Report: Turning Around CARICOM, Proposals To Restructure The Secretariat

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Turning Around CARICOM:
Proposals to Restructure the Secretariat
Richard Stoneman
Justice Duke Pollard
Hugo Inniss
FINAL REPORT
January 2012

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Turning Around CARICOM:
Proposals to Restructure the Secretariat
Richard Stoneman
Justice Duke Pollard
Hugo Inniss
FINAL REPORT
January 2012

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Consultancy to Conduct an Organisational Restructuring of the Caribbean Community Secretariat
Landell Mills Ltd/ Final Report/ January 2012

Consultancy to Conduct an Organisational Restructuring of the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) Secretariat

Service contract No. CISP/CCS/R.7.2.1./SER 11.12

Report prepared and submitted by LANDELL MILLS LTD

Authored by consultants:

Richard Stoneman
Duke Pollard
Hugo Inniss

This report was mandated by CARICOM Heads of Government and was contracted by
the CARICOM Secretariat with the financial support of the European Union and the
Member States of CARICOM.

The content of this report is the sole responsibility of Landell Mills Ltd and can in no way
be taken to reflect the views of CARICOM Member States or the CARICOM Secretariat

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Acknowledgements
We are extremely grateful to our colleagues on the Project Management Committee and in the
CARICOM Secretariat for all their help and support during this assignment.

We are also extremely grateful to all the people round the region who helped organise our many
visits and to those we met and who unstintingly gave of their time.

However the responsibility for this report, and particularly for any errors or omissions, remains
ours alone.

Richard Stoneman
Duke Pollard
Hugo Inniss

January 2012

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACP Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Countries
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASG Assistant Secretary General
CARICOM Caribbean Community
CARIFORUM Caribbean Forum of ACP States
CCJ Caribbean Court of Justice
CDB Caribbean Development Bank
CEO Chief Executive Officer
COO Chief Operations Officer
COTED Council for Trade and Economic Development
CSME Caricom Single Market and Economy
CVQ Caribbean Vocational Qualifications
CXC Caribbean Examination Certificate
ECCB Eastern Caribbean Central Bank
ECCU Eastern Caribbean Currency Union
EC$ Eastern Caribbean dollar
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit
EMC Executive Management Committee
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HR Human Resources
HSD Human and Social Development Directorate
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IFI International Financial Institution
IMF International Monetary Fund
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECS Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
OTN CARICOM Office for Trade Negotiations
PANCAP Pan Caribbean Partnership against HIV/AIDS
PCA Permanent Committee of Ambassadors
PMO Project Management Office
PR Public Relations
RMTA Resource Mobilisation and Technical Assistance
SRPR Strategy, Regional Policy and Review Department
TEI Trade and Economic Integration Directorate
TOR Terms of Reference
TASU Technical Assistance Support Unit of the CARICOM Secretariat
WTO World Trade Organization

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Table!of!Contents!
Executive!Summary ................................................................................................ 7!
1.! Introduction................................................................................................... 11!
1.1! The Challenge ...................................................................................................................................... 11!
1.2! 0ui 0veiall Appioach....................................................................................................................... 12!
1.S! Stiuctuie of Final Repoit ................................................................................................................ 1S!
2! Challenges!Facing!CARICOM............................................................................ 14!
2.1! A Necessaiy Constiuct. ................................................................................................................... 14!
2.2! A Constiuct in Ciisis.......................................................................................................................... 14!
2.S! 0veiselling Nagnifies the Ciisis................................................................................................... 1S!
2.4! 0ui Piognosis ...................................................................................................................................... 16!
2.S! Requiiements foi a Positive 0utcome....................................................................................... 17!
3! Diagnosing!CARICOMs!Current!Difficulties ..................................................... 18!
S.1! Beveloping Fiustiations ................................................................................................................. 18!
S.2! Exogenous Souices of Fiustiation: The Binuing Constiaints.......................................... 18!
S.S! Enuogenous Souices of Fiustiation: A Bysfunctional Constiuct ................................... 2u!
S.4! Towaius Solutions............................................................................................................................. 26!
S.S! Concluuing Remaiks: 0ui Pioposeu Appioach..................................................................... 27!
4! Prioritisation:!The!First!Step!to!CARICOMs!Recovery...................................... 29!
4.1! Why Naking Piioiities Natteis .................................................................................................... 29!
4.2! The Ciucial Role of Beaus of uoveinment ............................................................................... 29!
4.S! The Neeu foi a Stiategy................................................................................................................... Su!
4.4! Stiategy anu Savings......................................................................................................................... S1!
4.S! 0ui Pioposal foi Beveloping a Stiategy................................................................................... S2!
4.6! uuiuelines foi Beveloping the Stiategy .................................................................................... SS!
5! Strengthening!the!CARICOM!Construct:!The!Second!Step!to!Recovery............ 37!
S.1! Intiouuction ......................................................................................................................................... S7!
S.2! uoveinance Issues............................................................................................................................. S7!
S.S! Scope of CARIC0N............................................................................................................................. S7!
S.4! Aieas Requiiing Stiengthening.................................................................................................... S8!
S.S! Peimanent Committee of Ambassauois................................................................................... S8!
S.6! An 0utwaiu Looking Constiuct: Some Potential Innovations......................................... 4u!
6! Diagnosing!the!Secretariats!Current!Difficulties ............................................. 43!
6.1! Key Factois in the Secietaiiat's Loss of Biiection................................................................ 4S!
6.2! uetting to uiips with the 0nueilying Pioblems .................................................................... 46!
6.S! A Biief Review of the Challenges Facing the Secietaiiat ................................................... 46!
7! Restructuring!the!Secretariat:!The!Third!Step!to!Recovery .............................. 52!
7.1! Intiouuction ......................................................................................................................................... S2!
7.2! Befining the Secietaiiat's puipose ............................................................................................. S2!
7.S! Funuamental change is iequiieu................................................................................................. SS!
7.4! The Restiuctuiing of the Secietaiiat.......................................................................................... S4!
8! Strengthening!the!Secretary!Generals!Office.................................................. 56!
8.1! The Change 0ffice .............................................................................................................................. S6!
8.2! Stiategy, Regional Policy anu Review Bepaitment.............................................................. S9!
8.S! Chef ue Cabinet ................................................................................................................................... 61!
8.4! The Remaining Aieas of the Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice..................................................... 61!

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8.S! Nanaging the Secietaiiat ................................................................................................................ 62!
9! Implementation!Under!The!Deputy!Secretary!General.................................... 63!
9.1! Rationale foi Implementation 0ffice.......................................................................................... 6S!
9.2! New Bepaitments in the Implementation 0ffice.................................................................. 6S!
9.2.1! Challenges!to!be!Overcome .............................................................................................................65!
9.2.2! Role!of!Implementation!Support!Group....................................................................................68!
9.2.3! Challenges!of!Project!Management.............................................................................................70!
9.2.4! Role!of!the!Project!Management!Office.....................................................................................72!
9.S! Re-casting Existing Biiectoiates anu Bepaitments............................................................. 7S!
9.3.1! Challenges!Facing!the!Directorates ............................................................................................76!
9.3.2! Directorates!of!Trade!and!Economic!Integration!and!of!Human!and!Social!
Development..........................................................................................................................................................78!
9.3.3! Foreign!Relations!Directorate.......................................................................................................79!
9.3.4! OTN!&!External!Trade.......................................................................................................................80!
9.3.5! Statistics!Department........................................................................................................................81!
9.3.6! General!Counsel ....................................................................................................................................82!
9.4! The Implementation Piocess ........................................................................................................ 82!
10! Operations!Directorate ................................................................................. 84!
1u.1! The Ciucial Role of Suppoit Seivices ...................................................................................... 84!
1u.2! Secietaiiat Suppoit Seivices: Not Fit Foi Puipose............................................................ 84!
1u.S! Requiiements foi Tuining Rounu Suppoit Seivices ........................................................ 8S!
1u.4! The 0peiations 0ffice.................................................................................................................... 87!
1u.S! Finance anu Institutional Accountability .............................................................................. 87!
1u.6! Buman Resouices ........................................................................................................................... 92!
1u.7! IT & Communications Seivices.................................................................................................. 9S!
1u.8! Coipoiate Seivices.......................................................................................................................... 9S!
11! Budget!and!Financial!Issues........................................................................... 97!
11.1! 0veiall Buuget .................................................................................................................................. 97!
11.2! The Financing Conunuium.......................................................................................................... 98!
11.S! Funuing Coie Staff........................................................................................................................... 99!
11.4! Relating the Coie Staff Buuget to the 0veiall Buuget.....................................................1u2!
11.S! Finance anu Risk............................................................................................................................1u2!
11.6! Impioving Nembei State Financing Aiiangements .......................................................1uS!
11.7! Immeuiate Financing Requiiements.....................................................................................1uS!
Appendices ......................................................................................................... 105!
Appendix!1:!Listing!of!Findings!and!Recommendations....................................... 106!
Appendix!2:!Action!Plan...................................................................................... 114!
Appendix!3:!Approaches!to!Regional!Governance............................................... 116!
Appendix!4:!Restructuring!CARICOM!Communications ....................................... 137!
Appendix!5:!Outline!Specification!of!Change!Office ............................................ 151!
Appendix!6:!Some!Views!on!CARICOM................................................................ 156!

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Turning!Around!CARICOM:!Proposals!
to!Restructure!the!Secretariat!
Executive!Summary!
1. CARIC0N is in ciisis. This is foi thiee ieasons:
! Longstanuing fiustiations with its slow piogiess have continueu to
mount;
! A seiious weakening in its stiuctuie anu opeiation ovei a numbei of
yeais;
! Continuing economic ietienchment since the 2uu8 financial ciisis
anu the iisk of a fuithei uowntuin in 2u12.

2. The ciisis is sufficiently seveie to put CARIC0N's veiy existence in question.
This is because many of its Nembei States aie highly inuebteu with the
iesult that a fuithei uowntuin in 2u12 coulu compiomise theii ability to
funu the constiuct. The Secietaiiat anu CARIC0N institutions aie not stiong
enough to cope with any majoi shoitfall in funuing. Notwithstanuing the
immeuiate uangeis, theie is eviuence that, without funuamental change,
CARIC0N coulu expiie slowly ovei the next few yeais as stakeholueis begin
to vote with theii feet.

S. CARIC0N can suimount the ciisis anu eventually piospei as long as
funuamental changes in its opeiation anu stiuctuies aie maue - anu maue
uecisively anu speeuily.

4. Theie also neeus to be contingency planning to piotect against the moie
pessimistic economic foiecasts foi 2u12 coming to fiuition. Iionically, the
key to 2u12's piospects appeais to be whethei oi not anothei iegional
constiuct, the Euiopean 0nion's Euio, can oveicome the ciisis that it is
facing.

S. Theie aie thiee geneial conuitions goveining whethei CARIC0N can suivive
anu eventually piospei. These aie:
I. The full anu unequivocal suppoit of Nembei States;
II. Taigeting the ueliveiy of a naiiow iange of specific, piactical anu
achievable benefits ovei a ieasonably shoit time hoiizon;
III. A cieuible ieoiganisation anu stiengthening of the CARIC0N
constiuct, incluuing the Secietaiiat anu CARIC0N institutions,
focuseu on the management of implementation.

6. Behinu each of these conuitions lay some impoitant issues. Bespite Nembei
States maintaining a seiious commitment to iegionalism in piinciple, many

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of theii uecisions, piactices anu actions have - often inauveitently -
unueimineu anu weakeneu CARIC0N in ieality. This must change.

7. In paiticulai, it is essential that the iegion settle on cleai piioiities as to
what it can anu cannot uo. Stakeholueis anu infoimeu commentatois aie
incieasingly unanimous that the longstanuing habit of the iegion attempting
to take on a nevei-enuing wish list of piioiities means that nothing is a
piioiity in piactice. The Beaus of uoveinment iecognition of this at theii
ietieat in uuyana in Nay 2u11 coulu piove an histoiic tuining point in this
iespect.

8. Foi CARIC0N to be tuineu aiounu successfully, both stakeholueis anu
inteiesteu paities
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neeu to become moie iealistic about the insuimountable
constiaints of geogiaphy, lack of size anu complexity faceu in ueveloping a
successful iegional constiuct in the Caiibbean. Whilst these constiaints
impose limitations on what can be uone anu the speeu at which it can be
uone, the funuamental challenge is to auuiess the plethoia of weaknesses in
the CARIC0N constiuct that have pieventeu it making acceptable piogiess
ovei many yeais.

9. 0ui main iepoit auuiesses these weaknesses in some uetail. The
weaknesses incluue the often ill-uisciplineu way CARIC0N conuucts its
business, the incieasingly loose stiuctuie binuing CARIC0N's oigans anu
institutions anu longstanuing anu giowing uifficulties in the Secietaiiat
itself. These seveie weaknesses, in combination with CARIC0N's tenuency to
announce uecisions ovei new initiatives as if full implementation weie
imminent, have iesulteu in the so-calleu "implementation ueficit." As
CARIC0N has become weakei, this ueficit has become incieasingly
intiactable. At the same time, mounting ciiticisms mean that it has become
an incieasingly apposite - yet uestiuctive - slogan in ciicumsciibing those
weaknesses.

1u. CARIC0N's iecoveiy can be biought about thiough thiee steps, each of
which encapsulates a bioau set of measuies. These aie:
! First!Step: Piioiitising long-teim goals into specific outcomes that
can be achieveu within a ielatively shoit timefiame. It is essential
that CARIC0N uevelop a five-yeai Stiategy to uelivei a limiteu set of
piioiities that can be iealistically matcheu by available iesouices
uuiing that peiiou. Remaining piioiities can be ueliveieu by
successive stiategies latei on;
! Second!Step: vaiious essential measuies to stiengthen the
CARIC0N constiuct. These incluue limiting the scope of CARIC0N
foi the foieseeable futuie anu stiengthening the 0igans of CARIC0N
anu the uisciplines by which they woik. These measuies also incluue
integiating CARIC0N's institutions bettei, not least by ensuiing they
aie moie accountable;

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The most impoitant inteiesteu paity in this iespect is the inteinational community, paiticulaily its
constituent aiu uonois.

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! Third!Step: A funuamental iestiuctuiing of the Secietaiiat to focus
on implementation anu on wheie the iegion can auu value, net of
any costs, to what Nembei States can uo inuiviuually. This
iestiuctuiing incluues: stiengthening the position of the Secietaiy
ueneial to enable moie effective leaueiship of CARIC0N; setting up
an Implementation 0ffice moie uiiectly focuseu on the piocess of
ueliveiing agieeu piioiities; stiengthening the Secietaiiat's
opeiations, which have been incieasingly unable to cope with the
piessuies put on them.

11. The thiust of these measuies is manageiial, iathei than stiuctuial. This
appioach is baseu on tiying to make things woik thiough focusing on the
specific pioblems that neeu to be iesolveu anu tiying to woik out the best
way of iesolving them. It is laigely baseu on stiengthening stiuctuies that
exist, iathei than on intiouucing new stiuctuies.

12. As fai as the Secietaiiat itself is conceineu, the thiust of these measuies
involves some changes in what is uone anu the way it is uone. This will
enable a bettei focus on outcomes anu on ieuucing the implementation
ueficit uiiectly, iathei than ielying on moie inuiiect piocesses. Success will
be uepenuent on closei cooiuination with Nembei States anu on theii
coopeiation in biinging about mutually uesiieu objectives.

1S. At this stage, theie is neithei the justification noi the suppoit to set up a
Peimanent Committee of Ambassauois. Theie is, howevei, a goou case foi
Ambassauois foiming a flexible anu infoimal auvisoiy gioup that, uepenuing
on its usefulness, coulu eventually uevelop into a moie foimal anu
peimanent aiiangement.

14. Restiuctuiing the Secietaiiat anu tuining aiounu the foitunes of CARIC0N
will iequiie a majoi effoit that is beyonu the cuiient capabilities eithei of
CARIC0N oi of the Secietaiiat. We have theiefoie pioposeu setting up a
tempoiaiy Change 0ffice, which is likely to opeiate only on a skeleton basis
uuiing 2u12 because of financing iequiiements. Neveitheless, it is essential
that key immeuiate piioiities, not least the uevelopment of a CARIC0N
Stiategy, be caiiieu out uuiing this peiiou. The full Change 0ffice will neeu
to opeiate foi about two yeais anu, iueally, shoulu be up anu iunning befoie
the enu of 2u12.

1S. We aie confiuent that sufficient savings can be geneiateu fiom within the
Secietaiiat's cuiient iesouices to funu the iecuiient costs of its new
activities. Bowevei, the Secietaiiat cannot be maue fit foi puipose by cutting
its buuget. It is essential that the cuiient level of funuing be maintaineu. We
aie theiefoie pioposing that Nembei State contiibutions be maintaineu at
cuiient levels in ieal teims until 2u1S.

16. Auuitional capital funuing will be iequiieu foi the Change 0ffice anu foi the
long oveiuue ieplacement of the Secietaiiat's ageing IT system. The
successful iestiuctuiing of the Secietaiiat is uepenuent on an up-to-uate IT

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system, which shoulu quickly pay foi itself thiough a combination of staff
savings anu impioveu effectiveness.

17. These capital costs will neeu to come fiom those Nembei States that aie not
highly inuebteu anu fiom inteinational uonois. The immeuiate costs foi the
Change 0ffice aie aiounu 0S$2Su,uuu anu the costs of the full Change 0ffice
about 0S$S.S million. We unueistanu that the costs of upgiauing the IT
system aie of a similai oiuei.

18. In oui juugement the foitunes of CARIC0N can be tuineu iounu as long as
the existential natuie of the cuiient ciisis anu its seiiousness aie fully
appieciateu anu unueistoou anu the iequisite uecisions anu action taken.
The main iepoit that follows sets out the main uecisions that aie iequiieu
anu the key actions that neeu to be taken.

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1. Introduction!
1.1 The!Challenge!

1. This has been a uifficult iepoit to wiite. As a team, we know we beai a heavy
iesponsibility to get it iight. We aie awaie that some veiy eminent people
have tiouuen similai teiiitoiy befoie. Yet the goals of CARIC0N have
iemaineu fiustiatingly elusive.

2. We aie also painfully awaie that, in the miust of an economic ciisis, which
iionically is centieu on the hitheito iole mouel foi iegional integiation, the
Euiopean 0nion, that this time it is uiffeient. The whole CARIC0N pioject is
in unpieceuenteu uifficulties anu - with no cuiient piospect of economic
iecoveiy in the iegion anu the seiious possibility of fuithei ietienchment -
unuei existential thieat.

S. 0ne of the officials with whom we have woikeu closely askeu us "to give the
tiuth - all of it." In a iepoit like this, it woulu be veiy easy to pull punches.
We aie suie that we have avoiueu this but, in the piocess, know we aie likely
to cause uistiess in some quaiteis. We much iegiet that, paiticulaily as
theie aie some veiy goou people involveu. Bowevei, we have a wiuei
iesponsibility to log the peiilous position that CARIC0N is in anu to suggest
a ioute away fiom the iocks anu out of the stoim.

4. 0vei the yeais, theie has been much eiuuite analysis of the challenges facing
CARIC0N anu of the iole of Secietaiiat. We uo not intenu iepeating much of
what has been saiu unless we have something new oi uiffeient to say
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is because we have piioiitiseu oui activities - anu "piioiity" is an oft-
iepeateu woiu in the iepoit that follows. 0ui piioiity is to focus on what
neeus to be uone, as no amount of eiuuite analysis of the situation will, on its
own, iesolve the intiactable challenges that have long faceu CARIC0N
S
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S. We veiy much hope that we have come up with woikable answeis that can
be implementeu successfully. The eviuence anu views that we weie given
anu oui long expeiience of assessing oiganisations of eveiy type gives us
confiuence that oui bioau conclusions as to what neeus to be uone aie
coiiect. Bowevei, we tiust we have the humility to know that we cannot
have got eveiything iight.

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Nuch of the analysis going back to "A Time foi Action" anu beyonu iemains highly ielevant touay.
S
We have not backeu eveiything up with eviuence, eithei because the infoimation uoes not exist oi because
pioviuing the eviuence woulu take us away fiom the main task of what neeus to be uone. Shoulu we be
askeu, we aie happy to tiy to back up anything we have saiu with whatevei eviuence is available. 0ui only
caveat is that we cannot ieveal souices foi what we weie tolu at inteiview.

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6. In paiticulai, we aie well awaie that, uuiing the shoit time available, we
have hau to uig uown into some aieas that iequiie moie caieful assessment
anu wheie what we have saiu is unlikely to be the final answei. 0ui iepoit
incluues suggestions as to how oui woik shoulu be taken foiwaiu quickly
anu how some of oui specific iecommenuations can be fuithei examineu
anu mouifieu as necessaiy.
1.2 Our!Overall!Approach!
7. Nuch of oui time has been spent tiavelling the length anu bieauth of the
Caiibbean wheie we have met a wiue aiiay of people fiom goveinment,
membeis of the public, community gioups, public anu inteinational
institutions anu the piivate sectoi. We aie veiy giateful to those who
oiganiseu oui extensive scheuules. We have met many eminent people,
incluuing cuiient anu foimei Beaus of uoveinment as well as the wiuest
possible gioup of stakeholueis, fiom officials intimately involveu with
CARIC0N to outsiueis with paiticulai inteiests oi viewpoints. Bespite
constiaints of time anu buuget, combineu with the inevitable uelays of such
an ambitious unueitaking, we weie able to visit each Nembei State although
we weie unable to see all of those we iueally shoulu have seen. We
paiticulaily iegiet that, in the enu, we coulu not follow up on a hanuful of
outstanuing meeting iequests.

8. Neveitheless, we believe oui piogiamme exposeu us to the full iange of
viewpoints. We weie pleasantly suipiiseu by the geneial unifoimity of
views
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as this gives a basis on which to builu. Noieovei, uespite huge
fiustiations at the lack of piogiess, theie iemains a ueep well of
commitment to the CARIC0N iueals, even though theie aie signs that the
well is beginning to uiy up.

9. 0ui visits to Nembei States weie inteitwineu with time spent in the
CARIC0N Secietaiiat, which was eventually sufficient foi the oveiall
puiposes of this assignment. We aie veiy giateful to officials, fiom the
Secietaiy ueneial uown, foi being unstinting with theii time anu fiank with
theii views on wheie the challenges anu solutions lie.

1u. We weie also stiuck at the wiuespieau unifoimity of geneial views between
the Secietaiiat, Nembei States anu othei stakeholueis as to wheie the
pioblems anu solutions lie, even if theie was less unifoimity as to the souice
of pioblems. The fact that the vaiious committeu stakeholueis tenueu to
uesciibe a wiue aiiay of pioblems in almost iuentical ways, except in theii
view of wheie iesponsibility lies, put us on the aleit that something ueepei
has been going on.

11. As will become cleai, we aie convinceu that the ieal souices of CARIC0N's
uifficulties aie the iesult of a builu up of ciicumstances ovei many yeais foi
which, ultimately, no one is to blame. We aie ceitain that we have iuentifieu

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Theie weie, of couise, shaues of opinion anu some seiious uissenteis within this geneial unifoimity. Theie
weie also, as woulu be expecteu, wiuei uiveigences on some issues, paiticulai if they weie issues of
national inteiest oi of uetail.

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those souices anu that, if a shaieu unueistanuing of them can be uevelopeu
amongst stakeholueis, then the solutions aie ielatively stiaightfoiwaiu
S
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1.3 Structure!of!Final!Report!
12. This Final Repoit begins by contiasting what CARIC0N is foi with an
oveiview of its peiilous cuiient position, the piessuies it is unuei anu the
possible outcomes. Theie is then a key passage on the necessaiy conuitions
that neeu to be met foi CARIC0N's foitunes to be tuineu iounu.

1S. We look at the oveiall constiaints anu challenges facing CARIC0N, how they
have uevelopeu anu the impact this has hau on CARIC0N's institutional
stiuctuie. We then ieach some geneial conclusions as to wheie the pioblems
lie. Following this, we consiuei the key issues of piioiitisation anu stiategy.

14. We then consiuei how the oveiall institutional stiuctuie neeus to be
stiengtheneu anu go on to make iecommenuations on both geneial anu
specific pioposals. This incluues auuiessing specific goveinance issues, such
as the pioposal to set up a Peimanent Committee of Ambassauois.

1S. We then tuin oui attention to the Secietaiiat anu its iole as "the piincipal
auministiative oigan of the Community".
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We examine how this iole has
been playeu in compaiison to how it shoulu be playeu in a woilu that has
moveu on a gieat ueal even since the Revised!Treaty!of!Chaguaramas was
uiafteu.
7
We focus on the neeu foi iesults anu the oiganisational stiuctuie
iequiieu to help uelivei them.

16. We then ioll out a pioposeu oiganisational stiuctuie anu, in the piocess,
examine staffing levels anu BR issues. Aftei an examination of buugetaiy anu
financing issues, we uiaw the main iepoit to a conclusion. We complete the
iepoit with a Listing!of!Findings!and!Recommendations anu an Action!Plan,
both of which aie stanu-alone annexes (Appenuix 1 & 2 iespectively). The
othei annexes in oui iepoit aie on Governance (Appenuix S), on
Restructuring!Communications (Appenuix 4), on an Outline!Specification!for!
the!Change!Office (Appenuix S) anu finally on Some!Views!of!CARICOM
(Appenuix 6).

17. We have tiieu to keep the naiiative flowing with the objectives of pioviuing
bievity anu claiity to a highly complex set of pioblems. As a iesult, we have
maue extensive use of footnotes. These have been useu in a numbei of
contexts, incluuing the uevelopment of the point at issue, explanations of
subtleties anu exceptions anu iefeiences to eviuence anu othei mateiial.
Whilst most of the footnotes aie impoitant to oui analysis anu aigument,
oui aim has been, as much as possible, to keep things stiaightfoiwaiu anu
avoiu stiaying too fai into tangents, impoitant as some of them aie.

S
The emphasis heie shoulu be on ielative. In something as complex anu uifficult as iegional integiation, as
the cuiient ciisis in the E0 beais out, nothing is evei completely stiaightfoiwaiu.
6
Aiticle 2S of the!Revised!Treaty!of!Chaguaramas (2uu1).
7
0p. cit.

14

2 Challenges!Facing!CARICOM!
2.1 A!Necessary!Construct?!
1. We have no uoubts that CARIC0N is essential to the iegion's futuie anu to
the piospeiity anu welfaie of its Nembei States
8
. Theie is no uispute that
significant benefits can be hau fiom iegional co-opeiation anu integiation
9
.
The pioblem is the iealisation anu ueliveiy of those benefits, as the uebate
ovei the so-calleu "implementation ueficit" makes cleai.

2. At the same time, we have been convinceu that CARIC0N iemains the only
viable option foi iealising substantial iegional benefits. With the exception
of the 0iganisation of Eastein Caiibbean States (0ECS), which is an integial
pait of CARIC0N, the othei iegional constiucts that have emeigeu in iecent
yeais aie eithei too uiveise oi too aitificial anu contioveisial to pioviue
viable alteinatives
1u
within the foieseeable futuie
11
.
2.2 A!Construct!in!Crisis!
S. Neveitheless, CARIC0N has lost its way bauly. Whilst its uifficulties have
plainly been builuing up foi yeais, they aie now coming to a heau.

4. The oveiall constiuct of CARIC0N has been unuei unpieceuenteu attack in
the meuia. It is iegaiueu as having faileu by the man in the stieet, assuming
he is awaie of it at all. It shoulu be noteu that theie aie enuless confusions in
the meuia anu geneial public between CARIC0N as a whole anu the
Secietaiiat, with the lattei iegulaily taking the blame foi pioblems of the
entiie CARIC0N enueavoui. Theiefoie, when we iefei to CARIC0N, we mean
the entiie institutional constiuct. Similaily, when we mean to iefei to the
Secietaiiat, we say so uiiectly.

S. Alongsiue some of the public peiceptions of CARIC0N, some of the
inteinational community see the constiuct as incieasingly iiielevant anu aie
often, ieluctantly, tiying to woik iounu it.

6. The common veiuict on CARIC0N can be summaiiseu by the
"implementation ueficit". CARIC0N is wiuely iegaiueu as having achieveu
little anu of being incapable of ueliveiing long-piomiseu benefits. Even
insiueis aie often ieuuceu to pointing to specific successes in functional co-

8
With oui economic, business anu finance expeiience, we feel we can confiuently asseit this. In any event,
no one seiiously questions this asseition anu it woulu take oui woik off on an unnecessaiy tangent to
pioviue eviuence.
9
Theie is moie ioom foi uebate about what shoulu be the extent anu mix of co-opeiation anu integiation
anu the speeu at which it is caiiieu out.
1u
0ui uefinition of viability in this context is a constiuct that coulu make a significant contiibution to the
iegion's futuie anu to the piospeiity anu welfaie of its Nembei States.
11
In biief, anu uespite the best of intentions, CARIC0N has alieauy auueu significantly to its challenges by
ueveloping beyonu its oiiginal Anglophile constiuct - anu the aigument that CARIC0N has oveistietcheu
itself by piematuiely so uoing was put to us on a numbei of occasions. In oui view, it is fai too eaily to
consiuei an application foi membeiship fiom the Bominican Republic. As will become cleai, CARIC0N's
funuamental pioblem is that it is alieauy tiying to uo too much. Taking on fuithei "piioiities" woulu, in
piactice, iesult in even less being achieveu.

15

opeiation anu to the iegion punching above its weight in inteinational
foiums.

7. The iegion-wiue CXC examination system unuoubteuly stanus out as a
beacon of what iegional co-opeiation can achieve. 0nfoitunately, the
haishest ciitics woulu suggest that little else has been achieveu.

8. Although these juugements aie highly ciitical, they unfoitunately iepiesent
what is wiuely peiceiveu. That the iecoiu of CARIC0N is actually somewhat
bettei uoes not caiiy gieat weight when the constiuct is iegaiueu as failing
anu on the sliue. Nany goou companies have gone bankiupt anu non-
commeicial oiganisations ceaseu to exist because peiceptions of them weie
ovei haish.

9. CARIC0N's uifficulties aie significantly multiplieu by the continuing
economic ciisis. CARIC0N's Secietaiiat has liveu fiom hanu-to-mouth in
buugetaiy teims foi most of the last uecaue. With Nembei States, in
paiticulai, now having to make savings wheievei they can, the Secietaiiat
has come unuei mounting financial piessuie.

1u. The natuie of this financial piessuie - as uistinct fiom the actual amount
available in uollais anu cents - has iesulteu in evei-incieasing unceitainty
anu the unavoiuable iequiiement to make aibitiaiy shoit-teim cuts. We
have confiimeu the feais noteu in oui Inception Repoit that this iiskeu
ieuucing the Secietaiiat's functionality
12
. In fact, anu as we will explain, the
unueilying pioblems aie moie funuamental anu long-teim than that anu
have also weakeneu the entiie CARIC0N stiuctuie.
1S

11. The saving giace foi CARIC0N is that theie iemains, by anu laige, a well of
commitment both to it anu to iegional integiation as a piinciple, if not in
piactice. The influences of a iapiuly changing woilu aie beginning to test
that commitment in some of the moie geogiaphically peiipheial Nembei
States. The same is tiue thioughout the iegion as a iesult of incieasing
uisillusion between the peiceiveu piomises of CARIC0N anu the ieality.
2.3 Overselling!Magnifies!the!Crisis!!
12. An impoitant way of tackling giowing uisillusion heau on is foi the ielevant
authoiities (both CARIC0N anu Nembei States) to be much cleaiei about
both the benefits CARIC0N is offeiing anu when they will be ueliveieu.

1S. We weie, foi example, unuei the misappiehension uuiing oui initial visits to
Nembei States that the goal of the Single Naiket was fiee movement of
goous between CARIC0N Nembei States in exactly the same way as theie is
fiee movement in the E0. In othei woius, once eveiything is in place
14
, goous

12
In paiagiaph 9 of oui Inception Repoit, we stateu that shoit-teim economies iesulting fiom the squeeze
on the Secietaiiat's buuget have been taken to - anu in all piobability well beyonu - theii limit anu fuithei
cuts can only ieuuce its functionality
1S
Although have not stuuieu CARIC0N institutions, we unueistanu that most of them aie facing even
gieatei financial unceitainties than the Secietaiiat.
14
Whethei phyto-sanitaiy oi customs pioceuuies etc.

16

coulu move fieely anu without iestiiction within anu between Nembei
States in a woilu with no inteinal boiueis oi iestiictions
1S
.

14. We weie unuei this illusion because many officials in Nembei States, let
alone membeis of the geneial public, believe that the goal of fiee movement
of goous means just that. We now know that fiee movement of goous within
CARIC0N means something else. It is veiy impoitant that iegional nationals
know that theie is no foieseeable piospect of them shopping in one islanu
anu taking the goous back to anothei without making any customs
ueclaiation oi paying impoit uuties.

1S. The geneial pioblem heie is that in a iegional bouy that was boin of
iuealism aiounu the time of inuepenuence, the tenuency has always been to
announce uecisions ovei new initiatives as if full implementation weie
imminent anu to ovei sell the timing anu benefits of implementation. This
was peifectly unueistanuable uuiing the fiist flushes of iegionalism when
the complexities of implementation weie less well unueistoou anu when the
new leaueis weie anxious to show what they coulu uo. But it is not
unueistanuable in the seconu uecaue of the next centuiy.

16. Rathei, it has been a continuing public ielations own goal. Its cumulative
impact has been uisastious foi CARIC0N with pait of the "implementation
ueficit" being a uiiect iesult of seiial oveiselling ovei many yeais. 0ui stiong
impiession, not least fiom moie positive meuia iepoits, is that the new
Secietaiy ueneial is ueteimineu to put this iight anu to be much cleaiei anu
moie iealistic about what CARIC0N is tiying to uelivei anu when.
2.4 Our!Prognosis!
17. Neveitheless, oui juugement is that CARIC0N is alieauy in a fight foi
suivival. The piessuies of the economic ciisis aie alieauy intense anu may
become significantly woise. At the same time, CARIC0N's opeiation anu
stiuctuie have been weakeneu ovei the yeais to the extent that it is
cuiiently unable to achieve the soit of positive iesults that woulu tuin iounu
its ieputation. This suggests one of thiee possible outcomes:
I. Theie is a not insignificant iisk that CARIC0N coulu be biought
uown quickly if the inteinational economic situation ueteiioiates
fuithei. With so many of its Nembei States alieauy highly inuebteu,
it is conceivable that significant funuing foi the Secietaiiat anu foi
CARIC0N institutions coulu be cut off at shoit notice.
16
We woulu
uige that contingency plans be uevelopeu to guaiu against this
eventuality foi the iegion as a whole anu foi the Secietaiiat;
II. In the absence of funuamental change, it is moie likely that
CARIC0N will expiie slowly, ovei peihaps foui oi five yeais, as

1S
In most of the E0, which is a contiguous lanumass, theie aie no longei boiueis. Wheie the boiueis exist,
such as into the 0K, the only checks aie foi ciiminal activity anu not to check, slow oi impeue the movement
of intia-iegional tiaue. If theie is an outbieak of uisease oi similai then theie may be tempoiaiy checks but
this is just as likely within an inuiviuual Nembei State as between Nembei States.
16
We aie awaie that, foi example, the Secietaiiat has alieauy hau seiious cash flow pioblems.

17

stakeholueis uespaii of positive piogiess anu giauually vote with
theii feet;
III. With funuamental changes in its opeiation anu stiuctuies, CARIC0N
can still tuin iounu its ieputation anu go on to piospei. These
changes neeu to be accompanieu by significant eaily iesults, which
aie wiuely peiceiveu as beneficial.

18. Change is, of couise, alieauy unuei way but with such change being uiiven
by ciicumstance, we uoubt it will be Schumpeteiian cieative uestiuction; the
emphasis is much moie likely to be on the uestiuctive alone. Positive change
is only likely to come about if CARIC0N's stakeholueis uecisively seize the
initiative.
2.5 Requirements!for!a!Positive!Outcome!
19. We cannot oveiemphasise the iequiiement foi funuamental anu positive
change if CARIC0N is to suivive anu eventually piospei. Theie aie thiee
geneial conuitions iequiieu to unueiwiite such change. These aie:
Iv. The full anu unequivocal suppoit of Nembei States;
v. Taigeting the ueliveiy of a naiiow iange of specific, piactical anu
achievable benefits ovei a ieasonably shoit time hoiizon;
vI. A cieuible ieoiganisation anu stiengthening of the CARIC0N
constiuct, incluuing the Secietaiiat anu CARIC0N institutions,
focuseu on the management of implementation.

2u. In uiagnosing cuiient uifficulties, we will explain what we mean by each of
the above anu what neeus to be uone in uetail. 0nce the necessaiy
agieements, infiastiuctuie anu plans aie in place to meet these thiee
conuitions successfully, we!recommend!a!major!relaunch!of!CARICOM to
be aimeu, in paiticulai, at the geneial public in Nembei States anu at the
inteinational community.

!

18

!
3 Diagnosing!CARICOMs!Current!Difficulties!
3.1 Developing!Frustrations!
1. The fiist thing to be saiu about CARIC0N's cuiient uifficulties is that they
aie only cuiient in the sense that they have become ciitical touay. This has
been paitly, though not entiiely, tiiggeieu by the cuiient economic climate.
The ciisis woulu have come soonei oi latei in any event.

2. The ieality is that cuiient uifficulties have been builuing up foi yeais. Theie
weie fiustiations twenty anu moie yeais ago leauing to the publication of
the seminal "Time!for!Action".
17
That iepoit, anu otheis that have since
followeu it, ieflecteu a giowing impatience at the lack of piogiess
emanating fiom the CARIC0N pioject. In biief, the time hau come to move
fiom the iuealistic initial phases of iegionalism to a focus on iesults.

S. In a iepoit of ovei Suu pages long (excluuing appenuices) anu following a
ieview of CARIC0N's iecoiu, "Time!for!Action" essentially laiu out a
compiehensive piogiamme of economic anu social uevelopment foi the
iegion anu then specifieu the institutional anu othei machineiy iequiieu to
uelivei it. vaiious subsequent initiatives anu stuuies have become moie
specific anu have tenueu to focus incieasingly on the machineiy iequiieu to
uelivei uesiieu iesults
18
.

4. In the meantime, anu uespite peiious of gieatei optimism
19
, the geneial
tienu was one of giowing fiustiation at how little theie was to show foi
extensive effoits to impiove iegional co-opeiation anu to intiouuce much
incieaseu iegional integiation.

S. We will go on to aigue that, concuiient with this giowing fiustiation, the
piomiseu machineiy eithei nevei mateiialiseu oi was insufficient to uelivei
the iequiieu iesults. 0ui conclusion will be that paitly as a iesult of these
factois anu paitly as a iesult of otheis, the CARIC0N stiuctuie, in geneial,
anu the Secietaiiat, in paiticulai, has giauually been weakeneu. But fiist of
all, we neeu to examine natuial ieasons why it iemains ciucial - anu always
has been ciucial - that the CARIC0N constiuct not be ovei ambitious.
3.2 Exogenous!Sources!of!Frustration:!The!Binding!Constraints!
6. CARIC0N faces a numbei of binuing constiaints that limit what it coulu evei
achieve oi, at a minimum, put a seiious biake on how quickly objectives can
be achieveu. These ciucial constiaints tenu to be foigotten in the miust of

17
A!Time!for!Action, Repoit of the West Inuian Commission, 1992.
18
The excellent Aichei, uomes et al stuuy, A!Review!of!the!Structure!and!Functioning!of!the!CARICOM!
Community!Secretariat, 2uu2, being foiemost amongst these.
19
Foi instance, anu coinciuing with Aichei, uomes et al, the Revised!Treaty!of!Chaguaramas, 2uu1, piepaieu
the giounu foi piactical measuies to speeu up the intiouuction of the Caiicom Single Naiket anu Economy
(CSNE).

19

fiustiations at the lack of iesults. Noie impoitantly, they aie iaiely taken
into account when ambitious piogiammes aie set. The inteinational
community is often at fault heie when it iegulaily fails to uistinguish how
much can be achieveu by a laige countiy ovei a peiiou of time compaieu to
a small Caiibbean community. The thiee most impoitant constiaints aie
geogiaphy, size anu complexity anu these aie uiscusseu in tuin.
!
Geography!(or!the!Belize!question)!
7. Amongst CARIC0N's Nembei States, 12 aie islanus.
2u
0nly S Nembei
States aie on a lanumass, of which only 2 aie contiguous. The 12 islanus aie
spieau ovei ioughly 6u,uuu squaie kilometies of the Caiibbean Sea, which
has an aiea of 2.7S million squaie kilometies. In othei woius a little of 2%
of the CARIC0N aiea is lanu in an oveiall aiea that is neaily thiee-quaiteis
the size of the Euiopean 0nion's 27 Nembei States combineu.

8. These geogiaphical facts immeuiately iaise what might be teimeu the
"Belize question" on the limits to integiation. This question poses the
insuimountable pioblem that, howevei well integiateu CARIC0N becomes,
it will always be quickei, easiei anu cheapei to uiive a tiuckloau of goous
acioss the boiuei to Nexico fiom Belize than to expoit them anywheie in
CARIC0N.

9. This question is, of couise, not limiteu to Belize. The pioblems of moving
between any two Nembei States of CARIC0N (except uuyana anu
Suiiname) pioviue a binuing constiaint - anu often piohibitive financial
cost - to integiation that baiely exists in a moie integiateu iegional
constiuct such as the E0. Even wheie the pioblem uoes exist in the E0, the
uistances aie much less anu the volumes of tiaffic hugely gieatei. The 0K,
foi example, is only 2u miles fiom the Euiopean mainlanu, a uistance
shoitei than between any two islanu states in CARIC0N.
21

1u. This issue of geogiaphy neithei pievents integiation noi is an aigument
against it. But it inevitably makes integiation moie uifficult anu, unless
iecogniseu as a binuing constiaint, leaus to uestiuctive fiustiation.

Market!Size!(or!the!Luxembourg!question)!
11. The total population of CARIC0N is aiounu 1S million, ovei half of which is
Baiti. The Single Naiket, fiom which Baiti is still in piactice laigely
excluueu, coveis 6 million consumeis.

2u
Baiti "shaies" Bispaniola with the Bominican Republic whilst some Nembei States consist of moie than
one islanu.
21
Although bettei tianspoit coulu amelioiate these uifficulties, cost woulu iemain a seiious - anu in some
cases piohibitive - issue. 0n one of the few iegulai Caiibbean sea-ioutes, it costs 1uu Euios ietuin (0S$14u)
to get a passengei feiiy fiom St Lucia to Naitinique which is a multiple of the cost of getting acioss the
English Channel. It geneially costs a minimum of aiounu 0S$2uu to get a cai acioss the Channel fiom
Englanu to Fiance on what is piobably the most competitive ioute in the woilu. The intiouuction of cai
feiiies between Caiibbean islanus woulu inevitably iesult in much highei faies both because scale
economies woulu be lacking anu because uistances woulu geneially be much gieatei.

20

12. Luxembouig is tiauitionally quoteu as the minnow of the E0.
22
Its
population of Suu,uuu is u.1% of the E0's population of Suu million! Yet,
weie Luxembouig a membei of CARIC0N, it woulu be the 4
th
laigest
membei in teims of population anu biggei than the 0ECS countiies
combineu.

1S. The point heie - anu it is an impoitant one - is that CARIC0N has seiious
limitations in what it can achieve ovei any given peiiou. Leaving asiue
issues such as the pioblems poseu by high iates of emigiation of skilleu
laboui, theie can only be a small numbei of officials available to caiiy out a
not uissimilai aiiay of integiation tasks to those that confiont much biggei
iegional blocks such as the E0.

Complexity!of!Integration!
14. The pioblem of size leaus stiaight into issues of complexity. The cieation of
a Single Naiket is inheiently complicateu. Bespite all its iesouices, the E0
stiuggleu to uelivei a single maiket in the 198us. The 1988 Cecchini
Repoit
2S
auuiesseu the issues anu intiouuceu such innovations as the
balanceu scoiecaiu appioach
24
to encouiage Nembei States to speeu up the
intiouuction of measuies cieating the Single Naiket. We woulu
recommend CARIC0N auopting something similai.

1S. As complexity pioviueu a seiious challenge foi the E0 when it was
intiouucing a Single Naiket, it shoulu be no suipiise that CARIC0N has
stiuggleu. The cieation of a Single Economy is even moie complicateu, as
the potentially catastiophic uifficulties cuiiently confionting the E0 make
cleai. We will ietuin to this issue as it has impoitant implications foi
CARIC0N.

16. The issues of complexity uo not, of couise, pioviue CARIC0N with an excuse
foi lack of piogiess oi uiminish the iealities of the "implementation ueficit".
Rathei they iaise the question of how to ueal with complexity, not least in
light of CARIC0N's binuing constiaints of size anu geogiaphy. This will, in
uue couise, leau stiaight into the majoi theme of oui iepoit. That theme is
prioritisation.

3.3 Endogenous!Sources!of!Frustration:!A!Dysfunctional!Construct!
17. Theie aie numeious souices of fiustiation with iegaiu to how CARIC0N
functions cuiiently. The impoitant issue is to uistinguish causes fiom
symptoms anu, fiom that exeicise, to uevise woikable solutions.

18. Theie is an incieasing lack of claiity as to what the CARIC0N stiuctuie is foi
anu what it is tiying to achieve
2S
. To be suie, theie is much activity but it is

22
Although it no longei has the smallest population in the E0 since Nalta joineu.
2S
Cecchini, The!Cost!of!Non"Europe,!1988. As the Cecchini Repoit anu ielateu uocuments pie-uate the
Inteinet, we have not been able to get electionic copies.
24
The Euiopean Commission biings out a iegulai publication, The!Internal!Market!Scoreboard. The 22
nu

euition was publisheu in Becembei 2u1u.
2S
This was both oui impiession anu what was tolu us in a wiue vaiiety of meetings.

