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EffortsofEnsureMaritimeSecurity

CarlyleA.Thayer

Presentationto 2ndTokyoDefenseForumSeminar OrganizedbytheMinistryofDefense Tokyo,Japan March16,2012

EffortstoEnsureMaritimeSecurity CarlyleA.Thayer*
ThreatsandChallengestoMaritimeSecurity
There is no legal definition of maritime security. Maritime security has been defined broadly by scholars and government officials to include any and all of the following: protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the maritime domain; security of shippingandseafarers;protectionoffacilitiesrelatedtomaritimeaffairs;portsecurity; resource security; environmental security; protection against piracy and armed crimes at sea; protection of fisheries; safety and freedom of navigation and over flight; regulationofmaritimeaffairs;andmaintenanceoflawandgoodorderatsea. The central argument of this paper is that efforts to ensure maritime security require bothrecoursetointernationallaw,includingtheUnitedNationsConventiononLawof the Sea (UNCLOS), and political negotiations among the major states concerned. Maritimesecuritycanonlybesecuredbycarefulnavigationbetweenlegalregimesand realpolitik. If the current status quo remains the implications are clear: maritime incidentscoulderuptatanytimeandunderminenotonlythebilateralrelationsofthe states concerned but regional security as well. If current maritime differences are not addressedtheycouldbecomeamajordriverinstrategicrelationsratheraproblemto bemanagedbymutualconsent.1 Legalregimes,suchasUNCLOS,arenecessarybutnotsufficientfoundationformaritime security.ThisisbecauseUNCLOSfailstodefinekeytermsusedinthedebatebetween maritime powers such as China and the United States. UNCLOS itself may have been overtaken by advances in technology both civil and military. In addition, China and many other nations have adopted laws to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZsthatarenotsupportedbyinternationallawincludingUNCLOS.Finally,theUnited States, although a signatory to UNCLOS, has not yet acceded to the Convention. It is highlyunlikelytheUSSenatewillratifyUNCLOSfordomesticpoliticalreasonsandthis possibilityislikelyreinforcedbyChineseunilateralinterpretationsoftheConvention. The paper focuses mainly on Southeast Asia. It identifies four major threats and challengestomaritimesecurity: 1.UnsafeactionsagainstmilitaryvesselsinEEZsandinternationalwaters
*Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.Email:c.thayer@adfa.edu.au Foraconsideredsetofcooperativeproposalssee:CliveSchofield,IanTownsendGault,HasjimDjalal,Ian Storey, Meredith Miller, and Tim Cook, From Disputed Waters to Seas of Opportunity: Overcoming Barriers to Maritime Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia, NBR Special Report No. 30 (Seattle: The NationalBureauofAsianResearch,July2011).
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2.Disruptionofcommercialactivities 3.Harshtreatmentoffishermen 4.Piracy 5.RegionalForceModernisation

