Pancho Villa

Pancho Villa and the Attack on Columbus, New Mexico Author(s): Friedrich Katz Source: The American Historical
Review, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Feb., 1978), pp. 101-130 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the American Historical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1865904 . Accessed: 02/10/2011 20:44
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The University of Chicago Press and American Historical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Historical Review.
http://www.jstor.org
Pancho Villa and the Attackon Columbus, New Mexico

FRIEDRICH KATZ
ON
the town of Columbus, New Mexico, to cries of "Viva Villa" and "Viva the According all available evidence, leaderoftheattackwas the to Mekxico." generalFrancisco"Pancho" Villa. The raiderswere Mexican revolutionary a in repulsedby unitsof the i3th U.S. Cavalry,garrisoned Columbus,after Americans battle.More than one hundredMexicans and seventeen six-hour The died in the fighting. United States responseto the attackcame quickly. initially composedof fourthousand expedition, Withinone week a punitive eight hundredmen (later increasedto ten thousandmen) commandedby invaded the Mexican state of Chihuahua under GeneralJohnJ. Pershing, of WoodrowWilsonto capturetheleaderand instigator from President orders provedto be both expedition theColumbusraid, Pancho Villa. The Pershing the disaster.In politicalterms,it brought United a politicaland a military of largesegments the Statesto thebrinkofwar withMexico and antagonized terms,it failed completelyin its attemptto Mexican public. In military into withdrew the expedition captureVilla. On February5, 1917,thepunitive UnitedStates,havingfailedeven to catch sightof its elusiveprey.' in intervention Latin Americahas been all too common;the U.S. military Villa raid on Columbus is the one instance of Latin American military intervention the United States. Perhaps forthat reason, it has been the in What led Villa to undersubjectofwidespreadspeculationand controversy.
I would like to thankthe University Chicago forDoththe researchtimeand moneyit grantedme to of preparethisarticle. 1 There is a verylarge body ofliterature the punitive on expedition intoMexico. For some ofthe main workswritten Americans, Haldeen Braddy,Pershing's by see Expedition Mexico(El Paso, 1966);Clarence in Clendenen, The 11nited Statesand PanchoVilla (Port Washington, N.Y., 1971); ArthurS. Link, Wt'ilson. Confu.si(on(Cr i.-l9ii and "S, (Princeton, 964),and Wilson:. 1 Campaigns Progressivism Peace(Princeton, and for 1965); Hlerbert Molloy Mason, Jr., TheGreat Pursuit (New York, 1970);Donald Smythe, (;uerrilla Warrior (New York, i963); Michael L. Tate, "Pershing'sPunitive Expedition:Pursuerof Banditsor Presidential Panacea?" TheAmericas, (1975): 46-72; and FrankTompkins,Chasing 32 V'illa (Harrisburg, Pa., 1939). For two Mexican works, one a monograph and the othera collection documents authorssympathetic of by to E. Carranza, see AlbertoSalinas Carranza, La ExpedicionPunitiva (Mexico, 1936);and Josefina de Fabela, ed., D)ocumentos hist6ricos la Revolucion de For works AlexicanaXII Expedicion PunitiVa, 2 vols. (Mexico, 1967-68). by Mexican authorssympathetic Villa, see AlbertoCalzadiaz Barrera,Porque to V'illaataco a Columbus (Mexico, 1972); Nellie Campobello, Apuntes sobre vida militar b'rancisco de V'illa(Mexico, 1940); and la FedericoCervantes, F'rancisco y la Revoluci6n (Mexico, i960). Vlilla I0I
MARCH
9, I9I6,
A MEXICAN
RAIDING
FORCE
of fivehundred men attacked
102
Friedrich Katz
take this seemingly quixotic adventure? The dispute among historians as to his motives shows no signs of abating. Among the reasons usually given, the most prominent are (i) Villa's desire to revenge himself on the Wilson administration for its recognition and support of his enemy, Mexican President Venustiano Carranza; (2) Villa's desire to revenge himselfon U.S. arms speculators who had cheated him; (3) Villa's wish to capture supplies of food and arms; and (4) Villa's hope of obtaining German arms and support in returnforhis attack against the United States.2 Most historians have viewed the attack on Columbus as an act of irresponsibility best and of complete at irrationality at worst. Some have suspected Villa of harboring an almost pathological hatred of the United States afterthe Wilson administrationhad with repaid him forhis initial support of U.S. aims and his refusalto interfere U.S. business interestsby aiding his rivals. In any case, the great disparity between what Villa might have expected to gain and what losses Mexico could expect to sufferas a result of his attack on the United States has led many to interpret the raid as little more than the revenge of a reckless desperado. New documentaryevidence suggests that Villa was neitheras irrational nor as irresponsible as is commonly suggested. The reasons and circumstances usually adduced to explain his decision to attack Columbus were at best secondary in importance. The primarymotivationwas Villa's firmbelief that Woodrow Wilson had concluded an agreement with Carranza that would virtuallyconvert Mexico into a U.S. protectorate. Although such an agreement never existed, Villa had reasonable grounds forsupposing that it did. In light of this supposition, his actions can no longer be construed as the blind revengeof an unprincipled bandit. They must be viewed as a calculated effort to safeguard what Villa believed others had blindly surrendered-Mexico's independence.
To UNDERSTAND HOW VILLA CAME TO BELIEVE in the existence of an agreement forwhich he neverreceived any directevidence, one must delve somewhat into the historyof the constitutionalistmovement,of which he was a part, and of its relations with the U.S. government and U.S. business interests. The constitutionalistmovement emerged in northernMexico in March 1913 after the overthrowand assassination of revolutionaryPresident Francisco I. Madero by conservativeforcesled by General Victoriano Huerta. The immediate
2 For interpretations the motives Villa's attackon Columbus,see, in additionto theworks citedin for of the previousnote,Charles Harris III and Louis R. Sadler, "Pancho Villa and the Columbus Raid: The
Missing Documents," New Mexico HistoricalReview,50 (1975): 335-47; Larry A. Harris, Pancho Villa and the Katz, "Alemania y FranciscoVilla," Historia Mexicana, 12 (1962): Raid (El Paso, 1949);Friedrich Columbus Revolution(Berlin, 1964); Francis J. Munch, "Villa's 83-103, and Deutschland,Diaz, und die mexikanische Columbus Raid: Practical Politics or German Design?" New Mexico HistoricalReview,44 (iq6q): 189-214; Mexico, 1915-1916: A New Look at the Columbus in James A. Sandos, "German Involvement Northern Telegram Historical Review,50 (1970): 70-89; Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmermann Raid," Hispanic American
32 (1975): 72-92.
(New York, 1958);and E. Bruce White,"The Muddied WatersofColumbus,New Mexico," TheAmericas,
on Pancho Villa and theAttack C'olumbus
103
problem was to find ways to finance its war against the Huerta government. The short-livedMadero movement of I 9 I 0- I I had been financed essentially by funds "borrowed" by Madero's brother,Gustavo, froma French railroad company, by forcedloans levied on wealthy Mexicans in the northernparts of the country,and perhaps even by contributionsmade by U.S. oil and other From the beginning, it was clear to the various leaders of business interests.3 the constitutionalistmovement that raising funds on such a makeshiftbasis for would not suffice them. They faced a longer and more exhausting struggle against a more vigorous and determined enemy than that opposed by the Madero movement. strategies were evolved by the revolutionaryleaders in Two very different northernMexico to meet the expenses of the fight.Pancho Villa, whose sway extended essentiallyover Chihuahua and Durango, sought to shiftthe burden of financing the revolution onto the old Porfirian upper classes and some weaker groups of foreigners-above all, the Spaniards. At firsthe contented himself with exacting forced loans. By the end of 1913 he went further, confiscating all the landholdings of the Chihuahuan upper classes. These were managed on the state's behalf by state administrators.Many Spaniards and much of theirland was were expelled fromthe Villa-controlled territories especially Americans, was left confiscated.4The propertyof other foreigners, untouched. Initially,Villa burdened them with neitherheavy taxes nor contriHe butions. Carranza's financial strategywas verydifferent. stronglyopposed confiscatingthe wealth of Mexico's upper class, even though he was forcedon occasion to accede to confiscationscarried out independentlyby some of his generals. When Carranza could not preventthe confiscationof estates, he did in everything his power to emphasize the temporary character of such measures and prohibited the land frombeing divided among the peasantry. As soon as he could, he returned these properties to their owners.5 In order to meet his financial problems, Carranza decided to shiftas much of the burden of new taxes as possible onto foreign companies. Since U.S. investments
See, especially, Stanley R. Ross, FranciscoMadero, Apostleof Democracy (New York, 1955). For possible links between Madero and the oil companies, see Kenneth J. Grieb, "Standard Oil and the Financing of the Mexican Revolution," C'alifornia HistoricalSociety Quarterly, (1971): 59-71; and Katz, Deutschland, 45 Di)az, unddie mexicanische Revolution, 186. Cervantes, FranciscoVilla, 79; Friedrich Katz, "Agrarian Changes in Northern Mexico in the Period of Villista Rule," in Contemporary Mexico (Papers of the Fourth International Congress of Mexican History, October 1973), ed. James W. Wilkie, Michael C. Meyer, and Edna Monz6n de Wilkie (Mexico, 1976); and John Reed, Insurgent Mexico (1914; reprint ed., New York, 1969), 122. 5 The problem of the confiscation of haciendasby revolutionary authorities and the later return of these estates to their formerowners by the Carranza government is one of the most important and least studied aspects of the Mexican Revolution. See Katz, "Agrarian Changes in Northern Mexico," and Douglas Richmond, "The First Chief and Revolutionary Mexico: The Presidency of Venustiano Carranza, 19151920" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1976), 6o-6. Carranza did not very frequentlydeal with this problem in public, preferringinstead to stress his commitment to agrarian reform;on one of the few times he did publicly address this issue, he spoke to the Constitutional Convention at Queretaro in 1917. See Informe Ct.Venustiano del Encargadodel PoderLjecutivo Constitucionalista, Carranza, Primer Jefedel EjrSrcito de la Republica: Leido ante el Congreso la Uni6nen la Sesion de 15 de Abril de I9I7 (Mexico, 1917). He very de definitely showed his opposition when he reprimanded General Lucio Blanco, who in 1913 divided the lands of the Hacienda de los Borregos among the peasants. See Armando de Maria y Campos. La Vida del GeneralLucio Blanco (Mexico, 1963), 68.
