Asian Journal of Social Psychology

Asian Journal of Social Psychology (2008), 11, 196207 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-839X.2008.00258.x

Exchanges of group-based favours: Ingroup bias in the prisoners dilemma game with minimal groups in Japan and New Zealand
Toshio Yamagishi,1 Nobuhiro Mifune,1 James H. Liu2 and Joel Pauling2
Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University, Hokkaido, Japan; and 2Department of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
1

Japanese (N = 48) and New Zealander (N = 55) participants were rst assigned to one of two minimal groups, and then played a prisoners dilemma game twice with an ingroup member and twice with an outgroup member. In one of the two games they played with an ingroup (or outgroup) member, participants and their partner knew one anothers group memberships (mutual-knowledge condition). In the unilateral-knowledge condition, only the participants knew the group membership of their partner, but the partner did not know the group membership of the participant. Ingroup bias in cooperation emerged only in the mutual-knowledge condition in both countries; in the unilateral-knowledge condition no ingroup bias emerged. Mediational analyses found that, in accord with predictions, cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition is mediated by expectation of the partners cooperation. Ingroup bias in the mutual-knowledge condition emerged only among those who identied with the ingroup. Results provide support for a group heuristics account of ingroup favouritism in the minimal group. According to this account, participants who face minimal groups activate an ecologically adaptive heuristic of unilaterally cooperating with members of the same group, expecting indirect repayment from others in the same group. Key words: cooperation, culture, generalized exchange, ingroup bias, prisoners dilemma game.

Introduction
Ingroup-favouring behaviour in the minimal group It is commonly observed, within laboratories as well as in everyday life, that people treat their own group members more favourably than members of other groups. Such ingroup favouritism occurs even in the minimal group, a collection of people who share a trivial category and yet lack any form of social contact or interactions (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). In the minimal group, participants are divided into two groups based on a trivial feature shared among them. Examples of minimal groups are groups of people who tend to over- or underestimate the numbers of dots displayed on a screen, and those who like Klees paintings over Kandinskys paintings and vice versa. In a typical minimal group experiment, participants allocate monetary rewards between one of their ingroup members and an outgroup member (e.g. Tajfel et al., 1971). Given the benign and nominal nature of the minimal group, there is no reason to anticipate that participants of the minimal group experiment should allocate more monetary reward to

Correspondence: Toshio Yamagishi, Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University, N10 W7 Kita-ku, Sapporo 060-0810, Japan. Email: Toshio@let.hokudai.ac.jp Received 25 May 2007; accepted for publication 9 December 2007.

the ingroup member than the outgroup member. Yet, ingroup-favouring behaviour, giving more money to the ingroup than the outgroup member, was observed in the original study by Tajfel et al. (1971) and a large number of subsequent studies (e.g. Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Turner, 1975; Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979; Hartstone & Augoustinos, 1995). Similar ingroup-favouring behaviour has been frequently observed in the study of experimental games such as the prisoners dilemma game (PDG); players of a PDG cooperate at a higher level with members of their own minimal group than with those from the minimal outgroup (Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer, 1991; Wit & Wilke, 1992; Kramer, Pommerenke, & Newton, 1993; Kramer & Goldman, 1995; Jin & Yamagishi, 1997; Kollock, 1997; de Cremer & van Vugt, 1999; van Vugt & de Cremer, 1999; Simpson, 2006). The nding of ingroup favouritism in the minimal group was seminal in deriving a theory of identity-based construction of inter- as well as intra-group processes, called social identity theory and its subsequent elaboration Self-Categorization Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). The standard explanation for ingroup favouritism in social psychology for the last few decades is the one from social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), according to which people treat ingroup members more favourably than outgroup members in the minimal group situation in order to enhance their social identity. The theory begins with the assumption that people have two types of identity. One is an

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individual identity dened by unique features of individuals, distinct from other individuals. Another type of identity is social identity, dened by features shared among a group of people of which the individual is a member. In a typical minimal group experiment, in which individuals personal identities are completely anonymous to each other, their social, rather than individual, identities become salient. And, thus, people come to dene themselves primarily by the socially shared features of the group; i.e. their category membership. The tendency among the participants of the minimal group experiments to dene themselves in terms of the shared social category leads people to the process of social comparison (Festinger, 1954) where other relevant categories are used as a means of understanding the value of their own category membership. Because the only possible comparison available in the minimal group is through monetary reward allocation, participants of the minimal group experiments provide more monetary rewards to their own group member than to a member of the comparison group as a way to make the comparison favourable to their social identity. Group heuristic Yamagishi and colleagues provide an alternative account of ingroup favouritism in minimal group studies that claims that the presence of a salient ingroup activates a group heuristic or a default decision strategy to be adopted by people who face a group situation (Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, & Shinotsuka, 1993; Jin, Yamagishi, & Kiyonari, 1996; Jin & Yamagishi, 1997; Yamagishi, Jin, & Miller, 1998; Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000; Kiyonari, 2002; Yamagishi et al., 2005). According to Yamagishi and his colleagues, people have a nave theory of how groups operate, and one important feature of it is the belief that the group accommodates a system of generalized exchange. Generalized exchange is a system of sharing help in which people unilaterally provide help without expecting direct repayment of the help from them. When group members behave in such a way, they eventually end up receiving help when they themselves are in need. In a generalized exchange, no direct reciprocation of help between particular partners takes place and, yet, people who give out benets to others receive benets from someone in the system. Blood donation is a good example. Those who donate their blood do not receive blood, when they are in need, from the person to whom their blood went and, yet, can expect to receive blood from someone else. Most generalized exchange, except those formally organized in industrial societies such as blood banks, takes place in naturally occurring groups. One important function of groups is that they serve as venues for generalized exchange or resource sharing (Woodburn, 1982; Kaplan & Hill, 1985; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000). Given the fact

