International Experts Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi

Nuclear Power Plant

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident
Virginie ELBAZ

Institute of Radioprotection and [N]uclear Safety Fontenay aux Roses - France Vienna March 19 22, 2012

Contents
1. Introduction

2. French approach to the stress test

3. Spent fuel storage pools 4. Safety assessment on spent fuel storage pools 5. IRSN assessment approach and outcomes 6. R&D program on Spent Fuel Pool accidents at IRSN

7. Conclusion

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

1. Introduction

After the Fukushima accident in March 11th in 2011, a review of the safety of the facilities has been undertaken at the European level based on European specification produced by WENRA and approved by ENSREG

The

complementary safety assessment CSA called stress test consists in reassessing the safety margins of the nuclear installations for extreme natural events (earthquake, flood) and total loss of the safety system (loss of power supply, loss of cooling)

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

2. French approach to the stress test

Background : Periodic safety review of a facility

PSR Every 10 years

Avoid discrepancy between the facilitys state and new safety approaches, practices and regulations,
Assess the robustness in the actual safety requirement Facilitate the on-going improvement of the facilities' safety and their operations

Process defined by the French Law

Safety reassessment

Ageing and conformity examination

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

2. French approach to the stress test

Periodic Safety Review

Updating

design)

of safety guide (definition of earthquake, seismic account the future operation context:

Taking into lifetime

activity evolution equipment characteristic evolution (ageing)

Operating feedback - events related to similar criticality accident of Toka-Mura in 1999

facilities:

flooding at Le Blayais NPP in 1999

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

2. French approach to the stress test

Stress Test
Specific examination of the conformity with the design requirements Extreme natural events taken into account in the safety requirement
Identification of a list of Systems Structures and Components (SSC) need to be qualified for hazard levels higher than those considered in the existing safety framework For extreme situations, this Hardened Safety Core allows to bring back the plants in a safe state
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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Robustness beyond the safety design requirement (severe accident)

In addition to the PSR

2. French approach to the stress test

Assessment of succession of events even in situation of degraded site and isolated from outside Potential induced events (fire, explosion, industrial site around)

Earthquake Flood

Beyond the design basis usually taken in French assessment + Combination of scenarios

Loss of Power sources Loss of all the sources of cooling

Deterministic approach Loss of supply even back-up, and ultimate back-up

IRSN assessment available on the website: www.irsn.fr

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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3. Spent fuel storage pools

Nuclear Fuel cycle

Pool

Pool

In

France, NPP fuels are stored in pools located in the nuclear power plants of EDF and before treatment in pools of the reprocessing plants of AREVA La Hague
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IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

3. Spent fuel storage pools

Spent fuel storage facilities in France

EDF

PWR reactors pools La Hague pools

Under water storage

AREVA EDF

Superphenix pool

Dry storage

CASCAD,

CEA (French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy) Commission) Cadarache

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

3. Spent fuel storage pools EDF PWR REACTOR STORAGE POOLS

Fresh

nuclear fuel used in PWR is manufactured with uranium, slightly enriched (4.5 %) with fissile 235U isotope and MOX between 380 and 630 of fuel elements according to PWR plants

Locations

Time

of decay before going to AREVA La Hague 2-3 years for UOX fuel
steel liner with reinforced concrete walls pool is situated in a specific building (BK), near the reactor building

Stainless

The

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

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3. Spent fuel storage pools

EDF PWR REACTOR STORAGE POOLS The maximum thermal power is between 8 and 14 MW
Water

Cooling system

capacity between 1150 and 1900 m3 pool cooling system is provided by an external system to the pool (PTR) and earthquake proof cooling system has 2 redundant loops (each one consists of pump and heat exchanger) water is drawn from the pipe located about 4 m below the surface of the pool
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The

The

The

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

3. Spent fuel storage pools

BK Transport La Hague

C. Cieutat Copyright AREVA

Pools

1988

built between 1976 and

500

and 1000 PWR baskets per pool

C. Cieutat Copyright AREVA

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

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3. Spent fuel storage pools

AREVA LA HAGUE SPENT FUEL POOLS
Volume

of water is between 10 000 and 15 000 m3 (10 times more than NPP pools) of the water: 9 m (twice the height of a basket) Thermal Power authorized is between 8 to 16 MW per pool (similarly to NPP pools)

water

Height

Maximal
C. Cieutat Copyright AREVA

PWR

design basket with initial 235U fuel enrichment of 4,5% and MOX assemblies come from EDF power plants

Main

fuel cladding
basket

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

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3. Spent fuel storage pools

AREVA LA HAGUE SPENT FUEL POOLS

The

reinforced concrete basin rests on a slab, independent of any adjacent structure, on neoprene bearings pads, and permits free thermal expansion.
water is permanently cooled and purified with cooling exchanger

Pool
C. Cieutat Copyright AREVA

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

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3. Spent fuel storage pools

UNDER WATER STORAGE AREVA LA HAGUE SPENT FUEL POOLS
Diagram of cooling water system of storage spent fuel pools Air cooling tower Indoor installation Outdoor installation

