modo Scotus dixit creaturas ex aetemitate esse productas a Deo in esse cognito, nam, ut in superioribus saepe dixiraus, illud esse, in sententia Scoti, non est reaile esse existentiae, neque esse essentiae, nam essentia creaturae non est cognosci, sed est id quod cognoscitur; erit ergo ens rationis. Verura est ipsumraet Scotiim, in
-422-
I dist. 3^>* qiiaest. unlca. Ad secimdiun dlco , declarare, quod lllud esse non est esse relationis rationls, sed allud esse diminutum et absolutura, non taraen declarat an sit dicendiim reale, vel rationis." Cf. also J. Paulus, Henri de Gand , pp. 131-135 where he analyzes Scotus' critique of Henry of Ghent.
13.
Let us first note that, in view of Sxmrez* remark about Wyclif in In I S. The. Bk. III^ cap, p, ^5 and especially: " valde autem dubito, an TLla haeresis in mentem alicujus venerit cited above in note #t, he would not seem to hold that Henry of Ghent ever held any such extreme position. However, Suares cites the following texts of Henry: "Ita scribit Henricus, in Suinma, articulo tertio, quaest. 23 et 25, et Quodlib. 8, q.l et 9, et Quodlib. 9> q.l et 2, et Quodlib. 11, q.3." Petrus Ponseca, In 3 Metaph ., cap. 5, q.l. Sect. IV, col. 321-322, puts it more cautiously: Ad priraum vero arcumentum superioris sententiae, facile esset respondere, si vera esset sententia Henrici Gandavensis, ut ilium Scotus raultis locis, ! praesertim Sent, d.3 q.5 et d.35 et d.36. etc' intelligit. Existiraat enim (si Scotus recte ejus opinionera interpretatur) res omnes infra Deura habuisse ab aetemo quoddara esse 3?eale actuale, quod vocat essentiae, nempe per participationem idearum divinarum, a quibus putat illas fuisse necessario ex aetemitate caussatas, 'Colligitur haec sententia Henric. ex quodlib. 3 quaest. 9. et quodlib. 5 quaest. 2. et quodlib. 4 quaest. 7 et 8. et quodlib. 2 quaest. 3.' Hoc igitur si verum esset, nihil difficultatls foret in argumento. Nihil enim minua esset, si connexiones rerura fuissent ab aetemo, quando ipsae etiam res eo raodo ab aetemo extitissent." Note J. Paulus and E. Gilson in the places cited at the end of note #5 above. Vazquez, op. cit .. In III S. Th., q.17, a.l, disp. 72, cap. 1, p.43a gives an interesting defense of Henry of Ghent against S\mrez and Scotus: "...neque vero Scotus impugnat Henrjbum, ut Recent lores quidam autumsint, quod dixerit, essentias esse aliquid extra Deura ab aetemo ante actum divinae voltmtatis, et intellectus, id enim nunquam Henricus somniavit, sed quia dixerit esse possibile creaturarum, quod ipse vocat passivura absolute, non relate, esse ante oranem actum intellectus et voluntatis divinae, quod ssuie verissimura esse, contra Scotum in ea disputatione ostendimus." Note that in the context of this problem Vazquez asks the question: Whether something is possible because God knows it or vrtiether God knows it because it is possible?
:
-423-
14.
Cf . note #2 above esp. the reference to J. Pauliis, op. clt ., p. 117, n.2,
Cf. D.M., 30, XV, #40: "Et Juxta banc signiflcationem et considerationem data est Celebris ilia divisio
15.
Theologorum scientiae divinae, in scientiam simplicis intelligentiae, et scientiam visionis; nam prior de se est tantum rerum possibilium ut sic, et abstractiva; posterior vero dicitur de tot a cognitione rerum, quae existentiam habent vel hatiturae sunt in aliqua differentia temporis. De qua divisione plura a Theologls traduntur, quae ab metaphysicam non spectant; satisque illi est signiflcationem illorura terrainorura nosse." For the theological treatment of this division of God's knowledge Cf Suarez, In I S.Th. Bk. Ill, cap. IV
. .
16.
Sviarez' reference to Hervaeus Natalis' critique of Henry of Ghent on the problem of the " esse essentiae" is " Quodlib. 11, q.l " which is found in fol. 179rb-180ra of the Venice edition of 1513 but G.M, Pelzer has foxrnd that the eleventh and twelfth Quodlibets of Hervaeus in the Venice edition of 1513 (fols. 179rb-l86vb) are in reality quodlibets III and IV, brief redaction, of Godfrey of Fontaine, Cf . Les quatre premiers quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines. Les phi losophes beiges, textes The point at issue herein et etudes . Tome II, p.XVlJ. Utruin essentia habeat esse reale extra deum quantum is; ad esse essentiae ant equaia habeat esse exist entiae ?" The first argument in favor of the affirmative betrays the position of Henry of Ghent: "Ad primum sic proceditiir et arguitiir quod creatura habeat esse reale quantiun ad esse essentiae antequara habeat esse reale quantum ad esse existentiae, quia sicut creatura quantum ad esse existentiae refertur ex parte esse realiter ad deum, sicut ad causam effectivara; sic q\iantum ad esse essentiae refertur realiter ab aetemo ad deum, sicut ad caxisam exemplarem realera, c\am ideae exemplares clnt in deo ab aetemo. Sed relatio realis requirit fundamentum reale. Ergo creatura ab aetemo habuit esse essentiae antequara habuerlt esse existentiae," Cf. Henry of Ghent, I Quodlib. q.9, fol. 6v-7r which has been cited in note #53 to Part I. Suarez' reference to Soncinas is found in In 9 Metaph . q.4 fol. T^ra-fol. T3yb wherein the problem treated is; " Utrum Res habeant esse quiditativTim ante sui productionem" . But in his " Respondeo " Soncinas uses the anonymous " eiliqui " "RespBmeoTaH hanc questionem dixerunt aliqui quod res habuerunt esse anteqi^am producerentur, illud autem esse non fuit esse existentiae.
'
r_^2-r
^r
-424-
sed fult esse essentiae, id est, ipsamet essentia rei fuit ante sui product ionera." However, in " In 5 Metaph, q.lQ p. 65b" , in his rebuttal of the first affirmative argument to the question: " Utrum complexaj de praedicatis quiddltativis habeant causam effectivam? " we read: '"Ad priraura dicitur quod ly esse, in Isto enuntiabili, horainem esse animal, dicit compositionem in intellectu, animalis cum homine. Nam philosophus primo periherme. dicit, quod verbum, est, significat compositionem, quae compositio est tantum rationis CLun non sit rerum dlstinctarum: huic autem corapositioni correspondet pro fundaraento idertLtas praedicati cum subjecto, quae est identitas sufficienter. Et etiam si homo non sit in rerum natura, quia entia rationis in nullo sunt subjective, sed hoc quod sint sufficit, quod habeant esse cognitxim. Nee est dicendxara, quod ly, esse dicat essentiam, quasi quod hcsnine non existence, homo' sit quoad esse essentiae. Istud enira non est Thomisticae dictum, sed est cadere in opinlonera Henrici, qui posult oranes res etiam diua actu non existunt, esse extra causas suas non quidera per actuale existere, sed per esse quidditativum, quod isti appellant esse essentiae, et de hoc specialiter loqueraur in 9 hujus." The references to the anonymous commentators on St, Thomas are " I Part . q.lQ, articulo tertio, q.46, art.l ."
qviae
17.
Cf. Capreolus op. clt .. In II Sent, d.l, q.2,a.3* ad quartum argumentum Aureoli contra q\iartam conclusionera. Sect. 4, Vol, 3 p. 44a, The fourth conclusion of Capreolus (p, 29b j to which Aureolus' position is taken as an objection is the following: " Quarta concluslo est quod nullum allud a Deo potest esseT nisi creatiaa a Deo ," As Capreolus reports it ([p.42a-b): Arguraenta Aureoli: QuaiiJo loco, contra quartam conclusionem arguit Aureolus
proband quod aliquid creari implicat contradictionemj et per consequens, probationes conclusionis, quae innituntur rationi naturali, non valent. Arguit igitur sic, in principio quarti (q. proem., art. l)."
18.
Cf, Capreolus, ibid ,, p. 73a. Suarez notes the following in the context " De Creatione" , D.M., 20, I, #30: "Ad ultiraara probat ionera (of. D.M., 20, I, #5), SLunptam et eo quod esse essentiae rerum supponatur creation! earum, qui existimant esse essentiae secundum se esse
aliquid aetemum, dicerent fortasse creationem esse ex nihilo existentiae, non vero essentiae. At vero Wicleph dixit creationem non esse product ionem ex nihilo simpliciter, sed ex esse Intelligibili ad esse extra Deura, ut refert Waldensis, torn. 1 c.l? Scotus item, in 2, d.l q.2 ait creationem esse productionem ex nihilo.
-42!?-
Id est, non de allquo sectindum esse existentlae, nee secundum esse essentiae, non tainen ex nihllo, id est, de nullo modo ente, nee simplielter, nee secundiiin quid; supponit vero res habere esse cognltiaa prius quam fiant, Veritas autem est, esse essentiae ci^aturae, aut esse cognitum seu intelligibile, antequam creaturae fiant, nihil reale esse extra De\ain, ut dlcemus late infra, in disputatione de essentia et existent la creaturae. Quapropter illud esse nihil obstat quomlnus per creatbnem fiat creatura ex nlhilo, et in quantum ens," In the context of the efficient cause of the created essence, D.M., 31> IX, #25, Suarez remarics as follows: "Atque hinc etlani facile applicantur aliae differentiae; nam solus Deus facit essentiam, nulla praesuppocita essentia, et consequenter solus ipse facit per se priio6 essentiam creatam, ut talis est. Dlcent fortasse, licet Deus faciat esse exist entiae ex nulla existent la, quia facit ex nlhilo, non vero facere essentiam ex nulla essentia, seu ex nlhilo essentiae, quia, nisi essentia supponatiir, non potest intelligi quod ie8 sit factibilis a Deo, Qui vero sic respondent, plane in aequivoco laborant, nam, si per essentiam Intelllgant rem in sola potentia object iva, nos de ilia non agimus, quia ilia ut sic nihil est, neque vere fit aut eeb terrolnus effectlonis, nisi fortasse dicatiir terminus a quo, quod nil refert, quia eodem modo dicetur existentla fieri a Deo ex non exlstentia in actu, et ex existentla in esse i)otentlall et objectivo; quia, nisi existentla esset possibllls, et ut talis praecognosceretur a Deo, non potuisset ab eo fieri. Si vero loquamur de essentia actuali, quae vere sit aliqua entitas GXtra Deum, falsissimum est non facere Deina essentiam creatam simplielter et absolute ex nulla essentia, quia nee facit creatam essentiam ex sviammet essentia, cum id sit iraposslbllej stmt enim essentiae primo dlversae; neque ex alia essentia extra suan, cum necesse sit omner.i illam ab ipso creari. Constat igitur, eamdem eralnentlara et singularem rationem habere Deum in efficienda essentia, quam habet in efficienda existentla. Quod etiam necessarlo sequitur ex Identitate essentiae actiialls, et existentiae, juxta ultimara partem praecedentls assertionis. Nam, sicut ex lllo princlpio ibi infei^bamus, essentiam et existentlam eodem modo fieri a causa secunda, ita hie dicendura est, eodem modo fieri a causa prima; est enim eadem omnino ratio, atque haec eadem doctrina de eadem efficientia existentiae et essentiae creatae conflrmat doctrinam superlus datara de identitate earum inter se." Note nothings of Gregory of Rimini cited by Capreolus, ibid., p. 71ab
**
'*
"TOr
-426-
"
Eleuterio Elorduy, S.J., "El concepto objective en Svidrez", Pensamlento , IV, (1948), p. 340. Cf. Capreolus, op. cit .. In II Sent., d.l, q.2, a,3 Vol. 3, p. 71a: "Si autem realitas sumatur pro exsistentia actual!, conceditur quod ilia exsistentia, vel esse actualis exsistentiae, nvmquam fxiit sub nihilo sibi opposito, scilicet nihileitate exsistentiae.
"i
20.
21.
How much of this is Capreolus and how much of it is Sxiarez is hard to say. For, in Capreolus, op. cit .. In II Sent, d.l, q.2, in his reply to the fourth argument of Aureolus versus his fourth conclusion (Vol. Ill, p.73l>), we read this very terse reiaark: "Esse enira essentiam, vel quidditatera, non est aliud quara habere rationem veraia, non fictitiam, in intellectu alicujus vere intelligentis." Note similar remarks of Eleutherio Elorduy, S.J.. "El concepto objectivo en Su^rez", Pensamiento , 4 (1948), p. 38I-382. But note should be teOcen of this sentence from the text cited by Surez in D.M., 31, II, 2 just prior to these i^marks: "Et ipsa, secundum se, Ben5)er est aliquid in genere essentiarum, et in esse intelligibili, et in potentia activa Creatoris, licet non in esse reali actual!." as well as the remarks which follow this. Cf. note #33 below. Suarez is here interpreting Capreolus to hold his own doctrine of " essentia realis" which figures largely here, and of which he has spoken in D.M,, 2, IV, #6-#7. Note the following from #7: "Quid autem sit essentiam esse realem, possuraus aut per negationem, aut per affirmationem exponere. Priori modo dicimus essentiam realem esse, quae in sese nullam involvit repvignantiam, neque est mere conficta per intellectum. Posteriori autem modo explicari potest, vel a iX)steriori, per hoc quod sit principium vel radix realium operationum, vel effectum, sive sit in genere causae efficientis, sive formalis, aive raaterialis; sic enim nulla est essentia realis quae non possit habere aliquera effectvua vel proprietatem realem. A priori vero potest explicsiri per causam extrinsecam (quaravis hoc non sic^liciter de essentia, sed de essentia creata verura liabeat), et sic dicimus essentiam esse realem, qviae a Deo realiter produci potest, et constitui in esse entis actualis. Per intrinsecam autem causam non potest proprie haec ratio essentiae explicari, quia ipsa est prima causa vel ratio
.IT
**
.1^
-427-
Intrlnseca entis, et simpliclssima, ut hoc coraiaunissirao conceptu essentlae concipltur; imde solum dicere possuraus, easentlam realera^ earn esse quae ex se apta est esse^ seu realiter existere." Cf. the remarks of E. Gilson, " Being and Some Philosophers" , pp. 97-98. Also note should be taken of D.M., 31, II, #10 which is treated below on the occasion of the fourth objection. In brief, Suarez seems to be glossing Capreolus as well as Henry of Ghent in such a way that they bolster his own position on " esse objectivum " and " essentia real is" just as we saw Durandus gloss Henry of Ghent
22.
This is to say that there is no real " esse" possessed by the creatable essence but it does possess some kind cf note #68 below in this section. of objective " esse" Cf. D.M., 25, I, #5 where Suarez has reference to objective and subjective presence: "Hinc vero suboritur gravis quaestio, quomodo intelligattu? exemplar esse in intellectu, an subjective seu foiroaliter, an objective tantum. Subjective dicitur esse quod inest intellectul, et Infonnat ilium, slve reipsa per veram inhaerentlara, ut in CreatoriD, slve nostro modo Intel ligendl, cum tamen in re sit per entitatem, ut in Deo. Objective autem dicitxir esse quod cognoscitur, seu actu objlcitur menti." Cf. D.M., 2, I, #1: "Conceptus object Ivus dicitur res ilia, vel ratio, quae proprie et imndiate per conceptun formalera cognoscitur seu repraesentaturj ut, verbi gratia, cum hominem conciplraus, ille actus, quem in raente efficimus ad concipiendxan hominem, vocatur conceptus forroalis; homo autem cognltus et repraesentatus illo actu dicitur conceptus objectlvus, conceptus quldem per denonilnationera extrinsecam a conceptu formall, per quem objectum ejus conclpi dicitur, et Ideo recte objectivus, quia non est conceptus ut forma intrlnsece termlnans conceptlonera, sed ut objectum et materia circa quam versatur fonnalis conceptlo, et ad quam mentis acies dlrecte tendit, propter quod ab aliquibus, ex Averroe, Intentio intellecta appellaturj Unde colligltur et ab aliis dicitur ratio objectlva, differentia inter conceptum formalem et objectivum, quod formal is semper est vera ac positiva res et in creaturis qualltas menti Inhaerens, objectivus vero non semper est vera res positiva; concipimus enlm interdum prlvatlones, et alia quae vocantur entia ratlonls, quia solum habent esse objective in Intellectu, Item conceptus formalls semper est res singularis et Indivldua, quia est res producta per Intellectum, eique inhaerens: conceptus autem objectivus interdum quldem esse potest res singularis et Indivldua, quatemus menti objici potest, et per actum forraalem conclpi.
xi3.,riw X
1.11.
-428-
saepe vero est res universalis vel confusa et communis, ut est homo, substantia, et sirailia."
23. 24.
J. Paulus, oj_clt., p. 102, p. 133.
Ibid ., p. 81, 87, 89; and note the text of Alonso Briseno in note #5 above. Ibid ., pp. 131-135, esp. 133.
Cf. Capreolus, op. cit .. In II Sent., d.l, q.2. Vol. Ill, p. 74b: "Ex quibus patet quod, ante creatlonem mundi, quaelibet quidditas, quae post creata fuit, habebat esse in intellectu divino, per suam ideara; et quod cuilibet tali naturae, secundvun suam absolutara considerationem, corapetabat omne praedicatxam quod per Talis ergo natura, antequam se consequitur earn. habeat esse in rerum natura, per productionem vel creationem. est oninino nihil, prout nihil opponitur
25.
26.
enti quod dicit actum exsistendi extra causam siiam; sed non erat nihil, prout opponitur enti quod dicit quidditatem vel naturam in se, vel dicit actum essendi in intellectu divino, vel in potentia productiva Dei. Et sic patet quomodo lapis factus est de nihilo, et quomodo non sequitur quod nihileitas sit conversa in entltatem; sed solum quod quidditas, quae non habebat esse extra causam suam, vel extra divinum Intellectura, postea imbuit esee actu extra Deum." Note in the same place p. 73a the following: "Et ciom dicitur quod dico quod tunc lapis non est factus ex puro nihilo; non est factus ex puro nihilo in genere entium vel essentiarura, sed ex puro nihilo in genere existentium actu vel in potentia passiva extra Devm. Nam, antequam mundus esset, vel crearetur mundus, erat niundus. Et erat id quod nunc est, non in actuali exsistentia, nee in potentia activa vel passiva creaturae; sed in potentia activa Dei, et in esse intelligibili, et secundum suan absolutam considerationem; item, in potentia logicali, quae est non repugnant ia terminorum; non enim repugnabat rosae esse substantiam, esse corpus, esse florera. Et ideo conceditur quod rosa, ab aetemo, erat substantia, corpus, flos; non actu, sed in potentia. Ideo non sic erat oranino nihil sicut chimaera, cui repugnat esse actu." There can ^^e no doubt that Capreolus in this last text seems to be a precursor of Suarez* own position,
27.