104
Friedrich Katz
predominated in northernMexico, this produced repeated conflictswith U.S. business interestsand, ultimately,with the U.S. government. Villa solved his financial problems by dealing less reverently with Mexicanowned private property than Carranza, a policy that reflected,in part, the in difference the social originsofthe two men. Villa grew up as a sharecropper and later became a cattle rustler; Carranza-at the other end of the social spectrum-was born and raised a hacendado. Villa's irreverencetoward private propertyalso reflected,however, the character of the region he controlled, in contrast to the states of Coahuila and Sonora dominated by Carranza. The latter's domain possessed a relatively liberal group of hacendados, many of whom had actively supported the Madero movement. Almost all of the Madero leaders in Coahuila and Sonora (for example, the Madero family, Carranza) were recruited fromthat group. By contrast, Villa's region had a far less liberal class of hacendados. Most of them fiercelyopposed the Madero movement and showed themselves signally unprepared for even the most moderate reforms.No prominenthacendados supported the Madero movement in Chihuahua; in fact, they were the firstto take an active stand against Madero by aiding the Orozco rebellion of 1912. No revolutionary movement could have survived in Chihuahua without destroying both the economic and political power of the traditional ruling oligarchy. Realizing this, Villa expropriated Chihuahua's large estates, promising the peasants that the land would be divided up as soon as the victoryof the Revolutionhad been ensured. The confiscationshad the additional tactical advantage of divertingmuch of the popular support Orozco had been able to secure throughvague promises of land reform.6 Thanks to his expropriationof large cattle estates in Chihuahua and, later, of the cotton grown by Spanish landowners in the Laguna area, Villa could count on sufficient resources to finance his revolutionformost of 1914 without having to put pressure on U.S. companies, a fact which helps to explain why taxes on those companies were far higher in Carranza's zone than in Villa's.7 Through his restrainttoward U.S. business, Villa doubtless hoped to gain access to U.S. arms and, eventually, even to gain officialrecognitionby the U.S. government.Yet he did not cater to the interestsof U.S. businessmen. Elsewhere in Mexico, U.S. companies purchased land and other assets frommembers of the upper class who panicked as the Revolution progressed and were ready to sell out at cut-rate prices. Villa's expropriations prevented this process fromoccurring in Chihuahua. Despite the obstacle to furtherAmericanization, Villa's impressive ability to control his troops and his restrainedtaxation of U.S. companies won him a good measure of initial U.S. support.8
6 Pascual Orozco, a former leader of the Revolution of 9 o-l l, staged an uprising against Madero in
In his program he emphasized the need for agrarian reform,though he never distributed any land. The Orozco revolt frequentlyhas been linked to the large estate owners in Chihuahua. See Michael Meyer, and .iexis an Rebel: (Lincoln, Neb., 1967). I.ascual O()rozco theMexican Revolution The Harvey O'Connor, The (Guggenheims: Making ofan American Dynasty(New York, 1937), 336-37. In a manifesto issLed to the .Nexican people after the United States recognized Carranza, Villa insisted that he had treated U.S. business interestsfarbetter than had his rival. See Vida A' eva (Chihuahua), Nov. 21, 1915. 8 One of America's most famous muckrakers, Lincoln Steffens,wrote in his autobiography, "The Reds in New York who were watching NMexico were on Villa's side, but the only reason they gave was that he was
1912.
Pancho Villa and theAttack Columbus on
105
How did Villa's tolerance toward U.S. business interestsaffectthe policies of the Wilson administration?Unlike his relations with the business interests, Villa's relations with the administration have been the subject of intensive research.9 Wilson was willing to throw U.S. support behind any serious contender for power in Mexico who could meet five criteria: (i) a demonstrable inclination to carry out social and political reformsto stabilize the country,including some kind of agrarian reform(Wilson never specified how far-reaching such a reformhad to be and at whose expense it was to be carried out); (2) respect forparliamentary institutionsand an intentionto carry out free elections as Madero had done; (3) dedication to the system of free enterprisewithout being subservientto any single business interest; (4) strict respect forU.S. propertyrightsand no partialitytoward European and, above all, British interests; and (5) a commanding personality, strong enough to
at least a bandit, a Barabbas, whereasCarranza was a respectable, landowningbourgeois.Jack Reed in a talkedthatway,and he laterwentin on Villa's side. I thought a trick used to practice making quick of I on decisionin politicsat home.I'd ask Wall Street, whichis so steadily wrong all social questions.IfI could of findout whichside Wall Streetwas on, I could go to the otherwiththe certainty being right.So I severalofthem inquireddowntherefor big businessmenwithMexican interests, the called on and invited to luncheon. Theycame eagerto 'startme off right.' And they agreedthatVilla was theman. Theirreason? withhim.He 'Well, you see, we have triedout bothofthemand Carranza,the , we can't do a thing won't listento reason.Obstinate,narrow-minded, us proud as hell, he has thrown out again and again. WhereasVilla . . . You mustn't theidea that get just because he's a bandithe's no good. We have had him seen and-he's all right, Steffens York, 1931), (New Villa is.' " LincolnSteffens, Autobiography The ofLincoln U.S. 715. Steffen's statements onlypartly are true.Yet thereis little doubtthatsomeofthemostimportant trueofthe largest of mining companieswithlargeinterests Mexico supported in Villa. This was certainly 334-36.J.D. Ricketts, them-The AmericanSmelting and Refining See O'Connor, TheGuggenheims, Co. whosecompanycontrolled hugeCananea minein Sonora,had a similarattitude. "Of course,thebest the to Jan. 20, man thattheyfound Villa," he wroteto GeneralHugh ScottinJanuary1915.Ricketts Scott, is For a briefperiod,William 1915,Libraryof Congress,Scott Papers, box 15 (general correspondence). publishedon RandolphHearst,who owneda huge ranchin Chihuahua,also favored Villa. In an editorial September26, 1914,entitled"Pancho Villa, the StrongMan of Mexico," Hearst's New York American blamedWilsonfor supporting not of Villa as president Mexico. This policydid notlastlong,and onJune3, 1915,beforeU.S. recognition Carranza, the American of referred Villa as a bandit and called forU.S. to of taxes on intervention Mexico. Hearst's changeofattitude in was probablydue to the imposition higher at foreign holdings Villa. Not all U.S. businessinterests by favored Villa. The oil companies, leastthrough of which 1914, were farmoresympathetic Carranza. Edward Doheny,president Mexican Petroleum, to had close linkswithStandard Oil, stated beforea Senate hearingin ig9g that his company,like many others as doingbusinessin Mexico, had supported Carranza from1913 onwardand paid him$685,ooo an advanceon future taxes.See UnitedStatesSenate Documents, Investigation ForeignRelationsCommittee, of Mexican Affairs, Reports and Hearings, i (66th Congress,2d Session, Senate Document no. 285; Washington, D.C., 1920): 278. HenryClay Pierce,head ofanotheroil company,also linkedto Standard chiefretainedthe Oil, establishedclose relations withCarranza. Both he and the Mexican revolutionary same lawyer,Sherbourne Hopkins,who-according to Paul von Hintze,the GermanAmbassadorin G. for Mexico-was more thanjust a lawyer.Von Hintze called him "a professional attorney revolutions Feb. i6, 1912, organizedfromthe United States in Latin America." See Hintze to Bethmann-Hollweg, probablyorganizedby Huerta DeutschesZentralarchiv Potsdam,AA2, no. 4461.In April 1914, break-in, a tookplace in Hopkins'sWashington office. Some ofthe letters thusobtainedwerepublishedin adherents, the New YorkHerald for 1914. They indicatePierce'sstrong sympathies Carranza. Pierce,who was in]June involved onlyin theoil businessbutalso in Mexican railroads, not had lostmuchofhispowerto theBritish the of of Cowdrayinterests. a result Carranza's control muchofMexico,bothhe and Hopkinsexpressed As supportforCarranza's hope thathe could now regainmuchofhis former influence. statedhis strong He over of nomination AlbertoPani as administrator the Mexican railroads, well as his disappointment of as of to Villa's reluctance recognize Pani's authority. theNew YorkHerald, See June28, 1919. The authenticity is the Herald'srevelations confirmed a telegramsent by Felix Sommerfeld, close collaboratorof in a of Hopkins,to Lazaro de la Garza, Villa's representative. Sommerfeld de la Garza, undated,University to Texas at Austin,Lazaro de la Garza Collection,wallet no. 13. for 9See, especially,Clendenen, The U.S. and PanchoVilla; and ArthurS. Link, Wilson:The Struggle NVeutrality (Princeton,1960),chaps. 8, 14.
o6
Friedrilch Katz
impose control over all of Mexico.'0 For a time President Wilson, Secretaryof State William Jennings Bryan, and a number of high officialsin the administration believed they had found such a man in Villa. His public statements beliefin free cordialitytoward U.S. representatives, bespoke desire forreform, institutions,respect for U.S. property, and commitment to free enterprise. In addition, he had the appearance of a strongman,well able to seize and hold power in Mexico and ready to turn it over to an elected president once the Revolution had triumphed." The Wilson administration's sympatheticattitude toward Villa manifested itselfclearly in the comment made about Villa by an unnamed high official to the French ambassador in Washington as early as January 19I4: In contrastto what is generallystated,Villa is not a man withoutproperty. His He parentsowned a ranchand enjoyeda certainprosperity. had no otherschooling as school but he did attendthat. He is not illiterate, the newspapers than primary as He are describehim to be. His letters even well formulated. is of Indian origin, He marksman. has no fearofphysical rider, and a first-class Huerta is, an excellent dangeror ofthe law, and he veryearlyled the lifeofa ranchman.It is the same life where of which many people led in remoteterritories our own West, territories had no control,where everyonewas his own master,and sometimes authorities creating own code of law. his his controlling adherents, imposedhis rule on others, He Villa becomespopularvery easilyand is able to maintainhis popularity. takes care ofhis soldiers,helps them,and is verypopular amongthem.... He would be order.Were I wellre-establish but,ifhe wantedto,he could very incapableofruling, of the president Mexico, I would chargehim withthistask: He would successfully to carryit out, I am convincedof that; he would forceall revolutionaries maintain order. In the presentstate of Mexico, I do not see anyoneexcepthim who would successfully carryout thistask.'2 The lack of complaints among the large U.S. interests located in Villa's and Villa's unwillingness to protest,as Carranza had done, against territory the U.S. occupation of Veracruz further strengthenedthe Wilson administration's sympathyforthe Chihuahua revolutionary. Villa's good relationship with U.S. business interestsbegan to deteriorate, however,afterhis break with Carranza. This diminution of support emerged quite clearly in conversations he held with Duval West, Wilson's special emissary to Mexico, the man charged with making policy recommendations to the U.S. president. West reported that Villa, to would be encouraged developthe on beingquestionedas to whatextent foreigners stated that therewould be no dispositionto prohibitsuch development, country,
see countries, '0 For an excellentassessmentof Woodrow Wilson's attitudetoward underdeveloped and States Revolutionary Nationalism Mexzco in (Chicago, 1971).chap. 2. RobertFreemanSmith,The United such ideas in a conversation 238-41.Wilsonalso expressed 1 See Link, Wilson: Struggle Aeutrality, The for in on on the subjectof Villa withthe Frenchcharged'affaires Washington July27. The U.S. president said thatVilla, upon entering Mexico Cityat the head ofhis troops,had declaredthathe would tolerate no excesses,and Wilsonthought his himcapable ofkeeping word. When the Frenchdiplomatasked him whom he would supportin case of a break betweenVilla and Carranza, Wilson did not answer him and believed Villa's armytheessentialforceofthe Revolution directly. onlystatedthathe considered He president.See Charge d'Affaires that its leader did not aspire to become a candidate forprovisional Archives Ministere Affaires du de Etrangeres, new ser. (Washington) ForeignMinistry, to July27, 1914, (Paris), Mexique Pol. 9. new ser. Etrangeres, 12Jusserand to Doumergues,Jan. 27, 1914, Archivesdu Ministerede Affaires (Paris), Mexique Pol. 9.
