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Kant, Kuhn, and the Rationality of Science Author(s): Michael Friedman Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Jun., 2002), pp. 171-190 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3080974 Accessed: 20/08/2009 11:34
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and the Rationality Kant, Kulhn, of Science*

MichaelFriedmant
Indiana University

This paper considers the evolution of the problem of scientificrationalityfrom Kant through Carnapto Kuhn. I arguefor a relativizedand historicizedversion of the original Kantian conception of scientifica priori principlesand examine the way in which these principleschange and develop across revolutionaryparadigmshifts. The distinctively philosophicalenterpriseof reflectingupon and contextializing such principlesis then seen to play a key role in making possible rationalintersubjective communication between otherwiseincommensurable paradigms.

In the Introductionto the Critique Pure ReasonKant formulates of what he calls "the generalproblemof pure reason,"namely, "How are synthetica priorijudgementspossible?"Kant explainsthat this general probleminvolves two more specificquestionsabout particulara priori sciences:"How is puremathematics and possible?" "Howis purenatural sciencepossible?"-where the firstconcerns,above all, the possibilityof Euclideangeometry,and the second concernsthe possibilityof fundamental laws of Newtonianmechanicssuch as conservationof mass, inthesequestions ertia,and the equalityof actionand reaction.In answering Kant developswhat he calls a "transcendental" philosophicaltheory of our humancognitivefaculties-in termsof "formsof sensibleintuition" and "pureconcepts"or "categories" rationalthought.Thesecognitive of
*This paperfirst appearedin Michael Heidelberger and FriedrichStadler(eds.)History of Philosophy of Science: New Trendsand Perspectives(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002) ? Kluwer Academic Publishers.It appearshere with the permissionof the editorsand of Kluwer Academic Publishers.It also reproducessome passages from my Dynamics of Reason: The1999 KantLecturesat StanfordUniversity (Stanford:CSLIPublications, 2001). tSend requests for reprintsto the author, Department of History and Philosophy of Science,Goodbody Hall 130, IndianaUniversity, 1011East ThirdStreet,Bloomington, IN 47405-7005; e-mail:mlfriedm@indiana.edu.
Philosophy of Science, 69 (June 2002) pp. 171-190. 0031-8248/2002/6902/0001$10.00 Copyright 2002 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

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structures taken to describea fixedand absolutelyuniversal are rationality-common to all human beings at all times and in all places-and naturalscience(the therebyto explainthe sense in which mathematical a of mathematical physicsof Newton) represents model or exemplar such
rationality.'

In the currentstate of the sciences,however,we no longerbelievethat Kant's specificexamplesof synthetica priori knowledgeare even true, true. For the Einsteinian much less that they are a prioriand necessarily revolutionin physicshas resultedin both an essentiallynon-Newtonian conceptionof space, time, and motion, in which the Newtonianlaws of mechanicsare no longeruniversally valid, and the applicationto nature of a non-Euclidean geometryof variablecurvature,whereinbodies affected only by gravitationfollow straightest possiblepaths or geodesics. And this has led to a situation,in turn, in which we are no longercona vincedthat thereare any real examplesof scientific prioriknowledgeat all. If Euclideangeometry,at one time the very model of rationalor a revised,so the argument priori knowledgeof nature,can be empirically Ourreasonsfor is revisable. then everything in principle empirically goes, one or anothersystemof geometryor mechanics indeed,of (or, adopting more generallyor of logic) are at bottom of the very same mathematics that considerations supportany otherpartof kind as the purelyempirical our total theory of nature.We are left with a stronglyholistic form of or empiricism naturalismin which the very distinctionbetweenrational must of andempirical knowledge components ourtotal systemof scientific itself be givenup. is This kindof stronglyholisticpictureof knowledge most closelyidenin tifiedwith the work of W. V. Quine.Oursystemof knowledge, Quine's beliefs shouldbe viewedas a vastwebof interconnected well-known figure, or on whichexperience sensoryinput impingesonly along the periphery. Whenfacedwith a "recalcitrant experience" standingin conflictwith our of beliefswe then have a choiceof whereto makerevisions.These system of close to the periphery the system(in whichcase can be made relatively
1. The "generalproblem of pure reason," along with its two more specificsub-problems, is formulatedin ? VI of the Introductionto the Critiqueof Pure Reasonat B1924. SectionsV and VI, whichculminatein the threequestions"Howis puremathematics possible?", "How is pure natural science possible?",and "How is metaphysics as a science possible?",are added to the second (1787) edition of the Critiqueand clearly follow the structureof the 1783 Prolegomenato Any FutureMetaphysics,which was intendedto clarify the first (1781) edition. This way of framingthe generalproblemof pure reason also clearlyreflectsthe increasingemphasison the questionof purenatural science found in the MetaphysicalFoundationsof Natural Science (1786). For an extendeddiscussionof Kant's theory of purenaturalscienceand its relationto Newtonian physics see Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), especiallychapters3 and 4.

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we make a change in a relativelylow-levelpart of naturalscience),but acute and persistent,for they can also-when the conflictis particularly example-affect the most abstractand generalpartsof science,including even the truthsof logic and mathematics, lyingat the centerof our system of beliefs.To be sure, such high-levelbeliefsat the centerof our system in are relatively reluctant revisethem to entrenched, that we are relatively or to give them up (as we once were in the case of Euclideangeometry, for example).Nevertheless,and this is the crucialpoint, absolutelynone to of our beliefsis forever"immune revision"in light of experience: The totality of our so-calledknowledgeor beliefs,from the most casual matters of geographyand history to the profoundestlaws of atomicphysicsor even of puremathematics logic, is a man-made and fabric which impinges on experienceonly along the edges. Or, to changethe figure,total scienceis like a fieldof forcewhoseboundary A conditionsare experience. conflictwith experience the periphery at
occasions readjustments in the interior of the field .... But the total

field is so underdetermined its boundaryconditions,experience, by that thereis much latitudeof choice as to what statements reevalto uate in the light of any singlecontraryexperience.... If this viewis right... it becomesfolly to seeka boundary between whichhold contingently experience, anon and syntheticstatements, whichhold come what may. Any statementcan be alytic statements, held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments in elsewhere the system.Even a statementvery close to the periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant experienceby pleading hallucinationor by amendingcertain statementsof the kind called is logical laws. Conversely, the same token, no statement immune by to revision.Revision even of the logical law of the excludedmiddle has beenproposedas a meansof simplifying and mechanics; quantum what difference therein principle is betweensuch a shift and the shift wherebyKeplersuperseded Ptolemy,or EinsteinNewton, or Darwin
Aristotle?2

As the last sentencemakesclear,examplesof revolutionary transitions in our scientificknowledge,and, in particular, that of the Einsteinian revolution in geometryand mechanics, constitutea veryimportant partof the motivationsfor this view. Yet it is importantto see that sucha stronglyanti-apriorist conception of scientificknowledgewas by no means prevalentduringthe late nine2. From the first two paragraphsof ? 6, entitled "Empiricism without the Dogmas," of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism,"PhilosophicalReview60 (1951): 20-43; reprintedin Froma Logical Point of View(New York: Harper, 1953), pp. 42-43.