Why Suarea did not cite Capreolus* gloss on this crucial text of St. Thoraas wherein reference is made to the
IL
-429-
twofold causality of the " esse essentiae" and " esse existent lae" according to Henry of Ghent, seen above in Part I, p. l8 is a remarkable mystery. It is not possible tltb Stiares has not read it, since he is aware of Capreolus' citation of the above text of St. Thomas. Then, too, he is av/are of Capreolus' mention of Henr-y of Ghent, Godfrey and Bernard de Gannaco in the text he has actually cited. But if there was ever an opportunity to purify the Thoraist tradition in one of its most fundamental theses, it would seem to be given when Suarez cites this text of St. Thomas. Yet, such does not seem to be the intention of Suarez, Rather, he seems more intent on iiiterpreting Capreolus in such a way that he actually bolsters his own position. Thus, Suarez is coming at the Thomists indirectly, by quoting them where he can, when they actually hold similar doctrines, and then vrtien he feels he has them cornered, he can assert that such and so is the data of the problem of the distinction between essence and existence as even the Thomists agree, so therefore their conclusion to a real distinction is not consonant with the data of the problem. Indeed, Suarez' position in this problem might justly be described as Olympian, for, as from the heights of Olympus, he can defend Scotus versus the Thomists, note the similarity of some Thomists to Henry and even cite St. Thomas against these Thomists; a very enviable situation to be in. Thus, Suarez is here neutralizing the Thomistic (by way of Henry of Ghent) doctrine of the " esse essentiae" and exemplary causality by very cautiously insisting that the essence comes to be by the efficient causality of the Creator.
28.
Cf. Disp. 31, II, #3. The Vives edition reads " quia omnis effect ic ad existentiam conf irmatur " , but in place of " cenf irmatur I have rad the " terminatur " found in this place in the Mainz edition of lb05.
'
29.
30.
Saarez means creature has creation and not an " esse as it is for
31.
By this that Capreolus grants that the possible absolutely no real existence prior to he is right, for the " esse essentiae " is existentlae " . It is an " esse possibile" Suarez himself.
Suarez is here opposing those texts on the rose wherein, thovigh there is no existent rose, it is still true to
9r;3
^"t
-430-
say a ixjse is a rose or a rose is a coi^poreal substance etc. Cf. Part 1, p. 13 where Capreolus has reference to this. Soncinas in In 4 Metaph., q.l2 , fol. B y-B^v , in answer to the seventh argument against the real distinction between essence and existence stating: "Septimo i*ealltas rei non distlnguitur ab ipsa re. Sed esse rei est sua realitas, quia nihil allud est dicere esse actualiter quam esse realiter." replies: "Ad septimura negatur major de realitate existentiae et conceditur de realitate essentiae. Nee est veruin quod existent ia sit tota realitas, quia rosa non existente Ista est ve3?a: rosa est ens reale." Cajetan speaks of the rose in Part I, p. 25 and in cap. 5 In De Ente et Essentia edit. Laurent , p. 154 and p.l5ti to the fourth argument of Antonius Trorabetta, v;hich is much like that foimd in Soncinas: "Praeterea. Nulla res componit cum sua realitate: ergo nulla quiditas differt realiter a sua existentia. Tenet consequentia, quia existentia est ipsa realitas rei, nihil enim aliud est dicere rem esse realiter J quara existere et e converse. Antecedens est de se notura. Ridiculum est enira dicere quod aliquid componat cum sua realitatem." Cajetan replies, again like Soncinas: "Ad quartum dicitur quod sicut esse est duplex scilicet existentiae et essentiae, ita duplex est realitas essentiae et existentiae, et licet nulla res componat cum sua realitate, tEimen cum hoc stat, quod componat ctim realitate existentiae; unde essentia hominis absolute in reali praedicaraento, substantiae scilicet, reponitur: posita autem in rerum natura fit realis realitate existentiae." Sylvester of Perrara alludes to the same man is a doctrine but in tenus of the proposition rational animal, in Part I, p. 28. Javellus also mentions the e:caraple of the rose in Part I, p. 33. Giles of Rome is also in this tradition, possibly at its source, as can be seen in the reference in Part I, note #49.
,
32.
Suarez is not using "ex nature rei" in the technical sense of a modal distinction but rather in the broad sense of an actual distinction in the thing prior to any intellectual activity. Thus, in this brx>axi sense, it refers to both the real and modal distinctions. Alonso Briseno op. cit ., p. 515 #74 refers to this argument of Suarez as follows: "Nee infirma apparet contra Thomistas ea probatio, quae eruitur ex sententia S. Thomae autumantis humanitatem Christi Domini creatam existent iam non sortiri, sed existere per increatum verbi existentiam. Supposlto autem quod h\amanitas ab aetemo propriam realitatem et positionem in esse
33.
amaa
.S
.t'.
.>v
-431-
essentiae slbi vendlcasset. Inutllls enim esset ac prorsus inanis, ac fictitia. positlvae realitatls essentiae, in esse essentiae, vel accessio, vel repetitio, si hmnanitas talem realitatem positivam in esse essentiae ab aetemo praesetulisset. Qxiare Pranciscus Soarius loco citato (in stia Metaphysica, disp. 31 de ente finite sect. 2) sub niiraer. 5 fatetur ingenue: 'Quod nullus Catholicus existiinare potest, illam rem essentiae humgmitatis, secundum id totura, quod in ea concipitur praecisa existentia, et aetemitate habere actu illam entitatem, soluraque illi defuisse unionem ad Verbum' ," Su2u?ez is countering the fifth Thomistic argument seen above in Part I, p. 55. In D.M., 31, XII, rrl5 et seq., he writes a lengthy rebuttal, of which #20 is of interest to Suarez' argument here in II, #5: "Tertio inferri potest (cf . #l3 Quapropter ex opposita sententia sequi videntur haec absurda). Verbum fuisse unitura hiimanitati ut intellectae in esse essentiae tantum, quod ab aetemo habebat, quia praeter illud esse non habet humanitas aliud, nisi esse existent iae; si ergo hoc esse existentiae in hiimanitate Chrlsti non fuit aliud, nisi esse Verbi, ergo illud esse fuit immediate unitum humanitati, quae secundum se aetema erat; igitur incarnari nil aliud fuit quam aetemam essentiam trahere ad increatum esse Verbi. Haec autem non est incamatio, sed fictlo, quia ilia essentia aetema nihil fuit, nee est assumptibilis secundum id praecise quod ex se et ex aetemitate habet j ergo necesse est ut aliquod aliud esse ei prius tribuatur prioritate naturae, vel saltem rationis, quod satis est ut illud esse sit distinctiim a subsist entia divina, quae per unionem coramunicatur."
34. 35. 36.
J. Paulus, op. cit
.,
p. 133.
37.
This is seen even moi^ explicitly in Sixarez* answer to the fifth objection D.M., 31, II, #6. His amswer is found in #11 and will be analyzed in this Part IV, p. 174 et seq.
38.
The reason would seem to be th* he, too, is holding a doctrine of two kinds of nothing, not in the sense that he will grant that the essence has no efficient cause and thus has some irreducible i*eality of itself apart from existence, but in the sense that what does not
lie-
.ee
-432-
exist yet can exist, since it is a possible, i.e. the essence as possible, is still something real. Not as real as the actual essence but it is real as apt to exist. Tlius, it is real in potency which thus distinguishes it from "entia rationis" like :ihimerae. In short, he is holding for a " nihil existent iae " which is the possible essence apt to exist,
39.
Cf. A. Pegis, op. cr. pp. 159-174. for some texts on The similarity to
gi t., p. 379> n.l and 2 and esp. E. Gllson, History... , p. 791, n.33
40.
All five objections are fovind in D.M., 31> the replies are found in #7 to #11.
Cf. Suarez D.M,, 30, XV, #27,
H*
#6 and
41.
For there, in the context of " De Scientia Dei circa creaturas possibiles" , we read: "Hie autem occurrebat quaestio Theologica, an haec scientia Dei ponat vel supponat aliquod esse in creaturis, ut cognosci possint, etiajn ut possibiles, quam disputant Henric, in suram. qu. 23 et 25* et Quodlib. 8, q.l et 9, et t^uodlib. 9, a.l et 2, et Quodlib. 11, q.3j Scotiis in I. d.35 et 3o, et in II, dist. 1, a.l, art. 2, et in Quodlib., q.l et 14, Capreol. in III (I ?)> dist. 35; Cajetan, et alii, I part., quaest. 14, art. 5 et 6 q. Sed non est, quod in ea immoremur hoc loco, 34, art. 3. quia de essentia creaturaruni, antequam sint, de quo disputat Henricus, dicturi suraus infra, tractsmdo de ente finito, et de distinctione essentiae et existentiae in illo; de esse autem cognito creaturarura, de quo tractat Scotus, solum potest esse et I'evera est dissensio in modo ioquendi; diciiiitur enira creaturae esse cognitae ab aliquo esse reali, non. quod in se habeant, sed in Deoj Deus enim cognoscendo creaturas, habet illas peculiar! modo in esse preraesentativo seu ideali, ut sumitur ex D, Them., I p., quaest. 14, art.l, et qiiaest. quaest. l6, art. 7; et A\igust., 6 15* per totara, et De Trinit., cap. ult., 5 Genes, ad lit., cap. 14, lib. Quaestionum, quaest. 46; et alios refert Waldens., 83. lib. I Doctrinalic fidei antiquae, cap. 8. Ab illo autem esse, quod creaturae in Deo habent, denorainantur cognitae, sed haec sol\.un est denominatio extrinseca in illis, solumque esse potest fundamentum alicujus relationis rationis. Neque aliud esse fingi potest sine magno errore, tam in fide quam in omni ratione natural!. Nee Scotus aliud intendit, ut ex citatis locis aperte constat, et iterura dicetur disputatione sequent!." This problem receives its theological
'.^4
y.'^a
ci.
^t
o.
-433-
treatment In Suarez* commentary In I S. Th. Bk. Ill , cap. 2, #1-#21. Cf. also In I S.Th ., Bt. II, cap. 26. Note slIso the last text cited in note #5 above.
42.
Suarez here abstracts from the theological aspects of the question In order to treat how possible creatures terminate the knowledge of God auid what " esse " they are understood to have in order to do so. This Is properly the metaphysical question at issue. Cf, In I S. Th ., BK. Ill, cap. 2, #21. For the names of the theologians involved in this problem and vriiich are omitted here cf. ibid ., #3-#6, #6, #14-#19, #20.
p. 87; E. Gilson, Jean P'ons , Scot , p. 287-28BTlir3l^ry . . , p. 466-467; p.7bBb, n.74 where Francis of Mayronnes uses this same terminology of "secondary object" after the fashion of Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus.
43.
44.
Cf. D.M., 30, XV, #25: "Sec\indum est, sclentlara Dei non respicere creaturas, nisi ut objectura secundariiun; nam primario solum versatur circa ipsum Deum, quem comprehendendo quasi per i*esultantiam quamdam cognoscit omnes posslbiles creaturas, et hoc sensu proprilssime dicitur illas cognoscere in seipso tanquam in causa." Cf. In I S.Th ., Bk. Ill, cap. 2, #13: "Alio modo intelligi potest Deus xmico et simplicissimo actu, intueri se, et in se creaturas, it a ut quando actus ille nuo se intelligit, concipitur a nobis transire ad creaturas,
non intelllgitur esse quasi novus actus etiam ratione distinctus, sed idem conceptus secundian utrumque terminum, quem habet, primarium et secundarium."
45.
46.
Cf. Suarez, De auxil., opusc. II, 8, 5; Tome II, p. 328 as cited by Eleuterio Elorduy, S.J,, "El concepto objectivo en Sudrez", Pensaraientc " , IV, (1948), P.38O: "Distinguenda ergo est in objecto duplex habitudo; una est principii, altera quasi termini. Priori modo, est verum non esse in objecto divinae scientiae inquirendian entitatem, seu realitatein per quam possit esse principium talis scientiae j quia sclent ia Dei non sumitur ab hoc objecto, praesertim quia hoc objectum est secundarium respectu illius scientiae secundxira se, et ita quoad hoc cessat dlfflcultas. Posteriori autem
modo possunt futura contingentia terminare divlnam scientam, etiamsl ab aetemo non habeant existentiam aetemam ab Deura, sed tantum pro suis tempo ribusj quia
9>-
T'
-434-
hoc terrainare non est allquld reale intrinsecum in objecto determinante sclent lam, sed est denominatlo extrlnseca proveniens ab Ipsa sclent la." In the same place note p. 365 for some texts and also In n,50. Cf, E, Gilson, Jean Dims Scot , p. 282 et seq; esp. p. 321, p,ti5-o7; G. Smith, op. clt ., p. 239, J. Paulus, op. clt ."
47.
Siiarez refers to St. Thomas: "ut recte dixit D. Thorn., I part., q.l4 art. 9, et I Cont. Gent., cap. 66." where
Scientia visioniif "Quaedam enira, licet non sint nunc in actu, tsunen vel fuerunt vel erunt; et omnia Ista dicitur Deus scire scientia visionis", and " Scientia slmpllcls Intelllgentiae" "Quaedam vero siint, quae sunt in potentia Dei vel creaturae, quae tamen nee sunt nee erunt neque fuerunt. Et respectu horum non dicitur habere scientiam visionis, sed simplicis intelllgentiae." Cf. also Capreolus, op. clt ., I Sent. d.33, q.l, a. 2, especially ad arg. Aureolo contra quartam conclusionem. Vol. II, p. 463.
St. Thomas explains
: :
"
48.
49.
"
Capreolus makes use of this same example in I Sent ., d.38, q.l, a. 2, Vol.11, p. 465b. Cf. Matthew of Aquasparta, "Ten Disputed questions on Knowledge", trans. R. McKeon in Selections from Mediaeval Philosophers , Vol.11, p. 263. "Ad 12. To the twelfth it must be said that God is cause of things, and things the cause of our knowledge in different manners. For God is the whole cause of things and cause of the whole of things therefore, things depend on His providence. But things are not the necessary cause of our knowledge; for God could imprint on our understanding species of things throxigh which we should know as he imparts them to angels." Cf. comments of E. Gllson, Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy , p. 234. For a discussion of the Avicennlan source of this tradition one may consult with profit, A.C. Pegis, "Matthew of Aquasparta and the Cognition of Non-Being", Scholastica Ratlone Histcrlco Crltlca Instauranda Acta Congressus Scholastic! Intemationalis Romae Amio SST^o MgML Celebratl , (Rome, 1^31), pp.4bl-480.
:
#mi
51.
A.C. Pegis, "Dilemna of Being and Unity", p.162-163. For the relations of Henry of Ghent with Ockham and nominalism cf. J. Paulus, op. cit ., pp. 137-198, 376-394, esp. 387-388.
.84
A'
-435-
52.
53.
54.
The complete rebuttal of the first Thomistic argument is found in D.M., 31, XII, ,f38-#47. Herein, we find ourselves in familiar territory, traversed by Capreolus, Soncinas, Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara and Javellus. Let us see Suarez at work. He first gives a very Just suramation of the basis for saying that the essence and, consequently, the essential predicates have no efficient cause. It amounts to this when existence is removed, the essence perishes and along with it those piKjpositions in which essential predicates are affirmed. Thus they woiJild not be necessary nor have perpetual truth. This would mean that all truths concerning creatures would be contingent and the death of science would be at hand, for science is of necessary truths. For, if essence is nothing without existence, then there would be no substance, nor accident, no body, nor soul nor anything of the like! Hence no essential attribute could rightly be predicated of an essence which is a nonentity. In view of our reseaich into the sources of the first Thomistic argument this is a very perceptive and very Just appraisal of the Thomistic position. Suarez next reports a position on this question which is similar to that of the objector in Capreolus' teatment, for (cf . Part I, p. 12), in view of the difficulties if essence perishes with the loss of existence, Suarez says that some modem theologians concede that propositions about creatures are not perpetually true, but begin to be true v/hen the creatures come to be and lose their truth when they perish, basing themselves on Aristotle's dictum " ab eo quod res est, yel non est, propositio vera vel falsa est ." However, Siiarez remarks that this is not only contrary to the modem philosophers but also to the " emtiqu i hilosophl" as vxell as to the Fathers of the ChurcIT. Se then cites tvro texts of St. Augustine, cited by Capreolus in I. Sent , d.8, q.l. Vol. I, p. 303b ind p.304b, md refers to a text of St. Anselm. Siiarez further complicates the issue by criticizing anyone who says, after St. Thomas, that, when the existence of creatures is destroyed, the propositions about them are not true in themselves but in zhe
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-436-
dlvine intellect. If this is said, Suarea says it is not a satisfactory solution because not only the propositions with essential predicates are pei*petually true in the divine intellect but all true accidental and contingent propositions are liue. Thus, Suar'es is not content with a solution v^ich maintains that, if truth is properly in an intellect, eternal truth can only find place in an eternal intellect, since created intellects are not eternal. And if anyone says that there is a difference between such propositions because, though all are perpetually in the divine intellect, still it is not with the same necessity, for those truths containing essentijil predicates are so present in the divine intellect that they cannot not be in it; whence they are absolutely necessary and unconditionally Further, if it is said that the other contingent so. truths, although they have always been in the divine intellect, yet not with absolute necessity but only on the supposition that they will be at some future time, Suarez says this increases the obstacles against the initial position. In addition, Suares insists that these propositions are not true because they are Imown by God, but rather, they are knoxm because they are time, other\;ise, no reason could be rendered why God necessarily knows then to be true* For, if their truth came forth from God himself it would do so by means of the will of God. Thus, their truth would not arise necessarily but volimtarily and thus contingently. Likewise, Suarez insists that these propositions are not true because known by God, since, in relation to these propositions, the divine intellect is merely speculative and not oper*ative. But the speculative intellect supposes the truth of its object and does not maQce it. Hence, Suarez concludes that the propositions in the first and second mode of predicating " per se " have perpetual truth not only as they are in the divine intellect but even in themselves as prescinding from the divine intellect. Suarez would seem to be holding that God's knowledge of such " per se" propositions is in some way posterior to these propositions since their perpetxial truth arises from the intrinsic identity of subject and predicate which identity, Suarez says in D.M., 31, II, #8 God knows most simply, we however know it by composition. And in keeping with this he states that, consequently the most common and received opinion is that these propositions are perpetually true as St. Ablert teaches with the ancient Arabs, namely Avicenna, Algazel and
-437-
Alfarabi, By way of comment on this Important text lest it be thought that Suarez is holding that there are eternal truths outside the divine intellect, I cite the following: "Remarquons d'ailleurs que par cette demiere affirmation Suarez ne contr'edlt pas i>ea affiriiiatioii& pr^c^dentesj il ne dit pas que ces Veritas sont vraies 'extra intellecturn diviniOT* et que mfene si Dieu n'existait pas, ces v^rit^s serai ent encore V3?aies, Etant accord^ qu'elles ne peuvent subsister etemellement ailleurs que dams I'entendement de Dieu, il reste que ce n'est pas, leur existence fetemelle dans cet entendement qui fonde leur v^rit^. L'esse verae' precede et fonde en elles I'esse cognitae* et ce n'est pas parce que Dieu les connalt qu' elles sont vraies, c'est parce qu'elles sont vraies en elles m:^liaes que Dieu les connalt. La n^cessit^ de leur v^rit^ les imposant k la connaissance divine, elle est logiquement ant^rieure h. la connaisssmce que Dieu en a," Cf . E. Gil son. La doctrine cart^sienne . , Though a critic of the Avicennian realism p. 49-50. of essence, Suarez still remains within that tradition. In St, A-.v.2rt, Suarez notes two texts which have figured proniinently in Capreolus' position, namely, in " Comment, libr. de Causis, propos. 8 " , and in " Postpraedicamentis , c.9". He then blithely remarks that 5t. Thomas, in the places cited (I p. q.lO, a. 3, ad. 3; q.l6, a. 7^ ad.lj q.l, De Verit., a. 5^ ad. 11; a.S, ad. 2 and 3) follows this same doctrine altho\igh he refers the perpetual truth of these propositions to the divine intellect. In addition, Suarez notes that Capreolus defends the same position in I dist. 8, q.l , conclus . , with texts from St. Thomas smd St. Albert, as does Soncinas in 9 Metaph. q.3 where he aJLludes to the follov/ing as holding the same position: Henry, Quodlib. 10, q. 2 and 3 ; Heivaeus, Qu odlib. 3j ql ; Scotus and other doctors in 3 dist. ^1 Suarez then adds to the list by including Cajetaui, I Poster., c.9 ; and Sylvester of Ferraira, 2 Contra Gentes, cap.p2 as well as some texts in ArSoETel Herein, Suarez as is his custom, is introdvicing his reader to the history of a problem but the problem is such that its I'amlfications are overwhelming. Ttxe insnediate context is the eternal truth of essential predications and thus the problem of predication is at issue as can be seen in the question asked by Soncinas In 9 Metaph. q.5 fol. T^vb-T^vb " Utrum propositiones factae de rebus non existent ibus in materia necessaria sint vere ?" Note his Respondeo: "I^espondeo quod circa hanc quaestionem dissenti\mt terministae et Jimicres dialectic!