21

often uifficult to uiscein what the activity is foi, wheie it might leau anu
what benefits coulu iesults. The most impoitant factois contiibuting to this
aie biiefly as follows:
a. Too!many!mandates
Theie is a long-stanuing anu wiuely unueistoou pioblem that Beaus
of uoveinment anu othei meetings of Community oigans iesult in fai
too many manuates anu uecisions foi the Secietaiiat to be able to
take foiwaiu.

It became appaient to us that the pioblem iuns ueepei. Nanuates aie
often vague anu theie is no system foi cioss-iefeiencing them with
eailiei manuates
26
. It is not even cleai that they aie always accuiately
iecoiueu. At the same time, follow up often seems to uepenu on
chance factois, such as the Secietaiiat having staff in the paiticulai
aiea of expeitise.

The one constant is that Aiticle 27:S of the Tieaty of Chaguaiamus,
which stipulates that the financial implications of uecisions shoulu be
uiawn out befoie any uecisions aie maue, is iaiely, if evei, invokeu.

b. Structural!weaknesses!in!institutional!terms!
We weie suipiiseu to finu out that theie is not a stiong oveiaiching
stiuctuie linking CARIC0N institutions to a common puipose. To the
contiaiy, a stiuctuie has evolveu wheie institutions become laigely
inuepenuent in piactice when they aie no longei ieliant on the
Secietaiiat foi assistance with iaising finance.

With the exception of institutions such as the Caiibbean Couit of
}ustice (CC}), whose inuepenuence is paiamount foi obvious ieasons
of juuicial inuepenuence, the lack of stiuctuie, common puipose anu
ieal accountability that has been alloweu to evolve amongst its
institutions has significantly weakeneu CARIC0N.

We aie awaie that theie will soon be a ieview of vaiious CARIC0N
institutions. 0ui specific concein is not so much the functionality of
each institution as a self-stanuing entity, as about theii position in the
CARIC0N Community anu how each fits in with anu inteiielates with
theii fellow institutions anu with the Community as a whole.

c. Organs!not!functioning!effectively!or!as!intended!!
We unueistanu that seveial of the 0igans of the Community aie not
being opeiateu as set out unuei the Reviseu Tieaty of Chaguaiamus.
Whilst we aie much moie inteiesteu in what woiks than in constiucts
sticking iigoiously to theii oiiginal uesign, the pioblem is not so
much that functions anu piactice have evolveu as 0igans have fallen
into uisiepaii.

26
We go into this issue in moie uetail when ieviewing the Secietaiiat.

22

At meetings thioughout the iegion, we heaiu how seveial 0igans
have uegeneiateu into talk shops known foi a mixtuie of inuecision
combineu with the same issues coming up at meeting aftei meeting.

Theie is a tenuency foi uecisions to be pusheu up the hieiaichy, with
too many being pusheu all the way to Beaus of uoveinment. This
iegulaily magnifies pioblems as Beaus aie often being askeu to
ueciue on uetaileu technical matteis foi which they cannot be
expecteu to have competence. In this iespect, it is one thing to ask
Beaus to confiim a uecision on the nou, as it weie, anu anothei foi
them to entei into uetaileu uiscussion as appaiently often happens.
27

28

Theie is a wiuely shaieu concein about the Community Council as
peihaps the biggest souice of weakness of those Councils that aie
fully functional
29
. Accoiuing to Aiticle 1S of the Reviseu Tieaty of
Chaguaiamas, the Council has some ciucial functions conceining
stiategic planning anu co-oiuination. We unueistanu that these
functions have fallen into misuse anu, in piactice, the Council's main
iole has become a filtei - anu pieliminaiy agenua settei - foi matteis
going to the full Beaus of uoveinment meeting.

d. Lack!of!serious!prioritisation!!
In this iespect, theie is no iegulai oi stiuctuieu piioiitisation of
CARIC0N activities at the Community level. This cleaily gives iise to
seiious concein fiom time-to-time, as CARIC0N becomes incieasingly
iuuueiless
Su
. The fact that the Community Council has not felt
empoweieu oi competent to play a stiategic iole has not helpeu.

We also unueistanu that it is uniealistic to expect the Buuget
Committee to maintain piopei oveisight, unuei cuiient
aiiangements, ovei the Secietaiiat's woik piogiamming exeicise on
which the its annual buuget is baseu. In any event, we have seiious
woiiies about the entiie woik piogiamming piocess as cuiiently
caiiieu out anu will ietuin to this latei when ieviewing the
Secietaiiat.

We will also ietuin to the issue of piioiitisation in moie uetail in the
next section of this iepoit. We woulu just note at this stage that theie
is no systematic piioiitisation thiough the 0igans of the Community.
To the contiaiy, we sense the piocess is moie iepiesentative of a

27
The pioblem is paiticulaily acute when uecisions aie maue in Caucus, when Beaus uelibeiate on theii
own anu when few, if any, officials aie piesent. The incieasing use of Caucus, whilst unueistanuable foi
othei ieasons, has magnifieu the giowing weaknesses in the way 0igans opeiate anu in theii impact on
CARIC0N's opeiations.
28
We weie tolu that pooily infoimeu uecisions aie iegulaily unimplementable at Nembei State level anu,
with aibitiaiy uecisions often emeiging, iegulaily not suppoiteu by the cabinets of inuiviuual Beaus, let
alone by the wiuei machineiy of theii goveinments.
29
We unueistanu that the Council foi Finance anu Planning iaiely meets.
Su
The Beaus ietieat in uuyana in Nay 2u11 was essentially auuiesseu to this pioblem.

23

potage of uncooiuinateu anu impiecise uecision taking without
piopei aiiangements foi follow up.
!!
e. Administrative!Weaknesses!
Community level activities aie obviously not assisteu by the plethoia
of meetings anu the seiious auministiative pioblems associateu with
them.

Nany meetings aie calleu iiiegulaily anu, accoiuing to many of those
whom we have met, without sufficient notice. We know that agenuas
ioutinely get changeu iight up to the last minute anu beyonu, anu that
it is iaie foi papeis to be ieauy sufficiently in auvance.
S1

S2

We also unueistanu that the amount of meeting papeis tenu to be
excessive, pooily oiganiseu anu iepetitive. It is iaie foi them to be
summaiiseu.

In the ciicumstances, it is not suipiising that Nembei States often
senu junioi staff to CARIC0N meetings who aie given no authoiity to
make uecisions.

These auministiative weaknesses
SS
aie examineu in moie uetail
when we ieview the Secietaiiat anu the seivices that it ueliveis.

f. Ineffectiveness!of!formal!channels!!
The CARIC0N stiuctuie laigely ielies on foimal communication
channels foi its functionality. The piimaiy channel is that of
Savingiams thiough which meeting iepoit, infoimation anu
announcements aie ciiculateu to Nembei States. Savingiams go to
the Foieign Ninistiies of all Nembei States
S4
, iegaiuless of whethei
the issue unuei uiscussion conceins all Nembei States.

In some Nembei States, the Foieign Ninistiy acts as little moie than a
post box wheieas, in the biggei countiies, officials may have the
capacity anu expeitise to follow up the issues at hanu with the
ielevant authoiities in theii countiy.

We weie tolu that most of the Secietaiiat's business is caiiieu out
thiough foimal channels that iespect uiplomatic niceties anu that

S1
We weie tolu that meeting paiticipants iegulaily uo not ieceive papeis until they aiiive at meetings.
S2
Almost all Nembei states highlighteu both slow communications anu uocumentation aiiiving veiy late.
These pioblems aie fuithei exaceibateu when theie is a iequiiement foi tianslation befoie infoimation is
uisseminateu. In both Baiti anu Suiiname, wheie Fiench anu Butch aie the main languages, excessive uelays
auu to the sense of exclusion felt by CARIC0N's non English-speaking membeis fiom uecision-making anu
influence.
SS
These weaknesses aie consiueieu so uamaging to Community business anu the functionality of CARIC0N
that we weie given a wiitten submission about it by one Nembei State. In othei Nembei States anu in
CARIC0N institutions, the oial eviuence we weie given was iegulaily maue in stiong anu unieseiveu teims.
S4
They aie sometimes copieu to othei ministiies oi institutions but not on a iegulai oi uiiecteu basis.

24

only a minoiity of officials make much use of infoimal anu moie
uiiect netwoiks.

It is abunuantly cleai that these foimal
SS
channels aie completely
inauequate foi getting business uone on anything like a timely basis,
if at all. Communications often get stuck in Foieign Ninistiies oi
passeu along to the wiong iecipient foi action. Similaily, they can be
gaibleu oi misunueistoou as they aie passeu along the line. The
system is, of couise, one that leaves no one iesponsible oi
accountable by uefinition.

The system is also olu-fashioneu foi the seconu uecaue of the twenty-
fiist centuiy. This is paitly a question of technology as theie aie much
moie efficient ways these uays to communicate, even foimally
S6
. But
it is also a question of the high uegiee of foimality goveining
CARIC0N communications. We iecognise that, to some extent, such
foimality peisists thioughout the Caiibbean in noticeable contiast to
the iest of the English-speaking woilu. Neveitheless, the uegiee of
foimality in the way CARIC0N conuucts its business appeais
excessive even by Caiibbean noims. It is maintaineu at an enoimous
cost in teims of efficiency anu effectiveness, making it much haiuei to
ieuuce the "implementation ueficit".

g. Problems!at!Member!State!level!
It is ieauily appaient that CARIC0N uecisions aie, on the whole, not
being implementeu at Nembei State level. veiy few uecisions have
leu to functioning aiiangements on the giounus that have piouuceu
ieal benefits. As will be uiscusseu latei, the enactment of laws, foi
example, may be pait of the piocess of biinging about
implementation but it is not implementation pei se.

The uifficulties in Nembei States aiise fiom a vaiiety of souices.
Sometimes theie aie technical anu iesouice uifficulties in biinging
about implementation. 0ui juugement is that pioblems aie moie
likely to be a iesult of CARIC0N issues not, in piactice, being of high
piioiity
S7
. uiven management anu implementation uifficulties tenu to
be a geneial pioblem in many Caiibbean countiies, any initiative that
lacks high piioiity faces seiious challenges, paiticulaily if it is pait of
a complex fiamewoik of initiatives, which is often the case with
CARIC0N.

In auuition to these technical, iesouice anu piioiity pioblems, theie
aie seiious issues that coulu be uesciibeu in teims of "when is a

SS
The uegiee of foimality is matcheu by an excessive cultuie of confiuentiality, which also impacts
peifoimance negatively.
S6
Technology has playeu a significant iole in bieaking uown pieviously foimal stiuctuies in many paits of
the woilu. The gieatei facility foi netwoiking anu foi uiiect appioaches offeieu by auvances in technology
has maue majoi uiffeiences to efficiency anu effectiveness.
S7
It appeais that many Nembei States cooiuinate CARIC0N activities pooily. We weie tolu of Ninisteis
failing to biief Beaus anu of CARIC0N of iepoits not being ciiculateu.

25

uecision ieally a uecision". 0veiall uecisions at the CARIC0N level can
uniavel in Nembei States foi any numbei of ieasons. A uecision maue
in piinciple can look veiy uiffeient when its implications aie
examineu in piactice. At the same time, getting a CARIC0N uecision
iatifieu anu put into action is usually much moie than a question of
pailiamentaiy appioval. A much wiuei consensus is often neeueu anu
pioposeu measuies ceitainly uo not get veiy fai without the full
suppoit of goveinment civil seivices, which tenu to caiiy
consiueiable weight in the Caiibbean.

h. Weakened!Secretariat!
In light of all these constiaining factois, it is unsuipiising that the
Secietaiiat has founu it impossible to iise to the challenge. 0n the
contiaiy, the factois aie eneivating anu theii impact is cumulative.
Theie is eveiy inuication that the Secietaiiat has become weakei ovei
the yeais.

The weakening of the Secietaiiat can be seen in many ways: the
giauual squeeze on its buuget that pieceueu the financial ciisis by
seveial yeais anu which, amongst othei things, has ieuuceu ielative
salaiy levels anu maue ieciuitment moie uifficult; the lack of
uiiection as to what CARIC0N is tiying to achieve anu the absence of
any ieal focus on how it can be achieveu; an unueistanuable uiift
towaius piocess anu foim, iathei than concentiating on getting
things uone;
S8
significant extianeous factois incluue evei moie
complicateu uonoi iequiiements anu pioceuuies, which, unless
manageu veiy caiefully, inevitably ieshape an oiganisation in the
uiiection of becoming a pioject office.

These pioblems aie exaceibateu in a Secietaiiat that is long on
tiauitional civil seivice anu technical skills, but exceeuingly shoit of
mouein management skills. At the same time, the Secietaiiat is just
not set up to ueal with the minutiae of cooiuination, follow up,
monitoiing anu evaluation that is essential to achieving the uifficult
anu complex goals that CARIC0N has set itself. Its ielatively goou
institutional memoiy, paiticulaily its iecall of biggei issues anu
milestones, contiasts significantly with a wiuespieau inability to
iecoiu anu manage impoitant uetail anu, as a iesult, shape a
woikable agenua.

19. These inteinal souices of fiustiation, which have ienueieu CARIC0N
incieasingly uysfunctional, aie by no means compiehensive. Theie aie
many otheis, incluuing factois that have a significant impact. Foi example,
the financing of CARIC0N pioviues built-in unceitainty anu instability. In
auuition to the buugets of the Secietaiiat anu CARIC0N institutions being
set on an annual basis, theie aie continual woiiies, paiticulaily uuiing

S8
A iapiu inciease in meetings, foi example, signifies activity, not action.

26

peiious of economic unceitainty, as to when oi whethei Nembei State
contiibutions will mateiialise.
3.4 Towards!Solutions!
2u. Nanaging nations is haiu but managing iegional constiucts is significantly
haiuei. The cuiient intiactable ciisis within the Euiopean 0nion makes this
ieauily appaient, even if it was not obvious befoie. It is, theiefoie, not
suipiising that it is uifficult to uistinguish symptoms fiom causes anu, as a
iesult, go on to uevise solutions that get to the ioot of the pioblem.

21. CARIC0N has tenueu to iesponu to slow piogiess in the integiation agenua
with foimal stiuctuial, pioceuuial anu legal pioposals. The establishment of
a Commission, along the lines of the E0 Commission in Biussels, was
pioposeu in A!Time!for!Action as long ago as 1992. Theie have been
vaiious stiuctuial pioposals since, some of which incluueu a supia-national
component anu some not. The most iecent iuea, anu one we have been
askeu to ieview, is setting up a Peimanent Committee of Ambassauois.

22. Pioposals foi giving the Secietaiiat significant supianational poweis have
nevei been accepteu by Nembei States. At the same time, compiomise
stiuctuies, aimeu at huiiying along implementation, have nevei pioveu
effective. Nany take this as eviuence that CARIC0N shoulu be given
supianational poweis. As the following paiagiaphs will show, we woulu not
accept this eviuence, even if Nembei States weie to go thiough an unlikely
Bamascene conveision in favoui of a supianational bouy.

2S. Rathei than get involveu in the long-stanuing anu piobably uniesolvable
uebate about soveieignty, we have poseu a uiffeient set of questions as
follows:
! Fiistly, is the intiouuction of new stiuctuies sufficient to impiove the
foitunes of CARIC0N.
o A positive answei to this question has to make the assumption
that new stiuctuies aie effective;
o Yet all of oui expeiience - not least the eviuence befoie us
conceining CARIC0N - suggests this assumption is wiong;
o This immeuiately suggests two fuithei questions.
! Seconuly, is a new stiuctuie even necessaiy in an exeicise to impiove
the foitunes of CARIC0N.
! Anu finally, might it not be bettei to auuiess pioblems of
implementation uiiectly anu at souice
S9
.

24. We have poseu these questions because oui tiaining anu expeiience sees
stiuctuies, pioceuuies anu legal mechanisms as amongst the many means
to an enu in management teims. We also note CARIC0N's expeiience
suggests that a ieliance on these mechanisms, as a means to biing about the
implementation of integiation, has self-eviuently not succeeueu.

S9
It will become cleai exactly what we mean by "uiiectly anu at souice" in uue couise, fiist in analytic teims
anu then in teims of oui piactical pioposals.

27

2S. Inueeu, whilst it is possible that a poweiful Commission coulu have
succeeueu, if only Nembei States hau been less anxious about ceuing some
national poweis, theie is nothing asiue fiom faith to be ceitain about this.
The key consiueiation is that whoevei is maue iesponsible has a set of
complex anu uifficult tasks to caiiy out ovei an extenueu peiiou of yeais in
a fast changing woilu.

26. Whoevei is iesponsible has to woik out exactly what is iequiieu to tuin a
uesiie foi a paiticulai facet of integiation into ieality. As is eviuent fiom the
histoiy of CARIC0N, pioposals that appeai to be stiaightfoiwaiu when
piesenteu as political iueals - such as fiee movement of people - become
evei moie complex, both conceptuality anu piactically, as soon as a uecision
is taken to tuin the iueal into an eveiyuay ieality. At the same time,
unfoieseen consequences aie uiscoveieu. As has been seen, some of these
may be contioveisial anu call the oiiginal political iueal into seiious
question.

27. A cential lesson of oiganisational histoiy is that the successful anu
sustaineu implementation of any iuea oi iueal is, fiist anu foiemost, a
function of management
4u
. Whilst pioviuing those exeicising management
with a clear stiuctuie, effective pioceuuies anu an enabling legal
fiamewoik is obviously helpful, a manageiial appioach tenus to put the
emphasis on what pioviues clarity anu effectiveness anu on what is
enabling, iathei than on any paiticulai mechanisms oi machineiy.

28. We woulu fuithei aigue that stiuctuies, pioceuuies anu legal fiamewoiks
on theii own aie not necessaiily helpful. Bistoiy is, of couise, litteieu with
examples of how they have been baiiieis to change anu success as much as
enableis of change anu success.

29. We aie, of couise, not uenying the impoitance of stiuctuies, pioceuuies anu
legal fiamewoiks, paiticulaily in the context of a constiuct such as
CARIC0N. What we aie saying is that they aie not the keys to success. It, of
couise, iemains impoitant that they be well-uesigneu anu kept unuei
caieful ieview foi theii contiibution to functionality anu effectiveness. But
ultimately, it is the management of integiation anu of its implementation
that is the most impoitant factoi in success.
3.5 Concluding!Remarks:!Our!Proposed!Approach!
Su. In uiagnosing CARIC0N's uifficulties, we have intiouuceu a management-
baseu appioach iathei than make any implicit oi explicit assumptions about
stiuctuies, pioceuuies anu so on. 0n its own, this of couise uoes nothing to
uiminish the scale of the ciisis facing CARIC0N oi the natuie of the inteinal
anu exteinal constiaints anu pioblems that aie to be faceu.

4u
This is not to say that othei factois, incluuing ianuom ones such as luck, uo not play a pait. But ovei a
sustaineu peiiou it is veiy unusual foi something to succeeu without goou management being a key factoi.
Even when theie aie exceptions, they aie inuiviuual outlieis. A ieview of a laige numbei of successful
oiganisations woulu always finu management as the most impoitant oveiall factoi in that success.

28

S1. Bowevei what the management-baseu appioach uoes uo is allow us to look
at all these pioblems fiom a uiffeient peispective anu to set up a tiieu anu
testeu fiamewoik baseu on seveial geneiations of management thinking in
majoi oiganisations anu leauing business schools.

S2. 0ui management-baseu appioach is also stiaightfoiwaiu. Stiippeu back to
the basics, it consists of woiking out how best the Reviseu Tieaty of
Chaguaiamas (oi upuateu expiessions of it agieeu upon by the stakeholueis
of CARIC0N
41
) can best be implementeu. vieweu on this basis,
Chaguaiamas anu its upuateu expiessions coulu be simply expiesseu as:
! Implementing the facets of iegional integiation as laiu out in
Chaguaiamas oi as upuateu;
! Beveloping othei foims of iegional co-opeiation anu integiation foi
touay's woilu that weie not fully foieseen oi spelt out in
Chaguaiamas anu wheie value is auueu (net of auuitional costs)
above what Nembei States coulu achieve on theii own.

SS. The iest of this iepoit is conceineu with how!to biing about not only these
oveiall objectives, but also with how!to iealise the specific uetaileu items on
which the achievement of the oveiall objectives uepenus. We believe that if
oui pioposals aie accepteu anu satisfactoiily implementeu, CARIC0N can
be tuineu iounu even in the miust of global economic ciisis.
!
!
!

41
This woiuing is useu auviseuly. "0puateu expiessions" is not intenueu as a cleaily uefineu concept, let
alone a legal constiuct. It woulu incluue emeiging beliefs that may be close to consensus, foimally oi
infoimally. Thus, foi example, the "Pause" in integiation, eluciuateu by Beaus at theii uuyana Retieat in Nay
2u11, is a statement of fact in the sense that theie a lack of iesouices anu appiopiiate economic anu
political conuitions to complete CSNE on anything like the oiiginal timetable. Whethei the "Pause" may
mean oi will come to mean that substantial elements of CSNE aie uniealistic oi unacceptable in the
foieseeable futuie, if at all, is cleaily not cuiiently an "upuateu expiession" of the will of stakeholueis.

29

!
4 Prioritisation:!The!First!Step!to!CARICOMs!Recovery!!
4.1 Why!Making!Priorities!Matters!
1. In auopting oui management-leu appioach, the immeuiate pioblem of
Chaguaiamas et al
42
is that these constitute long teim goals involving
uegiees of complexity anu iesouice iequiiements beyonu the capability of
being implementeu by any oiganisational constiuct uuiing a ieasonable
peiiou of time. uiven the binuing constiaints that it faces, Chaguaiamas et al
is close to useless as a guiue to what CARIC0N shoulu be uoing in the shoit
to meuium teim.
4S

2. This is no ciiticism of Chaguaiamas et al. It is meiely iecognition of the fact
that the long-teim mission pioviues scant guiuance as to what CARIC0N
shoulu be uoing on a uay-to-uay basis anu the oiuei of piioiity in which it
shoulu be uoing it. Chaguaiamas et al shoulu nevei have been useu foi this
puipose. CARIC0N can only evei succeeu if it woiks to tightei, moie specific
anu time bounu piioiities. The same piioiities shoulu apply to CARIC0N in
geneial anu to the Secietaiiat in paiticulai.
4.2 The!Crucial!Role!of!Heads!of!Government!
S. In theii uuyana ietieat in Nay 2u11, Beaus of uoveinment iecogniseu the
neeu foi making piioiities. Bespite the outciy fiom some quaiteis that
CARIC0N's mission was being uowngiaueu, the Beaus call foi a "pause" was
no moie than a ciucial iecognition of ieality.

4. Equally, the fact that the Beaus then went on to list many times moie
piioiities than CARIC0N coulu cope with shoulu also not be iegaiueu with
uismay. It is not the job oi expeitise of Beaus to inuulge in the piactical
business of matching piioiities with iesouices. Rathei, the impoitant issue is
that Beaus iecogniseu the piinciple that nothing useful can be achieveu
unless piioiities anu iesouices aie matcheu. It is up to manageis anu theii
expeit auviseis to uo the uetaileu matching anu to peisuaue Beaus of the
limits to what can be achieveu.

S. Baving uisplayeu essential leaueiship in uuyana, it is not oveistating the
case to say that the futuie of CARIC0N uepenus on Beaus continuing to
uisplay such leaueiship anu unity of puipose. As we inuicateu at Section 2.S
above, the fiist of thiee main iequiiements foi the suivival anu iecoveiy of
CARIC0N is:
!

42
This shoulu be taken to incluue its upuateu expiessions, not least in the foim of Beaus of uoveinment
manuates, as explaineu at the enu of the pievious section.
4S
In any context, anu paiticulaily in a collection of small states such as CARIC0N, the implementation of
Chaguaiamus et al can only be seen as a long-teim mission of consiueiable ambition. The fact that theie aie
incieasing uoubts about some aspects of the CARIC0N mission, anu that othei constiucts - such as
CARIF0R0N - have emeigeu, has auueu to the challenges of implementing such a complex long-teim
mission.

30

Requirement!I:!The!full!and!unequivocal!support!of!Member!States.

The most impoitant element of this is the enlighteneu suppoit of Beaus.

6. At the iisk of stiiiing contioveisy, the positions taken by Beaus ovei the
yeais have iegulaily not been enlighteneu anu have been a majoi
contiibutoiy factoi to CARIC0N's cuiient weak position. A failuie to pioviue
consistent leaueiship has iegulaily been combineu with making uniealistic
anu uniealisable uemanus on CARIC0N whilst being unwilling to pioviue
the iesouices to meet such uemanus. In theii mitigation, Beaus have been
given scant guiuance as to the neeu foi stiict piioiitisation anu why it is so
impoitant. Theie has been a mistaken ieluctance on the Secietaiiat's pait to
challenge specific instances when too much was being askeu.
44

7. In summaiy, we woulu contenu that the ieal significance of the uuyana
ietieat was that it pioviues a funuamental bieak with past piactices. These
piactices have inauveitently compiomiseu the entiie CARIC0N stiuctuie by
weakening its ability to auuiess the complex anu uifficult tasks foi which it
was set up. It is then ciucial that this bieak with past piactices be confiimeu.
4.3 The!Need!for!a!Strategy!
8. In making a bieak with past piactices, the entiie CARIC0N stiuctuie fiom
Beaus uownwaius neeus to uevelop cleai guiuelines foi what it is uoing.
This intiouuces the seconu of the thiee main iequiiements foi the suivival
anu iecoveiy of CARIC0N given in Section 2.S above:

Requirement!2:!Targeting!the!delivery!of!a!narrow!range!of!specific,!
practical!and!achievable!benefits!over!a!reasonably!short!time!horizon.

9. In othei woius, it is essential CARIC0N uevelops a stiategy. This neeus to be
a cleai statement of what can be achieveu anu how foi a time bounu peiiou.
The stiategy shoulu stiictly piioiitise what CARIC0N will uo in line with
available iesouices. Thiough a cleai plan of action, it shoulu uiive the whole
CARIC0N constiuct, incluuing its oigans, its institutions anu the Secietaiiat.
It shoulu also uiive ielations with outsiue stakeholueis, incluuing uonois,
the piivate sectoi anu civil society.

1u. In teims of CARIC0N's immeuiate conceins, stiategy is not much moie than
a fancy name foi making iealistic piioiities. It is often saiu that the thiee
guiuing piinciples to buying piopeity aie location, location anu location. As
fai as CARIC0N is conceineu, that maxim shoulu be iewiitten as - howevei
unfoitunate the use of English - piioiitisation, piioiitisation anu
piioiitisation.

11. We aie fai fiom alone in making these points conceining iealistic piioiities
anu stiategy. We have heaiu them all iounu the iegion anu in the Secietaiiat.
They weie amongst the most iegulaily wiuely iepeateu views that we heaiu.

44
As uiscusseu in moie uetail in the ieview of the Secietaiiat below, it is essential that Aiticle 27:S of the
Reviseu Tieaty of Chaguaiamas hencefoiwaiu be useu anu that policy woik suppoit its effective use.

31

The same points have also been maue in vaiious publications, incluuing a
cuiient Economist Intelligence 0nit (EI0) iepoit
4S
.

12. Anothei iepoit entitleu Bridging!the!Gaps:!CARICOM!Regional!Survey!of!Aid!
Effectiveness
46
is also timely. It was only publisheu aftei oui initial uiaft of
much of this Final Repoit, yet it uncannily beais out much of what we have
saiu, but fiom a iathei uiffeient peispective. Two quotes fiom it aie woith
iepeating. Fiist, theie is "neeu foi a cleai, simple mission anu stiategy, with
ueliveiy of tangible value anu much impioveu communication of iesults
achieveu". Seconu, "Foi many, eveiy sectoi seems to be a piioiity, meaning
that none ieally aie."
47

4.4 Strategy!and!Savings!
1S. The cuiient economic ciisis suggests that a less expensive CARIC0N
constiuct woulu be helpful to Nembei States. It is also implicit, if not explicit,
in oui teims of iefeience that Nembei States woulu welcome a cut in the
Secietaiiat's coie buuget that they funu. Whilst the aiguments foi such will
be uevelopeu in the succeeuing sections of this iepoit, culminating in oui
buuget iecommenuations in Section 11, we shoulu at this stage point out the
impoitant connection between stiategy anu piioiities, on the one hanu, anu
savings anu effectiveness, on the othei.

14. Naking piioiities is about making choices. It is about ueciuing to uo one
thing iathei than anothei anu committing iesouices anu thought to biinging
about that thing. This whole package is the baie bones of stiategy. It follows
that stiategy anu piioiities aie ineluctably linkeu to savings anu
effectiveness. Without a stiategy baseu on piioiities, it is much haiuei to
commit iesouices anu thought to what shoulu be uone anu both can be
spieau about too thinly. It is a shoit jump to a lack of effectiveness,
implementation ueficits anu so on.

1S. Similaily, a lack of piioiitisation anu stiategy encouiages a lack of focus,
leauing to ill-uiiecteu iesouices, waste anu so on. In such a situation, making
savings is veiy haiu. Without being cleai about wheie iesouices shoulu be
uiiecteu thiough piioiitisation anu stiategy, it is uifficult to know wheie
savings shoulu be maue. Savings anu cuts aie inuistinguishable in such
ciicumstances.

16. By contiast, when piioiities aie maue anu a stiategy uevelopeu, savings aie
not the same thing as cuts. A cleai focus on what shoulu be uone anu what
shoulu not be uone allows iesouices anu thought to be focuseu effectively on

4S
In its Becembei 2u11 upuate, EI0 juuges that iegional integiation will iemain an elusive goal anu
suggests that the iegion "iuentify a few iegional initiatives that can be ueliveieu iapiuly in a mannei that
iebuilus confiuence." See, The!Economist!Intelligence!Unit!Limited,!2011.
46
Bridging!the!Gaps:!CARICOM!Regional!Survey!of!Aid!Effectiveness,!Stephen van Bouten, Accoiu
Inteinational Nanagement Seivices Inc., 0ctobei 2u11.
47
We woulu uisagiee with veiy little of what is wiitten in the Bridging!the!Gaps: iepoit conceining
CARIC0N, paiticulaily pages SS-42. We woulu iecommenu that anyone associateu with CARIC0N ieau
these sobeiing pages in paiticulai. Some of the quotes fiom inteiviews conuucteu aie so peitinent that we
have incluueu them at Appenuix 6 of this iepoit.

32

piioiities. uieatei efficiency means that savings can often be maue without
any cuts in output. It is possible up!to!a!point and!in!some!circumstances to
cut iesouice allocation without cutting outputs.

17. We aie not heie suggesting that a cut in the Secietaiiat's iesouicing by
Nembei States is eithei uesiiable oi possible in cuiient ciicumstances. The
aiguments suiiounuing that will be uevelopeu in the following sections.
What we aie saying is that piioiitisation makes savings possible. In some
ciicumstances, it is sensible to ieallocate such savings to incieasing
effectiveness, say by taigeting a ieuuction in the implementation ueficit. In
othei cases, those savings can leau to cuts in iesouicing without putting
uesiieu outcomes at iisk.

18. This pioviues a fuithei poweiful ieason foi ueveloping a stiategy. Whethei
oi not it is uesiiable oi possible foi Nembei States to make savings in
contiibutions to CARIC0N in cuiient ciicumstances, effective piioiitisation
woulu make it possible foi savings to be taken in such a foim in!the!right!
circumstances when CARIC0N is woiking in a moie effective, focuseu anu
piouuctive mannei.
4.5 Our!Proposal!for!Developing!a!Strategy!
19. We recommend!that the most impoitant cuiient piioiity foi the Secietaiiat
is to piepaie a Stiategy foi a S-yeai peiiou with a view to it being agieeu by
Beaus of uoveinment.
48
Whilst the Stiategy shoulu have a uegiee of
flexibility to allow foi majoi changes in the exteinal enviionment, it shoulu
be iegaiueu as the key uiivei of the CARIC0N constiuct. It shoulu be specific
anu lay uown in some uetail those aieas that aie piioiities foi action anu
those aieas that will be uefeiieu until a latei uate. Without such claiity, we
feai foi the continueu suivival of CARIC0N.

2u. The Stiategy can anu shoulu be tiue to the iueals of CARIC0N, paiticulaily
on the basis of those iueals being aujusteu foi a iapiuly changing woilu. Foi
CARIC0N to suivive anu become ielevant to new geneiations, the Stiategy
neeus to iuentify specific benefits that aie ueliveiable anu to uevelop the
means to make suie that they aie ueliveieu.

21. It is essential that all stakeholueis acknowleuge that only so much can be
achieveu in a paiticulai peiiou of time; piioiitisation has to be the
watchwoiu. Although theie is cleaily a ieal implementation ueficit,
CARIC0N can no longei affoiu an auuitional peiceiveu ueficit, maue up of
announceu anu uniealisable wish lists. Raising expectations in this way iuins
CARIC0N's cieuibility, weakens its position anu, ultimately, will leau to its
uestiuction.
49

48
We will uesciibe how this shoulu be caiiieu out in oui ieview of the Secietaiiat.
49
Expectations have been built up that have fai exceeueu CARIC0N's capacity to uelivei. Numeious
inteiviews have maue is cleai that these continueu attempts to maintain the position that iegional
integiation is oi can be a fast-acting panacea have biought iegionalism into uisiepute.

33

22. Choices have to be maue, anu in some cases these choices will be painful.
0nfoitunately, the Caiibbean simply uoes not have the human oi financial
iesouices to uelivei uesiieu benefits ovei a wiue fiont in an uniealistic
timefiame, as oui analysis of binuing constiaints makes cleai. Bowevei, a
Stiategy that makes cleai choices anu matches piioiities to iesouices can
ielaunch CARIC0N as a vibiant, ielevant focus foi iegional uevelopment anu
giowth.

2S. The Stiategy pioposeu neeus to be put in place quickly. An outline stiategy
shoulu be the main item on the agenua at the next meeting of the Community
Council. The Community Council shoulu piesent the outline to the next
Beaus of uoveinment meeting with cleai iecommenuations. The full S-yeai
Stiategy shoulu then be completeu uuiing the fiist half of 2u12 anu agieeu at
seconu Beaus of uoveinment meeting in 2u12. In uiiving the CARIC0N
constiuct foi the next S yeais, the Stiategy shoulu be seen as giving the new
Secietaiy ueneial a manuate foi his teim of office.

24. As well as uiiving the CARIC0N constiuct, the Stiategy is essential foi the
iestiuctuiing of the Secietaiiat. We have often been askeu the question
"What is the Secietaiiat being iestiuctuieu foi." This is a goou question.
Whilst it is possible to suggest impoitant impiovements in how the
Secietaiiat is stiuctuieu, it cannot be maue fully fit foi puipose until that
puipose is piopeily specifieu.
4.6 Guidelines!for!Developing!the!Strategy!
2S. It is cleaily not oui business to specify what shoulu be the content of
CARIC0N's Stiategy. We woulu, howevei, suggest some biief guiuelines as
follows:
a. Overall!vision!!
We aie convinceu that the vision foi CARIC0N neeus to be upuateu to
ieflect touay's woilu. Too many of CARIC0N's conceins seem to ieflect a
bygone age, a view that was expiesseu to us in uiffeient foims in
numeious meetings. Ciiticisms about the constiuct being an olu boys'
netwoik, inwaiu-looking anu uominateu by insiueis aie wiuely shaieu.

Peihaps the most impoitant anu constiuctive comments weie maue to us
by one of the Beaus of uoveinment in oui piivate meeting with him. Be
aigueu convincingly that CARIC0N shoulu be outwaiu looking. It shoulu
be tiying to help uevelop the Caiibbean to compete on the woilu stage,
iathei than focusing so much on its moie inwaiu looking anu tiauitional
agenua.

In paiticulai, although the completion of the Single Naiket is impoitant,
much of it is about competing foi a small maiket of 6 million people
Su
.
The potential gains fiom that aie miniscule compaieu to what coulu be
achieveu fiom successfully becoming moie outwaiu focuseu
S1
.

Su
Excluuing Baiti as it is not yet piactically pait of the Single Naiket
S1
We woulu fully agiee with these comments. 0ui expeiience is that the Caiibbean has been slow in taking
up economic uevelopment oppoitunities anu has piobably misseu some altogethei. In oui ieview of the

34

b. Mainstreaming!a!regional!agenda!
In paiticulai, CARIC0N is the only bouy that is well placeu to uevelop
a iegional agenua that auus value to anything Nembei States can uo
inuiviuually. Within CARIC0N, only the Secietaiiat has the scope anu
authoiity to uo the necessaiy legwoik. Such a iegional agenua shoulu
cleaily be to be mainstieameu with anu agieeu by Nembei States. But
the uevelopment of such an agenua is a much wiuei concein.

CARIC0N cuiiently tenus to ieflect a combination of Nembei State
anu inteinational conceins, laigely because Nembei States anu the
inteinational community have the means
S2
of tabling anu piomoting
paiticulai agenuas. But the means foi cieating a uistinct iegional
agenua anu peisonality aie less obvious. Whilst Nembei States can
anu uo table pioposals foi a iegional agenua, these natuially often
ieflect Nembei State's paiticulai conceins iathei than being a iesult
of thinking thiough what initiatives coulu be top piioiities foi the
iegion as a whole. Similaily, inteinational bouies anu institutions,
whethei the INF oi IBB, foi example, can have some veiy goou iueas
but a iegional agenua is not theii piimaiy concein.

It became incieasingly cleai to us, anu was iaiseu on a numbei of
occasions uuiing oui consultations, that CARIC0N neeus the ability to
uevelop a uistinct iegional agenua to make it moie ielevant to touay's
society anu to uemonstiate that the iegional constiuct can auu value.
This is why we have put consiueiable emphasis on iegional
policymaking anu how it can be caiiieu out in the latei sections on
iestiuctuiing the Secietaiiat. In essence, theie is a significant gap in
iegional policymaking, which the Secietaiiat neeus to fill anu which is
intimately ielateu to a CARIC0N Stiategy.
!
c. Outline!prioritisation!
As fai as ueveloping piioiities aie conceineu, we woulu piopose an
initial tiawl thiough the vision of Chaguaiamas et al, uiviuing it into
at least thiee categoiies:
! Initiatives that aie canuiuates to be incluueu in the initial S-
yeai Stiategy;
! Initiatives that can be put off until latei;
! Initiatives that can be put off inuefinitely.

Secietaiiat, we have pioposeu a gieatei focus on iegional policy uevelopment paitly to ensuie that such
oppoitunities can be investigateu.
S2
These means may be pioceuuial oi iesouice uiiven. Nembei States can, of couise, iaise matteis of
concein thiough the vaiious CARIC0N bouies. Bonois can uiive thiough paiticulai conceins by
conuitionality anu have been effective in uoing this in a numbei of human iights issues. They can also offei
geneious financial incentives to piomote paiticulai conceins. In the absence of uonois wiuei inteinational
conceins, it is, foi example, uoubtful that CARIC0N woulu have such a majoi involvement in BIvaius
wheie the PANCAP piogiamme amounts to aiounu 12% of the Secietaiiat's oveiall buuget. This is because
both non-communicable uiseases anu violence aie much gieatei causes of piematuie ueath than BIvaius
in the Caiibbean iegion.

35

It is inevitable that fai too much will be incluueu in the fiist categoiy
uuiing the initial tiawl. But initiatives that can anu shoulu be put off
can quickly be taken out of consiueiation.

An obvious example is the intiouuction of a single cuiiency anu all
the associateu measuies. It has alieauy been iecogniseu that the
oiiginal taiget uate of 2u1S was vastly oveioptimistic. uiven the
majoi ciisis in the E0, anu the lessons that will neeu to be leaint fiom
it, a single cuiiency foi CARIC0N - whose economies aie much moie
uissimilai than those making up the Euiozone - is cleaily off the
agenua foi yeais. We woulu be suipiiseu if it became a ieality within
a geneiation. It woulu theiefoie make sense to iecognise this
explicitly anu to focus on moie iealistic neai-teim piioiities.

As well as making haiu choices about what CARIC0N can anu cannot
uo ovei the upcoming peiiou, piioiitisation neeus to be extenueu to
othei stakeholueis, not least uonois. The point was maue foicefully to
us that incieasing amounts of scaice iesouices
SS
have been taken up
in meeting aiu uonoi agenuas in iecent yeais, howevei impoitant oi
welcome those agenuas may be in piinciple. Agenuas on
enviionment, genuei anu laboui may, foi example, be veiy impoitant
but, like eveiything else, they shoulu be subjecteu to tests of
piioiitisation. In some piojects anu piogiammes, it is essential to take
full account of these issues; in otheis, they aie iiielevant anu can be a
iesouice-wasting uistiaction
S4
.

u. Ranking!of!initiatives!
The iemaining initiatives neeu to be iankeu in oiuei of piioiity
followeu by:
! An opeiational management exeicise to woik out exactly what
neeus to be uone on each initiative to achieve implementation.
The exeicise shoulu be costeu anu timetableu;
! The uevelopment of an oiueieu pipeline of initiatives;
! The matching of costeu anu timetableu initiatives with
management iesouices anu likely availability of funuing.

It woulu be bettei to piioiitise too few initiatives than too many. This
is, fiistly, because economic anu othei uevelopments aie likely to
thiow up new anu cuiiently unknown piioiities. Seconuly, even this
soit of exeicise is likely to oveistate how much can be achieveu.
Thiiuly, the psychological impact of ovei peifoiming in teims of
achieving piioiities will be positive - as will the publicity - wheieas
unueipeifoimance will have the opposite effect. At the same time, if

SS
This is a paiticulaily impoitant point in light of the binuing constiaints faceu by the Caiibbean. The
inteinational community iegulaily oveilooks the impact of these.
S4
It woulu be veiy helpful fiom eveiyone's point of view to auopt a case-by-case appioach on these matteis.
0theiwise, theie is a uangei of an ineffective tick-box mentality ueveloping wheie mantias aie obseiveu but
little iesults.

36

theie is ovei-peifoimance new initiatives can always be pulleu
foiwaiu thiough the pipeline.

e. The!Restructuring!of!CARICOM!and!of!the!Secretariat!
Finally a key pait of the Stiategy will be to uiaw out what is accepteu
fiom this iepoit anu othei similai stuuies with a view to the
funuamental iestiuctuiing of CARIC0N anu the Secietaiiat ovei the
next S yeais.

Assuming it is laigely accepteu, this Final Repoit can pioviue the
backbone foi iestiuctuiing as fai as the Secietaiiat anu the oveiall
stiuctuie of CARIC0N aie conceineu. It will neeu to be integiateu
with othei iecent woik uone, such as that on peifoimance
management. It will also neeu to covei the upcoming stuuies
conceineu with CARIC0N institutions anu with Cai foium.

!

37

!
5 Strengthening!the!CARICOM!Construct:!The!Second!Step!to!
Recovery!!
5.1 Introduction!
1. The thiiu anu last main iequiiement foi the suivival anu iecoveiy of
CARIC0N given in Section 2.S above specifies:

Requirement!III:!A!credible!reorganisation!and!strengthening!of!the!
CARICOM!construct,!including!the!Secretariat!and!CARICOM!
institutions,!focused!on!the!management!of!implementation.

2. In this section, we biiefly consiuei wheie the CARIC0N constiuct neeus to
be stiengtheneu befoie moving on to a moie uetaileu ieview of the
Secietaiiat.
5.2 Governance!Issues!
S. In Section S.4 above, we aigueu that it is most unlikely that CARIC0N's
uifficulties can be oveicome thiough fuithei stiuctuial oi legal innovations.
0ui sense is that appaiently goou iueas may tuin out to be alteinative
ioutes that enu up at the same biick wall - the "implementation ueficit".
This view is wiuely shaieu aiounu the iegion.

4. Neveitheless, CARIC0N's goveinance can be impioveu in a numbei of ways.
Theie aie vaiious legal issues to be kept unuei consiueiation. These incluue
goveinance issues going back to the West Inuian Commission, the
challenges pioviueu by CSNE, paiticulaily in light of the moie iecent EPA
agieement, anu the cuiient pioposal foi a Peimanent Committee of
Ambassauois. These issues aie uiscusseu at Appenuix S in a papei by
}ustice Buke Pollaiu entitleu "Appioaches to Regional uoveinance in the
Caiibbean Community".

S. The iemaining goveinance issues consist of tiuying up anu stiengthening
exeicises, iathei than funuamental change. The ciucial issue is to make
CARIC0N's existing mechanisms anu aiiangements woik bettei. Theie
neeus to be a geneial tightening up of the CARIC0N constiuct, paiticulaily
conceining institutions, anu we will uiscuss how below. At the same time
existing aiiangements conceining the 0igans of the Community neeu to be
maue to woik bettei thiough a combination of bettei uisciplines, impioveu
pioceuuial anu auministiative aiiangements anu incieaseu suppoit. These
aie also outlineu below.
5.3 Scope!of!CARICOM!
6. Foi the sake of completeness, we shoulu make some biief comments on the
scope of CARIC0N's activities. This essentially coveis two sepaiate
uimensions: the numbei of Nembei States anu the Pillais of the

38

Community; the Pillais bioauly uefine CARIC0N's aieas of inteiest. uiven
its cuiient weak position, it is cleai that CARIC0N is in no position to
expanu eithei its membeiship oi the Pillais.

