HEADQUARTERS NATIONS AND FAR

INTELLIGENCE SECTION.

EAST

COMM

GENERAL

THE COMMUNIST IN POW

WAR CAMPS

The Background of incidents Among Communist Prisoners in Korea

28

JANUARY

1953

,* lncfdents

ii

, , .,.-: * a

Foreword From time United rioted, Nations refused to time during the past year, aomnunists in the

prisoner-of-war to obey orders,

camps in Korea held kangaroo

have demonstrated, courts, kidnapped,

or

and murdered. on a scale and injuries. propagandized. the incidents Nations connection

&!any of these requiring

incidents

have been of a nature with resultant assiduously connection

suppression

by force,

deaths have between The about

These the

comnunists

everywhere is the by the

By no means accidental and their exploitation

communists. information and fuller

United that

Command offers as a contribution

the follov?ing tc wider methods.

under-

standing

of communism and its

PART I THE BACKGROUND A. United 1. intentions Nations Command Policy on Treatment start forces . of War Prisoners conflict, to the treatthe

Within

a few days of the Nations

of the Korean with regard Their

of the United

ment of prisoners chief, captured humanitarian nations 2. tifying United ciples General

of war were made clear. Douglas MacArthur, "will applied announced be treated

commander-in!+, 1950, with that the

on July

enemy personnel principles

in accordance

by and recognized

by civilized

involved The United the States of the

in armed conflict." States Government Committee affirmed this policy in no"the prin-

International will,

of the Red Cross that by the humanitarian of prisoners of 1949. prinoiples

of course,
(on

be guided the treatment

Conventions Article

of war), To enwere to time "the with the

particularly able being the

3 of the Geneva Convention

to see for delegate itself that these by it 23, field

Committee

applied,

a senior

appointed on July his

was welcomed at which

Korea with General handling

official

accreditation formally of war directed

1950,

MacArthur

command that

of prisoners

. . . will

be in accordance

1949 Geneva Convention." 3.

United treated entitled physical, humanitarian rather ventions which than The obligations Nations thus assumed as a matter in general, that of course prisoners
by the

Command required,

be

as human beings to adequate spiritual concepts explicitly

who had ceased shelter,

to be combatants for

and were their on

food,

and facilities welfare. accepted that

and intellectual so generally stated

These ars based they are implied

in the

successive of war,

international the most recent

conof

on the treatment

of prisoners

was drawn up in Geneva in 1949.

4. prisoners voluntarily, to "the

NCJless merit they laws,

implicit

in the

conventions

is the

concept

that or in-

such humane treatment no longer are waging and orders according

because,

volunbarily

war and have become subject in force in the armed forces 82 of the judicial 1949 of

regulations

the Detaining

Power, 'I which, "shall in respect such laws, have

to Article in taking

Gnneva Convention, plinary measures

bo justified

or disci-

of any offense regulations

conmittod

by a prisoner

of war against

or orders." of the enemy,"

5.
prisoners

Because they

cnased to be "instrurmnts a generous in with measure Articles a wide

can be allowed

of self-government. 79 and 80, that range of duties. they Tdhwe

The Geneva Convention

provides,

are to have "representatives" there 7here secret 6. that are there ballot, It officers, the senior

officer "th?

is to

be the shall for

representative. freely this elect post. by

ar+ no officers, every six

prisoners

months, ti their with these

choice

was in accordance Nations for

requirermnts the

and concepts an3 Ends the spirit

the United

Command established handling all

administrative personnel.

opPrationa1

structure

captured

and means ware equally and the B. l?tter of the

humanitarian

and in harmony with

1949 Geneva Convention.

Hold it for on Priscners in United that it Nations would the
Gamps

The Continued 1.

Communist

From the beginning, with their character scrupulous

?vas recognized the communists

be in fullest Cormand by it they

keeping advantag?

to take

of the

adherence without

of the United being nature

Nations restrained of what

to the Geneva Convention in any way in their might attempt,

thl?mselves The exact

own actions.

however, unusual for

was not appar>-nt. mcr? than a year.

Nor was there Connunist

evidence in

of anything United incid-nts

prisoners quiet. Such

Bations

camps wsre tractable

and relatively to those

as occurred

were verv I similar 2

known wherever

there

had been prisoners communist treatment.

of war in modern times. propaganda machines rarely

The North mentioned

Korean the pris-

and Chinese oners 2. or their

When their

hand began to

be exposed, it

through

interrogation that: in

of prisoners a, United

and captured The communist

documents, high

gradually

became clear the prisoners

commsnd regarded in combatant controllnd status. within

Nations b.

camps as still wore

The prisoners system There

th"! camps by the fighting. high

same political c.

whioh

had dominated between

them while the

was communication leaders

communist

command and communist d. sequoncos the

in the camps. rogardlqss of the con-

The prisoners to themselves,

were to bo used, to qmbarrass

the United ths position

Nations of the

Command in communists

eyes of the world

and strengthen negotiations. prisoner

in the Panmunjom armistice e. formulated ting with Thr: plans and timed tho United for

mutinies

and other

incidents

were

by the very Nations

same communists

who were negotiaat Panmunjom. and Chinese pris-

Cormand representatives the North Korean

3.
oners

In their in United axioms

attitude Nations that

toward

camps, the the individual

communists is

are faithful

to their except as any of all

well-known

of no importance

he can contribute mans. tho right

to communist of his himself of his

ends and that

such %ends justify least

He has no rights to consider orders

own as a human being, by ca$ur? military his whole

fined

from the obligation end political status mastrrs.

to obey the

communist that

The Geneva Convention nnbitlod resistance

may imply is

as a prisoner to cease any from is capture

to humane treatm=,nt and be passive, on his part.

posited

on his willingness

but the

communists

do not recognize geographic;ully sole obligation his

such obligation his army, he still

Though separated of that army, and his given

is part

to rr~n>

uut such or&rs

as it

may hav?

him before

or gets to him after Geneva Convention captured they

can

his

capture.

