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Fukushima Daiichi Accident Spent fuel pools ~ Facts, actions taken, and issues ~
Hiroshi ABE, Atsushi UI, Masashi HIRANO JNES
IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety International Experts Meeting Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at TEPCOs Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station 20 March 2012 Vienna VIC, Building M, Room M3
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
Contents
Part I:
What occurred and response at SFPs of Fukushima Daiichi
Part II:
Action taken in the other nuclear power plants
Part III:
Measures to be taken and future issues
Overall view
Regarding spent fuel Pools (SFPs) at Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 to 4, main concerns in the early phase of the accident were: 1. Loss of cooling and water make-up function due to loss of power might cause fuel uncover and damage, and
2. Structural damages of SFPs by the influence of hydrogen explosions in addition to incessant aftershocks might cause SFPs damage and radioactive releases. Actually, fuel cooling was maintained through emergency water injection by spraying trucks, concrete pump trucks, etc. in Units 1 to 4. In Unit 4, support structure to SFP was installed. Structural integrity of SFPs were maintained in these Units.
Through the accident, measures to be taken further have been identified.
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
Unit 1
587 (28)
514 (52) 1331 (204) 946 (48)
Unit 2 SFP
Unit 3 SFP Unit 4 SFP
Unit 6
Common pool Dry cask
876 (64)
6375 408
5
The common pool Japan Nuclear(common spent fuel storage pool) Energy Safety Organization
Earthquake
At 14:46 on March 11, 2011, an Mw 9.0 earthquake occurred off the Pacific coast of Tohoku region, The source area was estimated to rupture with a size of 450km long and 200km wide Fukushima NPP
15:08,Mar. 11 1km, M7.5
are a
Sou
rce
Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1,2,3 were in operation and automatically shut down
Unit 4,5,6 were in periodic inspection
Res_1FZ2011031114462R2_EW .waz Max. accelerations on base mat in Reactor Buildings was observed at Unit 2, Res_1f2_Ss-1_mat_EW .waz Res_1f2_Ss-2_mat_EW .waz 550gal(EW), 25% larger than that by standard ground motion Ss, 438 gal Res_1f2_Ss-3_mat_EW .waz
1000
(Gal) Acc. (Gal)
550
3000
(h=0.05)
500
Acc. (Gal)
2000
0 -500 -1000
0 50 100
Time(Sec)
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization ()
2 (cm/s ) 1000
150
200
250
0 0.02
Period (Sec)
()
#4 T/B
#3 T/B
#2 T/B
#1 T/B
Before Tsunami
After Tsunami (before explosion)
Hydrogen explosion
Unit 1 15:36 March 12: Hydrogen explosion in the reactor building Unit 3 11:01 March 14: Hydrogen explosion in the reactor building Unit 2 around 06:00 March 15: Noise of explosion Unit 4 around 06:00 March 15: Explosion in the reactor building (An inflow of hydrogen from Unit 3 is assumed, as the exhaust pipe for venting the PCV joins the exhaust pipe from unit 4 before the exhaust) Unit 4
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Emergency cooling
SFP cooling function was lost due to loss of offsite power, damage of cooling system piping by hydrogen explosions, etc. In addition, sea water pumps were lost and, as a result, its recovery was difficult. Feeding water to SFPs was done by spraying trucks and pump trucks in Units 1, 3 and 4, it took time to arrange the measure to supply water to high elevation continuously. In unit 2, water was injected through part of fuel pool cooling and cleanup (FPC) system.
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
September 9, 2011
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
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20
Temperature
100
80 15
60 10
Water level
5
40
TAF
4/1 4/8
20
5/6
6/3
7/1
7/8
8/5
9/2
9/9
3/11
3/18
3/25
4/15
4/22
4/29
5/13
5/20
5/27
6/10
6/17
6/24
7/15
7/22
7/29
8/12
8/19
8/26
9/16
9/23
TEPCO result
Government of Japan, Additional Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA - The Accident at TEPCOs Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations - (Second Report), September 2011, p.II-170
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It could be concluded that radioactive nuclides in the SFPs were due to fallout
Detected nuclides
Half-life
Detected nuclides
Concentration of Unit 4 SFP (Bq/cm3) May 7 56 67 16 Aug 20 44 61 Lower than detect (Ref)Mar 4 Lower than detect 0.13 Lower than detect (Ref) accumulated water on basement floor at Unit 4 T/B 31 32 360 12
Taking picture
It seems no large-scale fuel damage
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/images/110428_1f_1t.jpg
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Air-cooled Hx
Heat Exchanger
Recirculation cooling
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
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15
16
M7.4, 15:08,Mar 11 M7.3, 09:57,Jul 10 M9.0, 14:46,Mar 11 M7.1, 23:32,Apr 7 M7.5, 15:25,Mar 11
M7.0, 17:16,Apr 11
M7.7, 15:15,Mar 11
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East
South
Whole
O.P.+39.92m5F O.P.+32.3m4F O.P.+26.9m3F
O.P.+18.7m2F
O.P.+10.2m1F O.P.-2.06mB1F
4th floorO.P.+32.3m
SW SFP N
3rd floorO.P.+26.9m
SW SFP
D/W Wall Temp. : as below Max. Temp. measured 403 (March 22) S/C Wall and floor Temp. : as below Max. Temp. measured 59 (March 27)
Strength
0.67 0.70 0.70
Stiffness
0.42 0.45 0.48
Strength
0.89 0.91 0.92
Stiffness
0.89 0.91 0.92
st(O.P.+10.2m)
Bst(O.P.-2.06m) S/C wall SFPwallfloor
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
190