that humans have lived and cooperated in small bands throughout most of their evolutionary history (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992) as well as in contemporary societies, it is no surprise that they have acquired a default decision rule that is to be used when they face a group situation. The group heuristic (Yamagishi et al., 1999) is a set of beliefs and decision rules (or rule of thumb) that people use, by default, when they face a group situation. It is accessible if carefully prodded, but in practice the use of a heuristic is so spontaneous that people often do not deliberately think if they should adopt the rule. We deviate from the standard conception of a heuristic as a rule of thumb in one respect: We consider use of heuristics not simply as a means for conserving cognitive resources. We agree with Gigerenzer (2000) in seeing some positive, adaptive role in the use of heuristics behaviour that follows heuristics is often ecologically rational. We summarize our view on this issue as a means for error management to be presented below. The group heuristic is ecologically rational (Gigerenzer, 2000) for those whose survival depends on resources provided by systems of generalized exchange (i.e. resource sharing). How critical resource sharing is for human survival is easily seen in the miserable situation of people who are denied access to resources shared among members of the community. The group heuristic induces people to behave in a way to minimize the risk of exclusion from a system of generalized exchange. Being nice to other members of a system of generalized exchange so as to avoid accumulating the reputation of a free-rider (and eventually being ostracized from the system) is a basic principle for group living from this perspective. To adapt to such group living, it is safe to assume that a system of generalized exchange with mutual monitoring exists when one faces an unfamiliar group situation. Erroneously assuming the absence of generalized exchange and behaving in a selsh manner incurs a risk of developing a bad reputation, and eventual ostracism from the system. This risk should be minimized even at a cost of behaving in a cooperative or altruistic manner when no reputation is at stake. Assuming the existence of generalized exchange, by default, when facing a group situation, is thus an ecologically rational strategy for those whose livelihood depends so much on generalized exchange (see Yamagishi et al., 1999; Yamagishi, Terai, Kiyonari, Mifune, & Kanazawa, 2007, for the logic of this error management). According to the group heuristic: (i) people facing a group situation assume, by default (i.e. without deliberate thinking), that social interactions that take place in the group involve generalized exchange; and thus, (ii) they behave in a way to minimize the risk of developing a bad reputation among the members of their group. One important implication is to behave in a cooperative or altruistic manner toward members of their own group without

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necessarily making conscious calculations about the benet of such behaviour. According to this approach, cooperative or altruistic behaviour is a kind of admission ticket to a generalized exchange system. Once admitted, people can enjoy the benet of generalized exchange when they are in need. When the cost of being caught for sneaking in without paying the fee is extremely high (as in most historical and modern societies), minimizing the risk of being caught for cheating is adaptive. Not cheating at all in a group situation is a certain way to minimizing the risk, although it requires the extra cost of paying the fee even when one can possibly free-ride. The group heuristic is thus adaptive in a group situation; even egoists who do not want to pay the fee may yet refrain from attempts at free-riding when there is a chance of being detected for such cheating behaviour. According to the group heuristic approach, sharing a salient social category is just a necessary, but not a sufcient, condition of producing ingroup-favouring behaviour. What is critical to the production of ingroup-favouring behaviour is the intuitive perception of the situation that generalized exchanges potentially take place. More specically, participants in the minimal group experiments practice ingroup-favouring behaviour when and only when they feel that other group members potentially provide benets to them through generalized exchange. Conversely, they will not practice ingroup-favouring behaviour when it is made clear that they do not receive favourable treatment from other group members. For example, Karp et al. (1993) replicated the basic design of the original minimal group experiment by Tajfel et al. (1971). In the original minimal group experiment, each participant allocated money to one ingroup member and one outgroup member. As all participants faced the same situation, they were in the situation of being allocated money from ingroup and outgroup members, albeit not from the particular others to whom they allocated money. Karp and colleagues showed that the ingroup bias in reward allocation observed in the standard minimal group condition disappeared completely when participants were paid a xed amount of money instead of being allocated money from other participants. Through this manipulation, Karp and colleagues eliminated dependence on other participants for their reward. If ingroup favouritism relied only on a desire to positively distinguish the ingroup (or liking of ingroup members), it should not matter whether rewards participants themselves will receive are dependent on other members. The nding that making the participants own earnings independent of the behaviour of others eliminates ingroup bias was successfully replicated by two additional experiments by Jin et al. (1996). In one of these experiments (Experiment 2), Jin and colleagues demonstrated that only those who expected a favourable allocation from their own group members gave more to an ingroup member than to an outgroup member.