I07
exceptthat,in thecase oflands,foreigners shouldnot,or would not,be permitted to own lands. That it was his idea that the country should be developedby Mexican capital and thatthiscapital shouldbe compelledor required-he did notsay whator howor when-to employitself theestablishment theusual industrial in of enterprise. I gettheidea from foregoing the statement from failure GeneralVilla to and the of take theopportunity afforded the questionto makeclear thewishofhis followers by to encourageforeign capital thathe is standing thepopulardemandthat"Mexico on should be forMexicans" and that an open door to foreign investors an ultimate is dangerto the nation.13 It seems surprisingthat Villa, whose intelligencewas attestedto by friendand foe alike, chose to make such a declaration to the man on whom Wilson relied fora criticaljudgment concerning further U.S. support forVilla. His motive was certainlynot propaganda. Villa's statementswere not designed forpublic consumption; they were never published. Perhaps by this time Villa simply feltstrongenough to reveal concepts and sentimentshe had not dared to express before. When he made the declaration in February I9I5, his decisive defeat at Celaya was still two months off,and Villa, like many observers in Mexico, was convinced that Carranza's defeat was imminent. Whatever the cause, Villa's remarks happened to coincide with his increased pressure on U.S. business interests in Mexico. Financial problems had already begun to plague him by the end of I9I4. He had exhausted a great part of the resources-mostly cotton and cattle-that the confiscated estates had brought him. As the civil war with Carranza wore on and escalated, many U.S. enterprises,mainly the mining companies, suspended operations, furtherdiminishing the flow of revenue. Villa was more acutely affectedby such suspensions than Carranza. Many oil companies fromwhich Carranza drew his revenue were located near the coast and felt sufficiently well protected by foreignwarships even to expand theiroperations. To compound the evils besettingVilla by the end of I9I4, his access to weapons was obstructed by the outbreak of the First World War. Suddenly, what had been a "buyer's market" turned into a "seller's market," and Villa had to compete with Great Britain, France, and other powers forscarce U.S. arms. No wonder, then,that he should attempt to relieve his financial distress somewhat by imposing heavier taxes on U.S. companies and by tryingto cajole them into resuming operations through threats of confiscation.14 Afterhis defeat at Celaya in April I9I5, Villa's financial situation worsened. Mexican and U.S. speculators, as well as large U.S. companies, began to divest themselvesof large amounts of Villa currencyacquired when it seemed that he would soon prevail.15 The effectswere immediately obvious: prices soared, food became scarce, and food riots broke out all over the Villa zone.'6
13 Undated Report by Duval West to the Secretary of State, National Archives, Dept. of State Files, Record Group 59, File 812.00 14622. 4 MarvinD. Bernstein, TheMexican Mining Industry, 1890-i950(New York, 964), chap. 9. Archives December 1915, 16 Reportby agent Emilio Zapico to the Spanish ambassador in Washington, as of the Spanish ForeignMinistry, quoted in VicenteGonzalez Loscertales,"Los Espafiolesen la Vida University Madrid, 1976). of Social, Politicay Econ6mica de M6jico, i9i0-i930" (Ph.D. dissertation, 16FranciscoAlmada, IfIistoria la Revoluci6n el Estadode Chilhuahua,(Mexico, 1971): 236-38,and 2 en de of (Mexico, 1971), 172-75. See thereports special Spanish agent de en Historia la Revolucion el Estado Sonora de "Los Espafiolesen August 1915,in Loscertales, EmilioZapico to the Spanish ambassadorin Washington, la Vida Social, Politicay Econ6mica de M6jico, 1910-1930,5"293-395.
io8
Friedrich Katz
At this moment Villa sufferedhis most palpable loss of popular support. Nothing Carranza ever did in the way of promising social and political reform proved as detrimental to Villa as the economic collapse that struck the territoriesunder his control. Villa sought relief by increasing the financial pressure on U.S. companies, which in turn provoked angry reprimands from the U.S. state department but not a complete break between Villa and the Wilson administration. Both sides still needed each other to forestalla complete victoryby Carranza. Villa agreed to the administration's proposal that he send delegates to participate in a peace conference-sponsored by the ABC powers and the United States-at which the contending Mexican factions would be represented.'7 From May I9I5 onward, afterVilla's militarydefeats had decisively if not fatally weakened his hold on Mexico, his relations with Washington grew more and more muddled. Tensions between Villa and U.S. companies mounted. Wilson tried to steer a precarious course, cooling his support of Villa appreciably though not entirely.He wished to avert a complete takeover by Carranza. Attempts were made to impose a solution to the civil war by eliminating both Villa and Carranza fromthe scene. In October 1915 Wilson finallyrecognized Carranza's government.U.S. fears of German intriguesin Mexico significantly influenced this decision. The historyof Mexican-American relations between May and October 1915 is a topic well beyond the scope of this paper, all the more so since the nature of these relations has been closely examined elsewhere.'8 What has not been sufficiently analyzed, and is of relevance to this study, is the suddenness of Wilson's change of heart regarding Carranza. Only a few weeks before the United States governmentgranted recognition to the Carranza government, Wilson sent General Hugh Scott to negotiate with Villa concerning the return of some expropriated U.S. holdings. Lansing told Scott to assure Villa that Wilson would under no circumstances recognize Carranza. Scott later stated that he never delivered this message to Villa, but Villa's agents in the United States did, in fact, learn of Wilson's assurances."9 The president's sudden about-face, coming only a short time after he had invited Villa to send delegates to Washington to participate in a peace conference and afterLansing had given assurances that the United States would never recognize Carranza, made Villa suspicious that some important clandestine event had changed Wilson's mind.
Clendenen, T'he U.S. and Pancho Villa, 165-91. See, especially, Link, It'ilson: 'TheStruggle Neutrality, for chap. 14, 456-94; and Clendenen, The U.S. and l `ancho( illa, 155-207. 19 In a letter of October 14. 1915 to James R. Garfield, who was acting as a lobbyist forVilla, U.S. Chief of Staff General Hugh Scott wrote, "You are not the only one astounded by the action of the administration. Nobody in the State D)epartment, below the Secretary himself, can understand it. You remember I told you that Mr. Lansing told me to say to Villa that under no circumstances would we recognize Carranza. I had a lucid interval down there while talking to Villa, and did not tell him what Secretary Lansing told me to tell him, as I believe that matters of that kind should be held back when dealing with primitivepeople unless you have the carrying out of them in your own hands, otherwise you can't explain to them that it was not your fault if not carried out." Library of Congress, Scott Papers, box 20 (general correspondenice).
17 18

VILLA'S
I09
FIRST REACTION TO THE RECOGNITION of his enemy was mild. He made no overtdeclarations against the Wilson administration,and no Americans in his zone sufferedharm. In fact, he still hoped to circumventthe most painful consequence of Wilson's action-the embargo on weapons-by carryingout his planned invasion of the border state of Sonora. The state was wracked by a civil war between the forces of Governor Jose Maria Maytorena, who had allied himself with Villa, and those loyal to Carranza. By invading Sonora, Villa hoped to tip the scale and assume controlofthe entirestate. Domination of both Chihuahua and Sonora would have diminished significantlythe effectivenessof the weapons embargo. It would have meant, as one U.S. military intelligence officerput it, "the increased possibility of smuggling arms from the United States."20 It would also have placed appreciable amounts of U.S. propertyunder Villa's control. Perhaps the administrationin Washington, even though it had already recognized Carranza, would be forced to accommodate Villa in some fashion. This hope is probably one of the main reasons why Roque Gonzalez Garza, formerhead of the Government of the Revolutionary Convention and Villa's representativein the United States, urged his chief in October 1915, afterthe recognition of Carranza by the United States, to proceed as rapidly as possible with plans to attack Carranza's forcesat Agua Prieta, Sonora.2" The Sonoran campaign, however, ended disastrously for Villa. His army was decimated when Carranza unexpectedly reinforced the garrison at Agua Prieta by marching his troops across U.S. territory-with officialU.S. permission.22Afterthis humiliating defeat, Villa assumed a new attitude toward the United States, one that was to dominate his actions more and more between November 1915 and March I9I6, when his troops attacked Columbus, New Mexico. This new attitude doubtlessly owed much to the interpretation that Roque Gonzailez Garza gave to Wilson's decision to recognize Carranza. On October 29 the emissary wrote Villa a long description and analysis of the events leading up to the recognition of his enemy:
It was a great blow to me to see that you have always been miserably deceived; possiblythis took place in good faithbut you were always deceived. I was also viewofinternational politicalrelations, situation our was very good; we wereone step clearestassurancesthat,from pointof viewof international the politics,everything was proceeding yourfavor; in thatonlya smalleffort our partwas required the on for to U.S. government take us into consideration and that the originalplan of the at participants theconference wouldbe implemented withsatisfactory for results US.
20Report of'Operations of "General" Francisco Villa since November i915, Headquarters Punitive In Expedition, the Field, Nlexico,July 1916, 31, National Archives, Mexican Claims Commission, For a 3. detaileddescription and analysisofVilla's Sonorancampaign,see Thomas H. Naylor,"Massacre at San Pedro de la Cueva: The Significance Pancho Villa's DisastrousSonora Campaign," Western of Historical
deceived ....
Afterarrivingin Torreon ...
I was clearly told that, fromthe point of
fromrecognition by the United States ....
A few days went by and you received the
Roque GonzAlezGarza to Villa, Oct. 26, 1915, privatearchiveof General Roque GonzAlezGarza (Mexico City). I wishto expressmythanks GeneralGonzAlez to Garza's daughter, Lourdes,for permission to use thisarchive. 22 Naylor,"Massacre at San Pedro de la Cueva," 130.
21
QUarterly, 8 (1977):
125-50?
I 10
Friedrich Katz
Gonzailez Garza did not mention the name of the person who had given these assurances to Villa. That he left open the possibility of the intermediary's good faith indicates that he was probably referring George Carothers, the to U.S. special agent in the Villa camp with whom Villa had entertained good relations. Bitterly,Gonzalez Garza then went on to describe how Villa's delegates at the Washington peace conferencewere treated by their American hosts: Our situation was depressing. turnedout to havebeen a lie; we werevery Everything badly off;we were not even listenedto.... The gth of October arrivedand the at participants the conference decided to recognizeCarranza .... This decision, communicated abrupto thefour ex to winds,was an enormous humiliation us since for we weredelegatesto thepeace conference. werenottoldanything thesolemn We and declarations made by Wilsonat an earlierdate weresimply discarded.All historical precedents wereignored.Even commonsense was notrespected, sincewe had come to theconference readyto make peace but in an honorable was way. This resolution approvedand we suffered greatblow. a He continued angrily, I have seen manyinjustices, I havenever in but thatCarranzawouldtriumph thought theinternational he after playedthecomedyofbeingthemostnationalpoliticalfield isticofall Mexicansand after provoked UnitedStatestwoor threetimes.I do the he not entirelyknow what has been decided concretely, but I am convincedthat something verydark has been agreed on; forI have no otherexplanationforthe sudden change in U.S. policyagainstour groupand in favor Carranza. of In another part of the letter,he stated, "God knows how many secret pacts" Carranza had signed with the United States.23 The dark plot and secret pact that he intimated were spelled out in a manifesto issued on November 5, 19I5 in Naco, Sonora, signed by Villa and probably drafted by Roque Gonzalez Garza's brother Federico, who for a long time had been part of Villa's administrationin the state of Chihuahua.24 It was published in the November 21 issue of Villa's newspaper, Vida)P'ueva. The manifesto raised the question why Carranza-who "had never given guarantees to Americans, who had plundered them, who had deprived foreigners as often as he could of the lands they owned in the eastern and southern parts of the Republic, and who had always aroused the repugnance of the U.S."-had suddenly obtained not only the recognition but also the active support of the United States. According to Villa, U.S. support to Carranza entailed nothing less than a $soo-million loan and permission for Carranza's troops to cross into U.S. territory. The manifestobluntlyanswered its own question: "The price for these favors was simply the sale of our country by the traitor Carranza." The manifesto furthercharged that Carranza had agreed to eight conditions imposed by the United States: (i) amnesty to all political prisoners; (2)
GonzAlez Garza to Villa, Oct. 26, 1915, Gonzalez Garza archive. en Almada, Historia de la Revolucion el Estado de Chihuahua,2: 382. Almada quotes a conversation with Villa's formersecretary of state, Silvestre Terrazas, as the basis forhis observation on the authorship of the manifesto.
