Events at Fukushima NPP in Japan

INES Level 7 Impact of extreme external events and their combinations

New impetus to review NPPs safety worldwide

2

Safety fundamentals
SAFETY CULTURE LEGISLATION Federal laws (responsibility principles) System of rules and regulation
- Alignment of priorities - Human factor

TECHNOLOGY (technical safety ensuring) DEFENCE-IN-DEPTH

PRINCIPLE

Multiplicity of safety barriers

State licensing authority (independent regulation)

KNOWLEDGE BASE

Variety of levels for protection barriers:

prevention of accidents
mitigation of accident consequences (accident management)

The safety fundamentals are correct and shall not be subject to any revisions

Prolonged loss of external and internal power and water supply

Failure to provide external support timely

Inefficiency of the severe accident management efforts made by personnel

Very low probable events and their combination (deterministic approach)

Off-site radiological impact on the public and the environment shall be excluded

Personnel, managers at NPP and in the Operating organization shall be focused on prompt actions aimed at accident prevention and mitigation of severe accidents consequences At each power unit there shall be available a reserve of engineering means protected against possible damage by a natural disaster, which ensure power and water supply for purposes of reactor and fuel pool cooling

The key criterion of success is the recovery of power supply and water feed for reactor cooling down implemented within first hours after the total blackout

Operating organization, governmental and local authorities, international organizations and the public shall be timely informed about a NPP event. Provision of external support from state level as well as from international community shall be ensured.

Methodology for Russian NPPs safety status analysis as regard to emergencies

Additional equipment failures

Deterministic experience related to BDBA consequences evaluation that has been accumulated beforehand

 Upgrading works aimed at safety improvement of NPPs (incl. BDBA management) have been implemented during last 10 15 years
Vulnerabilities and list of hypothetic initial events have been identified for each NPP Implementation of supplementary measures aimed at enhancement of NPP capability to operate in a standalone mode (up to 5-10 days) is needed The countermeasures considered in designs of the operating NPPs cover not all BDBA initial events (combination of 2 or more failures was not considered)
7

 Analytical report on the reviewed scenarios of abnormal external event impacts on Russian NPPs; Measures aimed at mitigation of beyond-designbasis accident consequences at NPPs:

Operative (1 to 4 months); Short-term (1 year); Medium-term (1 to 2 years); Long-term (3 to 7 years)

Reviews of safety status with involvement of General Designer, Architect Engineer and Scientific Supervisor have been performed for all operating NPPs in Russia with all credible extreme events. For each NPP a separate report has been elaborated.

Supplementary safety improvement measures have been developed for each NPP

The reports on safety analysis of a NPP under extreme external impacts had been submitted to the regulatory body (Rostechnadzor) till 15.08.2011 As per results of own review, Rostechnadzor had approved the reports on safety analysis of a NPP under extreme external impacts in November 2011

Operative measures
Focused checks and analysis of NPP safety provisions for extreme impacts

Extraordinary plant staff emergency drills as per BDBA scenarios

Extraordinary tests of safety systems equipment with EDG start-up

Increased number of regularly performed emergency drills related to personnel actions in case of a BDBA
10

Short-term measures
To identify backup (additional) water (borated water) sources for purposes of heat removal from the core, fuel pool and SNF storage facilities, and to introduce procedures of their use into the operating documentation To develop a generic list of supplementary mobile equipment per a unit To perform additional quick studies and analysis of NPP seismic zoning documentation, and calculation analysis of seismic impacts on the reactor unit, fuel pools and on-site SNF storage facilities To perform analysis of emergency instructions and guidelines as regard to sufficiency of accident management actions to be performed by staff To elaborate technical specifications on the supplementary design solutions
11

Medium-term measures
Supplementary equipment delivery to NPPs Development of the design documentation and beginning of implementation of the supplementary design solutions Adjustment of emergency instructions and accident guidelines after the equipment delivery to NPPs

Long-term measures
Full-scope implementation of the supplementary design solutions

Adjustment of emergency instructions and accident guidelines after implementation of the planned measures
Development of severe accident management guidelines
12

Generic set of mobile equipment for BDBA management purposes, per a Unit
80 pcs.
Motor-driven Pumps

74%
(59 .)

26%
Supplied

35 pcs.

Mobile Pump Units (MPU)

20%
(7 .)

80%
May 2012

36 pcs.

Mobile Diesel Generator Units (MDGU) 0.2 MW

(32 .)

89%

11%

31 pcs.

Mobile Diesel Generator Units (MDGU) 2.0 MW

29%
(9.)

71%
(22 .)

13

Power supply securing

To identify supplementary schemes of power supply from emergency diesel generators to the loads:

power control; control systems.

Heat removal securing

To identify supplementary water sources and schemes of water supply to reactor, steam generators and SNF storage pools using diesel-driven / motor-driven pumps; To implement a system for SNF pool metal liner cooling.
Explosion safety ensuring

Implementation of hydrogen monitoring and afterburning systems; Implementation of a system for emergency gas release from the reactor containment. 14

Seismic resistance ensuring

Provision for reactor scram by the automated emergency protection system in case of earthquake; Improvement of seismic resistance of plant equipment, pipelines and civil structures.
Provisions for management and control

NPP equipping with emergency I&C devices designed for operation under BDBA conditions; Improvement of protection of plant MCRs and ECRs; Development of Severe Accident Management Guidelines.

15

Upgrading the communication infrastructure of the Engineering Support Center, the Crisis Center and NPPs; Establishment of a regional Crisis Center of WANO Moscow Center.

16

Analysis of scenarios and radiological consequences of severe accidents, with the goal of implementation of: the RPV cooling system; the system for emergency gas release from the reactor containment;

the emergency I&C;

other supplementary design solutions.

Calculation of maximum possible seismic impacts at the NPP locations, on the basis of modern computational models.

17

 Federal safety requirements are met with the compensatory measures taken into account;
For Russian NPPs in operation, analysis of their defense-in-depth resistance has been carried out; Measures aimed at enhancement of operating NPPs resistance to extreme external impacts have been developed and are implemented; For Russian NPPs under construction or in designing, it is planned to perform analysis of their resistance to extreme external impacts.

Final slide

18

19