. .
:
Ov
"
"
-438-
ab antiquls.
existiinant nullata propositionem esse veram cujus subjectum in rerura natura non est, Sed clarlssirai
philosophi oppositum putant, scilicet Albertus Map:ius, in libro de causis, capitulo 8 et in post praedlcamentis, capittilo 9 et S, Thomas, De Veritate q.o a.l, 9.... Idem tenuit Henricus, quolibet 10, q.3 et Hervaeus, quolibet, 3* q. prima, et Scotus et conimuniter alii doctores 3, d.21...." Compare this to the text of Javellus cited in PaLrt I note #75. Also involved is the problem discussed by Soncinas In 3 Metaph. qlQ Utrum coraplexa, de praedlcatls quidditativis habeant causaia effectlvarii ?" wlriich contains overtones of the first Thoraistic argument foimd in Suarez and thus implicitly influences the problem of the distinction of essence and existence. Capreolus' reference as well as that of Ferrara explicitly treat this problem of the distinction of essence and existence, thus tying in with this last question of Soncinas, Hervaeus Natalis in Quodlibet I q.lO, fol. 22vb-24va treats a similar question to that fovind in Soncinas, 5 Metaph, q.lO for there Hervaeus says: "Ad tejrtium sic proceditur. Et arguitur quod repugnat fidei ponere aliquid coraplex\an esse creatum et cum hoc esse necessarium, quia repxignat ponere aliquid incomplexum esse creatum, et cum hoc necessarium, . , In Contrarium est, quia incomplexum esse creatum et necessarium, non repugnat fidei. Ergo nee complexura,,. Circa istam quaestionem principaliter simt duo facienda. Primum est videre de causa istorum complexorura quae dicuntur esse necessaria, scilicet utrum habeant causam. Secundo respondebitur ad quaestionem." It would seem that this book by H, Elie, Le complexe significabile , would be helpful but it is not available to me. In sum the problem is, does essence have an efficient cause? In Quodlibet 3* q.ljfol. 67vb the first problem at stake is: " Priinum pertlnet ad intellectiun et est uti^um varitas dicat ens ratlonisT" Javellus in 5 Metaph. q.l2, p. 751bp.753a harks back to Hervaeus and Soncinas in his question: Si necessaria habent causam efficientem ?" In this Javellus follows Hervaeus versus Soncinas: "Pro resolutione igitur hujus dubii tria agenda sunt, Primo quia intendo sequi Hervaeum in quodlibet I, q,10 cujus sensura in hoc dubio repute esse Thomisticum, praepono aliquas distinctlones , . Tertio solventur rationes Pauli Soncinatis qui in 5 Metaph, quaestio 10 tenet contra Hervaeum." Ponseca in 5 Metaph., cap, 5, q.l and 3, col, 315-336 treats the same problem in these terms: "Utrum ea.
'
5
1.
A
1
-439-
Q uae. sunt slrapliclter necessariaj causam habeant ?" The texts of St. Albert relate the pxoblera of essent ial predication to tliat of the divine ideas. Thus, we are here in this section of Suarez witnessing the confluence of the problem of essential pi'edication, the problem of the distinction between essence and existence, the problem of the divine ideas and I suspect we a3?e vritnessing facets of the problem of God's knowledge of future contingents the problem " de auxiliis" . After noting the histoi*y of the problem, Suarez refers to that qualification of the Thomistic stand that the essence of the creature has no efficient cause which we found instanced in Soncinas and Sylvester of Ferrara above (cf. Part I), For, Suarez notes that this position is declared in such a way by many of the above-mentioned authors that they say the essences of creatable things are not eternal, absolutely speaking, as Suarez had shown above in Section II of his thirtyfirst disputation. Rather, they say that the connection cf essential predicates with these essences is eternal. This Is the very qualification of Soncinas and Ferrara when they assert that the created essence, e.g. man, has an efficient cause but that the connection signified in the proposition man is a rational animal, has no efficient cause. For, as Suai*ez tells us, many of these say further that, vfhen things are created the essences of things are created and come to be, yet the above-mentioned connection does not come to be, for it is one thing for essence to come to be, but it is another for such an essence to be of such and such a thing, e.g. the etjcjence of man, horse etc. Suarez grants, along with these men, that the first is true, for the created essence, absolutely speaking, lias an efficient cause because, as Suarez has shown, not only the existence of things are created but also the essences. These men, however, say that, the fact that essence is of such a thing, does not have an efficient cause nor is it created because of itself it is necessary and perpetual; that is to say, that man or animal has an efficient cause but that Peter be a man or man be an animal does not have an efficient cause because that connection of itself is altogether necessary. Whence, Suarez tells us that, as a consequence, they say that, although the essence of the creature has a cause, still the truth of the essence does not have a cause because the truth of a thing consists in that necessary connection which is perptual and has no cause. In this way there is science of necessary and perpetxial truth.
.3
"1
-440-
In #42 Suarez* critique begins. Here is a sample: "Sed haec etiam sententia, nisi amplixis declaretur, non videtur posse defendi. Primo, quia si connexio ilia talis praedicati cum subjecto aeterna est, inquire quid sit extra Deum, nam vel est aliquid, vel nihil; si aliquid, quoinodo est aetema sine causa efficiente? Si nihil, mlriam quidera non est quod efficientem causam non habeat, rairum taraen est quod possit esse aeterna, aut quod sit realis connexio, si nihil est. Item connexio nihil aliud est quam unio; unio avitem res aut modus rei esse debet; si ergo nulla res est aetema, neque etiam unio rerum esse potest aeterna, quia modus rei non potest esse sine re. Praeterea, quomodo potest essentia habere efficientem causam, et non habere ab ilia ut sit talis rei essentia? Nam si essentia fit, in aliqua re seu entitate fit; ergo per eamdem efficientiam habet, quod sit talis rei essentia. Et confirmatur. . ," Michael de Palacios, In I Sent., dist.8, disp.2, fol. 8lra-8lrb in the context of his fourth conclusion: " Quarta conclusio essentiae rerum non sunt aetema " notes a qualification similar to that of Soncinas and Ferrara: "Quod vero quidam decertant essentias esse aeternas, non 4'-i'3^ ipsae extitlssent aeterno, at quod connexiones sunt verae aeterno, ut homo est animal rationale, aut quod tria et duo sunt quinque." His critique parallels that of Sxxarez.
55
Suarez cites: "D. Thorn. I part, quaest. 10, art.3j ad. 3" a text also cited by Capreolus cf. Part I note #42 and wherein St. Thomas says nothing about the " objective" presence of these eternally true propositions in the divine Intellect. Rather, St. Thomas merely insists tltb eternal truths exist in an eternal Intellect. Note however, tnat Suarez is not altogether happy with this text of St. Thomas cf. D.M., 31 XII. #40-#4l and note #54 above. For Suarez' notion of objective'' presence cf, note #22 above in this Part,
56.
But is this conditional necessity nothing more than the necessity of a fact in no va.y implying an order of essence within being? This merely means that the creature is totally contingent. Suarez* position on this conditional necessity is found in his remarks on the second sense of the copula " est" . Cf. D.M., 31* XII, #45: "At ver-o in alio sensu propositiones sunt verae, etiamsi extrema non existant; et in eodem svmt necessarie ac perpetuae veritatis, quia ciim copula est , in dicta sensu non slgnif Icet existentiara, non
'
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attribuit extremis actiialem realitaten in seipsis, et ideo ad suara veritatem non requlrit existentiam, seu realitatem actualen. Item, hoc declaratur ex praedictis auctoritus, quia propositiones in hoc sensu reducuntur ad sensun hyixjtheticxJiT; seu conditionattsn; cum eniia diciraus hominera esse animal, abstra^iendo a tempore, nihil aliud diclnus, nisi hanc esse hominis naturam, ut non possit fieri homo quin sit animal. Unde, sicut haec conditionalis est perpetua, "Si est, homo, est animal*, vel 'Si currit, movetur', ita haec est perpetiia, 'Homo est animal*, vol, 'Cursus est motus*. Atquc hinc ctiair. fit ut h&e connexiones in hoc sensu non hafceant causara efficientem, quia omnis eff icientia terminatur ad actualem existentiam, a qua dictae propositiones in hoc sensu abstrahunt. Et hoc solum probant rationes illae quae congerit Concinas locis citatis, Imo, in hoc eodem sensu non solijn non requirunt hae connexiones causara efficientem in actu, verum etiara neque in potentia videntur lllain postulare, si foiTnaliter ac praecise cistamus In earun veritate... Quanquam in hoc possiraui; discrimen assignare inter connexiones nccessarias, conceptas et enunclatas inter res possibiles seu essentias reales, et inter res flctitias vel entia rationis, quod in lllis ita est connexio necessaria secundum intrinsecam habitudinem e:ctremorum abstrahentium ab actuali exist entia, ut tamen sit posslbills in ordine ad actualem existentiam, et hoc totum potest significari per copulam ' est *, etiam ut a tempore abstrahit, ita ut, cum dicitur * Homo est animal rationale' , significetur, hcaninera habere essentiam realem sic definibilera, seu (quod idem est) esse talo ens, quod non est fictura, sed reale, saltern possibile; et quoad hoc pendet Veritas talium enuntlationism a causa potente efficere existentiam extremorum. ." Herein Suares deviates from the position of the objector in Capreolus for whom the necessity of essential predication was a conditional necessity on the condition that the subject exist. Here, in Suarez, the conditional necessity is grounded on the possible essence on the condition that it is to be produced. Note the remarks of Alonso Brlsefio, op. cit ., p. 510 #55 "Probatio autem Maironii dum ostendit aetemam veritatem necessarium enuntiationum non salvari, si necessitas ilia essendi absoluta non sit, sed ex hypothesij ac proinde quae conditionate tantum enuntiet, quod homo sit animal, suppositio nimirum, quod homo exist at; urget Soarium in sxia Metaph. disp. 31 Section. 12 a,n.39 usque ad '47. Quern etiam perstringit
.
.442-
Malronlus in I dlst.42 q.6 ubi quaerit: Utrum ad veritatera propositionis requlratur entitas terminorum?' Versicul, Secundus modus dlcendi." Note #58: "Quam Maironll etrsuiaentatlonem sic etlara contra Soarium expendlt Albertinus, Tomo 2 sue rum corollarium, sub praedicamento substcintiae disp. I quaest. I conclus. Quia si termini complexlonis necessariae X sub num. 27. propriara sibi realitatem essentiae non vendicarent, quae per copulam (est) absolute, et sinpliciter, et absque conditione, et hiipothesi, exprimi posset: fieret, ut enuntiatio contin^ens eamdera necessitatera praeseferret quam necessaria." Cf . p. 523, #98; "Ad arpiumentvim Malronii pro Henrico 4 sub. n\tter. 54 usque ad 58 (p.509) quod ex veritate aeterna necessarivan complexionum producebat realitatem positivam terminorum inter se connexorum. Respondeturj convincere contra Soatrium, veritatera hujusraodi enxmtiationum non esse conditionata, seu non lmpori;are hypothesim vel conditlonem exlstentiae, sive realitatis posit ivae terminorum, non tamen invehi in connexionera necessariam terminorum^ quae salvari potest absque exercita posit ione extreraorum, cum sola potent iali et sigr.ata. Cum enim asseriraus hominem esse animal, sicut (ly est) ab omni dxiratione temporarla, et existentiali absolviturj ita nee aliud importat quam connexionem necessariam inter utrumque extremum, hominem actu esse animal i sed utrumque extremum actu import are connexionem cum non repugnantia ad existendum." For a brief appreciation of Francis of Ma^Tr'onnes, mentioned in the above texts, one may consult E. Gilson, Histoi-y... , p. 466-467, 768 n.74.
57,
As Suarez notes in his complete rebuttal of this second D.M., objection based on the first Thomistic argument 31, XII. #44: "Haec vero controversia (ut nihi quidem videtur) tota consistit in varia significatione illius copulae * est *, per quam conjunguntur extrema in his enuntiationibus . Duobus enim modis accipi potest. Primo, ut significet actualem et realem conjunctionem extremomira in re ipsa existentem, ita ut, cum dicitur, ' homo est animal ' significetur reipsa ita esse. Secundo, solum sitiHificet, praedicatiira esse de ratione subjectl, In priori sensu Veritas sive extrema existant, sive non. propositionxom pendet sine dubio ab existentia extreraorum, quia juxta illajii significationem verbura est *, non absolvitur a tenttxsre, seu (quod idem est) slgnificat realem et actualem duratlonem, quae nulla est, albata existentia extiEmoruia, et ideo talis propositio falsa est, nam est affirmativa de subjecto non supponente.
'
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Et in hoc eodera sensu, optlrae probant rationes proximae factae^ veritatem harmn enuntiationtun pendere ex causa efficiente, a qua pendet existentia extremorum. Item probatur, non solum essentiara creatara, absolute suniptum, habere causam efficientem, sed etiam applicationem essentiae (ut sic dicam) ad hanc rem habere causam efficientem. Id est, non solum hominem vel animal habere causam efficientsm, sed etiam, hominem j-eipsa esse animal, habere causam effisientera." Herein Si;arez seems to be faithful to the position taken by the objector in Capreolus' trcEbment. Cf. note #5'^ above for the other sense of the copula " est" .
58,
Suarez lias some clarifying remarks in D.M,, 31, XII, #45 in an answer to azi objection: "...semper ergo reatat dlfficultas tacta, quonodo, scilicet, si objectum illud in se nihil est, poalt ex se habere talem connexionera praedicatorum, ut fundet aliquo raodo necei?sitatem talis scientiae, et talis veritatis, ac talis exeng>laris. Ad hoc dicend\im videtur, hanc oonnexionem nihil aliud esse quam identltatem extremorum, quae sunt in propositionibus essentialibus et affirmativis (idem dicend^jm est pi-^Dportioaaliter de diversitate exti'emoruitt in neeativis). Omnis onira Veritas p2opositionis affimativae fundatur in aliqua extremorum identitate vel imitate, quae, licet a nobis concipiatur complexo modo, et per modun conjunctionis pracdicati cum subjecto, tamen in re nihil est praeter ipsararaet rei entitatem. Identitas autem, cum sit propietas entis (nam idem et diversum ad unitatem reducuntur, ut supra diximus), in omni ente, seu in orani statu entis cum proportione reperitur. Unds, sicut homo existens et aniaal in re idem sunt, ita homo possibilis, seu qui objici potest scientiae aut exeraplari hominis, identitatem iriabet ciim animali piX>portionaliter svmiptoj liaec ergo identitas sufficiens e-:it ad fundandam illam necessitatem, et reperiri potest in ente in potentia, quamvis nihil sit actu, quia nihil addit enti in potentla, nisi habitudinem rationis in ordine ad conceptus nostros." Cf. also D.M., 31, I, #2 for 3\Aare::' glossary on " esse" "Esse autem veritatis propositionis, ex se non est esse reale et intrinsecum, sed est esse quoddam objectivum in intellectu componente, unde convenit etiam privationibus Sic enira diclmus, caecitatem esse, vel hominem esse caecum, ut latius Arist., 5 Hetaph,, capite septimo."
; .
flif
59
Cf , previous note for Suarez as well as note #18 above In this Part and D.M., 31, III, #7. For Scotus, consult E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot , p. 204, n.l - p. 205, 291 n.l,
295.
Cf. J. Paulus, op. cit ., p. 133.
50.
Note the example of the rose. Cf. note #31 above for possible sources of this objection.
Cf. D.M., 31* II, #6.
61.
This is important for Suarez' remarks in D.M,, 31# VI, #23 on the meaning of essence.
Cf. Soncinas, 9 Metaph. q.4, ad. 3, fol. T^v: "Ad
62.
tertium dicitur quod dupliciter aliqua possunt dici uiiuin niimero. Uno modo positive, quia scilicet quodlibet eorum est ens positivum, et abinvicem sunt indistlncta ita quod ad talen unitatera hae duae rationes requiruntur et sic negatur minor quia omni forma producibilis sit nihil nulli rei potest esse idem positive. Secundo modo dicuntxir aliqua esse xinum negative quia scilicet non sunt actu distincta ciim altenun eorum sit purum nihil cui repugnat actualis distinctio licet istud nihil aliquando ei^t illud ens cum quo nunc dicitur esse
unura ne;ative.
."
.
63.
Cf . notes #54 and 7f56 above in this Part. With respect to Suarez remarks in note #54 on the possibles in relation to speculative i^aiowledge, there is a very close doctrinal similarity to Avicenna as noted by Gerard Smith, op. cit ., p. 240-241: "Now back of God's decision to create an " esse essentiao ", according to Avicenna, there is only speculative icnowledge (of the " esse essentlae" ), not practical knowledge... Without the control of practical reason it is small wonder that Avicenna' s Eohippus marches all the way to nominalism. What, after all, is nominalism if not a denial of God's wisdom and its discernible outlines in His artifacts?"
Cf. D.M.,
31, III, especially #1.
64. 65.
66.
67.
Cf. Cajetsui, In De Snte et Essentia , cap. 4, q,6, #59, edit. Laurent, p. 92. Suarez as in the case of Capreolus, has a text of Cajetan to cite in favor of his doctrine of real essence. Banez also maintains this distinction
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of Cajetan in In S.Th ., I, q.lO, a. 3: "Essentiae rerum antequam exist airit sunt entia realia, ut ens reale distingiiitur contra fictltiura, non tamen ut distinguitu.r contra non existens in actu, secundum distinctionem Cajetani in 1. de Ente et Essentia, CIV, q.6." as cited in J. Ilaritaln, Dl stinguer pour unir ou les degres du savoir , p. 178, n"m
68.
Cf D.M., 6, IV J ^!^: "...qiiando eniia dicitur res habere esse tanttjn in causis,prius quam existat, duo dic\intiir: priraum est, quod in causa est virtus ad dandum esse tali rei, quae virtus quasi per denorainationem extrinsecara denoininat effectum esse, non siinpliciter, sed in causa, et quantum ad hoc non amittitur tale esse in causa, etiamsi res in se et extra causam producatur, quia virtus causae integra inanet. Aliud, quod indioatur, cum dicitur res habere esse in causa, est in se nondum existere, et hoc est quod amittitur, quando in se producitur; hoc autem non est positivuin, sed privativura, ut constat. Dices, ultra haec esse ex parte effectus modum quemdatn potentialem, quo possibilis dicitur, qui modus amittitur, ex quo incipit existere. Respondetur, hunc non esse modian positivum ex parte effectus distinctum a praedictis, quia, ut dicetur inferius tractando de essentia st existentia, aptitudo objectiva rerura possibiliuiii ad existendura non est ex parte illarum, nisi non repu^antia quasdam, et ex parte causae denotat potentiam ad illas producendas .
