Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1883 first Japanese immigrant arrived to Argentina 1915 Japanese newspaper Buenos Aires Shuno 1919 Japanese Garden (orchids and cyclamen) 1953, from 17m. inhabitants, 13.657 were Japanese Today: 32 000 Japanese are Argentineans
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remembering the great losses suffered, reflecting on the Fukushima Daiichi accident, and
3.
Content
(nuclear safety to protect people rather than NPPs)
1. Fukushima and its deficiencies 2. International response 3. Lessons being learned 4. The Argentine approach 5. Epilogue
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Were the earthquake and tsunami the cause of the accident at Fukushima Daiichi? ..
or
These were devastating natural events that triggered the accident, . but not its fundamental cause!
Deficiency 1
Underestimation of potential external events, in particular:
siting the plant close to sea level in an area known to be subject to tsunamis and, vulnerability of the grid for earthquakes.
Deficiency 2
Insufficient design provisions to maintain power in any emergency situation for
cooling, instrumentation, control room habitability, lighting and communications, In particular, to ensure a reliable supply of electricity to the emergency cooling system.
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Deficiency 3
Inadequate containment and mitigation devices to prevent the release of substantial amounts of radioactive material to the environment.
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Deficiency 4
Unsafe spent fuel storage
(a particular problem for enriched uranium fuel)
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Deficiency 5
Scarce planning and preparedness, e.g. for
accident management of various events, accidental prolonged situations and emergency response.
Deficiency 6
Insufficient regulatory control.
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Consequence
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2. International response
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IAEA
The IAEA is the only organization within the UN family with specific statutory responsibilities in nuclear safety, namely:
establishing safety standards and providing for their application.
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IAEA response
Convened a Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, which took place in Vienna, on 20-24 June 2011.
Overall objective was: to strengthen nuclear safety throughout the world [sic]
rather than identifying and correcting the specific deficiencies!
An IAEA mission to review Japan's approach for assessing safety. Strengthen IAEA peer review services. A report highlighting the results of the IRRS missions. Coordination and cooperation between the IAEA and WANO; 4 OSART missions have been conducted. A systematic review of the IAEA Safety Standards. Capacity building in Member States with nuclear power programmes and those planning to embark on such a programme has been developed. 3 INIR missions have been conducted. A web-based platform to strengthen communication has been launched A review of INES has been initiated. A number of meetings have been held, including:
on the IAEA RANET on Nuclear Liability (INLEX) in building the necessary infrastructure for a nuclear power programme; and on the establishment of a Technical and Scientific Support Organizations Forum.
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There seems to be a disconnect between the Action Plan and the necessary concentration of efforts on the authoritative identification and correction of the deficiencies that caused Fukushima Daiichi
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Why to divert attention to generic nuclear safety issues rather than concentrate efforts in the deficiencies of Fukushima Daiichi?
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A few months after Chernobyl, the IAEA had organized a high-level technical assessment of the accident causes, which was recorded by INSAG.
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which produced a solidly based, authoritative account of the consequences of the accident.
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VILNIUS ORSHA
Molodechno Borisov Lida Novogrudok
Gorki
D
p ne
SMOLENSK
Aleksin
R
zh So
S
Roslavl
I
Kirov
A
Lyudinovo
KALUGA
ka
TULA
Novomoskovsk
Kimovsk
MINSK
Be re z in a
MOGILEV
Bykhov Cherikov
Krichev
R
Slutsk
Baranovichi
Bobruysk
BRYANSK
D es na
Efremov Yelets
Soligorsk
OREL
GOMEL
Dn ep r-B al ug ski C anPinsk
Novozybkov
Sosna
Pr i p y a t
Pr i p y a t
d
Narovlya Sarny
G o ryn
KURSK
S ey m
O sk ol
kho
St o
CHERNIGOV
Ovruch Polesskoje Chernobyl Narodichi
Pripyat
Slavutich
De
sna
SUMY
P sel
ROVNO
Te
te
BELGOROD
KIEV
ZHITOMIR
Berdichev Ternopol Khmelnitskiy VINNITSA Belaya Tserkov
R os ka
Dn
U
ep
Vo r s k l a
KHARKOV
POLTAVA
1480-3700 kBq m-2 555-1480 kBq m-2 185-555 kBq m-2 37-185 kBq m-2 <37 kBq m-2 27
CHERKASSY
Chancellor Angela Merkel, who at the time was Minister of Environment of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, was the President of the Chernobyl Conference
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UNSCEAR: Estimate of the global impact WHO: Assessment of doses incurred ICRP: Lessons learned
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33
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1.2 1019 Bq
131 I 134,137 Cs
Noble gases:
21 March, 2012
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Calculated air dose rate (shaded area) and measured (plot with values) air dose rate]
The Universal Time Constant (UTC) is presented at the top (Japanese Standard Time: + 9 hours).