To the

communists,

th*ereforo,

the

has value but

not in safeguarding for

the melfar?

of their in which a useful

p-irsonnol

in assuring

them circumstances and providing

do maximum harmtoth-ir propaganda exploitation

guardians

peg far them. 4. "fighters"

cf any countermeasures

taken

against

This belief continuing interviews

of the*connnunist the war within and seized

prisoners

in thems'clves

as

the camps, r?vcaled docyuments, is

in detail excopparty I&, 1952. and 113

in countless tional clarity

shown with

and fullness

in a hand-written riot

i?xhortativr: of December were killed

summary of the results In that wounded. according determined attempt

of the Fongam-do

at mass breakout, would bc heavy and %ur death",

85 prison?rs
casualties fighting

That there

had boon expected, comrades "task . . . were imposed out -fight on could to

to the document, to dia a glorious

Though the

us by the party not be fulfilled, give fied oners the that "lost

and fathnrland" the "main

-- which purpose

was to break

is to develop The party

a class

enemy a crushing tk-is

defeat". In the

loadership effort",

was satisthe prisand these was a "legal made it sucthe

had been dow. but their and glorious with

"magnificant lives

nothing

shameful victory."

in the fight, D-I;? uprising

'nere for fight

liberation

, , . conn:ctrd that

the fatherland themselves of t&

war". Yhe Great

That

cassfulwas fatherland, nakedly violence

by sacrificing fighters

sons of Korea, Stalin"

and honorable the inhumanitarian, of the Amorioan world, to

had "exposed

brutal, imperialists,

cannibalistic causing the party the

slaughtering peaceable peoples

of the whols (sic!) nations

th;;: fatherland, shout for revenge". from the

and all

democratic victory

They had %on a great pcacnable peoples to disclose

by estran-ing The United

the Americans Xations

of the world"* the Pongam-do

Command had becn compelled

incident press th?

by radio,

"without

conoflalment, devoted its

to thR world", to

and "the

of the whole world invnstigation

attention As a result,

Compound F and "the offensive the crimes by the to the (1) over troops docu-

of the incident". (sioL) policy nations toward briskly".

by ths- democratic and slaughtering ?ncmy is ment, 5. after the

of the prisoners This

TNorld against

of war committed will, the according fatherland", authority

now developing thr:timo

"hasten

of our rejoining concept by the of continued

Th? communist their capture control from

enemy would learmd In their subordinates but

have littln

meaning without Korean and Chinosc

elaborate

systctm

by the North armies,

communists officers often tary fear

th? Sovi#?ts.

perhaps

many of the and

and some of the-ir fanatical communists,

are well-indoctrinated soldiers arc, involun-

most of the to&h-r

conscripts instilled

who must be held by intcnsiv? punishment.

and made to fight constant

through

"instruction," This

surveillance, officers prisoners or in

and ruthloss cormnissars United party policy, allowed trol

is done by politicaf

($),

hundreds

of whom have biion amcng the

Nations and skilled those

Command camps, themselves in dominating othws.

members of the In accordance

communist with standard have con-

who have been captur.?d to be captured prisoners. It

or pnrhaps

deliberately have established

themselves other

mthodically

over

is they

who have decided

who would

71) POW Camp No. 1, Koje-do. Special Intellignme Report No. 7. Bccausc cf ls:hat it reveals of the thinking of the communist prisoners a translaticn cf this document in its entirety is given as Annex 1. (2) Of thr; 120,000 prisoners hs?ld by the United Xaticns Command, all have undergone instruction by political offic,?rs. Specific and dztail:>d rof'nrwcqs to the systqm ax-2 found in the following docum-nts: 521 MISD Rpt #1375, 21 Ncv 51, 528~1JISFI-0662, 18 Ott 1951, KOR-B-100 (lo*), 10 July 1951, KOR-2-502 (lob), 25 SC:@ 1951. Air University Far East Research Group, Duestionnaire 5a-Erief on Cultural Political Officws, Self Criticism fJestings and Relations to Gn, KT 4022, 6 NOT 52, KT 40!+!+, 4 NOV 52, KT 4054, 4 NOV 52.

be the suring order munist politically Strict

"r~eprnsentativ?" that responsibility

leaders for

in the

camps and compounds, of' discipline

enand

the maintenance and clothing

and the distribution hands (2). inept adhr:rence As long

of food

would be in comunorganized in their powr. and

as they were togothor, were complnt?ly Nations

non-communists by the United

Command to the of

stipulations was

of the Geneva Convention decidedly 6. to the With the advantage communist

on the selection of the political organization

"rnproscntatives" offic'rs.

well

sntrnnched

in the

pris-

on?r-of-war cations arousing

camps, the next it

step was to establish command in United

in

.?ffecti.vo Korea without

communi-

between the

and tha high of the

North

suspicions

Nations Part

Co-mmand. How this II, but in general (2) or USC

was done is cxplainod

in some detail

was made of ag-?nts who allowed m-mbors filtrated, prisoner-of-war 7. Through of the often communist guerrilla

themselves n&work

to be oapturod

in South Korea who intothc. vicinity of the

in the guise

cf rcfugws, back

camps to pass mcssagcs such channels wrentually for

and forth. instructions to the of

flowed

oommunists

in the camps to riots

preparc

open violnncs They wer"

in the form

mass mutinios, and attack their

and breakouts.

to disobey,

chall;:ngc to

guards.

