Asia Pac J Manag (2011) 28:667681 DOI 10.

1007/s10490-009-9179-7

Disneys successful adaptation in Hong Kong: A glocalization perspective

Jonathan Matusitz

Published online: 28 October 2009 # Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2009

Abstract This paper applies the principles of glocalization theory to Disneys successful adaptation in Hong Kong. Glocalization refers to the interface of the global and the local. After Hong Kong Disneylands lack of success within a year of its opening in 2005, Disney executives attempted to cater to the local Chinese context. From a glocalization perspective, four major changes were made: (1) reduction of prices; (2) adaptation to local visitors customs; (3) change of dcors and settings; and (4) adaptation of labor practices. Ever since, Hong Kong Disneyland has proved successful: park attendance and revenues from growth have increased. Keywords Adaptation . Business . China . Culture . Disney . Globalization . Glocalization The purpose of this paper is to apply the principles of glocalization theory to Disneys successful adaptation in Hong Kong. The theme park is known as Hong Kong Disneyland. When it first opened in 2005, it was met with mitigated responses. One of the main reasons is that Disneys traditional method of imposing its US products from its Burbank, CA headquarters to the Chinese local context did not work. Amid many criticisms, employees complained that Disneys labor practices, restaurants, and various outlets were not Chinese enough, and Disneys rides, shows, and events were not appealing to Chinese visitors. To the locals, this demonstrated too much Western cultural imperialism. As a result, Disney executives attempted to cater to the local Chinese context and this is why the author adopts a glocalization perspective. Glocalization refers to the interface of the global and the
J. Matusitz (*) Nicholson School of Communication, University of Central Florida, 600 Colonial Center Parkway, Lake Mary, FL 32746, USA e-mail: matusitz@gmail.com

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local, a cooptation of the global and the local, the dynamics of cultural homogenization and heterogenization, and the conflation of both universalizing and particularizing tendencies. Ever since, Hong Kong Disneyland has proved fairly successful: park attendance and revenues from growth have increased. This paper begins with a detailed description of the theoretical concept of glocalization, what the term means, in what areas it has been applied, and how it fits into current globalization trends. Then, this paper proceeds to outline the history of Hong Kong Disneyland from its opening to the present. What follows is the heart of this analysis: the glocalization of Hong Kong Disneyland. As such, it is a section that explains, in detail, the four major changes that have made Hong Kong Disneyland more successful: (1) reduction of prices; (2) adaptation to local visitors customs; (3) change of dcors and settings; and (4) adaptation of labor practices. This paper ends with a discussion section that also includes suggestions for future research.

Glocalization theory: A description Developed by Robertson (1992, 1994), glocalization is a theoretical concept that is a mlange of the words globalization and localization. Glocalization refers to the interface of the global and the local (Andrews & Ritzer, 2007), a cooptation of the global and the local (de Nuve, 2007; Swyngedouw, 1997), the dynamics of cultural homogenization and heterogenization (Eric, 2007), and the conflation of both universalizing and particularizing tendencies (Robertson, 1994). Whereas globalization, in and of itself, stresses the omnipresence of corporate or cultural processes worldwide, glocalization stresses particularism of a global idea, product, or service (Ritzer, 2007). Communication scholar Marwan Kraidy has analyzed glocalization in detail. According to Kraidy (2001), glocalization refers to a new cultural hybrid and change of norms and practices aimed as adjusting to local mindsets (Kraidy, 2002). Glocalization is not merely another take on niche-marketing, now global. Rather, glocalization also adds accuracy to the present globalization approach among scholars and practitioners (Svensson, 2001). Glocalization theory fuses relationships, balance, and harmony between cultural homogenization and heterogenization, standardization and adaptation, homogenization and tailoring, convergence and divergence, and universalism and particularism (Robertson, 1995). Glocalization is important because it questions the very model of Western cultural imperialism (Schiller, 1971). From this vantage point, globalization strengthens the consciousness of the world that pervades both the local and the global (Holton, 1998). This opposed the argument that globalization is a fully homogeneous process. On the contrary, while globalization gears toward some degree of cultural homogenization, it simultaneously permits people to identify more strongly with their local culture (Maynard & Tian, 2004). Glocalization is tantamount to relocalization, whereby the practice is to integrate local elements into global themes, products, or services (Archer, 2008; Lee, 2003). Glocalization emphasizes that relocating a theme, product, or service elsewhere has a higher chance of success when it is accommodated to the local culture in which it is introduced (Appadurai, 1996; Robertson, 2001). The fundamental thesis behind glocalization is that imposing our home values in other cultures does not always bear fruits. For Friedman (2005), in order to uphold cultural survival, local cultures must