120 70 75
0.70
0.70 0.70 0.70
0.45
0.55 0.63 0.62
0.91
0.94 0.97 0.96
0.91
0.94 0.97 0.96
West
East
South
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Whole
(O.P.+39.92m)5F (O.P.+32.3m)4F (O.P.+26.9m)3F (O.P.+18.7m)2F (O.P.+10.2m)1F (O.P.-2.06m)B1F
SW SFP
N S
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
SW SFP
22
Wall and floor: Sea water boiling point Max. Temp. measured 84oC (May 7)
105oC
Concrete and steel reinforcing bar strength (Wall and floor of SFP)
Strength ( Ratio to at room temp.) Temperature (oC) Concrete Strength Stiffness Steel bar Strength Stiffness
105
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
0.7
0.6
0.9
0.9
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Normal
Outer surface damage
100%
50% 85%
Full damage
0%
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SFP Floor
(1) Bending
Max. bending moment (M) x102(kNm/m) 10.7 9.0 Ultimate bending strength (Mu) x102(kNm/m) 14.8 14.8 Ratio (M/Mu) 0.72 0.61
4 (4)
18.0
36.6
0.49
(2) Shear
unit
3 4 Max. Shear Strain(rmax) x10-3 0.65 2.63 Ultimate Shear Strain(ru) x10-3 4.0 4.0 Ratio (rmax / ru ) 0.16 0.66 unit 3 4
(2) Shear
Max. Shearing force (S) x102(kN/m)
19.3 13.12
Evaluated value by Ss are smaller than allowable limit Seismic safety against aftershock confirmed
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
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http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/images/110730_2.jpg
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
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NISA instructed licensees to implement emergency safety measures on March 30, 2011
Securing the emergency heat removal function and the emergency cooling function for the plants including SFPs
Alternative measures for cooling and water make-up by using such as fire engines and pumper trucks were prepared.
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Procedure 2: water supply from refueling water storage tank Procedure 5: Makeup sea water by mobile pumps / fire engines
Reactor Building
Reactor Contain ment
Fire Hydrant
Water Supply
Fire Engine Supply water to make up for lowered water level Cooler
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Alternative makeup using CST pump from CST Overflow to SFP from skimmer surge tank
Overflow to SFP from skimmer surge tank Alternative makeup using fire engines
30
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1. Enhancement of redundancy and diversity of cooling / water make-up function Enhancement of diversity by introducing the air-cooled heat removal system Implementation of alternative measures for water makeup 2. Enhancement of instrumentation to monitor key parameters i.e. water level, temperature, etc Needs to be functional / operable under severe conditions These items will be implemented in the process of SA rulemaking in Japan 3. Decentralization of fuel storage Spent fuel management / policy Needs to reduce the spent fuel inventory in SFPs in R/Bs Needs to avoid concentration of spent fuel inventory in one place Effective use of dry cask storage
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization
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Further improvement of procedures / manuals, organizations and training Feedback of operating experience worldwide and the state-of-the-art science and technology Enhancement of consistency with international standards and practices
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Appendix
Items that should be addressed in regulation identified in NISA report in February 2012
Measures against containment failure and hydrogen explosion 18.Diversification of heat removal function of containment 19.Measures against over-temperature failure of containment top head flange 20.Reliable transition to alternate low-pressure water injection 21.Improvement of reliability / operability of PCV vent 22.Reduction in influence on ambient environment by PCV vent 23.Ensuring independence of PCV vent line 24.Prevention of hydrogen explosion Management and I&C 25.Resevation / Implementation of command post in case of accident 26.Ensuring communication function in case of accident 27.Ensuring reliability of instrumentation in case of accident 28.Strengthening of monitoring function of plant status 29.Strengthening of onsite environmental monitoring in case of accident 30.Eestablishment of emergency response system and implementation of its training
Offsite power supply 1. Enhancement of reliability of offsite power supply 2. Improvement of seismic resistance of substation 3. Improvement of seismic resistance of switchyard 4. Prompt recovery of offsite power supply
Onsite power supply 5. Diversification in layout of onsite electric systems 6. Strengthening of water tightness 7. Strengthening of redundancy and diversity of emergency AC power supply 8. Strengthening of emergency DC power supply 9. Installation of dedicated power source to specific facility 10.Making ease of electric supply from outside 11.Stockpile of spare parts of electric systems
Cooling capability and water supply 12.Enhancement of decision making capability in case of accident 13.Water tightness and diversity in layout of cooling systems 14.Strengthening of ultimate heat sink after accident 15.Improvement of reliability / operation of isolation valves & SRVs 16.Strengthening of alternate water injection capability 17.Improvement of reliability of cooling / water supply function of spent fuel pool
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