7. To the contiaiy, CARIC0N neeus to consoliuate with its cuiient
membeiship anu to focus on stiengthening its bianu. Similaily, theie neeus
to be gieatei piioiitisation within the cuiient Pillais, iathei than any
expansion in activities. To the extent that any expansion is consiueieu - anu
we fully unueistanu incieasing conceins about iegional secuiity - this
expansion shoulu be at the expense of othei piioiities. As we noteu in the
pievious section, haiu choices have to be maue.
5.4 Areas!Requiring!Strengthening!
8. In oui ieview of the Secietaiiat, which follows latei in this iepoit, we make
some initial pioposals to begin tightening the CARIC0N stiuctuie. These aie
conceineu with making CARIC0N institutions moie accountable whilst, at
the same time, uiawing them in to play theii pait in a moie unifieu iegional
stiategy.

9. When ieviewing the Secietaiiat, we also piopose piactical measuies to
suppoit the opeiations of 0igans of the Community bettei fiom the Beaus
of uoveinment uown. Impioveu systems foi evaluating anu managing
manuates shoulu help maintain the uiscipline of piioiitisation intiouuceu in
the Stiategy. This will be combineu with the piovision of bettei suppoit to
the Community Council to enable it to fulfil its stiategic iole, as was
envisageu in the Reviseu Tieaty of Chaguaiamus.

1u. We will specify auuitional geneial measuies to oveicome cuiient
auministiative weaknesses, also to be implementeu by the Secietaiiat.
Taken togethei, we believe this package of management-baseu measuies
can significantly stiengthen the iole of the 0igans of the Community in the
CARIC0N stiuctuie.

11. Fuithei changes, which we will piopose foi the Secietaiiat, aie uesigneu to
help oveicome implementation pioblems at the Nembei State level. These
incluue the uevelopment of piocesses uesigneu to taiget anu oveicome
implementation bottlenecks. Bettei follow up anu the uevelopment of
infoimal communication netwoiks to supplement the foimal channels aie
all uesigneu to taiget a majoi ieuuction in the "implementation ueficit".
5.5 Permanent!Committee!of!Ambassadors!
12. In oui aim to auuiess implementation challenges at souice, we have also
consiueieu the pioposal to set up a Peimanent Committee of Ambassauois.
The pioposal, both in its oiiginal anu mouifieu foims
SS
, was given a mixeu
ieception aiounu the iegion with few showing much enthusiasm.

SS
The }amaican uoveinment oiiginal pioposeu that Peimanent Ambassauois iepiesenting each Nembei
State be laigely baseu in ueoigetown, uuyana anu act as a link between the Secietaiiat anu Nembei States.
Consiueiable tiavel costs coulu also be saveu with Ambassauois iepiesenting theii Nembei States at some
of the meetings of Community 0igans. The St vincent uoveinment subsequently pioposeu a moie fluiu

39

1S. Reseivations ievolveu aiounu both cost anu effectiveness issues. Theie was
a geneial woiiy that it coulu inciease costs without any guaiantee of
incieaseu effectiveness. It was iegulaily aigueu that if cabinet ministeis,
with the suppoit of civil seivants, have pioblems tianslating CARIC0N
uecisions into appiopiiate measuies anu implementation within Nembei
States, how coulu an inuiviuual Peimanent Ambassauoi be expecteu to uo
bettei. Bespite these vaiious views, it is the lack of ieal commitment to the
pioposal that makes its full implementation unwoikable at this stage.

14. Neveitheless, oui position is moie agnostic. As we have aigueu, we uo not
see new oi alteinative stiuctuies as the solution to the "implementation
ueficit". Rathei, we see the necessity of iuentifying the inuiviuual
components of the "implementation ueficit" at souice anu uiiectly
auuiessing what neeus to be uone to iesolve them. This is a uetaileu
management task wheie officials at the Secietaiiat neeu to woik moie
closely with Nembei State officials in focusing on the uay-to-uay piocess of
implementation.

1S. We have ieuesigneu the Secietaiiat's oiganisation stiuctuie to enable it to
play a moie uiiect iole in the implementation piocess anu covei what,
heietofoie, have been weak oi missing links in the chain of implementation.
As things stanu, we uo not see a cential oi foimal iole foi a Peimanent
Committee of Ambassauois in this uetaileu piocess of implementation.

16. Bowevei, we see meiit in a Committee of Ambassauois pioviuing infoimal
suppoit anu auvice to CARIC0N's Secietaiy ueneial anu playing a co-
oiuinating iole in theii own countiies. This is a moie limiteu iole than
foieseen foi the PCA but, uepenuing on how well it woiks, it coulu be
uevelopeu into a wiuei anu moie foimal iole in uue couise.

17. It is cleai that Ambassauois can pioviue a useful sounuing boaiu about new
pioposals, auvise on piogiess with implementation anu, above all, put
acioss the views of Nembei States. Baving moie continuity than the
Community Council, the Ambassauois can fulfil an impoitant piepaiatoiy
function foi Community Council meetings. Ambassauois can also play a co-
oiuinating iole in theii own countiy. It is appaient that ministeis iegulaily
fail to biief theii Beaus of uoveinment following CARIC0N meetings, that
iepoits aie not ciiculateu iounu Nembei States anu that matteis enu up
being uiscusseu unnecessaiily at Beaus of uoveinment meetings because of
Beaus inauequate biiefing about matteis that have been settleu.

18. With theii bioauei puiview - anu on the basis that they have the eai of theii
iespective goveinments anu paiticulaily the Beau of uoveinment -
Ambassauois can play an impoitant tiouble shooting, auvisoiy anu
integiative iole.

aiiangement with Ambassauois spenuing shoit peiious in ueoigetown asceitaining in some uetail what
neeueu to be uone, followeu by playing a piogiess-chasing iole back in theii own countiy.

40

19. Such an infoimal iole will complement the new iole we aie suggesting foi
the Secietaiiat, which is essentially a sophisticateu piogiess-chasing one.
uiven the uifficulties anu complexities of implementation, it may tuin out
that this iole neeus to be uevelopeu fuithei both in the Secietaiiat anu in
Nembei States, with both siues woiking closely togethei to tiy to cleai the
implementation pipeline. This may pioviue an oppoitunity foi ievisiting the
pioposal to cieate a fullei anu moie wiue-ianging Peimanent Committee of
Ambassauois.
5.6 An!Outward!Looking!Construct:!Some!Potential!Innovations!
2u. In Section 4.S above, we suggesteu that CARIC0N shoulu become a moie
outwaiu looking constiuct. In this iespect, we have two sets of innovations
to suggest, neithei of which shoulu involve CARIC0N in majoi expense but
both of which coulu contiibute significantly to CARIC0N becoming moie
outwaiu looking anu inclusive. They coulu potentially uelivei impoitant
benefits to the iegion as well as geneiate some useful souices of new
income foi the Secietaiiat. At the same time, the fiist innovation, which
conceins the Beaus of uoveinment meeting coulu inciease effectiveness
anu ieuuce costs.

Heads!of!Government!Conference!
21. Theie aie cuiiently two Beaus of uoveinment Confeiences each yeai. The
main summei confeience cuiiently falls between seveial uiffeient stools:
! It incoipoiates lengthy ceiemonies, wheie both the puie ceiemonial
elements anu the speeches aie veiy long. Both aspects have uiawn
wiuespieau ciiticism;
! Nuch of the confeience is conuucteu behinu closeu uoois in Caucus
with Beaus of uoveinment on theii own oi with veiy few officials;
! Relatively laige uelegations of officials fiom Nembei States anu fiom
the Secietaiiat aie left sitting aiounu uoing viitually nothing. This
also uiaws wiuespieau ciiticism;
! vaiious visitois fiom the inteinational community spenu most of
theii time kicking theii heels.

22. The way the Beaus meeting is oiganiseu suggests theie is no claiity about
its puipose. Some elements suggest it is supposeu to be a show case public
event. 0theis elements point to a piivate anu iestiicteu gatheiing.

2S. In ieality, the gatheiing is not fit foi puipose. The outwaiu looking elements
aie oiganiseu in an anaichic mannei likely to give any outsiue visitois a
pooi impiession. When it comes to the moie inwaiuly focuseu meetings of
Caiibbean goveinments anu officials, theie aie cleai tensions between
whethei the focus shoulu be on small meetings between key paiticipants oi
a moie open foium involving full national uelegations.

24. The Beaus of uoveinment Confeience stiuck us as an expensive misseu
oppoitunity. Small Caiibbean countiies simply cannot affoiu having some of
theii key officials tieu up foi seveial uays uoing viitually nothing, especially

41

when it involves expensive tiavel anu hotels. It also uoes little foi
CARIC0N's ieputation that outsiue visitois aie maue to hang aiounu foi a
couple of open sessions anu foi the off chance of meeting Beaus of
uoveinment.

2S. If Beaus of uoveinment meetings aie to be basically inwaiu-looking anu
focuseu on Caucus, then it woulu be sensible to abanuon all the suiiounuing
fiippeiy, expense anu wasteu time. Small meetings coulu be iestiicteu to
Beaus anu a few officials anu it woulu piobably make sense to have them
moie iegulaily, paiticulaily as viueo-confeiencing becomes moie ieliable.

26. 0ccasional Beaus of uoveinment meetings uesigneu to showcase the
Caiibbean anu oiganiseu on an explicitly outwaiu looking basis coulu
supplement these iegulai meetings. Each meeting coulu have a topical
theme with speakeis inviteu fiom all ovei the woilu. The iuea woulu be to
involve not only the inteinational community but also the inteinational anu
iegional piivate sectoi.

27. Such confeiences woulu pioviue a Bavos-like oppoitunity foi Beaus of
uoveinment, theii ministeis anu officials to mix with moveis anu shakeis
fiom aiounu the woilu. They coulu get acioss the message that the
Caiibbean is open foi business anu foi paitneiship anu obtain inteinational
meuia coveiage. At the same time, investment oppoitunities anu iueas
woulu natuially flow fiom all the netwoiking at such an event.

28. Bone well, such confeiences coulu attiact seiious inteinational
sponsoiship. If they weie to be set up siue-by-siue with a business oi
investment faii - anu theie aie a numbei of pieceuents foi such - they
coulu also be tuineu into money-spinneis foi CARIC0N
S6
. Well-chosen
uates uuiing the noithein wintei woulu ensuie top-level tuinouts.

29. Iueally such confeiences shoulu take place annually though we aie awaie
that not all Nembei States woulu have auequate facilities to host such
inteinational events. We recommend!such a confeience being oiganiseu to
celebiate CARIC0N's 4u
th
anniveisaiy anu its ielaunch in 2u1S.

Su. Whethei oi not this specific pioposal is accepteu, we further!recommend
that the oiganisation anu puipose of Beaus of uoveinment meetings be
ievieweu anu that they be ieuesigneu on a moie mouest basis to meet
specific objectives.

Dialogue!with!the!Private!Sector!
S1. At the Beaus of uoveinment Confeience in St Kitts in }uly 2u11, Beaus weie
keen to encouiage the closei involvement of the piivate sectoi in CARIC0N.
Bistoiically the links have been weak. This has not been helpeu by

S6
Buiing the optimistic eaily yeais following the collapse of the Soviet 0nion, an annual confeience
accompanieu by an investment faii was always attenueu by leauing Russian politicians anu business people,
by the inteinational community anu leauing acauemics anu by inteinational bankeis, investois anu
companies.

42

fiagmenteu anu uiviueu piivate sectoi iepiesentation at the iegional level.
0ui unueistanuing is that many key piivate sectoi playeis uo not even
bothei to get involveu.

S2. A funuamental impiovement in CARIC0N's ielations with the piivate sectoi
is long oveiuue. The fact that no close netwoik of ielationships exists is a
majoi weakness, not least because a majoi pait of CARIC0N's iaison u'tie
is to facilitate business within the iegion. The piivate sectoi's views on what
woiks anu what uoes not anu on wheie piioiities lie woulu be invaluable.
S7

SS. Bowevei, we cuiiently see little value in setting up some soit of council oi
committee involving iepiesentatives of the piivate sectoi. Although theie
aie some stiong piivate sectoi oiganisations aiounu the iegion, theie is no
oiganisation that is tiuly iepiesentative of the iegion. At the time of wiiting,
theie is no oiganisation that is fully iepiesentative of inuigenous
businesses, let alone of inteinational companies. At the same time, the
officials of these piivate sectoi oiganisations aie often not business people
themselves

S4. Our!proposal woulu be to set up a uialogue uiiectly with leauing figuies in
business in the iegion. uiven the small size of the iegion, the inuigenous
moveis anu shakeis aie well known. A small giouping of half-a-uozen of
them coulu be supplementeu with thiee oi foui CE0s of leauing
inteinational businesses in the iegion; theie neeu be no fixeu
membeiship.
S8

SS. We woulu suggest iegulai small anu infoimal meetings, possibly ovei
uinnei. In oui expeiience an infoimal aiiangement is the best way of
builuing up ielationships anu getting busy executives to open up on a
fieewheeling basis. At moie foimal business meetings, they aie moie likely
to want to get thiough a naiiowei agenua quickly.

S6. As well as pioviuing CARIC0N with invaluable insights, we believe that
such meetings coulu leau to significant sponsoiship anu financing.
S9
Fiist,
the piivate sectoi coulu pioviue sponsoiship to CARIC0N events as long as
conflicts of inteiest weie avoiueu. Seconu, the piivate sectoi coulu be
peisuaueu to pay foi ieseaich, paiticulaily in aieas in which it is inteiesteu.
Thiiu, it is also likely to help with costs to uefenu Caiibbean inteiests oi to
uevelop oppoitunities
6u
.

S7
Cleaily CARIC0N neeus to uiffeientiate between impaitial auvice anu lobbying. This shoulu not be a
pioblem foi a self-confiuent oiganisation containing the iight soit of policy auviseis.
S8
These coulu peihaps incluue commeicial banking, touiism anu one oi two othei sectois.
S9
Buiing the iecent involvement of two of oui team in caiiying out a feasibility stuuy to set up a iegional
piofessional tiaining institute foi the finance sectoi, the CE0 of an inteinational finance company offeieu to
make a seiious contiibution to the set up costs. Be was veiy keen that the oiganisation be got off the
giounu quickly anu feaieu it woulu otheiwise be seiiously uelayeu.
6u
We suspect, foi example, that Biitish Aiiways woulu have been keen, if askeu, to woik with CARIC0N anu
the Caiibbean Touiism 0iganisation ovei the iecent Auvanceu Passengei Buty issue. It is likely that a joint
lobbying exeicise woulu have been moie successful than a moie fiagmenteu appioach, paiticulaily if key
figuies, such as the Secietaiy ueneial, heaueu a joint lobbying mission to Lonuon.

43

6 Diagnosing!the!Secretariats!Current!Difficulties!
6.1 Key!Factors!in!the!Secretariats!Loss!of!Direction!
The!basic!problem!
1. In Section S.S above, we outlineu how a combination of factois has left the
Secietaiiat with an unmanageable woikloau. Its influence anu contiol ovei
the integiation agenua, which was always constiaineu, has been
funuamentally weakeneu. As a iesult the Secietaiiat has lost sight of its ieal
puipose. The Secietaiiat - anu the entiie CARIC0N agenua - has become a
hostage to piocesses that have uevelopeu a life of theii own, iathei than a
bouy focusing on well-uefineu objectives anu the achievement of specific
iesults.

2. Typical amongst these piocesses aie enuless meetings, which to a laige
extent have become pooi pioxies foi uecision taking anu foi action
61
. But
they aie, by no means, the only factoi in why piocess, pioceuuie anu
auministiation have come to uominate the Secietaiiat.

S. These pioblems have built up ovei a lengthy peiiou, which tenus to make
them much moie obvious to outsiueis. In this section, oui objective is to
unueistanu bettei why these pioblems have built up.
!
Major!gaps!in!policy!making!
4. We have alieauy uevoteu a whole section of this iepoit to piioiitisation as a
key necessaiy conuition to tuining iounu CARIC0N's foitunes. In auuition to
the cuiient lack of uiiection that iesults fiom a lack of piioiitisation anu
stiategy, theie is no geneial anu oveiaiching policymaking in the Secietaiiat
conceining how the iegion can maximise its position anu meet the
challenges it faces.

S. To avoiu any confusion, we aie heie iefeiiing to ueveloping a stiategic
fiamewoik in iesponse to systematic anu iegulai enviionmental scanning
iathei than the uevelopment of specific sectoial policies conceining aspects
of iegional uevelopment oi of integiation. The Secietaiiat has a well-
establisheu tiauition in policymaking in this sense having uevelopeu policies
to piesent foi iegional agieement in agiicultuie, foou anu nutiition,
goveinment piocuiement, enteipiise uevelopment, inuustiy, eneigy anu
youth policy amongst otheis.

6. Yet, as a senioi official put it to us, the Secietaiiat has no time foi ieal
thinking. It is this bianch of policymaking that is oui concein. It is the

61
This is a common pioblem amongst oiganisations that aie stiuggling to change. The new CE0 of a majoi
aiiline was so conceineu about the uominant meetings cultuie being a substitute foi ieal pioblem solving
that he took the iauical step of closing uown all the aiiline's meeting iooms. Bencefoith, manageis hau to
meet in a hall without seating. The puipose was to encouiage small meetings that focuseu on solving the
issues at hanu quickly, with those piesent taking iesponsibility, to ieplace the cultuie of laige talking shops,
which hau come to take up enuless management time whilst pioviuing a lack of cleai uecision-making anu
accountability.

44

uevelopment of the soit of blue skies thinking moie typical of think tanks
anu which is often iesponsible foi paiauigm shifts anu funuamental change.
This is cleaily a longstanuing pioblem along the following lines.
i. The Secietaiiat's "policy foimulation" is laigely iestiicteu to uay-to-
uay ieaction (of the type how uo we iesponu to a paiticulai mattei
aiising within the iegion oi inteinationally.) anu to the minutiae of
ueveloping uetaileu aspects of integiation (much of which is
uelegateu to consultants);
ii. Specific policies aie uevelopeu on a piecemeal basis anu in iesponse
to manuates oi to conceins of the moment - anu then only if
iesouices aie available
62
;
iii. Yet a lack of seiious economic anu financial evaluation means that
manuateu policy initiatives that have little oi no chance of evei
becoming ieality can be kept in play inuefinitely
6S
;

7. In oui expeiience,
64
theie is no policymaking in the think tank sense
6S
in the
Secietaiiat, in CARIC0N oi in the iegion as a whole. Theie is, foi example, no
systematic suiveying of what is oi what coulu become impoitant to the
iegion anu of wheie iegional co-opeiation coulu auu value (net of costs) to
what Nembei States can achieve on theii own.

8. Similaily, theie is no thinking as to the uiiections the iegion might go in,
whethei they aie feasible, anu how the iegion might get theie. Without such
systematic thinking, the iegion is likely to miss oppoitunities foi iegional
uevelopment - anu in oui view alieauy has uone. Finally, theie is little oi no
uevelopment of policies to confiont majoi cuiient issues, pioblems anu
oppoitunities facing the iegion. An oft-heaiu iecent ciiticism, foi example,
that theie has still been no seiious iegional iesponse to the 2uu8 financial
ciisis, is impossible to iefute
66
.

9. This is a seiious vacuum anu it is a majoi weakness in the way the
Secietaiiat has been stiuctuieu. It has negatively impacteu the whole
CARIC0N constiuct, contiibuting to its lack of uiiection.
!
The!tyranny!of!meetings!
1u. 0ne of the cleai iesults of this lack of uiiection is CARIC0N's ieliance on
meetings. The Secietaiiat hosts numeious foimal meetings - ovei 2uu pei

62
The woik that is uone tenus to be in iesponse to the excessive numbei of manuates anu issues aiising out
of vaiious iegional meetings. Theie is no mechanism foi filteiing, evaluating anu piioiitising these uemanus
except foi the lack of financial oi human iesouices oi of expeitise.
6S
Beaus of uoveinment, ministeis anu officials natuially wish to piess iueas foi the betteiment of the
iegion anu, in the absence of othei souices of iueas anu pioposals, have eveiy ieason to continue tiying.
64
The wiitei was at one point Biiectoi of the Russian Euiopean Centie foi Economic Policy anu iesponsible
foi 4u policymakeis giving high level auvice on Russia's economic anu social tiansition following the
collapse of the Soviet 0nion.
6S
Cuiient policy activities aie little moie than the auministiation of assoiteu iueas anu initiatives; theie is
no naiiative oi linkage. Although the implementation of the Tieaty of Chaguaiamas anu the flagship CSNE
piogiamme cleaily involve "policy uevelopment", these aie specific policies conceining specific initiatives
that weie put in place some time ago. They aie not iegional policymaking as such.
66
This is the soit of coie issue that outsiue stakeholueis think CARIC0N was set up foi. Anu they aie iight,
whatevei insiueis might think!

45

yeai we have been tolu oi uouble the figuie of ten yeais ago. It is not cleai
why theie aie so many meetings oi what they aie foi
67
. Both the numbei of
anu the utility of meetings aie the subject of majoi ciiticism thioughout the
iegion. They aie seen as a waste of time, which by anu laige achieve veiy
little.

11. Neetings can, of couise, be a goou way of taking matteis foiwaiu if they
iesult in uecisions being taken, action being initiateu anu follow up taking
place. Bowevei, they aie by no means the only way of taking things foiwaiu
anu, with the exception of small specific meetings with cleai objectives,
meetings aie iaiely the best way to instigate effective action.

12. Neetings, anu paiticulaily laige meetings, aie usually only appiopiiate foi
foimal uecision taking, foi pioviuing infoimation oi foi a confeience-style
open-enueu uiscussion of iueas. In this context, foimal uecision taking means
eithei confiiming something that has alieauy been ueciueu oi voting on
specific piopositions, such as at Annual ueneial Neetings.

1S. It is eviuent that few CARIC0N meetings iesult in cleai uecisions fiom which
action is initiateu anu then effectively caiiieu out. Theie is a long list of
ieasons, well aiticulateu by many of those we have met, as to why meetings
aie ineffective in taking the CARIC0N agenua foiwaiu.

14. To paiaphiase the uictum that "patiiotism is the last iefuge of a
scounuiel"
68
, CARIC0N meetings seem to have become the last iefuge of
officials unceitain how to take iegional integiation foiwaiu. The substitution
of the activity of meetings foi actions focuseu on implementation has also
contiibuteu to CARIC0N's incieasing weakness anu its appaient inability to
get anything uone.

The!ineffectiveness!of!projects!
1S. Anothei iesult of lack of uiiection is the way that piojects have become
piocess-uiiven, iathei than one of the many means to the implementation of
integiation anu iegional co-opeiation. Amongst the numeious ciiticisms of
CARIC0N piojects
69
, the most impoitant is that they have tenueu to become
an enu in themselves, iathei than one of the means of uiiving iegional
integiation foiwaiu. As a iesult, CARIC0N piojects aie wiuely iegaiueu as
being ineffective.

16. The unueilying ieasons foi these pioblems with piojects aie:
a. Pioject outputs being incieasingly confuseu with implementation
outcomes;

67
Some meetings aie, of couise, statutoiy anu biing togethei the vaiious oigans of CARIC0N foi iegulai
foimal meetings. But most meetings aie moie specialiseu anu conceineu with taking foiwaiu aspects of
integiation.
68
Samuel }ohnson, 177S
69
The ueep-seateu pioblems of pioject management anu how they can be iesolveu will be assesseu in the
section on iestiuctuiing the Secietaiiat.

46

b. The Secietaiiat's incieasing ieliance on piojects foi its financing has
inevitably leu to piojects becoming an enu in themselves;
c. The success of Secietaiiat staff - anu the whole business of woik
piogiamming - is incieasingly uepenuent on obtaining piojects.

17. When, as we often heaiu, people iefei to the Secietaiiat as becoming a
pioject office (at the expense of being the uiivei of implementation anu
integiation), this is what they mean. A weakeneu oiganisation without a
cleai uiiection anu secuie finance will natuially be ieshapeu anu lose sight
of its ieal goals anu objectives.
6.2 Getting!to!Grips!with!the!Underlying!Problems!
18. Foi the Secietaiiat to woik well anu CARIC0N to achieve its objectives, the
following aie iequiieu:
i. Policy anu piioiitisation to uiive meetings anu othei mechanisms foi
taking uecisions, initiating action anu biinging about implementation
of integiation;
ii. A well-functioning system of follow up anu suppoit, in co-opeiation
with Nembei States, to biing about specifieu actions that iesult in the
implementation;
iii. Piojects being but one of vaiious mechanisms of pioviuing suppoit to
biing about implementation.

19. The linkages suggesteu in the pievious paiagiaph coulu have been wiitten
in shoithanu as follows:
i. 0bjectivesuecisions leauing to >
ii. > Action leauing to >
iii. > Results.

2u. We suspect that these linkages have nevei been stiong. They have now
bioken uown to the point of being inopeiable.

21. As a iesult of the bieakuown in these linkages, a vicious ciicle has, in effect,
emeigeu wheie pioceuuies anu piocess have, uespite the best of intentions,
become moie impoitant than getting iesults anu hitting objectives.

22. Befoie tuining to how the Secietaiiat can be iestiuctuieu to bieak this
vicious ciicle, we fiist examine some of the pioblems facing the Secietaiiat
in a little moie uetail.
6.3 A!Brief!Review!of!the!Challenges!Facing!the!Secretariat!
The!Secretariat!is!currently!not!fit!for!purpose!
2S. As things stanu, the Secietaiiat is too weak to leau any attempt to tuin
iounu CARIC0N's foitunes. The main ieasons foi this aie as follows
7u
:

7u
The Secietaiiat is a failing oiganisation because it has been unuei so many piessuies foi so long, with
many of these piessuies not of its making. Like any failing oiganisation, theie aie weaknesses thioughout
the oiganisation. We have focuseu on the pivotal weaknesses but otheis aie bounu to emeige with a full
change management piogiamme.

47

a. A!structure!ill"designed!for!encouraging!leadership!
The weaknesses of the Secietaiiat stait in the Secietaiy-ueneial's
0ffice. It is set up as a iepiesentational office iathei than that of a
Chief Executive. To be suie, the Secietaiy-ueneial has some
iepiesentational functions. Neveitheless, his piimaiy iole is one of
leaueiship as CE0 of CARIC0N.
71
Bis office shoulu be uesigneu to
enable him to caiiy out that leaueiship iole.

b. Weaknesses!in!management!arrangements!
The piessuies unuei which the Secietaiiat woiks have iesulteu in
some impoitant aiiangements not functioning as intenueu oi
bieaking uown entiiely. The Executive Nanagement Committee
(ENC)
72
, has met spoiauically foi some time, paitly because Assistant
Secietaiy ueneials aie unuei gieat piessuie to tiavel. It was ieviveu
to meet monthly unuei the Acting Secietaiy ueneial anu the new
Secietaiy ueneial is intent on making it woik moie effectively.!
!
c. Lack!of!mechanisms!to!prioritise!activities!
The lack of exteinal mechanisms to encouiage piioiitisation
7S
is
miiioieu by a lack of mechanisms within the Secietaiiat.
74
The
laigely bottom up system of Woik Piogiammes uoes little to
encouiage the piioiitisation oi co-oiuination of Secietaiiat woik (See
Box 1 foi a uiscussion on Woik Piogiammes).
!
d. Pivotal!gaps!in!policymaking!
Foice of ciicumstance means that, as uiscusseu above, theie is
viitually no blue skies thinking about iegional policies that coulu auu
value to what can be achieveu at the national level. Yet this is - oi at
least shoulu be - a majoi iationale foi iegionalism. Being taskeu by
Nembei States to investigate specific issues oi sectois is not the same
thing anu is, in any event weakeneu, by excessive uemanus anu the
lack of piioiitisation. This can be uesciibeu as wish list, iathei than
stiategic, thinking.

71
As laiu out in Aiticle 24 of the Reviseu Tieaty of Chaguaiamas
72
The ENC is maue up of the top officials of the Secietaiiat anu cuiiently incluues the Secietaiy ueneial, the
Beputy Secietaiy ueneial anu Assistant Secietaiy ueneials.
7S
In auuition to a woik piogiamme ciicumsciibeu by the oveiambitious timescales of agieements such as
that conceining the CSNE, the Secietaiiat is iegulaily taskeu with new obligations in vaiious economic
sectois such as agiicultuie oi tianspoitation anu in the social spheie without theie being any consiueiation
as to the iesouice cost oi feasibility of caiiying out such tasks.
74
Rathei than uevelop inteinal mechanisms to piioiitise exteinal uemanus, the Secietaiiat has in effect
uevelopeu an inefficient iationing system baseu on iesouice availability (both funus anu expeitise) anu the
inteiests anu capabilities of existing staff. This inevitably iesults in slow anu mixeu piogiess ovei a wiue
aiea with little, if anything, being signeu off as piopeily implementeu. At the same time, this anaichic
allocative system is not veiy goou at iesponuing to changes in the exteinal enviionment. Theie is the evei-
piesent uangei that the piogiess that is being maue is towaius objectives that aie changing oi becoming
less ielevant.

48

!
!
e. Too!much!focus!on!process!
The ieliance on specific piocesses, not least foimal meetings, to get
business uone is outmoueu. 0nfoitunately, a cultuie of ielying on
piocesses has uevelopeu at the expense of getting iesults
7S
.

f. Lack!of!results"based!culture!
The lack of a iesults-baseu cultuie makes implementation a hit anu
miss affaii. The cuiient oiganisational stiuctuie facilitates:
! A lack of systematic follow-up with Nembei States;
! Weak monitoiing of piogiess with implementation;
! No claiity about the natuie of bottlenecks anu impeuiments to
implementation oveiall (even if inuiviuual staff aie awaie of
the pioblems in theii aiea);

7S
Savingiams aie still seen as a key way of expeuiting Secietaiiat business because they weie establisheu as
a foimal (anu theiefoie uifficult to change) channel foi communications between the Secietaiiat anu
Nembei States. Yet they aie cleaily a veiy inefficient way of getting things uone at all, let alone on any
timetable othei than a leisuiely one.

Box!1:!Work!Programming!

The system of Woik Piogiamming is seiiously flaweu:
! Theie is no piopei oveiview to specify oveiall piioiities, to co-oiuinate
piogiammes oi to ieview outtuins. This is not suipiising as theie is no
oveiaiching stiategy to guiue piioiitisation;
! Theie has been no systematic monitoiing of woik piogiammes. A one-off
analysis was caiiieu out of 2uu8 woik piogiammes but we weie unable to get
a copy of this;
! Plans to use woik piogiammes as a basis foi peifoimance management aie an
impoitant step foiwaiu (as being intiouuceu by the Belta Paitneiship, in
association with Kitch Consulting).
! Bowevei, the system of cascauing ioles, activities, iesponsibilities anu
accountability uown the oiganisation makes it even moie impoitant that an
oveiall stiategy be in place.
! Stiategic piioiities can then be bioken uown into achievable woik
piogiammes at uiiectoiate, uepaitmental anu inuiviuual levels anu be useu to
assess peifoimance against objectives.

In cuiient ciicumstances, it is unsuipiising that:
! The Secietaiiat is iegulaily uesciibeu as being split into ill-cooiuinateu silos;
! Woik piogiammes have become extenueu "to uo" lists that aie not piioiitiseu
anu which cannot be completeu in the time available. Laige paits, if not entiie
woik piogiammes, aie caiiieu ovei fiom yeai-to-yeai;
! Staff have come to view woik piogiamming as a pointless management task
that inteifeies with theii oveibuiueneu scheuules.

49

! Insufficient focus on iesolving impeuiments to
implementation.

g. Weak!project!management!!
The spieauing of pioject management thioughout the oiganisation
has pioveu a majoi weakness in the Secietaiiat's oveiall peifoimance
as well as leauing to pooily manageu piojects:
! Pioject management is a specialist task, not one that can
effectively be combineu with othei management oi specialist
ioles;
! Piojects aie not well piioiitiseu anu aie pooily co-oiuinateu.
76

Theie appeais to be little stiategic oveisight;
! With the lack of a systematic anu stiuctuieu appioach, pioject
management is slow anu uepenuent on the availability of
inuiviuuals
77
. The involvement anu inteiest of Nembei States is
hit anu miss;
78

! Contiacting uisciplines aie pooi anu untimely fiom pioject
conception to payments;
79

! Theie appeais to be no piopei buugeting of piojects as theie is
often little ielation between pioject buugets anu the
iequiiements of the teims of iefeience.
8u

81

! Pioject outcomes aie likely to be well shoit of what woulu be
possible with goou pioject management. Although piojects can
leau to the implementation of integiation, we weie tolu that
pioject completion usually leaves an issue some way shoit of
implementation.

h. Severe!operational!problems!
The back office anu opeiational functions that aie essential to the
smooth iunning of any seivice business aie not fit foi puipose:
! IT anu communications seivices aie unsatisfactoiy anu out of
uate;
! Confeience Seivices aie oveiwhelmeu
82
anu unable to suppoit
meetings anu theii follow up on an effective oi timely basis;

76
We weie tolu of an extieme case wheie one uepaitment tiieu to set up a pioject wheie anothei
uepaitment was alieauy caiiying out a viitually iuentical pioject.
77
We weie tolu that if someone goes on holiuay, oi is sick, that the pioject woulu be usually be helu up until
theii ietuin. Pioject financing can only be signeu off at veiy senioi levels anu, if key management staff aie
tiavelling, piogiess will be helu up until theii ietuin.
78
We weie given numeious instances of Nembei States not being ieauy foi consultant inteiventions anu
foi piojects being extenueu ovei long peiious befoie being completeu. As consultants aie geneially
contiacteu foi specific peiious, this can iesult in the non-completion of laige paits of teims of iefeience
unless consultants aie able anu willing to iescheuule woik.
79
CARIC0N has a pooi ieputation amongst consultants.
8u
This is anothei example of (a lack of) finance being useu in an inappiopiiate way as a iationing
mechanism. Rathei than woik out what neeus to be uone anu piioiitise between competing piojects,
pioject buugets appeai to be fixeu without caieful consiueiation of the iequiiements of the teims of
iefeience.
81
We unueistanu that consulting companies iegulaily eschew oppoitunities to biu foi CARIC0N piojects
because they juuge that the woik cannot be completeu within the allocateu buuget.

50

! A veiy weak finance function incieases the piecaiiousness of
the Secietaiiat's position
8S
;
! 0nsatisfactoiy pioject finance aiiangements auu to pioject
management pioblems;
! Although Buman Resouices appeais the best manageu
opeiations' function, the backlog in its activities suggests that it
is unuei seiious stiain.
!
The!Secretariats!mix!of!staffing!has!become!outmoded!!
24. These weaknesses in the oiganisational stiuctuie of the Secietaiiat aie
magnifieu by weaknesses in Secietaiiat staffing. The main issues aie as
follows:
a. Unfilled!posts!at!senior!levels
Aiounu 2S% of senioi level posts aie cuiiently unfilleu, with key
vacancies in pivotal aieas. These incluue seveial vacancies at
Assistant Secietaiy ueneial level as well as ciucial longstanuing gaps,
such as the Beau of Finance post. Iiiespective of the uegiee to which
the cuiient stiuctuie is fit foi puipose, no oiganisation can function
effectively when so many posts iemain unfilleu.

b. Arbitrary!cost!cutting!
The Secietaiiat has been foiceu into seveie cost cutting at shoit
notice ovei iecent yeais. 0f necessity this has iesulteu in shoit-teim
anu laigely unplanneu uecisions about filling posts. Whilst economies,
incluuing cost cutting, aie veiy impoitant in the cuiient enviionment,
caiefully ueviseu oiganisational plans neeu to be put in place quickly
to ieplace aibitiaiy shoit-teim cuts.
!
c. Inappropriate!mix!of!skills!
The Secietaiiat contains laige numbeis of civil seivants anu
specialists at senioi levels. Amongst them may be some natuial
leaueis but veiy few have eithei hau management tiaining oi been
iuentifieu as having leaueiship skills. To move foiwaiu successfully,
the Secietaiiat neeus many moie manageis.

d. A!plethora!of!junior!posts!
The abunuance anu job titles of junioi staff uemonstiate an outmoueu
oiganisation. The numbei of iegistiy cleiks, secietaiies,
auministiative assistants, messengeis, stenogiapheis etc. is
suggestive of the pie-computei age. This is, of couise, the obveise of
pooi IT anu communications seivices. 0nfoitunately, the olu-
fashioneu methous aie no substitute as the Secietaiiat is unable to
keep tiack of the multifaiious anu complex tasks befoie it.

82
The outmoueu "meetings" cultuie of CARIC0N contiibutes to these uifficulties, as uo unsatisfactoiy IT
anu communications seivices. Neveitheless, the peifoimance of these seivices neeus substantial upgiauing
iiiespective of these contiibutoiy factois.
8S
See Section 1u.S foi a uiscussion of the finance function

51

e. Insufficient!new!blood!
The Secietaiiat has been well seiveu by a loyal anu committeu cauie
of staff who have somehow kept the oiganisation afloat. A high
piopoition of these staff aie at oi beyonu ietiiement uate. The
oiganisation neeus an infusion of new bloou biinging new
appioaches anu iueas, paiticulaily at senioi levels.

52

7 Restructuring!the!Secretariat:!The!Third!Step!to!Recovery!
7.1 Introduction!
1. It will be iecalleu that the thiiu anu last main iequiiement foi the suivival
anu iecoveiy of CARIC0N given in Section 2.S above specifieu:

Requirement!III:!A!credible!reorganisation!and!strengthening!of!the!
CARICOM!construct,!including!the!Secretariat!and!CARICOM!
institutions,!focused!on!the!management!of!implementation.

2. Following the vaiious analyses maue eailiei, we aie now in a position to put
the last piece in place - what neeus to be uone to biing about a cieuible
ieoiganisation anu stiengthening of the Secietaiiat.
7.2 Defining!the!Secretariats!purpose!!!
S. To summaiise how we have aiiiveu at this point, we eailiei stateu that the
Secietaiiat is too weak to leau an attempt to tuin iounu CARIC0N's
foitunes. In paiticulai, this means it is not cuiiently in a position to make
inioaus into the so-calleu implementation ueficit. We also noteu that the
Secietaiiat coulu only be maue "fit foi puipose" if its puipose weie, fiist,
cleaily uefineu. Accoiuingly at the CARIC0N level, anu as set out eailiei, the
following is iequiieu:
i. An agieeu S yeai stiategy to uiive the entiie CARIC0N constiuct,
incluuing the Secietaiiat;
ii. Stiengthening the oigans of CARIC0N, paiticulaily the Community
Council, anu impioving the uisciplines with which they aie iun;
iii. Stiengthening the stiuctuie of CARIC0N thiough incieasing the
accountability of, anu co-oiuination with, institutions of the
community;
iv. Piesenting a unifieu stiuctuie anu puipose that will encouiage othei
stakeholueis to play a full pait in ie-launching CARIC0N.

4. We have uemonstiateu - anu heie ie-emphasise - that a funuamental shift in
the opeiational uiscipline of the entiie CARIC0N stiuctuie is iequiieu so
that the stiuctuie woiks effectively towaius the enus in an agieeu Stiategy.
This shift neeus to apply thioughout CARIC0N, fiom Beaus of uoveinment
thiough the vaiious councils of CARIC0N anu its institutions to Nembei
States.

S. The position of the CARIC0N Secietaiiat is cleaily cential to this
funuamental shift. It has the key iole in oichestiating anu encouiaging the
changes that can make CARIC0N fit foi puipose. Bowevei, the Secietaiiat
can only play this iole if it, in tuin, is maue fit foi puipose thiough
appiopiiate iestiuctuiing.

53

6. In tuining to the iestiuctuiing of the Secietaiiat, we aie guiueu by the
following piinciples:
i. The uemanus maue of the Secietaiiat neeu to be matcheu with
financial anu human iesouice availability. This shoulu be achieveu
thiough an agieeu stiategy uiiving the CARIC0N constiuct as a whole
anu the Secietaiiat in paiticulai. It shoulu be backeu up thiough the
aiiangements anu uisciplines uesciibeu elsewheie to manage the
woik of the vaiious councils anu oigans of CARIC0N;
ii. The Secietaiy ueneial neeus to have the tools to leau the CARIC0N
community. Yet the Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice is cuiiently oiganiseu
as a iepiesentational anu auministiative office anu, as such, is a
souice of weakness. It shoulu be upgiaueu anu ieconfiguieu to
become the fulcium foi stiategy, ieview anu iesouice management.
iii. The focus of the Secietaiiat shoulu shift to stiategic iegional policy
anu to the implementation of integiation.

7. Theie aie few puiists left who insist that the Secietaiiat's iole is an
auministiative one
84
anu that only Nembei States can implement. This is an
aitificial uistinction wheie the lines between auministiative, management,
uesign, auvisoiy, expeit anu implementation ioles have become
incieasingly bluiieu
8S
. It is also aitificial in that the line between wheie the
Secietaiiat's iole finishes anu the Nembei States' iole staits is nevei haiu
anu fast. Finally - anu piagmatically - the "implementation ueficit" woulu
nevei be oveicome by taking an out-uateu puiist appioach.
7.3 Fundamental!change!is!required!
8. Funuamental changes in the Secietaiiat's stiuctuie, opeiation anu staffing
neeu to be intiouuceu giauually ovei a peiiou of about S yeais
86
. 0ui
recommendations foi the main changes aie as follows:
a. Refocusing CARIC0N anu iestiuctuiing the Secietaiiat thiough a
tiansitional Change 0ffice woiking uiiectly to the Secietaiy ueneial;
b. Refocusing the Secietaiiat on ueliveiing a Stiategy foi CARIC0N anu
on ueveloping stiategic iegional policies to auu value to what
Nembei States can inuiviuually achieve;
c. Enabling the Secietaiy ueneial's leaueiship iole thiough
stiengthening his office to focus on his executive iole, iathei than his
iepiesentational iole. In paiticulai, the Secietaiy ueneial shoulu take
chaige of the Secietaiiat's woik as iegaius stiategy, iegional policy
anu ieview;
u. Putting an emphasis on implementation, wheie the Beputy Secietaiy
ueneial shoulu be put in chaige of a new Implementation 0ffice

84
The Secietaiiat shall be the piincipal auministiative oigan of the Community - Aiticle 2S.1 of the Reviseu
Tieaty of Chaguaiamas
8S
An aichitect, foi example, woulu have little chance of uenying iesponsibility foi a builuing falling uown
unless he oi she coulu show that the builuei faileu to follow his oi hei plans. The aichitect woulu only be on
fiim giounus if he oi she coulu show full fault on the builuei's pait. That iequiies that the aichitect oi an
unimpeachable iepiesentative of the aichitect take a veiy close inteiest in what the builuei actually uoes.
86
Iueally the tiansition shoulu be shoitei. Bowevei, with a likely iequiiement foi uonoi funus, a shoitei
peiiou is piobably not piactical.

54

incoipoiating functions uesigneu to focus on the implementation of
integiation;
e. Appointing a new Chief 0peiations 0fficei (C00) at Beputy Secietaiy
ueneial level whose specialiseu iesponsibility will be to get ciucial
back office anu suppoit functions into shape.

7.4 The!Restructuring!of!the!Secretariat!
9. The next thiee sections of the iepoit contain oui uetaileu analysis anu
pioposals as to how the Secietaiiat shoulu be iestiuctuieu. The sections aie
as follows:
i. Stiengthening the Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice
ii. Naking the Beputy Secietaiy ueneial iesponsible foi implementation
iii. Setting up an 0peiations Biiectoiate unuei a Chief of 0peiations

1u. 0ui pioposeu geneial oiganisational chait foi the Secietaiiat is at Figuie 1
as follows.
!

55

56

!
8 Strengthening!the!Secretary!Generals!Office!

1. Changes shoulu stait in the Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice anu we piopose an
oiganisational chait
87
foi the 0ffice as follows at Figuie 2. An eaily
ieoiganisation of the Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice will allow it to uiive changes
thioughout the Secietaiiat anu manage the tiansition peiiou. Iueally, this
tiansitional peiiou shoulu not exceeu 18 months; we suspect this may piove
oveiambitious anu that S yeais will be moie iealistic, given the likely neeu
foi uonoi involvement. The oveiall changes thioughout the Secietaiiat aie
pioposeu aftei this section.
8.1 The!Change!Office!
2. The most impoitant anu immeuiate initiative is to set up a Change 0ffice.
The uiiect objective of the 0ffice is to uelivei a iestiuctuieu Secietaiiat. Its
inuiiect objective is to assist the Beaus of uoveinment anu Secietaiy ueneial
in making the whole CARIC0N stiuctuie anu opeiation fit foi puipose.

S. Foi financial ieasons, the 0ffice is likely to have a skeleton staff to begin
with. Funuing shoulu be souiceu as quickly as possible. Iueally Nembei
States, oi a selection of them, shoulu pioviue the funuing. Bonoi funuing
may be moie iealistic. Bowevei, theie may not be time to await uonoi
funuing
88
befoie staiting some of the opeiations of the Change 0ffice. Some
inteiim funuing, whethei inteinally oi Nembei State souiceu, coulu
theiefoie be essential.

4. The initial focus of the Change 0ffice will be on ueveloping a S-yeai Stiategy
to uiive CARIC0N, in geneial, anu the Secietaiiat, in paiticulai. We
recommend theiefoie that an expeit in stiategy be appointeu as soon as
possible. This inuiviuual's initial task will be to uevelop an outline stiategy
foi the fiist Beaus of uoveinment meeting in 2u12 with the objective of
getting a full stiategic plan agieeu at the seconu Beaus of uoveinment
meeting in 2u12
89
.

S. The position as expeit in stiategy is likely to be full-time oi close to full time.
It coulu be a staff appointment oi on consultancy teims. The moie impoitant
issue is that the iight appointment be maue anu be maue quickly. The
inuiviuual appointeu shoulu be fiom outsiue the Secietaiiat anu shoulu
iepoit uiiectly to the Secietaiy ueneial anu, thiough him, to the Beaus of
uoveinment.