.
69.
70.
Cf , S. Gilson, Jean Puns Scot , p. 202 n.2, p. 29I n.3, p. 292 n.l, p. 293 n.l. Cf . El Gilson, History... , p. 791 n.33; P. Copleston, A History-... , Vol. Ill, p. 90,
Cf. Gerard Smith, op. cit., p. 238.
Cf. J. Paulus, op. cit
.,
71.
72.
73.
74.
Cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodlib. Ill, q.9 (edit. Paris, 1518), fol. 60v-62r; J. Paulus, op. cit ., p. 25, 114-115 notes; E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, p. 109, 203, P.310 n.2.
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-446-
75.
in proof of his fifth conclusion: " Qulnta concluslo est quod aliquod esse est ipsa essentia creaturae^ aliquod yero esse eat actualitas ejus, et aliquod esse non esF hoc nee aliudT" The objectbr in Suarez interprets this text of St, Thomas after the fashion of the doctrine of Henry of Ghent. That is, he interprets St. Thomas' first meaning of " esse" which says the quiddity or nature of the thing, to mean " esse essentiae ". Cf, note #11 in Part III above,
76.
77.
78.
p. 34-103.
J. Paulus, op. cit .j p. 131 et seq; E, Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, p.2ti9 n.l, p. 291 n.l. This is the meaning noted by Suarez in his glossary at the outset of this thirty-first disputation. Cf. D.M., 31, I, #2: "Nam esse essentiae, si vere condlstlngultur ab existentla, nihil addit Ipsi essentiae, sed solum differt ab Ilia in modo quo conclpltur vel slgnlflcatur); xmde, sicut essentia creaturae ut sic, ex vl sui conceptus non dlclt quod sit allquld reale actu habens esse extra causas s\ias, Ita esse essentiae ut sic, praeclse in illo sistendo, non diclt esse actuale, quo essentia extra causas constituatur In actu; nam si esse in actu hoc modo non est de essentia creaturae, nee pertinere poterlt ad esse essentiae ejus; ergo esse essentiae creaturae ut sic ex se praesclndit ab esse actuali extra causas, quo res creata fit extra nihil, quod nomine esse existent lae actualis significamus.
79.
Cf. J. Paulus, op. cit ., p. 285; S. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, p. 289 n.l.
80.
Gabriel Vazquez in his treatment of the problem of the distinction of essence and existence would seem to refer to this second meaning vfhich Suaies gives to " esse essentiae^ Cf. In III S.Th., q.iy. a.l , disp. 72, cap. 2, p.4a4b: "I4ulta sane praeter haec disputant Recentlores de esse et essentia, variasque circa rem hanc quaestlones raultlplicant, parvi sani, aut nullius raomenti, quae ex dictis facile dllui possunt. Prima est de esse essentiae quod vocant actuale, quidnam sit: (Cf Suarez, D.M., 31, IV-V) constat autem ex dictis nullvun esse actuale convenire essentiae; nisi esse, quod vocamus existentiae. Secundo est, quidnam
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slt exlstentia (Cf. Suarez, D.M., 31, VIII): patet autem, exlstentiam nihil aliud esse, quam essentiara Ipsam extra causas piKxiuctara. Tertla est de causis existentiae (Cf. Suarez D.M,, 31, VIIl), qais autem non videat, easdera esse causas existentiae, et ipsius essentiae ut actus sit? Quarta est de corapositione existentiae, an videlicet constet partibus (Cf . S\iarez D.M., 31, XI), Kvanifestum autein est easdera habere partes, et eodem inodo ac ipsam essentiam, siquidem ab ea non dlstinguutur." However, it must be said that in his remarks on the " esse essentiae quod vocant actiiale" , Vazquez may well be referring to the same Thomistic ti'adition we will soon witness in Suarez wherein essc esGentiae" is a real, actual " esse" yet in potency cf . D.M., to " existentia or an " esse existentia " 31, !CV, #7 and especially V, #3 and #b which will be discussed below.
**
''
8l,
This is the point of no return for Suarez' own teaching on the distinction between essence and existence as well as for his critique of the Thomistic doctrine. It is something to behold to see how Suarez achieves his destruction of the Thomistic position by proceeding slowly, dispassionately yet inexorably. Here, he is merely content to stand on his proven principle that the essence has an efficient cause. For Suarez can thus say that, even though he may grant, that " esse essentiae " is really distinct from the " esse existentiae" , which " de facto " he does not j;:rant, his principle that essence or " esse essentiae " demands an efficient cause, This sets the stage for Suarez' is still valid. insistance that his " esse essentiae" is the true existence and hence the creature is in no need of that Thomistic accretion the "esse existentiae".
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PART V
1.
D.M., 31, IIIj. #1. Suarez mentions this division of beins in his j Index Locupletissinius" . Cf. D.M., p. XLVIb: "Est auta^i pro totius libri intelligentia advertendum, aliud esse dividore ens in ens in potentia vel in actu, aliud vero dividere ens in ens, quod est potentia, vel quod est actus nam prior non est divisio in entia essentialiter diversa sed in diversos status ejusdem entis secundum rationem existendi; et in hoc eensu pauca dicit Philosophus in toto hoc librx); illam vero divisionem nos applicamus in Disp.31 sec, 3. Posterior autem divisio est secundum dlversas rationes essentiales entiiim, sive existentium actu, sive in potentia tantim..." Cf. also D.M., 2, IV, #8-#12, as well as D.M., 31, VI, #13. Note also an article by Jose Ignacio Alcorta, "Problemdtica deltema de la c3?eacion en Suirez" , Pensamiento , IV, (1943), p. 321.
Cf, D.M., 7, I, #2: "Aliquando vero considerrtur talis distinct io inter ens et non ens, aut inter non entia omnino diversa, et time vocatur distinct io realis
2.
negativa; quia \m\jati illorum extremorum non habet realitatem qaam habet aliud, si ens positi^oira et reale sit,,."
3.
Soncinas is at least one Sioarez likely has in mind. In 9 Metaph., q,3, fol, T^v; "Secundvim est quod duplex est dlstinctio quia altera est positiva, scilicet inter rem et rem quanom utraque est, sed una non est alia. Altera est negativa ad quam non requiritur utruraque extr*eraum esse, sed sufflcit alteram non esse, et hoc modo distinguitur ens a non ente, St sufficit ad hanc dlstinctionera quod hoc non sit illud,,, Unde dicltur quod aliud est lapldem existere et aliud est lapidem esse speciem et quaerltur utrum ista distiactio sit realis aut rationis. Dicendum est quod est rationis, quia alterura extremura est ens rationis... Dico igitur ad quaestionem quod entitas actu existens habet aliquid reale, scilicet existent lam quam non habebat dum esset potentialis. Dico secundo quod inter rosam actualem et seipsara potentialera, non potest esse distinctio positiva nee negativa realis quia ipsae non simt duae r-es, sed eadera. Alexander of Alexandria in his texts
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The reference to Sonclnas is correct In 9 Metaph., q.3, fol. T^rb-fol. T^ra, vrtierein Soncinas Is discussing the question: " Utrum eadem res quando est actu disting\;iatur reallter a seipsa quando est in potentla , puta rosa quae est a seipsa'prlusquam esset ". Let us note his following i^emarks to see if they Just i f Suarez' attribution: "Respondeo, et pro noticia hujus quaestionis praeiaitto aliqua. Primujn est quod rosa existens actu mere substantialiter accepta nihil addit supra quiditatera ixjsae nisi existentia a qua praescindit quiditas sec\mdum se accepta... Quartum est quod cum dico rosarr esse possibilera vel potentialem, sit denominatic rosae ab aliqua potent ia. , , Dico tertio quod rosa potent ialis, id est, id quod denoiainatur potentiale nihil habet in se reale a quo denominetur potentialis, sed ista denoniinatio est tantum ab extrinseco, scilicet a potentia agentis. Dico quarto quod praedicti modi non sunt reales ita quod esse potentiale dicat modura realem in ipsa re existentem quae dicitur potentialis, licet dicat modum realem in causa agente scilicet ejus potentiam activam... (fol. T'^vb) Patet ergo quod esse in actu et esse in potentia non dicit diversos inodos reales quorum unus est in ipsa re, scilicet esse in actu. Nam actualis existentia est in re existente. Alius veix) modus, scilicet esse in potentia est in causis effectus producibilis, nam rosa antequam producatur est in causis suis puta in virtute celi, dicitur enim quod in sole est rosa virtualiter quia sol habet vircutem productivam rosae, et ab ista potentia denoiiiinatur rosa possibilis." Simrez thus has a Thomist who holds his second principle Just as he had Capreolus maintaining in part his first principle. Thus, he is biding his tine till he is ready for an outright frontal attack.
v^iere he discusses the question: " Utrura potentia objectiva detur ?" At the outset he remarks: "Respondeo
5.
quod dari potentia objectivam expresse ab Henrico creditum est quolibeto primo q.9 et quolibeto 3 q.9. Et a Scoto 2 di. 6 priraura." And it is his intention to show that there is no such real potency called objective potency: "Contra istam opinionem teneo quod non est danda potentia aliqiia realis quae dicatur potentia objectiva distincta contra activam et passivara." Svjarez refers to Scotus "in 2 dist, 16 qiiaest, 1, Paragraph
2.
\}
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Rationes istae" . The texts cited from Alonso Briseno In Part TV note #5 would aeem to have place here also.
6.
Suarez cites " in , dlst. 12. guaest. 1..." Gilson, Jean Puns ocot, pp.433--43o.
Cf, E.
7.
8.
Interpretationem multi rejlciunt, impugnando acriter hanc potantiara objectivam. 3ed quoad hoc existimo de nomine et aequivoco hos oxua Scoto disputare; nam ille non intelllglt per potentiam ob.jectivam aliquan veram reia, q\iae sit actu in rertim natui-a, quo sensu sola potentia activa vel passiva est potentia realis, ut infra dicam latins, tractando de essentia oreatiirae, et declarando speciem qualltatis, quae e^t potentia; sed per potentiam objectivaju-ntelligit Scotus reri in statu possibili antequan actu sit, quomodo dicimus rem esse in potentia antequam sit; et quia res, ut est possibilis, est objectum potentiae actlvae, ideo dicitur ab Scoto esse in potentia objectiva. Atque ita dicit nanc potentiara et actuia esse ejusdem generis, quia res poasibilis et res in actu ejusdem /generis sunt; irao dicere etiam posset esse eamdem rem net^ative (ut aiunt), quia non sunt duae res, aed eadem, in diversis statibus concepta. Quocirca res, quam Scotufi in ea inteiTpretatione intendit, vera eat, non tamen recte accoiumodatur ilia interpi*etatione auctoribus, qui ante Scotum. illud axiona docueruntj Aristoteles enim, ut ex dictis patet, nxinquain in eo sensu locutus est, nee Averroes, qui loco citato ait potentiam et actimi esse dtfferentias oppositas; et cum 9 Metaphysicae, in principio, varias nuraeret potentiae acceptiones, nunquam fecit raentionem illius potentiae objectivae." On this sarae point with respect to Aristotle, Cf E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot , pp. 434-435.
9.
Cf. D.M., 7, I, #^-#8, #15 as well as the texts cited in Part II above.
J. Paulus, op. clt ., p,121,
10. 11.
Cf. D.M., 31> 11, #1: "...esset autem erix)neum dicere, Deura ex necessitate et absque libertate comraunicare creaturis aliquod esse reale participatuiu ab ipso, quanturavis diroinutum, cum de fide sit, Deum operari
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onmia secundum consillvua voluntatis suae." And In II, #3 Suai^z notes: "Est autem de fide certoim, Devua non fecisse essentias creatas ab aeterno, quia neque ex necessitate (ut arguinentabanrur contra opinlonem Scoto attrlbutam), cum de fide sit, Deum nihil agere necessario siinpliclterj neque ex libera voliontate; sic enim de fide est, in tempore coepisse operarl,"
12.
Suarez cites " D . Thorn. , I part . , quaest . 9 j arfc . 2" , where St. Thomas treats the question; " TJtrum Esse ImTiTutabile Sit Dei Proprium?
''^
13.
14.
15.
principaliter observandum est circa aliud extremum, scilicet, ens aut essentiam in actu addere existentiam ipsi essentiae." As we have seen in note #4 above, Soncinas makes such a remark: "Primura est quod rosa existens actu mere substantialiter accepta nihil addit supra quiditatem rosae nisi existentla a qua praescindit qulditas secundum se accepta." In another place. In 4 Metaph., q.l2, fol. B^ra Soncinas notes the following: "Sed requiritur aliquid ei additum quo formaliter existat. Et si sic dicatur habeo propositum, quod existentla addit rem super essentiam." Cf. Capreolus, op. cit .. In I Sent, d.8, q.l, a.l. Vol. I, p. 310b: '^Qioaeritur enim cur non est Ista vera, Aut hoc est ix>sa exsistit, sicut ista rosa est rosa. quod, ad hoc quod rosa exsistat, non sufficit quidditas rosae, sed oportet aliud addere quo formaliter existat Such et si sic dicat, habetur propositum nostr\n." texts seem to be what Suarez has in mind as well as those where existence " accldit " to essence. Sxiarez accepts this authentic dictixtn to be one of the guiding principles of the first Thomistlc argument, for there, D.M., 31, I, #4 he remarks: "Quod si dicas, cum fit creatura, non solum fieri esse, sed etiam essentiam creaturae, respondetiir, non fieri essentiam, sed fieri essentiam sub esse, seu fieri essentiam existentera, et ideo non sequi essentiam factam distingui ab essentia absolute, nisi ratione existentiae, quam illi addit."
16.
VHiat
Suarez has done by his rewording of the authentic dictum is to phrase it in such a way that it is reduced to the distinction between essence as "ens in actu"
.^I
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and essence as " ens In potent la vel ut posslbllls" or that betx^een being and non-being which he has agreed is a real negative distinction. Cf. D.M., 31, III, #1.
17.
18.
19.
This text, in so many words, is not fo\ind in the Louvain, 1646 edition of Giles* Quodlibets, but something very similar appears there. Cf. Quodlibet I, q.7, p.l6a: "Esse ergo nihil est adiud, quam quaedam actualitas impressa omnibus entibus ab ipso Deo, vel a primo entej nulla enim essentia creaturae est tantae actualitatis, quod posslt actu existere, nisi ei imprjjoatiir acti:ialitas quaedara: et ilia actualitas impressa vocatur esse." It must be noted that Capreolus cites this same text of Giles, op. cit .. In I Sent., d.8, q.l, a.l, Vol.1, p. 315a. Thus, Suarez interprets this to mean that essence in act adds existence to the essence. Since it is such texts as that of Giles of Rome which Suarez has in mind we can add the name of Javellus to the names of Capreolus and Soncinas in note #15 above, Cf Tractatus de Transcend, cap. IV, p. 466b: "Esse autem dlcit primam actualitatem impresaara cullibet enti creato a prima causa, qua fonnaliter exist it, exam ex se et sibi derelictum quocunque alio circumscripto existere non
possit.''
20.
By receptive potency
S\aarez means a potency that has some entitative actuality and is receptive of a further act. Cf. D.M., 31, VIII, #3 and D.M., 31, XIII, #3 where matter is given as an example of a receptive potency.
21.
This is an instance where Suarez is plajring off his "esse essentiae" or "esse actualis essentlae" against the Thomistic " esse existent iae "^
Cf. D.M., 31, I, #10 which is the fifth Thomistic argument. Cf. Part I and note also D.M,, 31, XII, #15 et seq.
22.
23.
Suarez is here preparing his readers for the forthcoming discussion of subsistence. Cf, D.M., 34, IV, #23: "Igitur quanKiiu existantia non est terrainata per ndum exist endi in se, et per se, adhuc est incon?)leta, et in statu quasi potentiale, et ideo ut sic non potest habere rationem subsistentiae .
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24.
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PART VI
1.
Cf. D.M., 31, IV, #1: "Dlxlraus de essentia creaturae, ut posslblli, et ut In actu, et de distinctlone earum qiialis sit; superest dicendum de esse, quo essentia in actu foimalissime const ituitxir." It would seem that these are three more of Siiarez* principles though he does not explicitly state it.
2.
3.
The Vives edition in this place D.M., 31, III, #2 reads " cornrnunicatlo" which seems Incorrect. I have read the " communicato" contained in the Mainz edition of 1605.
Suarez deliberately chooses this word " const itutio" to characterize the identity of his essence and existence. Cf. D.M., 31, V, #1 and XIII, #8.
31, VI, #3 for another use of the argument from am infinite regress.
4.
5.
Cf. D.M.,
6.
Cf. J. Paulus, op. cit ., p. 285; Henry of Ghent, Quodlib. I, q.9, fol. 7rv: "Et est hie distinguendum de esse secundum quod distinguit Avicenna in quinto in fine Metaphysicae suae quod quoddam est esse rei quod habet essential iter de se quod appellat\ir esse essentiae. Quoddam vero quod recipit ab alio quod appellatur esse act\ialis existentiae. . Si loquaumir de primo esse creaturae, illud sola ratione differt ab essentia creaturae, nee potest ei abesse..."
.
7.
8.
9.
10.
What Suarez seems to have in mind here is that the proponents of the first and second positions will gremt that an actual "esse essentiae" intrinsically constitutes essence in the order of "ens in actu", a position which iz alludes to in D.M., 31, V, frb. This would account
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for their agreement with Suarez* first proposition here stated. As to the second proposition it means that these men also assert that this " esse essentiae " which constitutes the essence as " ens in actu" is not really distinct from that essence. These raen^ however hold that J in addition, this essence and its " esse essentiae" need an "esse existentiae" to constitute this essence as existenFI This is why Suarez* third proposition is the bone of contention.
11.
Cf. E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, second edit.. Appendix, p.219-2'^0
12.
vrtiich
Suarez is again hinting at his doctrine of subsistence is soon to be discussed, Cf , note #23 in Part V above
13.
This is an instance where Suarez* two-fold meaning comes into play and he can charge his opponents with equivocation. For if they insist that " esse essentiae" is not temporal and contingent as Stiarez asserts, but eternal and necessary, Suarez can reply that they are " speaicing of esse potentiale" and do not invalidate his doctrine of a temporal and contingent " esse essentiae" .
This is the burden of the texts on the roses cited in Part V note #15. Vazquez gives a very clear rendition of such a doctrine in III S. Th., q.l7, a.l, disp. 72, cap.l, p. 482a: "Secundo (potest suaderi) quia essentia separari potest ab existentia, nempe cum res corrumpitur, et nisi ita esset, numquam res corrumpi posset, ergo esse et essentia aliquo modo distlnguuntur ex natura rei, quae enlm aliquo modo separantur, licet utrumque seorsim separatum manere, non possit, sed alterum tantum, distingu\int\ir ex natura rei, saltern ut res et modus sicut dixlraus 1. p disputatione 116 cap. ? poCTTO autem licet existentia rei non maneat corrupta re ipsa, raanet tamen essentia, quia essentiae rerum perpetuae sunt, et incorruptibiles, cum ab aetemo esse dicsmtur."
14.
15.
The objector would seem to make the point that if this " esse essentiae" of Suarez is all he says it is, then it is true existence and the eternity of essential predication is still saved, for Suarez keeps the very characteristics of " esse " maintained by his opponents.
I have been unable to identify the " alii" mentioned by Suarez but I thinlc that a piece of his promised treatment
16.