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forfeit some of their economic imperialism to global processes so that they can achieve economic success by Western standards. Yet, to remain local, local cultures must simultaneously maintain their local ways of life while undergoing globalizing processes. Friedman (2005) refers to this as glocalization too. Consequently, glocalization is a specific type of globalization that is receptive to differences within and between areas of the globe (Robertson, 2001). The goal of glocalization is to look for local market input and break out from the ivory tower. This also means that no single approach is right in all instances. Glocalization refers to both minor modifications to global products and more significant changes to those products for a specific local market (Robertson, 2007). From this perspective, direct associations exist between the local and international levels (Mooney & Evans, 2007). Local forces work to alleviate the impact of transnational institutions (Aliet, 2007). As explained in this paper in detail, one of these transnational institutions is the economy of global scale set by a giant of globalization: the Walt Disney Company. For the past two decades, one of the chief concerns Disney has had with respect to globalization is determining the fit of what it wishes to transfer abroad with new host cultures (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989, 1997; Kogut, 1989; Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1993; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). Since the headquarters of the Disney corporation in the US are considerably foreign from its subsidiaries on other continents, the corporation is well aware that the transplantation of Disney assets may not fit the receiving environment in host countries (Hymer, 1976; Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002, 2003). Only when adaptation to foreignness is successful can glocalization become successful. Generally, foreignness refers to dissimilarityor lack of fitin operating contexts of a transnational corporation between home and host environments (Hymer, 1976; Kindleberger, 1969). Adaptation requires flexibility and tolerance, even the promotion of differences. One of the biggest obstacles to effectiveness for executives working outside their native culture is a lack of tolerance from the locals. However, mere tolerance of differences is just the beginning. Real adaptation requires executives to generate diversity vis--vis local conditions (Ulrich & Smallwood, 2006). People think they might know a great deal about foreignness, strategic fit, and differences in host cultures, but there is something about the role of the country environment in the global transfer of corporation assets that is missing (Brannen, 2004). As this case study on the glocalization of Hong Kong Disneyland will reveal, glocalization theory helps fill this gap. Disney experienced unanticipated success in Japan but an equally unanticipated lack of success in Hong Kong, even though both places are in East Asia. This demonstrates that, somehow, in the transfer process, the transplanted Disney assetsas well as the notion of foreignness itselfassume unanticipated meanings that directly affect globalization outcomes (Brannen, 2004).

Hong Kong Disneyland: From its opening to the present The Walt Disney Company is one of the biggest media and entertainment businesses in the world. The company grew from a tiny business in 1923 to one of the heavyweights of globalization. In the 1920s and 1930s, Disney consisted of only one studio and one theme park. By the end of the twentieth century, the company had