23 24
on Pancho Villa and theAttack Columbus
III
concession grantingthe United States rightsover Magdaa ninety-nine-year lena Bay, Tehuantepec, and an unnamed region in the oil zone; (3) an agreement that the ministries of the interior, foreign affairs, and finance would be filledby candidates enjoying the support ofthe Washington government; (4) all paper money issued by the Revolution would be consolidated after consultation with a representativenamed by the White House; (5) all for just claims by foreigners damages caused by the Revolution would be paid and all confiscated property returned; (6) the Mexican National Railways would be controlled by the governingboard in New York until the debts to this board were repaid; (7) the United States, through Wall Street bankers, would grant a $500-millionloan to the Mexican governmentto be guaranteed by a lien on the entire income of the Mexican treasury,with a representative of the U.S. governmentto have supervision over Mexico's compliance with this provision; and (8) General Pablo Gonzalez would be named provisional president and would call forelections within six months. Villa's policies in the next months were clearly presaged in passages of this manifesto."Can foreigners, especially the Yanquis, " Villa asked, "harbor the illusion that they can exploit 'peacefully while thanking God' the riches of Mexican soil?" He continued,
effectiveguarantees? ...
can Can they be naive enough to assume that Carranza's government give them
As far as I am concerned, I sincerely and emphatically
declare that I have much to thank Mr. Wilson for,since he has freedme of the and, to obligation giveguarantees foreigners above all, to thosewho wereonce free to of professor philosophywho is citizens and are now vassals of an evangelizing of the of people and who violatesthe sovereignty destroying independence a friendly thestatesofArizonaand Texas, allowingtheirsoil to be crossedbythe"constitution" of or a alisttroops. This does notimply feeling enmity hatredagainsttherealpeople ofthe UnitedStatesofNorthAmerica, glorious whomI respectand admirefortheir and fortheirlove ofprogress. traditions, theirexampleoforderand economy, for Villa raised the possibility of an armed conflict with the United States, while he denied that that was his intent: for a I After such a clear-cut declaration, wishto statethatI have no motive wishing all betweenmycountry and the UnitedStates. For thisreason,after I have conflict since the Americanpeople know for events, said, I declineany responsibility future efforts giveguarantees to to well perfectly thatI have alwayscarriedout superhuman Let assign responsibilieach of theirnationalswho is livingin our country. history
ties.25
Significantly,not one of the innumerable political, diplomatic, military,or financial agents the United States had stationed along the border reportedthe publication of this manifestowhich contained such clear forebodingsofVilla's intentions. Not even George Carothers, the formerU.S. special agent with Villa, who was charged by the U.S. state department with assembling all possible informationon Villa's activities, made any mention of the Naco Manifesto. Did these men simply not bother to read Vida Nueva,or had they
25 V'ida NVueva (Chihuahua), Nov. 21, 1915. Although it has been ignored by U.S. historians, Almada en printed this manifesto in the appendix to his La Revoluci6n el Estado de Chihuahua,2: 382.
I I2
Katz Friedrich
become captives of their own image of Villa the Bandit, who, as events began to turn against him, would leave Mexico to enjoy elsewhere the enormous sums of money they believed he had accumulated while in power? Did Leon Canova, the head of the Latin American desk in Washington, know of the manifestoand decide, forreasons of his own, to suppress it?26 On November 22, I9I5, afterhis troops had launched an unsuccessfulattack on the Carranza garrison at Hermosillo, capital of the state of Sonora, Villa sent a letter to the two commanders of Carranza's troops in that cityManuel Dieguez and Angel Flores. In it he mentioned the eight provisions of the secret pact that, in his opinion, Carranza had signed with the United States and stated that "we are now in the hands of the North Americans; we have accepted a Yanqui protectorate." He added that Carranza had now converted the conventionist movement (Villa and his allies) into the only and independence of Mexico, and, forthis group that defended the integrity reason and in spite of all defeats, its triumph was now inevitable. That the United States allowed Carranza's troops to cross its territorymeant that, when the United States wants or needs to, it can enter Mexican territory. Will you allow this?" Villa asked Carranza's generals. He made no specific overturesto them; he only asked them to give their opinions on the charges. Villa, most likely, hoped to enter into some kind of negotiations with Carranza's commanders. But, although Angel Flores did send a reply to Villa (the contents of which are not known), Dieguez declined to do even that.27 Villa's hope that the accusations against Carranza would stave offdisaster in his Sonoran campaign proved unfounded. Three weeks afterhis unsuccessful overturesto the two Carranza generals, Villa returnedto Chihuahua at the head of a decimated and demoralized army and found Carranza's troops gaining on his last strongholds in the state. As disaster approached, the specter of a pact between Wilson and Carranza began to loom ever larger in Villa's thinking. On December i6 he sent a letter to the commanders of the Carranza forces heading for Chihuahua, who had by now reached the city of Camargo. In it he made far more concrete proposals than before. After iterating his accusations against Carranza, Villa stated that, because of this Carranzistas "so as not to new development, his troops had stopped fighting shed Mexican blood." To the Carranza generals he proposed an alliance 'ithat would unite all of us against the Yanqui who, because of racial antagonisms and commercial and economic ambitions, is the natural enemy of our race and of all Latin countries." In case such an alliance was signed, he wrote, Three days aftersigningthis letter, he would give up command of his troops.28 Villa made a farewell speech to the people of Chihuahua fromthe balcony of
26 Since, as I contend,Villa's charges were based on a plot involving Canova, the lattermighthave wanted to preventVilla's accusations frombeing broughtto the attention his superiors.There is, of however, evidenceto substantiate no thisassumption. 27 Alberto , Calzadiaz Barrera,11echos Reales la Revoluci6n,(Mexico, 1972): 141-43. de 28 FranciscoVilla toJefe de la Columna Expedicionaria Nortey a los demas Generalesque forman del of parte de ella: Camargo o en donde se Encuentran, Dec. i6, 1915,University Californiaat Berkeley, Bancroft Library, Silvestre Terrazas Papers,vol. 78,pt. 1.
on Pancho andthe Villa Attack Columbus
II3
>
:!
,F,lfi*'
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
. ...
*~~~
----~---
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
;'<'s;'-''.*.v.'.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ t: +: }=' Si '
r
w-A-s; .......
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~^0
i net
e i-*-Sw ott#
-''
S
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~M
f~~~~~~~~~~
{> <
es
~~~~~~
Villa in the mountains.FromJessie Petersonand Thelma Cox Knoles, eds., Pancho Villa: Intimate Recollections PeopleWhoKnewHim (New York, 1977). Photo courtesy by Hastings House Publishers.
114
Friedrich Katz
the Municipal Palace. He repeatedhis accusationsthatCarranza had signed a secretpact withthe United States.29 As Villa's forces dwindledand theoccupationofall citiesin Chihuahua by Carranza's forces became imminent, manyU.S. observers expectedVilla to crosstheborderto find in refuge theUnitedStates.30 This pattern behavior of of had provedcharacteristic many Latin Americancaudillos who lefttheir countries after unsuccessful to coups and revolts rewardthemselves their for exertions withwhatever wealththeyhad been able to accruewhiletheywere mastersofthe nationaltreasury. Withno one restraining supervising or him, Villa had controlled finances theDivisionoftheNorthfor the of years.Had he wanted,he could easilyhave depositedlargesumsofmoney foreign in banks. to But Villa did not conform the model. his A fewdays after farewell of speech,Villa wentto therailroadstation the capitalcityofthestateto bid goodbyto Silvestre Terrazas,hisclosecollaborator and Chihuahuan secretary state. He instructed of Terrazas to go to El Paso to arrange withCarranza's authorities thesurrender Villa's troops for of at theborder townofCiudadJuarez.Terrazassuggested Villa thathe leave to Mexico, perhaps in order to go to Europe and study the new military techniques being utilizedin WorldWar I. Villa answeredthathe would inwitha numberofloyalmenintothemountains, wherehe could stead retreat he easily elude any hostiletroops. "I will never leave my country,"' announced."Here I will stayand fight."But he stillhad hopes forchange in Mexico. "Beforesix months have passed," he told Terrazas, "it will become clear that U.S. recognition the Carranza faction of was not disinterested but in factdependent thesame proposalswhichWashington on made as theprice me of granting recognition, proposalswhichI rejected."' Villa did not revealto Terrazas the meaningof his six months'timetable. But he did make his plans abundantly clear in a letter, written fewdays a later,to Emiliano Zapata, whichwas foundon the body of a dead Villista afterthe Columbus attack.After for attributing responsibility his defeatat Sonora to Wilson forallowingCarranza's troopsto crossU.S. territory and the Villa after containedin his Naco Manifesto, describing secretagreement wroteto his ally, Fromtheforegoing willseethatthesale ofthiscountry complete under is and you these for we not stated a circumstances, reasons previously, havedecided tofire bullet our and more and ourselves attack to against Mexicans, brothers, toprepare organize in theAmericans their owndensand make them know Mexicois a landfor the that free a tomb thrones, for and and crowns, traitors. With aimofinforming people thesituation inorder organize of and the the to and of recruit greatest the number menwiththeaforementioned I have possible aim, divided armyintoguerrilla my bands,and each chief willgo to thatpartofthe he for of country considers appropriate a period sixmonths. isthetime That period we
Reportof Operationsof "General" FranciscoVilla, 5. of Clendenen,The U.S. andPancho Villa,222-23. Fidel Avila,Villa's Governor Chihuahua,reinforced thisinterpretation sendingWilsona telegram thatindicatedthatVilla would seekrefuge theUnited by in to Foreign Relations theUnited States States; Papers Relating the of (1915), 777. 31 Silvestre in de Terrazas, "El VerdaderoPancho Villa" (chap. 53 of Terrazas's Memoirs), Boletin Ia de 8 Sociedad ChihuahuenseEstudios Hist6ricos,(1955): 769-71.
30
29
II
we have set to meetin the stateofChihuahua withall the forces will have recruited in the country carryout the movement that will uniteall Mexicans. to The movewe have to maketo the UnitedStatescan onlybe accomplished through the north, we do not have any ships.I beg you to tellme ifyou agreeto come here as withall your troopsand on what date so that I may have the pleasure to go perand sonallyto meetyou and together startthe workof reconstruction enhancement of Mexico, punishing our eternalenemy,the one thathas always been encouraging and difficulties quarrelsamong our race.32 hatredand provoking The letterto Zapata was preceded by a conferenceof all militarychiefsstill loyal to Villa at the Hacienda de Bustillos on December 23, 19I5. The conference adopted a resolution that stated, thatthe C. VENUSTIANO CARRANZA as Chiefof the opposingpartyhas Considering: contracted whichplace the country the hands offoreigners, thing compromises in a the honorableMexican people will neverapprove. thattheUnitedStateswillexactthefulfillmentsaid compromises Considering: of and that upon not obtainingsame will intervene our country in underany pretext, waitingbut forthe hourof our utmostweakness! thatrather Considering: the than permit hour to come when we would fallintothe hands of the ambitiousNorthAmericans, would become the accomplicesto the we traitor's party,who has lookedforthe ruinof our country. In the meeting held todaywe have agreedthatGeneralFRANCISCO VILLA, ChiefS. of C. of the conventional army,shall take the propersteps to advise the nationofthe threatening dangerto itsintegrity, we shall proceedto organizein therespective and regions the country." of On the same day that Villa appealed to Zapata, he sent emissaries to mobilize troops in other parts of the country to fightagainst the United States.34It is significantthat none of Villa's upper- or middle-class supporters-such as Felipe Angeles, Raul Madero, Jose Maria Maytorena, or even the Gonzalez Garza brothers-were involved in this scheme. While preparing his attack on the United States, Villa decided to implement the warning given the U.S. governmentand U.S. interestsin his Naco Manifesto, in which he had stated that Americans should not believe that Carranza was capable of giving them sufficientguarantees to continue exploiting the resources of Nlexico. Villa began to confiscate U.S. property whereverhe found it. In January I9I6 he occupied Babicora, William Randolph Hearst's ranch, which had long been spared, and confiscated a large number of cattle and horses. In Santa Isabel on January 17 loyal Villa troops under the command of Pablo Lopez stopped a train carrying seventeen American mining engineers who were returningto Mexico fromthe United States to restore operations in a U.S.-owned mine. All were executed.35
32 This letter was part ofa collection documents of foundon a dead Villistaafter Columbusattack. the They neverreached the state department filesbut are containedin the AdjutantGeneral's Office, File Record Group 94, along withFile 2377632. 2384662, The completetextofthisletter was first publishedin E. Bruce White, "The Muddied Waters of Columbus, New Mexico," 72-92. A complete list of the documents and an attempt analyzethemwas publishedat thesame timein Harrisand Sadler,"Pancho to Villa and the Columbus Raid: The Missing Documents," 345-47. 33 See Adjutant General'sOffice, 2384662. File 34 Ibid. 35 Investigators the Punitive of Expedition concludedinJuly1916, thisconnection willbe observed "In it
ii6
Friedrich Katz
V~~
_~~~
Villistaskilledin the Columbus raid. From Petersonand Knoles, eds., Pancho Villa (New York, 1977). Photo courtesy Hastings House Publishers.