'
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of this is found in D.M., 31, V, #5-#6 where he discusses the two types of Thoraist who say subsistence is existence. For, the first type, who say that the substantial essence " is first and formally constituted as ens in act" by existence could be interpreted to maintain the position mentioned by Suarez here, since, unlike the second type they do not have the intermediate " esse essentiae* between the essence and " esse existent iae" ,
*
17.
This is the position vrtiich shall be discussed in the next chapter and is treated by Suarez in D.M., 31* V, #6. This is also the same type of doctrine foiond in the above objection in this Part against which Suarez will " play off his subsistence versus the Thonistic esse existent iae ."
Suarez again refers to the Thomistlc i>osition in D.M., The implication is that he, Suarez, would 31, V^ #6. call it " subsistentia*
*
18.
19.
This will be precisely the function of Suarez' subsistence. Cf . Part V note #23.
the Thomists stymied. If they say that the constituted by " esse essentiae" demands completion by an " esse oxistentiae " , Suarez replies that the latter is not existence but subsistence. If the Thomists say that " esse essentiae" constitutes the essence as ens in actu" as v;ell as existent, Suarez retorts that, if such is the case, then they can in no way assert it is distinct " ex natura rei " from the essence
20.
Suarez
lias
sujtual essence,
21.
This is Suarez j first explicit mention of subsistence though it has been hinted at a number of times.
22.
This dispute will keynote the following chapter and v;ill be governed by Sviarez* principle that something really distinct cannot intrinsiceilly constitute another as "ens in actu".
el
TI
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PART VII
1.
Cf. D.M., 31# V, #1 et seq, and Sioarez, In III S.Th., disp. 8, IV, #3 Vol. 17, P.36I: "Tertla quaestic est, quomodo subsistentia creata distinguatur ab existentia Ipsius natu3?ae substantial is, ut sic. Et dicendiira est
consequenter juxta definitionem praecedentls quaestlonis, subsistentiara esse raodum naturae exlstentis, ut existens est, atque adeo existentiae Ipsius. Nara ex vi existentiae solum intelligitur natura esse extra causas suas, et apta, ut in se et per se sit; per subsistentiam vero actu terrainatur, et quasi forraaliter constituitur in modo per se essendi ..."
2, 3,
in hoc conveniunt, quod existentia respectu essentiae existentis habet rationera actus, et causam formalera imitatur, Ctonesque similiter docent, non esse proprie et in rigore formalem causam. Quod nos facillimo negotio declaramus, quia propria causa formalis distinguitur ex natura rei a subjecto, in quo suum effectum formalem habet, et cum eo facti veram et realem conqpositionemj existentia vevo ex natura rei non distinguitur ab essentia, et ideo non potest esse vera forma, neque actus physicus, sed raetaphysicus, et modus ita intrinsecus, ut non distinguatur a re quam modificat, sicut differentia est actus generis, et non est proprie forma ejus," This notion of metaphysical act and intrinsic mode after the fashion of specific difference in relation to genus will prove important
4.
In regard to " personalitas" Cf. D.M., 3^, II, #20: "Quocirca si comparemus suppositura ad naturam, distinguuntui tanquam includens et inclusum; nam suppositum includit naturam, et aliquid addit, quod personalitas *, * suppositalitas * , aut subsistentia creata appellari potest; natura vero ex se praescindir ab hoc addito seu a subsistentia." Cf. also D.M., 3^, IV, #23 where Suarez notes: "Rejectis aliorum ipinionibus, superest ut nostram sententiam aperiamusj et quoniara personalitas per raodum actus et formae a nobis concipitiir, ex raunere et officio
'
'
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ejus optirae Intelligitur q\ild ilia sit, et quoraodo ad naturam conpsu'etur. Dico ergo primo, personalitatem ad hoc dari naturae, ut illi det ultiraura complementum in ratione existendi, vel (ut ita dicara) ut existentiam ejus compleat in ratione subsistentiae, ita ut personalitas non sit proprie terminus aut modus naturae seciindum esse essentiae, sed secundiam esse existentiae ipsius naturae."
5. S\iarez notes these two places in the coraraentaries on the " SiJiama" and the Sentences "I part., q.40. seu in I, Cf. Vazquez, In I S.Th., q.40, a.l, dist. 2b et 33." dlsp.158, cap. 2, p.204a-b. Cf . also Thomas of Argentina, Coimnentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententlarum , (Venetiis, 1554;, In I d.33> q.l, a. 2, p. 100b. Note D.M., 31, XIII, #10: "...et ad vitandara vocis invidiam vocetur constitutio, et non compositio, etiam rationis."
:
6.
Cf . D.M., 31, VIII, #11. Suarez would seem to have in mind the first and fovirth Thomistic arguments. The rebuttal of the first Thomistic argument is found in D.M., 31* XII, #38 et seq. The answers to the second and third arguments are found in D.M., 31, XIII, #1 et seq. with explicit treatment of the second argument in #14. The fourth argument is touched on in XI, #16, and the fifth is found in XII, 14 et seq.
Note D.M., 31, X, #2 where Suarez remarks: "Qui vero exist imemt, actum existentiae esse rem real iter distinctara ab essentia, difficilius possunt rationem reddere, ctir non sit proprie forma."
Cf . note #27 below in this part as well as note #5 and #8 in Part VIII below.
Cf. D.M., 31, XI, #23-#29. Cf. Antonius Andreas, In 7 Metaph. q.l, (Venice, 1513)* fol.32va-fol.33va where he discusses the question: " Utrum inherent ia sit de essentia accident is ?" Cf. also Dominic of Flandria
7.
8.
9.
This is the position which Suarez has been alluding to prior to his fifth section and is about to confront. Cf. Part VI #12, #17, #18 J Part V, #23.
Cf. D.M., 31, V, #4 where Sxiarez also asserts that in addition to showing that the modes of subsistence and inherence is not existence, he intends to show that no
11.
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ri
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other modes than these can be thought of which Is both distinct " ex natura rei" from the actual essence and is its true existence. This latter assertion is not treated here but in D.M., 31, V, #10 and will be treated in its turn below.
12. 13.
A text of Dominicus Soto is of interest here where he remains on the possible influence of Henry of Ghent on Cajetan Cf. In 4 Sent,, d.lO, a. 2, p. 274a: "His itaque sic constitutis existlt etiaranum argumentvun. Quantitas q\iando erat in pane, non erat nisi subjectum, quo mediante accidentia inhaerebant pani. Ergo, facta transsubstantiatione non potest esse subjectum quod, scilicet, cui insunt, et quod accidentia sustentet, nam panis erat, qui ilia sustentabat. Propter hoc argumentura, quod non est contemnendtam fingit hie Cajetanus nescio qxiam theologiam. Est enim dublum quomodo qtiantitas persistit sine subjecto, utrum scilicet Deo semper et continenter earn per miraculum sustentante, an per consecrationem tribuente ei novum esse subsistentiae, quale habet substantia, ita ut per illud deinceps ilia naturaliter subsistat. Scotus enim in 4 distin, 12 q.l et omnes theologi aiunt per Devaa. sesaper illam sustentari sine acquisitione alterius esse, Cajeteinus vero, ait quant i tat em q\iam habebat in pane. perdere esse quo, et novum esse quod existentlae per miraculum suscipere, per quod naturaliter existit... Et hanc censet esse opinionem S. Tho, et suavem raod\am sustinendi sacramenti accidentia. At profecto haec neqiie est opinio S. Thorn, sed Henrici Gandensis, quem Scotus impugnat, neque est bene intelligibilis, neque satis credibilis. Enimvero istud? esse exist entiae nunqioam intellexi esse aliqiaam entitatem distinctam a subjecto, tanquam aliam rem, sed est modus et actus substantiae. Quare dum quantitas perdere dicitur acqtiirit, neque araittlty, sed hoc tantvim per miraculum sit, ut non insit, sed per se stet." Cajetan would thus seem to be one Theologian who will say a new " esse existentiae " is created, by wliich the consecrated accidents exist. And in view of Capreolus' rapport with Henry of Ghent, the charge of Soto on this sco3?e with reference to Cajetem is Interesting.
14.
.1
if
1
-
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15.
Cf. D.M., 34, II, #8 where Suarez notes: "Secimda opinio est Scoti, in 3* d.o, quaest.l, et d.6, quaest. 1, et in 1, d.13, et quodlib. 19, art. 3, qui ait, suppositum creatum nihil rei positivae addere naturae singulari, sed solum negationem dependentiae actualis, et aptitudinalis ad aliquod suppositum. . . Et hanc opinionem sic expositam sequuntur Scotistae, in 3*d,lj Bassolis, quaest. 1, art; Maironis, quaest. 11. Lychetus autem ibi, quaest. 1, qxiamvis earn probabilem censeat, existimat tamen Scotum non omnino illi adhaesisse. Aureolus etiam, apud Capreol. in 3* dist. 5* quaest. 3*
.
raultis argumentis contendit,non posse creatum suppositum addere supra naturara aliquid positivum.
Atque idem sentit Gabriel, in 3* d.l, quaest. l...et idem sentit Marsil., in 3, q.l, art.l."
16. Cf. D.M., 34, IV, #15 where Suarez says: "Sic Igltur contra illara sentontiara absolute concludimus. Existentia non distinguitur ex natura rei ab essentia actualij subsistentia autem distinguitur ex natura rei ab essentia actuali; ergo non potest esse omnino idem cum existentia." Cf. also D.M., 31, XII, #14.
17.
Suarez, in another place, indicates whom it is he has in mind here, for in D.M,, 31, XI, fr^ when treating this question: "Sed ttmc \ilterius qiiaeri potest an in substantiis creatis existentia sit solius suppositi, vel etiam naturae.", he notes: "At discipuli D, Thomae contrarium sentiunt; divisi tamen sunt, nam Capreolus et alii docent quidera existent iam substantialera esse primo ac per se solius suppositi, ita tamen ut existentia non supponat ordine naturae suppositum constitutum et illud actuet in ratione existendi, sed formaliter ipsa constit\iat suppositum. Quo fit ut Juxta hanc sententiara, si praescindamus id quod est quasi subjectum vel receptivum existentiae, revera non sit supi>ositi;un, sed natura ipsaj nam suppositim potius est corapositura seu constitutum ex natura et existentia, atque ita existentia erit suppositi, ut const itui, naturae vero, ut potentiae actuabilis. Quae sententia In eo falsa est, quod confundit existentiam cvan. subsistentia, et non tribuit existentiae proprium effectum formalem ejus, qui est constituere rem in actu in ratione entis actualis, quam rem supra attiglraus, et de ea latius dicituri sumus infra, agentes de natura et supposito." The other disciples of St, Thomas and their positions are indicated in D.M., 31, XI, ^: "At vero Cajetanus et alii docent, existentiam supponere suppositum constitutum in 3?atione suppositi, illudque acttiare.
t^
-461-
et prlmo et per se constituere ens actu exlstens. Quorum fundaraentuci est, quia solum suppositura est Id quod est^ proprie loquendoj sicut solum suppositura est quod operatur, quia ejus est esse, cujus est operari; ergo existentla primo et per se est actus suppositii consequenter vero coDHnunicatur naturae et partibus ejus, Et esset quidem haec sententia probabilis, si existentla esset res distlncta a substantial! natura, quanquam aegre possit expllcari quid faciat subsistentia circa substantialem naturam praeclse consideratam ut essentia est, et prius natura quam exlstens, de quo ageraus in disputatlone citata de supposito." The position of Capreolus whom Suarez says Javellus follows, is treated again by Suarez in D.M., 3^ J rv, #3. Cajetans position is discussed in D.M., 34, IV, #17 et seq.
18.
Suarez undoubtedly has Capreolus' position in mind as found in D.M., 31, XI, #5 sunid #3^, IV, #2 and the Thoraists whom Siiarez says disagree with this are mentioned by him in D.M., 34, IV, #4: "Merito tamen Cajetanus, Perrar. et alii Thomistae rejiciunt sententiam hanc quoad lianc partem, nam est apei^ta repugnant ia die ere, suppositura et naturam distingui a parte rei, et tamen suppositura nihil addere naturae, quod sit intrinsecura ipsi supposito, sed tantum aliquid extrinsece connotatum." Suarez is here talcing advantage of the fact that he can quote Thomist against Thomist and thus casting doubt on the unanimity of thought and interpretation within that school
Cf. D.M., 34, IV, #23-#4l.
19.
20.
Suarez woxild seem to h&ve this other group of Thoraists in raind when he remarks in D.M., 34, IV, #8-#10: "Est igitur alius dicendi raodtis, et potest esse quinta principalis opinio in hac materia, existentiam substantialem intrinsece ac formaliter constituere suppositura, et consequenter suppositura nihil aliud addere naturae praeter hujusmodi existentiam, Haec opinio est frequens nunc inter modemos Theologos, et quidera supjxjsito priori dicto, loquitur consequenter; nam si existentla sola est, quara suppositura addit naturae, non potest per illam nisi intrinsece constitui. Item quia juxta hanc sententiam existentla est subsistentia ipsa; sed subsistentia creata intrinsece constituit suppositura citatum, quia suppositura nihil aliud est q\iam incomraunicabiliter subsistens; per subsistentiara autem creatam intrinsece constituitur aliquid incoraraunicabiliter subsistens; ergo, Unde, posita hac subsistentia in natura, impossibile est non poni
^p,
h..
r.r^
.81
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suppositinQ, et ablata ilia et manente quocianque alio In natura, Irapossibile est poni suppositvun; ergo hoc
est intrinsecum constitutivxun suppositi, Itaque In hoc optirae loquitur haec sententia." At this point, Sua.rez cites a critique of this position by Cajetan: "Tasnen in eo quod supponit, et in quo cum praecedenti convenlt, scilicet, quod existentia substantialls, intrinsece, forraaliter et essentialiter sit ipsamet subsistentia, impugnatur haec opinio a Cajetano, 3 part., quaest. 4, art, 3* et aliis..." But notwithstanding this critique Suarez insists: "Nihilominus, si vera esset sententia in qua omnes isti auctores conveniunt, quod existentia est res realiter ab essentia distincta, praeferenda omnino esset haec quinta opinio opinioni Cajetani, et aliorum, qui tot entitates sine ?ausa raultiplicant, distinguentes personalitatem seu subsistentiam ab essentia et ab existentia, et rursus existentiara et essentiam inter
se." Thus, this opinion is very likely the one Suarez Indicates in D.M,, 31* V, #6 for in both, existence or " esse exist entiae" is not intrinsic to the nature, rather, in each case it is intrinsic to the supposit which is something else eigain. Cf. Suarez, D.M., 34, IV, #12: "Neque contra hoc obstat, quod existentia ^nxta hanc opinlonem non sit intrinseca naturae, aut quod non sit de essentia individui substantialls, q\ila, ut dicebam, aliud est loqul foimallter de supposito ut suppositum estj allud vero est 3oqui de natura ipsa, vel de supposito ut est tale substantiale indivlduura, sub tall specie substantlae constitutum. Priori modo dlciraus, Juxta hanc sententiara, existentiam substantialera esse Intrinsecam supposito et formale constitutivian illius, non taraen esse intrinsecvun naturae, quia condistinguitur ab ilia ut actus ejus. Similiter non est intrinseca aut fonnaliter constltuens suppositum In ratlone ejus substantialls Individui, aut contrahens vel determinans speciem ad hoc indlvlduum, sed hoc est proprlura niunus principiorum Indivlduantiiaii, et naturae singularis, a qua habet suppositum, ut sit individuum talis essentiae vel speclei, et non a personalitate." Unfortunately there Is no indication who these men might be as I have been unable to find any reference to them or their position in the Thomlsts initially cited by Suarez, For a further critique of this by Suarez cf. Suarez, In III S.Th , dlsp, 8, I, #12, Vol. 17, p. 333 et seqj dlsp, 3b, ^I, #3, Vol.18, p. 268 et seq. Note also Alonso Briseno, op, clt .. Tome I,
JUX^
t.*!^'v
Vlj
iJ&
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1.
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p. 45; Vazquez, In III S.Th ., Disp. 31, cap. VI, p. 240 et seq. for a good hlstoricELl survey of men and positions; Bartholonieiir Medina, Expositib in Tertian D. Thomae Partem, (Venetiis, 1390), In III, q.^l, a. 2,
p,t>b
21.
By this, Suarez means that these Thoraists hold for the san^ number of principles maintained by him, namely, the essence, its 'esse essentlae" and " esse existent iae" or subsistence, of which the first two are not really distinct. Thus, he would seem to distinguish these men from Cajetan and others who multiply so many entities without reason by distinguishing personality or subsistence, from essence and from existence as well as distinguishing essence from existence, Cf. D.M.,
'
22.
potest. . ." This is the rendering given by the Vives edition, but the imderlined " identitas " does not seem correct. For this reason, I have read the "entitas" reading dound In this place in the Mainz edition of 1005.
23.
Cf. D.M., 31* V, #6: "Pi'imo, propter abusum terroinorum, quia per esse existentiae nemo intelligit omne id, sine quo actualis rei identita^ conservari non
Cf. Susrez, D.M., 34, VI, #25-#26: "In sexta ratione attin^i. ;r alia difficultas, an, scilicet, fieri possit ut Deus impediat emanationem subsistentlae a natura per solara suspensionem influxus, atque ita fieri possit ut natura conservetur sine ulla subsistentia propria, vel aliena." Suarez can again indulge in
These adversaries k^o distinguish the order of " ens" from the oixier of " existens" seem to be the heirs of a similar position in Giles of Rome in a work not alluded to by Suarez in his initial citation of the Thomist ic texts. Cf. Theoremata De Esse et Essentia , edit. Hocedez, (Paris, 1930 J, Theorema 12. The title reads " Omne quod est cltra primura non est suum esse sed habet essentiam realiter dif ferentem ab esse et per aliud est ens et per aliud existens ." Note page 77 where Giles explains: "Quod vero addebatur in propositione quod omne tale per aliud est ens et per aliud est existens, leviter declarat\ir. Nam ut patebit in propositione sequenti, omne tale est ens per essentiam
:
.c
,5..3
.12
.10
.DX
Hi
.>Sft
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-464-
sed non potest existere nisi ipsi essentiae superaddatur esse. Si ergo orane quod est cltra. Priraum est ens per essentiam, et existit per esse, ciara essentia sit aliud ab esse oportet quod orane tale per aliud sit ens et aliud existens." Cf. also p. 83: "Redeamus ergo ad piopositura et dicamus quod quaelitet res est ens per essentiam suani tamen quia essentia rei creatae non die it actum corapletum sed est in potentia ad esse, ideo non siifficit essentia ad hoc quod res actu existat nisi ei superaddatur aliquod esse quod est essentiae actus et compleraentum, Existunt ei^go res per esse superadditum essentiae vel naturae, Patet itaque quoraodo differat ens per se acceptuBi et existens."
suara
26.
An example of this would be the fact that species or difference is looked on as the act and genus as the potency wherein the genus is the determinable element and difference is the determining factor. And this is borne out by Siiarcz* o^-m interpretation of this very point of the objection. Cf . D.M., 31, V, #15.