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numerous TV networks, additional theme parks openings, a cruise line, merchandising in US malls and airports, publishing houses, real estate, hotel resorts, and so forth (Clandinin, 2006). By 2005, the Walt Disney Company expanded to 129,000 employees (Page, 2006). This high number of employees stems from the fact that the company has established, respectively in time, Disneyland, Disney World, Tokyo Disneyland, Disneyland Paris, and Hong Kong Disneyland (Schmidt, Conaway, Easton, & Wardrope, 2007). Building theme parks is the main foundation of Disneys strategy of global growth. According to Disneys Chief Executive Bob Iger, overseas markets are crucial because they offer clear growth opportunities for a business that still earns more than 75% of its revenues from domestic sources (Marr & Fowler, 2005). Hong Kong Disneyland is the most recent major theme park built by Disney. All began in 1985 when Disney executives met with government officials of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) to negotiate the companys expansion there. After years of talks, Disney opted for a park in Southern China (Marr & Fowler, 2005). The Walt Disney Company and HKSAR reached an agreement to build the theme park in Hong Kong in 1999 (Zhang, 2007). Even though Hong Kong was handed over to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in July 1997, there is still a one-countrytwogovernment-system that prevails. The HKSAR government agreed to invest $2.9 billion (including infrastructure improvements and loans) and earn a 57% stake in the project (about $780 million); Disney would own the remaining 43% (approximately $419 million) (Marr & Fowler, 2005). According to estimates from the HKSAR government, the construction of the resort created 30,000 jobs (Wiseman, 2005). The PRC is still the worlds most popular destination for the Walt Disney Company because of the nations size. Investors predict Chinas economy will remain robust. A global businesss decision to make a foreign investment is contingent upon economic and political factors. What mostly attracted the Walt Disney Company to Southern China are low labor costs and less costly materials (Schmidt et al., 2007). In China, Mickey Mouse, Daffy Duck, and Winnie-the-Pooh are hardly household names. Disney wanted to change that. According to the World Tourism Organization, an international group that oversees policy issues, the PRC is expected to be one of the largest tourist destinations on earth in the next 15 years; and Hong Kong is already in the top 15 (Holson, 2005). The hope is that Hong Kong Disneyland will boost the tourism industry in the next two decades (Lee & Haque, 2006). Hong Kong Disneyland was built on a 250-ha plot located on Pennys Bay and sided by mountains (Holson, 2005). The precise location is the undeveloped Lantau Island, 30 min away from downtown Hong Kong. The theme park can be easily reached from Hong Kong by a Mass Transit Rail System (MTR). The resort is themed around four lands, which are representative of other Disney resorts. The lands are Main Street, USA, Tomorrowland, Adventureland, and Fantasyland. Each land comes with star attractions (Ball, Horner, & Nield, 2007). Hong Kong Disneyland also includes the first train line ever devoted to a theme park, with rail cars sporting mouse head-shaped windows (McPhail, 2006). Hong Kong Disneyland opened in September 2005 (McKercher, Wong, & Lau, 2006). Amid disappointing attendance (A Chinese Makeover for Mickey and Minnie, 2008), the theme park only drew 5.6 million visitors during the first season. This debut was marred by public relations debacles and protests over Disneys

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refusal to let Chinese food inspectors onto the premises (Wiseman, 2005). According to labor leader and legislator Lee Cheuk-Yan, Hong Kong was not a good place for being a colony of Disney. To begin, Hong Kong Disneyland could not manage to draw customers because it was considered too small relative to other Disney theme parks worldwide (i.e., Disneyland, Disneyworld, Tokyo Disneyland, and Disneyland Paris). In fact, Hong Kong Disneyland was so small that visitors had to wait in lines for hours before enjoying park rides and other attractions (Huang & Hsu, 2005). In line with these contentions, after Hong Kong Disneyland opened, it was facing competition from a neighboring attraction, Ocean Park, a marine-themed theme park located in the Southern District of Hong Kong (Huang & Hsu, 2005). A few years ago, approximately five million people visited Ocean Park, earning it the position of the Worlds Number 15 Theme Park by Annual Attendance. This figure was well ahead of Hong Kong Disneyland (Fyall, Leask, Garrod, & Wanhill, 2008). Additionally, the city of Hong Kong considered Disneys presence as unacceptable. Planting an American cultural and business institution on Chinese soil was expected to be challenging from day 1 (Wiseman, 2005). Within days of its opening, the Hong Kong Disneyland infuriated local pop stars, upset labor leaders, and received criticism from the Hong Kong government, its own partner in the theme park. Among other things, a discontented, fired employee climbed atop Space Mountain and said he would kill himself until he was talked down (Wiseman, 2005). Given these drawbacks, observers and analysts were questioning Disneys latest foray in a foreign culture. Among the rebukes, visitors from mainland China were not familiar with both the Disney culture and Disney characters (Lee, Garbarino, & Lerman, 2007). Likewise, they had no idea about how to behave or what to enjoy at an amusement park. In fact, some visitors were entering the park, snapped a few pictures, and then turned around to leave (Fowler & Marr, 2006). After months of discussion, Disney executives realized that Hong Kong Disneyland was insufficiently catered to local customs and needed to undergo serious local adjustments in order to become popular among the Chinese and Hong Kongers. The next section discusses the glocalization changes brought forth by Hong Kong Disneyland.