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teenthand earlytwentieth centuries-duringthe veryperiod,thatis, when the great revolutionsin geometryand mechanicswe now associatewith the work of Einsteinwereactuallytakingplace. If we beginwith the key figures in the philosophy of non-Euclideangeometry, for example, truethatHermann Helmholtz von viewedthechoice whereasit is certainly betweenEuclideanand non-Euclidean as one, he geometries an empirical of also suggestedthat the more generalstructure spacecommonto both and Euclidean non-Euclidean or systems(thatof constantcurvature what Helmholtzcalled "freemobility")was a necessarypresupposition all of and form of our spatialinspatialmeasurement thus a "transcendental" tuition in the sense of Kant. And, partly on this basis, Henri Poincare went even further.Althoughno particular geometry-neither Euclidean nor non-Euclidean-is an a priori condition of our spatial intuition,it does not follow that the choice betweenthem, as Helmholtzthought,is an empirical one. For thereremainsan irreducible betweenourcrude gulf deand approximatesensory experienceand our precisemathematical scriptionsof nature. Establishingone or another system of geometry, of Poincare argued, thereforerequiresa free choice, a convention our own-based, in the end, on the greatermathematicalsimplicityof the Euclideansystem.3 Nor was such a stronglyanti-apriorist conceptionof scientificknowlto the first scientificthinkersenthusiastically embrace edge adopted by Einstein'snew theory. These thinkers,the logical empiricists,of course rejectedthe synthetica prioriin Kant's originalform. They rejectedthe a idea of absolutelyfixedand unrevisable prioriprinciples built,once and In place of an holistic for all, into our fundamental cognitivecapacities. however,they insteadadopteda radicallynew conceptionof empiricism, the a priori.Perhapsthe clearestarticulationof the logical empiricists's in newviewwas provided HansReichenbach his firstbook, TheTheory by
of Relativity and a Priori Knowledge,published in 1920.4Reichenbach dis-

tinguishestwo meaningsof the Kantiana priori:necessaryand unrevisof able, fixedfor all time, on the one hand, and "constitutive the concept on the other.Reichenbach of the objectof [scientific] knowledge," argues,
3. For extendeddiscussion of Helmholtz and Poincaresee my "Helmholtz'sZeichentheorieand Schlick'sAllgemeineErkenntnislehre," PhilosophicalTopics25 (1997): 19in 50; "Geometry,Construction,and Intuitionin Kant and His Successors," Gila Scher and RichardTieszen (eds.), BetweenLogic and Intuition(Cambridge: CambridgeUniUniLogicalPositivism(Cambridge: Cambridge versityPress,2000);and Reconsidering versity Press, 1999), chapter4. und 4. Reichenbach, Relativitdtstheorie ErkenntnisApriori (Berlin: Springer, 1920); translatedas The Theoryof Relativityand a PrioriKnowledge (Los Angeles:University of CaliforniaPress, 1965). The distinctionbetween the two meaningsof the Kantian a priori describedin the next sentenceoccurs in chapter 5.

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on this basis, that the great lesson of the theory of relativity is that the former meaning must be dropped while the latter must be retained. Relativity theory involves a priori constitutive principles as necessary presuppositions of its properly empirical claims, just as much as did Newtonian physics, but these principles have essentially changed in the transition from the latter theory to the former: whereas Euclidean geometry is indeed constitutively a priori in the context of Newtonian physics, for example, only infinitesimally Euclidean geometry is constitutively a priori in the context of general relativity. What we end up with, in this tradition, is thus a relativized and dynamical conception of a priori mathematicalphysical principles, which change and develop along with the development of the mathematical and physical sciences themselves, but which nevertheless retain the characteristically Kantian constitutive function of making the empirical natural knowledge thereby structured and framed by such principles first possible. Rudolf Carnap's philosophy of formal languages or linguistic frameworks, first developed in his Logical Syntax of Language in 1934, was the most mature expression of the logical empiricists's new view.5 All standards of "correctness," "validity," and "truth," according to Carnap, are relative to the logical rules definitive of one or another formal language or linguistic framework. The rules of classical logic and mathematics, for example, are definitive of certain logical calculi or linguistic frameworks, while the rules of intuitionistic logic and mathematics (wherein the law of excluded middle is no longer universally valid) are definitive of others. Since standards of "validity" and "correctness" are thus relative to the choice of linguistic framework, it makes no sense to ask whether any such choice of framework is itself "valid" or "correct." For the logical rules relative to which alone these notions can be well-defined are not yet in place. Such rules are constitutive of the concepts of "validity" and "correctness"-relative to one or another choice of linguistic framework, of course-and are in this sense a priori rather than empirical. This Camapian philosophy of linguistic frameworks rests on two closely related distinctions. The first is the distinction between formal or analytic sentences of a given framework and empirical or synthetic sentences-or, as Carap puts it in Logical Syntax, between logical rules ("L-rules") of a linguistic framework and physical rules ("P-rules"). The L-rules include laws of logic and mathematics (and may also, at least in spaces of constant curvature, include laws of physical geometry), whereas the P-rules include empirical laws standardly so-called such as Maxwell's equations of electromagnetism. In this way, Carnap's distinction between
5. Carnap, Logische Syntax der Sprache (Wien: Springer, 1934); translated as The Logical Syntax of Language(London: Kegan Paul, 1937).

