Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Canada: Post Fukushima Strategies

Fred Dermarkar
Ontario Power Generation
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Overview of Canadian Industry Response

Public Communication Strategy: immediate, open, not defensive Canadian Industry Integration Team (CIIT) Domestic and International participation Hosted two Emergency Preparedness workshops: All three levels of government and Military Comprehensive assessments with reports to the CNSC in July 2011
Confirmed Safety of NPPs; Identified opportunities to further improve defences for Beyond Design Basis Events

Physical improvements to NPPs have commenced Continuing implementation of CNSC Task Force Action Plan

Five Key Learning Points

1. Systematically review and verify defences against external hazards 2. Increased flexibility to respond to unexpected events to prevent fuel damage 3. Severe accident management (SAM) is a key part of safe operation 4. Partner with other operators and with the community to enhance Emergency Response capability 5. Regulatory framework aligned with nuclear safety risk and enforced through strong regulatory oversight 3

Fukushima Site

1. External Hazards
Applied methodology for Screening External Hazards Based on IAEA guidance Accepted by CNSC For specific hazards of interest, Review Level Conditions (RLC) were established to assess adequacy of current defences Confirm no cliff-edge effects

1. External Hazards - Seismic RLC

Design Basis for existing plants: Older Plants: Building Code Newer Plants: - 1,000 year recurrence interval - 1980s knowledge of seismic hazard Review Level Condition (RLC): 10,000 year recurrence 2011 Seismic Hazard Results for plants that have completed assessment: Plants seismically robust for an event with 10,000 year recurrence interval
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1. External Hazards - Flooding RLC

Design Basis: historically derived Review Level Condition (RLC):
Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) event for the region theoretical, not historical Concurrent with wave overtopping due to storm

Fort Calhoun Site

Actions:
Barriers installed around backup generators (Darlington-complete; Pickering A: Q2 2012) Installing water-tight doors to Secondary Control Area tunnel at Point Lepreau

Flood Barrier Around Darlington EPG Fuel Pump

1. External Hazards Tornados & Man-Made

Some plants not explicitly designed for tornados Methodology for assessing tornado hazards under development Seismically induced fires and floods Methodology under development in concert with EPRI Man-made hazards may change significantly with time Land use surrounding the site needs to be monitored for new or changed hazards.

2. Flexibility - Overview of CANDU (Typical)

Passive fuel cooling through Steam Generators Dousing Water System C6 (>2,000 Mg) Dearator

Additional sources for passive fuel cooling: Moderator System (>240 Mg) Shield Cooling System (>500 Mg)
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2. Flexibility - Beyond Design Basis Events

Some BDB Events have been considered in the Safety Case and are explicitly considered in the station EOPs. Bounding Scenario1 used to determine emergency measures and equipment to mitigate accident progression Safety Case is well established and understood . Management of DB Events are integrated well into Station operation

SAMG implemented & being enhanced. Mitigation measures are integral to SAMG

Consequence

Severe Accidents

Beyond Design Basis Design Basis

Likelihood

Total extended loss of AC power, leading to a total loss of normal heats sinks. Only existing cooling water inventories are credited. Only station batteries are credited. This approach is aligned with the direction from WANO and INPO

2. Flexibility Strategy to Maintain Cooling

Findings:

Steam generators (SG) depressurized from MCR within 40m

- Enables gravity addition of water to steam generators - Establishes a source of passive fuel cooling for at least 8h - Provides time to setup portable diesel pumps to maintain flow to SGs

Steam generators proven effective as a passive heat sink

- Narora 31 March 1993 - Pickering 14 August 2003

Emergency Mitigation Equipment (EME) for alternate cooling to SG

Portable diesel driven pumps and generators Multiple different addition points from multiple locations Plug-and-play Portable crane to remove debris Stored on-site outside protected area Will also provide alternate water supply to spent fuel pools

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3. SAM - Strategy
Leverage inherent design features unique to Candu:
>700 Mg of water surrounding the fuel provides >24h before corium exits vessel

Objective: retain corium in-vessel

Calandria Vault / Shield Tank over-pressure relief Water addition points to moderator and calandria vault / shield tank to enable connection of portable diesel pumpers

SAM Technical Basis Documents

Under Revision through the Candu Owners Group (COG) Will be used to revise station SAM Guidelines
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3. SAM Activities and Status

Containment Filtered Venting System Installed at 1 NPP Committed as part of upcoming refurbishment of 5 NPPs Under review at other NPPs Hydrogen Mitigation All utilities are bolstering existing Hydrogen mitigation measures (such as H2 igniters) with Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners (PARS) Installation of PARs has been completed at 6 NPPs and will be completed on all 20 Canadian NPPs by 2015

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Summary
Canada has responded to the events at Fukushima with Diligence and Urgency The Canadian industry has risen to the challenge Broad collaboration domestically and internationally One NPP awarded a strength by WANO for the response Several key actions in the CNSC action plan are already complete The CNSCs response was prompt, robust and comprehensive Identified by the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission as a good practice that should be used other regulatory bodies.
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Summary
Reviews performed by the CNSC and the Industry confirm:
Canadas NPPs are safe Canada is learning through collaboration with others Canadas NPPs are developing the flexibility and capability to respond to events not previously envisaged

Canada has embraced the challenge from Jim Ellis, CEO INPO: This is not a time for half-measures. We must improve the industry we have, and shape the industry we want.

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Thank You!