Another means by which Yamagishi and colleagues used to make the absence of generalized exchange salient is the manipulation of commonality of knowledge. While Jin and colleagues succeeded in demonstrating the validity of their argument, they faced a potential problem in their design that paying the participant a xed amount of money creates a third group of money allocators. The elimination of ingroup bias in reward allocation in the xed-payment condition could thus be attributed to the fact that participants did not share group membership with their own minimal group members (although this alternative explanation of their ndings cannot explain why only those who expected favourable allocation from their own minimal group members gave more money to them; see Experiment 2, Jin et al. (1996). Thus, they turned to a new methodology to support their argument. Jin and Yamagishi (1997) (reported in English in Yamagishi et al., 1999) were the rst in this series to demonstrate that making the lack of within-group generalized exchange salient eliminates the ingroup bias in cooperation. They rst successfully replicated the ingroup bias in a PDG observed in earlier studies in which PD players cooperated more with ingroup members than with outgroup members (Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer, 1991; Wit & Wilke, 1992; Kramer et al., 1993; Kramer & Goldman, 1995). Then, they succeeded in eliminating this ingroup bias by manipulating membership information. In the unilateral-knowledge condition they newly introduced, participants knew the group membership of their partner, but the partner did not know the group membership of the participant. In the mutual-knowledge condition, both players knew one anothers group membership. Participants in the unilateralknowledge condition were unable to expect ingroupfavouring behaviour from other members of their group, because they did not know that the participant was a member of their own group. This meant that a favour given to an ingroup member by the participant could not be returned by someone else in the group. Jin and Yamagishi (1997) succeeded in eliminating the ingroup bias in cooperation by making the lack of within-group generalized exchange salient in this way; they found an ingroup bias in cooperation in the standard, mutual-knowledge condition, but failed to do so in the unilateral-knowledge condition. Since this initial experiment, the same nding has been replicated by Kiyonari (2002; reported in English in Kiyonari & Yamagishi 2004), and Yamagishi et al. (2005, using nationality as the ingroup with Japanese and Australian participants). It should be noted that within social identity theory there has also been considerable theoretical activity to dene when and why ingroup favouritism will be observed. In a well-known paper, Abrams and Hogg (1988) noted problems with the self-esteem explanation for ingroup favouritism as posited by social identity theory. In a recent review,

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Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis (2002) conrmed that evidence for such an explanation was mixed: ingroup favouritism is by no means universal, in either experimental or survey research. Authors such as Grieve and Hogg (1999) and Hunter, Cox, and OBrien (2005) have provided alternative accounts attempting to rescue the social identity explanation of ingroup favouritism. None of these revisions, however, can explain Yamagishi and colleagues ndings. East Asians and Westerners The goal of the present study was to replicate the series of PDG studies with the knowledge manipulation, conducted byYamagishi and colleagues (Jin &Yamagishi, 1997; Kiyonari, 2002; Yamagishi et al., 2005) that supported the group heuristic account of ingroup-favouring behaviour. They argued that the importance of group-bounded generalized exchange is universal, and so is the adaptive advantage the group heuristic provides in inter- and intragroup situations (Yamagishi et al., 1999, 2007). However, according to Yamagishis (1988a,b, 1998; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994; Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & Schug, 2008) institutional view of collectivism versus individualism, the dening feature of a collectivistic society is in the degree according to which generalized exchanges are conned within tight group boundaries. The cost of failing to cooperate with ingroup members and, as a consequence, eventually being expelled from the group and shared resources in the group is greater in collectivistic societies than in individualistic societies. This is because most groups in collectivistic societies are closed to outsiders and, thus, those who have been expelled from the current group have a hard time being accepted by another group and receiving the benet of generalized exchanges in the new group. Behaving according to a default decision rule or heuristic that favours cooperation within ones own group and thus reducing the possibility of being expelled from the group is more adaptive in collectivist societies in which the cost of being expelled from the group is larger than in individualist societies. This leads to the prediction of a stronger effect of the knowledge manipulation as well as the stronger ingroup-favouring behaviour in the mutual-knowledge condition in collectivist societies than in individualist societies. A completely opposite prediction to the one based on the institutional collectivism can be made concerning the effect of the knowledge manipulation based on an argument by Yuki and colleagues (Yuki, 2003; Yuki, Maddux, Brewer, & Takemura, 2005) that social categories are more salient and play a more prominent role in Western cultures than in East Asian cultures. According to them, sharing the same social category is at the core of Americans perception of groupness, whereas the perception of group-ness among the Japanese is based on interconnectedness (relationships) among