87
This oiganisational chait like the otheis we have piouuceu focuses on functions iathei than posts oi
inuiviuuals, except wheie obvious (e.g. Secietaiy ueneial, Chef ue Cabinet etc.)
88
Tenueiing iules anu uonoi pioceuuies have maue it moie uifficult to access funuing quickly. Bowevei,
some uonois can iesponu quickly paiticulaily foi limiteu sums that uo not tiiggei inteinational tenuei
pioceuuies.
89
uiven the veiy tight timelines, it may piove impossible to ieciuit someone to have an outline stiategy
ieauy foi the fiist Beaus meeting. In this case, we woulu suggest that a piesentation be maue to Beaus of the
main conclusions of this iepoit anu the uigent neeu to uevelop a Stiategy.

57

58

6. The inuiviuual appointeu coulu potentially go on to leau the full Change
0ffice, when financing is in place, anu shoulu have a key iole in uiawing up
the uetaileu specification of the Change 0ffice. An outline specification anu
costing is given at Appenuix S, both foi the immeuiate anu longei teim
aiiangements.

7. It woulu be helpful if the expeit in stiategy coulu uiaw on some occasional
finance anu oiganisational uevelopment suppoit. It woulu also be helpful if
the inuiviuual be assigneu a piofessional assistant fiom within the
Secietaiiat's cuiient staffing. Such an inuiviuual coulu be a biight up-anu-
coming membei of staff.

8. It is impoitant that theie be continuity between the initial skeleton staff of
the Change 0ffice anu the eventual full office. Although it is likely to piove
necessaiy to set up the office on a sequential basis with uiffeient souices of
funuing, tenueiing iules shoulu not be alloweu to get in the way of the
common sense iequiiement foi staffing continuity.

9. The focus on the Change 0ffice will giauually shift fiom ueveloping anu
agieeing an oveiall stiategy to implementing the iestiuctuiing of the
Secietaiiat anu to making the CARIC0N constiuct moie fit foi puipose foi
implementing the stiategy. This will incluue the following:
a. Stiengthening the stiuctuie of CARIC0N, not least ensuiing that
CARIC0N anu its institutions aie uevelopeu as a moie unifieu bianu
aimeu at common goals.
9u

b. Beveloping, getting agieement to anu setting up moie secuie
financing foi both the Secietaiiat anu foi CARIC0N's institutions.
91

c. Beliveiing a iestiuctuieu Secietaiiat anu managing the tiansition.

1u. Whilst the Change 0ffice is impoitant foi all of these puiposes, especially to
uevelop a unifieu anu functional constiuct, it is essential foi the
ieoiganisation of the Secietaiiat. We aie awaie that CARIC0N iegulaily
compiomises on alteinative wateieu uown solutions. In this ciicumstance,
we woulu wish to emphasise oui piofessional opinion that a weakei
compiomise is most unlikely to woik.
92

11. As noteu in the outline specification at Appenuix S, the Change 0ffice will
neeu to call on skills coveiing stiategy, stiuctuie, finance anu financing,
communications, oiganisational iestiuctuiing, BR, ieciuitment anu vaiious
opeiational aieas incluuing IT, auministiation management anu
confeiencing.

9u
This will involve putting in place pioceuuies anu uisciplines to ensuie such stiategic alignment takes
place as well as ueveloping syneigies, economies anu aieas foi co-opeiation.
91
As has been aigueu eailiei, Nembei State funuing shoulu be put on a moie secuie - anu less hanu to
mouth - footing. At the same time, the stiategy shoulu uiaw laigei, bettei taigeteu anu co-oiuinateu anu
moie committeu funuing fiom aiu uonois.
92
The oiganisational anu opeiational change iequiieu is too extensive foi staff iesponsible foi uay-to-uay
management of the Secietaiiat's business to have any chance of caiiying it out successfully.

59

12. The Change 0ffice shoulu have a coie of full-time staff ovei a contiact peiiou
plus shoitei specialist inputs. It will woik closely with new anu existing
peimanent uepaitments anu will be iesponsible foi ueveloping some new
key ioles. Foiemost amongst these, anu as uiscusseu below, will be a new
anu specialist Chief of 0peiations at Beputy Secietaiy level.
8.2 Strategy,!Regional!Policy!and!Review!Department!
1S. A new uepaitment, to which we have given the woiking title Stiategy,
Regional Policy anu Review (SRPR) Bepaitment, shoulu follow closely in the
wake of setting up the Change 0ffice. An expeit in stiategy, policy anu
communications shoulu leau the uepaitment. In essence SRPR's
iesponsibilities will be:
a. Strategy:!
0veisee the management anu implementation of the CARIC0N
stiategy:
! 0puate the existing stiategy, as appiopiiate, on the basis of
iesouice availability;
! In uue couise, piepaie a follow up stiategy, which shoulu be
baseu on a caieful ieview of oveiall iesults combineu with
emeiging piioiities anu iesouice availability;
! In paiticulai, evaluate the feasibility anu iesouice availability
foi any new pioposals emanating fiom Beaus of uoveinment
anu othei CARIC0N bouies.
9S

b. Regional!Policy!and!Competitive!Advantage:!
Bevelop iegional policies anu initiatives on a pioactive anu ieactive
basis:
! Examine new anu existing integiation anu othei policies anu
manuates on a ciitical basis, incluuing a ieview of theii
macioeconomic anu othei impacts anu of theii timing;
94

! Investigate wheie the iegion can auu value, incluuing those
aieas that can biing about eaily wins;
9S

! Assess how the iegion can uevelop its stiengths on the basis of
competitive auvantage;
96

! Leau the policy iesponse to challenges that aiise foi the
iegion.
97

9S
0ne of the majoi weaknesses of the CARIC0N constiuct is that Aiticle 27:S of the Reviseu Tieaty of
Chaguaiamas has always been ignoieu. The community will nevei manage anu implement the tasks befoie
it unless piioiities aie continually allieu to iesouice availability.
94
Long-establisheu policies, whethei cential to integiation (such as CSNE) oi specific manuates, neeu to be
ievieweu iegulaily to ensuie that they aie still ielevant anu feasible. Some may be upuateu, some uelayeu
anu otheis uioppeu.
9S
The E0 gaineu consiueiable goouwill when it inteiveneu in the mobile phone maiket to intiouuce
stanuaiu (anu ieasonable) chaiging anu conuitions foi the use of mobile phones in othei Nembei States.
This shoulu be a ieasonably stiaightfoiwaiu task to accomplish, peihaps by uiiect negotiation, with the
small numbei of opeiatois piesent in CARIC0N Nembei States.
96
The woik of Baivaiu Business School's Nichael E Poitei, which staiteu with his book "The Competitive
Auvantage of Nations", woulu be a goou place to stait. The Caiibbean cleaily has a wiuespieau competitive
auvantage in touiism anu in inteinational finance anu paiticulai Nembei States have competitive
auvantage specific to themselves, not least Tiiniuau & Tobago as fai as gas in conceineu. Woik is neeueu on
how to maintain anu fuithei uevelop these auvantages. Some blue skies anu objective thinking also neeus to
be uone to iuentify othei business sectois wheie the iegion coulu uevelop auvantage.

60

! Woik with othei inteinational, iegional anu national bouies to
iuentify anu uevelop competitive auvantage foi the iegion.
These shoulu incluue the Caiibbean Bevelopment Bank (CBB),
the INF anu Woilu Bank anu cential banks thioughout the
iegion.

c. Resources:!
0veisee anu uevelop the iesouices available to the Secietaiiat anu, as
appiopiiate, its institutions:
! In cooiuination with the Finance Bepaitment, take ovei
iesponsibility foi moie secuie foims of Nembei State financing
fiom the Change 0ffice;
! Woik with the Pioject Nanagement 0ffice (see below) on moie
co-oiuinateu anu bettei-taigeteu uonoi funuing anu on
maximising tiauitional souices of outsiue income;
! Bevelop new souices of income incluuing sponsoiship, piivate
sectoi financing anu chaiging foi seivices.

d. Monitoring!and!Evaluation:!
Bevelop a monitoiing anu evaluation capability to allow a cleai
oveiview of piogiess with CARIC0N's stiategy:
! Woik with the Implementation Biiectoiate (see below) to
unueistanu anu assess piogiess with implementation,
paiticulaily at Nembei State level, anu to ueciue wheie high-
level inteivention is iequiieu foi policy oi othei ieasons;
! Woik with the Pioject Nanagement 0ffice (see below) to
ensuie that auequate methous aie ueviseu anu useu foi
monitoiing anu evaluating of piojects anu that oveiall lessons
aie leaint;
! Woik with the Pioject Nanagement 0ffice anu with uonois to
uevelop stanuaiu methous of monitoiing anu evaluation. Ally
these methous, as fai as is piacticable, with piogiess with
implementation;
! Woik with BR to ally monitoiing anu evaluation with
peifoimance management.

e. Communications!and!Information
98
:!
Nake communications a cential pait of CARIC0N stiategy anu
policies, incluuing pioviuing the Secietaiy ueneial with a peisonal
communications auvisei:
! Raise awaieness anu euucate the people of the Caiibbean
about CARIC0N, its aims anu activities;

97
The lack of a iegional iesponse to the 2uu8 financial ciisis continues to uiaw heavy ciiticism, which, faiily
oi not, is iegulaily aimeu at CARIC0N. 0n a naiiowei basis, the CARIC0N Secietaiiat anu the Caiibbean
Touiism 0iganisation (CT0) uiu come togethei to iesponu to the unfaii application of the 0K's APB tax (Aii
Passengei Buty) to the iegion. Whilst we have been tolu that too little was uone too late, this iesponse
pioviues the basis on which to builu futuie iesponses, paiticulaily if the Secietaiiat has a uepaitment
chaigeu with picking up such issues quickly.
98
The iepoit of oui Communications Auvisei is at Appenuix 4.

61

! Coopeiate anu cooiuinate with CARIC0N Nembei States to
communicate with anu euucate theii citizens about Caiibbean
issues;
! Communicate with CARIC0N's inteinational paitneis anu
taiget auuiences about the iegion's inteinational objectives;
! Raise the piofile of the woik of the Secietaiiat anu the
Secietaiy ueneial as the figuieheau of CARIC0N.
8.3 Chef!de!Cabinet!
14. The Secietaiy ueneial's iepiesentational iesponsibilities shoulu, in effect,
become a paiticulaily poweiful anu efficient way in which he caiiies out his
executive iole. In woiking closely managing the Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice,
the Chef ue Cabinet anu the Beau of Stiategy, Policy anu Review will have
impoitant ioles in helping biing this about.

1S. We have been impiesseu with how the Chef ue Cabinet iole is cuiiently
caiiieu out in ciicumstances that have been fai fiom iueal. Bowevei, in
auuition to being too focuseu on auministiative anu pioceuuial issues, the
iemainuei
99
of the Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice uoes not give the impiession of
effectiveness. Although the length of oui assignment piecluueu the uetaileu
examination of inuiviuual ioles anu how they aie caiiieu out, we saw
enough to concluue that the Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice neeus a shake up.

16. We woulu suggest that the Chef ue Cabinet initiate a ieview to be caiiieu out
by the Buman Resouices Bepaitment to ieuuce the oveiall numbei of staff,
claiify ioles anu biing in some fiesh bloou. The objective shoulu be to
establish a poweiful Piivate 0ffice. This will have the key iole of
opeiationalising the much stiengtheneu stiategic anu policy auvice now
available to the Secietaiy ueneial at the top levels of stakeholuei bouies
with whom the Secietaiy ueneial geneially inteifaces.
8.4 The!Remaining!Areas!of!the!Secretary!Generals!Office!
17. The Special Auvisei on what coulu be teimeu "issues of the moment" shoulu
play an impoitant iole in the newly establisheu Stiategy, Policy anu Review
Bepaitment. In similai fashion, the cuiient Public Infoimation 0nit shoulu
be integiateu into the Communications anu Infoimation section of that
uepaitment.

18. Finally, we unueistanu that Inteinal Auuit has only been establisheu
ielatively iecently. This is an impoitant function whose influence neeus to
giow. We weie not able to investigate its iole in uetail but oui impiession is
that it shoulu be stiengtheneu anu bettei iesouiceu. We recommend that
the Change 0ffice look at this issue in moie uetail anu uevelop pioposals, as
appiopiiate.

99
We excluue fiom this juugement the Secietaiy ueneial's Special Auvisei on issues of the moment anu the
sepaiately houseu Infoimation 0nit. These aie consiueieu sepaiately below.

62

19. Inteinal Auuit is an impoitant pait of the Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice anu its
finuings anu auvice shoulu pioviue impoitant suppoit in making the
Secietaiiat fit foi puipose.
8.5 Managing!the!Secretariat!
2u. The above pioposals will give the Secietaiy ueneial a stiongei executive
iole anu theieby stiengthen the leaueiship of CARIC0N. The ievival of the
Executive Nanagement Committee (ENC), which has alieauy been set in
tiain, will fuithei stiengthen the Secietaiy ueneial's iole as CE0 anu will
help tighten up the management of the Secietaiiat.

21. The ENC has been weakeneu ovei the yeais paitly because Assistant
Secietaiy ueneials (ASus) have hau to caiiy out too much ioutine woik anu,
in paiticulai, have been expecteu to tiavel too much. It is impoitant that they
be moie available in ueoigetown foi high-level inteiaction with Nembei
States. This gieatei availability will also allow the ENC to function bettei. In
this iespect, the pioposals in the next two sections foi the Implementation
0ffice anu foi the 0peiations Biiectoiate iespectively will help fiee up ASus
to focus moie on theii management iole.

22. At the same time, the establishment of an Implementation Nanagement
Committee with suppoiting staff, as uesciibeu in the following section, will
also enable the Secietaiiat to focus bettei on management issues. The
Change 0ffice will neeu to uelineate the ioles of the two committees, which
will have oveilapping membeiship, so that the specialist woik of the
Implementation Nanagement Committee leaus effectively into the bioauei
iemit of the ENC.

63

!
9 Implementation!Under!The!Deputy!Secretary!General!

1. Alongsiue stiengthening the Secietaiy ueneial's position thiough a moie
explicit focus on stiategy anu policy, the seconu key innovation that we
piopose is to chaige the Beputy Secietaiy ueneial with iesponsibility foi the
implementation of integiation anu othei iegional co-opeiation, as piioiitiseu
by the agieeu stiategy.

2. A pioposeu oiganisational chait foi the Beputy Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice is
at Figuie S. As befoie, the vaiious boxes iefei to functions iathei than
positions. 0n its own, the oiganisational chait hiues as much as it ieveals
about what we see as a funuamental oiganisational shift. Repoiting to the
Beputy Secietaiy ueneial will be S Assistant Secietaiy ueneials of
Biiectoiates whose titles iemain laigely unchangeu but whose functions,
staffing anu co-oiuination activities will be iauically oveihauleu.

S. The key innovations will be an Implementation Suppoit uioup, which shoulu
iepoit to an Implementation Nanagement Committee anu, on a uay-to-uay
basis, uiiectly to the Beputy Secietaiy ueneial. The Implementation
Nanagement Committee shoulu meet iegulaily. It shoulu be chaiieu by the
Beputy Secietaiy ueneial anu consist of the Assistant Secietaiy ueneials
plus the Beau of the new Pioject Nanagement 0ffice anu otheis as the
Beputy Secietaiy ueneial may ueciue.

4. As well as pioviuing technical suppoit to the Implementation Nanagement
Committee, the Implementation Suppoit uioup will have a key iole in
uiiving foiwaiu anu co-oiuinating implementation as uesciibeu below. A
new Pioject Nanagement 0ffice anu the Statistics Bepaitment will also
iepoit uiiectly to the Beputy Secietaiy ueneial.
9.1 Rationale!for!Implementation!Office!
S. 0nce the Implementation 0ffice is fully opeiational, the Secietaiiat will have
uevelopeu two key anu ielateu capabilities:
I. An integiateu office focuseu on ueliveiing efficiently those elements
of integiation anu co-opeiation that aie the Secietaiiat's uiiect
iesponsibility;
II. Knowleuge anu unueistanuing, on a continuous anu coipoiate
basis,
1uu
of exactly wheie specific integiation anu otheis measuies
have got to, what the bottlenecks oi uelays aie anu why, anu on the
options foi oveicoming these bottlenecks anu uelays.

1uu
As things stanu, inuiviuuals have a cleai pictuie of wheie specific items of integiation have got to but
theie is no oveiall oi complete pictuie at the institutional level. Similaily, specific stuuies may claiify
matteis oveiall at a paiticulai moment in time but such snapshots quickly become out-uateu.

64

65

6. The Implementation 0ffice has a ciucial iole to play because the keys to
iesolving the so-calleu "implementation ueficit" aie:
a. Fiistly, piioiitisation thiough the agieeu stiategy so that CARIC0N
only takes on what it can uelivei;
b. Seconuly, setting up the oiganisation of the Secietaiiat so it can focus
effectively on the piioiities that it neeus to caiiy out;
c. Thiiuly, co-oiuinating what the Secietaiiat uoes with the
implementation activities of Nembei States anu CARIC0N
institutions, iuentifying wheie theie aie uelays anu issues, anu
focusing on iesolving the uelays anuoi issues iuentifieu. This, is
essence, is the focus of the Implementation 0ffice.

7. To achieve these enus, the oiganisation anu opeiation of the new
Implementation 0ffice will be as set out in the following paiagiaphs.

9.2 New!Departments!in!the!Implementation!Office!
9.2.1 Challenges!to!be!Overcome!
Managing!the!Implementation!Process!
8. The woik of the vaiious 0igans of the Community is cuiiently suppoiteu by
uiffeient paits of the Secietaiiat on a piofessional basis, as well as by
Auministiative anu Confeience Seivices. As has alieauy been uesciibeu, the
meetings of all these 0igans, plus the plethoia of technical bouies beneath
them, take up an inoiuinate amount of time wheie the uefault moue of the
Community is to call a iegional meeting in iesponse to issues that aiise.
Theie is a wiuely helu view that meetings have, in a majoiity of cases,
become a substitute foi woiking out what neeus to be uone anu how it
shoulu best be achieveu
1u1
.

9. Nowheie is this moie the case than when it comes to implementation. The
tiauitional thinking is that, if things (whethei oveiall policy oi uetaileu
technical issues) have been agieeu at meetings anu put into action thiough
Savingiams anu ciiculateu iepoits, then they shoulu be implementeu. In
foimal teims, the ielevant Nembei State officials have been infoimeu anu
the implementation piocess is unueiway
1u2
.

1u. The pioblem, as most people now iecognise, is that implementation uoes not
woik like this. Neetings, uecisions, Savingiams, ciiculateu iepoits anu
technical assistance aie laigely inciuental to what happens on the giounu
anu to whethei a paiticulai uecision is actually implementeu. As a iesult,
theie is now a uamaging geneial view that an incieasingly uiiectionless
CARIC0N talk shop goes hanu-in-hanu with the implementation ueficit.

1u1
This view is shaieu wiuely aiounu the Secietaiiat anu in viitually eveiy Nembei State that we visiteu.
1u2
Wheie technical issues oi specific pioblems have been iuentifieu, suppoit may be given to the
implementation piocess but this is not uone on a systematic basis.

66

11. To get to giips with this ieality that the implementation piocess is veiy weak
- anu the geneial peiceptions that the pioblems aie even woise - the
Secietaiiat neeus to focus much moie uiiectly on managing the
implementation piocess. It shoulu never be assumeu that meetings etc. leau
to any conciete iesult out in the ieal woilu.

Reforming!channels!of!communication!
12. We have elsewheie outlineu how the appioach to meetings anu to piojects
neeus to change. A fuithei uefining issue as to what CARIC0N can uo
conceins channels of communications, in geneial, anu Savingiams, in
paiticulai. Savingiams aie the Secietaiiat's piimaiy means of
communication anu of instigating action. They aie foimal anu numbeieu
emails
1uS
sent by the Secietaiiat unuei the Secietaiy ueneial's name to each
Ninistiy of Foieign Affaiis in all Nembei States with copies to Associate
Nembei States. Savingiams can also be copieu to othei ministiies but the
"oiiginal" foi action always goes to Ninistiies of Foieign Affaiis.

1S. Whilst the ieliance on the singulai channel of Savingiams is out-of-uate anu
unnecessaiily foimal, the ieal pioblem is that such ieliance is hopelessly
ineffective
1u4
. 0ui recommendation is that the ieliance on Savingiams
shoulu come to an enu anu new moie infoimal netwoiks openeu up to
supplement the foimal channel.

14. We unueistanu that the Secietaiiat has fiom time-to-time iequesteu that
new channels anu wiuei netwoiks be openeu up anu that its iequests have
nevei been accepteu. Some Nembei States iemain weuueu to singulai
foimal channels anu stanu on ceiemony whenevei the piospect of auuitional
oi alteinative appioaches is iaiseu. Complaints aie also sometimes maue
when officials with initiative tiy to oveicome bottlenecks by going iounu
these foimal channels.

1S. 0ui view on this is uncompiomising: if CARIC0N stakeholueis ieally want
the iegion to piogiess, anu to ieuuce iunning soies such as the
implementation ueficit, then in the veinaculai expiession they neeu to "get
ieal". Theie is no place in the mouein fast-moving woilu foi a ieliance on
olu-fashioneu anu singulai channels of communication, which patently holu
up implementation, as the piimaiy means foi getting things moving.

16. Rathei than ielying on ineffective hieiaichies, inuiviuual officials in the
Secietaiiat, in Nembei States anu in othei stakeholueis neeu to set up theii
own netwoiks to focus on piogiessing the matteis in which they aie

1uS
A new seiies is establisheu each yeai. When we fiist visiteu the Secietaiiat in Nay 2u11, ovei 4uu such
emails hau alieauy been sent since }anuaiy 1
st
.
1u4
In some smallei Nembei States, all Savingiams go to one official in the Ninistiy of Foieign Affaiis.
Bealing with them may be a small pait of the official's job anu inuiviuuals uo take holiuays anu get sick! As
one fiustiateu such inuiviuual stateu, she was constantly caught between competing piioiities. Caiiying out
hei "post box" function was uifficult enough, let alone the Savingiam system's assumeu expectation that she
hau the time oi skills to piogiess chase a laige numbei of CARIC0N issues. This is paiticulaily pioblematic
as it is often uifficult to juuge what action to take given the vaiying piioiity, complexity anu technical
content of Savingiams.

67

involveu. Such a matiix management appioach will be key to the
Implementation 0ffice's success oi failuie.

17. Theie neeus, of couise, to be some foimality. In this, Savingiams have a iole
to play in the same sense that legal contiacts aie the founuation foi many
business-to-business ielationships. Yet if businesses ielieu on contiacts as a
means to get things uone, iathei than the iich vaiiety of infoimal uay-to-uay
contact that is the ieal basis foi successful ielationships, most woulu quickly
go bankiupt.

18. In summaiy, effoits to impiove the efficiency anu effectiveness of the
CARIC0N constiuct anu to ieuuce the implementation ueficit will only woik
if mouein methous of communications anu netwoiking aie alloweu, anu
inueeu encouiageu, to woik alongsiue moie tiauitional foimal channels. This
is one of the most ciucial issues if CARIC0N is to be tuineu aiounu
successfully.

Confidentiality!
19. A fuithei impoitant issue conceining CARIC0N's excessive foimality is its
cultuie of confiuentiality. The Secietaiiat's uefault setting is that uocuments
anu infoimation aie classifieu. This miiiois the wiuei CARIC0N constiuct
that tenus to be inwaiu looking anu closeu. It neeus to be moie open anu
welcoming to iegain the inteiest anu suppoit of wiuei stakeholueis, not
least the geneial public. 0ui iepoit on iestiuctuiing communications at
Appenuix 4 suggests how this can be biought about.

2u. As fai as the confiuentiality of uocuments anu infoimation is conceineu, it is
essential CARIC0N embaik on a piogiamme of ue-classifying infoimation. It
is cleai that confiuentiality helps maintain the silo mentality both within the
Secietaiiat anu wiuei in CARIC0N, with one hanu often not knowing what
the othei is uoing. A cultuie of confiuentiality also facilitates the lack of
accountability thioughout CARIC0N anu makes it moie uifficult to
bieakuown bottlenecks to implementation.

21. It is essential to bieakuown this cultuie of confiuentiality foi efficiency anu
effectiveness ieasons as this will help make the CARIC0N constiuct fit foi
puipose. Noieovei, as noteu above, bieaking uown the cultuie of
confiuentiality is essential to iegain public tiust anu suppoit. We woulu
theiefoie recommend!that the cultuie of confiuentiality be uismantleu.

22. We unueistanu that theie aie technical pioblems in ueclassifying uocuments
because of the existence of a plethoia of uateu pioceuuies. We woulu
theiefoie fuithei recommend that the Beputy Secietaiy ueneial set up an
expeit gioup to examine the best way of ueveloping a new system wheie the
uefault position shoulu be one wheie uocuments anu infoimation aie fieely
available. With seveial Nembei States now having expeiience of Fieeuom of
Infoimation legislation, as well as its wiue intiouuction elsewheie in the
woilu, theie is an available well of expeiience anu expeitise to uiaw upon.

68

9.2.2 Role!of!Implementation!Support!Group!
2S. To establish a much stiongei connection between the activities anu
objectives of the Community in geneial, anu of the Secietaiiat in paiticulai,
iequiies a much cleaiei focus on uesiieu iesults anu the path to achieving
those iesults. Insteau of meetings being the uefault moue of the Secietaiiat,
they shoulu be one of a vaiiety of mechanisms aimeu at achieving iesults.

24. To biing this about, the Implementation Suppoit uioup shoulu be set up to
woik closely with the Beputy Secietaiy ueneial anu the vaiious uiiectoiate
anu uepaitment heaus in the Implementation 0ffice. The uioup shoulu be
piimaiily manageiial anu piofessional, not auministiative.
1uS
It will combine
the functions of co-oiuinating meetings with a much gieatei focus on follow-
up anu implementation. The uioup's key objective - anu that of the Beputy
Secietaiy ueneial - is to shift the Secietaiiat fiom being an oiganisation
piimaiily focuseu on meetings anu piocess to one that focuses on
implementation anu iesults.

2S. To make this shift, the Implementation Suppoit uioup shoulu uevelop a
questioning logic along the following lines:
a. What is the issuechallengepioblemobjective.
b. Is the issue of concein to all CARIC0N Nembeis, whethei it is in its
geneiic foim (e.g. fieeuom of movement) oi specific foim (e.g.
tiaining in immigiation pioceuuies).
c. Bow anu by what methou can it best be auuiesseu (e.g. having a
community level meeting to uiscuss piogiess with fieeuom of
movement, by visiting specific Nembei States to finu out what the
situation is on the giounu oi thiough a high level inteivention).
u. Is the issue moie amenable to a wiue anu inclusive inteivention oi
to a small anu taigeteu appioach.

26. This logical piocess will allow a uecision to be maue as to whethei the
appiopiiate couise of action is, say, a community-wiue meeting focuseu on
such anu such, a smallei anu moie focuseu meeting, a high level inteivention
by an Assistant Secietaiy ueneial, oi a fact-finuing visit to specific Nembei
States. By thinking thiough what is iequiieu, a uiscipline will be establisheu
not only to ueciue the best foim of inteivention (i.e. meeting oi fact-finuing
visit etc.) but also the objectives of the inteivention (e.g. what
uecisionsiesults shoulu we get out of the meeting).

27. At the same time, the Implementation Suppoit uioup shoulu play a key co-
oiuinating iole as the eyes, eais anu piogiess chasei of implementation. It
is cleai that, on a coipoiate basis, CARIC0N is not well infoimeu as to the
oveiall state of implementation, anu that the Secietaiiat is not much bettei.
The sepaiate knowleuge of inuiviuuals anu the momentaiy snapshots
pioviueu by uetaileu iepoits
1u6
aie a long way shoit of what is iequiieu to

1uS
Auministiative suppoit to meetings will, as uiscusseu latei, be pait of the Secietaiiat's 0peiations
Biiectoiate.
1u6
With a "iepoits" cultuie ueveloping on similai lines to the meetings cultuie that has been uesciibeu.
Although consultants can have a veiy useful iole in biinging about uesiieu iesults, it is easy foi the hiiing of

69

manage the complex piocess of implementation in ieal time. The
Implementation Suppoit uioup can biing about a funuamental impiovement
in this iespect by:
a. Nonitoiing on a continuous basis wheie each piioiity in the
CARIC0N Stiategy has ieacheu in teims of implementation in each
Nembei State (oi CARIC0N institution);
b. Iuentifying bottlenecks to implementation anu theii cause;
c. Specifying whethei the causes of uelays aie to be founu in technical,
policy oi political issues - oi aie even just a question of lack of
commitment on the pait of key inuiviuuals;
u. Beveloping appiopiiate iesponses to iesolve these issues anu to
oveicome the bottleneck in question;
e. Co-oiuinating with the ielevant paits of the Secietaiiat, the Nembei
States conceineu anu othei appiopiiate bouies to uelivei the
iesponse.

28. The uevelopment of such thinking anu uisciplines shoulu giauually become
seconu natuie to the new uioup anu to senioi management. As a iesult, the
thinking befoie a iegulai set piece meeting such as the Beaus of uoveinment
oi the Council foi Tiaue anu Economic Bevelopment (C0TEB) will focus
bettei on what the meeting shoulu achieve, on the piogiess that has been
maue since the pievious meeting anu on co-oiuination with othei oigans
anu activities. The Community's Stiategy will, of couise, pioviue oveiall
guiuance as to what neeus to be achieveu.

29. In combination with oui pioposeu shake up of opeiations,
1u7
the aim is to
libeiate the Secietaiiat so that the woik of CARIC0N becomes much moie
focuseu anu effective. Bencefoith, meetings shoulu be but one foim of
getting things uone. We woulu envisage theie being a majoi ieuuction in the
numbei of meetings. Whilst it is not appiopiiate to be ovei-piesciiptive in
this iespect by setting taigets, iathei than allowing goou management
piactices to emeige, we aie confiuent that theie weie too many meetings ten
yeais ago, let alone cuiiently. We woulu be uisappointeu if well ovei half of
the cuiient meetings loau weie not quickly iuentifieu as being unnecessaiy.
As management piactices impiove, we woulu expect to see fuithei
ieuuctions. 0ui suspicion is that uiminishing ietuins quickly set in beyonu
2u to Su CARIC0N-wiue meetings pei yeai that incluue all Nembei States
1u8
.

Su. The woik of the Implementation Suppoit uioup will be pivotal. Theie aie
obviously insufficient iesouices foi the uioup to be eveiywheie all the time.
It will neeu to set up iepoiting templates anu a netwoik of contacts to

consultants to become an unwitting anu ineffective substitute foi getting things uone. The synuiome of luciu
iepoits gatheiing uust is, of couise, the well-known iesult of this.
1u7
0ui pioposeu new 0peiations Biiectoiate, which will biing back-office specialist expeitise to the woik
of suppoit uepaitments, is uesciibeu in the next section.
1u8
The pioblem is that theie is insufficient infoimation available foi anyone to make a settleu juugement as
to how many meetings theie shoulu be. In a small iegion with limiteu iesouices anu wheie the same
officials will be involveu in many meetings, we can be ceitain the numbei shoulu be a fiaction of 2uu. Bow
small a fiaction is a combination of bettei infoimation anu goou management juugement as to effectiveness
of meetings vis--vis alteinatives in teims of iesults.

70

uevelop an infoimation uatabase. This shoulu be backeu up thiough iegulai
Nembei State visits by Implementation 0ffice staff oi by othei well-biiefeu
Secietaiiat officials as appiopiiate.
1u9

S1. As can be seen, the woik of the Implementation Suppoit uioup will iequiie
fiist-class management anu co-oiuination skills.
9.2.3 Challenges!of!Project!Management!
S2. The following geneial points can be maue about the way piojects aie
cuiiently hanuleu:
a. Nanaging piojects takes up such a laige piopoition of the
Secietaiiat's time anu iesouices that it has usuipeu some of the
Secietaiiat's moie impoitant functions - anu ieshapeu the
institution;
b. Nost aspects of pioject management aie uecentialiseu with
uepaitments anu units within each uiiectoiate having theii own
piojects;
c. Spieauing out the auministiative anu technical featuies of pioject
management in this way is highly inefficient in many ways. These
incluue: pooi piioiitisation of piojects; pioblems of uuplication;
inteiuepaitmental tuif issues; haphazaiu pioject pioceuuies
manageu by technical staff that usually have neithei geneial
management noi pioject management tiaining oi expeiience; pioject
management being caiiieu out on a long-uiawn out sequential basis
uepenuent on the availability of specific staff anu iesulting in nevei-
enuing time uelays anu scheuuling uifficulties; a lack of fit between
the tasks that neeu to be caiiieu out anu the iesouices maue
available.

SS. Peihaps the most impoitant issue is that, like meetings, piojects aie pait of
the aimouiy of implementation but veiy iaiely implementation in theii own
iight. It can be uifficult to giasp this, as CARIC0N is a constiuct laigely of
complex intangible seivices. In such a constiuct, it is easy to confuse means
with enus anu activities with action. Piojects anu consultancies aie almost
always the means to an enu, not the enu in themselves. If theii activities aie
not piopeily ielateu to action then nothing iesults
11u
.

S4. A seiious pioblem in iecent yeais, with the Secietaiiat being unuei so much
piessuie is that piojects have tenueu to squeeze out iegional policy making
anu othei activities even although these activities, oi at least paits of them,
aie enus in themselves wheieas piojects aie not
111
.

1u9
In othei woius, in some cases it may be appiopiiate foi geneialist membeis of the uioup oi wiuei
Implementation 0ffice to make wiue-ianging visits to paiticulai Nembei States (oi CARIC0N institutions).
In othei cases, it may piove moie efficient oi moie effective foi othei officials to check on paiticulai issues,
peihaps because they aie of a technical oi specialist natuie. In yet othei cases, officials who aie going to
paiticulai places foi wiuei business ieasons coulu be askeu to follow up on specific matteis as pait of theii
visit.
11u
We weie, sauly, maue awaie of many examples wheie Nembei States faileu to engage with pioject
activities, let alone use them as an integial pait of biinging about implementation.
111
0ne of the pioblems heie is that piojects aie almost all uonoi funueu anu, as a iesult, fai fiom costless. In
paiticulai, the impeiative to comply with uonoi pioceuuies is iesouice intensive anu can squeeze out othei

71

SS. We unueistanu that theie is some opposition to the iuea of a Pioject
Nanagement 0ffice (PN0) within the Secietaiiat. This is a woiiying
inuication of just how fai the Secietaiiat's oiganisational cultuie has shifteu
fiom its piimaiy puipose. Box 2 below highlights some of the ieasons why a
PN0 is now essential. 0thei stiong ieasons will be highlighteu in the latei
sections on Resource!Management anu on the Technical!Assistance!Support!
Unit!(TAS0).

piioiities. In the absence of single-minueu management, this can eventually shift the oiganisation's cultuie
anu puipose away fiom what it was set up to uo. In meetings thioughout the iegion, we iegulaily heaiu the
view that the Secietaiiat is becoming an incieasingly holloweu-out pioject office. Setting up piofessional
pioject management seivices can uefiay this pioblem.

Box!2:!Some!reasons!why!a!Project!Management!Office!is!essential!
!
! We unueistanu that many Secietaiiat officials aie cuiiently ieluctant to
enteitain the iuea of piojects being manageu on a stanuaiuiseu basis. Such
suggestions aie seen as inteifeience. This has to change as no oiganisation
can affoiu such an iuiosynciatic anu inuiviuualistic appioach - not least
when the inuiviuual officials' position is mistaken anu contiibutes to the
Secietaiiat's weak position.

! Noieovei - anu asiue fiom all the issues of efficient anu effective pioject
management - managing piojects shoulu be some way uown the list of
piioiities of most Secietaiiat staff:
a. Piojects anu implementation aie uiffeient things;
b. The Secietaiiat's piimaiy focus shoulu be on policy anu on
implementation;
c. Piojects aie inciuental to those tasks.

! 0ne cuiient pioblem is that the bottom up system of woik piogiamming
encouiages the iuea that piojects anu implementation aie the same thing:
a. The size anu shape of existing Biiectoiates is to a laige extent
uictateu by theii success in biuuing foi pioject iesouices;
b. Yet, as we keep iepeating, agieeu piioiities at the stiategic level
shoulu uiive woik piogiammes anu piojects;
c. The system, as it cuiiently opeiates, is viitually the othei - and!
wrong - way iounu.

72

9.2.4 Role!of!the!Project!Management!Office!
S6. A new Pioject Nanagement 0ffice is theiefoie ciucial to ciacking the
implementation conunuium. In paiticulai, it shoulu:
! Piofessionalise pioject management anu save iesouices;
! Enable theie to be an emphasis on piioiitisation anu co-oiuination;
! Establish cleaiei links between piojects as a means anu the ieal
objectives of implementing specific enus;
! Iuentify, in co-oiuination with the Implementation Suppoit uioup
anu otheis, what has to be uone both alongsiue anu sepaiate to
piojects to biiuge iemaining gaps to the achievement of
implementation.

S7. The PN0 shoulu be maue up of thiee units, which aie uesciibeu in tuin
below. These aie:
a. Pioject Auministiation anu Suppoit
b. Resouice Nanagement
c. Technical Assistance Suppoit 0nit (TAS0)

S8. The PN0 shoulu be leu by a fiist-class managei who will co-oiuinate veiy
closely with the Stiategy, Regional Policy anu Review Bepaitment in the
Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice in establishing piioiities foi piojects anu ensuiing
that they aie matcheu by available iesouices. The management team will
also be iesponsible foi uay-to-uay effoits to maximise available iesouices,
again liaising with the Stiategy, Regional Policy anu Review Bepaitment as
fai as highei level plans anu negotiations aie conceineu. It will also be
iesponsible foi pioject monitoiing anu evaluation anu foi a stiengtheneu
TAS0.

Project!Administration!and!Support!
S9. The Pioject Auministiation anu Suppoit Bepaitment shoulu have the
following functions:
a. Nanaging the implementation of pioject piioiities uiawn up with the
Stiategy, Regional Policy anu Review Bepaitment;
b. Betailing pioject piioiities into a time-bounueu plan, which outlines
each pioposeu pioject, what it is intenueu to achieve anu how it fits in
with othei measuies anu activities, both specific anu geneial. The unit
will neeu to woik closely with the Implementation Suppoit uioup to
claiify how each pioject fits in with paiallel implementation effoits
anu to iuentify what othei inteiventions aie iequiieu so that the iole
any pioject plays in biinging about implementation is maximiseu;
c. Beveloping stanuaiu templates anu pioceuuies foi all aspects of
pioject management incluuing Teims of Refeience, tenuei
pioceuuies anu evaluation, contiacts, pioject ievisions, iepoiting,
monitoiing anu evaluation anu payments;
u. Beveloping management infoimation systems so that ieal time
infoimation on piojects is available thioughout the Secietaiiat anu
paiticulaily foi management;

73

e. Taking full iesponsibility foi the management anu success of each
pioject. This is a key iequiiement as the iole of technical specialists
anu otheis, who cuiiently manage piojects, shoulu in futuie be
limiteu to an auvisoiy function as fai as the piojects themselves aie
conceineu. This will incluue inteiventions - but not contiol - at
vaiious stages of the pioject fiom the teims of iefeience onwaius
112
;
f. Woiking, as appiopiiate, with othei uepaitments to ensuie the
success of piojects. We unueistanu, foi example, that the
management of pioject payments is cuiiently veiy weak anu, in the
following section on the pioposeu 0peiations Biiectoiate, will
piopose a Pioject Finance 0nit within the Finance Bepaitment
11S
;
g. Ensuiing piojects aie monitoieu anu evaluateu to uonoi oi othei
iequiiements;
h. Woiking with uonois to uevelop moie stanuaiu methous of
monitoiing anu evaluation;
i. Woiking with the Implementation Suppoit uioup to uevelop methous
of allying pioject monitoiing anu evaluation with the unueilying
objective of biinging about implementation.

Resource!Management!!
4u. Bespite some contioveisy, not least because it has hau a uual
CaiicomCaiifoium iole, the cuiient Resouice Nobilisation anu Technical
Assistance (RNTA) uepaitment is alieauy caiiying out some of the functions
of a PN0. It has been effective in obtaining iesouices foi CARIC0N anu foi
the Secietaiiat anu, in many cases, successfully kept activities going that
coulu otheiwise have collapseu. It has also staiteu ueveloping some of the
functions we have suggesteu foi the Project!Support!and!Administration!
Department above. The iole of the RNTA's implementation expeit (pioviuing
some auvice anu uiscipline to the haphazaiu pioject management of cuiient
Biiectoiates) hau become essential.

41. The biggest pioblem with all these activities, as they aie cuiiently caiiieu
out by RNTA, is that they tenu to be uone on a fiie-fighting basis. This is
paitly because theie is no stiategy uiiving pioject piioiities anu paitly
because the uefault iesponse to new challenges is to iequest that RNTA
iaise some funuing. 0nfunueu manuates aie a paiticulai pioblem anu RNTA
is iegulaily taskeu with getting the Secietaiiat out of a hole, as it weie, by
finuing uonoi funuing
114
.

42. Although fiie fighting is cleaily essential at times of ciisis, it is an inefficient
way of conuucting noimal opeiations. It also causes long-teim uamage.

112
Bencefoith, piojects shoulu be seen as helping technical anu specialist staff peifoim theii jobs (anu
contiibute to how theii peifoimance is juugeu), not as a key iaison-tie foi theii jobs. This is an impoitant
uistinction. Piojects shoulu become a pait of the whole policy anu implementation package iathei than an
enu in themselves which inuiviuual staff anu uepaitments natuially become piotective about.
11S
Whilst the PN0 will be juugeu on its success in managing piojects, back office uepaitments in the
0peiations Biiectoiate will be juugeu on efficiently pioviuing the appiopiiate suppoit seivices on a timely
basis.
114
We have alieauy suggesteu that the new Stiategy, Review anu Regional Policy Bepaitment shoulu ieview
manuates foi theii feasibility befoie consiueiation is given to when anu how they might be iesouiceu.

74

CARIC0N is cuiiently not iegaiueu by uonois as amongst the best of
institutions thiough which to put theii iesouices. This is paitly because of a
lack of stiategy anu piioiitisation, paitly because pioject implementation is
not iegaiueu as amongst the best anu paitly because an incieasing
piopoition of activities aie seen as unsustainable
11S
. Theie is a seiious
uangei that CARIC0N will finu funu iaising incieasingly uifficult.

4S. CARIC0N's most successful iesouicing activities have been when piioiities
have been piopeily uevelopeu anu well aiticulateu. The funuing foi the
implementation of CSNE anu the setting up of the CSNE 0nit in Baibauos
was secuieu by piepaiing a cleai anu joineu-up plan, which, amongst othei
things, was piesenteu to a uonois' confeience at the Caiibbean Bevelopment
Bank (CBB).

44. The implications of this aie stiaightfoiwaiu. It is essential that iesouicing,
like so much else unuei uiscussion, becomes moie stiategic. Fiie fighting
neeus to be ieplaceu, fiistly, with a cleai view of wheie the Secietaiiat's
longei teim funuing is coming fiom anu of the secuiity of that funuing
116
.
Seconuly, uonoi funuing must be sought on a moie planneu basis,
paiticulaily with piioiities piopeily laiu out anu ielateu to CARIC0N's
stiategy; cobbling togethei last minute pioposals to meet neeus as they aiise
shoulu become the exception. !

4S. This is why we have iecommenueu placing a stiategic iole foi iesouicing in
the Stiategy, Regional Policy anu Review Bepaitment of the Secietaiy
ueneial's 0ffice. The new Resource!Management!Bepaitment shoulu cleaily
woik hanu-in-hanu with this uepaitment anu be its implementation aim.!
!
46. 0theiwise, the issue is not so much changing the cuiient functions of RNTA
as one of stiengthening anu iegulaiising its iole. The foimation aiounu it of
the PN0 will achieve that. Its majoi functions will be: !
! Woiking with the Stiategy, Regional Policy anu Review Bepaitment
to piepaie piogiamme plans foi piesentation to uonois. Specific
plans shoulu be baseu on an oveiall plan baseu on CARIC0N's
Stiategy;
! Naiketing pioject piioiities to uonois on a piogiammatic basis that
fits best with specific uonoi inteiests anu capabilities;
! 0btaining uonoi commitment to piogiammes unuei uiscussion;
! Nanaging uay-to-uay ielations with uonois;

11S
Seveial uonois have tolu us that they often finu it uifficult to unueistanu why CARIC0N is iequesting
such anu such funuing. Theie aie wiuespieau ciiticisms of CARIC0N's pioject management. The most
funuamental pioblem may be uonois incieasing ieluctance to funu CARIC0N institutions that it feels aie
becoming aiu uepenuent. Although Nembei State uoveinments may like the issue to go away, sustainability
is becoming an incieasingly impoitant issue.
116
This means all funuing, not just uonoi funuing. As well as Nembei State contiibutions, this incluues new
souices of funuing such as fiom the piivate sectoi anu fiom sponsoiship.