They were to cause enough trouble

tl) Plans, polici?s, directives and m&hods cf implementation of oontrol, mutinies and punishment of IWs bythn Communist are revealed in documents - KOR - 308 - 208 (5C) 5 June 1952, 11 June 1952, 25 June 1952 , 17 July 1952, 9 July 1952, 19 June 1952, & July 1952 and 31 July 1952. KOR - 704 - 1005 (5a) 13 Dee 1952, EQ UNC POT Camp #I (Xojo-do) dated 1 Ott 1952 and 2 Sopt 1952, 2 November 1952 and assorted documents taken from P&S, KOB - 704. - 1005 (5a) 25 Sept l952. (2) In late 1951 the United Nations Command captured its first North Korean Prison Camp agetis. Thrse prisomrs revealed that they were deliberate plants and had been trained by the Political Security Department of th- North Korean ."r.my. Thcsc agents rove-led that their mission was to stir prisoners of war to riot and mutiny to foster Communist aims regardless of the outcon'! to the participants. 528@ISPI-0730, 18 Dno 1951, 528 IVE~PI-0729, 16 Dee 1951. 6

weaken the position armistice they

Xcma

of the United (I). the local If

Nations thoy

Comnnnd in the Panmunjom in brizaking operating the Unitad areas.

vrith

ncgctiations link up tith tho trocps the

succeeded bandits and force frcm

out, in South Naticns

wcrc; to

communist populace

to tnrrorizc

Command to pull anticipat-d and that the that

and -quipl-h:nt rioting prisoners

forrmrd no&

would

It was -.. resistance and to

many might

be killed.

Thay w-r? in ordering

srpondable,

howevar, loaders

instructions

were explicit

the communist

disregard

any possible

cons?qwnco thc,rr: wore,

to the participants thn better Nations their

in incidents. value.

The nor-o cnsualtiss Moral world, nrmisticcondomnation it

propaganda

of the United would help

Command in the its firmness

eyes of the in the

was rrasonnd, negotiations. The scurc':

to weaken

8.
commnd 8Jations armistice the

of thcsc It

instructions was the v-:ry arcund

was not simply men who sat with the tn'r.lo

chug4

th-

high the United

in R'orth Korcn.

Command representatives negotiations.

of the with

Panmunjom carrying on

Thrsy wsre

doubly

negotiations

in furtherance and putting help

of th-: objectivrs into the sffcct

of the comunist measures, primarily 5dtheir

hierarchy military, vantag?. continued

and devising which Their would

tc sting

negotiations was only duties

to their incident&to

assignment

as delcg5tos militsry

pcrfcrmnce

of their

(2).

Nam 11, a former

(1) Special Intcllig?nce Reports, HQ, WC POW Camp $1 (Kojc-do) 2 Sept and 1 Ott 1952. Interrogation of Prisoner of War Reports of Prison Camp Agents. KOR - 308 - 208 - entire 5C series dnted &lay 1952 to Dee 1952. (2) Intalligcnce derived from thousands of docents has established thy mission and duties of the Communist dole@es as identical with their primery missions in the Communist armies. Supplement Numbor 1 te Operaticaal Jhmcrandum 8d-3,k8Wgc, 29 act 1951;521 XISDI - 1322, 4073 3 Nov 51, CCRAK $103, 10 28 Ott 51,&+ 5- Corps -L _ . r . "?%"n;,. January 1952, ZZi-5555, Lx'3X~~T,w" ZJY-5893, 21 Dee 1951, ZJY 8957,

DRC

1952.

Soviet Chief

officer, of Staff

was the most important and Chief of ths for all Security ensuring lxrsrnnnl

of then, Agency the loyalty through

and as Cultural of ths North Korean

Army (l), the State

was rssponsiblc? by controlling

of tho army to officers was Chief with of or

political

comissars.

Lpo Sang Jo, Nam's deputy of Military disguised Sovi& Security Intelligence. as a lioutonant MVD agent with Depnrtmont,

at Panmunjom, (2). Frequontly

Collection Panmunjom, Pa, former Political Nam botwxn hoadquartors

them at Kim Korean for Army agents

or snrgoant, a high position

was General in the North officer Korean 2nd train

V&IO sorvod cormand

os liaison North

Panmunjom and his (3). the

in the

on.0 of his tesks priscner-of-war

was to recruit camps.

to be s.ont into C. Tho Xcjs-do Toward the of increasing prisoners

Outbreak L:nd of 1951, offorts by the Th? success would like the United Nations to Command bncarnc uware contact with the

comnunists of those to instigat

kcop in

of war.

nfforts

could

not bc neasurod. for

That the communists grant+d, no ovidonct ingrsdiont cnsui-o it. but the that

e trouble rxaincd Surprise care

was takr-n quiet

prisoner-of-war anything

ccmpounds

and gave

zas dc,v?lcping. plot, tho and sprcial rutbrcak

was an essential was taken to to fit the

in the communist Not until after

was it

possible

71,

N&i 11's rise as a Soviet officqr has been traced from his Soviet Army carenr to Korea as a Soviet-sponsorod North Korean gem ral in KG 1122, 31 May 52.