For reasonsthatare notclear,Villa decidedto strike at directly theUnited to to Statesfarearlierthan he had announcedin his letter Zapata. According in a one participant the attack, Juan Caballero,Villa concentrated largepart and toldthemhe plannedto of his troopsat the Hacienda de San Jeronimo attackthe UnitedStates.Again,themainreasonhe gavewas thesecretU.S.Carranza pact. Villa toldthemthatthepact had been offered himearlier to at to thatVilla first Caballeroreported Guadalajara, but he had refused signit.36 decidedto attackPresidio, Texas, but changedhis plan after partofhisforces deserted. was afraidtheymight revealhis plans to theAmericans. ThereHe Villa became extremely reserved aboutthenameofthetownhe planned after,
the thatVilla's locationat thetimeofthemassacrewas farfrom scenewheretheact was enactedand that of he was so situatedand the circumstances attending accidentalarrival thetrainbearingthe ill-fated the advanceinformation havebeen to seventeen Americans, weresuch thatVilla could nothavehad first-hand thatordersto rid able to issue directordersto Lopez to kill them.There is reason to believe,however, through Rodriguezbefore Lopez left Mexico weregivenLopez by Villa, either telegraphic by instructions at meeting El Valle betweenVilla and Casas Grandes forMadera, or later in personat the unexpected of Rodriguez.Ordersfrom Villa to killAmericans, could havereachedLopez at anytime, course,butitcan be statedquite positively thatVilla was notin thevicinity Santa Ysabel at thetimeofthemassacre,and of he to further whenreports theincident that of reachedhimbycouriers was inclined denyitsauthenticity." was definitely this congruent Reportof Operationsof "General" FranciscoVilla, 8. Nevertheless, killing with the warningsVilla clearlyexpressedto Wilson and to Americanminingcompanies in his Naco Manifesto. de 36 Confederaci6n Veteranos de de Revolucionarios la Divisi6ndel Norte,Relato de Hechos Hist6ricos la Actuaci6ndel Gral. FranciscoVilla y sus Tropas, Archivo la Palabra Mexico, Typescript Juan de by Caballero (Dec. 7, 1971).
Villaandthe Attack Columbus on Pancho
II 7
to attack.It was onlywhen theyarrivednear Columbus,New Mexico, that his men foundout wheretheywere going. have WhyVilla pickedColumbus forhis target not apparent.He might is wantedto use the attackto settleold scores.Perhapshe wantedto take his revengeon the arms dealer, Sam Ravel, who he felthad betrayedhim, althoughCaballero doubtsthisversion.Perhapshe hoped to get moneyand noneconstiBut wereclearlysecondary; suppliesthere.37 such considerations for an tutedhis main motive launching attackon theUnitedStates-his firm conviction thatCarranza had sold out Mexico to the United States.
WHAT REAL SUBSTANCE WAS THERE
Carranza and the UnitedStates?Had such a pact in factever a pact between of been proposedby Wilson?Had it been hatchedby members his administration? Was it pure invention Villa or his collaborators? Was it a scheme by whichhoped Villa's actionswould provoke devised U.S. business by interests, in U.S. intervention Mexico? Was it a concoctionof the German secret whichhoped to distract from European theater of U.S. attention the service, in war by forcing to intervene Mexico? it evidence thatCarranzaeversignedsucha pact. Of Thereis nottheslightest of all the accusationsVilla leveledagainstCarranza,onlyone-point five the of truth.Carranza had indeed manifesto-containeda grain eight-point the and during Revolution agreedto examineU.S. claimsfordamagessuffered This, no doubt, was returning confiscated properties their to former owners.38 for forces. was not,however, result the was a majorvictory theconservative It but ofCarranza's own conservative to ofU.S. pressure convictions, whichhe His to had held fastfrom day he joined the Revolution. readiness negotiate the U.S. claims could scarcelyjustifythe accusation that he had converted Such a pact would have been entirely Mexico into a U.S. protectorate. Nor is there slightest the incompatible withhis staunchnationalistic posture. thatWoodrowWilsoneither such an agreeproof proposedor contemplated mentwithany Mexican factionat any timeduringthe Revolution. The pact, nevertheless, notentirely figment Villa's imagination; in was a of show thatin 19I5 such a plan had been conceivedand was fact,documents considered a leadingofficial thestatedepartment, of representaseriously by and Mexican conservatives tivesof U.S. businessinterests, (but not of Carranza's faction).In May ofthatyear,Leon Canova, head ofthe statedepartment'sMexican desk, and Eduardo Iturbide,who had been Mexico City's chiefof police duringthe administration Victoriano of Huerta, elaborateda in scheme fora U.S.-supportedcounterrevolution Mexico. They hoped to involve least part of Villa's armyat a timewhen Villa had suffered some at serious defeatsbut Carranza's supremacyhad not yet been clearlyestablished.
concessions made publicly. he Papers There is no evidencethatCarranza everwentbeyondthelimited States (1915), 705-07. Relations theUnited of Relating the to Foreign
38
in to Villa's profound belief theexistence of
37 Ibid.
I8
Friedrich Katz
the bothMexican leadersfrom politicalsceneby Wilsonhopedto eliminate support and helpinga candidatewho could gain overwhelming recognizing in be and thusmight able to end thecivilstrife Mexico. At from bothfactions thatthe officials thatpoint,Canova proposedto a numberofadministration group headed by United States throwits supportto a counterrevolutionary of and supplythatgroupwithstocks food openlyavowthatsupport, Iturbide, it among the population.These gestures, was whichit could thendistribute In for he the hoped,wouldsecureforIturbide popularity lacked.39 return such rightsto both the U.S. were to grantwide-ranging help the conservatives of "Americansupervision customs and government U.S. bankers,including was mentioned-from in collection," exchangefora largeloan-$500 million were also to accept the appointment the by U.S. banks. The conservatives advisor"withunspecified powadministrative UnitedStatesofan "unofficial to In reforms."40 his memorandum thenSecreers to "overseethe necessary taryof State Bryan,Canova did not explain what he meantby "necessary sent to Chandler but he did stipulatein anothermemorandum reforms," the servedas intermediary between administration who frequently Anderson, confiscated by realproperty and businessinterests "all Churchand other that bands or otherswithoutproperor due process of law since revolutionary "41 by February13, 1913 shall be re-occupied theirlegal owners. a high statedepartment by Canova's plot was farmore than an attempt official and a fewMexican and Americanassociatesto secureadvantagesin Mexico. The plan was backed by importantsegmentsof Mexico's preand of oligarchy, whomManuel Calero was a representative, by revolutionary Its for U.S. businessinterests, whom ChandlerAndersonwas spokesman.42 camp by re-estabpurposewas to exploitdisunionwithinthe revolutionary would be domilishinga Diaz-like regimethat,unlikeits real predecessor, nated by the United States. The plan also had vocal supportwithinthe of most outspokenwas Secretary the InteriorFranklinK. administration; On withoil interests.43 his who in lateryearsbecame closelyidentified Lane, But Bryandismissed initiative plan was discussedat a cabinetmeeting. the the plan, declaringthat the United States "should not take up a man who
" For a description the Canova-Iturbide 470The Neutrality, see conspiracy, Link, Wilson: Strugglefor of 74. 40 Canova to theSecretary State,Dept. ofStateFiles,RG 59,File812.00 15531 of 1/2. of The statedepartment 41 Diary ofChandlerAnderson, paperscontain May 28, 1915,Library Congress. diary, is in of onlythebarestoutline Canova's plot.Most oftheavailableinformation contained Anderson's Very for especially entries April23,May 14,May i9, May 28,Junei,june'29,July 23,andJuly30, 1915. the i in desireto apply a strategy 19'I5 similarto thattheyapplied in 191 . They apparentis the conservatives' was of as werewillingto agreeto some "compromises" faras thecomposition thegovernment concerned. of Iturbidewas quite willing,forexample,to include Manuel Bonilla as a representative the pro-Villa of control To of forces. ensureconservative and AlvaroObreg6nas a representative thepro-Carranza forces would have no part in the new Government, I, the Mexican armysimilarto that in 191 " Iturbidehimself in it, forces, supporting whichhe regardedas essential, order but would act as the leader ofthe military out to to thathe might in a position compelthe new government carry thepledgeswhichit would have be to make in orderto securethe supportofthe UnitedStates." AndersonDiary,July22, 1915. see 42 For Anderson's for mining, and otherinterests, Smith,TheU.S. and oil, role as lobbyist American Revolutionary Nationalism, 95.
43 Ibid.
I I9
would probably play in with the reactionaries.""" Although Wilson did not voice any opinion at these meetings, he later expressed agreement with Bryan's position, and Canova's plan was discarded.45 The plan contained three of the main provisions to which, according to Villa's accusations, Carranza and the United States had agreed: (i) the $500million loan by U.S. bankers to Mexico and American financial control of essential parts of Mexico's economy, (2) strong influence over the Mexican governmentby advisers in Washington, and (3) the return of expropriated holdings to foreignersand Mexican enemies of the Revolution. In their talks with U.S. officials,the plotters never mentioned other provisions that appeared in Villa's Naco Manifesto, provisions that would have made Mexico not only economically but militarilydependent upon the United States: U.S. naval bases in Magdalena Bay; U.S. control of the Isthmus to Tehuantepec, the oil regions, and the Mexican railways; and the rightof the U.S. government to send troops to Mexico whenever it considered such a step to be necessary. Nor did Canova and Iturbide mention the right of the United States to impose its candidates as secretaries of foreign relations and of finance on a new Mexican government. Was there any validity, then, to the other charges of the Naco Manifesto? There is a very strong possibility that the Canova-Iturbide plot went far beyond what they they were willing to reveal to U.S. authorities and that it included a covert pact encompassing most of Villa's charges. In their proposals to U.S. officials,the plottershad remained vague on threecounts: what financial interestsbacked their plan; what they had promised these interests in return; and what the specific tasks and powers of the U.S. advisers were to be. In his letter to Bryan, Canova made only one reference to financial to support. He included lettersfromSpeyer and Company offering lend $500 million to the new Mexican government, the United States were to go along if with Canova's plan. Iturbide was somewhat frankerin a conversation with Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson, according to a memorandum by Anderson: his would favor [Iturbide's] Burleson. . . statedthat he thought administration the if and and thatitwas clean. This movement, itcould showsufficient strength backing, with because he felt thathis own connection last seemedto offend Iturbidesomewhat it was a guaranteeof its cleanness.It appeared thatwhat Burlesonwantedto know had undertaken. they was who was backingitfinancially what,ifany,obligations and to Iturbidetold him that therewere threebankerswho had offered financethe of movement. One was Mr. Williams,the brother JohnSkeltonWilliams;the other was Mr. Kenna, who was vouchedforby SenatorUnderwood,and anotherwhose had name he said frankly he did notknowbecause theoffer come in an indirect that that Speyer and Company were prepared to financethe way. He said further movement it were endorsedby the administration.46 if
" As quoted in David F. Houston, EzghtYearswith Wilsons Cabinet,1913 to 1920, I (New York, 1926): 133. Link, Wilson: The Strugglefor Aeidtrality, 475-76. 46 Diary of Chandler Anderson, July 23, 1915, Library of Congress. Robert Lancaster Williams was a banker and railroad executive, whose brother, John Skelton Williams, had been appointed comptroller of the currency by Woodrow Wilson. Edward Dudley Kenna was also a railway executive, who had been vouched for by a Democratic senator.