The glocalization of Hong Kong Disneyland Hong Kong Disneylands main challenge was to tailor its corporate philosophy and niche attractions to the local Chinese culture, environment, and mindset while keeping the Disney theme intact, something that has proved challenging to Disney executives (Marr, 2007). By integrating itself into the Chinese context, the goal of Disney was to avoid problems of cultural backlash, customs, and traditions. This section explains, in detail, the four major glocalization changes that have made Hong Kong Disneyland more successful: (1) reduction of prices; (2) adaptation to local visitors customs; (3) change of dcors and settings; and (4) adaptation of labor practices. Reduction of prices When Hong Kong Disneyland opened in September 2005, the area had not fully recovered from the late 1990s Asian financial crisis (Wiseman, 2005). In the

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beginning, the admission ticket to the theme park was too high for local visitors. Because China overall was still a nation with low income levels, the lack of affordability of the Disney vacation experience did not help (Marr & Fowler, 2005). Also, the theme park sold tickets that visitors could use on any day, without considering Chinas holiday schedule (Kwok, 2007). Executives at Hong Kong Disneyland soon realized that finding strategies to drop prices and, ultimately, to fit the nations low-income levels and holiday schedule was necessary (Marr & Fowler, 2005). Today, prices at HK$295 (US$38) for an admission ticket (for adults) on a weekday are cheaper than at the other Disney parks (Year of the Mouse, 2005). Because Hong Kong Disneyland was (and still is) the smallest Disney park worldwide, another reason for promoting these low off-peak prices was an attempt at crowd controlprices became higher on weekends and holidays. Now Hong Kong Disneyland even offers lower prices for seniors. This is presumably an effect of the family-oriented culture in Asia in regards to senior citizens (Zhibin Gu & Ratliff, 2006). A third reason for cutting the price stems from the fact that China already has numerous theme parks (although many of them are forced to close or are struggling financially). The Walt Disney Company successfully conveys the message that its parks are different from the more traditional thrill-ride parks that are the Chinese standard today (Marr & Fowler, 2005). Not surprisingly, because China is a massive country, the Hong Kong theme park is welcoming, yearly, at least a third of its visitors from the mainland, not just from Hong Kong. However, it is important to note that, nowadays, particularly this fiscal year 2009, the income levels of inhabitants of Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong have surpassed the income levels of people who live in many other large cities worldwide (Prices and Earnings, 2009). In fact, the economy in Hong Kong has so much improved that Hong Kong Disneyland has recently increased its admission prices for Hong Kong residents from HK$295 to HK$350 for adults, and from HK$210 to HK$250 for children. Disney visitors have been charged these prices since the spring of 2009 (Lau & Chen, 2009). Adaptation to local visitors customs People from mainland China have very different expectations than those from many other places in the world. Generally, visitors from the mainland travel on package tours that include group dinners. At first, Hong Kong Disneyland could not accommodate such large groups. In addition, the ticket prices did not have adequate commissions for the tour operators. Therefore, few of them included Disney on their itineraries. Hong Kong Disneyland was so unpopular that a Hong Kong transvestite bar nearby was attracting more visitors from the mainland (Holson, 2005). Today, the theme park has significantly improved its collaboration with tour companies, which now benefit from a share in attractions and steer their groups towards them (Fowler, 2006). Disney marketing executives have also been training Asian travel agents for months, where the firm expects one third of the parks revenues to come from (Martin, 2007). In a similar vein, efforts by the Walt Disney Company to improve the attendance at the Hong Kong Disneyland theme park have included adding local attractions and