(2) LEE Sang Jn has boon idontifi-d as the head oftho North Korean Army Intcllig?nco, Hc> was brought frcm Russia and placed in this position in July 1950. 302 - DISC - 1 - 2768, Feb 52, KOR - 308 207 (2>, Dee 1952.
(3) General KIX Pa has b-en idsntified as a forrxr Scvint hWD agent and now one of the high-ranking officers cf the North Korean Political S,curity Department. Bye witnessps hav- seen him at Fanmunjom disguised variously as a linutenant or sergeant. KOR Nov 1952, ZJY-5275, 19 Ott 51. 308 - 207 (2)*

Pieces tice

together negotiations, of war.

and reconstruct only

what

had happened, remained,

In tkn repatriation

armisof

one major

issue

prisoners nist for

Nan 11's

delegation

bcgan to stall, That

and commu-

propaganda the Koje-do

became more vehomont. prisoners l&tar, to mutiny. and it onablcd

was the momont ohcsen out their that initially of Command Even SC, with of in-

They carried

structions . tho

to tho

must be admitted thomtc by the thy achieve United

advantage

of surprise

a measur': Nations

success. saved tho

Only stern situation

counter-action and brought

camp under worldwide

cwtr@l. nttanticn pwsocuticn

Nam 11 gained propaganda Communist

an cpportunity rf of war"

to attract will-gal

allegations prisomrs

and barbaric Natie17s

by tho United

Command.

ii 'THZ UNFOLDING GF Thi PLCT

A.

Development 1. With well

of the Situation the collapse 100,000 of the North Communists throughout forces into Nations where Korean forces toward the end of Nations Eighth Army.

1950,

over

were held the rear

by the United area of the

Command in installaticns The entrance sequent of Chinese

the Korean forces their

conflict

and the submass evacuation soon imperiled of action, of Koje-do,

withdrawal

of United

necessitated concentration of several

of Trisoners logistical it off

to the Pusan area, channels. After

consideration a Food installation which

courses

was decided the south

to establish coast of Korea,

on the island

would be large Initial 1951, construction

enough to accommodate and first the total shippopula-

the mass of Communist ments of prisoners tion at Koje-do

prisoners.

began in early exceeded 1~0,000.

and by midyear

On the mainland, The Koje-do Chinese. difficulty

at Pusan, population

a smaller was divi-

installation ded into 2.

housed hospital about 130,000 Koreans

patients. and 20,000

In the early

days of Koje-do, Not until

little

was experienced of any signifiin the Armistice to prisoners of

by camp authorities. cance. fihen it

lPSZ was there perelleled

trouble

appeared,

it

developments 4, pertaining

negotiations war.

at Panmunjom on Agenda Item on this issue had narrowed neg,otiators

The talks

to the question indicated that, for

of who would before exchange they of

be repatriated.

The Communist

would make any substantive prisoners, prisoners under against 3. sonnel for its they required

agreement an estimate

on arrangements of the total return

number of Communist to Communist control

the United principle his wish.

Nations that

Command would

no prisoner

would be repatriated

by force

No effort to determine

had been made until their however, political made it

that

time

to screen

captured

per-

sympathies, net sssary

The Communist

demand

an estimate,

to question

the prisoners.

I.

Carqful would

plans resist

were return

made to ascertain to Communist

who among the prisoners North Korsan

forcibly

control. in their

and Chinsse they thought they

prisoners would merely 4.

were to be asked whether resist they repatriation, elected difficulty

olun minds

forcibly whether

and South Koreans

were to be asked authorities.

to be handed over was experienced

to Communist until

No particular the first

the screening by

teams reached fanatical Screening

of a group

of compounds

led and controlled

Communist could

elements

who refused

to cooperate at the time

in the program. but in view

have been accomplished considered was decided

by force,

of what was then negotiations of scattered in certain canture it

to be the favorable to wait. At aoout the climaxed general

trend

of the Armistice a series spirit by the This made it such

the same time, same rebellious on &y of the

incidents other

at Koje-do

reflected

cornFounds. Dodd, then defiance

These were commanding dictated

7, 1952, island.

of General

demonstration quite disreerd United toward Brigadier an officer placed After Boatner, Communist 5. reduce clear

of overt

by compound leaders United could its Nations

to ths Commander in Chief, of discipline and authority

Command, that if the

not be tolerated responsibilities

Netions all

Comrr.and was to discharge personnel as required

properly

captured General with

by the Geneva Convention. combat leader in the Orient, uncontested on the island, of all the and was

Eaydon L. Boatner, a diversified

an experienced of service to regain forces

background wit,h orders

in command of Koje-do receiving withjn an augmentation about

control. General

of securrity

one week,

was in complete

control

compounds. As a consequence of what had been revealed, of the prisoner population it was decided by to

the concentration

on Koje-do

establishing islands into

n?w camps dispersed which would

on the Korean insofar feeling. Prisoner 11 of

mainland as possible,

and on other prisoners of of the

be shifted,

thn same nationality newly organized United

and political Nations

Under the d;rection

Var Command, pro-Communist

Korean on the islands brought

prisoners southwest immediately together side Korean

were transferred tip of Koje-do, southwest on the island of the island prisoners

to three

other

locations--Chogu-ri, and Yongeho-do, prisoners were on Antitwo

and to Pongam-do of Koje. All Chin?sa with

of Cheju-do,

the pro-Communists on the south. of camps throughout worked out plan for

the north Communist

and the anti-Communists were settled in a chain a carefully of self-contained more manageable compounds following large-scale the authority installations. realized that subversive

South Korea. the construction orisoners 6. screening but isolated

The operation

included

and winterization in smaller,

camps in which groups. the completion demonstraticns, continued instalof

would be housed The breakup successfully acts

of the Koje-do curtailed

challenging

of camp officials In all anti-Communist

to occur lations, in exact Rations evident provement B.

in pro-Communist once the prisoners accordance Frisoner sincerity in living with

they had in fact

been handled

the plans

announced

to tnem by the United cooperation and im-

of itar Command, there in accepting conditions. Reached Into their

was enthusiastic new locations

as a desirable

How the Communists

1.

the Camps negotiations that the

Toward the end of 1951, the issue

when the Panmunjom Armistice prisoners unit of war, to help it

approached

of exchanging

was learned

the Communists discussions.