4
I20
Friedrich Katz
That the third backer chose not to reveal his identityor that Iturbide chose not to disclose his identitymay indicate that the person was judged unacceptable to either Bryan or the U.S. government. Significantly,Iturbide completely evaded the question as to what obligations his party had assumed toward U.S. special interests. Naturally, the intriguingquestion about the Canova-Iturbide plot is what was meant by "necessary reforms" and what was to have been the power of the "U.S. unofficialadviser" charged with implementing them. Although we have no direct evidence as to what was intended, we may surmise the outlines based on still other plans and agreements that were drawn up some time afterthe attack on Columbus. and a half years after Canova and Iturbide On December 6, I9I7-two came out with theirfirstplot concerning Mexico-Secretary of State Lansing wrote a secret memorandum to Wilson concerning yet another plot. This document, which was classified until recently,merits extended quotation. X This afternoon, came to see me and said thathe had runacrossa mostremarkable plot in relationto Mexico. (X is an intimate friend minein whomI have implicit of confidence.) had been consulted a Mexican ofgood family He by belonging theold to regime, whomI willcall "S. " I am personally acquaintedwithS and believehimto be X honorableand straightforward. said that S statedthathe had been approached witha proposition undertake revolution to a againstthe Mexican government, that the generalplan had been workedout, and [that] manyprominent Mexicans and in Americans thiscountry wereinvolved and arrangements weremade to place ample fundsat the disposal of thosethatwere engagedin the enterprise. from S told X thathe had been interviewed Cecil Ira McRaynolds,an attorney by New York, who said he was actingforAndersonHurd, and that McRaynolds told himthatthisplannedrevolution theapprovaloftheDepartment State,thatV, had of a high official the Department,knew of the plan and had assured him of the in approvalof the government. in S said that,whileit seemedto be alright[sic],he did notwishto do anything the matter unlesshe was absolutely surethatthisgovernment approvedit. Knowingthat of X was a friend mine,he asked himto see me and find truth. toldhimthathe the X was familiar withmypolicyin relation Mexico and thathe was certainthatV had to not been authorized speak forthe Department to encouragethismovement or but to thathe would see me ifS desiredhimto do so. S repliedthathe did because he would have nothing do withit unlessitwas alright. thengaveX a carboncopyon pink He to for the forth arrangements financing movement the paper ofa bilingualletter setting and the concessionsand compensation be givenby the new government when it to came intopower. Six days later, X again saw Lansing and added more details to the plot: that AndersonHurd, who appeared to be the He [X] said that he was informed centralfigure the movement, in thoughprobablyonlyan agent,had been employed by the ShippingBoard to negotiateforthe purchaseof German ships in Mexican had ports,and that Cecil Ira McRaynolds,his attorney, also been employedby the thatthe Board in somecapacity.McRaynoldstoldtheMexican S thathe was certain Departmentof State knew all about the plan because, he asserted,the Shipping Board was behindit and thatSenatorJamesA. O'Gorman ofNew York had talked the matter overwithFrankL. Polk,a Counselorin the State Department. (Polk told me laterthatO'Gorman had called to see him about the purchaseof some shipsin Uruguaybut nevermentioned Mexico.)
Attack Columbus on Pancho Villaandthe
I2I
McRaynolds told S that the primary purposeof the proposedrevolution was to securetheoil at Tampico and the Germanshipsin Mexican waters;and thathe had had a conference whichwerepresent at Corwin, Swain,and Helm oftheStandardOil Co., and V oftheDepartment State.They metin New Yorkand discussedtheplan. of McRaynolds also told S the Standard Oil Co. was to put up $5 millionto begin with.Of thatsum,$2.5 million wereto be used for to purchasing ships;$I.5 million the finance revolution; thebalance-$i million-was to go to thosewho had been the and in instrumental aidingthe movement. told X thathe understood S thatV was to be paid out of the lattersum.47 Obviously, Lansing feltthat the matterwas too sensitiveforhim to commit to paper the names of the persons involved,even though the paper was a secret memorandum to the president. Other documents in the same file, however, conclusively identify two of the three persons mentioned. The high officialof the Department ofState, "V, " was Leon Canova, the man originallyin charge of Washington's Latin American desk, later solely in charge of Mexican affairs. "S," the Mexican of "good family," was Eduardo Iturbide. After Lansing discovered the plot, he relieved Canova of his post.48 The bilingual pact signed by the conspirators, which X (whose identity cannot be ascertained) handed to Lansing, contains provisions strikingly similar to those mentioned by Villa in his accusations against Carranza. Point IO of this secret agreement stated, In recognition the services of whichyou and yourprincipalsobligatethemselves to I and associates,obligatemyself themto perform do, formyself, principals, my and the end that I and theyand the politicalpartywhichsustainsus will use all our influence and the means at our disposal to bringabout the following: That the (a) of appointments the secretariesof Foreign Relations and of the Treasuryof the will Mexican government be givento men especially fitted re-establish mainto and betweenthe governments Mexico and the United States tain completeharmony of confidence youand yourprincipals in and inspire withreference thecarrying of to out
47 SecretMemorandaofSecretary StateLansing, of Dec. 6 and Dec. 12, 1917, NationalArchives, Dept. of of State,Office the Counselor,Leland HarrisonFile, box 208 (Mexican intrigue). thatwas includedin thefile, as a 48 Canova's identity "V" is confirmed a document by namely, wirefrom theU.S. Embassyin London,whichstated, "Admiralty greatly disturbed a report by thatCanova has been implicatedin some Mexican intrigue and is likelyto lose his job." See Harrisonto Bell,Jan. 17, 1918, National Archives, Dept. of State, Leland HarrisonFile, box 208 (Mexican intrigue). Another memorandum in thesame fileofJuly12, 1918 confirmed Iturbide's identity "S": "Informant me thatMichael as told Spellacy,an oil man, had told Congressman McLemoreofTexas in confidence, thatMcLemorehad and told informant confidence, in and informant me in confidence, told practically identicalinformation the that was in the secretmemorandum Secretary of Lansing whichwas turnedover to this office the at of beginning the investigation Mexican affairs. of Informant said that all thiscame from Iturbidetelling Spellacy some timeago thatthe State Department, through "V," had halfsanctioned financing a the of revolution Mexico through in certainNew York bankersto the amountoffive milliondollars,and thatit was understood betweenI and "V" that"V" was to geta portion thismoney helping put thedeal of for to through; that"V" said thattherevolution thesanctionofthe State Department had and thatthebankers to milliondollarsfor made arrangements producethe five thatpurpose, at thelast moment, higher but the officials the State Department of to refused sanctionit." The statedepartment obviously was afraidofthe scandal an immediate dismissalof Canova mightproduce.He "resigned"from statedepartment the on December2, 19I8, and the reasonswere carefully concealed from So public scrutiny. well organizedwas thisconcealment thatnearly fifty yearslaterLouis M. Teitelbaum, historian a trying find reasonsfor to the Canova's resignation, "The cause ofhisleavingis nowhere statedin thepublished private or records wrote, a available forstudy, circumstance Wilson nearlyunique in the State Department";Teitelbaum,Woodrow and theMexicanRevolution (New York, 1967),269. Afterhis resignation, state department the carefully followed every his ibid.,41 1. movement;
I 22
Friedrich Katz
theobligations herein contained.(b) That theMexican government appointyour will principals, withthecharacter financial of or the adviser fiscalagent,for negotiation of all financialquestions which are to be negotiated the United States ... Such in appointmentas fiscal agent will also carry with it the designationof the bank recommended your principalsas depository the Mexican government by of upon qualification such in a properway. as Point io (g) specified that a mission be nominated by the new government which would be empowered to negotiate with the United States concerning " the bases which are to serve forthe followingmatters: Chamizal, the waters of the Colorado River, naval stations in the Pacific, the strategic military railroads of the Republic of Mexico; and to agree upon the appropriate measures that are to be taken so that your principals may supervise in Mexico the expenditure of the Funds secured by loans placed by them.)" In Point io (i) it was stated that "To bring about the utmost harmony and cooperation between the governmentof Mexico and the United States . .. we are in favor of and will work to bring about the voluntary creation by the governmentof Mexico of militaryzones to cover and include the lines of all north and south trunk railways, now existing or to be hereafterconstructed under a stipulation that will provide for a mutual offensiveand defensive alliance and require both parties to protect the said zones in all cases of threatened danger." Point io () had as its purpose "the termination to a compromise satisfactory them of the concession under which Sir Weetman to Pearson, now Lord Cowdray, and his associates operate the railway line between Puerto Mexico and Salina Cruz, across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and the returnof the said railway and the control and complete operation of the same to the governmentof Mexico.)" It did, moreover,grant to the parties involved,"the conditions being equal, the profitsfromthe sale of the bonds to provide the necessary funds to enable the government of Mexico to bring about the terminationof such concessions, to place the said railway in firstclass operating condition, and to double-track the same forits entire length, with all the necessary equipment, terminals,etc. " It was "understood, ' under the terms of the agreement, that "in all cases the Mexican government" would "retain control or majority of the stock of the railway company, granting to your principals, together with such compensation as may be agreed upon, such portion of said stock as may be proper but not exceed 49% of the same. " Also included was a clause which provided that this railway would be made part of a militaryzone, which the United States would have the rightto protect if it feltthe railway was threatened.49 Did a similar agreement underlie the I9I5 Canova-Iturbide scheme? Although there is no conclusive evidence for such an accord, there is a strong probability that it existed. One indication is the remarkable similaritybetween the charges Villa leveled at the United States in his Naco Manifesto of 1915 and the provisionsofthe I917 accord. U.S. interests were to have the deci49Bilingualunsignedagreement, November19i7, National Archives, Dept. of State, Leland Harrison File, box 208 (Mexican intrigue).
123
in of siveinfluence selecting Mexico's secretary foreign relations and secretary of finance.The United States was to grant a large loan to Mexico and its in supervise finances turn.The UnitedStateswas to be givennavalbases in the Pacific,mainlyin Magdalena Bay. U.S. businessinterests wereto share controlof the Tehuantepecrailroad,whichhitherto had been underBritish control. Also includedwereotherconcessions the UnitedStatesthatVilla to in had not mentioned his accusations.50 Since the same plotters,Canova and Iturbide,were involvedin both thereis good reasonto assumethattheywerereadyto enter schemes, intothe same kindofagreement I915 thattheydid in 1917. And, althoughthereis in no definite evidence thattheoil companieswereas involved theplotof 19I5 in as in thatof I917, thata man likeChandlerAnderson, who was very sympatheticto oil interests, had backed Canova's plan in I915 could indicatea similarsupport oil companies.Certainly, by thereis no reasonto assumethat theoil interests less compunction had a about supporting plotin 1915 thanin 1917. Carranza had forfeited their original support after beganraising he taxes on oil.
IT IS NOW POSSIBLE TO GET A CLEAR IDEA of the eventsleading up to and Villa's attack on Columbus. What may be termed Canova's motivating "overt"plan ofMay 1915 would have sufficed put an end to the Revolution to and have transformed Mexico intoa U.S. protectorate. complemented If by " the "covert plan of 19I7, it would have spelled complete political and economicdomination Mexico: theovert of provisions provided an "unoffifor cial administrative advisor" and U.S. supervision customs; the covert of for provisions, (i) U.S. intervention Mexico whenever United States in the perceiveda threatto the operationof the railroads and to a numberof important ports and otherstrategic facilities, stronginfluence U.S. (2) by businessinterests overtheTehuantepecrailroad, and (3) probablecontrol by the U.S. Navy over Magdalena Bay. Villa's armyheld a keypositionin the scheme. "I'm assured," Canova wrote Bryan, "that 20,000 men, mostly trainedsoldiersof the old Federal Armycominglargelyfrom Villa's ranks, would adhere to it; but, in all probability, Villa's entirearmywilljoin the " movement. He also wrotethathe had discussedthosepartsoftheplan that he had revealedto Bryanwithtworepresentatives Villa, ofwhommorewill of be said later.51
50 Amongthe otherconcessionsto its U.S. backers,the Mexican side was willing "to bringabout the attachment return thetrueowners, legal means,ofthefunds and to by whichtheso-calledCommission for the RegulationofHenequen has in thisCity. . . " and " (d) To bringit about thattheMexicanGovernment grantto yourprincipals, otherconditions beingequal, the preference the upbuilding for and operation in the Republic of Mexico, of the industries iron and steel, and those related thereto, of includingthe acquirement and exploitation minesofiron.(e) That theMexican Government givefacilities your of will to principals theupbuilding thesugarindustry thecountry, willnotimposenewtaxesor burdens for of in and whichimpedethisindustry. That the Mexican Government grantto yourprincipals, (f) will otherconditionsbeing equal, the rightto purchase the vessels to be sold because of havingbeen interned the by Government any reason." Ibid. by 51 Canova to the Secretary State,July 17, 1915, of National Archives, Dept. of State Files RG 59, File 812.00 155311/2.