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entertainment offerings in 2008 (Ng & Orwall, 2007). For example, seasonal entertainment, such as Disneys Haunted Halloween (which was actually started by Ocean Park), A Sparkling Christmas, and Disneys Chinese New Year, are shown in the park to celebrate main Chinese festivals. It is a truism that fireworks and gunpowder were invented in China (Sardar & Masood, 2006). For this reason, Disney managers made a wise move by holding fireworks extravaganzas in Hong Kong Disneyland. The park also includes the worlds only Fantasy Gardens, where children can meet famous characters (Reiber, 2007). Likewise, for a long time, China was under communist rule. Today, this is still felt in Hong Kong Disneyland in the sense that, for instance, Mickey and Minnie Mouse benefited from a communist makeover in 2008. While Mickey was put in a bright red Mao suit, Minnie sported a cherry-blossom red dress, in an attempt to appeal to Chinese tourists (A Chinese Makeover for Mickey and Minnie, 2008). Cast members at the theme park speak both English and local dialects. In Hong Kong, one of the official dialects is Cantonese; in China, it is Putonghua (also known as Standard Mandarin or Standard Chinese). Since Chinese visitors are still not too familiar with the Walt Disney Company, the theme park has produced guides describing attractions like rides and shows. Brochures and maps are printed in traditional and simplified characters, Japanese, and English (Fowler, 2006). To demonstrate its willingness to adjust to the Chinese tourist culture even more, Hong Kong Disneyland will soon perform its own version of the show Its a Small World, with a lady doll in a traditional Chinese opera costume and a specifically designed Hong Kong scene that features Victoria Harbor and the citys landmark skyscrapers. The goal of Disney is evident: to blend local, regional, and global elements. New versions of the theme songrespectively in Mandarin, Cantonese, Tagalog (the official language in the Philippines), and Koreanwill be added to the Hong Kong rendering of Its a Small World (Epstein & Shapiro, 2007). Visitors from both mainland China and Hong Kong will be pleased to see the Jungle Cruise (Barrier, 2008). Indeed, the Hong Kong Disneyland version has new features, whereby skippers conduct live commentary in Cantonese, Putonghua, and English; guests can board whatever boat and the skipper speaks their language. The skippers witticisms and jokes have also been tailored to local cultural sensibilities. And, in contrast to the other Disney parks that also have the Jungle Cruise attraction, Hong Kong Disneyland has added Cambodian ruins for guests to float past and an unruly pack of hippos. In this case, there are no guns scaring off the hippos; the hippos have bad breath and belch (Holson, 2005). All these new Disney facets seem to exemplify the Disneyfication of the spectacle (Demossier, 2007). Nevertheless, Hong Kong Disneyland recently came under fire for being so overcrowded on the Lunar New Year holiday, so much so that ticketed guests had to be turned away (Fowler, 2006). In line with these contentions, to benefit the most from its guests, Hong Kong Disneyland tried to make adjustments to local eating habits and food preferences. One of the most challenging decisions by Disney was to include, in its menu, a traditional but very expensive Chinese dish: sharks fin soup. In some cases, it can be as pricy as US$400 (HK$3,120), just for a bowl. Along with the soup, roast suckling pig and sliced abalone were planned to be included in wedding banquets that the firm was promoting at the two hotels at Hong Kong Disneyland (Year of the

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Mouse, 2005). Sharks fin soup is a long-established Chinese elegant dish popular at weddings and other major social events. Sharks fin soup holds cultural significance and is considered luxurious and a sign of affluence and generosity. However, even though the dish has been a conventional delicacy for centuries, the method to catch and kill sharks (to provide the tasty ingredients) has been under heavy criticism, especially with respect to the process by which fins are harvested. Many sharks are endangered (Hills & Welford, 2006). As a result, environmentalists pressured Disney to get rid of sharks fin soup from its restaurant menus due to fears over the diminishing shark population (Studer, Tsang, Welford, & Hills, 2008). For example, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Sea Shepherd Conversation Society, the Animals Asia Foundation, and Greenpeace lobbied to great lengths to prevent Disney from serving the soup at Hong Kong Disneyland. After its attempt to serve sharks fin soup on the Wild West-themed Main Street, USA was thwarted by those NGOs (Year of the Mouse, 2005), Disney finally agreed (Bloomgarden, 2007). Today, the glocalization of other local food preferences has really taken place; restaurants at Hong Kong Disneyland primarily serve Chinese food (Hills & Welford, 2006). Disneys intention to serve roast suckling pig and sliced abalone in wedding banquets was followed through. At a recent event where special dishes were served in the parks eight restaurantseverything from curry to noodles to sushiDisney managers agreed that a specific type of Chinese hamburger be prepared by a local chef (Holson, 2005). When the Walt Disney Company realized that Chinese visitors usually take ten more minutes to eat than Americans, the company added 700 seats to park dining areas. Hong Kong Disneylands managing director, Bill Ernest, admitted that Disney is still learning about Chinese culture (Martin, 2007). Change of dcors and settings Another important glocalization move adopted by Hong Kong Disneyland was to change dcors and settings to fit in with Chinese culture more (Hills & Welford, 2006). Feng shui, an ancient Chinese disciple of arrangement, is now playing a key role in the theme parks design. For instance, the park moved its main entrance so that it is facing the right direction. When building this new gate, Disney executives shifted the angle of the front gate by 12 (Holson, 2005). The park also added a curve in its walkway from the train station to the gate so that chi (or energy) cannot flow into the South China Sea (Adekola & Sergi, 2007). In other words, chi cannot slip past the entrance and out to the China Sea (Holson, 2005). Other feng shui experts were hired to lay out the rides (Martin, 2007). Dazzling visual changes and nods to cultural differences at Hong Kong Disneyland may appear to be so much marketing (Holson, 2005), but feng shui consultants keep saying that these changes ensure prosperity for the park (Year of the Mouse, 2005). When the creation of each building was finishedone of the main ballrooms was purportedly 888 m2 in sizeincense was burned; the number eight is a lucky number in Chinese culture (Hills & Welford, 2006). On the other hand, the number four is believed to be bad luck. As a result, there are no fourth-floor buttons in any of the elevators at Hong Kong Disneyland (Holson, 2005). Other feng shui modifications have included bringing cash registers closer to corners or along walls,