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L-rulesand P-rulescloselyparallelsReichenbach's distinction, developed in his 1920book, between"axiomsof coordination" (constitutive princidiflaws).Carnap's empirical (properly ples) and "axiomsof connection" betweenlogicaland physicalrules(analyticand synthetic senferentiation tences) then induces a second fundamentaldistinctionbetweeninternal Internalquestionsare decidedwithinan already and externalquestions.6 in withthe logicalrulesof the framework adoptedframework, accordance the in question.External questions,by contrast,concernprecisely question of which linguistic framework-and thereforewhich logical rules-to adopt in the first place. And since no logical rules are as yet in place, externalquestions,unlikeinternalquestions,are not strictlyspeakingraon tionallydecidable.Such questionscan only be decidedconventionally of or considerations convenience suitability the basisof broadlypragmatic desirefor securityagainstthe for one or anotherpurpose.An overriding possibilityof contradiction,for example,may promptthe choice of the whereasan interest weakerrulesof intuitionistic logic and mathematics, rules in ease of physicalapplication may promptthe choiceof the stronger of classicallogic and mathematics. Now it was preciselythis Carnapianphilosophyof linguisticframeof and foil for Quine'sarticulation a works that formedthe background holism accordingto whichno form of epistemological radicallyopposed distinction betweena prioriand a posteriori, fundamental logicaland factual, analyticand syntheticcan in fact be drawn.As we have seen, it was wherehis challenge in Quine's1951paper,"TwoDogmasof Empiricism," was distinction firstmadewidelyknown,that the to the analytic/synthetic beliefsalso holistic figureof knowledgeas a vast web of interconnected firstappeared.But it is importantto see here that it is Quine'sattackon the analytic/synthetic distinction,and not simplythe idea that no belief whatsoeveris foreverimmuneto revision,that is basic to Quine'snew form of holism. For Carnap'sphilosophy of linguistic frameworksis just as wholly predicatedon the idea that logical or analyticprinciples, much as empiricalor syntheticprinciples,can be revisedin the progress initialforof empiricalscience.7 Indeed,as we have seen, Reichenbach's a was mulationof this new view of constitutive prioriprinciples developed
6. This distinction is first made explicitly in Carap, "Empiricism,Semantics, and de Ontology,"RevueInternationale Philosophie11 (1950):20-40; reprintedin Meaning and Necessity, 2nd ed. (Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press, 1956). 7. Carnapexplicitlyembracesthis much of epistemologicalholism (based on the ideas of Poincareand PierreDuhem) in ? 82 of Logical Syntax. Quine is thereforeextremely misleadingwhen he (in the above-cited passage from ? 6 of "Two Dogmas") simply equates analyticitywith unrevisability.He is similarlymisleadingin ? 5 (p. 41) when he asserts that the "dogma of reductionism"(i.e., the denial of Duhemian holism) is "at root identical"with the dogma of analyticity.

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preciselyto accommodatethe revolutionary changes in the geometrical and mechanicalframework physicaltheorywroughtby Einstein'sdeof velopmentof the theory of relativity.The differencebetweenQuine and Carnapis ratherthat the latter persistsin drawinga sharp distinction betweenchangesof languageor linguisticframework, whichconstituin tive principles definitive the verynotionsof "validity" "correctness" of and are revised, and changes in ordinaryempiricalstatementsformulated constitutiveframeagainst the backgroundof such an already-present work. And this distinction,for Carnap,ultimatelyrestson the difference betweenanalyticstatements dependingsolely on the meaningsof the relevant termsand synthetic statements contentfulassertions about expressing the empirical world. distinction-and thus on CarQuine'sattackon the analytic/synthetic versionof the distinctionbetweena prioriand empirical nap's particular principles-is now widely accepted,and I have no desireto defendCarnap's particularway of articulatingthis distinctionhere. I do want to holism is reallyour question,however,whetherQuineanepistemological it our only option, and whether,in particular, in fact represents best way of comingto termswith the revolutionary changesin the historicaldevelopmentof the sciencesthat are now often taken to supportit. Quineanholism picturesour total systemof scienceas a vast web or as conjunctionof beliefs which face the "tribunalof experience" a corQuine grantsthat some beliefs, such as those of logic and porate body. are central,whereasothers,suchas those of biology, arithmetic, relatively But are relativelyperipheral. this meansonly that the formerbeliefs say, at are less likely to be revisedin case of a "recalcitrant experience" the whereasthe latterare more likely to be revised.A reasonable periphery, scientificconservatism prefersto reviseless central,less well-entrenched beliefs before it is forced to revise more central and better entrenched beliefs. Strictly speaking, however, empirical evidence-either for or that is our against-spreads over all the elementsof the vast conjunction total systemof science,whereinall elementswhatsoeverequallyface the And it is in this precisesense,for Quine,that all "tribunal experience." of are beliefswhatsoever,includingthose of logic and mathematics, equally
empirical.

But can this beguilingform of epistemological holismreallydo justice and to the revolutionary withinboth mathematics natural developments sciencethat have led up to it? Let us first considerthe Newtonianrevolution that producedthe beginningsof mathematical physicsas we know it-the very revolution,as we have seen, that Kant's conceptionof synthetica prioriknowledgewas originallyintendedto address.In constructphysics Newton created,virtuallysimultaneously, ing his mathematical the advances:a new form of mathematics, calculus, three revolutionary