1

had organized This unit,

a special

in influencing of the North agents plans

attached

to the headquarters of training out various negotiators senior

Korean

Army,

had the specific

mi-L ecions

to send into and of It

the prisoner-of-war furnishing was under intelligence

camps as FWs to carry to the Communist of General

at Panmunjom.

the supervision

Warn 11,

Co.mmunist delegate

at Panmunjom (1). (1T Prison camp agents have revealed that a special unit was formed to train them in their mission of penstrating United Nations camps by allowThis unit was part of the ing themselves to be captured by UN forces. Political Security Department of the North Korean Army, GHQ. [General Nam 11, in his capacity as Cultural Chief of Staff of the North Korean Army, commands and suoervises the duties of the Political Security Department. 528~MISPI-0730, 18 Dee 195i, 528 MISPI-0729, 16 Dee 51. CCRM #lOj, 10 Jan 52, ZLY+'$~, 1 Nov 1951.
12

In December Chief

of 1951,

the translation Section from

of a captured Labor

document Party

sined that

by the

of the Southern to information thirty

of the Korean the party to sixty

stated

"according approximately diers

in Kyongsang thousand North

Namdo, South Korea, Korean Army sol-

thousand

interned

in the Koje-do Namdo Branch in their was part

prisoner-of-war of the Korean (I),

camp have been organized, labor Communist Farty will

and the Kyongsang start 2. extended sion civil activities The unit

behalf"

of Nam's political echelon

control

organization brigade party,

which or diviyouth,

down through party

each military cells. It shows, troops, a soldier's party line. membership Additional control elements

from corps, handled

to three-man

The organization published censored secure career daily mail their either

and oropaganda choirs

affairs.

and weekly and utilized blind loyalty

newspapers, all pos-

organized sible morale. suspending ation both

and service

media to indoctrinate It controlled him from

and bolster him to or any devifor the of

by admitting him for

or 'oy prosecuting missions

from the party thought

of Nam's machinery troops included preparation

and physical

of all within

Communist the

detection military

of dissident propaganda,

armed forces,

the recruitment, punishment of traitors

training (2).

and dispatching

of agents,

and the corporeal 3. mitted trate line

i.;any :?risoners that thoy were

captured deliberate

by the United plants

Nations

forces

have adto penein frontsur-

and had been dispatched Yale acents were dispersed either

the prisoner Communist units

camos at Koje-do. and, during This smsll

combat

nngagemsnts,

rendered their

or were "captured." th-

method enabled ease and comfort detection. to secure

many agents through

to find

way into

compounds with without

the normal were dispatched nearby

prisoner-of-war as refugees. prisoner-of-war egents within

channels

Female agents Dmployment to assist

They were instructed hospitals the camps.

at or live the Communist

or camps in order

11) ATIS DCCU'XF?$T27, D;Jcembor 1951 by %i?f Korean isbor Party.

of Southern

Section

of

(2) Tnousands of prisoners through interrog.ation reports, dccuments and other sourc-?s of intelligence h,-v-0 revealed in detail the function and missions of the Communist political apparatus which binds thair armiTs into combat urits. ATIS Enemy Documnts 9 Nov 1951, 521 MSD Kpt #1375, 21 Nov 51, Supplensnt #l C'FN Xfiic 8, 29 Ott 1;l KT LO29, 8 Nov 52, KG tiO9, 5 D=c 52, Air Univ-:rsitg Far Fast Fks-,arch Group Questionnaire Sa, Brief , self-criticism meetings and relations to CR cultural politial officers men. 12

L. After

All

agents

initially they were (a) Cor;munist

were selected thoroughly History theory;

from hard-core for

Communists. in the and Korean party

selection, subjects: (b)

schooled

two months Party

following labor groups, situation, directed effect Party:

of the USSR Communist (c) (d) methods Korean

of organizing revolution The agents

either

civilian

or military;

and world were to the was

and (e) specifically that unification and that

the situation to spread

in South Korea. propaganda

among the prisoners Korean

of Korea under withdrawal

the North

Cioverrment forces

a certainty was imminent. being that high given the life North

of the United to emphasize that

Nations

from Korea was

They were also to the North of the North Government Korean

modern equipment Union

Army by the Soviet soldier had vastly

and China, that

Korean

improved, about

Korean

officials high

were concerned respect

the welfare would

of the prieoners

of war and that return.

and consideration

be shown them upon their 5. agents they To stimulate were told soon would that return

maximum loyalty an Armistice to North

and zeal definitely

in their

mission,

the and that en-

would be signed fears

Korea. that

To dispel

previously forces because prisoners.

gendered killed all

by the Communist prisoners,

propaganda

the United now stated

Nations that

the Communist

leaders

of

the Armistice As a final

negotiations encouragement

the enemy had stopped and inducement, praised

murdering

the agents

were promised return. (1). of "cell

that They

they would be publicly would be treated 6. Specific

end decoreted Korean

upon their people

as hzroes instructions

of the North stipulated

the establishment

organization vision cells thr=+ within

committees"

in each prisoner-of-war smallast

camp and close units.

suparThree and

them down to their to constitute

three-prisoner three officers groups

were considered divisions

a group, Korean within

a division

a committee. to responsible stringent

North positions milit-ry

were to be assigned network in

by the agents order to foster

the cellular As the cells , protests

discipline. out strikes

grew strong,

they were to instigate

and carry l@ Dee 195'1, l.&

and demonstrations.

