Main Conclusions of the French NPPs Stress-tests : a Need for a Hardened Safety Core

Caroline LAVARENNE Karine HERVIOU

IAEA International Expert Meeting 19-22 March 2012, Vienna

Content
1. Origin, content and methodology of French nuclear installations stress-tests in 2011 2. Conclusions of the French Stress-tests 3. Completion of the French Safety Approach 4. Conclusion

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1.1 Stress-tests origin

1st accident learning's
Inappropriate design of the power plant regarding external hazards Long-term loss of cooling and energy supplies Failures affecting simultaneously all site plant difficulties to manage the situation in the long term.

National and international reactions

The French Prime Minister asked the French Nuclear Safety Authority, on March 23th The European Council asked for stress-tests on all European NPPs on March 24th and 25th

European Terms of Reference proposed by WENRA (April 21st)

French terms of reference established by the ASN (extended to other nuclear installations) to French operators on May 5th The WENRA terms of reference endorsed by ENSREG and the European Commission (May 25th)

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1.2 Content of ASN terms of reference / methodology for stress tests

3 parts
External Hazards
real state

Robustness to External Hazards

All possible situations

Loss of Safety Functions

Robustness to the Loss Of Power Supply or Loss of Heat Sink

Pools/reactors

site

Severe Accident

Robustness of the provisions to mitigate Severe Accident A graded and deterministic approach Expert judgment

cycle

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1.2 A review using multiple skills

External hazards (earthquake, flooding) Human aspects and organisational factors

Knowledge of the effective state of facilities

Accidental situations

Civil works

Emergency preparedness and management Radiation protection in accidental situation Severe accidents

Equipment Induced hazards (environmental environment, fire, explosion, loads drops)

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Content
1. Origin, content and methodology of French nuclear installations stress-tests in 2011 2. Conclusions of the French Strest-tests
1. Effects of non compliances 2. Robustness to hazards 3. Robustness to postulated situations

3. Completion of the French Safety Approach 4. Conclusion

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2.1 Installations robustness: real state

Potential impact of ensures the non compliances ability

Compliance of installations to safety requirements Means to manage an is a prerequisite for accident may be the robustness of the unavailable facilities for the beyond-design basis situations

of facilities to deal with accidents postulated in the design basis, basis

Operators have taken into account the main non-compliances known on June 30, 2011 in their stress-tests.

Complete the review conducted for stress-tests by the end of 2012 Reinforce processes to detect and cope with non-compliances

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2.2 Installations robustness for beyond design external hazards

Earthquake

significant seismic margin factors on major structures and equipment reported by operators

uncertainties to define seismic motions and simplified nature of approaches

do not allow to evaluate, with a sufficient degree of confidence, the robustness of each facility for beyond design basis earthquake.

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2.2 Installations robustness for beyond design external hazards

Flooding

Most equipment used in case of LHS or SBO located inside the flooding protection volume, protected in the event of a design basis flood

A consistent water levels may be observed on the platforms of some nuclear facilities for beyond design basis floods

additional studies to confirm water levels on plateforms for beyond design basis floods strenghtening of the flooding protection volume to reduce SBO and LHS risks
IRSN analysis and conclusions on CSA IAEA International Expert Meeting 19-22 March 2012, Vienna
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2.3 Installations robustness: Loss of heat sink or electrical supply

severe accident (EDF NPPs case)
Loss of Electrical Supply (Station Black Out: external + EDG)
SBO > 1 or 1 day > 1 to 3 days Core meltdown Significant releases (after containment venting system opening)

Core meltdown Loss of SG cooling by turbine-driven pump Few hours

Studies/EOPs proposed to confirm grace periods Additionnal Provisions : water make-up, EDG
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2.4 Installations robustness

Effect of non-compliances

Induced events (fires, explosions, pipes breaks, loads drops) Induced hazards on industrial sites around

Additional provisions

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2.4 First Conclusions Design Basis