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for dealing with infinite limiting processes and instantaneousrates of in change;new conceptionsof force and quantityof matterencapsulated his three laws of motion; and a new universallaw of nature,the law of in universalgravitation.Each of these three advanceswas revolutionary itself, and all were introducedby Newton in the context of the same scia entificproblem: that of developing singlemathematical theoryof motion and capableof giving a unifiedaccount of both terrestrial celestialphenomena. Since all three advanceswere thus inspired,in the end, by the same empiricalproblem,and since they togetheramountedto the first known solution to this problem,Quine'sholistic pictureappearsso far correct.All elementsin this particularsystem of scientificknowledgemathematics, mechanics, gravitational physics-appear equallyto facethe of "tribunal experience" together. there are fundamental in Nevertheless, asymmetries the way in which the differentelementsof this Newtonian synthesisactuallyfunction.To begin with the relationshipbetweenmathematicsand mechanics,Newton's secondlaw of motion says that forceequalsmasstimesacceleration, is where acceleration the instantaneous rate of change of velocity (itself the instantaneous of changeof position).So withoutthe mathematics rate of the calculusthis secondlaw of motioncould not even be formulated or writtendown, let alone function to describeempiricalphenomena.The combinationof calculusplus the laws of motion is not happilyviewed, to therefore,as a conjunctionof propositionssymmetrically contributing a singletotal result:the mathematical of Newton'stheoryrathersuppart we plies elementsof the languageor conceptualframework, might say, withinwhichthe rest of the theoryis then formulated. And an analogous between (if also more subtle)point holds with respectto the relationship and Newton'smechanics gravitational physics.The law of universal gravitation says that thereis a force of attraction,directlyproportional the to to productof the two massesand inversely proportional the squareof the distancebetweenthem,betweenany two piecesof matterin the universewhich thereforeexperienceaccelerations towardsone anotherin accordancewith this same law. But relativeto what frameof reference the are accelerationsin question defined?Since these accelerationsare, by hymaterialbody can be taken as actually pothesis,universal,no particular at rest in this frame, and thus the motions in questionare not motions relativeto any particular material these body.Newtonhimselfunderstood motionsas definedrelativeto absolutespace,butwe now understand them
as defined relative to an arbitrary inertialframe-where an inertial frame

is of reference simplyone in whichthe Newtonianlaws of motionactually hold (the centerof mass frameof the solar system,for example,is a very close approximation such a frame).It follows that without the Newto tonian laws of motion Newton's theory of gravitationwould not even

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make empiricalsense, let alone give a correctaccount of the empirical phenomena:in the absenceof these laws we would simplyhave no idea what the relevantframe of referencemight be in relationto which the universalaccelerations to gravityare defined.Once again, Newton's due mechanicsand gravitational physicsare not happilyviewed as symmetthe ricallyfunctioningelementsof a largerconjunction: formeris rather withinwhich a necessarypart of the languageor conceptualframework alone the lattermakesempiricalsense. Now the Newtonian theory of gravitationhas of course been superseded by Einstein'sgeneraltheory of relativity,and one might naturally expectQuine'sholisticpictureof knowledgeto describethis lattertheory much more accurately. Generalrelativity,like Newtoniantheory,can be advances: development of seen as the outcomeof threerevolutionary the a new field of mathematics, tensorcalculusor the generaltheoryof manifolds, by BernhardRiemann in the late nineteenthcentury;Einstein's whichidentifiesgravitational effectswith the inprincipleof equivalence, ertialeffectsformerlyassociatedwith Newton'slaws of motion;and Einstein's equationsfor the gravitational field, which describehow the curvatureof space-timeis modifiedby the presenceof matterand energyso as to directgravitationally affectedbodiesalong straightest possiblepaths or geodesics.Once again,each of these threeadvanceswas revolutionary in itself,andall threeweremarshalled togetherby Einsteinto solvea single that of developinga new descriptionof gravitation empiricalproblem: consistentwith the specialtheoryof relativity (whichis itselfincompatible of with the instantaneousaction at a distancecharacteristic Newtonian and also capable,it was hoped, of solvingwell-knownanomalies theory) in Newtonian theory such as that involvingthe perihelionof Mercury. and synthesized EinAnd the three advancestogether,as marshalled by in in fact succeeded solvingthis empirical stein, problemfor the firsttime. of theIt does not follow, however,that the combination mathematical of manifolds,geodesiclaw of motion, and field equationsof gravitaory tion can be happilyviewed as a symmetrically functioningconjunction, such that each element then equally faces the "tribunalof experience" when confrontedwith the anomalyin the perihelionof Mercury,for example. To begin again with the relationshipbetweenmathematicsand trajectories mechanics,the principleof equivalence depictsthe space-time of bodies affectedonly by gravitationas geodesicsin a variablycurved just as the Newtonianlaws of motion,whenviewed geometry, space-time of from this same space-timeperspective,depict the trajectories bodies affectedby no forcesat all as geodesicsin a flat space-time geometry.But the whole notion of a variablycurvedgeometryitselfonly makessensein new the context of the revolutionary theoryof manifoldsrecentlycreated by Riemann. In the context of the mathematicsavailablein the seven-

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teenthand eighteenth centuries, contrast,the idea of a variablycurved by space-timegeometrycould not even be formulatedor writtendown, let alone function to describeempiricalphenomena.And, once again, a closely analogous(but also more subtle)point holds for the relationship betweenmechanicsand gravitationalphysics. Einstein'sfield equations of describethe variationin curvature space-timegeometryas a function of the distributionof matterand energy.Such a variablycurvedspacetime structure wouldhave no empirical however, meaningor application, if we had not firstsingledout some empirical phenomenaas counterparts of its fundamental geometricalnotions-here the notion of geodesicor does preciselythis, straightest possiblepath. The principleof equivalence however,and withoutthis principlethe intricatespace-time geometrydescribedby Einstein'sfield equationswould not even be empirically false, but ratheran emptymathematical formalismwith no empiricalapplication at all.8Justas in the case of Newtoniangravitation theory,therefore, the three advancestogethercomprisingEinstein'srevolutionary theory should not be viewed as symmetrically functioningelementsof a larger the conjunction: first two function ratheras necessaryparts of the lanwithinwhichalone the thirdmakesboth guageor conceptualframework and sense. mathematical empirical It will not do, in eitherof our two examples,to view what I am calling the constitutivelya prioriparts of our scientifictheoriesas simplyrelatively fixed or entrenchedelementsof sciencein the sense of Quine, as beliefs which a reasonablescientificconserwell-established particularly difficultto revise.WhenNewton formulated vatismtakes to be relatively his theoryof gravitation, example,the mathematics the calculuswas for of still quitecontroversial-to suchan extent,in fact, that Newtondisguised his use of it in the Principiain favor of traditionalsyntheticgeometry. Nor were Newton's three laws of motion any better entrenched,at the in time, than the law of universalgravitation.Similarly, the case of Einstein's general theory of relativity,neither the mathematicaltheory of manifoldsnor the principleof equivalence was a well-entrenched of part main-stream mathematics mathematical or physics;and this is one of the centralreasons,in fact, that Einstein's revolutiontheoryis so profoundly then, sincewe are dealingwith deepconceptualrevary. More generally, olutions in both mathematicsand mathematical physics in both cases, entrenchment relativeresistanceto revisionare not appropriate and disfeaturesat all. What characterizes distinguished the elements tinguishing
8. For an analysis of the principleof equivalencealong these lines, includingillumidefnating comparisonswith Reichenbach'sconception of the need for "coordinating initions"in physical geometry,see Robert DiSalle, "SpacetimeTheory as PhysicalGe42 ometry,"Erkenntnis (1995): 317-337.