UnsafeactionsagainstmilitaryvesselsinEEZsandinternationalwaters
The United States is the worlds leading naval power. Naval power requires the high seasformaneuvertobringthisforcetobearoncriticalsecuritysituations.2Duringthe negotiation process that led to UNCLOS the USwas adamant in defence of customary freedom of the seas. As a matter of both international law and realpolitik the United States opposes all attempts by coastal states to limit access to their EEZs by military shipsandaircraft. China, on the other hand, is a continental power that is gradually emerging as a maritimepower.3ChinaseekstocontestUSnavaldominanceintheWesternPacificby expandingitsnavalreachfromthefirsttosecondchainsofislandsoffitseasterncoast. China has adopted legal warfare as part of its military doctrine and utilizes both domestic legislation and its interpretation of international law to restrict as much as possibleUSmilitaryactivitiesinitsEEZ. GiventhatboththeUnitedStatesandChinaarealsonuclearpowerswithvitalnational securityinterestsatstakeitisimprobablethatanylegalregimecouldbeadoptedthat would satisfy both states.4 In these circumstances a political agreement based on realpolitikisthemostlikelysolution.Bothcountriesneedtoaddressthemanagement ofmaritimeincidentsthatregularlyoccurbetweentheirnavies.In ordertodosothis matter needs to be addressed at the highest political level such as the ChinaUnited States Strategic and Economic Dialogue and its associated Defense Consultative Talks and the ChinaUnited States Consultations on Asia Pacific Affairs. Once political agreementisreachedmaritimesecurityissuesshouldbeturnedovertoofficialsattheir bilateralmeetingunderthe1998MilitaryMaritimeConsultativeAgreement.
See Peter Dutton, Introduction, in Peter Dutton, ed., Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons (Newport, RI: China Maritime StudiesInstitute,U.S.NavalWarCollege,2010),913. PengGuangqian,ChinasMaritimeRightsandInterests,inPeterDutton,ed.,MilitaryActivitiesinthe EEZ: A U.S.China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons (Newport, RI: ChinaMaritimeStudiesInstitute,U.S.NavalWarCollege,2010),1522. Alan M. Wachman, Playing by or Playing with he Rules of UNCLOS?, in Peter Dutton, ed., Military ActivitiesintheEEZ:AU.S.ChinaDialogueonSecurityandInternationalLawintheMaritimeCommons (Newport,RI:ChinaMaritimeStudiesInstitute,U.S.NavalWarCollege,2010),107119andSamBatemen, Solving the Wicked Problems of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?, ContemporarySoutheastAsia,33(1),2011,128.
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Both China and the United States should agree that the existing International Regulations for Avoiding Collisions at Sea are the foundation for the management of safety of navigation. The USChina Military Maritime Consultative Council (established 1998,suspendedin2001andresumedinFebruary2009)5shouldtaskitsMaritimeand Aviation Safety Working Group to draft an Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA) that specifies regular consultations, dangerous conduct, means of communication and a mechanism to adjudicate, review procedures and correct transgressions. It is notable thatseveralscholarsfromChinaandtheUSareinagreementthatanINCSEAshouldbe adopted.6 Such an agreement should also be accompanied by confidence and trust buildingmeasures.7 Inaddition,ChinaandtheUnitedStatesneedtoworkoutamodusvivendiorcodeof conduct governing military and intelligence gathering activities in each others EEZs. MarkValenciasuggeststhatonerelevantguidelinewouldenjoinbothpartiestorefrain fromthethreatoruseofforceandprovocativeactssuchasactiveintelligencecollection to support the use of force against the coastal state, or interfering with that states electronicsystems.8 International law, including UNCLOS, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for establishing maritime security in disputed waters of the South China and East China Seas. It is clear that geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States at any momentcanthreatenthefabricofweaklegalregimes.Internationallaw,whichreflects theconsensusoftheinternationalcommunity,cango onlysofarwhenmajorpowers areindisagreement.

Disruptionofcommercialactivities
Chinas actions in threatening to ram a commercial oil exploration vessel operating in theReedBankareaclaimedbythePhilippinesandcuttingthecablesoftwocommercial exploration vessels operating well within Vietnams EEZ represent an unprecedented threattothesafetyofnavigationintheSouthChinaSea.InChinaseyesitsactionswere
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MarkValencia,TheImpeccableIncident:TruthandConsequences,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009, 27.

Eric A. McVadon, The Reckless and the Resolute: Confrontation in the South China Sea, China Security,5(2),Spring2009,69andJiGuoxing,TheLegalityoftheImpeccableIncident,ChinaSecurity, 5(2), Spring 2009, 2021. An INCSEA between the US and China should include procedures for coordinationsuchasclosestpointofapproachortheminimumdistancecalculatedwhenashiporaircraft approachesanothershiporaircraft.
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SeethesuggestionsbyPengGuangqian,ChinasMaritimeRightsandInterests,inPeterDutton,ed., Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons(Newport,RI:ChinaMaritimeStudiesInstitute,U.S.NavalWarCollege,2010),1921. MarkValencia,TheImpeccableIncident:TruthandConsequences,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009, 27.