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Belorus
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Ukraine
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Evacuees
Chernobyl
Ucrania Belarus 91,406 24,725
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Te + I
134 Cs
Contribution to doses
137 Cs
Summary of radiation doses to the main population groups due to the Chernobyl accident
Population group Number (ths.) Mean thyroid dose (mGy) N/A 490 N/A Mean effective dose in 19862005 (mSv) 117 31 61
Workers (19861990) Evacuees (1986) Area of strict control (in B, R, U) Belarus, Ukraine and 19 Russian regions Distant European countries
98 000
16
1.3
500 000
1.3
0.3
50
50
Namie, Iitate: 10-50 mSv; Katsurao, Minami-Soma, Naraha, Iwaki: 1-10 mSv
Variation of Air Radiation Dose Rate in Iitate Village Office (7Gy/h after 3 months)
Natural Background
annual dose
mSv/year
Iitate
VERY HIGH
TYPICALLY HIGH
AVERAGE
~1
MINIMUM
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Children received substantial thyroid doses due to the consumption of contaminated milk.
More than 99% of cases were successfully treated, but fifteen died.
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Namie: 10-100 adults and 10y; 100-200 1y; Katsurao, Minami-Soma, Naraha: 10-100 all ages Iwaki: 1-10 adults; 10-100 for 10y and 1y
Rest of Fukushima prefecture (less affected): 1-10 adults; 10-100 for 10y and 1 y Neighbouring Japanese prefectures: 1-10
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Calculated rain intensity (shaded area) and I-131 air concentration accumulated in vertical air column (red contours)]
The Universal Time Constant (UTC) is presented at the top (Japanese Standard Time: + 9 hours).
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Nuclear safety
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Prevention
Rather, prevention should be supported by wide quantitative criteria, within a probabilistic context, a priori of design and operation.
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ignoring a priori the possibility of unpredictable causes of accidents, concentrating on what they already know,
and then
Mitigation!
It should be accepted that - however robust the prevention is there is always the possibility of implausible unpreventable eventsand in our view,
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Inadequate contention
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Modeling
X 5%/Sv
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Chernobyl:
Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
Alexey V. Yablokov (Editor), Vassily B. Nesterenko (Editor), Alexey V. Nesterenko (Editor), Janette D. Sherman-Nevinger (Editor)
It concludes that based on records now available, some 985,000 people died of cancer caused by the Chernobyl accident!
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Justification
Justification
Is evacuation justified?
Ramsar, Iran
If some of the evacuation in Fukushima is justified, why is not justified to evacuate some of the inhabitants of this city?
Optimization
Optimization
Harm
Radiation harm
Social harm
Optimal
safety
88
Dose limit ()
mSv in a year
Regulatory exemption
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Extant Sources
Residual dose
Reference level
93 93
100
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Simplified summary of individual dose restrictions
(in mSv in a year)
0.01
A typical question from the Japanese public is: Why doses of 20 to 100 mSv per year are allowed now, after the accident, when doses greater than 1 mSv per year were unacceptable before the accident? The Japanese expression for the 1mSv/y dose limit,
, [= beam,= amount,=border,=time]
is unequivocal: dose amount not to be exceeded in the time.