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of our theoriesis rathertheirspecialconstitutive function:the functionof formulationand empiricalapplication makingthe precisemathematical of the theoriesin questionfirstpossible.In this sense, the relativized and dynamicalconceptionof the a prioridevelopedby the logicalempiricists appearsto describetheseconceptualrevolutionsfar betterthandoes Quinean holism.This is not at all surprising, the end, for this new concepin tion of the constitutivea prioriwas inspired,above all, by just theseconceptualrevolutions. It is no wonder,then, that in ThomasKuhn'stheoryof the natureand characterof scientificrevolutionswe find an informalcounterpart the of relativized first conceptionof constitutivea prioriprinciples developedby the logical empiricists.Indeed,one of Kuhn's centralexamplesof revolutionary scientificchange,just as it was for the logical empiricists,is Thus Kuhn'scentraldistinction preciselyEinstein'stheory of relativity.9 betweenchangeof paradigm revolutionary or science,on the one side,and normal science,on the other, closely parallelsthe Carnapian distinction betweenchange of languageor linguisticframeworkand rule-governed Just as, for Carnap,the operationscarriedout within such a framework. logical rules of a linguisticframeworkare constitutiveof the notion of "correctness" "validity" or relativeto this framework, a particular so paradigm governing a given episode of normal science, for Kuhn, yields generally-agreed-upon (althoughperhapsonly tacit) rulesconstitutiveof what counts as a "valid"or "correct" solution to a problemwithin this episode of normal science.Just as, for Carnap,externalquestionsconcerningwhich linguisticframeworkto adopt are not similarlygoverned by logical rules,but ratherrequirea much less definiteappealto conventional and/orpragmaticconsiderations, changesof paradigmin revoso with generallylutionaryscience,for Kuhn,do not proceedin accordance rulesas in normalscience,but ratherrequire more agreed-upon something akin to a conversionexperience. Indeed,towardsthe end of his career,Kuhn himselfdrewthis parallel betweenhis theoryof scientific revolutionsand the relativized conception of a prioriconstitutiveprinciples explicitly: sourceof constitutivecategories,my Thoughit is a more articulated structured lexicon [ = Kuhn'slate versionof "paradigm"] resembles Kant'sa prioriwhenthe latteris takenin its second,relativized sense. Both are constitutiveof possibleexperience the world, but neither of dictateswhat that experiencemust be. Rather,they are constitutive
9. Kuhn develops this examplein TheStructureof ScientificRevolutions, ed. (Chi2nd cago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1970), chapter9. There is some irony in the circumstance that Kuhn introducesthis example as part of a criticismof what he calls "early logical positivism"(p. 98).

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of the infiniterange of possible experiences that might conceivably occur in the actualworld to which they give access.Which of these conceivable occursin that actualworldis somethingthat experiences must be learned,both from everydayexperience and from the more and that scientific systematic refined experience characterizes practice. of They are both sternteachers,firmlyresistingthe promulgation beliefsunsuitedto the formof life the lexiconpermits. Whatresultsfrom respectfulattentionto them is knowledgeof nature,and the criteria that serve to evaluate contributionsto that knowledgeare, correwithin anotherform spondingly,epistemic.The fact that experience of life-another time, place, or culture-might have constituted is to knowledgedifferently irrelevant its statusas knowledge.10 Thus, althoughQuine may very well be right that Carnaphas failed to of givea preciselogicalcharacterization whatI am herecallingconstitutive there is also nonethelessno doubt, I suggest,that carefulatprinciples, of tentionto the actualhistoricaldevelopment science,and, more specifto the very conceptualrevolutionsthat have in fact led to our curically, rent philosophicalpredicament, shows that relativized prioriprinciples a of just the kindCarnapwas aimingat arecentralto our scientific theories. But this close parallelbetweenthe relativizedyet still constitutivea prioriand Kuhn'stheoryof scientificrevolutionsimplies(as the last sentenceof our passagefromKuhnsuggests)that the formergivesriseto the same problemsand questionsconcerningthe ultimaterationalityof the scientific that literature enterprise are all too familiarin the post-Kuhnian in history,sociology,and philosophyof science.In particular, sincethere constitutiveprinciplesgoverning appearto be no generally-agreed-upon the transitionto a revolutionary new scientificparadigmor conceptual therewouldseemto be no senseleft in whichsucha transition framework, can still be viewed as rational,as based on good reasons.And it is for preciselythis reason,of course,that Carnapviews what he calls external questionsas conventionalas opposedto rational,and Kuhn likensparaIt digm shiftsratherto conversionexperiences. appears,then, that all we have accomplishedby defendingthe relativizedyet still constitutivea in prioriagainstQuineanholismis to land ourselvessquarely the contemwhereinthe overarching porary"relativistic" predicament, rationalityof the scientific has enterprise now been stronglycalledinto question. The underlyingsourceof this post-Kuhnianpredicament, we have as is the breakdown the originalKantianconceptionof the a priori. of seen, Kant takes the fundamentalconstitutiveprinciplesframingNewtonian
10. Kuhn, "Afterwords,"in Paul Horwich (ed.), WorldChanges(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 331-332.