5284ISPI-0729,

16 Dee I;$, KT 4158,

7.

In addition further instructed

to their

cellular

organizing the attitude

functions,

the agents of each

were

to investigate

and conduct

prisoner. voluntarily, and those interrogation. posing 8. effective Guidance

They were to obtain those

the names of those

who had surrendered Korean times Government, for informers

who were unsympathetic

to the North in several guards future

whom the camp authorities Names of the Republic were also contact

had called of Korea for

and all

as prisoners To establish coordination, Bureau,

to be obtained with Communist high for

reference. of war and insure

prisoners

the Communist is responsible of guerri.lla Section

command used the Guerrilla the infiltration operations Korean (1). of agents In addition, into

which

South Korea the Military To its military

and the control Intelligence Department, system,

of the North

Army was employed. Korean of

Espionage intelligence

com.posed of the elite was entrusted

of the North

much of the transmission Korea. It is

the records into with agent

and messages

from prisoners

to North

organized

teams of 10 to 12 officers of the team commanders with

and non-commissioned varying portable from radios to form together senior

officers lieutenant manuto

the ranks

colonel. facture nets iers

'1%~ teams are equipped and are dispatched with

of Soviet covert with

instructions These units, Bureau,

intelligence cour-

throughout of the

South Korea. Guidance prisoners

guerrilla

kerrilla

were the primary and North

means of contact (2). utilized the

between 9.

the Communist It has further press contact for

at Koje-do that

Korea

been determined communication not always

the Communists

non-Communist that direct

and planning. be pcssible

They anticipated because of increased

would

n> Thousands of bandits, agents and guerrillas have surrendered or been captured by UNC counterintelligence units. They have revealed in detail the functions, duties and missions assigned to them by the Guerrilla of General Pae Chol, who also is a Guidance Bureau under the leadership Soviet Army officer. 521-!&ISDI-1400, 3 Dee 51, 521 XISDI-lh26, 17 Dee 51, 521~xISDI-~!&, 26 Dee 51, KOR 0165834L~ Sept 51, KOR-704, X02 (lOa> '2 Dee 1952, CCRAK F-6260, 2 Dee 52, KT hO83, 24 Nov 52, KT 3879 29 Cct 52. (2) Communist military a:;ents operating in South Korea have been captured and stated they were part of, and trained by the Espionage Department of the North Korean MI Section, They were generally officers with cryptographic and signal training. (North Korean Intelligence System FECII) 13). Guerrilla couriers of ths Guerrilla Guidance Bureau were utilized as a primary mqans of contact KOR - 7& - 1003 (5a) '2, 5, 6 Nov 1952 and Special Intelligence Reoort $4, HQ UNC PCW Camp #l, (Koje-do), '2h Ott 1952.

United

Nations

security

measures. press that

Thus instruction and interim

was given

in how to

use the non-Communist Prisoners daily into have stated

as a secondary copies Material of current for

medium of contcct. were lectures smuggled was

newspapers

the compounds. from the newspapers however,

indcctrination the published newspapers

prepared

by distorting was that these

news items. enabled the corn-

The main advantage, munist tice other 10. leaders negotiations violence

in the

camps to keep current to time their

on developments activities, riots,

in the Armisdisorders and (1).

and thus

to be most advantageous

to the Communist functioning

negotiators

To keep the compounds organized, communication

and under

control,

an internal ternal occasion feigned lished mcuth. cation

system was needed. the 6Lth Field

The principal Hospital. compounds,

means of ini%en there prisoners was then estabwas

communication

was through with

to get in touch illness between

members of other the hospital. notes

to get into

Communication tied center to rocks

the wards by throwing

or by word of communiin this compounds. was desigthe Communin the

The officers' system, All

ward %as the nerve information

of the hospital were centralized

and directives released

ward and then

disseminated

by patients

to different

Each ward was known as a "yuk" nated ist a "ku" or battalion. organization the Communist

or company.

Each group of wards for

Ward A-6 was th-? headquarters (2). Most of the prisoner either voluntarily leader If

intra-hospital joined

workers

hospital tarily. whether ,

organization carefully

or involunto ascertain he

Each was interrogated or not

by his ward

the man was already

a good Communist. Labor Party

acceptable,

was then made a member of tha Korean part of the communication 11. In addition flegs, system.

and became an integral

to the hospital hand signals, rocks for

communication whistling

system,

the prisoners and throwing Messages Report #l K@R - 70& -

used semaehor

and chanting

messages wrapped

around

inter-compound

co?uxunications.

71) KOR - 308 - 208 (SC) 9 June 1952, and 2, HQ UNC, PW Camp #l, (Koj+ do), 1005 (Sa), 5 Cct 1952. (2) KOR - 704th CIC Det, KCWZ APO 234, 208 (SC) dated 9 June 1952. 16

Specie1 Intelligence 1 and 2 Sept 1952, 2 Novamber

x-d

195'2, KOR - 308 -

xc3re also the various

placed

in rations,

clothing

and sxpplies overlooked ingenious

being

delivered of

to

compounds.

The prisoners by a rather

no possibility attempt to tie

communication to large 12. including dispatched tions dragon

as evidenced flies (1).

messages

Communication North Korea,

between

prisoners

and points mainly

outside

the camps,

was accomplished Korea through

by agent-prisoners with instruc-

from North

the mcdiurn of capture in the enclosures. who received in North

to be delivered by covert

upon arrival agents

This

system was on Such

augmented messages messages fiscated

on the outside for

and passed Korea,

from Communist addressed

prisoners

delivery

to even Kim I1 within

Sung and Mao Tse-tung (2).

have been con-

from priscners

the compounds

71) KCZGI 350.09 subject, Ccrmunist PsPl and Civilian (2) Special CZGI Letter, Intelligence trxsnittal

Communist Internees,

Subversion within 3X dated 20 Cct 195'2.