group members. As the minimal group is characterized by a shared category, and the lack of interaction among group members, it is more of a group in Western cultures than in East Asian cultures. This leads to the prediction that the effect of the group heuristic triggered by the minimal group is stronger among Western cultures than in East Asian cultures. In short, the institutional view of collectivism predicts that the predicted ingroup bias in the mutualknowledge condition will be stronger in Japan than in New Zealand, whereas Yuki and colleagues argument of the category-based (vis--vis relation-based) nature of groupness in the West leads to the opposite prediction that the predicted ingroup bias in the mutual-knowledge condition will be stronger in New Zealand than in Japan. Yamagishi et al. (2005) examined whether the effect of the knowledge manipulation was stronger or weaker in a Western culture, Australia, than in Japan, and found that it was stronger among Australian than among Japanese participants. However, their study involved nationality as the group category rather than minimal groups. As the national identity of the Japanese is known to be weak, the weaker effect of the group heuristic among Japanese participants in Yamagishi et al. (2005) may be unique to the social category of nationality.1 We thus decided to replicate Jin and Yamagishis (1997) study both in Japan and in New Zealand using minimal groups. Based on Yamagishi et al.s (1999, 2007) argument about the adaptive value of the group heuristic, we predict that the effect of the knowledge manipulation will be observed both among Japanese and New Zealanders. We do not have any specic prediction concerning the relative strength of the knowledge effect in the mutual-knowledge condition, because, as discussed above, there are bases for predicting relative strength in either direction. While the primary goal of this study is to provide support for the universality of the group heuristic account of ingroup-favouring cooperation, we hope that cross-cultural comparison of the effect of the knowledge manipulation will provide useful information for further theoretical development. Hypotheses We test the hypothesis that ingroup-favouring behaviour in the PDG observed in previous studies involving the minimal group (Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer, 1991; Wit & Wilke, 1992; Kramer et al., 1993; Kramer & Goldman, 1995) will disappear when the lack of generalized exchange in the group is made salient. Specically, we predict ingroup-favouring behaviour in a mutual-knowledge condition in which the partner knows that the participant is in the same group and thus the participant expects ingroup-favouring behaviour from the ingroup partner (Hypothesis 1), and the lack of the ingroupfavouring behaviour in a unilateral-knowledge condition in

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which the partner does not know that the participant is in the same group and, thus, the participant cannot expect ingroup-favouring behaviour from the ingroup partner (Hypothesis 2). We further examined the precise means through which ingroup-favouring behaviour occurs through mediation and moderation analyses using expectancies for ingroup-favouring behaviour from other people and degree of identication with the ingroup. Specically, it is predicted that the effect of the expected ingroup bias in cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition will be mediated by expectation of the partners cooperation, and that the ingroup bias in cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition will emerge only among those who perceive the minimal group as a venue for generalized exchange (i.e. those who identify with the ingroup).

member of the same group or the other group. Finally, in the Out-UK (outgroup/unilateral-knowledge) condition, the participant knew that the partner was a member of the other group, but the partner did not know whether the participant was a member of the same group or the other group. Participants in the unilateral-knowledge condition also knew the fact that the partner did not know which group the participant belonged to. In addition to these four games, participants rst played the same PDG in which neither the participant nor the partner knew each others group membership, as a practice. Following this practice session, participants played the four experimental games in a random order. Prisoners dilemma game The PDG used in the current experiment took the form of resource exchanges rather than the standard form involving a payoff matrix. In each of the four within-subjects conditions, the participant was provided with an initial endowment of NZD 2.00 or 200 yen and then was asked how much of the endowment to provide to the partner in increments of 10 cents or 10 yen. The amount of money contributed by the participant to the partner was doubled by the experimenter before it was given to the partner. Similarly, the participant received twice the amount of contribution made by the partner. Thus, the joint prot was maximized when both contributed the most, each receiving NZD 4.00 or 400 yen. However, the participant could keep the endowment to him- or herself by not contributing to the partner; the less he or she contributed to the partner, the more he or she saved for him- or herself. Thus, not contributing any was the dominant strategy. However, if the two participants adopted this dominant strategy of not contributing any, they each ended up with the original endowment of NZD 2.00 or 200 yen, which is half of what they could have earned if they both contributed the maximum. No feedback of the partners decisions was provided after each transaction; participants were informed of the summary results at the end of the experiment. Procedure The experiment was conducted at Hokkaido University, Japan, and Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. The laboratory at each location consisted of several compartments for the participants and a control room. Each compartment was equipped with a computer, which was networked to a host computer. Upon arrival at the laboratory, each participant was immediately led to his or her compartment and asked to wait until all the participants arrived. Each participant had no chance to interact with other participants. The participants rst took a picture preference test in which they evaluated 28 pairs of paintings displayed on their computer monitor and indicated

Method
The basic design is a replication of Jin and Yamagishi (1997). Participants were rst divided into one of two minimal groups, the Klee group and the Kandinsky group. Each participant then played a PDG four times, once in each of the within-subject conditions to be explained below. In each of the four PDG, each participant was given 200 yen (or NZD 2.00) as an endowment and was asked how much of it to give to the partner. The amount provided by the participant was doubled in value and was given to the partner. No feedback was provided about the partners behaviour after each game. Six or eight participants participated in each session in Japan, two to ve in New Zealand. Design and participants The experiment was a 2 2 2 mixed design in which participant nationality (30 male and 18 female Japanese students from Hokkaido University, and 23 male and 32 female New Zealander students from Victoria University of Wellington) was crossed with the 2 2 within-subjects conditions (the knowledge conditions and the ingroup/outgroup conditions). Participants played the PDG to be presented later with a member of their own group (ingroup condition) or with a member of the other group (outgroup condition). In the mutual-knowledge condition, participants were informed that their partner also knew which group they belonged to. In the In-MK (ingroup/mutual-knowledge) condition, both the participant and the partner knew that they shared the same group membership. In the Out-MK (outgroup/mutual-knowledge) condition, both of them knew that their memberships were different. In the IN-UK (ingroup/unilateral-knowledge) condition, the participant knew that the partner was a member of the same group, but the partner did not know it. That is, the partner in this condition did not know whether the participant was a