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where such placement is said to increase prosperity. In Crystal Lotus, the parks upscale restaurant, Disney put in a virtual koi pond where computer-animated fish zoom away from guests who approach a glass screen. The pond is one of five feng shui features in the restaurant; the others are wood, earth, metal, and fire. Bogus fire glows on a screen behind bottles in the bar. Because of the fire code, real fire was not allowed (Holson, 2005). In a similar fashion, Hong Kong Disneyland has a topiary garden where people dressed as Mickey Mouse, Minnie, and other cartoon characters pose for photographs with guests, a favorite pastime with Asian parkgoers. Instead of buying official photographs, visitors like to snap their own, even posing with shop toys, although they tend not to buy them (Year of the Mouse, 2005). Products emblazoned in cartoon characters come in solid gold. So, for the camera-rabid Chinese, there are fewer frightening rides and more costumed staff roaming about for photo-ops (Year of the Mouse, 2005). And once inside the theme park, Chinese visitors consider it little more than a backdrop (theatrical scenery) for family snapshots. Therefore, Hong Kong Disneyland began to distribute brochures that explained how to enjoy rides. Disney even went as far as hiring guestologists to follow parkgoers around with a stopwatch (Martin, 2007). Adaptation of labor practices A final major glocalization effort by Disney has been to adapt its US labor practices to Chinese ones. Labor practices refer to employee traditions and overall corporate philosophy. For example, Disney, as the happiest place on earth, is notorious for implementing its smile factory strategy (Van Maanen, 1991). Yet, the smile factory so dear to Disney proved unsuccessful among the Chinese crew personnel. To begin, in Hong Kong, people who are overly friendly are looked upon with suspicion. So, a smile is not automatically seen as a positive feature. By the same token, park guests do not display interest in the displays and interest from park employees (Bryman, 2006). For these reasons, Hong Kong Disneyland crew personnel just could not smile to the level of Disney University standards (Doz, Santos, & Williamson, 2001). In fact, they were required to smile at customers in less than 60 seconds of their entering the theme park (Cheney, Christensen, Zorn, & Ganesh, 2004), and that caused a mini revolution. The smile factory was also a problem because Hong Kongers are not famous for their hospitality (Adekola & Sergi, 2007). Providing a fake smile or smiling more than one normally would is part of an overarching concept called emotional labor. Emotional labor is an important site for resistance (Bryman, 2006). Emotional labor is a type of emotional regulation whereby employees display the emotions that they are expected to display as part of their duty. Emotional labor is commonly surface acting: employees inhibit their real feelings and, rather, display emotions on the surface (emotions that they do not actually feel) (Geist-Martin, Ray, & Sharf, 2003). Surface acting also implies that an emotional dissonance exists between inner feelings and outer expression (Guy, Newman, & Mastracci, 2008). In the same perspective, when Hong Kong Disneyland opened in 2005, cast members were told that they would not go to work, but put on a show. They were also instructed to act as if they were on stage, especially when being out in the

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park. The dilemma is that Chinese culture is more conservative. They do not like to be that expressive about feelings. This Disneyfication, this attempt to turn Chinese crew members into smiling robots, did not work (Clandinin, 2006). So, the Disney company had to make glocalization adjustments. Mr. Rasulo, one of the Disney executives, conceded that Disney had to show flexibility, given the diverse cultures in Asia. Park employees today speak three languages: English, Cantonese, and Mandarin (Holson, 2005). Let us not forget to mention that, during the first few years after the construction of Hong Kong Disneyland began, the park was plagued with controversy. There were complaints about not only environmental damage but also about pay and conditions. For instance, cast members and construction workers complained of short lunch breaks, long hours, and an insufficient number of staff (McPhail, 2006). Their complaints also concerned low pay (as compared to other Disney parks) and differentials between cast members. In the beginning, there were 5,000 original employees, but 1,000 left (which is considered high in Hong Kong because it is very customary to stay with ones employer). As a result, Disney had to change direction again. Today, employees have a trade union called the Hong Kong Disney Cast Members Union. The union aims at improving pay and work conditions (Ball et al., 2007).