75

! Woiking with the iest of PN0 on piogiamme anu pioject
implementation, as appiopiiate, with the exact uivision of woik
sometimes uepenuent on uonoi pioceuuies
117
.
! Woiking with the othei uepaitments of PN0 to set up a pioject
management infoimation system.
!
Technical!Assistance!Support!Unit!(TASU)!
47. In a uiffeient way to RNTA, the Technical Assistance Suppoit 0nit is also
caiiying out some of the functions of a nascent PN0. It is also, in pait, a
piototype Implementation!Support!Group. The key uiffeience is that TAS0 is
inviteu into Nembei States on a piecemeal basis. It knows exactly wheie
uisciete aspects of integiation implementation have ieacheu in specific
Nembei States anu why theie aie uelays anu bottlenecks. !
!
48. 0nfoitunately, TAS0 is only manuateu to iesponu to Nembei State iequests
anu uoes not have an oveiall view of the piogiess with implementation.
Neveitheless, its pioactive moue of opeiation pioviues a mouel foi the
Implementation!Office.

49. In paiticulai, TAS0 has uevelopeu a netwoik of contacts thioughout Nembei
States anu is not afiaiu to piogiess chase infoimally by whatevei means
necessaiy when the moie foimal official channels fail to opeiate. This is a
mouein anu sensible appioach, paiticulaily given the vaiiety of
communications' technologies now available.

Su. The TAS0 mouel neeus to be built upon. In association with the
Implementation!Support!Group, it shoulu stiengthen its iole by auopting a
moie of a "supply push" than "uemanu pull" appioach. With so many
competing conceins anu piioiities, Nembei States neeu to be put unuei
moie effective piessuie to make iegional integiation
118
a piioiity.

S1. 0theiwise, iathei than questioning its cuiient functioning, the main issue as
fai as we aie conceineu is wheie TAS0 shoulu be locateu. uiven that it
caiiies out uisciete piojects anu, like RNTA, inteivenes to help othei paits of
the Secietaiiat that lack effective pioject management skills, TAS0 shoulu
foim pait of what shoulu become a poweiful PN0. It shoulu also woik
closely with the Implementation Suppoit uioup as a "fiontline" bouy to help
biing about implementation once gaps have been iuentifieu anu appiopiiate
iemeuial action agieeu.
9.3 Re"casting!Existing!Directorates!and!Departments!
S2. The iemainuei of the Implementation 0ffice will be maue up of the S existing
Biiectoiates plus the Statistics Bepaitment. Theie shoulu be majoi changes

117
We aie, foi example, awaie of the impoitance of RNTA's woiking ielations with the E0 anu the tiust that
has been built up.
118
uiven the cuiient pioblems of the E0, the CARIC0N mouel of state-by-state agieement anu
implementation may yet piove the moie iobust if theie is moie attention to the soit of effective
management iequiieu to biing about implementation. Although it is still fai too eaily to know the eventual
outcome, theie is cleaily incieasingly poweiful opposition to what many see as an ovei-centialiseu E0
mouel that is ovei ieliant on uiktat.

76

in the way the two laigest Biiectoiates - those of Tiaue anu Economic
Integiation (TEI) anu of Buman anu Social Bevelopment (BSB) iespectively
- opeiate. At the same time, substantial savings can be founu in these
Biiectoiates as noteu below. These aie ciucial to help pay foi the
stiengthening of the Secietaiiat that is essential to tuining iounu CARIC0N.
The changes in the othei thiee small Biiectoiates - Foieign Relations, 0TN
anu Exteinal Tiaue anu ueneial Counsel - will be less pionounceu.
9.3.1 Challenges!Facing!the!Directorates!
SS. Whilst cleaily not iesponsible foi the so-calleu "implementation ueficit", the
Biiectoiates have become a symptom of it. As the gap between the ambitions
anu intentions of CARIC0N anu what happens on the giounu has wiueneu,
the stiuctuie of the Biiectoiates has ienueieu them poweiless to uo much to
biiuge the gap. These iemaiks aie paiticulaily ielevant to the TEI anu BSB
Biiectoiates because they aie at the centie of integiation activities anu much
laigei than the othei Biiectoiates.

S4. These two big Biiectoiates
119
exemplify how the Secietaiiat has come to
focus on piocess, iathei than iesults anu implementation. Each Biiectoiate
spenus a majoi piopoition of its time piepaiing foi oi iepoiting on meetings
anu on ueveloping anu managing piojects. We have alieauy maue an
extensive analysis of why these activities uo not necessaiily leau to effective
action anu how the linkages to oveiall objectives anu implementation have
become uistoiteu.

SS. It is also cleai to us that the weaknesses in the Secietaiiat's policymaking,
which weie assesseu in Section 6, aie paitly a iesult of the way policymaking
has been oiganiseu, paiticulaily in the TEI anu BSB Biiectoiates. With the
Secietaiiat uemonstiably having no time to think
12u
, its policymaking at
thiee impoitant levels can be constiueu as follows:
! Strategic!regional!policymaking:!
Essentially this is thinking about what the iegion shoulu uo, justifying
why it shoulu uo it (in teims of net value auueu compaieu to
alteinatives) anu woiking out how to uo it anu whethei it can be
uone successfully
121
.

When people say the Secietaiiat has no time to think, they aie usually
iefeiiing to this soit of ciucial blue skies thinking. We founu little oi
no eviuence of such policymaking anu have alieauy iuentifieu this is a
majoi weakness in the cuiient CARIC0N constiuct.

119
TEI anu BSB aie iesponsible foi almost Su% of the Secietaiiat's expenuituie compaieu to a total of S%
foi the othei thiee, excluuing 0TN foi which we have no figuies. These peicentages iefei to the Secietaiiat's
oveiall expenuituie maue up of Nembei State anu uonoi contiibutions.
12u
This was noteu eailiei in Section 6. Whilst expiesseu in these teims by a senioi official, it seems to us to
have captuieu a majoi weakness in the CARIC0N constiuct.
121
In othei woius, stiategic iegional policymaking is about iuentifying viable piioiities foi iegional action,
subjecting them to feasibility analysis anu specifying a woikable plan of action.

77

! Development!of!specific!policies:!
Specific policies can oiiginate fiom stiategic policymaking, fiom
ueveloping paiticulai aspects of the Reviseu Tieaty of Chaguaiamus
anu fiom manuates agieeu by CARIC0N.

As noteu in Section 6, the Secietaiiat has a iich tiauition of
ueveloping policies coveiing specific sectois anu issues
122
, mainly in
iesponse to the agieeu tieaty. The pioblem is that few policies have
been implementeu anu seveial sit on shelves gatheiing uust (anu
piesumably become less ielevant ovei time). Bepenuing on available
iesouices, as uiscusseu below, theie aie also attempts to uevelop
policies in specific aieas as a iesult of manuates.

The pioblem with specific policymaking conceins piioiitisation. Fiist,
policies neeu to be iegional piioiities if they aie, in piactice, to be
moveu successfully fiom the uiawing boaiu towaius ieality; this
again uemonstiates why ueveloping a CARIC0N Stiategy is so
impoitant. Seconu, theie is a ieal uangei that specific policies will
piove unwoikable if they aie pusheu thiough on the basis they seem
a "goou thing", oi aie pait of a political wish list, unless they can pass
the test of stiategic policymaking
12S
.

! Policies!associated!with!implementation:!
Theie aie even moie uetaileu opeiational policies associateu with
paiticulai aspects of implementing iegional integiation anu co-
opeiation. Such policies
124
aie enableis of integiation anu
coopeiation anu have moie in common with the uevelopment of
pioceuuies than with stiategic policymaking.

The implementation of majoi CARIC0N initiatives such as CSNE
involves consiueiable opeiational policymaking of this type. Such
policymaking is technical anu neeus to be caiefully cooiuinateu with,
if not built into, the piocess of implementation.

S6. The Secietaiiat has valiantly tiieu to set up vaiious small specialist units to
manage specific policy questions anu sectois. Inevitably, these have pioveu
too small to be effective
12S
anu theie is fiustiation all iounu. 0nfoitunately,
the Secietaiiat uoes not have the iesouices to continue employing a vaiiety
of sectoi specialists on a peimanent basis, whethei economic oi social.

122
Baving uevelopeu policies foi agiicultuie, foou anu nutiition, goveinment piocuiement, enteipiise
uevelopment, inuustiy, eneigy, youth etc.
12S
We aie confiuent that case stuuies woulu show that specific policies have!failed anu that such failuies
coulu have been pieuicteu if subjecteu to the soit of complete policymaking analysis we aie pioposing.
124
Foi example, specific policies on fiee movement oi goveinment piocuiement woulu tenu to expiess
piinciples anu these piinciples woulu then be expiesseu in uetaileu opeiational policies as the piactical
uetails aie woikeu out anu agieeu.
12S
That theie aie only one oi two officials in sectois such as tianspoit anu agiicultuie anu cuiiently none
ieciuiteu foi othei sectois is haiuly the point. Although the choice of sectois foi which specialists aie
employeu uoes not ieflect the make up of the Caiibbean economy - the iegion's two biggest inuustiies,
touiism anu financial seivices, aie not iepiesenteu anu only one peison coveis seivices - this also is not the
main point.

78

S7. Noieovei, such a sectoi-leu appioach is inevitably paitial anu has been at
the expense of oveiall stiategic policymaking. The Secietaiiat has not only
hau no time to think, but it has also not employeu the soit of policy
geneialists that can think about competing policy issues stiategically. As we
have alieauy aigueu, impoitant issues have inevitably been misseu because
of a policy appioach that is too paitial.

S8. The way foi the Secietaiiat to hanule specific economic anu social sectois is
to mount specific piogiammes baseu on the policy uevelopment woik of the
Stiategy, Regional Policy anu Review Bepaitment. The uepaitment shoulu
incluue high-level policy auviseis who tenu to be wiue-ianging geneialists,
iathei than naiiowly focuseu technical specialists. A small numbei of macio-
anu micio-economists can give goou coveiage to economic sectois,
paiticulaily if theii expeiience takes in both the public anu piivate sectois.
The same aigument applies to social scientists with iespect to the social
sectois.

S9. The clinching aiguments foi this aie as follows:
i. The Secietaiiat cannot affoiu anything else;
ii. Theie aie many examples of highly effective institutions that follow such
a mouel
126
;
iii. Specialists can be uiawn in, as neeueu, both thiough woiking with
specialist institutions anu thiough shoit-teim contiacts;
iv. The policies that aie uevelopeu can be suppoiteu with specific initiatives
foi funuing anu implementation, as appiopiiate.
9.3.2 Directorates!of!Trade!and!Economic!Integration!and!of!Human!and!Social!
Development!!
6u. In biinging these analyses of meetings, piojects anu policymaking togethei,
it is cleai that the ioles of the TEI anu BSB Biiectoiates can anu shoulu be
moie tightly focuseu anu ieuuceu in scope. In paiticulai:
i. Time anu iesouices spent by TEI anu BSB on piepaiing foi, attenuing
anu iepoiting on meetings shoulu be substantially ieuuceu unuei the
guiuance of the Implementation Nanagement Committee auviseu by
the Implementation Suppoit uioup;
ii. Pioject woik in these Biiectoiates will also be ieuuceu with oveiall
iesponsibility foi piojects moving to the PN0;
iii. The cuiient gaps in policymaking can only be oveicome by the
Stiategy, Regional Policy anu Review Bepaitment in the Secietaiy
ueneial's 0ffice taking ovei most aspects of policymaking, as alieauy
iecommenueu. TEI anu BSB shoulu continue to be iesponsible only
foi the specialist opeiational policy woik associateu with
implementation. The Biiectoiates can also give auvice to the Stiategy,
Regional Policy anu Review Bepaitment on aspects of specific anu
stiategic policymaking, as appiopiiate.

126
The wiitei was involveu in one that playeu a key iole, paiticulaily piioi to 1998, in the massive job of
tiansitioning Russia fiom a Soviet economy to a maiket economy.

79

61. The piactical upshots of this ieoiganisation aie that the TEI anu BSB
Biiectoiates shoulu be much ieuuceu in size. A significant piopoition of
cuiient activities shoulu be moveu to the Stiategy, Policy anu Review
Bepaitment of the Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice oi to othei paits of the
Implementation 0ffice
127
wheie the emphasis will be on ieuucing the
activities conceineu, on caiiying them out moie efficiently oi on ueveloping
moie effective ways of meeting objectives.

62. We make iecommenuations on the scale of ieuuctions of these Biiectoiates
in Section 11, Buuget anu Financial Issues, below. As oui ieview of the
Secietaiiat uiu not involve the uetaileu woik of job evaluations, we have set
financial taigets that we iegaiu as achievable. It will be pait of the woik of
the Change 0ffice, in conjunction with othei uepaitments anu officials as
appiopiiate, to caiiy out a moie uetaileu stuuy anu to biing about its
implementation.

6S. These iecommenuations will libeiate the iefoimeu TEI anu BSB
Biiectoiates to play a key anu focuseu implementation iole within the
Implementation 0ffice. With ovei Su% of the Secietaiiat's total
expenuituie
128
falling unuei the CSNE anu PANCAP piogiammes, which aie
pait of TEI anu BSB iespectively, these two Biiectoiates will have a ciucial
iole in tuining aiounu CARIC0N's foitunes.

64. A specific issue conceins the woik of the CSNE 0nit in Baibauos. Nanaging
the 0nit fiom ueoigetown has not pioveu easy. At the same time, the 0nit's
woik on the single maiket will stait to iun uown in the foieseeable futuie.
Whilst theie is no immeuiate justification to ielocate the 0nit to ueoigetown,
this may piove uesiiable in the meuium teim anu shoulu be kept unuei
ieview. We iecommenu that this issue be ievisiteu uuiing the next S yeais.

6S. The uivision of ioles between the Implementation Suppoit uioup anu the
two majoi Biiectoiates shoulu piove stiaightfoiwaiu. TEI anu BSB will
caiiy out the uetaileu implementation woik in theii iespective aieas. By
contiast, the iole of the Implementation Suppoit uioup is to monitoi
piogiess anu to iuentify bottlenecks anu the best way of oveicoming them.
The Implementation Suppoit uioup will neeu to woik closely with each of
the Biiectoiates, both in gatheiing the iequisite infoimation anu in woiking
out solutions. The Biiectoiates will, in many cases, implement the solutions.
The whole piocess will be oveiseen by the Implementation Nanagement
Committee anu, on a uay-to-uay basis, the Beputy Secietaiy ueneial anu the
iespective Assistant Secietaiy ueneials.
9.3.3 Foreign!Relations!Directorate!
66. Foieign Relations has foi many yeais been a majoi stiength of CARIC0N.
The Secietaiiat plays a key iole, co-oiuinating common positions with

127
Some cuiient staff may have a facility foi puiei policy woik anu otheis a facility foi getting things uone
in the Implementation 0ffice.
128
These peicentages iefei to the Secietaiiat's oveiall expenuituie maue up of Nembei State anu uonoi
contiibutions.

80

Nembei States anu theii oveiseas iepiesentation in the woilu's majoi
capitals. The CARIC0N methou of tiying to foige common positions - but
always iespecting inuiviuual countiies that take a uiffeient view - seems
sounu anu matuie anu, above all, woiks.

67. The iegion punches above its weight in inteinational affaiis anu iightly takes
consiueiable piiue in uoing so. A cynic might iesponu that the iegion is
bounu to punch above its weight given that each small countiy gets the same
vote as the biggest countiies in the woilu. This woulu be unfaii because,
although the numbeis game is cleaily impoitant, theie aie othei iegional
blocs whose effoits to co-oiuinate foieign policy have been little shoit of
uisastious.

68. 0ui concein is iathei uiffeient. Fiom oui obseivations anu uiscussions, we
have concluueu that the iegion appeais moie successful in influencing
inteinational issues, both majoi anu minoi, than in looking aftei its own
inteiests. Whilst many view both the EPA anu CARIF0R0N as examples of
wheie CARIC0N countiies faileu to puisue theii common inteiests
auequately, oui point is moie geneial. We believe that theie shoulu be a
moie explicit attempt to link Foieign Relations to common inteiests anu that
this link neeus to be built into the Secietaiiat's stiuctuie.

69. At a iesult, theie aie aiguments foi ielocating Foieign Relations to the
Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice, given its stiategic anu policy content. Bowevei,
we believe those aspects can be uealt with by goou matiix management. In
paiticulai, the uepaitment shoulu woik closely with the Stiategy, Policy anu
Review Bepaitment of the Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice to ensuie that wiuei
economic anu othei inteiests aie well coveieu.

7u. Anothei aigument foi meiging Foieign Relations with anothei uepaitment
is its small size; it is only iesponsible foi S% of the Secietaiiat's expenuituie.
Bowevei, the aiguments foi Foieign Relations iemaining an inuepenuent
uiiectoiate aie stiongei because of its specialist iole. The Foieign Relations
Biiectoiate shoulu be integiateu moie into the mainstieam woik of the
Secietaiiat anu this can be achieveu by it iepoiting to the Beputy Secietaiy
ueneial.

71. Finally, we weie tolu that theie is cuiiently little, if any, activity as iegaius
community ielations within the Biiectoiate. 0ui instinct is that community
ielations coulu be bettei hanuleu elsewheie in the Secietaiiat but we weie
unable to follow this up sufficiently to make a cleai iecommenuation. Foi the
time being, the Foieign Relations Biiectoiate shoulu cooiuinate these
activities with the Implementation Suppoit uioup. The mattei shoulu be
kept unuei ieview anu ievisiteu by the Change 0ffice.

9.3.4 OTN!&!External!Trade!
72. The position of 0veiseas Tiaue Negotiations (0TN) has been an anomalous
one. It is pait of CARIC0N anu closely associateu with the Secietaiiat, but

81

not fully pait of it. We view the aiguments foi integiating it into the
Secietaiiat as oveiwhelming in institutional teims. Bowevei, this is not the
same as ielocating 0TN to ueoigetown fiom Baibauos. The aiguments that
0TN woulu lose most of its staff by such a move aie peisuasive. It woulu also
aiguably piove moie uifficult to conuuct negotiations fiom a ueoigetown
base.

7S. As an institutional stiengthening exeicise to builu against the oft-iepoiteu
silo mentality within anu between CARIC0N institutions, we iecommenu the
following:
a. The Biiectoi of 0TN shoulu leau a new Biiectoiate, iepoiting to the
Beputy Secietaiy ueneial. The Biiectoiate shoulu incluue the
Exteinal Tiaue Bepaitment (cuiiently pait of TEI), which shoulu
iemain in ueoigetown
b. In enuoising the pioposals that 0TN anu CSNE shoulu move into the
same offices in Baibauos anu shaie common seivices as an economy
measuie, the stiuctuie shoulu be fuithei stiengtheneu by the
Biiectoi of 0TN now heauing up the Secietaiiat's office in Baibauos;
c. uiven 0TN's continuing location in Baibauos, the Biiectoi shoulu also
woik closely with the Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice on stiategic anu
policy matteis. This shoulu incluue stiategic anu policy oveisight foi
the CSNE 0nit.

74. We unueistanu that exteinal tiaue
129
useu to be pait of the Foieign anu
Community Relations Biiectoiate. In similai mannei to the Biiectoi of 0TN
oveiseeing the woik of CSNE by viitue of being locateu in Baibauos, the
Assistant Secietaiy ueneial iesponsible foi Foieign Relations shoulu
oveisee the woik of exteinal tiaue in ueoigetown.

7S. Although a fai fiom stiaightfoiwaiu tiuying up exeicise, these pioposals will
biing togethei vaiious uispaiate paits of the Secietaiiat in a stiongei
stiuctuie. The lines of iesponsibility anu accountability aie cleai as they leau
to the Beputy Secietaiy ueneial. At the same time, the aiiangements pioviue
foi stiongei oveisight of the Secietaiiat's activities in Baibauos whilst
encouiaging the emeigence of essential matiix management methous.
9.3.5 Statistics!Department!
76. We also uelibeiateu ovei wheie the Statistics Bepaitment shoulu be placeu
in the new oiganisational fiamewoik. Theie aie aiguments foi it to be
closely ielateu to stiategy anu policy anu aiguments conceining
implementation. We ueciueu on balance that it shoulu be incluueu in the
Implementation Biiectoiate, as we unueistanu that it is uoing much useful
woik with Nembei States on moueinising theii statistics.

129
The Exteinal Tiaue Bepaitment is pait of the cuiient Biiectoiate of Tiaue anu Economic Integiation.

82

9.3.6 General!Counsel!
77. Bespite it being iesponsible foi only 1% of the Secietaiiat's oveiall
buuget
1Su
, we uo not view the aiguments foi integiating the small ueneial
Counsel office into a biggei Biiectoiate as sufficiently stiong. This is because
of the specialist natuie of its woik.

78. Similaily, we uo not foiesee any majoi change in the ueneial Counsel's
functions. We uo, howevei, see it woiking closely with both the new
Implementation Suppoit uioup anu with the new PN0. The ueneial Counsel
has long helpeu Nembei States with the piovision of mouel laws anu othei
assistance. As legislation is usually the fiist conciete step in the piocess of
implementing integiation, it is the fiist place to look foi uelays anu
bottlenecks.

79. Nouel laws aie also often insufficient to oveicome uelays anu blockages, as
they have to be auapteu to local conuitions. In the smallei states, in
paiticulai, help is often neeueu to tuin these mouel laws into laws suiteu to
the Nembei State in question.

8u. It is, in some ways, paiauoxical that the ueneial Counsel has long been pait
of the implementation piocess. This is because theie is still a tenuency, both
within the Secietaiiat anu in Nembei States, to see the passing of laws as the
completion of implementation
1S1
. In ieality, it is the beginning of
implementation; eveiything that pieceues it is a piocess of planning anu
negotiation that, if taken no fuithei, achieves nothing.
9.4 The!Implementation!Process!
81. The pioposals that we have maue foi an Implementation Biiectoiate aie
essentially about opening up the implementation piocess, making it cleai
what steps it involves anu ueveloping the capabilities to ensuie the
appiopiiate steps aie taken.

82. We woulu see the implementation piocess as incluuing the following
stages
1S2
at a minimum:
u. First!stage: Legislation;
e. Second!stage: Regulations anu pioceuuies to enfoice legislation;
f. Third!stage: Setting up anu financing bouies anuoi auuing
iesponsibilities to existing bouies to manage whatevei is being
legislateuintiouuceu (e.g. accieuitation);
g. Fourth!stage: Soft opening foi business
1SS
, wheie pioceuuies aie
testeu, staff tiaineu anu the iesults inspecteu foi quality - anu,
paiticulaily, to see if they woik;

1Su
Its buuget is equivalent to neaily S% of Nembei State contiibutions but ieuuces to little ovei 1% when
uonoi funuing is taken into account.
1S1
This tenuency is cleaily less pionounceu than at eailiei stages of integiation. But the lack of focus on the
implementation piocess, both in the Secietaiiat anu in Nembei States, means that what is iequiieu is still
systematically unueiestimateu.
1S2
Nany of these stages neeu to be implementeu in paiallel, anu not sequentially, if implementation uelays
aie to be avoiueu.

83

h. Fifth!stage: Full opening foi business with the piomiseu piouuct-
seivice being pioviueu (e.g. a national accieuitation office pioviues
the coiiect uocumentation to an agieeu stanuaiu);
i. Sixth!stage: Full opening foi business thioughout CARIC0N (e.g.
theie aie accieuitation agencies thioughout the iegion oi in as many
Nembei States as aie incluueu in the scheme)
j. Seventh!stage: The piouuct-seivices of the accieuitation agencies aie
known by anu accepteu by othei agencies
1S4
, such as immigiation,
thioughout the iegion;
k. Full!implementation - and!all!that!matters!from!the!perspective!
of!the!CARICOM!national
135
: Whatevei has been piomiseu can be
accesseu in ieality anu actually woiks (e.g. the accieuitation supplieu
in uuyana is accepteu by immigiation officials in Baibauos).

1SS
This can be thought about as similai to the soft opening of a hotel wheie a limiteu numbei of guests aie
inviteu (often at uiscount piices) to test iun the hotel to ensuie it can uelivei the piouuct-seivices that it has
maiketeu (i.e. piomiseu). The same is tiue of so many of the things CARIC0N has been set up to achieve.
Setting up accieuitation agencies is only pait of the piocess. The key test is whethei CARIC0N nationals can
use the accieuitation (the piouuct-seivice) as they have been piomiseu (i.e. as has been maiketeu to them).
1S4
In the cieuit caiu inuustiy, a bona-fiue visa caiu is only any goou because it is wiuely accepteu.
1SS
Fuithei to the pievious two footnotes, the CARIC0N national is no uiffeient to any customei in this
iespect.

84

!
10 Operations!Directorate!!
10.1 The!Crucial!Role!of!Support!Services!
1. 0iganisations that aie successful on a sustaineu basis almost always have
the following chaiacteiistics:
i. Cleai sense of what!they aie "uoing" anu why;
ii. 0nueistanuing of how to "uo it" in teims of the piocesses iequiieu;
iii. 0nueistanuing of the maiket
1S6
they aie "uoing it" foi anu how it is
conuitioneu by the wiuei enviionment;
iv. Ability to auapt what!they aie "uoing" to meet a changing maiket;
v. 0nueistanuing of How the oiganisation shoulu be set up in
opeiational teims so that what it is "uoing" can be ueliveieu
consistently anu successfully in piactice.

2. So fai, we have focuseu on the fiist foui chaiacteiistics anu only paitially on
the fifth anu last. The oiganisational iestiuctuiing we have uesciibeu above
focuses exclusively on what can be uesciibeu as fiont office functions. It uoes
not focus on back office suppoit anu the systems anu pioceuuies that any
oiganisation neeus if it is to "uo" what it sets out to efficiently anu effectively.

S. 0peiations management has always been impoitant to successful
oiganisations anu, in some, is what makes the oiganisation successful
1S7
. In
complex seivice oiganisations such as the Secietaiiat, the iole of the suppoit
seivices that make up opeiations is subtlei. If they woik well, they aie baiely
noticeu anu the oveiall oiganisational machine pioceeus in a seemingly
effoitless mannei. Bowevei, if they uo not woik, the machine constantly
bieaks uown anu splutteis along at best.
10.2 Secretariat!Support!Services:!Not!Fit!For!Purpose!
4. Sauly, anu as we uesciibeu eailiei, the back office suppoit functions in the
Secietaiiat aie not fit foi puipose. Eveiything the Secietaiiat uoes is
hamstiung by pooi quality anu unieliable suppoit seivices. At the same
time, no pioposeu changes in what the Secietaiiat uoes
1S8
can be successful
until the pioblems with suppoit seivices aie fully auuiesseu.

S. To take a couple of examples as follows:
a. Iiiespective of oui view about the Secietaiiat's oveiieliance on
meetings, they can nevei be successful in a situation wheie lengthy

1S6
Business teiminology pioviues a useful shoithanu heie. Some woulu aigue that you cannot categoiise a
constiuct such as CARIC0N as seiving a maiket as it is a public goou anu much moie subtle than that. Yes,
but ultimately CARIC0N is about ueliveiing a set of benefits to a specific gioup of people who, in this case,
happen to be the citizens of the iegion. This is essentially no uiffeient to what any oiganisation uoes
whethei public, piivate, social oi maiket.
1S7
The Nouel T Foiu automobile, which was maue possible by Beniy Foiu's mass piouuction methous, is
one celebiateu example. Noie iecently NcBonalus' intiouuction of fast foou was baseu almost entiiely on
an opeiations' management concept.
1S8
Whethei pioposeu by us oi by anyone else.

85

agenuas anu papeis aie ueliveieu at the last minute anu wheie
paiticipants have no hope of getting to giips with the uocuments they
aie given;
b. Without vastly impioveu IT anu communications seivices, it will
almost ceitainly piove impossible foi the Secietaiiat to become the
"eyes, eais anu piogiess chasei" of CARIC0N. If the Secietaiiat uoes
not caiiy out this function, no one else will anu, if it is not caiiieu out,
it is not possible to come to giips with the "implementation ueficit"
anu how it might be iesolveu.

6. Neveitheless, the unueilying pioblem seems to be significantly woise than
can be uesciibeu by a few examples. We nevei ceaseu to be suipiiseu that
stanuaiu anu vital management infoimation is geneially unavailable. In oui
inteiviews anu meetings we weie iegulaily given a supeib analysis of
geneial anu specific issues by inuiviuuals anu often iefeiieu to luciu iepoits
that hau been wiitten. But basic management infoimation was geneially
unavailable othei than in an anecuotal oi paitial foim.
1S9

7. 0ne of the key issues befoie the Secietaiiat is that it is given too many
manuates to have any chance of implementing them all successfully. But
when we askeu foi a list of manuates anu ieal time infoimation on the
piogiess in theii implementation, we uiscoveieu that nothing exists
14u
.

8. The same is tiue in teims of monitoiing anu evaluating the upshots fiom
Woik Piogiammes. It is not uone on a systematically manageu basis, which
means theie is little piessuie on staff to peifoim
141
. Similaily, theie is no
management infoimation system available foi piojects. As fai as we can tell,
theie is not even an up-to-uate anu centially helu list of piojects.
10.3 Requirements!for!Turning!Round!Support!Services!
9. It woulu be possible - anu may become uesiiable - to uevote a uetaileu stuuy
to iesolving the ueep-seateu pioblems that cuiiently exist. These pioblems
can be oveicome, given time, but only if thiee ciucial iequiiements aie met,
as follows, anu as uiscusseu below:
I. 0peiations being given the authoiity to succeeu
II. Specialist opeiational staff in key positions
III. Substantial investment in technology

I.!Authority!to!Succeed!
1u. Nost opeiational functions have tiauitionally not been given much authoiity
oi sufficiently high piioiity by the Secietaiiat
142
. Whethei in finance oi

1S9
Some analysis can be uone, foi example, fiom financial iecoius. But it is not set up as management
infoimation anu, as such, not a gieat ueal can be uiawn fiom it.
14u
Theie was a heioic iecent stuuy, baseu on going thiough the minutes of Beaus of uoveinment meetings
(anu then tiying to cioss-iefeience yeais of meetings) to tiy to asceitain the position. Fiom a biief ieview,
the stuuy uoes not seem to have ievealeu much in teims of useful management infoimation; it coulu not
because the way the iaw infoimation is helu.
141
Inuiviuual manageis may monitoi theii own staff but they cuiiently have little incentive so to uo.
142
This was a common featuie of many oiganisations iounu the woilu, paiticulaily in the public sectoi,
until ielatively iecently. But theie have been uiamatic changes in the last twenty yeais. Whilst new

86

coipoiate seivices, weaknesses oiiginate in nevei being given the iights soit
of authoiity oi status to be able to succeeu. It is iaiely sufficient foi top
management to iealise that theie is a pioblem anu to make geneial attempts
to tiy to soit it out.

11. This point can best be maue by example. viitually eveiyone we have spoken
to complains about the uysfunctional natuie of CARIC0N meetings. Nost
meetings aie cuiiently set up to fail because of last minute agenuas anu the
lack of availability of concise infoimation on a timely basis. Theie aie, of
couise, any numbei of goou ieasons anu excuses as to why this happens, as
was iegulaily explaineu to us. viitually all such ieasons miss the ieal point.

12. The ieal point is that Confeience Seivicing can only be well-iun if they aie
alloweu to be well-iun. Such seivices aie a specialiseu business these uays
anu piofessional seivice pioviueis woulu simply not allow the bieakuown of
essential uisciplines that unueimine CARIC0N meetings. This might be
thiough managing piocesses anu pioceuuies bettei oi thiough having the
authoiity to pievent otheis fiom inauveitently causing the pioblems about
which they then complain.

1S. We aie not heie suggesting that Confeience Seivices be outsouiceu - it
woulu be too expensive. What we aie suggesting is that they be
piofessionaliseu anu given the authoiity to succeeu. The same aigument
applies to all suppoit seivices.

II.!Specialist!staff!in!key!positions!
14. Baving specialist opeiational staff in some key positions is an impoitant
issue that tenus to be oveilookeu oi uownplayeu. We have alieauy stateu
that a specialist Chief of 0peiations is essential at Beputy Secietaiy level.
Theie also neeu to be high-level specialist staff in aieas such as finance.

1S. The iequiiement foi specialist staff is also not limiteu to senioi staff. It is
incieasingly the case that staff woiking in back offices all ovei the woilu
neeu to know the iequiiements anu mechanics of theii paiticulai iole,
iathei than be expeit in the oveiall business. This has implications foi
ieciuitment wheie the uefault position shoulu be to ieciuit staff with
expeiience in the paiticulai aiea fiom outsiue the Secietaiiat oi CARIC0N
family, iathei than moving someone fiom elsewheie in the oiganisation.

III.!Substantial!investment!in!technology!
16. The neeu foi substantial investment in technology is one of the elephants in
the ioom as iegaius the iestiuctuiing of the Secietaiiat. Again, viitually
eveiyone we spoke to complaineu about the communications technology
available in the Secietaiiat anu about its IT equipment anu systems. Whilst it
is cleaily essential that equipment anu systems be moueiniseu, the pioblem
is that it will be expensive. The issue, theiefoie, tenus to be put on the back

technology has playeu its pait in this, the neeu to lowei costs whilst becoming evei moie efficient anu
effective, has been the moie impoitant factoi. At the same time, specialist functions have emeigeu.

87

buinei. In oui view, it woulu be a false economy to put off any longei the
moueinisation of equipment, systems, softwaie etc. They aie yeais out-of-
uate.

10.4 The!Operations!Office!
17. The tempoiaiy Change 0ffice, to be locateu in the Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice,
will have a key pait to play in intiouucing a new 0peiations 0ffice, which
shoulu be heaueu up by a new Chief of 0peiations at Beputy Secietaiy level.

18. The Chief of 0peiations (C00) will be a piofessional in the opeiationsback-
office fielu anu is likely to be ieciuiteu fiom a laige seivice opeiation, such
as a banking gioup. Theie will not be many oiganisations in the Caiibbean
that contain a peison with all the iequisite skills anu expeiience. We think it
much moie likely that the peison ieciuiteu will come fiom the uiaspoia in
Noith Ameiica oi Euiope.

19. In any event, the job of tuining iounu the Secietaiiat's opeiations is a
uifficult anu uaunting one anu will iequiie someone with vaiieu anu
successful inteinational expeiience to leau it. As well as being an opeiations'
specialist, the peison ieciuiteu will neeu successful expeiience in tuining
iounu oiganisations, businesses anuoi substantial opeiations that have got
into uifficulties.

2u. A pioposeu oiganisational chait foi the C00's 0ffice is at Figuie 4. As befoie,
the vaiious boxes iefei to functions iathei than positions. The new 0ffice
shoulu have the following uepaitments anu these aie uesciibeu in tuin:
a. Finance
b. Institutional Accountability
c. BR
u. IT & Communications Seivices
e. Coipoiate Seivices
10.5 Finance!and!Institutional!Accountability!
21. We weie conceineu to finu that the finance function has nevei hau a high
piofile position in the Secietaiiat. Noieovei the position of Biiectoi of
Finance has been vacant foi some time. A ieciuitment exeicise ievealeu no
suitable canuiuate anu, with a ieciuitment fieeze intiouuceu since, it has not
been iepeateu. A continuing pioblem is that the post is not sufficiently
attiactive to attiact a high flying piofessional. We believe this is paitly a
mattei of pay levels anu paitly because the post is at an insufficiently high
level in the Secietaiiat hieiaichy.

22. It is essential the Secietaiiat have a high level Finance Biiectoi - anu highei
in the hieiaichy than cuiiently. The pay anu conuitions neeu to be set to
attiact a suitable canuiuate. We woulu iecommenu ieciuiting fiom the
piivate sectoi anu that the peison iuentifieu shoulu cuiiently be Finance
Biiectoi of a significantly sizeu oiganisation.

88

2S. The Finance Biiectoi shoulu sit on the Secietaiiat's Executive Nanagement
Committee anu be taskeu with making substantial impiovements in cuiient
finance anu accounting piactices, as well as intiouucing vaiious innovations
to biing these piactices up-to-uate. The woik of the finance uepaitment
shoulu be split between 4 aieas - accounts, buuget, financing anu pioject
finance. Pioject finance staff shoulu woik closely with the PN0.

24. The finance function is cuiiently weak. The Finance Biiectoi will neeu to
oveihaul the uepaitment as well as get involveu in specific initiatives
14S
. The
moie impoitant items on the agenua aie uiscusseu as follows. !
!
Accounting
2S. It is essential theie be ieconciliations on a much moie timely basis. These
ieconciliations shoulu be matcheu with an inteinal system that pioviues an
enu of uay balance on a daily basis of the cash available to the Secietaiiat.
The establishment of on-line banking woulu be helpful in this iegaiu as it
woulu facilitate the iegulai examination anu inteiiogation of accounts.

26. The Secietaiiat cuiiently iuns 77 bank accounts. Although uonois often
insist on sepaiate bank accounts, these shoulu be stieamlineu. Theie is
iecent eviuence of funus fiom uonoi piojects still in bank accounts following
the closuie of piojects. This confiims that the monitoiing anu management
of bank accounts neeus to be tighteneu.

27. Neeting the stiingent iequiiements of uonois iequiies the caieful
monitoiing of conuitions. Legal inteipietations of contiacts, in paiticulai,
neeu to be unueistoou by all paities.
!
Project!Finance!
28. A fastei smoothei efficient piocess of hanuling pioject finance is iequiieu.
0ne of the ciiticisms levelleu at the Secietaiiat is that, amongst othei things,
its systems of payments anu appioval aie so cumbeisome that consulting
fiims anu seasoneu piofessionals aie always waiy about biuuing foi its
piojects.

29. The management of pioject financing iequiies much impioveu cooiuination
- with RNTA cuiiently anu with the new PN0 in uue couise. We note that
pioject thioughput is slow anu that little ovei Su% of the Secietaiiat's
poitfolio of piojects aie cuiiently active.
!
Financing
Su. The Finance Bepaitment shoulu uevelop an eaily waining system that flags
anu stiess tests cash flow anu othei financial pioblems that confiont the
Secietaiiat. This woulu enable a bettei iesponse when Nembei State
funuing is uelayeu oi inuefinitely withhelu.

14S
Foi example, the Finance Biiectoi will neeu to look at measuies to manage funus uuiing the elapseu time
between the iequest foi anu the uisbuisement of uonoi funus. Theie also neeu to be bettei aiiangements in
the uepaitment foi hanuling the uisbuisement of funus to the vaiious iegional institutions.

89

S1. The Finance Bepaitment shoulu also play a pioactive iole in stiuctuiing the
funuing available to the Secietaiiat fiom both Nembei States anu fiom
uonois. It shoulu, foi example, mitigate the significant foieign exchange iisk
that the Secietaiiat takes, often unknowingly.
!
Reporting
S2. The Finance Bepaitment shoulu intiouuce full anu tianspaient iepoiting of
the Secietaiiat's annual financial peifoimance. This shoulu follow best
piactice anu be in line with inteinational financial iepoiting stanuaius.
144
It
is paiticulaily essential to intiouuce piopei accounts anu peifoimance
measuiement into the Secietaiiat's Annual iepoit, which cuiiently incluues
no haiu eviuence anu which is no moie than a PR biochuie. Piopei
iepoiting shoulu be manuatoiy in touay's financial enviionment. It is an
impoitant way of iegaining CARIC0N's cieuibility anu shoulu be intiouuceu
foi all its institutions.

Institutional!Accountability!
SS. These innovations shoulu incluue a new Institutional!Accountability
Bepaitment manageu by the Finance Biiectoi. The Bepaitment shoulu take
the leau in intiouucing mouein anu tianspaient iepoiting stanuaius both foi
the Secietaiiat anu foi CARIC0N institutions. This shoulu incluue the
intiouuction of iepoiting iequiiements to meet the best inteinational
iequiiements with CARIC0N's annual iepoits incluuing a wiue iange of
financial anu othei uata
14S
that woulu be legally iequiieu of any public
company.

S4. The Secietaiiat's wiuei annual iepoiting shoulu contain a fiank assessment
of aims, achievements anu challenges. This can be uone positively using goou
communications techniques but an empty PR exeicise shoulu be avoiueu.
The annual iepoit shoulu incluue iepoits fiom CARIC0N institutions.

SS. We weie hoiiifieu when, at one of oui fiist biiefing meetings, we askeu a
ioutine infoimation question anu uiscoveieu theie was no available answei.
We askeu if a simple table coulu be constiucteu listing the buugets of the
Secietaiiat anu each of the CARIC0N institutions
146
. The Secietaiiat uoes not
have this infoimation anu, when it tiieu to uo a one-off exeicise ielatively
iecently to finu it out, was tolu by seveial institutions to minu its own
business.

S6. If CARIC0N is seiious about tiying to manage the iegional implementation
piocess anu, even moie so, about getting value foi money, some heaus neeu
knocking togethei. Regional institutions neeu to be accountable. If they aie

144
The Pacific Islanus' Foium, foi example, meets inteinational iepoiting stanuaius. This compaies veiy
favouiably with the Secietaiiat that ielies on out-uateu Financial Rules anu Regulations.
14S
We aie stiongly of the view that this uata shoulu incluue the uetailing of Nembei State contiibutions anu
the extent to which payments aie up-to-uate.
146
The only othei way to get this infoimation is to iequest that each Nembei State Ninistiy of Finance
pioviue it. We askeu foi this infoimation at seveial meetings but have not ieceiveu anything. Knowing all
Nembei State contiibutions woulu only give a pait of the answei as to the buugets of institutions.

90

not accountable to CARIC0N in a cleai anu iegulai piocess through!the!
Secretariat,!then they aie unlikely to be accountable to anyone - anu
ceitainly not to the iegion
147
. This lack of accountability woulu be a seiious
issue at any time. But when theie aie uoubts ovei the sustainability of
iegional funuing in the miust of the woist economic ciisis foi geneiations, it
cannot be acceptable.!
!
S7. Accoiuingly, we recommend that Beaus of uoveinment authoiise the
Secietaiiat to issue manuatoiy guiuelines to iegional institutions to biing
about genuine accountability along the lines uesciibe below.

S8. Quite apait fiom the accountability issue, the absence of any functioning
stiuctuie
148
linking institutions into CARIC0N is a huge weakness in the
whole CARIC0N constiuct. This has to change. As well as laying uown
stanuaiu annual financial iepoiting iequiiements foi CARIC0N
institutions
149
, the Finance Biiectoi shoulu woik with the Implementation
Biiectoiate anu the Stiategy, Policy anu Review Bepaitment to establish
iepoiting iequiiements foi institutions beyonu stanuaiu financial
infoimation. A stanuaiu template is neeueu wheie institutions iepoit on
theii activities, piogiess anu achievements in compaiison to plan. The iepoit
shoulu also be wiitten in teims of how the institution is contiibuting to
CARIC0N's oveiall stiategy anu piioiities.

S9. The oiiginal intention that institutions be pait of the aimouiy of CARIC0N to
contiibute to the implementation of iegional integiation anu co-opeiation
neeus ieinfoicing explicit teims. Institutional accountability is one of the
fiist steps in this. The othei is that the Stiategy, Policy anu Review
Bepaitment will neeu to call upon specialist expeits to help with a vaiiety of
iegional policy issues of the moment; in many cases this will give
oppoitunities to woik with specific CARIC0N institutions.

4u. These initial changes shoulu be the fiist steps to pioviuing CARIC0N with a
tightei management stiuctuie that coulu make the entiie constiuct fit foi
puipose. CARIC0N institutions shoulu be the equivalent of inuiviuual
business units in a coipoiate conglomeiate stiuctuie. Although having wiue-
ianging autonomy, such business units aie pait of a stiuctuie wheie
iesponsibilities anu accountability aie caiefully uefineu anu wheie taigets
anu oveiall peifoimance iequiiements aie agieeu anu monitoieu.

147
Whilst institutions have theii own ministeiial councils, these neeu to be assisteu by the peimanent anu
co-oiuinating oveisight that only the Secietaiiat can pioviue. This incluues a bettei unueistanuing of theii
activities, on what they aie spenuing money anu wheie the money is coming fiom. Paiticulai conceins aie
whethei institutions aie piomoting iegional oi othei conceins anu whethei they aie iaising money
inuiviuually oi foi the iegion.
148
Naking institutions iesponsible to oigans of CARIC0N that meet iiiegulaily anu whose membeiship is
constantly changing is of no piactical use unless theie aie cleai anu stanuaiu iepoiting anu accountability
iequiiements.
149
We know that compliance anu filing accounts on time is an issue with some public institutions in the
Caiibbean. Theie will neeu to be sanctions if CARIC0N institutions uo not comply once new iequiiements
have been agieeu anu intiouuceu. Possible sanctions coulu incluue Nembei State contiibutions being paiu
into an esciow account unuei the contiol of the Secietaiiat, with the funus only ieleaseu when institutions
comply.

91

92

10.6 Human!Resources!
41. Although oui shoit pioject obviously uoes not incluue the time to caiiy out
a full auuit of inuiviuual uepaitments anu functions, oui stiong impiession is
that the cuiient Buman Resouices (BR) set up is coping ieasonably well
with the piessuies of ietienchment. It was one of the few uepaitments fiom
which we acquiieu extensive anu ielevant wiitten infoimation.

Management!Information!
42. The BR uepaitment has the basis foi an up-to-uate peisonnel management
infoimation system, which coulu anu shoulu be integiateu with the
uevelopment of an oveiall - anu compatible - management infoimation
system. In this iespect, we aie awaie of the cuiient initiative to intiouuce a
Peifoimance Nanagement System anu suppoit it fully. As we have uiscusseu
with those involveu, the Peifoimance Nanagement System iequiies an
oveiall stiategy fiom which the objectives of the Secietaiiat as whole, anu of
its uepaitments anu inuiviuual staff, can be cascaueu uown.

4S. These issues will iequiie the attention of the Change 0ffice. 0nce eveiything
is in place, the Secietaiiat shoulu have the means of evaluating its
peifoimance in compaiison to piioiities, whethei on an oveiall,
uepaitmental oi inuiviuual basis.