These sources for Suarez* use of " ac tiial it as ent 1 tat 1 va" and " actus formalls" are found in D.M., 13, V, #2, where in treat in; the question: " Utrum materia sit pura potentia. et quo sensu id accipiendum sit ?" he remarks Disolpuii ergo D. Thomae comrauniter Interpretantur materiam dici puram potentiam, quia neque ex se, neque in se habet ullam existentiam nisi per formara. At vero Scotus, Henricus et alii supra citati, distinguunt duplicera actum, formalem, scilicet, et entitativum, et materiam decent ex. se habere actum entitativum, non tamen forraalem, et consequenter aiunt materiam vocari puram potentiam in ordine ad actum fonnalera, non vero in ordine ad actum entitativum." How this doctrine affects Suarez* understanding of the real distinction can be seen in this same place #5: "Praeterea, Juxta illara sententiam de distinctione reali, vel ex nattira rei, existentiae ab essentia actuali, negari non potest quin essentia actualis, ut condistinsuitur ab existentia, habeat aliquam actualitatem, quam non habet essentia concepta in sola potentia objectiva; ergo essentia ipsa act\ialls, esto non sit sua existentia, est aliquic actus entitativus, id est aliquid aliud praeter puram potentiam objectivara; imo, nisi ita concipiatur essentia actualis, non potest intelligi ilia o inio, quae distinguit illam ab existentia, tanquam rem a re vel a modo reali." This gives good insight into Suarez appreciation of real distinction with reference to note #3 above in this Part.
27.
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PART VIII
1,
Suarez refers to Aristotle in Cf, D.M,, 31, VI, #1. "3 Metaph. 0.2; lib. 5, cap. 7; libr. 10, cap. 4" of which the first reference is Incorrect as it should be Cf. Gamma 2. 1003b25-29 Trans. W.D. 4 Metaph. c.2. Ross, Oxford, 1928.
2,
Cf . J. Owens, "An Arlstotelean Text Related to the Distinction of Being and Essence", Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association , Vol. XXI, pp. Ib5-171, esp. p.lbo.
Suarez also refers to Averroes commentary on those places in Aristotle cited in note #1 above, wherein Averroes takes Avicenna to task which certainly lends his adversary as Avicenna and his followers.
Cf. D.M.,
31,
I,
3,
4,
5,
#2 and #13.
Cf. Capreolus, op. cit .. In I Sent, d.8, q.l, a.l where " Secunda as his second conclusion Capreolus treats: conclusio principalis hujusarticuli est ista; Quod esse creaturae non sic s~ habet ad illud qu^d est, vel a?
quldditatem creaturae, omnino conslciliter sicut foiTna substantialis ad materiam" The reason Siiarez cannot appreciate this doctrine is because, for him, the composite of matter and form, or the essence, must have an entitative actuality which is not the gift of a really distinct existence. Cf. D.M., 31, X, #3: "Potest vero objici, quia essentia est causa raaterialls existent iae; ergo existentla est causa formalls; nam haec duo quasi correlative se habent. Respondetur in nostra sententia negando antecedens. Alii vero dicere consequenter debent, cum eadera pioportione, essentiam imltarl quidem causaun materialem et receptivam, non tamen esse proprie et in rigore materiam vel subjectum. Semper tamen eis relinquitur explicaridum, quid sit hie effectus formalls, seu quae formalls actualitas, quam det existentla alteri rei a se distinctae, cum non possit esse ipsa actualitas entitativa, et omnis alia superaddita et distincta a subsistentia vel inhaerentia, nee possit esse necessaria, nee intelligitllls, ut in superloribus fuse astensum est."
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6.
Cf . Part VII, p. 226 where Sijarez gives an inatcince of this " absoluta potent la" in the case of God's conservation of the Eucharistic accidents, Suarez gives an extensive treatment of this question: "Utinim essentia creata sit separabllis a sxm exlstentla ?"" in D.M., ^i, xil where -3 is of especial interest in this place we are now treating, as well as #6.
Cf. D.M., 31> X, #3
nftiich
7.
8.
#5 above.
This doctrine would seem to be found in such a position as the following mentioned by Suarez in D.M., 13, V, 6: "Qulcquid ergo opineraur de distinct ione essentiae et existent iae, certe materia ut est in re distincta a forma est aliquls actus entitativas, tamen diverso modo... Juxta allara vero sententiam distinguentem ex natura rel existentiam ab essentia actiiali, et nihilominus admittentem, materiam primara habere suam propriara existentiam, quam retinet sub quacunque forma, dicendxara est materiam, praeter act\am foiroae, et esse suam essentiam actiialem, et habere praeterea propri\im actiom existentiae." For, in this doctrine, matter, though possessing an entitative act, still it is pure potency in relation to formal act, and so the essence, though replete with an entitative act by virtue of " esse essentiae ", still is in potency to an " esse existentiae" which does not intrinsically constitute this essence but rather it intrinsically constitutes the composite of this essence " and itself esse existentiae" . It is no wonder then that Suarez cannot see how the exponents of the real distinction can help from holding that existence is not just a quasi form but is a form, properly spesilcing.
9.
Cf. D.M., 31, XII, #8-#9 wherein Suarez intends to use this vei*y argument in the refutation of the first two positions. Cf. Suarez, In III S.Th ., disp.36, I, #4, Vol. 18 p. 261: "Ex ratione vero existentiae sic explicata, colligitur primo, fieri non posse ut aliqild sit ens in actu seu ut conclpiatur tanq^iam actualis entitas, quin in suo conceptu forraaliter et intrinsece includat existentiam, ita ut nee per abstractlonera praecisivara intellectus
10.
possit unvim ab altero sepajcari, manente vero conceptu utrlusque. Quod patet ex dictis addlto generali principio impossiblle esse concipere effectura aliquera' formaliter constitutura per aliquam forraam, aut per
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actum Intrinsecum similera forraae quin in illo Includatur talis forma.... Et ratio generalis est, quia causa formalis vel actus qviasi forroalis concurrit ad suum effectum vel quasi effect\;m, intrinsece et per se ipsum ilium const ituendo, et ideo intime includitur in conceptu constituti, constat autem ex dictis, entitatera act\ialera ut sic, intrinsece et q\iasi formaliter const itui in esse entitatis actualis per existentiam; ergo impossibile est concipere entitatera actualem ut sic, quin in ilia intrinsece includatur existentia."
-468-
PART IX
1,
For a very clear text on the difference between the real and modal distinctions Cf. D.M., 31^ XI, #11; "Ut f igura, quae a quantltate soliun distinguitur inodaliter, ab aliis rebus realiter a quantltate distinctis eandem habet distinctionem realem; de qu re late diximus supra, dls. 1, ubl etlaxn ostendiiaus distinctionem modalem non in eo distingui a reall, 4UOd non includit distinctam existentiam, sed in eo quod existentia aterius extremi non est talis essentlae, quae se sola pocsit entitatem fundare, sed modi qui essentialiter et seipso immediate nititur in aliqua alia entitate, ut ibi latius declaratum est." Cf. D.M., 7, I, 7fl6, #18, #20.
Cf. D.M., 7, I, #9 where Suarez says: "Tamen hoc posito,
2,
adhuc superest qiiaestio, an oranis dlstinctio, quae antecedit in rebus omnem operationem intellectus, non tantum fundamental iter et virtualiter, sed etiam acxialiter et formaliter, sit veluti ejusdem rationis qxioad hoc, ut sit inter res distinctas, an vero in rebus ipsis sit aliqua major et minor distinctio, et Ilia quae major est, scilicet inter rem et rem, nomen distinctionis realis obtlneat; alia vero vocetur distinctio media, seu aliis nominibus infra explicandis." Cf. D.M., 7 I, #20 where Suarez explains: "Ex his ergo facile intelligitur sensus et probatio conclusionis positae,narn hie modus prout a nobis est explicatus, ex natura rei distinguitur actuallter a re, cujus est modus, ut omnes fatentur; imo plures vocant illam distinctionem realem, quia In rebus ipsis reperitur, quod evidentius constablt ex dlcendis sectione sequenti; sed non proprie distinguitur hie modus ab eo cujus est modus tanquam res a re; distinguitur ergo rainori distinct ione, quae proprissime appellatxir modalis."
3,
Cf . D.M., 7* li #2 where in regard to the notion of a distinction positive on the part of each extreme, Sxiarez notes: "Illud etlara est in hac distlnctlone observand\im, solere distingui in positivam et negativara; quae partitio non tam ex parte Ipslus distinctionis, qviam extremorum ejus data est; distinctio enim ipsa fonnaliter semper in negatione consistlt, ut supra dictum est; tamen haec negatio intercedit
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aliquando inter res positivas et reales, quarum una non est alia, et tunc dicitur distinctio positiva, et haec est propria distinctio realis, de qua nos locuti sumus .
4.
5.
V note #2.
Cf. D.M., 31, XI, #8-#9. Cf. D.M., 31, VI, #12 where the editors of the Vives edition cite this reference: "Bannes, I p., q.44, art. 1, ad. 4 argura." but this part of Banez* commentary has not been available to me.
6.
7.
Suarez thus reduces this "quo" to a "quod" as in this text found in D.M., 2, V, ?5T "Et confirmatur, nam si hi modi non sunt ens, ergo nihil suntj ergo nihil confen?e possunt ad essentias reales constituendas Respondent aliqui, hos modos non esse ens ut quod, tamen esse ens, ut quo, seu aliquid entis, et inde neque esse simpliciter et \mivoce ens, ut Scotus loquitur, neque' oranino nihil, Sed haec responslo solum vldetur in verbis consistere, quoniara esse ens ut quo, nihil aliud est quara esse formam seu actum realem ut in metaphysica constitutinne seu coraposltione; nulla autem potest esse forma vel actus realis alicujus, nisi in se sit aliquid reale, quod est esse in se ens realej ergo repugnat dicere aliquid esse reale quo, et non ens ut quod, nam illud quo, in hujusraodi quod necessario fundari debet. Quod in omni compositione physica inductione ostendi potest. Est autem eadem ratio in metaphysica compositione, quia etiam in ilia potentia et actus concipiuntur ut constitutentia integrsun realitatem, seu essentiara; unde in se etiam considerata necessario concipl debent, ut habentia aliquid realitatis seu essentiae saltern partialis; alias non possent concipi ut apta ad constituendum et complendum essentiara realem; et haec ratio applicari potest ad omnes differentias tam ultimas quara non ultimas, generlcas, specif icas et individuales."
Cf. D.M., 31, XII, #8-#9 for if this existence is a "res" or entity in its own right, it can be and not be. So, it cannot be its essence to intrinsically constitute the existing thing in act. Thus, as there is no real distinction as between " duae res" or a " res" and its mode, so neither can there by any such distinctions in the case of the actual essence on the basis of the argument that it can be and not be.
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9.
In regard to these examples of action, motion and quantity Suarez remarks In this place D.M., 31^ VI, #12: "In exemplls vero adductls, vel non semper est distlnctlo ex natura rei inter quo et quod, ut fortasse Inter durationem, et quod durat; vel si est, aliunde est colligendaj et numquam est admittenda sine sufflcientl Indlcio, ut supra tractatura est."
Cf. E. Kant, Der elnzig mogliche Bewelsgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, I Abb,, 1 Bet-r,, 1 cited by E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers , p. 125-126, Compare Suarez D.M., 31* VII, ^5.
10.
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PAKT X
1.
Cf. D.M., 7* I* #6 where Suarez notes: "Ex quibus Intelligitiir prlmo, distinctlonem rationis non appellari, 60 quod inter entla rationis versetur, in quo raulti decepti sunt, ut postea videbirausj constat enlm ex dlctls exemplis, ea, q\iae sic distlngui dicuntur, entla i*eales esse, vel potlus ens reale dlversls modis conceptum; et rat lone etlam Id patet, quia ratio non flnglt entla, quae sic dlstlngult, sed soliom per modinn dlstlnctorura conclplt, quae distlncta non sunt; ergo non ea, quae distlnguuntur, sed sola Ipsa dlstlnctlo per ratlonem resultat. Nee tamen mens fallltur sic dlstlnguendo, quia non affirraat In re esse distlncta quae sic conclplt, sed slmpllclter, et absque conqpositlone, seu afflrmatlone aut negatlone, ea conclplt ut distlncta per abstractlonem praecislvam,
per quam quasi efflclt hujusmodi distinctlonem," An example of this preclslve abstraction is Instanced in D.M,, 2, IV, #9: "Respondetur, 'ens' secundum 111am dupllcera accept lonem non slgnlflcare dupllcem ratlonem entls, dlvldentem allquam communem ratlonem, seu conceptum communem, sed slgnlflcare conceptum entls, magls vel minus praeclstra: ens* enlm in vi nomlnls sumptum slgnlficat Id, quod habet essentlam realera, praesclndendo ab actual! exlstentla, non quldem excludendo illam, seu negando, sed praeclslve tantum abstrahendo..." Note also Part III, n.2.
2.
Cf. Part VIII, note #10 as well as D.M., 31, VI, #3. In addition, the following text from D.M., 31, XII, #13 makes this point altogether explicit: "Quod si Portasse dlcant differentiam illam individxialem, licet non sit absolute de essentia, esse tamen de essentia Petri, ut Petrus est, dlcemus et nos exlstentlam actualem et exercltam non esse de essentia absolute, esse tunen de essentia essentlae actualls, prout est actu ens extra nihil; ideoque quamwls possit Intelllgl essentia absolute in esse potentlali, seu objective, sine actuall exlstentla, non tamen posse intelllgl essentleua factam ens actu, et extra nihil sine Intrlnseca et propria exlstentla."
3.
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4.
Cf . In I Sent., d.8, disput. 2, fol. SOrb: "Etenim idaea horainis non erat Petrus, vel Paulus, at potlus isti hominum essentlam partlcipabant, et illlus particlplo fruebantur indlvldua. Caeterura hoc Platonicum placitum Perlpatetlcis collapsum lam dlu est machlnis. Ideoque Philosophi alii idaeis explosis In reliquo a Platone non discrepant. Affirmant enim essentiam non esse idem, atque indlvldua, quae habent essentiam, etenim esse est individuorum, ut Petrus est homo, et habet has cames, et haec ossa, et rellqua, quae materia indivlduando suppeditat. At vero essentia ab istis abstrahit, ut animal rationale non cames has, aut ossa haec, aut colorem caesium oculorura, vel subnigrum, et,, convehit secum, sed tantum rationem commimem omnibus hominibus, hoc est specif icam araat, Hanc sententiSLra Avicenna lib. meta, 5 ca, 5 amplexus est. Quo loco non obscure testatur esse accldens essentlae, esse, et ejus additamentiim. Et Algazellus subscripslt, ut coramemoratur commentator Averroes lib, suo, cui titulvun fecit Destructio destructionum disputatione octava. Cujus verba referuntur Inibi, Deus (ait) est per se ens, at ci^aturae habent esse per addltamentura, quia recipiunt esse a Deo, Deus vero a nullo reciplt esse, ideo a se est Deus et per se est et non per aliud. Neque abhorret a placitum horum Arabiim Phllosophorum S. Tho, in opuscule de ente et essentia 30, c.2 et 5 et in S\arama contra gentes lib. 2, ca, 5 (52?) et in I P. Q3* art. 3 et 4, irao it in horum sententlara manibus et pedlbus."
5.
For as Suairez says in this place D,M., 31* VI, #13? " , .nam simllis distinctionis inter indivlduum et speciera sufficit ut sola ratio specifica dicatur esse tota essentia rel, et non indlvlduatio," This means that the distinction of reason is such that the concept of the species does not include the individual even though both are identical in reality. Cf D,M., 5 II* #19: "Sed videri potest hie respondendi modus paum consentaneus commiini modo conclplendl et loquendl phllosophorum, qui hanc contract ionem spec lei ad indlvldua explicant per modum metaphysicae compositlonis, Et non sine ratlone videtur hoc communlter affirraari, quia etiam genus et differentia non distinguuntur in re in qua conjunguntur, ut infra ostendemus, et nihilominus propter varlas convenientias et disconvenientias, quae inter plures res reperiuntur, intellectus diversos conceptus format generis et differentiae, quorum unus in alio non includatur; sic ergo facere etiam potest inter speciera et indlvldua; est enim fere eadem proportio eorum inter
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-473-
se, et idera dlscrinen a conceptu entls... et consequenter poterit etiam individuum resolvl in conceptum speciel et differentiae individualis; ilia enim non est homo, nee Petrus, verbi gratia, sad differentia contrahens hominem et constituens PetiTJin. . Sed hoc non obstante non est negands ilia metaphysica compositio individui, qiiia ad illaa satis est ut specifica ratio possit ente praescindi, ut non inclusa in ista differentia individual i." Cf. clIso D.M., 5* II, #32 as well as #3? where Sxaarez notes: " Ramdemque ob causam def initio scientifica non datxir, nisi de connuni et specifico conceptu, atque in hoc sensu species xiltiioa dicitxir tota essentia individuorum, scilicet, formal Iter ac praecise sur^Jta et concepta^ et prout ejus cognitio ad hxananaa scientiam deservit ..."
.
6.
"Haec opinio tribuit\ir. . . Henric, et 10; de quorum sententia postea dicam." q.9
31,
I, #11:
7.
We are confronted with the spectacle of Capreolus and Henry of Ghent using similar su-guments to prove a distinction between essence and existence, and yet one asserts a real distinction and the other establishes an intentional distinction. It na^' be that Suarez means to say that Capreolus is actually holding a distinction of reason thoiigh he does not term it such.
Cf. D.M., 47, III, #12.
Cf. Henry of Ghent,
8.
9.
^odlibet,
I,
10.
Cf. E. Gilson, "Notes s\ir le vocabulaiie de I'etre", Mediaeval Studies , 3, (1946), pp. 150-153.
11.
Instead of Chapter I, this shotild be, St. Augustine, 12 De Civitate Dei cap. 2 , PL, 41, col. 350.
Cf. St. Augustine, 2 De Moribus Manichaeorura, cap. 2 ; 7Ly 32, col. 1346.
12.
13.
Cf , Anfljrosius Calepinus, Dictionarium Octolinguae , (Lugduni, I663), p. 567a: "Essentia o<jc-'a Gall, essence Ital. essenza Germ. Wassenheit Hisp. essencia. Angl. essence, the thing of anything. Vocabulum est religiosis quiden Latinae linquae observatoribus non usitat\jm, a Philosophis tamen melioris inopia in \una receptum pro ipso esse cujusvis rei, quam o5cr::*v Graeci appellant. Augustinus lib. 12 de Civitate Dei.
.8
-474-
Sicut ab eo quod est sapere, vocatur sapient la: sic ab eo quod esse, vocatur essentia, novo quldem nomine, quo usi veteres non sunt Latlni sermonis autores, sed iaitt nostris temporibus usitato, ne deesset ^etiara linguae nostrae quod Graecl appellant OoO'teiS/ , hoc enim verbum e verbo expressvun est, ut diceretur essentia. Quint, lib, 8 c.3. Quorum dura quaedam admodum, ut ens, et essentia, quae cur tantopere aspememur non video nisi, quod inqui judices adversus nos suraus: id^oque paupertate sermonis laboranus, Hinc essentiale, GDO'^iJ^Vt*^ i quod est essentiae: et Essentialiter, cc&iiCh^!^ secundum essentlam. > Vocabula svint solis Philosophis, et Theologis usurpata," p. 649a: "Ens, entis, participium praesentis temp, non est in usu, inquit Priscieui, Quintllian, lib, 8, cap. Multa ex Graeco forraata nova, ac plurima a Sergio 3. Plavio, quorum dura quaedam admodxim videntur, ut ens et essentia: quae cur tantopere aspememur, nihil video: nisi quod iniqui judices adversus nos sumus, ideoque paupertate sermonis laboraraus. Futures, a \xai, Particip. idem signif leans quod erit ut Plaut. 'Mostell,' quid illis futurum est caeteris qui te araant? Cic, de Senectute', Aut etiam optanda si aliquo evim deducit ubi futurus sit aetemus,"
14.
15.