justifiedbecauseChinaheldlegaljurisdictionoverthesewatersandtheoilexploration vesselswereassistinginplunderingresourcestowhichChinawaslegallyentitled. Ifthissituationisnotaddressedthroughpoliticalmeansitwillonlybeamatteroftime beforeconfrontationtakesplaceintheSouthChinaSeabetweenarmedstatevessels. Theimmediatesolutionisforallpartiestorecommitthemselvestorefrainingfromthe threatoruseofforcewithoutprejudicetotheirsovereigntyclaims. As an immediate measure, China and the ASEAN states should expedite their Joint WorkingGrouptocarryouttherecentlyadoptedGuidelinestoImplementtheDOC.And on a bilateral basis, China and Vietnam should adopt practical measures under their recentlysignedAgreementonBasicPrinciplestoSettleSeaDisputes. All parties should publiclycommitnot to interfere in thecommercialoperations of oil exploration vessels and oilrigs pending the adoption of a legally binding ASEANChina Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. At the same time, the ASEAN states should endorse, flesh out and adopt specific measures to implement the initiative by the PhilippinestoturntheSouthChinaSeaintoaZoneofPeace,Freedom,Friendshipand Cooperation.ThisproposalisaimedatcreatingenclavesthatdividetheSouthChinaSea intoareasthatarerecognizedasbeingindisputefromthoseareasthatarenot.Once areas in dispute have been identified, the state parties should proceed with a pilot schemetotesttheefficacyofjointdevelopment.

Harshtreatmentoffishermen
ThreepointsneedtobemadewithrespecttofishingintheSouthChinaSea.Thefirstis thatmillionsofpeoplearedependentonfishfortheirdailysourceofprotein;thefish stockintheSouthChinaSeaisbeingdepletedthroughoverfishingandmarinepollution. Thesecondpointisthatfishdonotrespectmaritimeboundariesandeasilypassfrom onestatesEEZtoanother.Third,thewatersoftheSouthChinaSeaareindispute. Over the past four years Chinese civil enforcement agencies have acted harshly to enforce Chinas unilateral annual fishing ban in waters of the South China Sea above twelvedegreesnorthnorthlatitude.ChinesevesselshavenotonlychasedVietnamese craftoutoftheareabuthavearrestedfishingboats,seizedtheircatch,andheldtheir crewsuntilpaymentofafine(ransom).Chineseenforcementactivitieshaveextended beyondthistoincluderammingandsinkingfishingcraft.Thishasledtothelossoflife on several occasions. Further, Chinese enforcement officials have fired at Vietnamese fishingcraft,usedphysicalforcetobeatfishingcrewsincludingtheboatcaptain,seized allitemsofvalueincludingnavigationalandcommunicationsequipment(GPSsystems, radios, spare parts), and Chinese officials have reportedly siphoned off fuel. Finally, there are reported instances where Chinese enforcement ships have driven off Vietnamesefishermenseekingrefugefromstorms.The2002DeclarationonConductof PartiesintheSouthChinaSea(DOC),towhichChinaisasignatory,enjoinsthepartiesto treatfishermenindistresshumanely.

TheDOCsuggeststhat cooperationbetweenChinaandlittoralstatescouldbecarried out to address marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, safety of navigationandcommunicationatseaandsearchandrescue.9Thecurrentsituationcalls out for a regional approach to manage the fisheries, control marine pollution and ensure the safety of navigation of all fishermen without prejudice to sovereignty claimsbyindividualstates. IfChinasclaimsthatitsannualfishingbanistoprotectthefishstock,whyareChinese fishingboatspermittedtoputtoseawhilethebanisinforce?Aregionalmechanismto manage fisheries should involve all parties with a direct interest. Each of these state parties could cooperate together enforce an annual fishing ban on their own citizens. Thestatepartiescouldmountjointpatrolstoenforcethebanwiththeminimumuseof force and due respect to domestic law. And state parties could render assistance to fishermenindistress. TwoproposalsweretabledatthethirdinternationalworkshopontheSouthChinaSea heldinHanoiinNovember2011.Thefirstproposedresolvingfisherydisputesthrougha regional cooperation and management mechanism.10 The second proposal considered thenorthwestquadrantoftheSouthChinaSeawherejurisdictioniscontestedbyChina andVietnam.Thisproposaladvancedtheconceptofamarineprotectedareabetween the two countries. As a matter of urgency, the states involved should adopt informal andvoluntaryprocedurestopreventincidentsinvolvingthethreatanduseofforcesuch asdescribedabove,includingtheaimingandfiringofweaponsbywarships,deliberate ramming,andtheconfiscationofnavigationalaidssuchasGlobalPositioningSystems.