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mathematical scienceas expressingtimelesslyfixed categoriesand forms of the humanmind. Suchcategoriesand forms,for Kant, aredefinitive of humanrationalityas such, and thus of an absolutelyuniversal rationality governingall humanknowledgeat all times and in all places. This conception of an absolutelyuniversalhumanrationalityrealizedin the fundamental constitutive principlesof Newtonian science made perfectly good sense in Kant's own time, when the Newtonianconceptualframework was the only paradigmfor what we now call mathematical physics the world had yet seen. Now that we have irretrievably this position lost of innocence,however,it would appearthat the very notion of a truly universalhumanrationalitymust also be given up. It would appearthat thereis now no escapefrom the currently fashionableslogan "allknowlis local." edge Yet Kuhn himself rejectedsuch relativisticimplicationsof his views. He continuedto hold, in a self-consciously traditional vein, that the evolution of scienceis a rationaland progressive processdespitethe revolutransitionsbetween scientificparadigmswhich are, as he also tionary to Kuhn claims,absolutely necessary thisprocess.The scientific enterprise, is essentiallyan instrument solvinga particular of probfor sort suggests, lem or "puzzle"-for maximizingthe quantitativematch betweentheoresultsof measurement. reticalpredictionsand phenomenological Given there are obvious criteriaor "values"-such as accuracy, this, however, of precision,scope, simplicity,and so on-that are definitive the scientific as such. Suchvaluesareconstantor permanent acrossscientific enterprise revolutionsor paradigm-shifts, this is all we need to securethe (nonand of scientific rationality paradigm-relative) progress: or [W]hether not individualpractitionersare aware of it, they are for trainedto and rewarded solvingintricatepuzzles-be they instrubetween mental,theoretical, logical,or mathematical-at theinterface their phenomenalworld and their community'sbeliefsabout it. ... If that is the case, however, the rationalityof the standardlist of criteriafor evaluatingscientific beliefis obvious.Accuracy, precision, scope, simplicity,fruitfulness, consistency,and so on, simplyare the criteriawhichpuzzlesolversmust weighin decidingwhetheror not a and givenpuzzleaboutthe matchbetweenphenomena beliefhas been solved.... To selecta law or theorywhichexemplified themless fully thanan existingcompetitor wouldbe self-defeating, self-defeating and
action is the surest index of irrationality. ... As the developmental

learnto recprocesscontinues,the examplesfromwhichpractitioners and so on, changeboth withinand ognizeaccuracy,scope, simplicity, betweenfields.But the criteriathat theseexamplesillustrate themare selves necessarilypermanent,for abandoningthem would be aban-

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doning sciencetogetherwith the knowledgewhichscientific development brings .... Puzzle-solving is one of the families of practices that

has arisen during that evolution [of human practices],and what it of is thatno interestproduces knowledge nature.Thosewho proclaim drivenpracticecan properlybe identified with the rationalpursuitof mistake.1' knowledgemake a profoundand consequential Thus, althoughthe process of scientificdevelopmentis governedby no framework fixedonce and for all, science,at everystage, singleconceptual still aimsat a uniformtype of puzzle-solving success,Kuhnsuggests,relatransitions tive to whichall stagesin this process(including betweenconbe judged. And there is then no doubt at all, may ceptualframeworks) Kuhn furthersuggests,that science,throughoutits development, behas efficientinstrumentfor achievingthis end. In this come an increasingly sense, therefore,thereis also no doubt at all that scienceas a whole is a rationalenterprise. This Kuhniandefenseof the rationalityof scientificknowledgefrom missesthe point, I believe,of the real the threatof conceptualrelativism challengeto such rationalityarisingfrom Kuhn'sown historiographical that the scientificenterpriseas a work. For it is surelyuncontroversial in fact become an ever more efficientinstrumentfor puzzlewhole has quantitative accuracy, solvingin Kuhn'ssense-for maximizing precision, simplicity,and so on in adjustingtheoreticalpredictionsto phenomenoWhatis controversial, rather,is the further logicalresultsof measurement. idea that the scientificenterprise model or therebycounts as a privileged exemplarof rationalknowledgeof-rational inquiryinto-nature. And the reasonsfor this have nothing to do with doubts about the incontrovertiblepredictive successof the scientific enterprise-they do not call into
question, that is, the instrumentalrationality of this enterprise. What has

calls commubeen calledinto question,rather,is what JiirgenHabermas Communicative ranicativerationality.12 rationality,unlikeinstrumental tionality, is concernednot so much with choosing efficientmeans to a given end, but ratherwith securingmutuallyagreedupon principlesof reasoningwherebya given communityof speakerscan rationallyadjuof dicate their differences opinion. It is preciselythis kind of rationality and that is securedby a sharedparadigmor conceptualframework; it is preciselythis kind of rationalitythat is then profoundlychallengedby the Kuhnian theory of scientific revolutions-where it appears that nonsucceedingparadigms,in a scientificrevolution,are fundamentally
11. Kuhn, "Afterwords" (note 10 above), pp. 338-339. 12. See Habermas, Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt:Suhrkamp, Action (Boston: 1981), vol. 1, chapter 1; translatedas The Theoryof Communicative Beacon, 1984).

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and intertranslatable thus shareno basis whatsoeverfor rationalmutual communication. Pointingto the obviousfact that sciencehas nonetheless and its continuedto increase quantitative accuracy, precision, so on is thus relativa quite inadequateresponseto the full force of the post-Kuhnian istic challengeto scientificrationality. Kuhn's notion of normalscience,as we have just seen, is itself based on an intra-framework notion of communicative rationality-on shared of rulesof the game,as it were,commonto all practitioners a singlegiven Whatwe now need to investigate, then, are the prospectsfor a paradigm. communicative rationality,capacomparablenotion of inter-framework of across ble of providingsimilarly sharedprinciples reasoning functioning revolutionary paradigm-shifts. Let us first remindourselvesthat, despite the fact that we radically in transition fromone changeour constitutive principles the revolutionary frameworkto another,there is still an importantelementof conceptual
convergencein the very same revolutionary process of conceptual change.

mechanicsapproaches classicalmechanicsin the limit Specialrelativistic as the velocity of light goes to infinity;variablycurvedRiemanniangeflat ometryapproaches Euclideangeometryas the regionsunderconsidfield equaeration become infinitelysmall;Einstein'sgeneralrelativistic the Newtonianequationsfor gravitation tions of gravitation as, approach once again, the velocity of light goes to infinity.13 Indeed, even in the and terrestrial celestialmechanics classical to transitionfromAristotelian From an we terrestrial celestialmechanics find a similarrelationship. and observerfixed on the surfaceof the earth we can constructa systemof linesof sightdirected towardsthe heavenlybodies;thissystemis spherical, to the celestialsphereof ancientastronomy,and the motions isomorphic of the heavenlybodies thereinare indeed described,to a very good apby proximation, the geocentricsystemfavoredby Aristotle.Moreover,in the sublunaryregionclose to the surfaceof the earth,wherethe earthis body,heavybodiesdo followstraight paths by farthe principal gravitating directedtowardsthe centerof the earth,again to an extremelygood apIn transitions, therefore, elements key proximation. all threerevolutionary as of the precedingparadigmare preserved approximate specialcases in the succeeding paradigm. This type of convergencebetweensuccessiveparadigmsallows us to
define a retrospective notion of inter-framework rationality based on the
13. In Kuhn's own discussionof the theory of relativity(see note 9), he explicitlydenies that classicalmechanicscan be logically derivedfrom relativisticmechanicsin the limit of small velocities. His main ground for this denial is that "the physical referents"of the terms of the two theories are different (op. cit., pp. 101-2). Here, however, I am merely pointing to a purely mathematicalfact about the correspondingmathematical structures.