The success of glocalization The four glocalizing changesthat is, reduction of the price, adaptation to local visitors customs, change of dcors and settings, and adaptation of labor practices have turned Hong Kong Disneyland into such a successful venue that the theme park announced in May 2007 it accumulated a double-digit percentage growth among mainland Chinese visitors (Hong Kong Disneyland May Miss Lenders Target, 2007). It has been predicted that the parks revenues will add $19 billion to the Hong Kong areas economic growth over the next four decades (Wiseman, 2005). The theoretical concept of glocalization has validity in this case. In the beginning, the theme park was not too popular. For the past 2 years, however, parents from all over China have flocked with their children to Hong Kong Disneyland. The park has grown seriously overcrowded, so much so that, at some point, it stopped selling tickets (Fenster, 2007). Even though the Chinese and Hong Kongers feel that Hong Kong Disneyland lacks creativity and innovation to move beyond the Disney brand itself, crew personnel at Hong Kong Disneyland are so busy that they cannot seem to catch a break. While there were too few visitors after the park opened, today there are too many. When the Chinese, on a week-long holiday, celebrate Chinese New Year, thousands and thousands of guests from mainland China descend on Hong Kong for a Golden Week of eating, shopping, and getting photos taken with Mickey, Minnie, and the rest of the Disney gang (Einhorn, 2006). Echoes of Hong Kong Disneylands growing popularity even triggered the idea, among executives of an amusement park in Beijing (the capital city of China), to plagiarize Disney characters by making them look like those at Disney. This caused anger and furor ahead of critical USChina trade negotiations (Tschang, 2007).

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The success brought forth by glocalization has led executives to consider doubling the parks capacity. For this reason, the Walt Disney Company has been talking with the Chinese government about building a second Chinese Disney park. Disney has chosen the metropolis of Shanghai, an appealing place for many Chinese (Einhorn, 2006). This will not happen before 2012, though (Marr, 2007). In this effect, Hong Kong Disneyland can be considered a warm-up act for Shanghai. The company hopes that the Shanghai Disney theme park will have a bigger presence in China for its themes, shows, movies, services, products, and other assets. By satisfying Chinas desire for a Shanghai theme park, Disney might be able to ensure broader entre into the worlds biggest consumer market (Marr & Fowler, 2005). With proper glocalization in Hong Kong Disneyland, the theme park has served as a splashy introduction to a new market in Asia, opening the door to other ventures. By the same token, a second Disney park in China will boost economic growth and employment, and further give Shanghai the shape of an international city (Marr & Fowler, 2005).

Discussion and future directions This analysis has demonstrated that, even Disney, the embodiment of a global firm par excellence, has to show flexibility and adjustment to local preferences in order to produce high profits and remain competitive in the global arena. As we have seen, when Hong Kong Disneyland first opened in 2005, the Walt Disney Company failed to understand not only Chinese local customs, but also their food preferences, eating habits, and meal times, their conception of how much should be spent (or not spent) on Disney admission tickets, their view of what Mickey characters and what settings and backgrounds should look like, what shows and events are attractive to them, employee customs and labor policies, and even their version of emotional labor. Truly, this analysis of Hong Kong Disneyland illustrates that glocalization works: Disney had to be flexible by factoring in Chinese culture and minimizing US culture, because it was considered cultural invasion in Hong Kong. As firms go global, executives have to weigh up the efficiency opportunities of global scale with the effectiveness requirements of location adaptation (Ulrich & Smallwood, 2006). With glocalization, scholars may reassess the concept of globalization and admit that it cannot always be a successful practice if it operates entirely at a global scale. Rather, globalization has to be localized through an assortment of strategies, based on which region the corporation is located (Rugman & Hodgetts, 2001). Just as Disney executives determine what is core and, therefore, universal across the firms global operations, they must also establish what is noncore and, therefore, be open to local adaptation. The world is too big and too different to even consider the idea that every corporate philosophy, culture, policy, and practice (let alone product, service, or process) can be applied universally everywhere. Disney demonstrates that it simply does not work (Ulrich & Smallwood, 2006). The glocalization of Disney also epitomizes the notion that the world is not being turned into a single homogenized realm because, across the globe, there are sites of resistance, in spite of the momentum of this well-regarded representative of popular culture (Bryman, 2006). This means that we must give due consideration that we