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which painting they liked more of each pair. Participants were then assigned to either the Klee group or the Kandinsky group, based on their true relative preference for the two artists paintings.2 After the assignment of the participants to one of the two minimal groups, they were asked to answer a short questionnaire involving a scale to measure the level of their identication with the ingroup and outgroup based on Grieve and Hogg (1999).3 While the picture preference test was given on each participants computer monitor, the PDG study was conducted using paper-and-pencil decision sheets and collecting participants responses written on the sheets. The use of the paper-and-pencil method, instead of the computerized method, was to give participants the feeling that they were actually interacting with other participants. After reading the instructions, participants completed ve transaction periods, including the practice session. Each transaction period started when the experimenter delivered an envelope that contained a decision sheet. Information about the group membership of the trading partner for the period (whether the partner in this trading period was a member of the Klee group or the Kandinsky group), and the knowledge information (whether the partner was told the group membership of the participant) were given. Then, the participant was asked to decide how much of the NZD 2.00 (or 200 yen) to provide to the partner (in increments of 10 cents or 10 yen). In addition, we measured participants expectations of their partners level of contribution on the second decision sheet by asking how much they expected their partner would contribute. Then, the experimenter collected the envelope containing the lled out decision sheets (both their own contribution level and their expectations for their partners contribution level). No feedback about the partners decision was provided after each decision. Participants decisions were not actually matched with the partners for each condition in determining the amount they were paid. This was because there was no real counterpart in decisions in the unilateral conditions. Instead, each participant was paid on the premise that each of their partners contributed an average of 40%, which was about the average cooperation level based on the previous studies. After the participants had completed all ve trading periods, they completed a postexperimental questionnaire assessing participants possible concerns for evaluation apprehension and demand characteristics.4 Participants were individually paid in their own rooms and separately discharged. The whole procedure, including instructions and post-experimental questionnaire, took approximately one hour.

additional New Zealand participant was found not to understand the PDG and did not remember which group he belonged to. These six participants were not included in the following analysis. Manipulation check We rst tested whether the computerized picture preference test successfully created two minimal groups, to which participants identied themselves sufciently. The participants levels of identication with the ingroup and the outgroup were measured with 18 items based on Grieve and Hoggs (1999) identity scale. Participants average response on a seven-point scale concerning their feelings toward the outgroup (either the Klee group or the Kandinsky group, depending on their own group membership) on liking, similarity, importance, closeness etc. was subtracted from their responses to the ingroup, and the mean difference score was used as the relative ingroup identication score (i.e. how strongly they identied with the ingroup compared to the outgroup). The mean relative ingroup identication score among Japanese participants (Cronbachs alpha = 0.81), 0.54 (SD = 0.67; t(47) = 5.56, p < 0.001), and 0.70 (SD = 0.55; t(48) = 8.89, p < 0.001) among New Zealanders (alpha = 0.66), were signicantly greater than zero. The production of the two minimal groups through the picture preference test was thus demonstrated to be successful for both Japanese and New Zealander participants, who identied themselves more with the ingroup than with the outgroup. No signicant difference in relative ingroup identication was found between New Zealand and Japan (t(95) = 1.32, p = 0.192). Cooperation levels in the practice session We rst analyzed the cooperation level (proportion of the contributed amount to the endowment of 200 yen or NZD 2.00) of the Japanese and New Zealander participants in the practice session, and found that New Zealanders tended to be more cooperative than Japanese (0.51, SD = 0.33, among New Zealanders vs 0.38, SD = 0.30, among Japanese; t(95) = 2.03, p = 0.045, h2 = 0.04). This difference is consistent with the previous ndings that Japanese PDG or SDG (n-person version of PDG) players were less cooperative than those from Western cultures (Toda, Shinotsuka, McClintock, & Stech, 1978; Yamagishi, 1988a; Yamagishi et al., 2005). Yamagishi (1988a,b, 1998) provides an institutional explanation for this cross-cultural difference in the cooperation level, according to which a high level of cooperation in the Japanese society is maintained not by their cultural collectivism or the priority they give to the group interest but by collectivistic institutions that monitor members behaviour and provide formal and informal sanctions. In the laboratory group in which no institutional

Results
Five of the New Zealand participants were born in nonEuropean countries and were ethnically non-European. An