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constitutiveprinciplesof the later conceptualframework: since the conare stitutiveprinciplesof the earlierframework containedin those of the lateras an approximate of specialcase, the constitutive principles the later framework thus definea commonrationalbasis for mutualcommunication fromthe point of view of this latterframework. this does not yet But
give us a prospective notion of inter-frameworkrationality accessible from

of the point of view of the earlierframework, course,and so it does not yet provide a basis for mutual communicationthat is truly available to both frameworks.14 Nevertheless,such a prospectivenotion of interalso beginsto emergewhenwe obframework communicative rationality servethat, in additionto containingthe constitutive of principles the older framework an approximate as of specialcase, the conceptsand principles new constitutiveframework the revolutionary evolve continuously,as it of were,by a seriesof naturaltransformations the old conceptsand principles. The Aristotelian for constitutiveframework, example,is basedon Euclideangeometry,a background and conceptionof a hierarchically teleologicallyorganizeduniverse,and conceptionsof naturalplace and natto ural motion appropriate this universe.Thus, in the terrestrial realm bodies naturallymove in straightlines towardstheirnaturalplace heavy at the centerof the universe,and in the celestialrealmthe heavenlybodies naturallymove uniformlyin circlesaround this center.The conceptual of framework classicalphysicsthen retainsEuclidean geometry,but eliminates the hierarchically and teleologicallyorganizeduniversetogether with the accompanying conceptionsof naturalplace. We therebyobtain an infinite,homogeneous,and isotropicuniversein whichall bodiesnaturally move uniformlyalong straightlines to infinity.But how did we arriveat this conception?An essentialintermediate stage was Galileo's celebrated treatment freefall and projectile of motion. For, althoughGalileo indeeddiscardsthe hierarchically teleologicallyorganizedArisand totelianuniverse,he retains-or better,transforms-key elementsof the Aristotelianconceptionof naturalmotion. Galileo'sanalysisis based on a combinationof what he calls naturallyaccelerated motion directedtowards the center of the earth and uniformor equablemotion directed Unlikeourmodernconceptionof rectilinear inertialmotion, horizontally.
14. That the convergencein questionyields only a purelyretrospective reinterpretation of the original theory is a second (and related) point Kuhn makes in the discussion cited in note 13 above, where he points out (p. 101) that the laws derived as special cases in the limit within relativity theory "are not [Newton's] unless those laws are in reinterpreted a way that would have been impossibleuntil after Einstein'swork." I believe that Kuhn is correctin this and, in fact, that it capturesa centrallyimportant or of aspect of what he has called the non-intertranslatability "incommensurability" and theories. pre-revolutionary post-revolutionary

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however, this Galilean counterpartis uniformly circular-traversing points equidistantfrom the center at constant speed. But, in relatively small regionsnear the earth'ssurface,this circularmotion is quite indisfrom rectilinear motion, and Galileocan thus treatit as rectinguishable And it is in preciselythis tilinearto an extremelygood approximation. motionis therefore,that the modem conceptionof natural(inertial) way, Aristotelian continuouswith the preceding conceptionof natural actually motion. the An analogous(if also morecomplex)point can be madeconcerning transitionfrom Newtonian mechanicsand gravitationtheory, through specialrelativity,to generalrelativity.The key move in generalrelativity, as we have seen, is to replacethe law of inertia-which, from the spacetime perspective inaugurated specialrelativity,depictsthe trajectories by of force-freebodies as geodesicsin a flat space-timegeometry-with the of accordingto whichbodiesaffectedonly by gravprinciple equivalence, itation follow geodesicsin a variablycurvedspace-timegeometry.How the did Einsteinactuallymake this revolutionary move, whichrepresents to nature? Einstein's firstactualapplicationof a non-Euclidean geometry traditionin the innovationgrowsnaturallyout of the nineteenth-century in this of as foundations geometry, Einsteininterprets tradition thecontext of the new non-Newtonianmechanicsof specialrelativity.The key transition to a non-Euclidean geometryof variablecurvaturein fact results from applyingthe Lorentzcontractionarisingin specialrelativityto the delicately positions geometryof a rotatingdisk,as Einsteinsimultaneously himselfwithinthe debateon the foundationsof geometrybetweenHelmwhereasEinsteinhad earliermadecruholtz and Poincare.In particular, cial use of Poincare'sidea of conventionin motivatingthe transition,on to fromNewtonianspace-time what the basis of mathematical simplicity, in the case of the rotating call we currently Minkowskispace-time, now, disk, Einsteinratherfollows Helmholtzin taking the behaviorof rigid of measuringrods to furnishus with an empiricaldetermination the unthis case, a non-Euclidean geometry.15 derlyinggeometry-in In each of our revolutionary transitionsfundamentally philosophical or ideas,belongingto whatwe mightcall epistemological meta-paradigms a crucial role in motivatingand sustainingthe meta-frameworks, play or transitionto a new first-level scientific paradigm.Suchepistemological the all-important meta-frameworks processof conceptualtransforguide to whatwe now mean,during mationand help us, in particular, articulate a natural,reasonable,or responsible a given revolutionary transition,by By conceptualtransformation. interactingproductivelywith both older
15. For a detailed discussion of this case see my "Geometryas a Branch of Physics," in D. Malament (ed.), ReadingNaturalPhilosophy(Chicago:Open Court, 2002).