Piracy
PiracyintheStraitsofMalaccaandSingaporehaslargelybeenaddressedbythelittoral states through coordinated patrols (Malsindo) and aerial reconnaissance (Eyes in the Sky),andbytheinternationalcommunitythroughtheRegionalCooperationAgreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Piracy has relocatedfromthestraitsintothesouthernreachesoftheSouthChinaSeawhereolder ships, anchored until the global economy picks up, have been the prime victims. Combating piracy and armed robbery at sea was one of the points for multilateral

DeclarationonConductofPartiesintheSouthChinaSea,PhnomPenh,November4,2002,Point6ad.

KuanhsiungDustinWang,Resolutionto Fisheries Disputes in the South China SeathroughRegional CooperationandManagement,Paperpresentedto3rdInternationalWorkshopontheSouthChinaSea, cosponsored by the Vietnam Lawyers Association and Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, Hanoi, November35,2011andVuHaiDang,ABilateralNetworkofMarineProtectedAreasbetweenChinaand Vietnam:AnalternativetotheChineseUnilateralFishingBanintheSouthChinaSea,Paperpresentedto 3rd International Workshop on the South China Sea, cosponsored by the Vietnam Lawyers Association andDiplomaticAcademyofVietnam,Hanoi,November35,2011.

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cooperation outlined in the 2002 DOC (Point 6e) that could be taken up by regional states.11 Onenewproposaltoaddressthisthreattosafetyofnavigationistoestablishalimited purpose Maritime and Air Identification Zone.12 This proposal argues that past impediments in international law against the use of force to combat piracy could be overcome by the application of Article 105 of UNCLOS. This would stimulate greater cooperation among regional states and the international community to address this growingthreattofreedomofcommercialshippingandnavigation.

RegionalForceModernisation
Chinas military modernisation and transformation, especially naval modernisation, coupled with increased Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, has created a securitydilemmaforSoutheastAsiasstates.Chinaseffortstosafeguarditssecurityby developingwhatitconsidersareasonableforcestructuretodetertheUnitedStateshas created insecurity in several ASEAN states due to Chinas lack of transparency. ASEAN stateshavebeencircumspectinpublicstatementsbuttheirconcernscanbediscerned by the significant rise in defence expenditures and the kinds of weapon systems and platformsthattheyhaveacquired.SoutheastAsiasarmsprocurementsgobeyondforce modernisationandincludetheintroductionofnewcapabilitiesthatcanbeoperatedat extendedranges.Itshouldberecognized,however,thatnotallofthesenewcapabilities havebeenacquiredinresponsetoChinasmilitarybuildup. In Southeast Asia the conventional submarine has been the new hallmark of naval acquisitions.13 Singapore recently modernised its submarine fleet. Malaysia has taken deliveryoftwoScorpeneclasssubmarines.VietnamhasorderedsixconventionalKilo classsubmarines.IndonesiaisintheprocessofacquiringsubmarinesfromSouthKorea. ThailandandeventhePhilippinesarereportedlyinthemarketforsubmarines.Nearby Australia has recently called for tenders to construct twelve large conventional submarines.Inaddition,Australia,Malaysia,thePhilippines,SingaporeandtheUnited Statesaresteppingupinvestmentintheirantisubmarinewarfarecapabilities. Securityanalystswarnthattheproliferationofsubmarinefleetsmaybedestabilizingin timesoftensionsandcrisesduetothecomplexitiesofcommandandcontrol.Inother words, Southeast Asias arms buying spree, although largely intended for defensive
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DeclarationonConductofPartiesintheSouthChinaSea,PhnomPenh,November4,2002.