Recruitment!and!staff!changes!
44. The cuiient ieciuitment fieeze can only be a shoit-teim measuie. Although
necessaiy foi immeuiate financial ieasons, a longei-teim fieeze only fuithei
weakens an oiganisation that is alieauy in uifficulties. Noie to the point the
oiganisation has to change anu a majoi aspect of change is the ieciuitment
of new talent.

4S. In auuition to substantial staff changes, theie neeus to be a significant
change in ieciuitment policies anu a ieview of the methous useu. This is a
high piioiity to oveicome what was uesciibeu to us thioughout the
Caiibbean, as well as in the Secietaiiat, as CARIC0N's "olu-boys netwoik".
This uesciiption has seveial contexts.
1Su
The most impoitant is that the
piioiities of CARIC0N have laigely faileu to move on fiom the vision of its
founuing fatheis anu that it is a miulate-2u
th
centuiy constiuct uesigneu foi
a uiffeient woilu to that which now exists.

46. We think theie is substance to these ciiticisms, as we have noteu eailiei in
the iepoit. We aie impiesseu by the aiguments that CARIC0N shoulu be

1Su
0ne context that causes consiueiable iesentment - anu not a little angei - is CARIC0N's continueu
involvement in ciicket beyonu the 2uu7 Woilu Cup, paiticulaily at the Beaus of uoveinment level anu in
othei key oigans of CARIC0N. Although the thiee wiiteis of this iepoit aie seconu to none in theii love of
the spoit, we uo finu the level of involvement of goveinments - let alone a iegional institution - as a little
ouu anu, in PR teims, uamaging. It gives the impiession of a gioup of matuie men being moie conceineu
about the minutiae of spoit than about the matteis of substance facing the iegion. We also wonuei what the
uoveinments anu peoples of Baiti anu Suiiname make of it all. 0ui visits suggest it auus to the sense of
exclusion that they alieauy feel fiom a malfunctioning CARIC0N constiuct.

93

moie outwaiu than inwaiu looking. In the context of ieciuitment, theie is
wiuespieau ciiticism that insiueis uominate ieciuitment to the Secietaiiat
anu to CARIC0N institutions. We suspect the institutions aie natuially
uiawn to insiueis, which usually means inuiviuuals woiking in public
seivice, iegional oi inteinational bouies, foi unueistanuable ieasons.
1S1
It is
impoitant to wiuen the net, incluuing to the piivate sectoi anu to the
Biaspoia.
1S2
It is as also impoitant to auopt pioceuuies that leau neithei to
an unintenueu bias in ieciuitment towaius insiueis
1SS
noi to accusations of
bias.

47. At the same time, theie is much to be saiu foi limiting the length of CARIC0N
caieeis, as is in the case in some inteinational bouies such as the
Inteinational Eneigy Agency
1S4
. If the funuing coulu be founu, it woulu also
be helpful to have a Young Piofessionals' scheme. Such appointments coulu
be time limiteu, if that became the geneial iule, with the option of fuithei
appointments latei in a caieei. Seconuments fiom othei oiganisations
1SS

woulu be a fuithei way of intiouucing new skill sets, iueas anu expeiiences
to the woik of the Secietaiiat.

48. We shoulu note that we aie fai fiom comfoitable making these
iecommenuations. This is because theie is a coie of highly committeu anu
capable long-teim piofessional staff in the Secietaiiat who have essentially
kept the oiganisation afloat in extiemely tiying ciicumstances. But foi
CARIC0N to suivive anu move on successfully, a majoi infusion of new bloou
is one of the essential iequiiements.

49. The BR Bepaitment will have a key iole to play in intiouucing change into
the Secietaiiat anu will neeu to woik closely with the Change 0ffice which,
as alieauy noteu, shoulu incluue oiganisational anu BR skills.
10.7 IT!&!Communications!Services!
IT!as!a!game!changer!
Su. IT anu Communications Seivices can be a game changei foi CARIC0N.
Fiistly, theie aie now so many things that can now be uone that coulu not
have been contemplateu even S-1u yeais ago. Seconuly, technological
auvance is paiticulaily significant foi a wiuely spieau constiuct such as
CARIC0N that has a bioau agenua anu complex goals. Thiiuly, the

1S1
At the level of full-time Secietaiiat staffing, theie has been no suggestion that the teim "olu boys'
netwoik" iefeis to any genuei bias.
1S2
Taigeting say the piivate sectoi anu the Biaspoia in ieciuitment auveits will help wiuen the ieciuitment
fielu. 0bjective tests (which we believe aie alieauy useu to some extent) anu outsiueis on appointments'
committees coulu also help.
1SS
Canuiuates that aie known to the appointments' committee, peihaps because they woik in goveinment
oi iegional institutions, aie foi unueistanuable ieasons moie likely to be appointeu. 0nless the canuiuate
has a bau ieputation, the committee is natuially moie likely to be uiawn to a known quantity who they aie
comfoitable with anu who immeuiately ielates to theii conceins anu inteiests. Yet, a canuiuate fiom the
piivate sectoi oi fiom the Biaspoia coulu tuin out a much bettei choice.
1S4
Piofessional appointments to the Inteinational Agency aie limiteu to a couple of S-S yeai contiacts.
1SS
These coulu incluue Nembei State uoveinments, iegional institutions such as the Caiibbean
Bevelopment Bank, inteinational institutions anu piivate sectoi banks anu companies.

94

appiopiiate use of IT anu communications can leau to majoi cost savings in
staff anu in othei expensive items such as tiavel.

S1. Communications with the Secietaiiat, anu inueeu aiounu the Caiibbean, aie
still not iueal anu aie some way shoit of the best stanuaius. Seivices like
viueo-confeiencing aie giauually being useu moie but inteiiuptions in
seivice mean that one paity oi anothei always seems to get lost in a multi-
paity confeience call. We have also founu that telephone connections with
the Secietaiiat fiom outsiue uuyana aie not always ieliable oi of ieasonable
quality.

Systemic!shortcomings!
S2. uiven the impoitance of the Secietaiiat to the iegion, it is to be hopeu that
the ielevant uuyanese authoiities can be pievaileu upon to impiove the
stanuaiu anu ieliability of the full aiiay of mouein telecommunications
seivices. The same point is impoitant aiounu the iegion. Even if theie weie
only one goveinment builuing oi oiganisation in eveiy Nembei State that
hau failsafe communications, it woulu make an impoitant uiffeience. We
have eailiei suggesteu ways of getting the piivate sectoi involveu, incluuing
thiough sponsoiship. Peihaps this is an oppoitunity.

IT!shortcomings!within!the!Secretariat!
SS. We weie not hiieu as IT specialists but have consiueiable expeiience as
useis. The cuiient level of seivices is pooi anu, with ageing equipment anu
softwaie, keeping it opeiational is the majoi uay-to-uay challenge.

S4. As oui expeit on communications anu goveinment ielations has iepoiteu
(see Appenuix 4), the CARIC0N website neeus substantial upgiauing. At the
same time, the websites of all CARIC0N institutions neeu to be piopeily
linkeu. This shoulu incluue a visual piesentation that has enough in common
foi those looking at two sepaiate sites to know immeuiately that the
institutions aie pait of the same oveiall constiuct. This has an impoitant
contiibution to make to stiengthening the CARIC0N stiuctuie, to ueveloping
the CARIC0N bianu anu to piesenting a unifieu image.

SS. The Secietaiiat's intianet, which coulu be a veiy poweiful tool, is a mess.
Some uepaitments make use of it anu otheis ignoie it. The Secietaiiat's olu-
fashioneu uefault position of making fai too much infoimation
confiuential
1S6
uoes not help. Neveitheless, the intianet itself neeus
upuating.

!
!

1S6
Although electionic secuiity has become a much moie impoitant issue in iecent yeais, it shoulu not be
confuseu with confiuentiality. In most mouein oiganisations, the uefault position is that infoimation shoulu
be wiuely available unless theie aie veiy goou ieasons otheiwise. As Fieeuom of Infoimation legislation is
intiouuceu in moie anu moie countiies, most infoimation is no longei kept fiom the geneial public, let
alone fiom staff in the oiganisation conceineu.

95

The!Secretariats!opportunity!
S6. The biggest oppoitunity cuiiently is to make a geneiational leap in using
technology as a tool to manage the Secietaiiat's business. Apait fiom the
Inteinet anu Intianet, ieal time infoimation on piogiess with integiation,
anu on financial, pioject, human iesouice anu peifoimance management
coulu now be uevelopeu anu linkeu by the appiopiiate use of technology. As
a iesult, the availability of management infoimation coulu be impioveu
beyonu iecognition.

S7. None of what we have wiitten above will be news to the IT Bepaitment.
Extensive iepoits have been caiiieu out on the Secietaiiat's system
iequiiements in a wiue-ianging pioject that took place between 2uu6 anu
eaily-2uu9. The solutions specifieu iun to seveial million uollais. 0ui woiiy
is that the solutions may alieauy be out-uateu in technology teims as the
final iecommenuations weie maue neaily thiee yeais ago.

S8. 0ui recommendation is that these solutions be ievieweu quickly in light of
this iepoit anu with the paiticipation of the Change 0ffice. The ieview
shoulu take into account changes in technology in the inteiim, as well as
planneu changes in the Secietaiiat's stiuctuie anu, in paiticulai, the impact
of these changes on iequiiements foi management infoimation. The iesults
of the ieview shoulu then be implementeu quickly by the IT Bepaitment
with the assistance of the Change 0ffice.

S9. A wholesale change anu upgiaue to the Secietaiiat's IT anu communications
infiastiuctuie is a necessaiy conuition foi the successful iestiuctuiing of the
Secietaiiat. The necessaiy investment has to be founu anu it woulu be a false
economy of incieasingly costly piopoitions not to intiouuce such an
upgiaue. uiven the age of the cuiient infiastiuctuie, fuithei uelays will auu
to costs.

10.8 Corporate!Services!
6u. Coipoiate Seivices incluue Confeience Seivices, Auministiative Seivices anu
the Bocumentation Centie.

Conference!Services!
61. We have alieauy uiscusseu Confeience Seivices in the context of CARIC0N
meetings. 0n the one hanu, the CARIC0N cultuie of meetings is one of its
majoi weaknesses; the numbei of meetings neeus to be ieuuceu to a fiaction
of theii cuiient level. 0n the othei hanu, Confeience Seivices is cleaily
oveiwhelmeu anu, as we have alieauy aigueu, uoes not have the authoiity to
oiganise meetings on a iational basis.

62. As we have also aigueu, Confeience Seivices cleaily neeus to be able to
pioviue seivices on a moie piofessional basis with the authoiity of a C00 at
Beputy Secietaiy level. What is less cleai is the impact this may have on
staffing levels, as the numbei of CARIC0N meetings is ieuuceu by one half oi
moie. 0ui initial juugement is that theie will be less staff but that they will,

96

on aveiage, be at a highei level. But this juugement will neeu to be iefineu by
moie uetaileu woik by the Change 0ffice anu, in uue couise, by the new C00.
!
Administrative!Services!
6S. In a similai mannei, oui juugement of Auministiative Seivices anu, inueeu,
the staffing tail in many othei uepaitments, is that it iepiesents an
oiganisational stiuctuie of a bygone, pie-computei age. If theie is any fat in
the Secietaiiat's oveiall staffing, it is amongst the cleiks, the auministiative
anu office assistants, the office attenuants, the stenogiapheis anu
messengeis.

64. Bowevei, it woulu be inviuious foi us to take these points any fuithei. We
have not been employeu to caiiy out a job evaluation exeicise anu oui
juugement can theiefoie only be of a geneial natuie anu baseu on oui
expeiience. 0ui iecommenuation is that the Change 0ffice anu, in uue
couise, the new C00, caiiy out a moie uetaileu ieview of junioi posts
thioughout the Secietaiiat to establish what savings can be maue anu
whethei any uepaitments oi functions can be abolisheu in theii entiiety,

Documentation!Centre!
6S. The Bocumentation Centie - oi at least its business of pioviuing accessible
anu compiehensive infoimation - is vital to the Secietaiiat in paiticulai anu
to CARIC0N in geneial. What is less cleai is the foim the Centie shoulu take.
Nuch of its woik coulu, in piinciple, be ieplaceu anu impioveu in quality anu
accessibility by the geneiational shift in IT alieauy uiscusseu.

66. As foi Auministiative Seivices, we have not uone an evaluation of the
Bocumentation Centie. 0ui outline juugement is that its seivice coulu be
impioveu at the same time as savings aie maue with new technology.
Bowevei, that juugement shoulu be subject to ieview by the Change 0ffice to
be confiimeu, in uue couise, by the new C00.

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!
11 Budget!and!Financial!Issues!
11.1 Overall!Budget!
Evaluating!the!need!for!cuts!
1. We unueistanu fiom oui teims of iefeience anu fiom the cuiient economic
ciisis that Nembei States woulu welcome a cut in the Secietaiiat's coie
buuget that they funu. In usual ciicumstances, oui inclination woulu be that
a buuget cut coulu be affoiueu anu savings founu. These aie not usual
ciicumstances. The position of the CARIC0N constiuct anu the Secietaiiat
aie so piecaiious that any significant cut in the shoit-to-meuium teim woulu
be countei-piouuctive - anu possibly fatal.

2. Cuts may, of couise, be foiceu by ciicumstance. The iisks of Westein
economies falling back into iecession oi woise have incieaseu significantly
in late-2u11. We recommend that a contingency plan be put in place foi
such a ciicumstance to enable CARIC0N anu the Secietaiiat to caiiy on
functioning on a caie-anu-maintenance basis. 0ui view is that savings woulu
neeu to be founu piimaiily by majoi cuts in meetings anu by ieleasing staff
in the aieas that we have iuentifieu foi eventual savings.

S. Bowevei, net oveiall cuts shoulu be avoiueu if at all possible. Although theie
aie aieas wheie consiueiable savings can be maue, as have been iuentifieu in
the pievious 2 sections, the Secietaiiat must uevelop the new functions
iuentifieu in the last thiee sections to enable it to ieuuce the implementation
ueficit anu to become fit foi puipose. Beveloping these functions is essential
to tuinaiounu CARIC0N's foitunes. A combination of these new functions
anu of piioiitisation thiough a CARIC0N Stiategy will both speeu up
implementation anu allow savings.

Creating!the!conditions!for!turning!round!CARICOMs!fortunes!
4. Significant buuget cuts at!this!stage woulu make an alieauy uifficult tuin
iounu anu iestiuctuiing exeicise much haiuei. It woulu substantially
inciease the iisks of failuie anu, in oui view, make failuie the likely outcome.
The pioblem is that the CARIC0N constiuct anu the Secietaiiat have alieauy
been tiaumatically weakeneu foi all the ieasons given in this iepoit,
incluuing having hau to live fiom hanu-to-mouth foi yeais.

S. In the following paiagiaphs, we aie pioposing maintaining the coie 2u11
buuget - anu theiefoie Nembei State contiibutions - ovei the foui
succeeuing yeais to 2u1S. This entails a small inciease in nominal teims,
which will piobably piove insufficient to covei inflation ovei the peiiou, anu
theieby iesult in a mouest cut in ieal teims.

6. Our!overall!recommendation!is that no oveiall cuts be maue unless
woisening economic ciicumstances leave no choice.

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11.2 The!Financing!Conundrum!
The!growing!funding!challenge!
7. It neeus to be saiu at the outset that Nembei States have iun CARIC0N on
the cheap foi yeais anu the negative iesults, in the way that this has
ieshapeu the Secietaiiat, speak foi themselves. Fiom all oui uiscussions, it
woulu seem theie has been a tacit stiategy of palming as many costs as
possible off on the inteinational uonoi community. This has left CARIC0N in
the woist of all possible positions as the vaiious consequences fiom this
tacit stiategy have contiibuteu significantly to the weakening of the
CARIC0N constiuct.

8. We have alieauy uiscusseu most of these consequences at some length.
These incluue piojects becoming enus in themselves, iathei than a means to
implementation. This is because the finance foi these piojects has helpeu
keep the oveiall show on the ioau. The consequences also incluue funu
iaising becoming a fiie fighting iathei than stiategic activity - anu one that
is ultimately self-uefeating because aiu uonois aie incieasingly uisappointeu
with the lack of focus anu subsequent iesults. These examples anu othei
factois alieauy uiscusseu have maue CARIC0N, anu in tuin the Secietaiiat,
an incieasingly piocess-uiiven constiuct iathei than one uiiven by iesults.
These factois have leu to mounting conceins ovei the implementation
ueficit.

9. The one consequence of Nembei States iunning CARIC0N on the cheap not
pieviously iaiseu is that of salaiies. A longstanuing objective is that
Secietaiiat salaiies shoulu be 7S% of equivalent inteinational positions in
the iegion. The ieality is that ielative salaiies have fallen ovei the yeais anu
weie iecently measuieu as at S7% of the ielevant yaiustick.

1u. Although a uetaileu investigation of iemuneiation was beyonu oui iemit, it
is cleai that salaiies aie a pioblem in attiacting anu ietaining staff
1S7
. It also
appeais that the pioblem is moie a question of the level of salaiies than
ieluctance amongst Nembei State nationals to ielocate to ueoigetown. It is
cleaily ciucial that it can attiact high calibie new staff if it is to be maue fit
foi puipose. Accoiuingly, we recommend that the Change 0ffice
investigates this issue anu makes pioposals as appiopiiate.

Restructuring!and!longer"term!funding!
11. Theie is nothing wiong, in piinciple, with aiu uonois pioviuing a high level
of financing. But!it!is!the!way!that!this!comes!about!that!is!crucial. The
6u% of all financing pioviueu by aiu uonois in the Caiibbean pales into
insignificance compaieu to ASEAN, wheie uonoi contiibutions aie aiounu
five times those of Nembei States. Bowevei, it woulu be entiiely wiong to

1S7
The Secietaiiat has hau uifficulties attiacting applicants to highei-level posts in iecent yeais. It is
unueistoou that entiy-level piofessional posts aie filleu but that young staff at that level tenu to stay only
long enough to get an impiessive entiy on theii Cvs. We weie tolu that the Secietaiiat useu to attiact the
"cieam of the ciop" but that this is no longei the case. As we have alieauy noteu, theie is a coie of highly-
committeu but ageing staff at the top of the Secietaiiat - many of whom aie beyonu ietiiement age - but
only a limiteu pool of talent in the following geneiation to ieplace them.

99

uiaw the conclusion that CARIC0N Nembei States coulu ieuuce theii
contiibutions in cuiient ciicumstances anu iely even moie on uonois.

12. CARIC0N fiist neeus to be maue fit foi puipose. It neeus cleai shoit-to-
meuium teim goals anu it neeus to be seen to uelivei what it says it will
uelivei. To uo that iequiies a seiious tuin iounu on cuiient peifoimance.
That is only possible with iesouicing. We think it most unlikely that a tuin
iounu can be achieveu with fuithei cuts.

1S. Bonois will only be uiawn in to make significant new contiibutions when
they aie convinceu that CARIC0N, anu its constituent Nembei States, have
accepteu that funuamental change is iequiieu anu aie seiious about tuining
the constiuct iounu anu making it fit foi puipose. It will only be when
CARIC0N staits ueliveiing iesults, anu is seen as a ievitaliseu entity
confiuent of its futuie, that the possibilities of ASEAN-type financing iatios
coulu open up. But it is essential that theie be a secuie base of Nembei State
financing, both now anu in the futuie.

The!immediate!requirement!
14. The upshot of all this is that Nembei States neeu to maintain theii
contiibutions to the Secietaiiat uespite the seiious piessuies on theii
buugets in the cuiient economic climate. We have below piepaieu a
pioposeu buuget foi coie staff coveiing the next foui yeais, which
uemonstiates how impoitant it is to maintain Nembei State contiibutions.
11.3 Funding!Core!Staff!
The!overall!position!
1S. The piofoima buuget is at Figuie S, which uesciibes in bioau teims how the
Secietaiiat's coie staff buuget shoulu be ieallocateu uuiing the peiiou 2u11-
2u1S. This summaiy table is baseu on a caieful analysis of uetaileu buuget
anu BR infoimation. We aie confiuent that the bioau figuies aie both
accuiate anu what is neeueu foi the job at hanu. Neveitheless, we woulu
emphasise that this is a piofoima buuget, which will iequiie fuithei uetaileu
woik by the Change 0ffice.

16. This analysis confiims that coie Nembei State funuing of the Secietaiiat
neeus to be maintaineu at cuiient levels ovei the next foui yeais to pioviue
the iecuiient iesouices to tuin iounu the CARIC0N constiuct anu make it fit
foi puipose. Najoi savings on cuiient activities will neeu to be maue ovei
the next thiee yeais, 2u12-2u14, to allow iesouices to be ieallocateu to
activities that can uelivei iesults.

!

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Figure!5:!Pro"forma!Budget!(EC$!million):!Core!Personnel!Budget!
Office! 2011 2012 2013 2014! 2015
Secretary!General! 5.0 7.0 9.2 10.2! 10.8
Operations! 15.4 13.2 10.8 10.4! 10.3
Implementation!Office! 12.0 12.8 13.0 13.4! 13.8
Of!which:! !
PN0 & Implementation
Suppoit
2.7 S.S 4.4 S.1
Tiaue & Economic Integiation S.7 S.1 2.S 2.1
Buman & Social Bevelopment 1.4 1.S 1.1 1.u
0thei
1S8
S.u S.1 S.4 S.6
Total!Secretariat!HR!Budget! 32.6 33.0 33.1 34.1! 34.9

How!the!allocations!are!broken!down!
17. The oveiall changes ovei 2u11-2u1S aie as follows:
a. Staff expenuituie in the Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice uoubles as a iesult
of its new stiategic anu policy iesponsibilities to moie than EC$1u
million;
b. 0peiational expenuituie falls by neaily one thiiu to aiounu EC$1u
million ovei the same peiiou. Nost of these functions aie cuiiently
unuei the Beputy Secietaiy ueneial anu will become the
iesponsibility of the new Chief of 0peiations. The majoiity of the
savings aie ieal savings, iathei than the tiansfei of functions. The
speeu of the changes will uepenu on how quickly the Change 0ffice
can be agieeu anu set up;
c. The new iesponsibilities of the Beputy Secietaiy ueneial aie the
activities to uo with implementation. Total expenuituie will inciease
slowly to almost EC$14 million. Bowevei, behinu the oveiall figuies
aie substantial savings anu majoi changes in functions as uesciibeu in
Section 9 above.
!
18. The expenuituie in the Secretary!Generals!Office will inciease iapiuly as the
tempoiaiy Change 0ffice is biought on stieam with the Stiategy, Regional
Policy anu Review Bepaitment being set up soon afteiwaius. The outline
staffing anu cost implications aie as follows:
a. The allocation of a notional sum of aiounu EC$7Su,uuu pei annum to
the Change 0ffice foi S yeais fiom the iecuiient coie staff buuget.
Nost of the expenuituie on the Change 0ffice will neeu to come fiom
auuitional non-iecuiient financing. We give an outline of what is
iequiieu at Appenuix S;
b. A Biiectoi shoulu leau the new Stiategy, Regional Policy anu
Resouices Bepaitment with expeiienceu heaus appointeu to its
constituent units - Stiategy & Regional Policy, Resouices, Nonitoiing
& Evaluation anu Communications iespectively;
c. Within the Stiategy & Regional Policy 0nit, theie shoulu 2 oi S
stiategy officeis anu 4-S policy auviseis;

1S8
Foieign Relations Biiectoiate, ueneial Counsel, 0TN anu Exteinal Tiaue anu Statistics

101

u. The Resouices, Nonitoiing & Evaluation 0nit shoulu have half-a-
uozen senioi staff;
e. The Communications 0nit neeus to be biought up to its full
complement, as iecommenueu by oui communications specialist in
his iepoit at Appenuix 4. Theie will be a new post as peisonal
Communications Auvisei to the Secietaiy ueneial;
f. We have costeu these staffing levels on the basis of cuiient giaues
anu pay scales anu they aie achievable within the specifieu buuget;
g. We woulu see the Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice as expanuing iapiuly
uuiing 2u12 anu 2u1S, with slowei incieases in subsequent yeais.

19. The new Chief!of!Operations (C00) neeus to be hiieu within 12 months anu
we outlineu the iequiieu skill set in Section 1u eailiei. The eaily ieciuitment
of a Finance Biiectoi will also be a high piioiity. The initial woik, which will
pieceue the C00's aiiival anu which shoulu be leu by the Change 0ffice,
shoulu be to embaik on getting IT seivices into shape. This will iequiie an
investment of seveial million uollais to biing to fiuition. 0nce the new IT
systems aie beuueu in, theie will be significant oppoitunities foi staff
savings. The immeuiate piioiities foi the new C00 will be the iestiuctuiing
of Confeience Seivices anu of the Auministiative Bepaitments.

2u. The most significant changes will occui unuei the Deputy!Secretary!General
wheie the new Implementation 0ffice will involve majoi changes in how the
Secietaiiat uoes things. The ieoiganisation will have to be caiiieu out
caiefully anu sensitively anu will be leu by the Change 0ffice.

21. Theie will be significant savings in the TEI anu BSB Biiectoiates as theii
woik becomes moie focuseu with some functions being tiansfeiieu anu
othei activities ieuuceu. These savings will pioviue funuing foi the new
uepaitments unuei the Beputy Secietaiy ueneial - the Implementation
Suppoit uioup anu the PN0. We woulu envisage theie being half-a-uozen
senioi staff in each of these uepaitments with possibly one oi two moie in
the PN0.

22. We have maue bioau estimates of staffing iequiiements at this stage, as we
have not been involveu in a uetaileu job evaluation exeicise. The Change
0ffice will neeu to caiiy out moie uetaileu analyses in uue couise.

2S. The important!point is that these bioau estimates confiim that
funuamental change can be biought about within the cuiient coie staff
buuget. Sufficient savings can be maue to pay foi the new functions, as long
as the oveiall buuget is maintaineu.

24. The auuitional costs aie essentially capital items. The IT costs aie
unavoiuable whilst funuamental anu complex change will only be possible if
it is uiiven by the tempoiaiy Change 0ffice. We recommend that iaising
capital sums foi these two exeicises be an immeuiate piioiity.

102

11.4 Relating!the!Core!Staff!Budget!to!the!Overall!Budget!
2S. The above coie staff buuget neeus to be ielateu to the annual buugeting
exeicise to ueiive annual buugets. Again this can be uevelopeu in uetail by
the Change 0ffice but a numbei of wiuei issues neeu to be taken into
account, incluuing the following:
i. By ueveloping anu changing piioiities anu by its focus, the CARIC0N
Stiategy will pioviue fuithei guiuance on how the Secietaiiat's
buuget shoulu be stiuctuieu. Although the functions anu ioles within
the Secietaiiat shoulu iemain tiue to the changes we have outlineu to
make the Secietaiiat fit foi puipose, the piioiities that emeige aie
likely to change the balance in how the Secietaiiat's iesouices aie
allocateu;
ii. Woik piogiammes shoulu be uevelopeu fiom the stiategy anu be
iolleu uown thiough the uiiectoiates to uepaitmental levels anu
inuiviuual objectives, taking account of the iecent woik uone in this
aiea on ueveloping a Peifoimance Nanagement System;
iii. Pioblems ovei the 2u12 buuget, paiticulaily as it may eventually be
establisheu as a baseline. We unueistanu that theie have been
uifficulties ovei establishing a Secietaiiat buuget foi 2u12 anu ovei
the basis on which it was uevelopeu. Whilst we have insufficient
uetail to make a iecommenuation, we woulu suggest that the buuget
anu the basis on which it has been set be ievisiteu.
11.5 Finance!and!Risk!!
26. The Secietaiiat has expeiienceu continual financing anu cash flow pioblems
ovei iecent yeais. It has been at seiious iisk of much woise. Although the
intiouuction of bettei iisk management will not oveicome these pioblems, it
will help manage them.

27. The majoi cuiient iisks aie:
a. A new iecession oi woise putting Nembei State contiibutions at
fuithei iisk;
b. Non-payment of outstanuing Nembei State contiibutions,
paiticulaily by laigei Nembei States;
c. The shoit-teim natuie anu unceitainty of cuiient funuing methous;
u. The lack of financial anu iisk management in the Secietaiiat;
e. Natuial uisasteis.

28. The system of Nembei State funuing is a shoit-teim one. Annual buugets aie
agieeu with upcoming contiibutions baseu on those agieeu buugets. Whilst
the natuie of the funuing mechanism pioviues unceitainty in itself, the facts
of iiiegulai Nembei State payments anu seiious levels of aiieais make the
pioblem much woise. 0vei iecent yeais, Nembei State aiieais at!year"end
have vaiieu between just ovei 2u% anu neaily Su%.

29. The aiieais of some Nembei State aiieais have been outstanuing foi as long
as ten yeais. Whilst these shoulu be iecoiueu as uoubtful uebts against
which piovisions aie maue in accounting teims, theii existence bauly
unueimines CARIC0N. Although we unueistanu the ieluctance, we favoui a

103

system of penalties. If laigei Nembei States weie to become cavaliei with
theii contiibutions to CARIC0N, the constiuct's suivival woulu quickly be
calleu into question.

Su. The cuiient funuing methou of Nembei State contiibutions has been a long-
stanuing iisk because of such unceitainties. They make it uifficult foi the
Secietaiiat to plan on a iational meuium-teim basis. As a iesult, the
Secietaiiat has on occasions hau no choice but to take iisks with its
oveiuiaft facilities anu its ieseives, which uo not appeai to be piuuent.

S1. When the Finance Bepaitment is stiengtheneu, it shoulu caiiy out foimal
iisk assessments in auuition to taking what measuies it can to manage iisk.
vaiious helpful measuies may be available. We unueistanu, foi example,
that theie is cuiiently no management of the Secietaiiat's foieign exchange
exposuie. As much of its funuing is in Euios but its spenuing is in Bollais, the
iecent uouble uigit fall in the Euio against the 0S Bollai coulu be costly. Risk
in this aiea coulu be alleviateu by some stiaightfoiwaiu financial measuies.
11.6 Improving!Member!State!Financing!Arrangements!
A!longer"term!funding!mechanism!
S2. In oui view, cuiient Nembei State funuing aiiangements have contiibuteu
to the Secietaiiat's oveiall pioblems. A moie secuie funuing system is
iequiieu so that funuing is known anu ieliable foi thiee to foui yeais aheau.

SS. We hau uiscussions with the Caiibbean Bevelopment Bank (CBB) about
these issues. In piinciple, CBB is willing to look at ways of secuiing the
Secietaiiat's funuing ovei a longei peiiou to iemove the high level of
unceitainty ovei its financial foiecasting anu planning.

S4. It is recommended!that these uiscussions be taken foiwaiu with a view to
putting the Secietaiiat's finances on a moie secuie basis.

Reforming!Member!State!Contributions!
SS. A mechanism to give moie ceitainty to Secietaiiat funuing is a sepaiate
issue to the question of iefoiming the system of Nembei State contiibutions.
Although theie aie aiguments foi such iefoim, it is a contentious aiea at the
best of times. It is viitually impossible in the miust of a majoi economic
iecession.

S6. 0ui recommendation woulu be to put the issue off until moie piopitious
ciicumstances. Alteinatively, a gioup coulu be set up to examine the issues
ovei a 12-24 month peiiou.
11.7 Immediate!Financing!Requirements!
Financing!in!a!Crisis!
S7. As the iisks of a fuithei economic iecession oi woise aie significant, theie
shoulu, as alieauy noteu, be a contingent plan to piotect the Secietaiiat in
the event a financing ciisis emeiges. We woulu also recommend that the
Secietaiiat entei into eaily uiscussions with the Nembei States that aie not

104

highly inuebteu anu not uepenuent on touiism foi laige piopoitions of theii
economic activity to pioviue immeuiate assistance in event of a fuithei
seiious ueteiioiation in economic ciicumstances. In the cuiient economic
climate, this suggests Tiiniuau anu Tobago anu Suiiname, with the possible
auuition of uuyana.
!
Financing!the!Secretariats!Restructuring!
S8. It woulu be uesiiable, concuiiently, to iaise significant non-uonoi financing
towaius the capital costs of iestiuctuiing of the Secietaiiat anu the same
Nembei States coulu helpfully leau in the piovision of such. This coulu have
the impoitant auvantage of getting iestiuctuiing unueiway quickly, as well
as senuing a stiong anu positive message to uonois as to Caiicom's intent.
0ui infoimation is that such uiscussions coulu be fiuitful, although they may
involve some hoise-tiauing ovei vaiious CARIC0N issues. This may piove
no bau thing.

105

Appendices!

106

!
Appendix!1:!Listing!of!Findings!and!Recommendations!!
!
Introduction!and!Challenges!
1. Caiioca's pioblems, anu those of the Secietaiiat, have built up ovei many
yeais (Section 1).

2. CARIC0N is essential to the iegion's futuie anu to the piospeiity anu welfaie
of its Nembei States. Alongsiue 0ECS, CARIC0N iemains the only viable
alteinative as a potentially effective iegional constiuct (Section2).

S. Neveitheless, the constiuct is in ciisis. This is paitly because peiceptions of
CARIC0N's failuie to uelivei - the "implementation ueficit" - have continueu
to giow anu paitly because of the seveie iecession (Section 2.2).

4. Theie is incieasing uisillusion because of the laige gap between the
peiceiveu piomises of CARIC0N anu the ieality. Pait of the pioblem is that
both CARIC0N anu Nembei States have consistently oveisolu the potential
benefits of integiation (Section 2.S).

S. CARIC0N's opeiations anu stiuctuie have been weakeneu ovei the yeais to
the extent it is now in a fight foi suivival. The constiuct neeus to change
funuamentally if it is to tuin iounu its ieputation anu go on to piospei.
CARIC0N's uifficulties may become acute anu immeuiate if the inteinational
economic situation ueteiioiates fuithei. Both the iegion anu the Secietaiiat
neeu a contingency plan to guaiu against this seiious iisk (Section 2.4).

6. Theie aie thiee geneial conuitions foi a positive outcome:
I. The committeu suppoit of Nembei States;
II. CARIC0N focusing on the eaily ueliveiy of specific benefits;
III. A cieuible ie-oiganisation anu stiengthening being unueitaken that
focuses on implementation.

0nce the necessaiy plans aie in place to meet these conuitions, we!
recommend a ielaunch of CARIC0N (Section 2.S).

Diagnosis!of!Difficulties!
7. Fiustiations with CARIC0N's piogiess have been giowing foi at least 2u
yeais going back to Time!for!Action!anu eailiei (Section S.1).

8. Significant exogenous constiaints of geogiaphy, size anu complexity aie
iegulaily oveilookeu anu unueiestimateu, both by the iegion anu by the
inteinational community. Ignoiing these binuing constiaints, which aie
laigely insuimountable, unnecessaiily auus to fiustiations (Section S.2).

107

9. Neveitheless the CARIC0N constiuct has become uysfunctional (Section
S.S). Contiibutoiy factois incluue:
! Too many manuates;
! The lack of an oveiaiching stiuctuie binuing CARIC0N institutions;
! Ineffective 0igans;
! Lack of piioiitisation;
! Auministiative weaknesses;
! The ineffectiveness of foimal channels;
! Pioblems at the Nembei State level wheie CARIC0N issues stiuggle to
gain piioiity;
! A weakeneu Secietaiiat.

1u. Pievious iesponses to what is now teimeu the "implementation ueficit" have
tenueu to focus on stiuctuial anu pioceuuial pioposals. These aie amongst
the many means to an enu in management teims anu they have not
succeeueu. 0ui analysis anu expeiience suggests a bioauei baseu
management appioach is iequiieu that focuses uiiectly on the pioblems of
implementation anu how they can be oveicome (Section S.4 anu S.S).

Prioritisation:!The!First!Step!to!CARICOMs!Recovery!!
11. The fiist iequiiement foi CARIC0N's iecoveiy is the piioiitisation of long-
teim goals into specific measuies that can be achieveu within a ielatively
shoit timefiame (Section 4.1). The ieal significance of the Beaus ietieat in
uuyana in Nay 2u11 was that they iecogniseu the neeu to make piioiities.
This is a ciucial bieak with the past if the new position is confiimeu (Section
4.2).

12. It is essential that a Stiategy is now uevelopeu to piioiitise stiictly what
CARIC0N will uo in line with available iesouices anu ovei a time bounu
peiiou. The neeu foi a cleai stiategy focuseu on ueliveiing specific anu
tangible benefits is wiuely-iecogniseu anu has been highlighteu by othei
iepoits being piouuceu concuiiently with this one (Section 4.S).

1S. The uevelopment of a stiategy is also essential foi making savings in the
iesouices uevoteu to CARIC0N without putting its objectives at iisk.
Without a stiategy, it is uifficult to uistinguish between potentially uamaging
cuts anu feasible savings that aie not uestiuctive (Section 4.4).
!
14. We!recommend that the Secietaiiat piepaie a S-yeai Stiategy foi
agieement by Beaus of uoveinment. The Stiategy has to make some haiu
anu painful choices as to what CARIC0N can uo - anu achieve - in S yeais
anu what it cannot uo. It is essential both to uiive the CARIC0N constiuct
anu to enable the iestiuctuiing of the Secietaiiat by giving it a cleai puipose
(Section 4.S).

1S. The Stiategy shoulu be put in place quickly anu be agieeu in the fiist half of
2u12. It shoulu be seen as giving the new Secietaiy ueneial a manuate foi
his teim in office (Section 4.S).

108

16. It is not oui business to specify CARIC0N's Stiategy. We can though offei
some guiuelines. These incluue the neeu to uevelop a vision that is ielevant
to the seconu uecaue of the 21
st
centuiy, measuies to make a iegional
agenua moie mainstieam anu the uesiiability of putting off some CARIC0N
objectives inuefinitely. These shoulu be followeu by a caieful exeicise to
iank iemaining objectives anu to commit to only those that can be iealiseu
within available management iesouices anu funuing. Finally the Stiategy
shoulu auuiess the iestiuctuiing of CARIC0N anu the Secietaiiat. Assuming
this iepoit is accepteu, it can foim the backbone of that (Section 4.6).

Strengthening!the!CARICOM!Construct:!The!Second!Step!to!Recovery!
17. Although CARIC0N's uifficulties will not be oveicome by fuithei stiuctuial
oi legal innovations, its goveinance can be impioveu in vaiious ways
(Section S.2).

18. 0thei than in exceptional ciicumstances, we!recommend!no!further!
widening!of!the!scope!of!CARICOM!in the foieseeable futuie. To the
contiaiy, it shoulu be consoliuateu (Section S.S).

19. In oui ieview of the Secietaiiat latei in the iepoit, we piopose a numbei of
piactical pioposals to tighten the CARIC0N stiuctuie anu make it function in
a moie effective anu uisciplineu mannei. These incluue measuies conceining
both CARIC0N's 0igans anu its institutions (Section S.4).

2u. We uiu not finu sufficient suppoit aiounu the iegion foi setting up a
Peimanent Committee of Ambassauois as a foimal institution of the
CARIC0N Community. At the same time, we see ieuucing the
"implementation ueficit" as a uetaileu management task wheie the piioiity is
foi Secietaiiat officials to woik moie closely with Nembei State officials.
Bowevei, we see meiit in an infoimal committee of Ambassauois pioviuing
suppoit anu auvice both to the Secietaiy ueneial anu to theii inuiviuual
Nembei State goveinments. Bepenuing on how these infoimal
aiiangements woik out, the pioposal foi a moie foimal Peimanent
Committee of Ambassauois coulu be ievisiteu (Section S.S).

21. CARIC0N shoulu become a moie outwaiu looking constiuct. This can paitly
be achieveu by changes in the Beaus of uoveinment Confeience wheie we
recommend that the oiganisation anu puipose of these confeiences be
ievieweu. We envisage that most meetings will become moie focuseu anu
smallei affaiis.

22. At the same time, occasional confeiences shoulu be uesigneu to showcase
the Caiibbean anu oiganiseu on an explicitly outwaiu looking basis. We
recommend!such a confeience being oiganiseu to celebiate CARIC0N's 4u
th

anniveisaiy anu its ielaunch in 2u1S. We also recommend ueveloping a
uialogue with the moveis anu shakeis in the piivate sectoi in the iegion.
Both of these innovations coulu uiaw new finance into CARIC0N (Section
S.6).

109

Diagnosing!the!Secretariats!Current!Difficulties!
2S. The Secietaiiat's pioblems have built up ovei a lengthy peiiou. The
linkages between objectivesuecisions, action anu iesults have bioken
uown. As a iesult pioceuuies anu piocess have, unintentionally, become
moie impoitant than getting iesults anu meeting objectives. An absence of
ieal policymaking anu an oveiieliance on meetings anu piojects aie key
factois in the Secietaiiat losing sight of its ieal puipose (Sections 6.1 anu
6.2).

24. The Secietaiiat is cuiiently too weak to leau an attempt to tuin iounu
CARIC0N's foitunes (Section 6.S). Reasons incluue:
! An oiganisational stiuctuie that uoes not facilitate the Secietaiy
ueneial's leaueiship iole;
! ueneial weaknesses in management aiiangements;
! A lack of mechanisms to encouiage piioiitisation;
! Pivotal gaps in policy making;
! Too much focus on piocess;
! The lack of a iesults-baseu cultuie;
! Weak pioject management;
! Seveie opeiational pioblems.

2S. At the same time, the Secietaiiat's staffing has become weakeneu anu
outmoueu (Section 6.S). Issues incluue:
! 0nfilleu posts at senioi levels;
! Foiceu anu aibitiaiy cost cutting;
! Inappiopiiate mix of skills;
! Too many junioi posts;
! Insufficient new bloou.

Restructuring!the!Secretariat:!The!Third!Step!to!Recovery!
26. We recommend that the iestiuctuiing of the Secietaiiat shoulu be guiueu
by S piinciples (Section 7.2):
i. Bemanus on it neeu to be matcheu by financial anu iesouice
availability;
ii. The Secietaiy ueneial neeus to be given the tools to leau the CARIC0N
Community;
iii. The focus of the Secietaiiat shoulu shift to iegional policy anu to the
implementation of integiation.

27. 0ui key!overall!recommendations foi the Secietaiiat (Section 7.S) aie:
a. Refocusing CARIC0N anu iestiuctuiing the Secietaiiat thiough a
tiansitional Change 0ffice woiking uiiectly to the Secietaiy ueneial;
b. Refocusing the Secietaiiat on ueliveiing a Stiategy foi CARIC0N anu
on ueveloping iegional policies to auu value to what Nembei States
can inuiviuually achieve;
c. Enabling the Secietaiy ueneial's leaueiship iole thiough stiengthening
his 0ffice to focus on his executive iole;

110

u. Putting an emphasis on implementation, wheie the Beputy Secietaiy
ueneial be put in chaige of a new Implementation 0ffice;
e. Appointing a new Chief 0peiations 0fficei (C00) at Beputy Secietaiy
ueneial level to get ciucial back office anu suppoit functions into
shape.

Strengthening!the!Secretary!Generals!Office:!Recommendations!
28. A Change 0ffice shoulu be set up quickly to suppoit the Secietaiy ueneial in
iestiuctuiing the Secietaiiat. We recommend that an expeit in stiategy be
appointeu as soon as possible to the Change 0ffice to piepaie a S-yeai
Stiategy foi CARIC0N. The Change 0ffice shoulu have a coie of full-time
staff plus shoitei specialist inputs. Iueally it shoulu leau the iestiuctuiing of
the Secietaiiat ovei 18 months but the likely neeu foi uonoi funuing
suggests a longei peiiou of S yeais will be iequiieu (Section 8.1).

29. A Stiategy, Regional Policy anu Review Bepaitment shoulu be set up in the
Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice to take foiwaiu the Secietaiiat's ieneweu focus on
stiategy anu iegional policy, to uevelop a goou oveiview of piogiess with
integiation, to take a moie stiategic appioach to obtaining iesouices anu to
ievitalise communications (Section 8.2).

Su. The Chef ue Cabinet's office shoulu be ieoiganiseu as a Piivate 0ffice to give
bettei suppoit both to the Secietaiy ueneial anu to the Chef ue Cabinet
(Section 8.S). Inteinal Auuit neeus to be stiengtheneu anu we recommend!
that the Change 0ffice make pioposals as appiopiiate (Section 8.4). The
oveiall management of the Secietaiiat shoulu be impioveu by stiengthening
the Executive Nanagement Committee (Section 8.S).

Implementation!Office!under!the!Deputy!Secretary!General!
S1. We!recommend!that the Beputy Secietaiy ueneial shoulu be iesponsible
foi a new Implementation 0ffice (Section 9). The 0ffice's majoi objective
shoulu be to implement the CARIC0N stiategy. This shoulu incluue a key
function of cooiuinating the Secietaiiat's activities with the implementation
activities of Nembei States anu CARIC0N institutions, iuentifying wheie
theie aie uelays anu issues, anu focusing on iesolving the uelays anuoi
issues iuentifieu (Section 9.1).

S2. In focusing on impioving the implementation management piocess, the
Implementation 0ffice will neeu to leau iefoims in CARIC0N's cultuie of
opeiation, incluuing moueinising how communications anu confiuentiality
aie manageu (Section 9.2.1).

SS. We!recommend the Implementation 0ffice set up an Implementation
Suppoit uioup woiking uiiectly to the Beputy Secietaiy ueneial anu to an
Implementation Nanagement Committee. The Implementation Suppoit
uioup (Section 9.2.2) shoulu focus on monitoiing piogiess with
implementation, iuentifying bottlenecks anu uelays anu theii causes,
ueveloping iesponses anu co-oiuinating ielevant bouies that shoulu uelivei
the iesponses.