NPPs able to withstand the design basis EQ or flood with no cliff-edge effect (just above), as soon as compliance to safety requirements is granted.
Need to complete the current safety requirements (design basis) in some areas in particular: characterization of seismic motion, motion combinations of hazards to consider (external, internal, with internal events), requirements associated to SSC (fire protection, severe accident management ...) durations of loss of heat sink and loss of energy
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2.4 First Conclusions Beyond Design Basis

For levels of EQ or floods significantly above Design Basis, Basis need to define a Complementary Approach to demonstrate the capability of the plant to withstand these hazards or extended accidental situations (long term accidents involving several units)

Need for a global approach to analyze the diverse additional provisions

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Content
1. Origin, content and methodology of CSA performed on French nuclear installations in 2011 2. Conclusions of the French Stress-tests 3. Completion of the French safety Approach 4. Conclusion

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3. Protection against external hazards: the situation today in French NPPs

Arrangements
to manage more and more severe situations

Level 5
(emergency management)

Level 4
(severe accidents)

Level 3
(Safeguard)

(abnormal operation)

Level 1
(Normal operation)

Do

Margins

Level 2

Non-compliance

t an pl of n n g ai esi m d

Level of hazard
Design Basis considered for designing systems and components
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IAEA International Expert Meeting 19-22 March 2012, Vienna

3. Post-stress tests approach: case of French operating PWR

Hardened Safety Core must be Arrangements to manage more protected against potential induced and events, like fire, explosion, load drops... more severe
situations Hardened Safety Core (limited number of essential functions)

Level 5
(emergency management)

Emergency management Limitation of severe accident consequences Non-compliance Prevention of severe accident Margins

Level 4
(severe accidents)

Level 3
(Safeguard)

Level 2
(abnormal operation)

Level 1
(Normal operation)

Level of hazards considered in the Design Basis

IAEA International Expert Meeting 19-22 March 2012, Vienna

Stress-test considered for designing Level systems and components to be defined

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Level of hazard

3. Post-stress-tests approach: case of French operating PWR

Arrangements to manage more and more severe situations

Human interventions in accidental situations

Level 5
(emergency management)

Level 4
(severe accidents)

(Safeguard)

(abnormal operation)

Level 1
(Normal operation)

Margins

Level 2

Non-compliance

Level 3

Compliance/maintenance

Level of hazard considered for designing systems and components

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IAEA International Expert Meeting 19-22 March 2012, Vienna

3. The general post-stress-tests approach

For Design Basis hazards/situations, the current provisions are sufficient to hazards/situations limit the impact on the installation and prevent the occurrence of an accident situation induced, For Beyond Design Basis hazards/situations, the Hardened Safety Core hazards/situations enables to bring back the plants in a safe state.

The Hardened Safety Core should be able to manage accident situations of long duration, affecting several plants of the same site, considering induced events: aims to limit the consequences of very extreme situations (but not impossible indeed) includes on site SSC to cope with the first hours after the accident, before the arrival of off-site support (such as FARN, EDFs Rapid Nuclear Action Force)
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Content
1. Origin, content and methodology of French nuclear installations stress-tests in 2011 2. Conclusions of French Stress-tests 3. Completion of the French Safety Approach 4. Conclusion

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4. Conclusion
The stress tests confirmed the relevance of the studies and positions taken for many years, especially considering PSR implementation, on-going research to improve the safety guidelines for the extension of the duration of operation of the facilities, R&D and improvement of severe accident management arrangements, limitation of releases... The content of hardened safety cores and associated requirements will be proposed by operators in mid-2012, with some particular points of 2012 attention for IRSN: Preference for added equipments, when possible, simple and robust, Search of diversification, Check the robustness of safety functions as a whole.

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4. Conclusion
Stress-tests (achieved)
Sent by ASN to EC (Dec. 2011) ASN Technical Requirements sent to operators (spring 2012)

Peer Review (on-going)

Final report May-June 2012

Operators Provisions
(perimeter & requirements) June 2012

EDF NPP Hardened Safety Core Content & associated requirements

December 2012

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Thank you for your attention

For more information: www.irsn.fr

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