Ponseca, in a similar critique of this position. In 4 Metaph. cap. 2 q. 4 sect. 1, col. 748 says: "Praeterea si existentia, nee in Deo, nee in creaturis ullo modo differiet ab essentia, non esset proprium divinae essentiae suam existentiam. Hoc autem p\ignat ciira omnium Theologorum sententia, ergo et illud."
16.
This follows from that doctrine of these " Nomlnales ", instanced when Suarez treats of the distinction between genus, -difference and species in D.M., 6, IX, #7. For there he remarks: "Tertia, sententia extreme contraria esse potest, haec neque re, neque etiam ratione distingui, sed esse oranino idem, etsi diversis vocibus signif icentur. Quae opinio attribui potest nominalibus, quatenus omnino negant haec universalia in rebus reperirij vix autem credibile est opinionem lianc in mentem alicujus philosophi venisse, ut argiimenta in principio facta ad imnimum concludiint," Thus, " essentia" and " existentia " cannot differ in concept for these men as Suarez will note and whose opposite he will soon maintain in order to say that existence is not of the concept of the essence as possible, as difference is not of the concept of genus.
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17.
This is almost a xuord for word rendition of Ponseca's text. In 4 Metaph oap. 2, q.4, sect. 3, col.754: "Alll dlc\int, creaturam exlstentem nihil adders suae essentiae, nisi hoc solim, quod sit extra causas suas. Sed nee hujusraodi sententia placet. Nam si idem esse credunt: rem esse extra suas causas, quod referrl ad illas relatione actualis dependentiae, ex proxime dictis refutata relinquitur. Si vero idem esse putant, quod rem productara esse a suis caussis, et nondum corruptam, aut annlhilatum ex eo non est probanda sententia, quia haec oratio non signiflcat formaliter, rem habere esse actu, sed accepisse illud a caussa sua, et nondum araississe, quae haud duble sunt conditiones conJ\inctae cum actuali existentia creaturarum, non ipsa eaoTum actualis existentia. Si denique idem, quod rem, neque esse solum objective in Intellectu, neque etiam in sola potestate suarum caussarum (neque enim alius praeterea succurrit sensus lllorum verborum) de eo esse nos qiiaerimus, quidnam sit, et quo pacto ab essentia distlnguatur. Itaque nihil liquido constat ex hoc explicandi raodo."
.
18.
Cf. Capreolus, op. cit .. In 2j d.l, q.3.i a-d.lj Aureoll , Vol. Ill, p. 71a where Capreolus remarks: "Si aut era realitas suraatur pro exsistentia actuali, conceditur quod ilia exisistentia, vel esse actualis exslstentiae, numquam fuit sub nihilo sibi opposite, scilicet nihileitate exslstentiae." Cf, also Eleuterio Slorduy, S.M., "El concepto objectlvo en Suarez", Pensamlento , 4 (1948), p. 383.
19.
This objection is again brought forth in D.M., 31, XIII, #11: "Secunda objectio esse potest, quia juxta nostrara sententiara nee compositio rationls excogitarl potest ex esse et essentia. Nam compositio per se alicujus rei esse debet ex extremis realibus, quamvls ipsa rationls sit; non enim dicltur rationls, quia ipsa extrema per ratlonem ficta sint, sed quia, licet quid reale sint, tamen in re non sunt duo, sed untim; at vero essentia et esse neque in re siint, nee etiam concipi possunt, ut duo extrema realia, quia, quando sunt duo extrema, eo modo quo sunt duo, unum non Includltur in alio; essentia vero non concipitur ut extremum reale, nisi ut Includens esse, ut a nobis supradictiJm estj ergo non potest concipi per modum compos it ionis, haec actualitas quara essentia Intelligitur habere ab esse. Et urgetur ampllus haec difficultas in ipsaraet existentia creata; ilia enim est ens creati^m.
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unde necesse est ut etiam in ilia locum habeat haec compositioi nam ilia est potentialis, et potest interc.uin esse, interdxim non esse, et tacien in ilia non potest intelligl compositio ex essentia et esse, alia procederatur
in infinitiim/'
This then is a more complete rendering of the objection now being treated in D.M., 31j VI, #22. S\iarez' answer* to this more complete objection is found in D.M,, 31, XIII, ;fl2 and is most instructive as to just wiiat Suarez* position is on the distinction between essence and existence. He replies: "Respondetur prirao, non esse necessarium ad compositionem rationis, ut extrema sint vel concipiantur tanquam entla real! a actual ia, praesertim praecise sumpta, et quatenus uniom non includitur in conceptu alterius, sed satis esse quod extrema sint ratinnes aliquae reales aptae ad existendura aliquo raodo. Quod patet aperte in compositione rationis ex natura specifica, et differentia individiiante; natura enim specifica, ut praecisa per conceptxaa ab omnibus* differentiis indivlduantibus, non est ens actu, sed solum ratio qimedain realis apta ut sit actu in individuia (loquirawr autem de ilia compositione, ut rebus realibus attribuitur, seu ut Iriabet terminum realem). Igitur quod extrema sint entia realia in actu, est quidem per se necessarium ad compositionem realem; ad compositionem autem rationis minime, Unde potest triplex compositio rationis dlstingui, Una qviae sit ex extremis, ut in re ipsa sxint entia actu, licet non sint actu distincta. Alia, quae sit inter extreiiaa realia quidem aptitudine seu formalitate reali objectiva, abstrahentia tamen ab actualitate existentiae. Alia denique quae sit qiiasi media, ita ut unura extremura ejus sit solum ratio aut essentia realis praecise concepta, aliud vero sit existentia actualis, Et haec responsio est optima, et satis confonais modo concipiendi. Thus, for Suarez, the essence is conceived by precisive abstraction as it is possible or as it is in potency and then is conceived as actiial so there is no instance of two extremes, nor need there be. In #13 Suarez completes his answer to the objection and clarifies his position fiATther: "Secundo vero dici posset, non omnem compositionem rationis esse ex extremis, quae mutuo se excludunt, seu quorujn neutrum includitur in conceptu alterius, sed satis esse ut unura possit ab alio praescindi, quamvis alterum e converse non possit. Sic enim substantia est aliquo modo composita secundum rationem quia resolvi potest in duos conceptus entis et modi per se, quamvis in conceptu modi necessario includatur ens. Sic ergo dicetur in praesenti. Et
US'
-477-
utroque modo potest conflrraatio de ipsa existentia expedirl; prlrao enim dici potest satis probabiliter, existentiam actualem, hoc ipso quod ab exe r'citio actualiter exlstendi abstrahitur, conf\indi cxmi ipsa essentia^ et ideo existentiara ut exercitaxfi non concipi ut corapositum, sed ut siniplicem xoodum componentem ens in actu creatura. Quap3x>pter, cum diciter haec compositio esse de ratione entis creati, intelligltur vel de eo quod concipitur ut id quod est, et non ut pipaecisa i^tio essendl, vel intelligitxir cum proportione, scilicet, compositionera hanc esse de ratione entis creati, ut compositi per illam, vel ut componentis, Vel secundo dici potest, in ipsamet existentia posse concipi hanc corapositionem sine processu in infinitum, quia ipsa, dum est ratio essendi essentiae, etiam est ratio essendi siblipsi, ut in superioribus fusius tractatum est."
20.
Cf. D.M., 2, IV, #6-#7: "Prirao niodo dicimxas essentiam rei esse id, quod est prlmum et radicale, ac intiniurn principiura omnivcn actionum ac proprietatvun, quae rei convenivint, et s\ib hac ratione dicitur 'natura uniUBcu,1usque rei', ut constat ex Aristot., 5 Metaph., text. 5i et notat S. Thomas, de Ente et Essentia, c.l, Secundo autem et Quodlib, 1, art, 4, et saepe alias, iwrln dicirmis essentiam rei esee, quae per definitionoa easplicatur, ut dicit etiam D, Thomas, dicto opusculo de Ente et Essentia, c,2, et sic etiam dici solet, illud esse essentiam rei, quod primo concipitur de re; primo (inquara) non ordine originls (sic enim potius soleraua conceptionera r^i inchoare ab his quae a\int extra essentiam rei), sed ordine nobilitatis potius et primitatis objectlj nam id est de essentia rei, quod concipiraus primo illi convenire, et primo constit\ii intrinsece in esse rei, vel talis rei, et hoc modo etiam vocatur essentia quidditas* in ordine ad locutiones nostras, quia est id, per quod respondemus ad qviaestionem, quid sit res. Ac denique appellatur 'essentia', quia est id,
quod per actton essendi primo esse intelligltur in unaquaque re. Ratio ergo essentiae his modis jwtest a nobis declarari," Cf. also D,M., 31^ II, lilO.
21.
22.
Of
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-478-
It is not foimd in reality, but has its origin in the mind. It is a distinction of the reasoned reason, because it arises not entirely from the shea? operation of the intellect, but from the occasion offered by the thing itself on which the mind is reflecting.
23.
distinctionis rationis" Siiarez remarks: "Distinctio autem rationis ratiocinatae in^jrirais requlrit diversitatera aliquam fonoalem in oonceptibus objectivis, in quo differt ab altera distinctione rationis ratiocinantis; convenit autem In hoc cian distinctionibus * in re inventis. Ut autei.i talis distinctio Judicetur rationis, et non rei, satis est ut praeter illam nem conceptuum, nullum inveniatur signum distinctio ex omnibus positis ad distinctioneiii raodalera vel realem cognoscendam; nam, cum distinctiones non sint raultiplicamdae sine causa, et sola distinctio conceptura non sufficiat ad inferendum distinctionera rei, quandocunque cum ilia distinctione conceptuum non adjungitur aliud signum majorls distinctionis, judicanda semper est distinctio rationis, et non rei. Ex quo infero, quandocunque certo constet, aliqua duo, quae in re unita et con June ta sunt, Iba esse in conceptibus objectivis distincta, ut in re et in individuo sint prorsus inseparabilia, tam rautuo quam non rautuo, et tam de potentia absoluta quam natural iter et tam quoad esse quam quoad realem unionera inter se, tunc magnum et fere certum argujuentum esse, ilia non distingui actu in re sed ratione ratiocinata." Note also D.M., 7, I> #5: "At vero posterior distinctio rationis (ratiocinatae) fit per conceptus inadeq\iatos ejusdem rei; nam licet per utrumque eadem res concipiatur, per neutrum tamen exacte concipitur totum id, quod est in re,neque exhauritur tota quidditas, et ratio objectiva ejus, quod saepe fit concipiendo rem illam per habitudinem ad res diversas, vel ad raodvun eorum, et ideo talis distinctio semper habet fundamentura in re, formallter autem dicetur fieri per conceptus inadaequatos ejusdem rei." In regard to the problem of how existence is said contingently of the creature Cf. D.M., 31, VII, #7.
24.
This is made clear in the following text from D,M., " Rationis distinctio 7 I* #8 where, in the context of: extrlnseca altera, altera intrlnseca " , smd more immediately in explanation of the question: " Unde oriatur rationis quaevls distinctio ", Suarez explains: "Ultimo ex dlctis intelligitur, distinctionera rationis propriam et intrinsecara, de qua loquimur, proprie et
.^H\JV
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per se non esse, nisi medio intellectu concipiente res iraperfecte abstracte, confuse, vel inadequate. Quia cum haec distinctio non sit in re, neque in objecto cognito, sol\;un consistit in quadam denominatione a conceptibus mentis, et ideo requirit distinctionera saltern in ipsis conceptibus, et in denominatione quae ab illis sumitur: haec autem distinctio conceptxim respectu rei, quae in se omnino una est, nunquam est, nisi Ob iraperfectionera ipsorura conceptuum." Cf also D.M., 6, IX, #21 which is cited in note #31 below, wherein it is explained that the composition of genus and difference is in the thing by an extrinsic denomination from the concepts of the mind. It is on the pattern of the composition of genus and difference that Suarez models his distinction between essence and existence
.
25.
26.
Cf. D.M.,
27.
Herein Suarez remarks on how a created substance, altogether complete, is located in the predicament of substance. But it is interesting to note that Suarez makes the remark in the context of metaphysically complete substance as opposed to physically complete substance. (Cf. Disp. 33* I* #15 "Substantia ergo metaphysicae incorapleta, est ilia quae concipitur per modxim partis metaphysicae, ut est, verbi gratia differentia. Completa vero dicitur, quae est Integra et totalis substantia ut species ultima, verbi gratia.). The text from #21 reads as follows: "Quinto declaratur res ipsa, nam omnis substEintia, quae ponitur in recta linea praedicamentali, concipitur per modum substantiae totalis et integi*e, et includit vel distincte vel confuse q\ildquid ad complementum substantiae necessarium estj ergo est substantia completa. Dices: confuse continere est continere tajitura in potentia; ad rationem autem substantiae completae non satis est continere in potentia complementum substantiae, sed in actu, alias
Cf. D.M., 33* I #21.
.5S
.TS
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materia prima esset substantia completa. Respondetur, includere in confuse non esse includere in potentia physica et reali ac vere passiva, qualis est materia prima; sed dicitur esse in potentia logice, aut secundum rationera, quae potentia non excludit quin res concepta actu sit completa substantia, et actu includat quidquid ad tale complementum necessariiim est, quamvis illud totum non concipiatur distincte tali conceptu, sed confuse, per modum tamen totius atque adeo per modiom substantiae completae. Quia substantia completa nihil aliud est quam substantia totalis et integra. Antecedens patet ex modo ipso concipiendi et praedicandi, nam homo nihil aliud est quam ipsa individua, ut inter se simllia, confuse concepta per modum vinius; et ideo saltern confuse includit totara substsuitiam individuam; et idem est de superioribus praedicatis proportionaliter, Et ideo possunt superiora de inferioribus praedicari, quia dicunt totum quod in illis est. Unde, cum alias dicant illud ipsum totum per modum subsistentis, seu existentis ut id quod est, dicxmt etiam illud per modum substauitiae con^letae, et totalis." In this way, it is not difficult to see why Suarez will say that actual existence adds nothing to the complete substance as located in the predicament of substance because it is there in objective potency or it is there as confusedly conceived. Cf also D.M., 50, XII, #14. For his division of substance into complete and incomplete Cf D.M., 33, I, #4-#5: "Ad hoc ergo dubium explicandvira inventa est ilia divisio substantiae in incompletam In qua partitione divisum est substantia et corapletara. in dicta signiflcatione latissime sunipta, ut ex dictis constat. Dividitur autem non ad raod\n generis i id enim fieri non posset, ut recte pi^bat airgumentum factum, quia non potest habere differentias quae sint extra rationem ejus, id est, q\iae substantiae non sint saltem incompletae, in quibus communis ratio substantiae, prout est divisum llllus partitionis, includitur. Dividitur ergo ibi substantia ad modum transcendent is per modos intrinsecos in quibus ipsa includitur, qui non indicant propriara compositionem etiam metaphysicam, sed solum expressiorem conceptionem hujus vel illius rationis substantiae, ad eum omnino modum quo supra declaravimus deterrainationem seu divisionem entis per varies modos intrinsecos (Cf. D.M. 2, IV, #7 -#12). Completa ergo substantia dicitur, quae est aut intelllgit\ir per modum totius se\i integrae substantiae, quae sola interdum quasi per antonomasiara substantia appellari solet,.,. Incorapleta vero substantia dicitur oranis ilia, q\iae pars est substantiae, vel ad modiom partis concipitur, quo modo materia et forma substantiae
.
r-:fn
-481-
sunt..." Suarez now distinguishes how a substance can be complete or incomplete, namely physically or metaphysically. Cf. D.M., 33, I* #6: "Ex hac vero declaratione intelligltur dupliciter posse dici substantiam completan, vel incompletam, scilicet, physice aut metaphysice. Physice dicetur substantia Incompleta, quae est pars physica, vel substantlalis modus aut terminus substantiae, concurrens aliquo raodo ad corapleraenttim ejus quia cum compositio ex natura et supposito, raetaphysica soleat appellari, et non physica, possunt hac ratione natura et suppositalltas dici substantiae incompletae metaphysice, potius quam physice, quo sensu haec denominatio sumitur solum ex ordlne ad scientiam; nam quia propriiom est metaphysicae considerare compositionem ex natura et supposito, ideo compositio ilia metaphysica appellata est, nam ex se abstrahit a materia, et communis est immaterial Ibus substantiis et eodera sensu dici possunt Ilia componentla metaphysice incompleta, ut distlnguantur a proprio modo, quod materia et forma incompletae dicuntur. Nos autera aliunde stanimus denominationem illamj physicum enim appellamus quidquid in re ipsa exist it absque intellectus operatlone." Vfhat a metaphysically complete or incomplete substance means for Suarez is seen in D.M., 33, I, #15: "Superest dicendura de alio sensu divisionis, id est, de substantia metaphysice seu logice corapleta aut incompleta. Quae distinct lo proprie locum habet in soils substantiis creatis, de quibus nunc agimusj nam in soils reperitur propria compositio raetaphysica ex genere et differentia ex q[ua ilia dlvlsio orta est. Substantia ergo metaphysice incompleta, est ilia quae conclpltur per modum partis metaphysicae, ut est, verbi gratia, differentia. Completa vero dicltur, quae est Integra et totalis substantia, \it species ultima, verbi gratia." Thus Suarez' use of " Partialis vel Incompleta substantia" should be qualified by " secundum
mis
rationeiiT^
28.
Suarez at this point (D.M., 31, VII, #6), notes the following: "Quia ergo Doctores cltati in hoc sensu vocant exlstentiaitt substantiam Incompletsun, et modiim vel actum substantiae, ideo eorum substantia nobis non probatur." The " Doctores citatl" are found in Section VII, #3 where Suarez notes that St. Thomas in q,5 De Potent la , a. 4 ad. 3, Capreolus in I Sent ., dlst. 8 q.l conclus. 3, and Cajetan in De Ente et Essentia, cap. 4 just before q.5 and cap. 5, q.lO, ad. a say tliat existence to be a
af
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certeiln act or term of essence and of the same predicament as the essence thoiigh not directly but reductively. The third conclusion of Capreolus, namely, " Tertia conclusio est quod esse existentiae non se habet omnino similiter ad substantiam vel essentiam creaturae sicut accidens ad sub J ec turn, accipiendo ace i dens proprie pro quldditate accidental! repoalta in allquo noverg generum accldentis ", cites the text of St, Thomas from tne t>e Fotentia as^well as other texts of his with little or no commentary on Capreolus' part. Neither St. Thomas nor Capreolus in the places cited mention that existence is reductively located in the predicament of its essence. But Capreolus mentions it in his reply to the third argument of Henry Of Ghent. Cf. op. clt .. Vol. I, p. 321b. Cajetan, however, makes explicTIE mention of it in the second reference cited by Suarez In De Ente et Essentia , cap. 5 q.lO, ad. 8, (Laurent edit,, p. 139)' "Ad octavum negatur antecedens. Existentia enim substantiae est substantia, et existentia accidentis est accidens, et, ut supra patet, existentia substantiae non est materia, nee forma, nee compositum, sed actualitas omnium eorun et sic est reductive in genere substantiae. Sed contra hoc instat arguens sic; Omne quod est reductive in genere, reponitur ut principium ipsius; sed esse non est principium substantiae: ergo non est in genere substantiae reductive. Ad hoc dicitur quod cum esse sit ultima actualitas rei et ultimum in generatione sit primura in intentione, esse erit in genere substantiae ut principium forraale liltiraatum ipsius substantiae; per hoc enim res reponitur in genere substantiae, quia est capax esse substantial is, etenim differentiae in omnibus generibus, ut infra declarabitxir, sumrauntur ab ordine ad ipsim esse." " Cf. E, Gilson, Cajetan et 1 existence" , Tijdschrift Voor PhilosoplAe , June, iyt)3, p.27i? n. p.27tJ, p.2ii3 n.b.