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monitoring and sanctioning are provided, Japanese feel less secure about other participants willingness to cooperate than Western participants and, accordingly, cooperate at a lower level than the Westerners. Hypotheses testing Figure 1 reports average cooperation level for each condition broken down by the participants nationality. It is clear, from the graph, that ingroup-favouring behaviour took place only in the mutual-knowledge condition (Hypothesis 1), and not in the unilateral-knowledge condition (Hypothesis 2). We conducted a 2 (the participants nationality: Japanese or New Zealander; between-participants factor) 2 (partners group: ingroup or outgroup; within-participants factor) 2 (knowledge information: unilateral or bilateral; within-participants factor) mixed design anova on cooperation level in PDG. The signicant main effect of the participants nationality, F(1,95) = 9.36, p = 0.003, h2 = 0.09, is consistent with the results of the practice session, and the previous ndings mentioned earlier. The main effects of partners group, F(1,95) = 18.84, p < 0.001, h2 = 0.17, and partners knowledge, F(1,95) = 8.88, p = 0.004, h2 = 0.08, were also signicant, but these main effects simply reected the elevated cooperation level in the In-MK condition. The knowledge group interaction was highly signicant, F(1,95) = 17.79, p < 0.001, h2 = 0.16, as predicted by a combination of hypotheses 1 and 2. No other effect was signicant. A set of additional planned comparisons5 on the effect of the partners group within each knowledge condition indicated that the ingroup-favouring behaviour was signicant only in the mutual-knowledge condition, F(1,95) = 32.68, p < 0.001, h2 = 0.26, and not

in the unilateral-knowledge condition, F(1,95) = 0.07, p = 0.792, as predicted. Participants nationality had only the main effect in the above anova; it did not interact with any of the other variables including the knowledge group interaction. Expectations According to the group heuristic account of ingroupfavouring behaviour, people behave more favourably toward ingroup members than outgroup members when they expect similar ingroup-favouring behaviour from other ingroup members. Additional support for the group heuristic model can thus be obtained from participants expectations regarding their partners cooperation. The pattern shown in Figure 2 is almost identical to the pattern of cooperation shown in Figure 1. We conducted the same anova as in the analysis of cooperation level, and found the same signicant effects: a main effect for nationality, F(1,95) = 8.51, p = 0.004, h2 = 0.08; the main effect of the group, F(1,95) = 41.68, p < 0.001, h2 = 0.31; a main effect of the partners knowledge, F(1,95) = 8.14, p = 0.005, h2 = 0.08; and a highly signicant group knowledge interaction, F(1,95) = 42.03, p < 0.001, h2 = 0.31. Analyses with a set of planned comparisons indicated that the effect of the group was signicant only in the mutual-knowledge condition, F(1,95) = 62.31, p < 0.001, h2 = 0.40, and not in the unilateral-knowledge condition, F(1,95) = 0.85, p = 0.360, as predicted. In addition to the above effects that were signicant in the analysis of cooperation, the following two effects were signicant only in the analysis of expectations. The signicant group nationality interaction, F(1,95) = 13.37, p < 0.001, h2 = 0.12, and group

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Figure 1 Average cooperation level in each withinparticipant condition broken down by the nationality of the participants. , Ingroup partner; , outgroup partner.

Figure 2 Average expectations of the partners cooperation in each within-participant condition broken down by the nationality of the participants. , Ingroup partner; , outgroup partner.

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knowledge nationality interaction, F(1,95) = 4.51, p = 0.036, h2 = 0.05, together indicated that the expectation of ingroup favouring cooperation was stronger among New Zealanders than among the Japanese. Did bias in expectancies mediate bias in cooperation? The group heuristic model predicts that the ingroup favouring cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition is mediated by the enhanced expectation of the ingroup partners cooperation in this condition. We conducted a mediation analysis of the effect of the partners group on cooperation, in which partners group was used as a dummy variable (ingroup = 1, outgroup = 0). The regression effect of partners group on cooperation was signicant both in Japan (b = 0.115, p = 0.003) and NZ (b = 0.167, p < 0.0001). Partners group also had a signicant effect on expectations (b = 0.113, p < 0.001, in Japan; b = 0.294, p < 0.0001, in NZ). When both partners group and expectations were entered as independent variables, the effect of partners group was reduced to a non-signicant level (b = 0.033, p = 0.299, in Japan; b = -0.070, p = 0.770, in NZ), whereas the effect of the expectation was highly signicant (b = 0.721, p < 0.0001, in Japan; b = 0.806, p < 0.0001, in NZ). Approximately 70% of the effect of partners group was mediated by expectation in Japan, and 100% in NZ. A similar mediation analysis was conducted to demonstrate that the effect of the knowledge manipulation on cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition was mediated by enhanced expectations for cooperation from the ingroup partner. The regression effect of knowledge on cooperation was signicant both in Japan (b = 0.092, p < 0.05) and NZ (b = 0.178, p < 0.001). Knowledge also had a signicant effect on expectations (b = 0.140, p = 0.002, in Japan; b = 0.184, p < 0.0001, in NZ). When both knowledge and expectations were entered as independent variables, the effect of partners group was reduced to a non-signicant level (b = 0.004, p = 0.614, in Japan; b = 0.043, p = 0.280, in NZ), whereas the effect of the expectation was highly signicant (b = 0.634, p < 0.0001, in Japan; b = 0.730, p < 0.0001, in NZ). Approximately 96% of the effect of partners group was mediated by expectations in Japan, and 75% in NZ. Identity and ingroup bias in cooperation and expectation We tested if relative ingroup identication explains ingroup bias in cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition (where ingroup bias in cooperation was observed) by regressing the level of ingroup favouring cooperation (cooperation level with the ingroup partner minus cooperation level with the outgroup partner) on relative ingroup