Camps for 211 Ott 52.

?.eport #l-i, HQ, UNC PC?VCamp $4, documents, 30 Ott $2.

17

PART III COW?~IST A. Political 1. ORGANIZIITION '&THIN THE CABPS

Organization. organizational to exploit this structure the Koje-do became operative which prisoners however, the North is Korean

The over-all developed Months

communists Chart 1.

shown in CDnmunist

before

the

prisoners

in individual

compounds were established they

organizing.

The communists branch of the

in Compound Korean Labor

92 in May of 1951 Party (1) which groups

the Koje-do the "Liberation

termed

Fighting corn and into a

Association," pounds. Youth cells

Similar

were formed

in most of the other agitation,

Each came to have subordinate Association as in all (military) communist sections, organizations.

political,

and members were divided Among them circulated as the following: and will for Republic sacri-

statement
(a)

of such aims and principles

l

Ve fice Party

are reborn our lives so that

members of the Party and display the North victory." members of the Party and carry all all Korean

our ability People's

the may

win the final

(b) .

'"Ne are reborn faithful proclamation

and will

be

to the Party to educate ail1 Republic refugees,

out tne Party's of war,l' of the of uar, of

prisoners the platform prisoners

(cl.

Thr

Party

implement

People's indigenous

to have all or officers

and soldiers the platform." try forces,

to

the Republic

of Korea recognize rfill Mth class foster the

(d) .

"Our Party be friendly and infuse soldiers."

internationalism, Chinese Communist into

consciousness

United

Nations

(2)
June 1952; ;;C& - 30%208 (SC) k April 52

TITja and
(2)

26 &y

- 15'2. 208

(SC),

KCR - 308

- 208 (Sa, 17 June 1952.

;r-/ I

I a; .!3 4

d-t R :: a ?? 2 2 iv d m I? ZJ *r-l 9 :a * k0 2 OS q :: iz iz I= -9 $ ;I f j 51 2p 2 Es 11;

1 1 1 /

JfTJi

I A: 5;s _ $$.$ -II .-iZ-4 0 - Qc$ ! ; L--5! 1 t / I tI I I

i--?

p1.j 1 j.yj 4. 3 L4 o,c! 1 @ii 1

* 2; i ;I ,4j/di-*- I:$ 7 +Ji I-.j I V I

p/i
/ a &.jJ
is jii

i.i

--I

I zj 3k cli g 3go I 1 z.5 $I/ 1 p2rj Liz-1

Chart 1

2. clarified

At a later its

stage,

the expanding as follows; the possible

Communist

organization

objective

Irife must consider negotiations ate ourselves which

rupture

of the cease-fire to liberSung.

are now underflay with

and be ready

in accordance of wr with Party should

orders

from Kim Il

The prisoners themselves organized liberate American autonomous officer ivill land

educate All

themselves tpes

and surround must be to

members.

of units -in

to rise all

in revolt

sim.~.ltaneously of war and attack occupy Koje-do.

order

the prisoners that noyl

the ROK and Alfter we win commanding and the (1)

forces rights

we will

keep in touch People's Lfter that guerrilla same time Korean

r-rith the

of the hrorth Korean on Korea proper. with

Army by mireless we 611 joint

NKPA together of the slogans

the Chiri-san at the of the

units.lt mere:

ado2ted soldiers

(a).
(b).

We are Republic."

Democratic

People's

"We have fought continue to fight

for for

the People's it."

Republic

and nil1

(c)o Cd).
(e).

We must be re-trained." "American Withdraw Vur imqarialism ycur is the enemy of humankind.

hands from Korea." is :iaiting for us. Y$e must be ready

Fatherland

to go to Chiri-san.lt

(f). (9).
3. 11, the party

We must be treated Convention.17 We must be friendly and instructions was perfected

in accordance

:vith

the Geneva

i;-ith

all

leftist

c%iipps.

(2)

As directives structure

began to flo:v and strengthened.

in from !km An Over-all

(1) (2)

K9R - 308 - 208 (Sa), KOR - 308 _

17 June 1952~ 17 June 1952.

208 (sa),

Political the various Organization, tary

Committee

vias established four

to control sections,

the prisoners Political in Chart in all Security, 2.

in

comoounds through Military,

and Agitation, committees were These

as show organized committees, the plans

Xili-

administration control military

compounds under organized of the offenders its mili-

Communist so-called committees. who deviated tant into

(Chart units

3).

in turn, and directives to punish to join

to enforce

llPeoplets from the

courts11 lqere established I%rtyls Informants oolicies or loyal military or refused party

organizations. or were placed L.

members penetrated down to squad level or "General Leading in pris(1).

in every

echelon Committee

The leader .-.I^_Im,wI 3..L-.-^ of the Poli$.ical

Headquarters the North

II was Jeon Moon Il, IS?< 182117, listed as a private - _ Jeon has been identified by his fellow Korean Lrmy.

group of 36 Sovietoners as Pak Sang Hyon, one of the original . _. Koreans brought into North Kors? by the Soviets in 1945 to organize the North Korean Satellite State. Other members of this Xthin Prisoners same Soviet

group lvere Kim Il. Sung, Ho Kni and Xam Il. Pak wnt that by the code name of Ro Sun Saeng. all the

the compounds, have stated ordered the for Nations instructo death

he controlled __ of General the riots program diroctivcs

compound s and ocrsonally He also :.t,?s allegedly 77 against

capture instigating screening tions,

Dodd.