MaryGeorge,CanaLimitedPurposeMaritimeandAirDefenceIdentificationZonebeEstablishedover the South China Sea?, Paper presented to 3rd International Workshop on the South China Sea, co sponsoredbytheVietnamLawyersAssociationandDiplomaticAcademyofVietnam,Hanoi,November3 5,2011,36.
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Defence analysts estimate that 86 submarines will be added to fleets in the AsiaPacific by 2020 of which 30 will be Chinese. See: IHS Janes quoted by Sabine Pirone, Chinas Pacific Push Spurs U.S. SpendingonAntiSubWarfare,BusinessWeek,November25,2011.

purposes,mayhaveadestabilisingimpactonregionalsecurity.14Sofartherehavebeen few if any indications that this issue is being addressed by ASEANcentric multilateral organizationstowhichthispapernowturns.

ASEANcentricsecuritycooperation
InEastAsia,internationallawservestoacertainextenttomodifystatebehaviour,but state behaviour is largely motivated and constrained by realpolitik. Solutions to maritime security issues in the South China Sea should be addressed by the maritime working group established by the ADMM Plus process and as part of the ARF work process.Inaddition,maritimesecurityissuesingeneralshouldbeaddressedbysummit meetingsamongthemajorpowers(ChinaUS,USJapanSouthKorea,ChinaJapanetc.) andbyASEANmemberstatesthemselves(i.e.,thefourclaimantstatesandthesixnon claimantstates).BothoftheseprocessescouldfeedintoEastAsiaSummitprocessand strengthentheregionsnewlyemergingsecurityarchitecture. Since its establishment in 1967 ASEAN has sought to promote the twin goals of Southeast Asia autonomy and ASEANs centrality in the regions security affairs. As an illustrationoftheformer,ASEANadoptedtheZoneofPeace,FreedomandNeutralityin 1971, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 1976 and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty in 1995. As an example of the latter, ASEAN initiated the ASEANRegionalForumin1994,theEastAsiaSummitin2005toincludeIndia,Australia andNewZealand(andlaterRussiaandtheUnitedStates)andtheADMMPlusin2010. ASEANsattempttopromoteSoutheastAsianautonomyanditscentralroleinsecurity affairs often comes under pressure by the centrifugal forces of the engagement strategiespursuedbyChinaandtheUnitedStates.Nowhereisthismoreapparentthan inthemaritimedomainwheretensionsinChinaU.S.relationhavebeentransmittedto Southeast Asia and overlay tensions in relations between China and ASEAN claimant states in the South China Sea. Maritime security has now emerged as the main issue facingASEANanditsrelationswiththemajorpowers. Although ASEAN has set itself the goal of becoming an ASEAN Community by 2015 composed of three pillars (PoliticalSecurity Cooperation, Economic Cooperation and SocioCultural Cooperation) it is highly unlikely that ASEAN will develop a common foreign policy or common security and defence policy by that deadline. The reality of ASEANcentric security cooperation is that it coexists and overlays the security alignments of its individual members. Thailand and the Philippines are treaty allies of the United States, Malaysia and Singapore are members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements, while Singapore is a close strategic partner of the U.S. ASEAN is also divided on South China Sea issues between the four claimant states (Vietnam, the
QuotedbyStephenCoates,USPacificcommanderwarnsoftacticalerrors,TheChinaPost,November 10,2011.AdmiralSmithalsonotedthatheexpecteddiplomacytoprevailintheeventofabrushupand compromisetoprevail.
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Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei) and the nonclaimant states. Even among the four claimantstatestherearedifferencesbetweenthePhilippinesandVietnamontheone handandMalaysiaandBruneiontheother.Theformeraremoreproactiveinresisting Chineseassertiveness,whilethelattermaintainaverylowkeyprofile. RegionalforcemodernizationcombinedwithtensionsintheSouthChinaSeahasraised thesalienceofmaritimesecurityissues.ASEANfacesthetwinprospectsthat(1)major power tensions will continue to be transmitted into Southeast Asia and (2) ASEANs centralityintheregionssecurityarchitecturecouldbeunderminedbyamajorpower takingunilateralactiontodealwithsecuritychallengesinthemaritimedomain. ASEAN has the means to position itself between the global powers to mitigate the spilloveroftheirrivalryinitsmaritimedomain.InMay2006,ASEANDefenceMinisters metforthefirsttimeandbegantheprocessofinstitutionalizingdefencecooperationon a regional basis. This enabled a new structure to emerge that now forms part of the ASEAN PoliticalSecurity Council under the ASEAN Charter. The ASEAN Defence MinistersMeeting(ADMM)becamethecapstoneoverwhatwereinformalmeetingsof thearmy,airforce,navyandmilitaryintelligencechiefs. At present practical guidance to ASEAN Defence Ministers and their subordinates to addressmaritimesecurityissuesasapriorityappearstobelackingandtheprospectfor practicalcooperationamongASEANnaviesdoesnotappeargood.Atthe4thADMMin May 2010, it was agreed that ASEAN navies would cooperate to patrol their maritime boundaries. Little has been done to implement this agreement. At the most recent ASEANNavyChiefsMeeting(ANCM5)inVietnaminJuly2011therewasdisagreement overanumberofissuesincludingtheformalnameofthemeeting,howoftenitshould meet, the conduct of joint patrols and a proposal for an ASEAN communications protocolwhennavyshipspassedeachotheratsea.15 ASEAN has also initiated other mechanisms to deal with maritime security. In 1994 ASEAN took the initiative to form the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF has successfullycarriedoutalivedisasterreliefexercise(ARFDiREx).InMarch2011theARF established the InterSessional Meeting (ISM) on Maritime Security. The ISM on Maritime Securitys Work Plan on Maritime Security was approved at the 44th ASEAN MinisterialMeetinginJuly2011.16Itfocusesoninformationsharing,capacitybuilding, and training rather than addressing the potentially disruptive impacts of current regionalforcemodernizationprograms.Indeed,in1995aproposaltocreatearegional
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Forgeneralreportssee:JoycePangco,VietnamasksAseannaviestouniteamidChinaforays,Manila Standard Today, November 24, 2011 and Viet Nam News Service, ASEAN navy chiefs advance co operation,MaritimeSecurity.Asia,July28,2011.