identication, and found that relative ingroup identication did not have a signicant effect either among Japanese participants, b = 0.051, t(46) = 0.93, p = 0.370, or among New Zealand participants, b = 0.056, t(46) = 0.90, p = 0.370. While relative ingroup identication exists for both Japanese and New Zealand participants, it did not enhance ingroup bias in cooperation. While the above analysis shows that relative ingroup identication does not have a direct effect on ingroup bias in cooperation, the following analysis suggests that it works as a moderator for ingroup bias in cooperation. To demonstrate this, we classied our participants into high ingroup identiers and low ingroup identiers based on the relative ingroup identication. High ingroup identiers are those whose ingroup identity score was higher than the outgroup identity score; the rest were classied as low ingroup identiers. In a knowledge (unilateral vs mutual) identication level (low vs high) participants nationality partners group (in vs out; a within-participant factor) anova on cooperation level, the only statistically signicant effects were the main effect of partners group (F(1,93) = 8.86, p = 0.004, h2 = 0.09), participants nationality (F(1,93) = 10.02, p = 0.002, h2 = 0.10), the knowledge group interaction (F(1,93) = 4.27, p = 0.042, h2 = 0.04) and the knowledge group identication interaction (F(1,93) = 4.09, p = 0.046, h2 = 0.04). The main effect of the knowledge was marginal (F(1,93) = 3.20, p = 0.077, h2 = 0.03). As shown in Figure 3, the rst interaction term indicates the pattern predicted by the group heuristic model, and the second interaction term indicates that this pattern existed only among high-identiers; ingroup bias in cooperation existed only in the mutualknowledge condition among high-identiers. Among low-

0 .7 0 .6 0 .5 0 .4 0 .3 0 .2 0 .1 0

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Figure 3 Average cooperation level in each withinparticipant condition among low-identiers (left panel) and high-identiers (right panel). , Ingroup partner; , outgroup partner.

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identiers, the average levels of ingroup favouring bias in cooperation (cooperation level with the ingroup minus cooperation level with the outgroup) were 0.05 (SD = 0.13) in the mutual-knowledge condition and 0.03 (SD = 0.10) in the unilateral-knowledge condition. Among highidentiers, the effect of the knowledge manipulation was more pronounced; 0.17 (SD = 0.26) in the mutualknowledge condition and 0.00 (SD = 0.24) in the unilateralknowledge condition. Almost identical pattern was observed with regard to expectations (Fig. 4). The moderating role of ingroup identity for the ingroup bias in cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition, but not in the unilateral-knowledge condition, suggests that the group heuristic operates when participants see the minimal groups as meaningful. This nding is consistent with the literature derived from social identity and selfcategorization theory, where high identiers act differently than low identiers (e.g. Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). The group heuristic account of ingroup bias in cooperation asserts that people adopt the default decision rule catered toward adapting to group life when facing a group situation. Those who failed to identify themselves with the ingroup were most likely the ones who did not see the minimal groups as meaningful groups and, thus, the default decision rule of cooperating with the ingroup as a means to adapt to the group life was irrelevant. From this perspective, relative ingroup identication is an indicator that one is subjectively facing a group situation. The group heuristic prediction of ingroup bias in cooperation specic to the mutual-knowledge condition was found only for the participants who saw group-ness in the minimal groups they faced.

Discussion
The results of the current experiment clearly support hypotheses derived from the group heuristic model. The mere fact that people share a group membership is not sufcient to make them treat ingroup members more favourably than outgroup members. In addition to sharing a same group membership, it was shown to be critical that the two need to know that both are aware of this fact (i.e. the commonality of the knowledge that the two share the same group membership). Why is the commonality of knowledge critical for the ingroup-favouring behaviour? One possible answer is that commonality of knowledge enhances group identity or, conversely, the lack of commonality of knowledge prevents group identity from being fully attained. Whether this was actually the case cannot be ascertained with the current experiment, as the knowledge was manipulated as a within-participants factor; the only way to examine if the knowledge affected ingroup identity was to administer identity scale in each within-participant condition, which would have been heavily affected by carry-over effects. However, we are assured, based on the results from previous studies in which the same knowledge manipulation took place as a between-participants factor, that the knowledge manipulation we used in this study likely had no effect on the participants identity with the ingroup and the outgroup. Suzuki, Konno, and Yamagishi (2007) and Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) compared the levels of ingroup identity and outgroup identity in the two knowledge conditions and reached the conclusion that the same knowledge manipulation as the one we used in this study did not affect relative ingroup identication.6 We provide an alternative account of the critical role that commonality of knowledge plays in engendering ingroupfavouring behaviour. In the unilateral-knowledge condition, the participant is not an ingroup member from the point of view of the ingroup partner and, thus, it is very clear that the ingroup partner will not treat the participant as a member of a generalized exchange; simply put, generalized exchange cannot take place in the group in the unilateral-knowledge condition. Given the void of generalized exchanges in the group, treating ingroup members favourably is a total waste; it is like paying an admission fee to enter a theatre where no play is performed. Participants in this study did not treat ingroup members more favourably than outgroup members in the unilateral-knowledge condition where it is salient that the group is not a venue of generalized exchange. The nding in the present study that the pattern predicted by the group heuristic ingroup bias in cooperation in the mutual-knowledge condition, and not in the unilateralknowledge condition emerged only among those who showed relative ingroup identication adds new evidence in support of the heuristic account of ingroup-favouring behaviour. First, the nding indicates that ingroup identity

0 .7 0 .6 0 .5 0 .4 0 .3 0 .2 0 .1 0

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Figure 4 Average expectation in each withinparticipant condition among low-identiers (left panel) and high-identiers (right panel). , Ingroup partner; , outgroup partner.