POOL
Water temperature 35C

Thermal exchanger

Fuel Assembly

slab
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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4. Safety assessment on spent fuel storage pools Safety of spent fuel pools
Keeping water level Pool water must be continuously cooled to remove the heat produced by spent fuel assemblies SAFETY REQUIREMENT Robustness of the civil engineering and of the cooling system Monitoring system Redundancy of equipment Backup generators/supply ACCIDENT Leak in the pool Loss of the water evaporation draining Damage the fuel cladding integrity Release of radioactive materials to environment
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IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

5. IRSN assessment approach and outcomes

Lots of questions involved the spent fuels storage pools during Fukushima accident
Monitor the situations of pools (water level, temperature of water) in case of a severe accident (degraded site)

Prevent the loss of the water level

Water Supply taking into account the increase of the radiation

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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5. IRSN assessment approach and outcomes Consequences of initiating events

Total loss of power supplies Failure of the instrumentation and control system

Dewatering of pool - Leakage - Drainage through a pipe

Total loss of cooling

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

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5. IRSN assessment approach and outcoming

Initiating events
Prevention - Robustness - Conformity with design requirement Instrumentation/measure Parameter of the spent fuel storage

Defence in depth

Emergency plan Crisis organization

D E S I G N

Identification of scenario of accident Redundancy of equipment Water level Temperature of Water

Current water supply - make-up means - Fire network - Demineralized water - Safety tanks

H A R D C O R E

IRSN approach
TO BE DEFINED

- Strengthten make-up water (pre-assembly pipe) in any condition (earthquake, high level of radiation) -Study more accident scenarios -Identification of operational and accessible devices set up in any conditions even for extreme situations

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

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5. IRSN assessment approach and outcomes for NPP pools

Definition of the HARDENED SAFETY CORE
Prevention -Robustness of the design (transfer tube) -In-service inspections -Compliance to the current requirements -Important For Safety (IFS) components and systems availability

Means of actions based on hardware and operations -Isolating or minimizing of leaks or breaks consequences (anti-siphon devices, new isolating devices) -Water supplies (strengthen the design of water supplies in any condition) -Instrumentation (monitor the water level on the full range of the pool height) -Possibility of restarting a cooling train
Means of crisis to be investigated - Accessibility to actions means in case of a high level of radioactivity due to sky effect -Hydrogen production ?
Sources: I. MIRAMON and L. GILLOTEAU IRSN
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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6. R&D program on Spent Fuel Pool accidents at IRSN

R&D program on Spent Fuel Pool accidents at IRSN
IRSN undertook R&D actions since several years concerning the issue of spent fuel pool accidents, especially concerning the behaviour of clad material in air

Development of calculation code Some studies and exploratory calculations have been done with the ICARE/CATHARE code (ASTEC Module), for very specific air undercooling scenarios, mainly focused on the thermo-mechanical behaviour of fuel assemblies.

The MOZART experimental program was launched (2005-2009) to address the phenomenology of zircaloy nitriding and oxidation in air.

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

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6. R&D program on Spent Fuel Pool accidents at IRSN

IRSN is fully involved in the OCDE Spent Fuel Pool program (US-NRC) at Sandia National Laboratory (2009-2013)

Devoted to the study of ignition conditions and thermal runaway propagation in Air on BWR and PWR fuel assembly mock-ups in pool storage conditions
Rupture of cladding

Validation of ASTEC code for PWR geometry

New ARAMIS R&D programme on spent fuel pool accident (2012-2016)

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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7. Conclusion

Conclusion
Recommendations leaded by IRSN Complementary attempt must be provided by the operators in order to ensure the spent fuel pools (hard core) in a safe state for scenarios beyond the safety requirements Capacity to restore water in any conditions (i.e degraded situation, after an earthquake) in order to increase the robustness of the facility

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

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Thank you for your attention

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

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Safety investigations dealing with postulated initiators (seism, flood) :

Overheating of the storage pool of spent fuel until boiling Decay of water inventory of the pool by steaming (or due to a leak or a piping break in case of an accidental draining) Risk of degradation of the radiological conditions (1 meter above a fuel assembly is necessary to guaranty good radiological conditions) Dewatering of fuel assembly being handled leading to a racing of zirconium oxidation reaction Boiling of the stored fuel assemblies leading to : a risk of restarting the chain reaction (criticality), and then a risk of important radiolysis of water leading to a hydrogen accumulation Dewatering of the stored fuel assembly in the bottom of the pool

leading to a severe accident

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

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Definition of safety criteria : in order to avoid worst events

Safety assessment performed during PSRs No dewatering of fuel assembly, even partially (in order to prevent from damaging the fuel cladding which causes a severe accident) : Assemblies in stored position

an assembly being handled

Safety assessment performed during CSAs (to be investigated) No localized boiling in the storage area of spent fuel assemblies (in order to prevent criticality risk leading to a risk of radiolysis of water and then, a risk of hydrogen accumulation)
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

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Definition of functional criteria in order to obtain safety assessments outcomes leading to the implementation of hardware modifications fundamental design principles

A leak or break in any system connected to the pools should not cause direct dewatering of stored spent fuel assemblies, even if no isolating action is launched. If a drainage occurs via a piping connected to the pools, it must be possible either to isolate the drainage process before direct dewatering of an assembly being handled or to put the spent fuel assembly in safe position before its dewatering. When drainage causes loss of pool cooling, an emergency water supply should prevent stored fuel assemblies from being dewatered later

IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ

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