124
Friedrich Katz
Villa did not for long remain in the dark about the contents of the plan, although it is not quite certain how he firstfound out. Perhaps, as he later reported, he was simply approached and offeredU.S. support if he were to approve all the provisions contained in Canova's plan. (Canova may have felt that in May 19I5 Villa had little to lose and that, having already been decisively defeated, Villa would be ready to settle for anything in order to retain at least some remnants of his power.) At any rate, it is certain that by the summer of I915 news of the Canova-Iturbide plot had reached Villa's representativesin Washington, who were deeply incensed about it. William Teitelbaum, a journalist and businessman who kept in touch with the various Mexican factions represented in Washington, described in a letter to H. G. the Wright,editor of the New York Globe, reaction of Villa's emissaries to the plot: On severaloccasions duringthe past weeks I have discussedwithyou the serious of charges being made by Mr. E. C. Llorente,the accreditedrepresentative the of of thatMr. Leon Canova, chief the Mexican division Mexican Convention forces, the State Dept., was secretly advancingthe candidacyof Eduardo IturbideforProvisionalPresident Mexico.... of A fewdays before I GeneralAngelescame to Washington, called on Mr. Llorente, the who complainedwith a degreeof temperthat Mr. Canova was complicating and fathering Iturbide'scandidacy,whichtheywould Mexican troubleby injecting fight the last ditch,even if backed by Americanforces.When, in proofof the to whosenameshe was statement he could offer thatnewspaper all was correspondents I told notat liberty divulge, to kepthiminformed thematter, frankly Mr. Llorente of I thatit lookedto me likea motein hiseyes.The same evening carriedthecomplaint to Mr. Canova forhis guidanceand he coollydismissedthe affair, saying,"I don't pay any attention them.They are hard to please." whichassured me that Mr. to Llorentewas mistaken. A fewdays later I arrangedan appointment have Mr. Canova meet General to the Angeles,which was held in Mr. Canova's home. General Angeles,following claimed he feltso insultedby Mr. Canova's praise of Iturbideand the conference, overtures made in seekingGeneral Angeles'cooperation, he thata further appointMr. Canova "showedhis mentat thesame place acceptedby GeneralAngelesbefore hand" thatGeneralAngelescould not and did not meet.52 Since Canova was the highest state department officialdirectly concerned with Mexican affairs,there was every reason for Villa to presume that he acted on instructionsfromthe administration. There was no way forVilla to learn that the cabinet had rejected Canova's plan. To the Mexican revolutionary, Canova's plan was nothing short of officialU.S. policy. When, in October 19I5, shortly after invitingVilla's representativesto a peace conference in Washington, Woodrow Wilson reversed himself with inexplicable suddenness and recognized Carranza, even Roque Gonzalez Garza, a far more moderate revolutionarythan Villa, concluded that Car62 Wright of so judged thecontents theletter significant he transmitted to Lansing.Teitelbaumto that it Wright, Aug. 17, 9i15;enclosed in Wrightto Lansing,Aug. i8, 19i5, National Archives, Dept. of State Files, RG 59, File 812.00 15834.
125
ranza must have bought this recognition by agreeing to importunate U.S. demands. The following month Wilson went one step furtherand allowed Carranza's troops to cross U.S. territory order to inflicta crushing defeat in on the man he had backed only a short time before,and Villa rid himselfofall lingering doubts as to the cause of the blatant reversal by the American president. He became firmlyconvinced that nothing less than Carranza's consent to the terms spelled out in Canova's original plan could have swayed Wilson so quickly. Little wonder, then, that Villa soon made his convictions known publicly and accused Carranza of having "sold out." The Naco Manifesto fellon deaf ears. Neither Dieguez nor other Carranza generals (except one) deigned to reply to his letters. The people of Chihuahua did not flockto his banner afterhe exposed Carranza's plans fromthe balcony of the Municipal Palace. As a consequence of this poor response, Villa no doubt became extremely frustrated, frustration his further aggravated by Carranza's ability to assume an extremely nationalistic posture even after having consented-so Villa thought-to Mexico's conversion to a U.S. protectorate. For a time Villa hoped-as he told his collaborator Silvestre Terrazas that Carranza would himself jeopardize his situation. If he applied any ofthe provisionsofthe pact, his generals would see Villa's accusations confirmedand turn against their chief. If he did not comply with the provisions, Wilson would drop him and Villa's own movement might revive. As the weeks passed and none of these hopes was realized, Villa's anger and despair mounted. It is a measure of the depth of that despair that Villa and cross seriously proposed to Zapata that he abandon his home territory wide sections of Carranza-controlled land to attack the United States. Villa's main problem was that he had no way of substantiating his charges with one exception: his accusation that Carranza had given U.S. troops the rightto enter Mexican territory returnforpermission to cross the United States to in rescue Agua Prieta from Villa's attack. In his letter to Flores and Dieguez, Villa had already touched on the issue. "If American troops enter Mexico," he asked, "what will you do?" This issue remained uppermost in his mind for a long time. In the first manifestohe issued afterPershing's invasion, he railed against Carranza:
VILLA'S PUBLIC ACCUSATIONS FOUND NO RESPONSE.
Withthegreatest in good faith, have remained I inactive withmyforces thehopethat theactivities the so-calledConstitutionalist toward of Government would be directed repellingthe invasion and securing the re-unification the Mexican people. of But . . . farfrom withthegreatest trying expeltheinvader, government to this utilized in the perversity gravity international of relations personalgain and without any for way respecting honorof Mexico.53 the
5 For a full textofthismanifesto, theappendixto AntonioNM. see villista Delgado, ed., Romance hisltrico (Chihuahua, 1975), 172-73.
126
Friedrich Katz
By attacking the United States and invitingpossible reprisals, Villa hoped to create an insoluble dilemma forCarranza. If the latterallowed U.S. troops to penetrate into Mexico without offeringresistance, Villa hoped to expose Carranza for what he thought he was: a tool of the Americans. If Carranza refused to have himselfexposed and simply ignored the original agreement and resisted the Americans, so much the better. The tie between him and the Wilson administration would have been ruptured and his position severely shaken. Max Weber, the German vice-consul in Ciudad Juarez, wrote to a business partner in the United States in December I9I6, "Villa wants intervention and stated in public in Chihuahua that, as long as the washwoman in Washington is at the head, he will continue to burn and loot until America intervenesin Mexico and brings about the downfall of Carranza."54 One more question needs to be considered: What role, if any, did Germany's much-rumoredinvolvementplay in Villa's decision to attack Columbus? In May I9I5, Bernhard Dernburg, Germany's propaganda chief in the United States, withoutconsulting Count Bernstorff, German ambassador, the submitted a plan to Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff(a high officialin the German admiralty who was soon to become its head) to use Villa in order to provoke U.S. intervention Mexico. Dernburg reported that Felix Sommerin feld, Villa's representativein the United States, had told him that he (Sommerfeld),while engaged in negotiationstwo months earlier between Villa and the U.S. chiefof staffat the Arizona border, could easily have provoked U.S. intervention.But Sommerfeldstated that he had not done so because he was not sure whether German authorities wanted such an intervention.He did point out that a U.S. invasion of Mexico would stop U.S. arms shipments to the Allies and distract U.S. attentionfromthe European theater. He also told Dernburg that he "was convinced that an American interventionin Mexico could be brought about."55 Holtzendorffjudged the matterto be of such gravitythat he submittedit for approval to Germany's secretaryof state, Gottlieb von Jagow, who gave it his wholehearted approval. He wrote, In my opinion,we must answer"yes." Even thoughI am not fully convincedthat deliveriesof munitionscan be stopped entirely, would be verydesirable that it Americabe drawnintoa war and be distracted from Europe,whereittendsto be proin English.It will not intervene Chinese affairs, that an intervention Mexico in so would constitute onlydistraction the American the for government. Since we cannot now do anythingin Mexico, American intervention would also be best forour interests there.56 Sommerfeldobviously had undertakenextensivepreparations forcarryingout this plan. In the same month that Jagow gave his approval, two men-J. M. Keedy and Eduardo Linns-turned up in Washington as representativesof
5
vol. I. May 1915, ibid. 56Jagow to Holtzendorff,
Max Weber to Major Britton Davis, Dec. 5, 1916,Privatearchiveof Max Weber, El Paso, Texas. " Dernburgto Holtzendorff, May 1915,German ForeignMinistry Archives, Bonn, Mexico i, Secret,
I27
Pancho Villa. They had neverbeforeand were neveragain linked with Villa in any way. According to the project for counterrevolutionin Mexico that he submitted to Bryan, Canova negotiated primarilywith these men to win the support of the Villista faction for his plan. Actually, the two men were German agents whom Sommerfeld had probably recommended to Villa as skilled negotiators, capable of wielding influence in the United States. In several reports by Kurt Jahnke, who headed German naval intelligence in
as NorthAmericafrom I to I9I9, Keedy is mentioned Jahnke'scollabora917

tor.57Linns was suspected in 1917 by U.S. authorities of being linked to Germany.58 There is no informationabout what role these men played in the negotiations with Villa. They may verywell have revealed to him those aspects of the Canova-Iturbide conspiracy that Canova would have kept secret. They may also have suggested to Villa that Carranza was involved in the negotiations with Canova. The one thing they did not need to do was to inventa plot that would have imposed a quasi-American protectorate over Mexico. Canova, Iturbide, and their allies among Mexican conservatives and U.S. business interestshad done that already. Nor did the German governmentitselfbelieve that any of its agents had caused or were even involved in the raid on Columbus. On March 28, I9I6, a who had not been informedof Sommerfewweeks afterthe attack, Bernstorff, feld's plan, wrote to German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, "It is not surprising that the attempt was made to state that German intrigues were responsible for Villa's attack and to depict Germany as the disturber of the peace. Naturally, no proofof this erroneous statementwas forthcoming."An probably Max von Montgelas, the head officialof the German foreignoffice, of the Mexican desk, added the word "leider" ("unfortunately") before the that, as faras he knew, Germany had not word "erroneous." He was regretful been involved in the Columbus attack.59
to referred as a Germanagent by CustomsAgentZachary Cobb; see Cobb to the 5 Keedy was first of Secretary State, Oct. 2, 1917, Dept. of State Files RG 59, File 862.202 12/742, MC 336 roll 59. In an with Keedy; Kapp papers, negotiations unsignedreportto WolfgangKapp, Jahnkedescribesextensive Merseburg,Rep. 92, El, no. 13. DeutschesZentralarchiv in 58 Linns was placed on a confidential "Trading withthe Enemy" list.U.S. AmbassadorFletcher, a reportto Lansing on July 27, 1918, called him "verypro-German."Teitelbaum, WoodrowWilson and the " This evidencedoes not entirely in of of rule out the possibility Germansponsorship or participation and after remainedin touchwithVilla bothbefore thatSommerfeld theattack.There are some indications arms to Villa; see suspectedhim of supplying the Columbus raid. In March 1917,Mexican authorities to Monteverde the Mexican Consul in Los Angeles,March 7, 1917,Archivode Relaciones Exteriores, lieutenants, James Sandos raises the with one of Villa's former Mexico. On the basis of interviews and thatDr. Rauschbaum,who was ofGermanoriginand servedas Villa's personalphysician possibility thata bank in thattown (the financial adviser,may have inducedVilla to attackColumbus by reporting in ColumbusState Bank withwhichVilla had dealings)had cheatedhim.Sandos, "German Involvement of answerto thisquestionwouldbe thefiles the for responsibility the raid. The best sourcesfora definitive in (about whose involvement filesof GermanArmyIntelligence Germanintelligence agencies.Whatever by WorldWar I weredestroyed bombsin WorldWar theVilla intrigue thereis no evidence)thatsurvived archivesin Potsdam.The recordsofthe Germannavy,whoseclandeswithGermanmilitary II, together World War II and are now available to tine services involved withVilla, survived werethoseprincipally I visitto thisarchive, im in researchers the DeutschesMilitararchiv Freiburg Breisgau.Duringa recent at