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per se does not produce ingroup bias in cooperation in the unilateral-knowledge condition. Ingroup identity is insufcient as an account of ingroup bias in cooperation unless and until it provides an account of why it does not enhance cooperation with the ingroup in the absence of shared knowledge of group membership. It should be remembered here that the same knowledge manipulation used in this study has already been demonstrated not to affect the level of ingroup identity (Suzuki et al., 2007; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). At the same time, the above nding suggests that the pattern of ingroup bias in cooperation predicted by group heuristic did in fact emerge for those, and only for those, for whom minimal groups were perceived as meaningful groups (i.e. those who exhibited relative ingroup identication). All of the ndings from this study consistently indicate that ingroup bias in cooperation is a product of group heuristic a default decision rule encouraging cooperation within groups in a group situation. It should be emphasized here that the operation of group heuristic does not imply that the decision is a result of deliberate calculations of the probability of future return. If this was the case, no participants would have cooperated with any partner regardless of the knowledge condition. The PDG used in this study was a one-shot game, and no future return could be expected. Rather, favourable behaviour towards the ingroup is a default decision that is taken by default; that is, without deliberate calculation when no salient cues exist indicating lack of generalized exchange. Obviously, groups are of critical importance to human life. However, what is important is not the group as a category. Groups are important to human life because they are where we get resources that we need. This strongly suggests that whatever psychological mechanisms humans have developed for our survival, they should be catered towards adaptation to what is going on in the group, including various forms of social exchange. The group categories are simply containers of various forms of social interactions (Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000); what matters is what is inside the container, not the empty container per se. New Zealanders were found to be more cooperative than Japanese in the practice session and in the overall level of cooperation. This nding is consistent with Yamagishi et al.s (2005) ndings in which Australians were found to be more cooperative than Japanese (see Yamagishi, 1988a, and Toda et al., 1978, for a similar results showing that Americans were also more cooperative than Japanese). More important is the fact that the pattern predicted by the group heuristic model was observed both among Japanese and New Zealand participants. The only signicant crosscultural difference in this respect was that ingroup bias in expectations in the mutual-knowledge condition was more pronounced among New Zealand participants than among Japanese. This difference seems to suggest that the operation of the group heuristic is stronger among New Zealanders

than among Japanese, implying that minimal groups are perceived as more real by New Zealanders than by Japanese. This is consistent with Yuki and colleagues argument that identity with categorical groups plays a more prominent role in the Western societies than in the Japanese society (Yuki, 2003; Yuki et al., 2005). If New Zealanders are more sensitive to social categories than Japanese, as Yuki and colleagues suggest, they are more likely to activate group heuristic than the Japanese when they face a minimal group situation in which no actual face-to-face interaction exists and thus produce the pattern of ingroup favouring cooperation predicted by the group heuristic model. In contrast, Japanese participants may show such a pattern of behaviour more strongly than New Zealanders when cues suggest the presence of interpersonal ties. Unfortunately, the current study does not provide sufcient data to test this argument. This is certainly an important topic for future study.

Acknowledgements
The research reported here was supported by a grant-in-aid from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grantin-Aid for Scientic Research, #14201014, to Toshio Yamagishi.

End notes
1. In the World Values Survey (World Values Study Group, 2000), only 22.8 % of Japanese replied to How proud are you to be [Nationality]? by very proud, in 2000, whereas this gure was 72.1% among Americans in 1999, 66.5% among Canadians in 2000, 65.1% among New Zealanders in 1998, 50.5% among the British in 1999, 39.7% among the French in 1999. 2. We avoided the use of random assignment, since from our previous experience that some of the participants were actually able to discern the two artists paintings. The random assignment would have raised serious suspicion among those participants about the use of deception. 3. The last item of Grieve and Hoggs (1999) identity scale, asking which of the two groups the participant wanted to belong to, was dropped from the analysis presented below in the process of constructing the relative ingroup identication score. 4. None of these items revealed threats from evaluation apprehension or demand characteristics. 5. For the four cells, in-MK, out-MK, in-UK, and out-UK, were assigned -1, 1, 0, 0, in the rst comparison, and 0, 0, -1, 1, in the second comparison. Another independent contrast, -0.5, -0.5, 0.5, 0.5, was also used in the regression analysis using the rst, second, third contrast as independent variables. 6. Suzuki et al. (2007) and Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) manipulated the knowledge condition as a between-participant factor, and thus they were able to measure the level of relative ingroup identication in each condition.

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