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and new developments taking place philosophical meta-frameworks within the sciencesthemselves,a new epistemological meta-framework notion (accessible even in the pretherebymakesavailablea prospective or revolutionary conceptualsituation)of inter-framework inter-paradigm rationality. In the transitionfrom Aristotelian-Scholastic naturalphilosophy to classicalmathematical physics,for example,at the sametime that Galileo was subjectingthe Aristotelianconceptionof naturalmotion to a deep it to (yet continuous)conceptualtransformation, was necessary eliminate and the hierarchical teleologicalelementsof the Aristotelianconceptual in mathematical geometrical and framework favorof an exclusively point for naturalphilosophy of view-which was encapsulated, the mechanical of the time, in the distinctionbetweenprimaryand secondaryqualities. Euclideangeometry,as an exemplarof rationalinquiry,was of course and alreadya part of the Aristotelianframework, the problemthen was, this and to accordingly, emphasize partat the expenseof the hylomorphic of teleologicalconceptualschemecharacteristic Aristotelian metaphysics. of This task, however,requireda parallelreorganization the widerconcepts of Aristotelianmetaphysics(concepts of substance,force, space, time, matter, mind, creation,divinity),and it fell to the philosophyof sucha reorganization-a philosophy whichin turn Descartesto undertake with recentscientific advancessuchas Copernican interacted productively astronomy,new resultsin geometrical optics, and Descartes'sown initial inertia.Similarly,in the transition formulationof the law of rectilinear fromclassicalmechanics relativity to theory,at the sametimethatEinstein was subjectingthe classicalconceptionsof space, time, and motion to a debateon conceptualtransformation, philosophical deep(yet continuous) the foundationsof geometrybetweenHelmholtzand Poincare,in which of and interpretations that scienceopposedone empiricist conventionalist of the Kantian philosophy, another against the ever-present backdrop played a centralrole-and, in turn, was itself carriedout in responseto mathematical advancesin the foundationsof geometrymadethroughout the nineteenth century.16 So what we see here, I finallywant to suggest,is that a reconceived version of Kant's originalphilosophicalproject-the projectof investigating and philosophicallycontextualizingthe most basic constitutive framework empirof definingthe fundamental spatio-temporal principles ical naturalscience-plays an indispensable orientingrole with respectto conceptualrevolutionswithin the sciencespreciselyby generatingnew meta-frameworks capableof bridging,and thus guiding, epistemological This to framework. peculiarly the revolutionary transitions a newscientific
16. See again the referencecited in note 15 above.

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philosophicaltype of investigationtherebymakes availableprospective notions of inter-framework rationalityin the light of whichradicallynew can constitutiveprinciples then appearas rational-as Descartes's approand transformationof the concepts of Aristotelian-Scholastic priation metaphysicsmade the new mechanicalnaturalphilosophya reasonable of and transformation option, for example,or Einstein'sappropriation reflectionsof Poincareand Helmholtzdid the the earlierepistemological same for relativitytheory. conceivedweb of belief, In placeof the Quineanfigureof an holistically understoodas a prioriand philoswhereinboth knowledgetraditionally ophy as a disciplineare supposedto be wholly absorbedinto empirical naturalscience,I am therefore pictureof a thorproposingan alternative of knowledge that nonetheless differentiated system oughlydynamical yet can be analyzed,for presentpurposes,into three main componentsor levels. At the base level, as it were, are the concepts and principlesof lawsof nature,such naturalscienceproperlyso-called: empirical empirical as the Newtonianlaw of gravitationor Einstein'sequationsfor the gravof itationalfield, which squarelyand preciselyface the "tribunal experience"via a rigorousprocessof empiricaltesting.At the next or second a that definethe fundamental level are the constitutively prioriprinciples framework withinwhich alone the rigorousformulation spatio-temporal is and empirical testingof firstor baselevelprinciples thenpossible.These a constitutewhat Kuhn calls paradigms: relarelativized prioriprinciples stable sets of rules of the game, as it were, that make possiblethe tively the activitiesof normalscience-including, in particular, problem-solving laws. In periodsof and formulation testingof properlyempirical rigorous a theseconstitutively prioriprindeepconceptualrevolutionit is precisely no whicharethen subjectto change-under intensepressure, doubt, ciples from new empirical and especiallyanomalies.It does not follow, findings in constitutive are however,that suchsecond-level principles empirical the On the contrary,sincehere,by samesense as are the first-level principles. is framework necessarily background hypothesis,a generally-agreed-upon of empirical in periodsof deep no straightforward process testing, missing, conceptualrevolution,is then possible.And here our thirdlevel, that of or plays an indispensphilosophicalmeta-paradigms meta-frameworks, able role, by servingas a sourceof guidanceor orientationin motivating fromone paradigm conceptual or framework and sustaining transition the meta-frameworks contribute the rationto to another.Suchphilosophical scientificchange,more specifically, providinga by ality of revolutionary basis for mutualcommunication (and thus for communicative rationality in Habermas's (and sense)betweenotherwiseincommensurable therefore scientific non-intertranslatable) paradigms. and None of thesethreelevelsarefixedandunrevisable, the distinctions

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I am drawinghave nothingto do, in particular, with differingdegreesof or certainty epistemicsecurity.Indeed,the wholepoint of the presentcona and is ceptionof relativized dynamical prioriprinciples to accommodate the profound conceptualrevolutionsthat have repeatedlyshaken our knowledgeof natureto its very foundations.It is preciselythis revoluin that our knowledge founhas tionaryexperience, fact, that has revealed dations in the presentsense: subject-defining constitutiveparadigms or whose revisionentails a genuineexpansionof our space of intellectual to revolution, possibilities, suchan extent,in periodsof radicalconceptual that a straightforward appealto empiricalevidenceis then no longerdirectlyrelevant.And it is at this point, moreover,that philosophyplaysits own distinctive a role, not so muchin justifyingor securing newparadigm whereempiricalevidencecannot yet do so, but ratherin guidingthe arand ticulationof the new spaceof possibilities makingthe seriousconsiderationof the new paradigma rationaland responsible option. The various levels in our total evolvingand interacting systemof beliefsare thus not distinguished differingdegreesof epistemicsecurityat all (neither by in by differingdegreesof centralityand entrenchment the senseof Quine nor by differingdegreesof certaintyin the more traditionalsense), but ratherby their radicallydifferentyet mutuallycomplementary contributions to the total ongoing dialecticof human knowledge-a dialectical scientificknowledgecontinuesto provide processin whichmathematical we us with the best exemplar have of humanrationality (that is, our very in spite of (and even because best exampleof communicative rationality) character. of) its profoundlyrevolutionary