ASEANRegionalForum,DraftOutlineofaWorkPlanonMaritimeSecurity:ATemplateforDiscussion, 2ndARFISMonMaritimeSecurity,Auckland,March2931,2010;CoChairsSummaryoftheThirdARF InterSessional Meeting on Maritime Security, Tokyo, Japan, 1415 February 2011; and 44th AM/PMC/18th ARF, Indonesia 2011, Chairs Statement, 18th ASEAN Regional Forum, 23 July 2011, Bali, Indonesia,Point41.

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armsregisterhasyettobeadopted.

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In2010,ASEANestablishedtheASEANMaritimeForum(AMF)underthetermsofthe ASEAN Political Security Community (APCS) Blueprint.17 The AMF is focused on a comprehensive approach to maritime issues and has so far not dealt with either maritimesecurityorSouthChinaSeaissuesindetail.18ThesecondmeetingoftheAMF washeldinThailandinAugust2011andproposedexpandingitsmembershiptoinclude dialoguepartnersinaseparatemeeting(AMFPlus). More significantly, in October 2010 ASEAN inaugurated the ASEAN Defence Ministers MeetingPlus(ADMMPlus).ThismeetingapprovedthecreationoftheASEANDefence Senior Officials Meeting Plus (ADSOM Plus) and five expert working groups.19 The ADMM Plus agreed tomeeteverythreeyearswith the second meeting scheduled for Bruneiin2013.Ayearafteritsestablishment,thetermsofreferencefortheADMMPlus ExpertsWorkingGrouponMaritimeSecuritywasapproved.Thisgroupwillnowreport its deliberations to the ADSOM Plus. In order to be effective, the ADMM Plus process mustbespeededupwithatleastannualmeetings.ThesecondADMMPlusmeetingwill conveneinBruneiin2013. Finally, in mid2011 ASEAN member states and China agreed on Guidelines to Implement the DOC nine years after the DOC was adopted. The ASEANChina Joint Working Group to Implement the DOC, originally formed in 2004, recommenced its workinJanuary2012atameetinghostedbyChina.20InNovember2011,ASEANSenior OfficialsbegandiscussionsonwhatactivitiesandprojectstoincludeinaseparateCode ofConduct.Onceagreementisreached,thedraftCOCisscheduledtobepresentedto Chinatodeterminewhat,when,whereandhowtheprojectwouldbecarriedout.21 Insummary,theriseofChinahasraisedtheimportanceofthemaritimesecurityforall states in East and Southeast Asia. China is at the centre of four of the five major challengestomaritimesecurityidentifiedinthispaper.SoutheastAsiasitsatthecritical juncture of SLOCs that cross the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific. The security of these SLOCs could be undermined by great power rivalry that is transmitted into Southeast Asia as well as ongoing force modernization programs. According to one
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HanoiPlanofActiontoImplementtheASEANRegionalForumVisionStatement,May20,2010,Point 3.