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cannot subscribe to a monolithic or one-dimensional view of globalization or Americanization, a worldview that depicts icons of American culture spreading by design worldwide and riding roughshod over local conditions and practices. Scholars conducting studies on Disneyfication or similar research have suggested that it is incorrect to think of globalization as a simple process of subsuming foreign cultures (Bryman, 2006; Zaheer, 2002). Not only has Disney accommodated to Chinas local preferences, dietary requirements, and even tastes for dcors and settings, but it has also applied the glocalization model to different cultures, such as the one in Europe after the Disneyland Paris (formerly Euro Disney) was opened in 1992 (Zhang, 2007). Understanding the theoretical concept of glocalization is a specifically critical matter, because Disneys experience is one of the many instances that indicate the current upward trend in the glocalization of corporations that increasingly transfer complex assets abroad. Now, more than ever, corporations are not just adapting ideas, themes, products, and services, but also entire organizations, including corporate philosophies and strategies, operational procedures, models for supervisoremployee relations, and so forth. These have to be ever more closely linked to the contexts and the sociocultural environments in which they are performed (Kostova & Roth, 2003). Nevertheless, it would be useful to further analyze the concept of glocalization not as a replacement of globalization, but as a process that gives globalization fresh and unique insights. Even though this case study of Hong Kong Disneyland has looked at one key aspect of glocalizationthat is, local adaptation or Robertsons (1992) notion that glocalization refers to creating products or services aimed for the global market but adapted to the local culturesthe very concept of glocalization does not limit itself to such a narrow approach. For example, as Wong (2000) points out, the idea of glocalization eliminates the fear from many that globalization is like a cultural tsunami that erases all differences. In other words, Wong continues, a giant corporation does not have to go global all the way to reach international success. In a similar fashion, as Waters (1995) suggests, glocalization entails the incorporation of certain global processes into the local setting. From this perspective, glocalization is not local adaptation, rather, it is global inclusion. For future research, it might also prove interesting to answer the following questions: Does glocalization lead to the end of global strategy, when it was thought that corporations could totally impose the global on the local and, hence, be ultra penetrative to local cultures, to such a point that they would erode those cultures? In other words, is the global getting out while the glocal getting in? In a similar vein, does glocalization mean that a company like Disney, or even Wal-Mart, is now expected to give more power to locals in order to successfully tailor its strategies for the local markets? Hong Kong Disneyland demonstrated this when the company replaced its own US supervisors with local supervisors who could speak English, Mandarin, and Cantonese. Finally, in the case of the Disney expansion worldwide, what would be better for ideal glocalization success: to build large theme parks (like Disneyland, CA) on other continents, or to create a stream of niche resorts and attractions in other countries? Put it another way, does glocalization work best in small portions worldwide, by adjusting painstakingly to local towns and regions, or in large

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sections, by adjusting to larger populations? No matter what, for a long time it was believed that the Walt Disney Company could be very successful by accelerating the global spread of its underlying principles (Bryman, 2006). Yet, the reality is that Disneys traditional method of force-feeding its products from its Burbank, CA headquarters to local contexts has fairly been altered (Marr & Fowler, 2007).

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Jonathan Matusitz (PhD, University of Oklahoma) is an assistant professor in the Nicholson School of Communication at the University of Central Florida. Born and raised in Belgium, he earned a BA in translation of foreign languages at the International Interpreters School in Mons (Belgium). In 2000, he moved to the United States and pursued an MA in professional communication at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. In 2006, he earned a PhD in communication at the University of Oklahoma. His current academic interests include globalization studies, intercultural communication, organizational communication, and communication and technology. He has published numerous articles in academic journals such as the Journal of Transnational Management, Planning Theory, and Journal of Popular Culture. He is now working on globalization research, particularly with respect to Wal-Marts ventures in Asia and Latin America.