111

S4. Theie shoulu also be a new Pioject Nanagement 0ffice (PN0) maue up of
thiee units, Pioject Auministiation anu Suppoit, Resouice Nanagement anu
the Technical Assistance Suppoit 0nit (Section 9.2.4).

SS. These new aiiangements will be ciucial to ciacking the implementation
conunuium anu to ieconfiguiing the woik of S slimmeu uown Biiectoiates,
namely Foieign Relations, 0TN & Exteinal Tiaue, Tiaue anu Economic
Integiation (TEI), Buman & Social Bevelopment (BSB) anu ueneial Counsel
(Section 9.S).

S6. The laigest uiiectoiates, TEI anu BSB, exemplify how a weakeneu
Secietaiiat has been uiveiteu away fiom iesults anu implementation to
piocess (Section 9.S.1). They shoulu play a moie focuseu iole in futuie
(Section 9.S.2). The changes in the othei Biiectoiates anu the Statistics
Bepaitment (Section 9.S.S - 9.S.6) will be less pionounceu.

The!Operations!Directorate!
S7. The back office suppoit functions in the Secietaiiat aie not fit foi puipose.
Eveiything the Secietaiiat uoes is hamstiung by pooi quality anu unieliable
suppoit seivices (Section 1u.2).

S8. Theie shoulu be a new 0peiations Biiectoiate. We recommend that the
new Chief of 0peiations (C00) be at Beputy Secietaiy level. The peison
appointeu shoulu be a piofessional in the opeiationsback-office fielu. The
C00 is likely to be ieciuiteu fiom a laige seivice opeiation (Section 1u.4).

S9. The 0peiations Biiectoiate shoulu have the following uepaitments:
a. Finance
b. Institutional Accountability
c. BR
u. IT & Communications Seivices
e. Coipoiate Seivices.

4u. We recommend that the iestiuctuiing of these back office functions
incluue:
a. 0peiations being given the authoiity to succeeu with specialist
opeiational staff in key positions (Section 1u.S);
b. Caiiying out uelayeu investments in technology as a mattei of
uigency. A wholesale change anu upgiaue of the Secietaiiat's IT anu
Communications infiastiuctuie, which is cuiiently not fit foi puipose,
is a necessaiy conuition foi the successful iestiuctuiing of the
Secietaiiat. This is a potential game changei foi the Secietaiiat
(Section 1u.7);
c. Intiouucing a new management infoimation system to incluue
peifoimance management as pei the iecent ieview. Theie shoulu be
changes in ieciuitment pioceuuies to encouiage a much wiuei iange
of applicants to the Secietaiiat (Section 1u.6);

112

u. Coipoiate Seivices being subject to a majoi oveihaul by the new C00.
Theie shoulu be substantial staff savings following a full evaluation
by the Change 0ffice (Section 1u.8).

41. We recommend that the Secietaiiat ieciuit a high level Finance Biiectoi
who will neeu to caiiy out a majoi oveihaul of the uepaitment, as well as get
involveu in specific initiatives (Section 1u.S).

42. The Finance Biiectoi shoulu also be iesponsible foi a new Institutional
Accountability Bepaitment, which shoulu take the leau in intiouucing
mouein anu tianspaient iepoiting stanuaius, both foi the Secietaiiat anu
foi CARIC0N institutions. In suppoit of this, we recommend that Beaus of
uoveinment authoiise the Secietaiiat to issue manuatoiy guiuelines to
iegional institutions to biing about genuine accountability (Section 1u.S).

Budget!and!Financial!Issues!
4S. The way the Secietaiiat's financing has been oiganiseu has been misguiueu
anu is a majoi souice of weakness. If CARIC0N is maue fit foi puipose, new
souices of funuing can be attiacteu when it staits ueliveiing iesults, anu is
seen as a ievitaliseu entity confiuent of its futuie. In the meantime, coie
funuing fiom Nembei States has the key iole to play (Section 11.2).

44. The position of the CARIC0N constiuct anu of the Secietaiiat aie so
piecaiious that any significant financial cuts in the shoit-to-meuium teim
woulu be countei-piouuctive - anu possibly fatal. We!therefore!
recommend that no cuts be maue in Nembei State contiibutions unless
woisening economic ciicumstances leave no choice. Significant buuget cuts
at!this!stage woulu make an alieauy uifficult tuin iounu anu iestiuctuiing
exeicise impossible (Section 11.1).

4S. We recommend that Nembei States contiibutions to the Secietaiiat be
maintaineu at cuiient levels until 2u1S. This entails a small inciease in cash
teims that, uepenuing on inflation, may tuin out as a small ueciease in ieal
teims. Such a stanustill buuget will enable a majoi ieallocation in the
Secietaiiat's buuget, as a combination of savings anu ieuuctions allows
ciucial new activities to be unueitaken. These aie the activities that can tuin
iounu CARIC0N's foitunes (Section 11.2).

46. We recommend pio-foima buugets foi coie staff fiom oui assessments anu
specify how these shoulu be allocateu. In essence, the staffing buuget foi the
Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice shoulu uouble as it takes on new stiategic,
planning anu ieview functions. By contiast, opeiational staffing shoulu be
cut by about one thiiu. This will be enableu laigely thiough investment in a
new geneiation of IT, paitly by gieatei efficiency anu specialisation anu
paitly thiough the ieuuceu neeu foi some seivices. The new functions of the
Implementation 0ffice, conceining implementation suppoit anu pioject
management, shoulu uevelop iapiuly to take up ovei one-thiiu of an oveiall
buuget that will only giow mouestly. The savings will be founu fiom existing
Biiectoiates, paitly thiough tiansfeiiing ioles anu ceasing ceitain tasks anu

113

paitly thiough a moie specialiseu focus anu efficiency savings (Sections
11.S).

47. These bioau pio-foima buuget estimates confiim that funuamental change
can be biought about within the cuiient coie staff buuget, though theie will
be some capital costs. Full annual buugets can be ueiiveu fiom the coie staff
buugets anu these can be uevelopeu by the Change 0ffice (Section 11.S anu
11.4).

48. Belays anu aiieais in Nembei State funuing have seiiously unueimineu the
Secietaiiat in iecent yeais anu cuiient funuing methous aie a majoi iisk,
with the continual unceitainty having seiiously weakeneu the Secietaiiat's
ability to meet its objectives (Section 11.S). We!recommend that
mechanisms be investigateu to pioviue the Secietaiiat with bettei secuiity
of funuing (Section 11.6).

49. The Secietaiiat shoulu seek to put in place contingent financing in the event
of a fuithei economic ciisis fiom the less inuebteu Nembei States. It woulu
also be helpful to obtain the capital costs foi iestiuctuiing fiom these
souices. This woulu get iestiuctuiing unueiway quickly anu senu a stiong
signal to the inteinational community about CARIC0N's intent (Section
11.7).

114

!
Appendix!2:!Action!Plan!

1. This is a pieliminaiy anu outline Action Plan.
2. We suggest that it is cooiuinateu by the Executive Nanagement Committee
(ENC) who shoulu assign iesponsibilities foi taking action to specific
officials, as appiopiiate.
S. It will neeu to be ieviseu anu uetaileu once a CARIC0N Stiategy has been
agieeu. The Stiategy shoulu be agieeu at the iegulai Beaus of uoveinment
Confeience in St Lucia in }uly 2u12 anu shoulu incluue the elements of this
Final Repoit that hau eailiei been signeu off anu agieeu.
4. The Action Plan will neeu to be fuithei uetaileu anu ieviseu uuiing the full
Change 0ffice's inception peiiou in late 2u12eaily 2u1S.

Action! Month!
1. Agiee Final Repoit with Pioject Nanagement Committee u
2. Agiee Final Repoit with Nembei States (NS) 1
S. Set up pioject on CARIC0N Stiategy - T0R & Finance 1
4. NS agieement to Change 0ffice & commence aiiangements Buiing 12
S. Appioach NS ie: both contingent anu Change 0ffice financing Buiing 12
6. Reciuit expeits to piepaie CARIC0N Stiategy 2
7. Commence ieview anu upuate of IT neeus & iuentify financing Buiing 24
8. Commence hiiing uigently iequiieu key staff Buiing 24
9. Initial steps to stiengthen Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice 1 to S
1u. Piesent Final Repoit to 1
st
!Heads!of!Government!(HOG)!2012 Naich 2u12
11. 0utline Stiategy to 1
st
!Heads!of!Government!2012 Naich 2u12
12. Agiee T0R anu financing (inteiim anu full) foi Change 0ffice S to 6
1S. Agiee financing IT iequiiements S to 6
14. Bevelopment of CARIC0N Stiategy S to 6
1S. Set up skeletoninteiim Change 0ffice (C0) Buiing 46
16. Nain piogiamme of stiengthening Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice 46 to 24
17. Initial buuget ieview S6 to 9
18. Initial steps to stiengthen CARIC0N constiuct S6 to 1S
19. Initial steps to set up Implementation 0ffice S6 to 9
2u. Piesent full Stiategy to 2
nd
!Heads!of!Government!2012 }uly 2u12
21. Inteiim Action Plan on basis of agieeu Stiategy Buiing 78
22. Commence implementation of agieeu Stiategy Buiing 78
2S. Commence effoits to biing about eaily stiategic "wins" Buiing 78
24. Tenuei foi IT equipment anu installation 7 to 9
2S. Tenueiieciuitment foi full Change 0ffice 7 to 9
26. Initial effoits to set up 0peiations Biiectoiate 9 to 1S
27. Commencement of full Change 0ffice Buiing 1u12
28. Inceptionieviewaction plan peiiou of full Change 0ffice 1u12 to 1S
29. Nain innovations in Implementation 0ffice 1u12 to 24

115

Su. IT upgiauing piogiamme 1u12 to 24
S1. Staff ieview, evaluation anu plan, incluuing ioles etc 1u12 to 18
S2. Nain ieciuitment piogiamme anu implementation staff plan 1S to Su
SS. Piesent anu agiee Change 0ffice piogiamme at 1
st
!HOG!2013 Naich 2u1S
S4. Nain effoits to stiengthen CARIC0N constiuct 16 to S6
SS. Nain change piogiamme in 0peiations Biiectoiate 16 to S6
S6. Nain buuget ieview 17 to 21
S7. Inteinational Confeience to celebiate CARIC0N's 4u
th

anniveisaiy
2
nu
half 2u1S
S8. Review, uevelop & negotiate financing aiiangements 22 to Su
S9. Review anu aujust new oiganisational & stiuctuial aiiangements 24 to S6
4u. Refine infoimation management systems 24 to S6
41. Refineieuevelop monitoiing & evaluation anu piogiess chasing 24 to S6
42. Review, auuit anu aujustment of Stiategy foi 2
nd
!HOG!2014 }uly 2u14

!

116

!
Appendix!3:!Approaches!to!Regional!Governance!

Approaches to Regional Governance in the Caribbean
Community

By Duke E.E.Pollard

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The prevailing structure of governance in the Caribbean Community
159
,
in the present submission, appears to be a function of historical
circumstance, constitutional legitimacy, political indecision and a
juridically misconceived concept of sovereignty, which is largely
irrelevant in the current political context. The collapse of the West
Indian Federation in 1962 undoubtedly harboured deleterious
consequences for regional governance in the determination of the
distraught political entities emerging from that politically defining
catastrophe. But, predictably, the most persistent negative fall out from
this unfortunate development was probably psychological, indelibly
implanting in the psyche of the ordinary man and critical decision-
makers alike, a visceral antipathy for regionally determined systems of
governance, and a correspondingly reactive affinity for economic
nationalism as the preferred option for structured economic
development. This psychological disposition may be attributed to what
has been pertinently described as the false dichotomy between
sovereignty and supranationality
160
which, overtly or by ineluctable
inference, has dogged the political debates on regional governance
and, for a considerable period, provided a persistent and intractable
impediment to functional institutional coherence and regional economic
integration. In the present submission this false dichotomy could more
appropriately be characterised as a juridically misconceived concept of

159
See the extremely informative paper prepared by the CARICOM Secretariat entitled The
Governance System in CARICOM dated 16 February 2010.
160
See P.I. Gomes, CARICOM Integration: The Need for Institutional Transformation, in K.
Hall & M. Chuck-A-Sang, CARICOM Policy Options for International Engagement, Ian Randle
Publishers, Kingston, 2010, p. 47.

117

sovereignty, to the extent that, stricto juris, sovereignty is a function of
relevant developments in international law.
161

1.2 For approximately three decades following the collapse of the
Federation, there was no serious in-depth discourse by critical
decision-makers on regional governance, nor was there any credible
attempt to put in place generally acceptable institutional arrangements
for meaningful and effective regional governance. The CARIFTA
experiment (1967) was not comprehensive nor viable enough to
constitute a sustainable attempt at regional governance, and the
original Treaty of Chaguaramas (1973) was so circumscribed by
institutional imperatives expressive of political concessions to national
sovereignty, in itself a juridical construct little understood and
inadequately appreciated, that positive, innovative initiatives in the area
of regional governance were unwittingly compromised.
162
Where
juridically misconceived sovereignty reigned supreme, legally
enforceable regional decisions were allowed to be ignored with
impunity as sanctions were regarded as both inappropriate and
disgustingly intrusive, and obligations as dispensable juridical irritants,
so much so that the West Indian Commission (WIC) in its seminal
report, Time for Action, was constrained to conclude that
implementation was the Achilles heel of the regional economic
integration movement. But, in the present submission, if
implementation was deemed to be the Achilles heel of the regional
economic integration movement, dualism, as a prophylactic
constitutional legacy from the British Crown, was the juridical missile
that found its mark. And herein is to be found, probably, the most
determinative contribution of the implementation deficit operating to
plague the regional integration enterprise.

1.3. The negative impact of dualism as a constitutional doctrine on the
enhancement of regional governance may be readily inferred from the
following dictum of Lord Hoffman in John Junior Higgs v Minister of
National Security and Others:

In the law of England and The Bahamas (whose Constitution is
representative of those in the Caribbean Community), the right
to enter into treaties is one of the surviving prerogative powers
of the Crown the Crown may impose obligations in
international law upon the State without any participation on the

161
See D.E.E.Pollard, The Caribbean Court of Justice: Closing the Circle of Independence,
The Caribbean Law Publishing Co Ltd, Kingston, 2004, p.171.
162
See D.E.E.Pollard, The CARICOM System: Legal Instruments, The Caribbean Law
Publishing Co Ltd, 2003, pp.185-223.

118

part of the democratically elected organs of Government. But
the corollary of this unrestricted treaty-making power is that
treaties form no part of the domestic law unless enacted by the
legislature The rule that treaties cannot alter the law of
the land is but one facet of the more general principle that
the Crown cannot change the law by the exercise of its
powers under the prerogative. This was the great principle
which was settled by the Civil War and the Glorious Revolution
in the seventeenth century.
163

1.4. And, to make assurance doubly sure, Article 240(1) of the Revised
Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC) pointedly provides as follows:

Decisions of competent Organs taken under this Treaty shall be
subject to the relevant constitutional procedures of the Member
States before creating legally binding rights and obligations for
nationals of such States.

This provision is, incontrovertibly, a clear statement of the dualist
principle. Indeed, this provision encapsulates the common law principle
consistently applied by the judges of Commonwealth States.
164

Dualism as applied in the Commonwealth Caribbean context has had
both positive and negative attributes. Postulated in other terms, if
dualism as a prophylactic constitutional principle has operated
positively to safeguard the rights of the ordinary citizen from the
political excesses of executive indiscretion, the negative fall-out has
been a culture of unimplemented decisions, which has impeded the
structured development of the regional economic integration
movement.
165
However, this so-called implementation deficit is not
peculiar to dualist states since the monist states of the European Union
also suffer from an implementation deficit of directives of the European
Commission. In one submission:

unimplemented directives remain a serious threat to the
development of common European policies and thus to the
strengthening of the integration process. A key problem seems
to be that despite its massive monitoring body, the Commission,

163
[2002] 2 A.C. 228.
164
See in Britain, The Parlement Belge (1877) 4PD 129, J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v
Department of Trade and Industry (1990) 2 AC; in Trinidad and Tobago, Ismay Holder v
Council of Legal Education, HCA No. 732 of 1997; in the Bahamas, Higgs v Minister of
National Security (2002) 2 AC 228; in Canada, AG of Canada v AG of Ontario (1977) AC 326;
Ahani v AG of Canada [2002] 1 S.C.R 72.
165
See D.E.E. Pollard, Unincorporated Treaties and Small States, Commonwealth Law
Bulletin, Vol. 33 No. 3 September 2007, pp. 389-421.

119

the EU lacks an effective control system and appropriate
enforcement strategies to control member states. The fact that
almost all member states have some areas in which their legal
implementation rates fall far below the average raises the
question of what happens during the final implementation
process, i.e., the actual administrative application of EU laws.
This could, in a worst case scenario, lead to a situation in which
the EU produces political decisions with no real impact on every
day life in the member states.
166

1.5. Constrained by the original Treaty of Chaguaramas (1973) which, for
all practical purposes, was a little more than an optical illusion in terms
of positive enforceable rights and legally binding obligations, the West
Indian Commission (WIC) in 1992 was persuaded to recommend the
revision of this Instrument if the regional economic integration
movement was to advance in the approaching millennium. The West
Indian Commission also recommended new structures of regional
governance including a Charter of Civil Society, an Assembly of
Commonwealth Caribbean Parliamentarians, a CARICOM Commission
and a Caribbean Supreme Court with an appellate jurisdiction in
substitution for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) and
an original jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Revised Treaty of
Chaguaramas.

1.6. Competent decision-makers did endorse, in part, the recommendations
of the WIC on the revision of the original Treaty of Chaguaramas, the
adoption of the Charter of Civil Society and the establishment of a
Caribbean Supreme Court of last resort, whose designation was
changed to the Caribbean Court of Justice. However, the flagship
recommendation of the WIC for the establishment of a CARICOM
Commission did not commend itself to all the Heads of Government
and, allegedly, senior officials of the CARICOM Secretariat were not
enamoured about the prospect of a CARICOM Commission to displace
them in the deliberations of critical decision-makers. In its place, the
Heads of Government with the unqualified support of the CARICOM
Secretariat settled for a Bureau of Conference to facilitate
implementation of decisions of the Community and to initiate proposals.
Conference was also persuaded to establish a quasi-Cabinet and to
allocate regional responsibilities among themselves. Predictably, there
were no institutional arrangements to underpin this initiative and the
jury is still out regarding a definitive determination about its failure or

166
R. Lampinen and P. Uusikyla, Implementation Deficit- Why member States do not Comply
with EU Directives, Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 21. No3, 1998 pp. 231- 249.

120

success. And, in the absence of viable institutional arrangements in
this behalf, the so-called implementation deficit continued to be a
problem.

1.7. The decision of the Heads of Government at Grand Anse (1989) to
establish the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) was
designed to deepen the regional economic integration effort in terms of
a measured institutional response to globalization and other tectonic
political changes in the international community. The basic elements of
the CSME were to be the free movement of goods and services; the
free movement of capital and skilled labour; the right of establishment;
a common external tariff; a common trade policy; and a competition
policy. These were to be complemented by a common currency,
convergent economic, monetary and fiscal policies, the harmonisation
of relevant laws as well as a credible disputes settlement regime.

1.8. The main components of the Caribbean Community were a
Conference of Heads of Government as the principal policy-making
Organ, assisted by several Councils. The Community Council, which
as the second highest Organ of the Community, was charged with
responsibility, subject to the directions of Conference, for the
development of Community strategic planning and coordination in the
areas of economic integration, functional cooperation and external
relations. The Community Council also had responsibility for
promoting and monitoring the implementation of Community decisions
in the Member States.
167
Probably the Organ with the most
burdensome responsibilities is the Council for Trade and Economic
Development (COTED), which brought together as occasion
demanded Ministers responsible for Agriculture, Industry and Tourism,
Trade and Transportation. The Council for Human and Social
Development (COHSOD) is largely responsible for support measures
in the areas of the free movement of persons, establishment of
accreditation arrangements, access to social security benefits,
harmonisation of labour laws and the development of human
resources. The Council for Finance and Planning has responsibility for
macro-economic convergence in the Community, coordinating the
movement of capital and the provision of financial services,
coordination of fiscal policies, interest and exchange rate policies and
the establishment of a common currency. The Council for Foreign and
Community Relations (COFCOR) is responsible for relations between
the Community and international organizations and third states.
Recently, the Council for National Security and Law Enforcement

167
See Article 13 (3) of the Revised Treaty.

121

(CONSLE) was added to the body of Organs. In addition, there are
three bodies whose functions may easily be discerned from their
nomenclature the Legal Affairs Committee, the Committee of Central
Bank Governors and the Budget Committee.

1.9. Other important bodies of regional governance are the Caribbean
Court of Justice (CCJ), the CARICOM Regional Development Fund,
the Caribbean Community Accreditation Agency, the Competition
Commission and the CARICOM Regional Organisation for Standards
and Quality (CROSQ). The Community is assisted in its work by
several Institutions
168
and Associate Institutions, which are not integral
to regional governance but discharge responsibilities similar to those
performed by the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations.
169

1.10. The method of reaching decisions by the Organs of the Community
would tend to support the characterisation of the regional body as an
association of sovereign states.
170
The Conference takes decisions on
substantive issues by qualified unanimity inasmuch as decisions
though required to be taken by an affirmative vote of all the members,
abstentions in an amount of one-quarter of the membership of
Conference do not operate to impair the validity of decisions.
171
The
Councils take decisions by an affirmative vote of three-quarters of their
membership.
172
Where, however, a vote is being taken in a Council on
an issue considered of critical importance to the well-being of a
Member State, such a State may request the decision to be reached by
unanimity provided that two-thirds of the membership agrees.
173
In the
practice of the Community, however, voting in organs is by consensus.

1.11. Article 26 of the constituent instrument of CARICOM provides for a
system of consultations designed to ensure that determinations of
Organs and Bodies of the Community were adequately and
appropriately informed by inputs from competent authorities in order to
facilitate the implementation process, which the WIC considered to be
the Achilles heel of the integration process. Starved as the States of
CARICOM are of financial resources, however, it is extremely doubtful
whether consultations undertaken in this context are as comprehensive
and wide-ranging as those conducted by the European Commission
prior to making important determinations such as regulations or

168
Some of these institutions have been identified in Articles 21 and 22 of the Revised Treaty.
169
See the judgment of the CCJ in Doreen Johnson v CARICAD [2009] CCJ 3 OJ.
170
See D.E.E. Pollard, The Caribbean Court of Justice; Closing the Circle of Independence,
The Caribbean Law Publishing co. Ltd, Kingston, 2004, pp 90-91.
171
See Article 28 (1) (2) of the RTC.
172
173

122

directives. Further, in the absence of a determination similar to that of
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that certain determinations of
European Community Organs have direct effect on the satisfaction of
specified conditions
174
, the Organs of CARICOM also have to
overcome the constitutional constraints identified in the provisions of
Article 240(1) of the RTC mentioned at paragraph 1.4 above.

1.12. With the exception of the recommendation of the Conferences Sub-
Committee on Governance to establish a Permanent Committee of
Ambassadors whose principal focus would be the enhancement of the
integration process through the facilitation of effective consultations
prior to proposals for decisions being put on the table; the
implementation of decisions; and the oversight of the functioning of the
Secretariats, all the principal proposals on regional governance
appeared to focus on according a supranational or near supranational
competence to regional organs. This is true of the CARICOM
Commission proposed by the West Indian Commission, the Montego
Bay Declaration (2003) on Mature Regionalism, the Report of the
Prime Ministerial Expert Group on Governance (PMEGG) and the
Report of the Working Group (TWG). And the so-called
implementation deficit has been generally perceived to issue from
failure to accord regional organs this supranational competence.

1.13. However, a careful examination of relevant developments does appear
to confirm that the Community Council, the second highest decision-
making organ of the Community, stricto juris, possesses the
competence to make regional decisions implementable in national
jurisdictions of CARICOM. Thus, Article 13 of the Revised Treaty
accords the Community Council, the right inter alia to:

- mobilise and allocate resources for the implementation of
Community plans and programmes;
- establish a system of regional and national consultations
to enhance the decision-making and implementation
processes of the Community;
- promote, enhance, monitor and evaluate regional and
national implementation processes and, to this end,
establish a regional technical assistance service;
- on the instructions of Conference, issue directives to
Organs of the Community and the Secretariat to ensure
timely implementation of the Community decisions, and

174
See Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Balastingen [1963]
ECR 1.

123

- to receive and consider allegations of breaches of
obligations arising under the Treaty.

1.14. But apart from the establishment of the Technical Assistance Services
Unit (TASU), which has apparently, so far given excellent service to
Member States, especially the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), it is
not known that the Community Council has employed its power to
enhance the implementation process in Member States. For example,
there is no good reason why Member States were not required to
establish Regional Integration Implementation Units a decade ago.
Nor is there any good reason why Assistant Secretaries General were
not mandated to promote and monitor Community decisions in terms of
implementation and to report to the Community Council. Similarly,
there is no reason why the Community Council has not put in place the
institutional arrangements for regional and national consultations with
the assistance of the Secretary General and in collaboration with the
competent authorities of Member States. The foregoing are all
initiatives authorised by the Revised Treaty and for which a basis in the
municipal law of Member States would be provided when the Revised
Treaty is incorporated into local law. And all the Member States have
enacted legislation to incorporate the Revised Treaty.

1.15. It is also tempting to attribute the implementation deficit to the lack of
financial resources of the economically unviable political entities of
CARICOM. But, here again, competent authorities were careful to
provide in Article 27 (5) of the Revised Treaty as follows:

Prior to taking decisions on any issue falling to be determined
by Community Organs, the Secretariat shall bring to the
attention of the meeting the financial implications of such
decisions and any other matters which may be relevant.

The substance of this provision is replicated in the relevant rules of
many international organisations. The purpose of the provision is two-
fold. Firstly, it is designed to remind competent-decision makers that
power and responsibility are indispensible correlates, and that where
one exercises power one must assume the correlative responsibility for
its consequences. Secondly, it is intended to protect international
bureaucrats from the charge of diffidence where unimplementable
decisions are made. However, it appears that despite invocation of this
provision by the Secretariat at opportune times, competent decision-
makers, nevertheless, press ahead with their determinations and

124

mandate the Secretariat to mobilise resources for the effectuation of
relevant determinations.
1.16. Before terminating discussions on the implementation of decisions of
competent CARICOM organs, it is important to draw a distinction
between implementation and transposition of regional determinations
into national legislation. Although the transposition of regional
determinations into national legislation is a relatively easy task for
jurisdictions possessing relevant capabilities, it is important to bear in
mind that most CARICOM jurisdictions are economically effete and
lacking the capabilities to transpose regional decisions in a timely
manner. And herein more often than not is to be found the genesis of
the so-called implementation deficit. But even after transposition of
regional decisions competent official have the unenviable task of
persuading administrations and competent officials of securing
compliance with the legislation and the success or failure of this
endeavour normally depends on the attitude and influence of
stakeholders liable to benefit or be adversely affected by the legislation
as well as political perceptions of its public acceptability. Social
attitudes and reactions to policy encapsulated in one or another
legislative enactment are important determinants of successful
implementation and constitute an intractable and variable input into the
implementation deficit syndrome.

And herein lies the gravamen of the issue concerning the
implementation deficit in CARICOM and the proposals of Conference
to reach a credible, acceptable solution on the problem of regional
governance.

1.17. Inherent in the recommendation of the West Indian Commission for
the establishment of a CARICOM Commission is what one
commentator has been tempted to describe as the false dichotomy
between sovereignty and supranationality
175
and which was juridically
buttressed by the constitutional doctrine of dualism. The CARICOM
Commission as an executive institution of the Community was intended
to be the driving force behind the implementation of regional decisions.
The Commission would be authorized to prepare and issue
instruments of implementation which were, in fact, draft legislation to
be issued by Ministers responsible for CARICOM Affairs in the form of
regulations made pursuant to umbrella CARICOM Community Acts to
be enacted by the legislatures of CARICOM States. In this way, the
Commission would, in effect, be determining national legislation but, in
form, such legislation would be issued by the CARICOM Ministers

175
Op. cit. at. f.n.2.

125

thereby circumventing the intractable issues of dualism and
supranationality while formally complying with the requirements of the
doctrine of sovereignty as understood by political scientists.

1.18. The employment of this procedure accords considerable credence to
the perception that sovereignty as an international law doctrine, stricto
juris, was not understood. In this context, it will be apposite to recall
that as an international law doctrine, sovereignty exemplifies that
corpus of rights, powers and privileges which international law allows a
State to exercise in relation to a determinable area of the globe subject
to compliance with such obligations which are correlative thereto.
176
In
the submission of Ian Brownlie, sovereignty denotes the legal
competence, which a state enjoys in respect of its territory.
177
In effect,
sovereignty is a determinable, dynamic magnitude amenable to
modification with relevant developments in international law.
Consistently with this view, the World Court has determined that the
acceptance by a State of restrictions on the exercise of its sovereignty
in a treaty is in itself an affirmation of sovereignty.
178
Postulated in
other terms, the essence of sovereignty, in one submission, is the
faculty to compromise it,
179
even though limitations on sovereignty are
not lightly to be presumed.
180
Viewed from this perspective, the
voluntary surrender by a Member State in a treaty of legislative powers
in one or another area of national activity to the central Organs of
CARICOM is in itself an affirmation of sovereignty and not a diminution
of sovereignty. So much for the false dichotomy between sovereignty
and supranationality which has so far effectively operated to frustrate
the establishment of viable institutional arrangements for regional
governance.

2. CARRYING THE PROCESS FORWARD

2.1. Immediately following the consultations with civil society on Options for
Governance to Deepen the Integration Process in Port-of-Spain,
Trinidad and Tobago, held on 13 February 2003, the Heads of
Government convened their Fourteenth Inter-Sessional Meeting where
the Prime Ministerial Expert Group (PMEGG) under the distinguished
chairmanship of Sir Shridath Ramphal was established. Based on the

176
See D.E.E. Pollard, The Caribbean Court of Justice: Closing the Circle of Independence,
Ian Randle Law Publishing Co., Jamaica, 2004, p. 171; also, I.A. Shearer, Starkes
International Law, 11
th
ed. Butterworths, London, 1994, p. 91.
177
Principles of Public International Law, 7
th
Ed. OUP, 2008 p.119.
178
See f.n. 26 infra.
179
See D.E.E. Pollard, op. cit. p. 173.
180
See The Lotus Case PCIJ Reps Series A No.10.

126

initial Report of the PMEGG, the Heads of Government at their Twenty-
Fourth Meeting in Montego Bay, Jamaica, reached the following
conclusions in principle in the context of Options for Governance of the
Community:

- reaffirmation of the status of CARICOM as a community of
sovereign States;
- development of a system of mature regionalism;
- establishment of a CARICOM Commission or other executive
mechanism to facilitate deepening of regional integration;
- adoption of the principle of automatic resource transfers for the
financing of Community Institutions;
- reform of the CARICOM Secretariat;
- recognition of the principle of variable geometry;
- development of processes for strengthening the Assembly of
Caribbean Community Parliamentarians.
181

2.2. In its Report entitled Regional Integration: Carrying the Process
Forward (whose Sub-title is Report on the Establishment of a
CARICOM Commission/Other Executive Mechanism), the PMEGG
elaborated on the doctrine of mature regionalism which was expressed
to be the most fundamental decision of the Montego Bay
Summit. This doctrine essentially advocated the development of a
system in which critical policy decisions of the Community taken by
the Heads of Government, or by other Organs of the Community, will
have the force of law throughout the Region, as a result of the
operation of domestic legislation and the Treaty of Chaguaramas,
appropriately revised, for example, Article 240(1), and the authority of
the Caribbean Court of Justice in its original jurisdiction taking into
account the constitutional provisions of Member States. This doctrine
of mature regionalism was based on the initial report of the PMEGG,
which perceived a need for a regime of Community law issuing from
competent Organs of the Community but deriving their validity in
municipal systems from the national laws of Member States.

2.3. This system of Community law as enunciated appeared to be a
significantly modified version of that advocated by the West Indian
Commission in its celebrated Report, Time for Action. Under this
system, the Commission would be competent to prepare so-called draft
instruments of implementation to be approved by the Heads of
Government or other competent regional body. These instruments

181
See Annex 2 of the Summary of Recommendations and Conclusions of the Twenty-Fourth
Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government, Montego Bay, Jamaica, 2-5 July 2003.

127

would be declaratory of rights and duties arising under the Decision
whose statutory effect would be derived from national CARICOM Acts
to be enacted by Member States pursuant to relevant provisions of the
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas appropriately amended. Compare in
this context the provisions of Section 2(1) of the European
Communities Act (1972) enacted by Britain in order to confer legal
validity on various determinations of executive law-making organs in
the European Community.
182

2.4. The Report continued: As regards enforceability, the West Indian
Commission envisaged that the CARICOM Supreme Court (now the
Caribbean Court of Justice exercising its original jurisdiction) would
have the competence to issue an Order of Implementation in
appropriate cases involving the upholding of rights and duties under
Community Law.
183
In this context, the PMEGG was anxious to
reaffirm that Community law will rest not on a pillar of supranationality
but on one of national sovereignty, albeit sovereignty exercised
collectively. And, here again, it would be apposite to be reminded of
the false dichotomy regarding sovereignty and supranationality. From
the very nature of sovereignty as an international law doctrine the
conclusion of a treaty conferring legislative competence on one or
another treaty body is not a compromise of national sovereignty but the
reaffirmation of such sovereignty
184
bearing in mind, as stated above,
that the essence of sovereignty is the faculty to compromise it.

2.5. In addressing the status and functions of the CARICOM Commission
the PMEGG recalled the decision in principle of the Heads of
Government reached at their Twenty-Fourth Meeting in Montego Bay,
Jamaica, to the effect that:

(a) the Commissions function will be to exercise full-time
executive responsibility for implementation of Community

182
The provisions of section 2 (1) of the European Communities Act (1972) read as follows:
All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or
arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to time
provided for or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are without further
enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognized and
available in law and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly and the expression
enforceable Community right and similar expressions shall be read as referring to one to
which this subsection applies.
183
See in this context the Order of the Caribbean Court of Justice in TCL v The Co-operative
Republic of Guyana [2009] CCJ 6 (OJ).
184
See the Wimbledom Case where the World Court stated: No doubt any Convention
creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction on the exercise of the sovereign rights of
the State in the sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain way. But the right of
entering into international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty., PCIJ, Reps.
Series A Vol. 1.

128

decisions in specified areas, as well as to initiate
proposals for Community action in any such areas;

(b) the functions of the Commission/Executive Mechanism
will relate to the CARICOM Single Market and Economy
and such other areas of the integration process as the
Conference of Heads of Government may from time to
time determine;

(c) in the exercise of its responsibilities, the
Commission/Executive Mechanism will be accountable to
the Conference of Heads of Government and will be
responsive to the authority of the other Organs of the
Community within their areas of competence.
185

2.6. In its Report, the PMEGG emphasized that the time had come for the
executive responsibilities for core aspects of regional integration to be
exercised by the CARICOM Commission in order to carry the process
forward. It recognized the agreement in principle reached by the
Heads of Government in Montego Bay, Jamaica, 2-5 July 2003, to
establish such a Commission or similar Executive Mechanism. It
recommended that the Bureau and portfolio arrangements established
by the Conference should continue alongside the CARICOM
Commission, despite some areas of overlap in their functions. The
Commission was to comprise a President and five Commissioners
including the Secretary-General. The PMEGG recommended that the
Commission should be accountable to the Heads of Government and
responsive to the authority of other Organs of the Community within
their areas of competence. Predictably, however, political indecision
again stepped in to rue the day!

3. THE WORKING GROUPS REPORT

3.1. Given the importance of the recommendations set out in the PMEGG
Report and based on their consideration thereof at their Sixteenth Inter-
Sessional Meeting in the Republic of Suriname from 16 to 17 February
2005, the Heads of Government at their Seventeenth Inter-Sessional
Meeting held in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, from 9 to 10
February 2006 appointed a Technical Working Group (TWG) and
tasked it with examining the PMEGG Report with a view to suggesting

185
See Regional Integration: Carrying the Process Forward, CARICOM Secretariat,
Georgetown, pp. 12-13.

129

the most feasible options for implementing the recommendations
therein. At the time of this writing, the options suggested for
implementation remain to be determined and executed.

3.2. On careful analysis of the Report of the TWG, it does not appear that
the legal implications of some of the PMEGGs recommendations were
fully appreciated. As concerns the perceived status of CARICOM as a
Community of Sovereign States, it is submitted that this
characterization of CARICOM is at best juridically misconceived and at
worst exhibits attributes of a juridical oxymoron. The term community
in international law must be construed to signify considerably more
than an intergovernmental arrangement among a group of States in
which certain attributes of sovereignty have been surrendered to the
central organs of the collectivity. The European Union appears to be
an excellent case in point.

3.3. Consider in this context the reasoning behind the decision of the
European Court of Justice in Costa v ENEL: By contrast with ordinary
international treaties, the EEC has created its own legal system which
became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and
which their courts are bound to apply. By creating a Community of
unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its
own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international
plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of
sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community,
the Member States have limited their sovereign rights and have thus
created a body of law which binds both nationals and themselves It
follows from all these observations that the law stemming from the
Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its special
and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions,
however framed, without being deprived of the character of Community
law and without the legal basis of the Community being called into
question
186

3.4. In the present submission, it appears more semantically appropriate to
designate CARICOM as an Association of Sovereign States.
187

Further, in discussing the principle of subsidiarity, the TWG did not
indicate how the application of this principle in attenuation of the
imperatives of sovereignty, stricto sensu, would impact positively on
the implementation deficit which plagues the regional integration
movement and is, perhaps, the most intractable mischief sought to be

186
No. 6/64, 1964 CMLR 425.
187
See D.E.E. Pollard, op. cit. at footnote 6, pp. 215-216.

130

suppressed in the current search for a generally acceptable vehicle of
regional governance.

3.5. However, the most troubling recommendation of the TWG Report
appears in paragraph 15.3 which advocates the passing of a single
CARICOM Act by the Parliament of Member States which will permit
the reception of Community law. In the present submission, if what is
contemplated here is a legislative measure similar to the European
Communities Act (1972) enacted by Britain in order to give all
determinations of Community Organs, current and future, the force of
law in the entire European region, this proposal appears to be
misconceived. CARICOM States, unlike Britain, have written
Constitutions expressed therein to be the supreme law and which have
allocated the legislative power to Parliament.
188
Consider in this
context the judgment of Lord Diplock in the famous case of Moses
Hinds v The Queen.
189
And it is inconceivable that Parliament is
empowered to delegate that competence to an external entity like
CARICOM without an appropriate amendment of the Constitution. The
position is entirely different in Britain, which at the material time was
governed by the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy
190
, as distinct
from the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, which obtains in the
Commonwealth Caribbean. What appears to be juridically feasible was
the procedure envisaged by the WIC in its celebrated report where the
CARICOM States would each enact an umbrella CARICOM Act and
appoint a Minister of CARICOM Affairs who would re-enact, as
occasion requires, in the guise of regulations, the instruments of
implementation issuing from the CARICOM Commission.
Furthermore, in paragraph 15.3.2, the TWG proposed an expansion of
the process of regional decision-making but omits identifying the
institutional arrangements for this system of continuous collaboration
between the Cabinets of Member States, the ministerial Organs of the
Community and the Commission. A similar observation may be made
about the recommendation at paragraph 15.4.3 where it is
recommended that the Commission maintain formal relationships with
national Cabinets, relevant Ministries, Community Organs, Heads of
Government (including the Conference, the Prime Ministerial Bureau,

188
See for example Article 8 of the Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana; Article
2 of the Constitution of Antigua & Barbuda; Article 117 of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Dominica; Article 106 of the constitution of Grenada; Article 2 of the
Constitution of the Federation of St Kitts & Nevis; Article 120 of the Constitution of Saint Lucia
and Article 101 of the Constitution of St Vincent & The Grenadines.
189
(1977) AC 195.
190
Since Britains entry to the European Union, doubts have been expressed about the
continued relevance of the doctrine of Parliamentary Supremacy.

131

the Quasi-Cabinet) and the Assembly of Caribbean Community
Parliamentarians.

3.6. Equally problematic would be the operationalisation of the
recommendation that the Commission should be provided with
sufficient legislative and institutional authority to ensure enforcement of
regional decisions through provisions in the Revised Treaty, the
delegated authority of the Heads of Government, and by virtue of
Community law. The TWG has explained how this recommendation is
to be implemented through the competence of the Commission as a
Community body to initiate proceeding s in the Caribbean Court of
Justice pursuant to Article 211 (1) (b) of the R.T.C. But what the TWG
omitted to explain is the manner in which the Commission is to be
invested with legislative authority and what are the implications of this
in terms of establishing adequate drafting capabilities to produce the
plethora of legislation issuing from the Commission to be implemented
in national jurisdictions! The TWG endorses the recommendation of
the PMEGG on the financing of Community institutions of integration
through automatic transfers of resources derived from customs duties
and enlargement of the body and competence of the Caribbean
Commonwealth Assembly of Parliamentarians. Finally, the TWG
appears to have endorsed the PMEGGs recommendations on variable
geometry, a concept encapsulated in Article 27.4 of the Revised Treaty
but apparently not understood by Member States.

4. THE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (EPA)

4.1. The conclusion in 2001 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas
Establishing the Caribbean Community including the CARICOM Single
Market and Economy (RTC) climaxed a decade of consultations and
negotiations among the Member States of CARICOM. Stricto sensu,
the RTC did no more than establish the legal parameters of the
CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME). In effect, the
establishment of the CSME as a full blown functioning international
institution is more than an historical event; it is designed to be a
process of which the conclusion of the RTC is merely the
commencement. Competent decision-makers of the Caribbean
Community are expected to put in place appropriate and effective
institutional arrangements for regional governance to accelerate the
establishment of the CSME, an accomplishment they have signally
failed to achieve up to the time of this writing.

132

4.2. Indeed, it should be a matter of grave regional concern that having
announced the partial establishment of a regional common market in
2006, competent decision-makers have committed the sub-region, in
collaboration with the Dominican Republic, to the EPA which harbours
plausible prospects of out-performing and superseding the CSME,
given its broader economic coverage and probably more effective
monitoring, implementing, sanctioning and institutional
arrangements.
191

4.3. Given its composition, structure and objectives, the EPA must be
perceived as an important dimension of regional governance in view of
its considerably wider coverage in terms of economic relations among
a larger group of participants and the principles established for the
guidance of competent decision-makers in the implementation of the
EPA. It is not without considerable significance, not to mention an
uncomfortable measure of regional concern that the coverage of the
EPA comprehends issues, identified in the built-in agenda of the RTC
(Article 239) for future determination, to wit, e-commerce; government
procurement; and free circulation of goods. Of even greater
significance is the legally binding time bound arrangements for the
achievement of specified objectives, unlike the RTC, credible
institutional arrangements for monitoring the implementation of the
EPA and an apparently effective sanctioning process of prescription.

4.4. The principal decision-making Organ is the Joint CARIFORUM-EC
Council (JC). In respect of matters for which the CARIFORUM States
agree to act collectively, the JC shall adopt decisions and
recommendations by mutual agreement and in respect of matters
which CARIFORUM States have not agreed to act collectively,
determinations of the JC will be by unanimity. The JC is tasked with
responsibility for supervising the implementation of the EPA and
monitoring the fulfilment of its objectives. In addition, the JC must
examine any major issue arising within the framework of the EPA and
any bilateral, multilateral and international question of common interest
affecting trade among the participants in the EPA. The JC is
empowered to take decisions on all matters covered by the EPA in
order to secure its objectives and such decisions shall be binding on all
parties as defined in relevant provisions and the signatory
CARIFORUM States, which are obliged to take measures for their
implementation in accordance with relevant internal rules.

191
Consider in this context the provisions of Articles 227 (1) (2); 230 (2) (a) (i) and (iv); 230 (5)
of the E.P.A.

133

4.5. The JC is assisted in is functions by the CARIFORUM-EC Trade and
Development Committee (TDC) composed of representatives of the
parties at the level of senior officials. The functions of the TDC include
the implementation and application of the EPA, evaluation of the
provisions of the EPA, disputes avoidance and resolution, monitoring
regional integration among the parties and assisting the JC in its
development cooperation functions. The TDC will be assisted by the
CARIFORUM-EC Parliamentary Committee, which may make
recommendations to the former. The CARIFORUM-EC Consultative
Committee shall assist the JC in promoting dialogue and cooperation
among organizations of civil society on economic, social and
environmental aspects of relations between EPA participants. Given
the commitment of several CARICOM States to various other regional
arrangements like the Association of Caribbean States (ACS),
Petrocaribe, the Bolivarian Alternative (Alba) and the Union of South
American States (UNASUR), regional governance in CARICOM has
assumed great significance. The EPA provides, inter alia, for a World
Trade Organisation (WTO) plus arrangement in respect of investment,
competition, government procurement, intellectual property rights and
environment and a so-called development component of an imprecise
and elusive nature.