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Chairs Statement of the 19th ASEAN Summit, Bali, 17 November 2011, Points 1417 (Maritime Cooperation).

HumanitarianAssistanceandDisasterRelief;MaritimeSecurity;Peacekeeping;CounterTerrorism;and MilitaryMedicine. Antonio Siegfrid O. Alegado, ASEAN, China to set ground rules on sea issues in January, Business World,November29,2011.
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Antara,ASEANreadytodiscusscontinuationofdocwithChina,November14,2011.

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thinktank,regionalSLOCsaresettobecomemorecrowded,contestedandvulnerable toarmedstrife.22

Conclusion
ASEANhasestablishedanumberofmechanismstodealwithmaritimesecurityissues. Atpresenttheseoverlapandareuncoordinated.WhatismissingisASEANleadershipin giving direction to these multiple bodies and establishing a structure so that policy recommendations can be transmitted to ministerial and head of state level. ASEAN leadersshouldpositionthemselvesbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStatesasthebrokers of consensus on what form a streamlined regional architecture should take and what policy priorities should be adoptedto ensure maritime security in Southeast Asia.The most recent expandedEast Asia Summit (EAS)discussed maritime security issues thus establishing a precedent for retaining maritime security as an agenda item. The EAS could become focal point to address maritime security issues across the AsiaPacific Region. ASEANcanbestpositionitselfbetweenglobalpowersbyfirstgettingitsownhousein order with respect to maritime disputes among its members. This would enhance ASEANs unity and cohesion and better enable ASEAN to promote Southeast Asian autonomyandASEANscentralityintheregionssecurityarchitecture. ASEANs dogged focus on promoting confidencebuilding measures with China in the South China Sea under the DOC, while an important security goal, is fundamentally a misplacedpriority.ThisapproachdividesASEANintotwocategories,claimantsandnon claimants, and prevents ASEAN itself from adopting a common policy. This approach alsoallowsChinatoplayondifferencesamongASEANmembersanddragoutnotonly discussions on DOC confidencebuilding measures but also discussions on a more bindingCodeofConduct.ACOCfortheSouthChinaSeaistoorestrictiveasitdoesnot coverSoutheastAsiaslargermaritimedomain. ThemainpriorityforASEANshouldbetoadoptaCodeofConductforSoutheastAsias Maritime Domain. This proposal is based on two premises. First, the security of the maritimedomaininSoutheastAsiaisindivisibleforallASEANmembers,whethercoastal orlandlockedstates.Second,internationallaw,includingtheUnitedNationsConvention on Law of the Sea, applies equally throughout Southeast Asias maritime domain and notjusttheSouthChina.Itisapplicabletoallstates. Southeast Asia is beset by a number maritime boundary disputes among ASEAN members: Vietnam and the Philippines, CambodiaThailand (Gulf of Thailand), and Indonesiaanditsneighbours,aswellasbetweenMyanmarandBangladesh.
RoryMedcalfandRaoulHeinrichs,CrisisandConfidence:MajorPowersandMaritimeSecurityinIndo PacificAsia(Sydney:LowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy,June2011),3andSamBateman,Solvingthe WickedProblemsofMaritimeSecurity:AreRegionalForumsuptotheTask?,ContemporarySoutheast Asia,33(1),2011,1517.
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Regionalmaritimedisputesinvolvebothclaimstosovereigntyoverislandsandfeatures andsovereignrightsoverresourcesintheseaandcontinentalshelf.Thepurposeofa Code of Conduct for Southeast Asias Maritime Domain is to provide a framework for state behaviour pending the settlement of disputes over sovereignty and sovereign rights. An agreement to a code of conduct should be without prejudice to claims to sovereigntyandsovereignrights. Whoshouldbeincludedinaregionalcodeofconduct?Whatareashoulditcover? The regional maritime code of conduct should include all ten ASEAN members of the Association(andfuturemembers),23andcoverSoutheastAsiasmaritimedomainnot just the South China Sea in a manner analogous to the Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality(1971),TreatyofAmityandCooperation(1976)andSoutheastAsiaNuclear WeaponsFreeZoneTreaty(1995). Coverage of the entire Southeast Asian maritime domain would make all of ASEANs members stakeholders in the Code of Conduct, including Cambodia and Myanmar.24 This would overcome the present division of ASEAN states into claimant and non claimantstateswithrespecttotheSouthChinaSea.TheadoptionofaCodeofConduct for Southeast Asias Maritime Domain would reinforce ASEANs corporate and legal identityandenhanceitsabilitytodealwithexternalpowers. Allsignatoriestothecodeofconductshouldrenouncethethreatofanduseofforceto: settletheirdisputesoversovereigntyandsovereignrights, disruptgoodorderatseaincludingsafetyofnavigationandoverflight.