Northern Mexico, 1915-1916," 70-89. On the whole, this evidence is not sufficientfor assuming German
419. Mexican Revolution,
I 28
Friedricch Katz
IN THE SHORT RUN THE ATTACK PROVED BENEFICIAL to Villa, in almost the same way he thought it would. For many months-as long as Carranza seemed incapable of expelling Pershing's punitive expedition-Villa became a symbol of national resistance in Chihuahua. Battered and nearly destroyedin December I9I5, his army multiplied, reaching several thousand by September I9I6. It even retook the capital city of Chihuahua and held it against Carranza's forces. Its strengthebbed again only afterthe punitive expedition leftMexico in February I9I7. A further benefit of the raid was Villa's receipt of several coffinsfilled with arms shipped from Germany after the attack. They had apparently been purchased froman arms factoryin Bridgeport,Connecticut before the outbreak of the war.60 Carranza, too, was deeply affectedby Villa's attack, though not in the fatal way Villa had hoped for. Mexican-American relations deteriorated and stopped just short of open belligerency. From March I9I6 onward, Wilson imposed a weapons embargo on Mexico-never strictly observed-which was to last until the fall of Carranza in I920. The latter,deprived of easy access to arms and despairing of his ability to expel the punitive expedition, successfullysought a rapprochement with Germany, which continued even afterthe exit of Pershing's troops from Mexico. Villa, meanwhile, faced a severely shaken Carranza and survivedfivehard and savage years of guerrilla warfare until Carranza was overthrownin I920 and Villa made peace with his successors. But what of Villa's avowed main purpose in attacking the United States-
to duringWorldWar I was informed thatthe mostsensitive filesrelating sabotage and secretoperations of were destroyedby the navy itselfafterthe war. The only reportson the clandestineactivities the intelligence serviceof the German navythat I managed to locate are containedin the German Foreign in archives Bonn and amongthepapers ofa leadingGermanpolitician, Kapp, now in the Wolfgang Office Merseburg,Rep. 92, El, no. 13. German DemocraticRepublic: Kapp Papers, Deutsches Zentralarchiv of in There I foundan anonymous report theactivities Germannaval intelligence Mexico between1917 on in and 1919, whichwas probablywritten KurtJahnke,who headed Germannaval intelligence North by in nor Americafrom1917to Ig199 and who had alreadybeen a Germanagentin 1916. Neither thesereports of intercepted the British thereany indication German by is in the telegrams the Germansecretservice of of sponsorship Villa's Columbus attack. While rejoicingat Villa's attack,the AustrianForeignOffice it (which carefully monitored the activitiesof its closest ally) neverattributed to Germany.Austrian und Staatsarchiv of April17,1916,Haus-,Hof-, Ambassadorin Washington the Minister ForeignAffairs, to indication than all ofthisis thatthe Germannavy,had it Wien, PA Berichte Mexico. A moreimportant reasonto claim thecredit withotherbranchesof been responsible Villa's attack,would have had every for In government powerstruggle withother theGermangovernment. 1916the navywas engagedin a growing submarinewarfare. successful A operationsuch as the agencies because of its demand forunrestricted obtainedthewholehearted organization Villa's attackon theUnitedStates,a plan whichhad previously of withthe would certainly have enhancedthe navy'sprestige endorsement the GermanForeignOffice, of rulersof Germany.I have foundno evidenceforany claim ofthiskindby the navyin any ofthe relevant nor in archives. Neither filesofthe GermanForeignOffice Bonn,Potsdam,and Merseburg thepapers the of the Reichskanzleiin the Deutsches Zentralarchiv Potsdam contain any evidenceforGermany's in of a involvement theColumbusraid. The same is trueforthediariesofKurtRietzler, close collaborator in whichcontainsomeofthemostsensitive data thatreachedChancellorBethmanntheGermanchancellor, 1972).All Aufsa1ze, Dokumente (G6ttingen, Hollweg duringthe courseofthewar. KurtRietzler,Tagebucher, sought thatone can say is that,immediately receiving news of the raid, the GermanForeignOffice after wrotea memwaysto supplyVilla witharms;thehead oftheMexican deskat theGermanForeignOffice in orandum to this effect March 1916. Memorandumby Montgelas,March 23, 1916,German Foreign Office, Bonn, Mexico i, vol. 56. 60 EmmanuelVoska and Will Irwin,SpyandCounterspy (New York, 1940),i67.
129
the preservationof Mexico's independence? Villa actually increased immeasurably the real threat to his country's independence. U.S. troops penetrated into Mexico, and, in i9i6, the United States sought to impose conditions severelylimitingMexico's sovereigntyas a prerequisite forthe withdrawal of its troops. And if Villa, by attacking Columbus, had sought to alert Mexican and U.S. public opinion to the threat to Mexico's independence that loomed uppermost in his mind-plots by U.S. interests to convert Mexico into a protectorate-he failed completely. Subsequent events not only failed to bear out the charges of his Naco Manifesto insofar as Wilson and Carranza were concerned, but they even failed to direct attentionto the veryreal foundations that underlay some of those charges. It was Villa's misfortuneto have been right in his general suspicions, but wrong in his specific assumptions. Plots like the one he outlined at Naco, that is, involving the same purpose but different names, continued to be hatched and to escape public notice. Only a few months afterSecretaryof State Lansing discovered and rejected Canova's plot to secure domination over Mexico for Standard Oil and other U.S. business interests in December 1917, a new scheme had already been conceived. For this pact the politician involved was AlfredoRobles Dominguez, a longtime adherent of Carranza, who was now willing to aid in the overthrowof his erstwhileleader. In a conversationbetween a representative Robles Dominof guez and a British diplomat in Washington, the Mexican politician let it be known that his movementwas to be financed by "the International Harvester Company, the St. Louis Car Company, certain oil interestsrepresentedby a Mr. Helm, and others."'" A few days later, the British representative in Mexico, Cunard Cummins, reported on some of the conditions Robles Dominguez had accepted as a price for gaining the support of these U.S. companies, and it is worthwhileto quote them forthe similaritythey bear to previous agreements. Robles Dominguez agreed (a) To act in Mexico and Latin America as the interpreter PresidentWilson's of policyof confidence and fraternity betweenthe UnitedStates and Latin America. (b) To establish here the "Bank of Mexico," the ConsultativeBoard of which composedofBritish, Americans, and Mexicans,twoofeach, willhandleand French, check the receiptsand expenditure the Government. will practicallybe the of It of Ministry Finance thoughforappearances sake a Mexican Minister, obedient an will be appointed. dummy, (c) To deliverto the League of Nations Magdalena Bay which on account of the interest displayedin it byJapan and the UnitedStates threatens involveMexico to withboth.He presumes thatthe League wouldplace thisstrategic pointin thehands of the United States foruse as a naval base on the Pacificand that through the intermediation the League, Mexican interests of would be dulyprotected. (d) To bringup forpromptsettlement pendingquestionswiththe UnitedStates all which serveas a cause of friction. The "Chamizal" dispute,the difficulties the of Tlahualilo Company, etc., etc., he would settle in a spiritfavourably disposed towardsthe foreign interests.62
61 62
Cumminsto ForeignOffice, April 1918, ibid.
Hohler to Foreign Office, April 1l, 1918, Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office 371 3244 2658.
130
Friedrich Katz
The failureto implementthese plans was due in the main to the unwillingness of both the U.S. governmentand some important U.S. business intereststo carry out any aggressive policy in Mexico as long as the United States was involved in World War I. It was also due, however, to Wilson's objection in principle to establishing a U.S. protectorate over Mexico. If Villa's attack on Columbus had done much to imperil Mexico's precarious independence, the failure of the Pershing expedition did much to repair the damage. Ultimately, it convinced the American public, as well as in the U.S. military,that futureintervention Mexico would be more difficult and costly than had been assumed. In 1914 Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison estimated that fourteenU.S. divisions would be needed to occupy Mexico;63 by I9I8 that estimate had to be revised upward. In April of that year the British general staffreported that the U.S. military now believed that, at the veryleast, twentydivisions (fivehundred thousand men) would be needed.64The failureof the Pershing expedition, however, not only enhanced Mexico's standing vis-a-vis the United States, but also Villa's standing with many of his own countrymen.In the pantheon ofpopular legend, expressed in countless stories and corridos,65 is still celebrated as the man who attacked he the United States-and got away with it.
63
London, ForeignOffice371 May 9, 1qi8, Public Record Office, Memorandumof the General Staff, 32442658. 65The legends about the attack on Columbus have been compoundedby the fact that Villa never nor assumed responsibility gave an explanationforthe attack.As a result,some authorshave officially groups in the United States. by gone as faras to claim that the raid was a provocation interventionist See, forexample,Edgcumb Pinchon,VivaVilla! (New York, 1933),338-39.The factsI have established leave no doubt about Villa's and participants of of hereas wellas thetestimony a largenumber witnesses Villaalaco Porque 234-47;Calzadiaz Barrera, and 1Villa, States Pancho involvement. Clendenen,TheUnited See Villa invasion, Pershing's he of and the testimony Juan Caballero. In the manifesto issued after (olumbus; hisltrico see For neither claimednor disclaimedresponsibility. thetextofthe manifesto, Delgado, Romance mayhave been thathe began to doubttheveracity app., 172-73. One ofthe reasonsforhis attitude villista, Villa accused Carranza in that,although themanifesto pact. It is significant ofthesecret Carranza-Wilson did nor to of capitulating the PunitiveExpedition,nowherein the manifesto at any time thereafter he Villa in so to again refer the secretpact, whichhad figured prominently his Naco declaration.By 1917, for may have had additionalreasonsforavoidingany responsibility the Columbus raid. The adoptionof of neutrality, to a worsening led of as the Mexican Constitution 1917, well as Carranza's German-inclined Villa Under thecircumstances, and betweenthe Carranza administration the U.S. government. relations against Carranza. if may have hoped to obtain U.S. neutrality, not support,in his fight
64
52.
Policy, Foreign and Generals, American RichardD. Challener,Admirals, i898-1ig4(Princeton, 1973),351-

Pancho Villa

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Pancho Villa

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Pancho Villa and the Attack on Columbus, New Mexico Author(s): Friedrich Katz Source: The American Historical

Pancho Villa and the Attackon Columbus, New Mexico

of fivehundred men attacked

(New York, 1958);and E. Bruce White,"The Muddied WatersofColumbus,New Mexico," TheAmericas,

on Pancho Villa and theAttack C'olumbus

Pancho Villa and theAttack Columbus on

Pancho Villa and theAttack Columbus on

Pancho Villa and theAttack Columbus on

Afterarrivingin Torreon ...

I was clearly told that, fromthe point of

fromrecognition by the United States ....

A few days went by and you received the

on Pancho Villa and theAttack Columbus

on Pancho andthe Villa Attack Columbus

;'<'s;'-''.*.v.'.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ t: +: }=' Si '

on Pancho Villa and theAttack Columbus

Villaandthe Attack Columbus on Pancho

in to Villa's profound belief theexistence of

on Pancho Villa and theAttack Columbus

Attack Columbus on Pancho Villaandthe

Pancho Villa and theAttack Columbus on

on Pancho Villa and theAttack Columbus

vol. I. May 1915, ibid. 56Jagow to Holtzendorff,

on Pancho Villa and theAttack Columbus

as NorthAmericafrom I to I9I9, Keedy is mentioned Jahnke'scollabora917

Pancho Villa and theAttack Columbus on

Cumminsto ForeignOffice, April 1918, ibid.

Policy, Foreign and Generals, American RichardD. Challener,Admirals, i898-1ig4(Princeton, 1973),351-

You might also like