4.6. In criticism of the EPA, it is alleged that the governance arrangement
is too binding, time bound and sanctions driven; that the scope is WTO
plus rather than CSME consistent; that the approach is technocratic
rather than needs strategic; that the development component is more
lip service than genuinely accessing; that the competitiveness-derived
potential is based on faith rather than conviction or reality; and that the
regional integration impact is distorting rather than deepening. In fact
one authoritative regional commentator has gone so far as to say that
as a legally binding international instrument with elaborate
implementation and enforcement provisions, it embodies a higher
degree of supranational governance than corresponding arrangements
in the Caribbean Community.
192

5. THE PERMANENT COMMITTEE OF AMBASSADORS

5.1. The Committee of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community
on Governance at its Thirty-First Meeting in Jamaica on 4 to 7 July
2010, agreed on the establishment of a Permanent Committee of
CARICOM Ambassadors which will serve to address the lacuna that

192
Caribbean Trade and Investment Report 2010, CARICOM Secretariat, Ian Randle
Publishers, Kingston, 2010 at p. 27.

134

exists in the existing arrangements as this relates to the consultative
processes at the national and regional levels (Articles 4(c) and 26,
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas) and facilitate the implementation of
decisions of the Community. This Committee would have responsibility
for the following

i. carrying out those mandates entrusted to it by
Organs of the Community;
ii. considering and taking follow-up action on the
reports of the Organs, Bodies , Agencies,
Institutions and Associate Institutions of the
Community

5.2. The Committee Members would reside in their respective capitals as a
cost-reduction initiative and would ordinarily convene through video-
conferencing. Being resident in their jurisdictions would facilitate
driving the implementation of decisions reached at the regional plane.
The Permanent Committee would also initiate proposals to give effect
to the decisions of Heads of Government and oversee the functions of
the Secretariat. Some of the functions currently performed by the
Community Council would be entrusted to the Permanent Committee.
It was determined that the functions of the Community Council should
be refined to focus on sanctions in the form of moral suasion for non-
compliance with agreed mandates, being restricted in this behalf to
naming and shaming and periodic publication of relevant reports.

5.3. Assuming, however, that the implementation deficit perceived to exist
in the Community was demonstrated more at the national than at the
regional level, and relevant indications appear to support this
assumption, then it would be reasonable to entertain an intensification
of the interface of the PCCA with national institutions, in particular, the
Regional Integration Implementation Units. In this connexion, an
important function of the Units Head would be to interact with the
Ministers of Legal Affairs, Attorneys-General and Chief Parliamentary
Counsel to promote and expedite the enactment of model legislation
issuing from the Legal Division of the CARICOM Secretariat for the
implementation of regional decisions as envisaged below. Similarly,
there would be need to interface with various line Ministers to ensure
that regional decisions on sectoral programmes and issues are being
implemented expeditiously. It is equally important that PCCAs
members should interact frequently with the Heads of Government who
are responsible for chairing meetings of national cabinets and
approving the legislative agendas of national administrations.

135

Permanent Secretaries of national administrations must not be
overlooked in this context. In effect, the relatively dismissive attention
accorded to the functions of the PCCA at the national plane compared
with the coverage accorded the interface of the PCCA with Community
Organs appears to be misconceived. Since implementation at the
national level appears to be the bane of regional governance, there
appears to be a need for greater intensification of the interface of the
PCCA with national administrations.

5.4. At the regional level, the Chairman of the PCCA or members of its
Bureau are required to interface regularly with the chairpersons of
regional organs, to attend meetings of these organs, assist the
Community Council in the discharge of some extremely important
responsibilities, relieve the Budget Committee of its functions, monitor
and supervise the functioning of the Secretariat. Given these
responsibilities of the PCCA at the regional plane, it is surprising that
provision is only made for a position of Director in the Office of the
Deputy Secretary-General and for the strengthening of the
management/executive function in that Office. In addition to
consultations by electronic means, the PCCA is required by the
relevant decision of Conference to maintain a regular presence at
CARICOM headquarters. Given the acute lack of drafting capacity in
all CARICOM countries, the scarcity of drafting skills regionally and
extra-regionally, due in large measure to the absence of attractive
conditions of service including upward mobility in the profession, and
the critical importance of sound and expeditious enactment of
legislation transposing regional decisions into national legislation,
consideration should have been given to strengthening the drafting
department of the Legal Division in the Secretariat. In this connection,
consideration could be given to the appointment of a Director of
Legislative Drafting and approximately five or six draftspersons to man
the Department in order to prepare draft model legislation to implement
regional decisions of Community Organs. The Legal Affairs Committee
should also be elevated into a Council as requested over the years by
regional Attorneys-General and credible arrangements made for its
prioritizing of draft model legislation and regular interface of the Legal
and Institutional Development Division of the Secretariat with Chief
Parliamentary Counsel at the national level to drive the regional
economic integration programme.

5.5. Consideration might also be given to augmenting the responsibilities of
the Deputy Secretary-General in the area of implementation given the
reduction in responsibility of this Office relating to the development of

136

the Communitys strategic planning and coordination set out in Article
13 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. In effect, assuming a
significant positive impact of the PCCA on the operations of the
Secretariat and the functioning of the Organs of the Community, it
appears that implementation of the relevant decision of Conference
should be effected pari passu with the restructuring of the
Communitys Secretariat. In this connexion, consideration may have to
be given to the establishment of a separate Unit in the Secretariat to
service the PCCA, the range and importance of whose functions are
not to be undervalued. The establishment of such a Unit may require
the discontinuance of some functions of the Secretariat not accorded a
high regional priority in the interest of cost effectiveness. However,
hard decisions in this area will have to await the outcome of the
recommendation on the establishment of the PCCA, which does not
appear to commend itself to several CARICOM Heads of Government.

Professor Justice Duke E.E. Pollard
University of Guyana
6
th
June, 2011.

!

137

!
Appendix!4:!Restructuring!CARICOM!Communications!

RESTRUCTURING CARICOM COMMUNICATIONS

Executive Summary

CARICOM communications present a mixed bag. The publications
generally seem to be high quality but the impact is questionable, because
budget does not permit adequate dissemination. The website, by contrast,
needs a lot of care and attention and is underused as a vehicle for
broadcasting the voice of CARICOM/the Secretariat. CARICOM/the
Secretariat should also make much greater use of social media (FaceBook,
Twitter, YouTube etc.) especially as a means of communicating with young
Caribbeans.
CARICOM has an identity problem that demands rationalisation and a
reinforced communications effort to raise CARICOMs profile. The CARICOM
brand needs reinforcing, rather than changing.
Publications apart, CARICOM communication products should reflect much
more the colour and the vibrancy of the West Indies: there is too much
bureaucratic language and too many photos of suits shaking hands with
other suits. Greater efforts should be made to show CARICOM and
Secretariat (SG in particular) in a more human light. Emphasis should be
placed on the fact that it is Your [the Caribbean citizens] Community by
using more demotic language, more relaxed and colourful photos, more input
from ordinary people, etc. whenever possible.
The Secretariat must find a way of involving member states more in
communication efforts.
The existing draft Communication Strategy is good and should serve as a
strategy for both CARICOM as a whole and the Secretariat. A lite version
should be produced for public consumption.

The point of departure has to be more resources both human and financial.
The budget today is half what it was 15 years ago. For CARICOM to
undertake its responsibilities in this field seriously there must be a
significant increase.

Recommendations

! The budget must be substantially increased.
! Staffing in the Secretariat must be kept at a minimum of six at all times
and should be supplemented by other means (see below).

138

! CARICOM should not be rebranded, but efforts made to raise awareness
of CARICOM and the work of the Secretariat, both with regional audiences
and in the international community.
! Ideally, this too should be undertaken on the basis of opinion research to
establish the most effective means of reaching out to target audiences.
! To assist this, as many CARICOM bodies as possible should be brought
under the main CARICOM website, http://www.caricom.org/.
! The Secretariat should commission a thorough overhaul of
http://www.caricom.org/.
! http://www.caricom.org/ should become the main platform for CARICOM
communications.
! The site should be re-geared to connect better with the ordinary people of
the Caribbean fewer photos of suits, more citizen-friendly language etc.
! On the site, the SG should be profiled as a representative of the
Caribbean people fewer photos in his office with Ambassadors and
HoGs, more of him in schools, factories, on farms, informally dressed and
so on.
! http://www.caricom.org/ should become an on-line library, with all
CARICOM publications available both in PDF-lite and PC-to-print
versions.
! CARICOM Secretariat must make much more use of the various social
media using http://www.caricom.org/ as the platform for them.
! Ideally, a separate study should be carried out into rationalisation of
CARICOM publications.
! Greater use should be made of http://www.caricom.org/ as a means of
disseminating CARICOM publications.
! The Secretariat should seek to freshen up the language of its
communications and avoid the language of officialdom except in those
areas of activity targeted at officialdom itself.
! Similarly, it should make greater use of images that show the human side
of CARICOM officials and show ordinary members of the CARICOM
community..
! The Secretariat must make a concerted effort to bring the member states
on board and make them stakeholders in the communication process.
! The Secretariat should seek the means to employ communications
satellites to work within member state ministries.
! A summary, publicity, version of Sharing the Vision should be
drafted for use with HoGs and for general public information purposes.

139

! A scheme to fund visitors from across the region to Visit the
Secretariat should be considered.
! The Secretariat should consider institutionalising an annual CARICOM
Quiz for schools/young people.
! The Secretariat should explore the possibility of commissioning a top
quality text book or books for the statutory Caribbean module in
schools across the region.
! CARICOM should seek to work with Diaspora.
! CARICOM information products currently supplied on CD-ROM could be
given out (inerasable) on promotional USB sticks.
! Looking to the longer term, CARICOM should consider the possibility of
launching a pan-Caribbean TV channel.
! CARICOM should consider greater use of outsourcing, commercially, to
provide on-the-ground communications actors in member states.
! CARICOM should consider seeking donor deployment of
communications experts, either on a Twinning basis or via a consultancy
contract.
! CARICOM communications should focus on two target groups in
particular business and youth.

1. Methodology
The consultant, communications expert Patrick Brooks
193
, was mobilised by
Landell Mills in response to identification of communications by the project
team, together with the CARICOM Secretariat, as a priority area in need of
focus and upgrading.

The consultant carried out preparatory desk-research, reading the literature
gathered together by the project team and studying the CARICOM Secretariat
website, then spent the week 12-16 September in Guyana. During that time
he had a substantive meeting with Leonard Robertson, with brief follow-up
conversations in person and a longer debriefing by telephone; he participated
in the in-depth team meeting with the Secretary General on 14 September,
and; had a detailed telephone discussion with Ms Jacquie Joseph. (A planned
meeting with Ms Joseph fell through, due to overrun of her previous
engagement. A planned meeting/telephone conversation with Ms. Hilary
Brown also fell through.)

19S
Patrick Brooks spent the first nine years of his life in Trinidad and Tobago. A British diplomat for nine
years, he was a senior communications advisor to the European Commission and now runs the EUs
communications programme in Kosovo. He has worked extensively in the Caribbean, most notably in T&T,
Jamaica, the Windwards and Turks and Caicos.

140

2. Study Findings

The Communications Department of the Secretariat currently consists of the
following staff:
! Head of Communications/Media Advisor to SG
! Senior Communications Assistant
! Distributions Officer
! Audio-Visual technician
The Dept. had a Senior Communications Officer until earlier this year, but that
post has been left empty since his departure. Similarly, the webmaster left this
summer and that post has been left vacant until the previous officers full
leave entitlement expires, on 6 November.

Operational budget in 2011 is EC$225,000, which has to cover all
communications activities and all CARICOM Secretariat publications. The
current budget represents a significant decline from the mid-1990s, when the
budget for information and publicity was EC$450,000 (1995).

The absence of key staff means that the workload on the Head of
Communications and colleagues is very heavy and their outputs are therefore
significantly reduced and impaired.

As noted, the Advisor also has to double as SGs media advisor/Porte Parole
figure.

3. Analysis

3.1 Resources

The budget of EC$225,000, half what it was 15 years ago perhaps a third in
real terms severely restricts the Secretariats ability to communicate
effectively on behalf of the Secretariat and CARICOM as a whole. When the
fact that this budget also has to cover all publications produced by CARICOM
is taken into account, it leaves practically nothing for pure communications
activities.

On the HR front, with a full team of six it is conceivable that the unit could
handle the work with which they are charged although even then they
should have access to outside support as needed, which budget limitations
currently compromise. With just four, as at the time of this study, it is not. This
shows, in many ways: the quality of the website is the most obvious example
(although it has improved markedly between the study visit and time of
writing).

The CARICOM Secretariat has responsibility for communicating with some 16
million CARICOM citizens, 200,000 in associate countries and nearly 200
million people in observer countries let alone the great world outside,

141

including important cooperation partners such as the EU (c. 500 million) and
US (300 million). So, the resources currently devoted to communications are
not a serious response to the needs.

A point of illustration: with a CARICOM population of 16 million, the Media
Advisors rule of thumb is that to have an effective impact the Secretariat
needs to print at least 500,000 copies of any general information publication
(as opposed to specific topic publications aimed at e.g. farmers or fishermen).
The maximum budget for most publications is EC$10,000 which will finance
a print runs of at most 20,000 copies.

An additional point is that requiring the head of the Communications unit to
double up as the SGs Media Advisor/Porte Parole not only adds to the
pressure but is bad practice in general terms. The two disciplines running a
Communications programme and acting as Spokesperson/Media Advisor
are very different. One is a long-term, slow-burn process: the other requires
(mainly) short-term responses to immediate challenges and opportunities. As
Alistair Campbell, Tony Blairs Spokesman/Media Advisor once said (in a
moment of uncharacteristic modesty) My job is all about yesterday, today and
tomorrow, not about planning long term actions that bear fruit in years rather
than days. Asking someone to take on both responsibilities means that there
is a risk that neither will be done to best effect. If you cannot afford both a cow
and a horse then obviously you have to choose one or another: but you
cannot expect to get both good milk and good transport. CARICOM should be
able to stretch to both and must if it wants to take its proper place on the
world stage.

The consultants opinion is that Mr Leonard Robertson, the current Advisor, is
a skilled, dedicated and hard-working communications practitioner, with many
years experience, who has managed to keep the machine running
remarkably well, in the circumstances. But he and his team need more
support.

As a consequence, CARICOM communications have so far been of the Fire
Service variety that is, no-one has gone out looking for a fire but, rather,
they have stayed in the fire station waiting for people to call in and let them
know there is a problem or in this instance, seeking information. In the 21
st

Century, that is no longer an option for a serious international organisation.
CARICOMs constituents have access to a vast array of information sources,
some of it providing misleading and mischievous stories about what is going
on in the world. The Secretariat must therefore ensure that it is leading the
field where information about CARICOM-related issues is concerned (for
instance EU and EPA-related issues), not tagging along behind, letting others
make their imprint on the news before CARICOM has its say.

As the SG himself remarked, CARICOM communications should not just be
about producing brochures....Unfortunately, with the existing financial and HR
constraints, it is hard to see how the Secretariat can do much more than that.
The ability to act effectively in any area will always be determined by the level
of human and funding resources available.

142

3.2 Identity

CARICOMs status and situation as a representative body are complex and
confusing, given that the Caribbean now has several overlays of different
groupings and bodies, as the Venn
diagram at left (courtesy of Wikipedia)
demonstrates. Missing from that diagram
is of course another level of complexity
and confusion: Car forum.

CARICOM must therefore set out its stall
prominently, not hide in the shadows.
CARICOM must raise its game in
communications terms in order to
persuade its own citizens of the merits of
its actions, and indeed make its mark with
its international partners.

The situation is further complicated by a multiplicity of Caribbean institutional
websites (see under 4.4, below).

3.3 Rebranding

In these circumstances, the question arises, should the Secretariat
seek to rebrand CARICOM as part of wider restructuring and
refocusing of the Secretariats energies? The current visual identity is
crisp and clear, if hardly very flamboyant or dynamic. (Without
knowing the background, the consultant can see that the different
colour blues of the two interlocking Cs can be understood to
symbolise the light blue of the Caribbean and the dark blue of the
Atlantic seas.)

There is little information readily available on which to base any in-depth
discussion of the question and rebranding is not a move to be taken lightly,
since it generally requires significant investment of resources and risks loss of
visibility and audience awareness unless major efforts are invested in raising
the profile of the new identity.

An example of careful rebranding whilst maintaining an established, well-
loved identity was the World Wildlife Fund, which was renamed the Worldwide
Fund for Nature in order to move with the times and the zeitgeist but kept
the old WWF name and panda logo so as not to lose any of its well-
established prominence. Any decision on rebranding CARICOM and the
Secretariat should therefore be based on serious consideration and preferably
following opinion research amongst CARICOM target audiences.

On the other hand, a concerted effort could and should be made to raise
awareness of CARICOM and the work of the Secretariat, both with regional
audiences and in the international community. Ideally, this too should be

143

undertaken on the basis of opinion research to establish the most effective
means of reaching out to target audiences. As part of that process, CARICOM
should also consider harmonising or rationalising the CARICOM brand, in
particular in where websites are concerned (see under 4.4 below).

3.4 Website

The consultant commented at some length on the current CARICOM website
in an e-mail to the Media Advisor (see in Annex). The key points in that mail
are that:

! Optimising the website depends on a number of factors, including the
limits of human and financial resources available, but also technical
constraints of operating within the Caribbean. These must be factored
into any decisions on http://www.caricom.org/;
! Technically, the site is easy to navigate and user-friendly perhaps even
a little light but dull and unlikely to draw in and hold many ordinary
Caribbean web-browsers;
! There are too many photos of suits, lengthy and boring captions giving
blow-by-blow accounts of visits etc., turgid officialese, too little friendly,
demotic language;
! Static reach no use of social media or other platforms to reach out
further, in particular to young people;
! No real attempt at dialogue communication; just a one-way street
information provider;
! Arrival of the new SG should provide the trigger for a comprehensive
overhaul of the site.
A broader and deeper finding, in the context of the overview of CARICOM
communications as a whole, is that http://www.caricom.org/ appears to be
underused as a communications tool for outreach to audiences who are not
currently following CARICOM development. It should become a major plank
in the Secretariats communication strategy. It can be used as the basis for
dissemination of on-line publications, videos and audio products, for dialogue
as well as information provision and is particularly good for connecting with
young people, business, civil society and other key target audiences. So,
more use should be made of the site.

In order to profile http://www.caricom.org/ as the place to look for information
about CARICOM, there should be some rationalisation so far as possible
of the multiplicity of websites now representing Caribbean bodies.
! http://www.caricomstats.org/ no logical reason why this should be a
stand-alone site;
! http://www.csmeonline.org/ ditto and this does not even carry the
CARICOM logo;
! http://www.cdema.org/ ditto this does not carry the logo;

144

! http://www.cimh.edu.bb/?pageID=SRg34X&content=home ditto
regarding logo;
! http://www.cardi.org/ ditto regarding logo;
! http://www.cmo.org.tt/ ditto regarding logo;
! http://caricad.net/ ditto regarding logo;
! http://www.caricomict4d.org/
There are arguments for http://www.crnm.org/ an excellent, clean and well-
organised site
194
having stand-alone status, since it deals with the specific
and highly-sophisticated world of international trade negotiations, but even
then the presentation of the CRNM and OTN on the website makes it look like
a separate institution, not part of CARICOM.

No doubt there are institutional reasons why CMO and/or CIMH, for instance,
should have their own space (as inheritor organizations of the WIF?) and
indeed others such as CARDI and CARICAD are also perhaps independent
given the nature of their activities and establishment.

3.5 Publications

The consultant did not have enough time to conduct a full study of
CARICOMs publications. On the whole, this appears to be an area that
works well but absorbs a great deal of the budget available for
communications. The publications are, in the consultants opinion, of a far
higher quality and better-targeted for public consumption than comparable
publications by the EU.

CARICOM View, available both in hard copy and downloadable from
http://www.caricom.org/, goes against the grain of the general criticism of the
website above (as indeed to most of the PDF fliers and brochures on the site).
It is colourful, readable and well-presented. Its only real demerit is that it is
very heavy in IT terms and therefore takes a long time to download. It could
be produced in lower definition PDF for everyday use and, if the aim is to
make it available for printing from the computer, in a higher definition PDF as
well.

CARICOM: Our Caribbean Community: An Introduction, the major coffee-
table publication is also colourful, well-written and containing good material,
with bright and relevant pictures. But the question it provokes is what
purpose does it serve? Is it a publication that is read or is it glossed by the
VIPs to whom it will mainly be given, then confined to the bin/archives or, at
best, the coffee table. The consultant is in no position to answer that
question, but it is one that must be asked of all such publications. By contrast
the short version in brochure form, though well-written and conceived is a
drab hen-bird, with ugly graphics and an unattractive brown cover. This is a
wasted opportunity: this could be CARICOMs calling card for the general

194
It is not particularly accessible or sympathetic to the general public but they are not the sites
target audiences.

145

public. Although there is no research material to demonstrate its public appeal
one way or another, the consultants instinct is that it does not serve that
purpose effectively.

The Annual Report is obviously an obligatory document and must be made
public, both in print form and on http://www.caricom.org/. With respect to the
latter, the latest Report available online is that for 2008-2009, which an
enormous download document 47 MB is. Again, this could be produced in
two versions light, low definition and high definition. That comment is
generally true for all on-line publications.

The consultants opinion of the Annual Report is that it is a very good
publication of its kind. The lay-out is straightforward and accessible, the
language official as it must be without being pompous and there is plenty
of colour and life in the graphics. Even the most dedicated bureaucrat finds
Annual Reports heavy going, but this one is one of the best of its kind the
consultant has seen from point of view of public communication. The only
issue outstanding is the fact that an Annual Report should not, by definition,
cover two years. If CARICOMs intention is to institutionalise the two-year
report, it might be wise to call it a Biennial report.

3.6 The Language and Images of CARICOM

Whilst the publications the consultant has studied generally pass the
accessible to the public test with high marks, CARICOM/the Secretariat too
often commits the traditional institutional crimes of dull, wooden language
langue de bois accompanied by boring photographs of suits.

This is perhaps best demonstrated by the website, so is covered in detail in
the e-mail in Annex on that topic. The main point registered there is that the
Caribbean is a vibrant, colourful place full of vibrant, colourful people using
vibrant, colourful language (often rather too colourful). So any
communications product or activity that is dull, bland and at worst sounds
pompous is unlikely to speak to them with any meaning.

With regards to language, even the Secretariat Mission Statement suffers
from langue de bois.

The image is good - if a bit corny and not strictly germane - but the language
is dull, officialese.

146

Not only does CARICOM focus too much on the suits in the photos that
illustrate the website and other material, their meetings and their speeches
also dominate too much. To reach out to the people of the Caribbean there
needs to be more emphasis on the Community aspect of CARICOM
promotion of the concept that CARICOM is your Community, does not
belong to the suits. That needs to be reflected in the languages and images
of CARICOM.

On a related point, one of the tricks of effective communications is not to
blow your own trumpet but let others do it for you. In institutional terms, that
means letting the public report in print, on radio, to camera about the
benefits flowing from your actions. During the Panday Governments
Rainbow Nation campaign in Trinidad and Tobago, in the late 1990s,
information/publicity TV slots and videos turned from the traditional political
talking heads Government ministers bragging about what they had
achieved to a more vox pop approach, interviewing ordinary people about
e.g. the changes that a new road built by Government in the last year had
made to their lives. One of the results was a dramatic increase in support for
UNC in Tobago, where it had previously had little standing.

3.7 Cooperation with Member States

One of the major communications challenges facing supra-national
organisations such as CARICOM is the question of member state involvement
and/or obstruction. There is a close parallel with the EU in this case. Jean
Monnets dictum about the EU that We are building a union of people, not a
coalition of states is all very well in theory, but in reality the states mostly
determine the attitudes and opinions of their peoples. When the supra-
national body has to work through those states, the result is generally that
where there is good cooperation with the state there is good cooperation with
the people. (UK is probably the exception to the rule, since there it is public
attitudes to the EU that tend to determine political thinking.)

CARICOM Secretariat needs more direct contact with the people of the
Caribbean and so ways of improving and deepening cooperation with
CARICOM members should be explored as a means of widening and
improving communication with their people.

3.8 Communication Strategy

The Secretariat already has a comprehensive and well-rehearsed draft
Communication Strategy, Sharing the Vision. It is a very professional paper
and the consultant has little to add, other than that it might be summarised
and simplified for use as a communication tool itself.

During the consultants meeting with the SG, he asked the question whether
this should be a Communication Strategy for CARICOM or for the
Secretariat? The answer is both: effective communications with the people
of the Caribbean about CARICOM and its policies and actions will be the best

147

way of communicating the work of the Secretariat as well. Politically it is also
generally better for a body like the Secretariat not to develop its own
strategy which can be inferred to suggest that it has aims that differ from
and are possibly at variance with the body politic. So Sharing the Vision
should serve both functions.

5. Conclusions

The consultants operational conclusions are as follows;
! CARICOM resources dedicated to communication, in particular
financial but also human, are far too few for the job in hand. For
CARICOM to undertake its responsibilities in this field seriously there
needs to be a significant increase. Secretariat HR could be maintained
at +/- 6 if they are supplemented in other ways (see
Recommendations).
! The Media Advisor and Head of Communications Unit roles should be
separated out.
! CARICOM has an identity problem, given institutional polygamy in the
Caribbean, and this both requires rationalisation and a reinforced
communications effort to set out CARICOMs stall.
! Rebranding is not worthwhile but a concerted effort to imprint the
brand on the Caribbean (and international) consciousness is.
! The website needs a lot of care and attention. This is necessary in any
case, but in addition, it should become the operational platform for
much of CARICOMs communications drive.
! Greater use of social media is also required.
! CARICOM publications are generally very good, but absorb too much
of the budget without actually covering the territory adequately. This
needs rationalisation, including greater use of PDF on
http://www.caricom.org/.
! Whilst CARICOM Secretariat communications must of course serve an
official and formal purpose, greater efforts should be made to show
CARICOM and Secretariat (SG in particular in a more human light.
Emphasis should be placed on the fact that it is Your [the Caribbean
citizens] Community by using more demotic language, more relaxed
and colourful photos, more input from ordinary people, etc. whenever
possible.
! The Secretariat has to find a way of bringing member states on board
for the communication efforts.

148

! The existing draft Communication Strategy is good and should serve
as a strategy for both CARICOM as a whole and the Secretariat.

6. Recommendations

Resources
! The budget of EC$225,000, half what it was 15 years ago, must be
substantially increased.
! Staffing in the Secretariat must be kept at a minimum of six at all times
and should be supplemented by other means (see below).
Identity and Rebranding
! CARICOM should not be rebranded, but rather a major effort made to
raise awareness of CARICOM and the work of the Secretariat, both with
regional audiences and in the international community.
! Ideally, this too should be undertaken on the basis of opinion research to
establish the most effective means of reaching out to target audiences.
! As far as possible there should be a continuity of CARICOM branding and
as many CARICOM bodies as possible without compromising their
ability to function effectively should be brought under the main
CARICOM website, http://www.caricom.org/.
Website
! The Secretariat should commission a thorough overhaul of
http://www.caricom.org/, starting with a study of what purpose the site
should ideally serve, taking into account the other recommendations made
here.
! http://www.caricom.org/ should become the main platform for CARICOM
communications. This not only cost-effective, but the internet increasingly
a preferred information vehicle of people the world over including the
Caribbean.
! The site should be re-geared to connect better with the ordinary people of
the Caribbean fewer photos of suits, more citizen-friendly language etc.
! On the site, the SG should be profiled as a representative of the
Caribbean people, not just as the SG of CARICOM an institution: so
fewer photos in his office with Ambassadors and HoGs, more of him in
schools, factories, on farms, informally dressed and so on.

149

! http://www.caricom.org/ should become an on-line library, with all
CARICOM publications available both in PDF-lite and PC-to-print
versions, so that browsers can read publications easily on-line and those
who want to print out can have print-shop quality publications.
! CARICOM Secretariat must make much more use of the
various social media using http://www.caricom.org/
as the platform for them.
Publications
! Ideally, a separate study should be carried out into rationalisation of
CARICOM publications: high quality, but under-budgeted to cover the
target area effectively, nonetheless they absorb a disproportionate amount
of the available budget.
! As noted above, greater use should be made of http://www.caricom.org/
as a means of disseminating CARICOM publications.
Language and images of CARICOM
! The Secretariat should seek to freshen up the language of its
communications and avoid the language of officialdom except in those
areas of activity targeted at officialdom itself.
! Similarly, it should make greater use of images that show the human side
of CARICOM officials and show ordinary members of the CARICOM
community in its communications outputs.
Cooperation with CARICOM Member States
! The Secretariat must make a concerted effort to bring the member states
on board and make them stakeholders in the communication process.
! As a means of achieving this, the Secretariat should seek the means to
employ communications satellites to work within member state ministries.
If these staff were offered to governments as additional staff, it might serve
as an inducement to take on some of the burden of CARICOM
communications. (Obviously, there are budgetary implications.)
Strategy
! A summary, publicity, version of Sharing the Vision should be drafted
for use with HoGs and for general public information purposes. The
consultant has offered to undertake this task himself.
Miscellaneous/General
The consultant has a number of additional, ad hoc suggestions to make:
! The website invitation to Visit the Secretariat is an excellent outreach
project although of limited application unless there is a scheme to fund
SOCIAL NETWORKS

150

visitors from across the region. This should be considered perhaps on a
competition/lottery basis.
! Quizzes, particularly for schools, are an excellent way of disseminating
knowledge across the whole spectrum of society. The Secretariat should
consider institutionalising an annual CARICOM Quiz.
! School text books provide another excellent outreach opportunity. (School-
work can draw in the whole family children, parents, grandparents.) The
consultant understands that there is a pan-Caribbean syllabus covering
Caribbean history and affairs. The Secretariat could commission a top
quality text book or books to supply this niche. (In the consultants
opinion, the existing Handbook for Schools contains many of the
necessary elements but also, sadly, too much wooden language and it is
not really child-friendly.)
! CARICOM should seek to work with Diaspora. Often they have a major
opinion-forming impact on home audiences.
! CARICOM information products currently supplied (inerasable) on CD-
ROM could be given out on promotional USB sticks. The cost difference is
not great, but recipients will be more inclined to look at the CARICOM
material when they use the USB stick on a daily basis.
! Looking to the longer term, CARICOM should consider the possibility of
launching a pan-Caribbean TV channel.
Regarding human resources, there are a number of avenues to explore:
! CARICOM should consider greater use of outsourcing, commercially, to
provide on-the-ground communications actors in member states.
(Obviously, there are budgetary implications.)
! CARICOM should consider seeking donor deployment of communications
experts, either on a Twinning basis or via a consultancy contract.
On a more general level, the consultant believes that CARICOM
communications should focus on two target groups in particular business
and youth.

7. Additional actions taken by the Consultant

! Analysis of webpage and report to Media Advisor
! Production of a summary, publicity, version of the CARICOM
Communications Strategy for use with HoGs and for general public
information purposes

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Appendix!5:!Outline!Specification!of!Change!Office!

Background!
1. The whole CARIC0N pioject is in unpieceuenteu uifficulties anu unuei
existential thieat. CARIC0N has lost its way bauly anu, its piincipal
auministiative oigan, the Secietaiiat has been giauually weakeneu ovei a
numbei of yeais to the extent that it is cuiiently not capable of tuining
iounu CARIC0N's foitunes.

2. Funuamental change is iequiieu to tuin iounu CARIC0N's foitunes, as
outlineu in the consultancy iepoit Turning!around!CARICOM:!Proposals!to!
Restructure!the!Secretariat
195
. The Secietaiiat uoes not have the staff oi the
capability foi such a majoi unueitaking. It theiefoie neeus to set up a
tempoiaiy Change 0ffice unuei the uiiection of the Secietaiy ueneial to
biing about the iequiieu funuamental change.

S. Setting up the Change 0ffice is the most impoitant initial iequiiement foi
tuining aiounu CARIC0N's foitunes. It neeus to be agieeu as quickly as
possible in eaily 2u12.

Objectives!of!the!Change!Office!
4. The uiiect objective of the 0ffice is to uelivei a iestiuctuieu Secietaiiat. Its
inuiiect objective is to assist the Beaus of uoveinment anu Secietaiy ueneial
in making the whole CARIC0N stiuctuie anu opeiation fit foi puipose.

S. The focus on the Change 0ffice will giauually shift fiom ueveloping anu
agieeing an oveiall stiategy to implementing the iestiuctuiing of the
Secietaiiat anu to making the CARIC0N constiuct moie fit foi puipose foi
implementing the stiategy. This will incluue the following:
u. Beliveiing a iestiuctuieu Secietaiiat anu managing the tiansition;
e. Stiengthening the stiuctuie of CARIC0N, not least ensuiing that
CARIC0N anu its institutions aie uevelopeu as a moie unifieu bianu
aimeu at common goals;
196

f. Beveloping, getting agieement to anu setting up moie secuie
financing foi both the Secietaiiat anu foi CARIC0N's institutions.

Timing!and!Financing!
6. In iueal ciicumstances, the Change 0ffice woulu be set up immeuiately anu
woulu complete the iestiuctuiing of the Secietaiiat anu a tiansfoimation of
CARIC0N within 18 months to 2 yeais. Bowevei, this woulu iequiie
immeuiate agieement anu available finance. We consiuei this unlikely given
the extent of iestiuctuiing iequiieu anu the amount of finance iequiieu.

19S
Turning!around!Caricom:!Proposals!to!Restructure!the!Secretariat,!Richaiu Stoneman, }ustice Buke
Pollaiu anu Bugo Inniss, Lanuell Nills Bevelopment Consultants, Becembei 2u11.
196
This will involve putting in place pioceuuies anu uisciplines to ensuie such stiategic alignment takes
place as well as ueveloping syneigies, economies anu aieas foi co-opeiation.

152

7. It is likely to piove moie feasible to get elements of the Change 0ffice
unueiway uuiing 2u12 with a full piogiamme unueiway within 12 months
anu implementeu thioughout 2u1S anu 2u14. Whilst it may be possible to
obtain limiteu financing foi a small anu iestiicteu tenuei quickly, the
financing of, anu tenueiing aiiangements foi, the full piogiamme will
inevitably take longei. As well as the question of Nembei State appioval anu
the exigencies of tenuei pioceuuies, it is highly likely that aiu uonois will
neeu to be involveu.

8. Foi these ieasons, the 0ffice is likely to have a skeleton staff to begin with.
Funuing shoulu be souiceu as quickly as possible. Iueally Nembei States, oi
a selection of them, shoulu pioviue the funuing. Bonoi funuing may be moie
iealistic. Bowevei, theie may not be time to await uonoi funuing
197
befoie
staiting some of the opeiations of the Change 0ffice. Some inteiim funuing,
whethei inteinally oi Nembei State souiceu, coulu theiefoie be essential.

Change!Office!Specification!
9. A full specification of the Change 0ffice will neeu to be piepaieu once the
iepoit Turning!around!CARICOM:!Proposals!to!Restructure!the!Secretariat!
has been consiueieu anu agieeu. At this stage, it is only appiopiiate to
specify the bioau outlines. The outline coveis the following:
a. 0utline Scope of Woik
b. 0utline skill iequiiements
c. Rough appioximation of buuget.

Taking these in tuin:

a. Outline!Scope!of!Work!
!
Developing!a!CARICOM!Strategy!
1u. The initial focus of the Change 0ffice will be on ueveloping a S-yeai Stiategy
to uiive CARIC0N, in geneial, anu the Secietaiiat, in paiticulai. An expeit in
stiategy shoulu be appointeu as soon as possible.

Restructuring!the!Secretariat!
11. The Stiategy will neeu to be iolleu uown into objectives, piioiities anu plans
foi the Secietaiiat which will in tuin neeu to be tianslateu into uetaileu
specifications of buuget, iesouice anu staffing iequiiements.

12. These iequiiements will neeu to be uevelopeu into a timetableu change anu
tiansitional plan to be agieeu with the Secietaiy ueneial anu Executive
Nanagement Committee. The plan will neeu to take account of key
milestones, such as the intiouuction of a new IT system, anu the leau-in
times to such milestones, taking account of financing anu tenueiing issues.

197
Tenueiing iules anu uonoi pioceuuies have maue it moie uifficult to access funuing quickly. Bowevei,
some uonois can iesponu quickly paiticulaily foi limiteu sums that uo not tiiggei inteinational tenuei
pioceuuies.

153

1S. The change anu tiansitional plan shoulu incluue a ieciuitment piogiamme,
also taking account of key milestones, incluuing the ieciuitment of key
peisonnel such as the Chief of 0peiations, the Beau of the Stiategy, Regional
Policy anu Review Bepaitment anu the Finance Biiectoi.

14. The plan will covei the full iange of BR issues, most of which weie
highlighteu in the iepoit Turning!around!CARICOM:!Proposals!to!Restructure!
the!Secretariat. These issues will incluue ielating uepaitmental plans to
woik piogiammes, the uevelopment of ioles anu iesponsibilities anu the
intiouuction anu integiation of the peifoimance management system.

1S. The Change 0ffice team will iuentify othei specific aieas iequiiing iefoim,
some of which weie highlighteu in the above-citeu iepoit, anu uevelop
pioposals, as appiopiiate.

16. The Change 0ffice will go on to co-oiuinate anu supeivise the
implementation of the change anu tiansitional plan with appiopiiate
Secietaiiat officials. Inteiventions will be iequiieu in most aieas of the
Secietaiiat, not least in masteiminuing anu leauing the majoi changes in the
Secietaiy ueneial's 0ffice, in the Implementation 0ffice anu in the
0peiations Biiectoiate. This will incluue getting new functions off the
giounu anu co-oiuinating with anu hanuing ovei to new staff, paiticulaily
those in key positions. It will also incluue attention to paiticulai functions,
not least stiategy anu policy, finance anu iesouicing anu IT.

Strengthening!the!CARICOM!structure!
17. The vaiious piioiities iuentifieu in the iepoit Turning!around!CARICOM:!
Proposals!to!Restructure!the!Secretariat neeu to be ievieweu, uevelopeu anu
put into action.

18. This incluues measuies anu pioceuuies to stiengthen anu ievitalise the
0igans of the Community, not least the Community Council anu Beaus of
uoveinment Confeience. It also incluues ueveloping the infoimal Committee
of Ambassauois along the lines suggesteu in the above-citeu iepoit.

19. A key inteivention, alongsiue appiopiiate Secietaiiat officials, will be
uiawing up anu implementing an impioveu inteiface between the
Secietaiiat anu Nembei States. This will incluue easing the intiouuction of
the Implementation 0ffice anu its new ways of uoing business. It will also
incluue intiouucing ways to assist with implementation such as new ways of
communicating anu establishing action-oiienteu netwoiks.

2u. The othei majoi aiea is biinging CARIC0N institutions into a stiongei anu
moie unifieu stiuctuie. This incluues ueveloping manuatoiy guiuelines foi
institutions, fiist, to play an integial iole in CARIC0N's stiategy anu, seconu,
to govein the lines of accountability anu iepoiting that will be uevelopeu
initially by the new Finance Biiectoi. It also incluues ueveloping a moie

154

unifieu bianu wheie it is cleai to outsiueis that CARIC0N anu its institutions
aie pait of the same family.

Reforming!Finance!
21. The Change 0ffice will investigate anu put into action how Nembei State
funuing of both the Secietaiiat anu the institutions shoulu be put on a moie
secuie - anu less hanu to mouth - footing. This coulu involve secuiitisation
along the lines uiscusseu with CBB as noteu in the iepoit Turning!around!
CARICOM:!Proposals!to!Restructure!the!Secretariat.!

22. The Change 0ffice shoulu also uevelop anu action pioposals to use the
CARIC0N Stiategy to uiaw laigei, bettei taigeteu anu co-oiuinateu anu
moie committeu funuing fiom aiu uonois. This shoulu incluue ueveloping a
moie unifieu anu co-oiuinateu system between the Secietaiiat anu
CARIC0N's institutions foi iaising finance.

b. Outline!skill!requirements!
!
Developing!a!CARICOM!Strategy!
2S. The position as expeit in stiategy is likely to be full-time oi close to full time.
It coulu be a staff appointment oi on consultancy teims. The moie impoitant
issue is that the iight appointment be maue anu be maue quickly. The
inuiviuual appointeu shoulu be fiom outsiue the Secietaiiat anu shoulu
iepoit uiiectly to the Secietaiy ueneial anu, thiough him, to the Beaus of
uoveinment.

24. It woulu be helpful if the expeit in stiategy coulu uiaw on some occasional
finance anu oiganisational uevelopment suppoit. It woulu also be helpful if
the inuiviuual be assigneu a piofessional assistant fiom within the
Secietaiiat's cuiient staffing. Such an inuiviuual coulu be a biight up-anu-
coming membei of staff.
!
Wider!remit!
2S. The Change 0ffice shoulu have a coie of full-time staff ovei a two-yeai
contiact peiiou plus shoitei specialist inputs. The coie staff aie likely to
incluue expeits in each of stiategy, finance anu BR to be ieciuiteu on a
consultancy basis. 0thei expeits, such as opeiations anu IT specialists, may
be iequiieu foi lengthy peiious. vaiious expeits will be neeueu foi shoitei
peiious incluuing communications, ieciuitment anu specialist opeiational
anu iestiuctuiing aieas. Staff seconueu fiom within the Secietaiiat anu
CARIC0N coulu usefully suppoit these coie staff, paitly to assist with the
change piogiamme anu paitly to gain some invaluable expeiience.

c. Rough!approximation!of!budget!
26. Foi a Change 0ffice to opeiate foi two yeais with S key staff full-time anu
shoitei-teim inputs totalling S full-time equivalents woulu iequiie a buuget
of about tS million, incluuing all expenses if let in full by an inteinational
tenuei. A moie uetaileu ieview of iequiiements in combination with a

155

juugement as to whethei othei cheapei means coulu be founu of uoing some
of the woik coulu ieuuce this amount by Su% oi so. We uoubt that the
Change 0ffice woik coulu be caiiieu out piopeily foi much less.

27. We unueistanu that upgiauing the Secietaiiat's IT equipment will cost a
similai amount ($S-S million). It is essential that this be uone alongsiue the
woik of the Change 0ffice. The lattei's woik cannot be uone effectively
without a funuamental upgiaue in the Secietaiiat's IT equipment.

28. The immeuiate woik of the Stiategy expeit, incluuing limiteu auuitional
expeitise, coulu be uone ovei a 6 month peiiou foi less than t2uu,uuu. Pait
of that expeit's teims of iefeience coulu be to uiaw up anu cost uetaileu
teims of iefeience foi the full Change 0ffice.

156

Appendix!6:!Some!Views!on!CARICOM!

1. We uiu not iecoiu veibatim the many views we heaiu on CARIC0N. In oui
ieauing we weie, howevei, impiesseu by a iepoit that was biought to oui
attention just as we weie completing the fiist uiaft of oui Final Repoit anu
paiticulaily by many of the quotes in it. The quotes weie ieflective of oui
own expeiience in the meetings we hau aiounu the iegion anu, as a iesult,
we have ueciueu to incluue some of the most peitinent heie with oui own
commentaiy.

2. The iepoit is Bridging!the!Gaps:!CARICOM!Regional!Survey!of!Aid!
Effectiveness!by!Stephen van Bouten, Accoiu Inteinational Nanagement
Seivices Inc., 0ctobei 2u11.!

S. In teims of CARIC0N's funuamental uifficulties, the following quotes ieflect
what we heaiu anu, to a laige uegiee, fit with oui analysis:
! "The uegiee of change iequiieu" is unlikely to be "inciemental";
! Some feel that the Secietaiiat neeus to be "oveihauleu fiom the
giounu up" oi that it shoulu be "blown up anu staiteu ovei";
! "Some thought that a much moie uiastic anu funuamental oveihaul
will be necessaiy".

4. Some of the iepoit's ciiticisms of the CARIC0N constiuct anu of the
Secietaiiat aie also woith quoting as they uiffei little fiom oui analysis:
! "Excessive foimality, insufficient iesponsiveness, inauequate follow-
up";
! "CARIC0N is inwaiu-looking anu not seivice anu iesults-oiienteu";
! Some noteu that, "Nanagement is a seiious weakness". "CCS is staffeu
laigely by piofessional-technical people with stiong expeitise in theii
functional aieas, but with inauequate management skill";
! "The gieat majoiity of iesponuents feel that CCS is not a capable,
efficient pioject management oiganisation";
! "A heavy ieliance on pioject ievenue, making secuiing of laige
numbeis of piojects of any kinu the top piioiity".

S. In ielation to stiategy anu piioiities, the following quotes aie also peitinent
though we woulu put moie emphasis on CARIC0N on as whole:
! "The neeu foi a cleai, simple mission anu stiategy, with ueliveiy of
tangible value anu much impioveu communication of iesults
achieveu";
! "Foi many, eveiy sectoi seems to be a piioiity, meaning that none
ieally aie" anu "Shoitcomings in piioiity setting is vieweu as a
paiticulai weakness of CCS (the Secietaiiat)";
! "CCS neeus to uo the technical analysis on issues aheau of time -
befoie a manuate is given - to unueistanu what iesouices will be

157

neeueu to uo the job anu to tell B0us (Beaus of uoveinment) what
the implications of theii choices aie". "CCS neeus to leain to say "No";
! "It (the Secietaiiat) uoes not unueistanu that activity uoes not equal
action, oi that outputs uo not equal outcomes".
! "A public sectoi cultuie, focusseu on piocesses iathei than iesults".

6. Finally, the Bridging!the!Gaps:! iepoit gives a SW0T analysis of CARIC0N
at Figuie 8 on page 41. We fully suppoit most of the points maue. We woulu,
howevei, uispute at least 2 of the 6 stiengths that aie quoteu. Fiist, whilst
the CARIC0N bianu shoulu be a stiength anu neeus to be iebuilt so that it
iegains its stiength, it is cuiiently unuei thieat. Seconu, as is cleai in oui
ieview of the Secietaiiat, oveiall policymaking (as uistinct fiom limiteu
specialist aieas) has become a majoi weakness.

7. These minoi uiffeiences aie unuoubteuly a iesult of the uiffeient
peispective fiom which the Bridging!the!Gaps:! iepoit was wiitten, iathei
than any seiious uiffeience of view.

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