AllASEANstatesshouldbringtheirmaritimeclaimsintolinewithinternationallaw,with particularattentiontoeliminatingexcessivebaselinesandclearlydistinguishingislands from rocks for purposes of maritime delimitation. The expertise of an independent paneloftechnicalandlegalexpertscouldbecalledtoassistindeterminingbaselines andtheclassificationofislandsandrocks. Allsignatoriesshouldcommitthemselvestoaresolutionofmaritimedisputeswithina mutuallyagreedtimeframethroughnegotiationsorothermutuallyagreedmethods.If, attheexpirationoftheagreedtimeframenoresolutionofmaritimedisputesisreached thestatesinvolvedshouldagreetoasettlementbasedonarbitrationbyanappropriate internationalcourtortribunal(InternationalTribunalonLawoftheSeaorInternational CourtofJustice)orotheragreedprocedure.
SuchasTimorLeste. Cambodia and Myanmar were the only two members of ASEAN to remain silent when maritime security/SouthChinaSeaissueswereraisedattheNovember2011EastAsiaSummitLeadersRetreat.

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AllpartiestotheSoutheastAsiaMaritimeCodeofConductshouldcommitthemselves todemilitarisingthefeatures(islandsandrocks)thattheyphysicallyoccupy,including theprohibitionofdeployingspecifiedtypesofweaponsystemssuchaslandbasedanti shipmissiles. Forpurposesofsecurity,includingprotectionagainstpiracyandarmedcriminals,police orcoastguardpersonnelmaybestationedonoccupiedfeatures. Amaritimecodeofconductshouldalsocontainprovisionsforallpartiestocooperate in: marine scientific research, marine pollution, fisheries management, search and rescue,antipiracyandotheragreedareas. Aregionalcodeofconductshouldsetupabodytooverseeitsimplementationandto handlecomplaintsanddisputesthatmayarise.Suchabodyshouldbeincludedunder the ASEAN PoliticalSecurity Community Council. ASEAN should then encourage its dialoguepartnerstosignontheRegionalCodethroughanappropriateprotocol. ThesecurityenvironmentisSoutheastAsiaisoverlayedbythreecompetingpatternsof security cooperation: U.S.led alliances and security networks; Chinas exclusivist East Asiasecurityframework;andASEANcentricsecuritycooperation.25Thethirdapproach offers the most likely path to ensuring maritime security. ASEAN first needs to reach consensus among its member about how to streamline the existing regional security architecture.Itthenneedstobringallofitsdialoguepartnersonboard.TheEastAsia Summitofheadsofgovernmentandstateappearsthebeststructureforaleadersled forumthatcanauthoritativelydealwithproposalstoenhancemaritimesecurityvetted througheitherorboththeARFandtheADMMPlusprocesses.

Afourthpatternofsecuritycooperationamongmiddlepowers,exemplifiedbytheFivePowerDefence Arrangements,isnotdiscussedinthispaper.See:CarlyleA.Thayer,SoutheastAsia:PatternsofSecurity Cooperation(Canberra:AustralianStrategicPolicyInstitute,2010),1330.


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