B A C K G R O U N D S P E E D
Protection of children
Parents do not believe that children are adequately protected by the radiation protection standards
The protection of children from the consequences of the accident has been of particular concern in Japan
98
Total
Whole Adult
5.5 4.1
0.2 0.1
"Contamination"
Connotations that:
worsened the lives of residents, generated anxiety, and ruined the economy.
100
VILNIUS ORSHA
Molodechno Borisov Lida Novogrudok
Gorki
Dn
ep
SMOLENSK
Aleksin
R
zh So
S
Roslavl
I
Kirov
A
Lyudinovo
KALUGA
ka
TULA
Novomoskovsk
Kimovsk
MINSK
Be re z in a
MOGILEV
Bykhov Cherikov
Krichev
R
Slutsk
Baranovichi
Bobruysk
BRYANSK
D es na
Efremov Yelets
Soligorsk
OREL
GOMEL
Dn ep r-B al ug ski C anPinsk
Novozybkov
Sosna
Pr i p y a t
Pr i p y a t
d
Narovlya Sarny
G o ryn
KURSK
S ey m
O sk ol
kho
St o
CHERNIGOV
Ovruch Polesskoje Chernobyl Narodichi
Pripyat
Slavutich
De
sna
SUMY
P sel
ROVNO
Te
te
BELGOROD
KIEV
ZHITOMIR
Berdichev Ternopol Khmelnitskiy VINNITSA Belaya Tserkov
R os ka
Dn
U
ep
Vo r s k l a
KHARKOV
POLTAVA
1480-3700 kBq m-2 555-1480 kBq m-2 185-555 kBq m-2 37-185 kBq m-2 <37 kBq m-2
CHERKASSY
102
Foodstuff
Water
Non edible
+ +
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Stigma
Those affected by the accident suffer from stigma due to their association with radiation and radioactivity. Consequently, they also suffer from psychological effects harmful to health,
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For many there is a social stigma associated with being an "exposed person"
Sterility
(People sincerely believe that school girls in Fukushima will not be able to have a baby in future!)
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Pregnancy
Should I terminate my pregnancy?
Stigma is responsible for great apprehension among pregnant women and probably for unnecessary terminations of pregnancies.
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Atucha NPP
Atucha II
745 MW(e)
Atucha I
357 MW(e) Operates since 19th March 1974
Embalse NPP
648 MW(e)
operates since April 25th 1983
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Stress tests
http://www.foroiberam.org
Results: are being cross checked until May, and will be jointly reviewed in June 2012.
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Prevention
Probabilistic criteria. Not academic, but regulatory!
Unique on-line leak-before-break-system (tritium) Greater volume of coolant per unit power. Supplementary heat sink: Moderator at low T. Greater thermal inertia. Gentler plant response Longer time for recovery actions.
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(High pressure injection system to mitigate hypothetic piping breaks is not required: water in the moderator expands and diverts to the core through the upper plenum. )
Containment
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Natural uranium fuel: Impossibility of criticality accidents Less energy per unit mass (MW/ton)
PHWR PWR 14 70 12 10 8 6 4 1 0 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
(MW/ton)
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Emergency response
The American Nuclear Society concluded that the severity of the Fukushima Daiichi accident was exacerbated by an unclear chain of command.
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Submission to ARN: Licensee, Civil Protection & Defence, Gendarmerie, Police, local governments.
Permanent coaching of the involved organizations and verification of the response capacity: drills with the participation of the population.
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5. Epilogue
We have the ethical duty of learning from these lessons and feeding-back the results into the international system.
Fukushima is reassuring, because in spite of the amazing scenario of deficiencies, as far as we know, no one has so far received a lethal dose of radiation!
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Reflections
should learn, understand and apply the concrete lessons on safety deficiencies derived from Fukushima.
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Is the international nuclear community prepared to identify the NPPs that do not comply with elementary safety requirements for
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Generic stress tests or action plans are not really needed to identify such NPPs.
E.g., NPPs that do not have efficient containment, or even no containment at all, are well known: they shall shut down!
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"Plus a change, plus cest pareil The more it changes, the more it's the same thing
J.B.A. Karr
Thank you!
+541163231758
www.arn.gob.ar
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Containment?