29.
By this Suarez means that if they will grant that existence is a metaphysically incomplete substance rather than a physically incomplete substance he can grant their point. Cf Footnote #2? above and also D.M., 33, I, #l-#28. Note especially D.M. 6, X, #l-#3'i "Abstracta Metaphysica voco ea, qiiae a conceptibus metaphysicis abstrahiaitur, ut animalitas, rational itas, et similes; voco autem ilia abstracta metaphysica, ut ilia distinguam a physica, ut sunt albedo, color etc..." In #3 he adds: "...si abstractio sit ejusdem rationis, scilicet, aut physica, aut metaphysica; inter has vero esse diversam rationem. Nam per abstractionem physicam, scilicet, albedinis a subjecto, non abstrahitur essentia
,
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1c
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t?
*>/? s"^
"i*^
rrr^:
S&;rr
Dr.
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-^
-483-
ab ipsamet re (ut sic dicam) quam const Itult, sed abstrahltur fonna a subjectoj et Ideo ex vl talis abstractionis solum tollitur praedicatio iiniversalls per modura proprii vel accidentis. .. Per allam vero abstractionera metaphysicam abstrahltur essentia ab entitate quara constituit,et foiroaliter concipitur ac significatur, ut cum dicitur albedineitas, et ideo in his abstractis non possunt fieri verae praedicationes, quando rationes conceptae distinctae simt saltern secundum
rationera,"
30.
This means that it is conceived as a metaphysical act and as a mode in the sense in which Suarez i-emarks in D.M,, 7, 1, 19'J "Ac denique Fonseca, lib. 5 Metaph., cap. 6, quaest, 6, sect. 2 hos modos expresse ponit, quamvis dlstinguat trai genera raodorum. . Alii qui non solum non sunt entitates distinctae, verum, neque ullo modo in re distinguuntur ab his rebus, quarum modi esse dicuntur, sed ratione tantian, ut sunt illi modi quibus contrahitur ens ad inferiora sed haec duo genera modorura jani sunt a nobis praetennissa, q^ola hi posteriores non sunt modi, nisi secundum ratlonem. ,." That is to say, it is not a real mode but rather, is a mode by extrinsic denomination from a concept, with a foundation in reality. Cf . Footnote #36 below. Thus the composition of essence and existence follows a similar pattern to that of genus and difference, haecceity and species and " ens " and its inferiors. Note Suarez' remarks in D.^C^'31* XIII, #7: "At vero Juxta nostrara sententiam dicendum est, compositionem ex esse et essentia, analogice tantum compositionem appellari, quia non est compositio realis, sed rationis; compositio enim realis non est nisi ex extremis in re ipsa distinctis; hie autem extrema non sunt in re distincta, ut ostendirausj ergo compositio ex illis non potest esse realis, Sicut autem ens rationis non est ens nisi analogice ac solo fere nomine, ita congxjsitio haec non habet univocam convenientiam cum COTopositione reali materiae et formae, verbi gratia, sed analogam tantum proportionera. Atque haec est prima et quasi generica differentia inter hanc compositionem, et 111am qviae est ex materia et forma. Cum hac vero conjuncta est alia differentia, quae ad rem praesentera spectat, quod compositio ex materia et forma reperitur tantum in corporibus et sensibilibus rebus; haec vero ex esse et essentia communis est omnibus entibus creatis, quae sunt entia in actui et ideo ilia compositio j^ysica est, quia non abstrahit a materia secundum esse; haec vero est
,
t-
.06
r.
{i'.'-JiV-
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metaphysica, quia abstrahit, et coraiiiunls est entlbus iimnaterialibua. Ex quo etlam fit, ut ilia prior coraposltio physica fundamentura sit physicae transrautationis haec vero niiuirae, sed ex se abstrahat a corrupt ione, vel tranamutatione physica, nisi quatenus adjungitur rebus, in quibuG prior corapositio reperitur. Ab aliis vero raetaphysicis compositionibus differt generatira loquendo, qrla ad diversum ten,iin\ira quasi formalera effectura ordinatur. In particulari vero differt a corapositione ex natura et subsistentia, quia haec realis est, ilia rationisj ab aliis veix) compositionibus rationis ut ex genere et differentia, etc., quia illae ex se abstrahunt ab existentia actuali, et considerantur etiam in ente in potent ia; haec vero consideratur tantian in re actu exist ente." In another place Suarez explicitly explains how existence is called "ul tii.a aotualitas" . Of. D.M., 31. XI, #22: "Atque hinc obiter infertur, quomodo Intel ligendum sit, quod a mult is dicitur, existent iam esse ultiraura actum, seu ultimam rei actual itateraj sic enim loquitur D, Thomas quaest. unica de Anira., art. 6, ad. 2; et Cajetan,, 1 part., quaest, 3 J u?t.4, circa secundam rationem Alii vero etiam Thomistae dicunt, existentiara D. Thomao. potlus esse primara rei actualitatem, quoniam esse potius est primus actus cujuslibet rei, quam ultimus. Quae varietas, supposita doctrina a nobis tradita, in sola vocu:n significatione consistere potGst, Nam existentia actualis dicitur esse actus, vel actualitas essentiae, non physice, et secxmdum rem, sed metaphysice, et secundum rationem, et hoc modo diversis rationibus potest dici act^is primus vel ultimus. Respectu enim praedicatorum essentialiiJim, quatenus vmian comparatur ad aliud, ut actus ad potentian raetephysicam, dicitur existnsntia ultimus actus, quia constituit in actu totara essentiam includentera omnia praedicata essentialia, et est id quod, nostro modo intelligendi, ultimo advenit essentiae, in const ituenda intrinseca et actuali entitate rei." Cf. also D.M.J 31, XIII, #20 where Suarez explains how " existentia" is not conceived as " id quod est " but as a " simplex inodus" by which essence is constituted in the orSer of actual being.
31.
Let us note first Suarez* remains in D.M., 33* I* #17 on incomplete substance: "Patet consequentia turn ex dlctis de substantia physice incompleta; servanda est enim eadera proportional is ratio; sicut ergo omnis substantia, quae pe se ordinatur ad physician complementum alterius, physice incompleta est, ita quae per se
:^
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ordinatur ad constituendaia substantlam inetaphysice completam, raetaphysice Incompleta est; turn etiara quia si substantia ex genera et ultima differentia constans est completa, ergo illae, ex quibus componitur, incompletae sunt; nam, sicut totvim ex partibus, ita substantia completae ex incompletis constat." LA us now regard his remarks in D.M., 6, IX, #21: "Ad priraum arguraentura in principio positum respondetxxr, compositionem ex genere et differentia non esse real em conQX)sitionem, sed r^tionis tantum; quia, ut bene probat argumentum, sine distinctione ex natura rei, neque corapositio vera, et qvjxe in re sit, intelligi potest; quia corapositio nihil aliud est quam distinctorura unio; ubi ergo non est distinctio in re, neque compositio esse potest; est ergo haec rationis corapositio. Dicitur autem haec compositio non esse omnino per rationem conficta, non qviia in re ectu antecedat, sed quia in re est fundameatum, ut intellectus possit concipere unam rationem ut potentialem, et praecisam ab altera, et aliam ut actiialem et deterrainantera alteram, et ita proprie compositio tantura est in concept ibus, in re vero soliim per extrinsecam denominationem a conceptibus mentis, et hoc modo dicitur esse compositio rationis." In #22 he adds: "Ad confinnationem respondetur, partes definitionis non proprie dici significare partes rei, sed habere quamdam proportionem cum partibus rei, ut D, Thomas exponit 7 I'fetaph., lect,9* quia se habent genus et differotia ad mod\aa materiae et forraae, qxiae svnt partes rei, a quibus propterea genus et differentia sximi dicuntur, ut sectione sequenti latius explicabimus." Then in #23 he continues: "Ad secundum respondetur, genus et differentiam dicere essentias, seu rationes essentiales diversas secundum rationem, non secundum rem, atque hoc modo genus dicitur esse extra rationem differentiae, et differentia etiam extra rationem generis; nam utriusque ratio ita mente concipitur ac praescinditur, ut secundum earn praecisionem et abstractionera neutra in altera fomialiter includatur; ad quod non est necesse ut in re ipsa distinguantur in una et eadera re, sed ex parte generis satis est quod ratio ejus, ut tali conceptioni respondet, non constituatur intrinsece per differentiam divisivam ejus, et consequenter ut possit in re inveniri absque tali differentia; ex parte autem differentiae, ut genus dicatiir esse extra rationem ejus, satis est quod in ejus praeciso conceptu objective non includatur conceptus objectivxis generis, sed concipiatur differentia ut actus generis, omnino ratione distinctus. Atque hoc etiam satis est ut genus et differentia dicantur
-486-
comparari ut potentia et actus essentlalls, non secundiim rem, sed secimdinn ratloneni tantiim; nam q\ialls est compositiOj tales esse debent actus et potentia; est
autem haec compositlo rationls, ut dlxlimisj eodem ergo dlcitur componi unum per se ex genere et differentia secundum rationem, et non secundum rem, et ideo tale coraposltura est raaxime per se uniwa, quia componentia in re unum sunt, et sectmdun rationem per se coraparantur et subordiiiantur. Et hoc sensu dixit D. Thomas, 7 Metaph., lect. 12, differentiam non addi generi, ut dlversan essentiam ab illo, sed ut contentam in eo implicite sicut deterralnatum continetur in indeterminatoj et hac de causa ex els con^oni uniim per
inodo
se."
Note also Suares' remarks in #24. Another fruitful treatment of a metaphysically incomplete being is foimd in Suarez' discussion of metaphysical form, of vrtilch difference is an example. Cf. D.M., 15, XI, #l-#28.
32,
Suarez tceats this question in D.M., 5, II. Let us first note his remarks in #9: "Dico sccundo: individuum, ut sic, non addit aliquid ex natura rei distlnctum a natura specifica, ita ut in ipso individuo, Petro, verbi gratia, htimanitas, ut sic, et haec humanitas, vel potlus id, quod additur humanitati, ut fiat haec (quod solet vocari haecceitas, vel differentia individualis), ex natura rei distinguantur, et consequenter faciant veram compositlonem in ipsa re." Note should be talcen of #10 and #15 but what Siiares says in #16 is particularly apropos: "Dico tertio, individuum addere supra naturam coramunera aliquid ratione distlnctum ab ilia, ad idem praedicamentum patinens, et individuvffii componens metaphysice, tanquam differentia Individualis contraiiens speciera, et individuiun constituens. Prima pars hujus assert ionis sequitur ex duabus praecedentibus; nam dictum est in prima, individu\in addere aliquid naturae comrauni, et in secunda negatum est illud esse distinctiim ex natura rei; ergo necessariura est ut saltem ratione distingiiatur, quia, si nullo modo distlngueretur, nullo raodo adderctur. Nee vero inde sequitur, id quod additur, esse aliquid rat ionis; nam, sicut est aliud distingxii ratione, allud vero esse tantum ratlonls, fieri enira potest ut quae realia siont, sola ratione distinguantur, ita etiam id, quod additur, potest esse reale, sicut revera est, quaravis sola ratione distlnguatur. Dices: ilia addltlo est tantum per rationem, Respondeo: quoad rem additam nego; quoad modum additionis, seu contradictlonis, aut composit ionis, concede; nam, sicut se'paratio naturae communis a differentiis Indlvlduis est solum per
out
iiicio; i^\i
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ii,^.
.:)
c^f;rrinr,-j
-487-
ratlonem, Ita e converse, quod differentia individualis intelligatur, ut addita naturae coinniunl, solum est per rationemj nam in re non est ilia propria additio, sed in unoquoque individuo est una entltas, utramque ratlonem per seipsam realiter habens," Note especially the following in #l3: "Responderi potest prirao, in his nostris conceptibus non esse magnum inconveniens adraittere hujusmodi prxjcessum, quia partitvir intellectus quae reipsa omnino indivisibilia sunt, et ideo mirum non esset si intellectus in his divisionibus seu conceptibus in infinitum procedere posset. Secimdo poBet aliquis ita philosophari de conceptu speciei et individui, sicut nos supra de conceptu entis et inferiorura ejus ratioclaati sun\is; diximus enim inferiora addere supra ens ailquid ratione distinctum, ita teuaen ut conceptus inferior immediate * conceptus sub conceptu entis non sit proprie resolubilis in duos conceptus, sed sit tantum conceptus sirr^jlex magis expressus et deterrainatus, quara conceptus entis; sic ergo in praesente dici potest, conceptum individui non esse proprie conqpositum, et resolubilem in conceptum alterius modi, seu differentiae individualis, sed esse sol\ara expressiorem conceptum ipsius naturae speclficae prout in re existit in tali entitate, in qua nee concipi potest talis entitas neque aliquid illius entitatis, quin talem specificam rationem includat, neque ipsa ratio specifica potest, ut in re existit, distincte concipi, nisi ut in tali vel tali entitate contracta. Et hac ratione facile vitatur processus in infinitum ut constat ex dictis in simili de ente." More of the same is found in #19.
33,
Siiarez' treatment of this is found in D.M., 2, VI, #7 wherein he writes: "Quarta igitiir opinio, et quae mihi probatur, est, hanc contract ionem seu determinationem conceptus objectivi entis ad inferiora non esse intelligendsun per mod\m corapositionis, sed solum per nradimi expressioris conceptionis, alicujus entis contenti sub ente; ita ut uterque conceptus, tarn entis quam substantia, verbi gratia, simplex sit ot irresolubilis in duos conceptus, solumque differant, quia iinus est magis determinatus quam alius. Quod in ordine ad conceptus formales recte explicatur; differunt enim sol^um quia per unum expressius concipitur res, prout est in se, quam per alium, quo solum confuse concipitur, et praecise secundim aliquam convenientiara ciim aliis rebus; hoc autera totum fieri potest sine propria compositione per solsun cognitionera confusam vel distinctam, praecisam vel determlnatam. Sic igitur his conceptibus forraalibus intelliguntur correspondere
-488-
duo objectivi siinplices, et Irresolubiles in plu3?es conceptus, quorum vinus dicit\ir superior vel abstractior alio, solum quia respondet confusion conceptui forraali, per quam non concipitur res secundum determinatum modum quo est in se, sed confuse et praecise. Potest etiara intelligi llle conceptus superior includi in inferiorl sine propria compositione inferioris; quia totura id, quod confuse concipitur in illo conceptu praeciso, reperitur in alio objecto expressius concepto, et in toto illo, q\iacunque i?atione consideretur. Ac denique intelligitur deteminatio superioric ad inferius, et additio inferioris ad superius, non quasi per additionera partis ad partem, sod per solam raajorera deteraiinationem, vel expressionem, aut confusionem ejusdem rei in ordine ad di versos conceptus mentis."
34.
contraction hej?e in question is what Suarez calls metaphysical contraction and is in keeping with his notions of a metaphysically incomplete being and a metaphysical act. Cf. D.H., 31 > XIII, ^8: ^Ut vero hoc magis declaretur, distingueie possuraus duplicem contract ionem seu llmitationem, unam metaphysicam, et 2LLter>am physicam. Metaphysica contractio non requirit distinctionem actualem ex natura ::^ inter contractum et contrahens, sed ad illam sufficit distinctio conceptuiim cum aliquo fundamento in re^ et hoc modo (si velimus cum raultis loqui) admittere possiimus, essentiam finiri et limitari in ordine ad esse, et, e converse, ipsum esse finiri ac limitari, quia est actus talis essentiae. Nam sub distinctis rationibus, seu in diverso genere causarum, non repugnat hie cii^culus; sicut in ipsamet essentia cistinguimus genus, et different iam, per quara species const ituitur ac liraitatur ad talera ac tantum perfectionera, et ipsa differentia, ut differentia, dici potest limitari in ordine ad tale genus, cujus est actiis, e converse. At vero, physice loquendo, si essentia sit simplex, ubstantialis, et completa, ut est substantia angelica, wrvera non indiget aliquo formal iter ac intrinsece limitsuite, praeter seipsam; sed sicut substantia composita limltatur a suis intrinsecis component ibus, seu principiis (a quibus siraul sumptis et unitis in re non distinguitur ) , quod nihil allud est quara per suananet entitatera intrinsece limitari, ita substantia simplex creata, physice ac realiter seipsa limitata eat. Quara limitat ionem habet, vel in potentia antequara flat, vel in actu cum fit. Unde c\n existentia nihil aliud sit quara essentia in actu constituta, sicut essentia actualis per seipsam, vel per sua intrinseca
^nie
dup^
.^t
e- %
i;}!.
-489-
principia est forraaliter llmitata, Ita etiam exlstentia creata limitationera habet ex ipsa essentia, non ut est potentia in qua recipitur, sed quia in re nihil aliud est quam ipsamet actualis essentia." That Suarz means nothing more by existence then the actual essence could not be made more clear than he expresses it in this closing sentence,
35.
.,
p. 288.
36.
In D.M,, 7* Ij #19 Suarez has also mentioned Fonseca and the modes: "Ac denique Fonseca, lib. 5 metaph., cap. S, quaest. 6, sect. 2, hos modes expresse ponit, quamvis distinsu.at tria genera modorura: qxiidara qui sxuit entitates ex se distinctae ab aliis, ut albedo, dulcedo, et in hoc ordine ponit figuram, sed imraerito, quia in tertio constituitvir, quia respectu quartitatis illam afficit tanquam modus, non tanquam res omnino ab ilia distincta. Alii qui non solum non sunt entitates distinctae, verum, neque ullo modo in re distinguuntur ab his rebus, quarura modi esse dicuntur, sed ratione tantum, ut sunt illi modi quibus contrahitur ens ad inferiora. Sed haec duo genera modo rum jam sunt a nobis praeterralssa, quia hi posteriores non sunt modi, nisi secundum rationem; illi vero sunt res, vel forraae habentes ex se proprias entitates. In tertio ergo ordine ponit eos modes quos proprl?. et speciall ratione reales modes appellamus, de quibus idem sentit, quod nos explicuimus, quamvis aliqua ponat exerapla qiiae incearta nobis sunt. Ut est illud de existartia rerum creatorum, de modo unde res dicitvir necessaria aut contingens, aut ens completiOT. vel incon^Jletum. Nam hoc ultimum aequivociam esse potest; quia si haec dicantur de toto et partibus integral ibus, sic verum est esse modum quemdara ad quantitatera pertinentemj eadem enim portio aquae, verbi gratia, si per se terminata sit et sejuncta ab aliis, dicitur ens corapletiun seu totalej sivero sit aliis continua, dicitur ens partiale vel incompletura, qui modus solum consistit in di versa xinione vel terrainatione. Si vero ilia dicantur de ente secund^um se, potius pertinent ad modos intrinsecos et essentiales entis, sive ens dicatur incompletum secundum rationem, ut differentia, sive physice et secundxjm rem, ut anima rationalis, quae dicitur ens incompletum., non per aliquid additvun essentiae ejus, sed per suaraet essentiaraj unde ille modus solum ratione distinguitur ab ilia. Et idem existimo de alio modo entis necessarii, vel contingentis, si in ratione absoluta entis haec considerenturj nam
-490-
si considerentur In rat lone denomlnationes extrinsecae, De existent la vero 19> X). quam infra disputabiraus." For some remarks of Fonseca #135 and #138.
effectus, sic sunt ut infra dlceraus (Disp. res est magis controversa,
I,
-491-
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