responsible the United He issued

in Compound voluntary

for

repatriation.

and propaganda. xho had dared

It '-IRS he ;sho sentenced to defy the Party

many of the prisoners (2). sently 5.

directives

Pak Sang Hyon has besn removed being held separately. sections of the

from the compounds and is prc-

Tha four

ltGxzr?l

Leading

Hcadquartcrs"

had

the folio-:Ji.ng

functions:

(1) (2)

Snxial Intolligcnce Reports, 1 Ott and 2 Sept. 5'2. Special Intolligance 2 Novcmbsr 195'2. Report #s,

HQ UNC POX Camp #fl (Koje-do), HQ UNC PW Camp #l (Koje-do),

-0

b %z&J OGi.4 -6 -$$ i @JdV1 i 29 +a vi 0 2)1 z $k$ I

-I

i-- 7 I .,+ d g i

-- - _ t? z Od--(o a, VI)2 s t r.0Z 5: 22 11awcj I l----r-r----Ei $ -$ *z 0 z-2 VI a, c: : T$ d II; : -J rhez Qim

w / i .rl ;.$ $2 I q WI .c : =: 2 --_

FI

s 2 0 2 2 K) --

u2 I h:: OS! 2 x si-2 : >: vl) i

, !$ y-1 it 22 5 e tj E c E$ i!? El +4 j! 2, $I GC,cJ I Ti;LT- Lt. v : ir ,.A /p& ;gq !- 4 I- --_! --g 0 I I 3 ar,i ; 9 .I--o 0 .kj 2 : dZ;rt v VI --_ -I I
I

Jp

-T------.,: v :: 2 3 03 a 2 2 5 I

2 2 2 9-E 2: 2, -d 2 F xG F, *r-l al * j; yg . &cl--. M 2, Q&X d k Gd*E -P;7 c, 3 a 4 gg m azu a GlJ es* 2 Ei 2 Z ,E U z ;: F; g 2, 52 Z EL 2 d 6 i, uo CR L r> .rl 0 13 $Z ET 3 k?ax $. L pi v .A s r-l * CP4 a cs :* 6 E r: 2 El Go

.~ r 2 2 i

---I

-;: : rn

.a

I--l

s d h&LI hl r: $3 ,r( -dr: a 23, 2 G,z,ln cu 0 is;; -..

I I I 1 I

.--r--2 2 : 5: ,$I zij -I s 0 0 cc :; 2 5 r-4H L.-C--1 -_ --28 g mc s .r-l 3 drn ; m 2.::5 -_ r4 r$ x-53 1;o u L3 1 00 a .jl z K -8 I 69 ;TJ ---F----l

: I-----12, c. -: 2 Lz/ * 2-+t d& ,-I I2 22; 1. I_. ( 1

j !

) d 2 i .z 2 i: c.0 ; i 2 2 --I d 12 !Y iz 3 N -+.l I!

i

i-/ $ 0 0 -- F 3 Yj .P f l-f I c: _I

z dh 42 T:k $g hal OCQ

CHBRT NO. 2

.
. . , _

CC~F~WJNIST POLITICLL

AD

Kr,LIL.RY

ORG~J!IZ/~TIOfJ WITHIN 3MJH UNC PW COMPOUND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

CG'F"IT'T%?,S IN ----*-A!_ BRIGAD _

;OWdDER ---

(~0~i.t~

wm

(a). was to investigate Brty outside line,

The Political all Party

Security

or First

Section

(Chart

!I)

members for and take

any deviation

from the measures against as follows:

recruit

members, It

precautionary into Security

infiltration, (1).

nas divided

tvfo sub-sections or First

Organizational Vo conduct

Sub-section: of Party

an investigation in acts

in secret of petty

members involved heroism

individual group activity), and

(as opposed to "heroic' opportunism, destructive into

faction?4ism, of degenerative been smuggled

and cowardice; elsments

who have under the be

thr3 organization Al211 of those

mask cf democracy. blacklisted. ail1

people

will

Only superior

experienced

members

b? selected,

and they i~G.11 be dispatched platoon,and squad. secret, Their status

to each company, and functions perform They y/ill nithin report h daily their

~G.ll be kept duties

and they will of their

on

at the risk and report units

lives. personnel to

investigate

all

the assignsd

and must be ready organization be submitted.

-+Jhcnever tho higher activity task r:port,~rill is

directs, In

case a secret tivo

compromised, for

the respecthe indis-

mcmbcrs nil1 (1)

be rosponsibla

crction.tl Captured Its plans documents included reveal detailed rasponsiblc

boll! this

section

implemented as co substance

its

duties of tasks,

(2).

instructions persons Sacurity

ddes,

executors,

and suporvisors

(3).

(2)

Int,~.rnal nStrengthsn

of Second Sub-section: by leading with the the

prisoners

the party

of :yar to effilia-lc vestigate the

organization.

In-

indcocndcnt

mob (those

not under

(I)

(2)

(3)

Special Intelligence Reports, HQ, UW PW Camp .l (Koje-do), 1 Ott and 2 Sspt 1952. 21

- he..... . -x 2 .; ; i; I- k c .,-I .n I5 ; 2 +, p i: 3 3 0 L s.32 2 ., b&s D OOkkrn c 2 g4, 0 .n /1 -4 cj 0- 0 *IS :-, 2 xp:. $7 4Jn*o$ :, 52 gz m CJ N d 04 ;i z - * i: + 0 ClzIr2 Z$bZ:r;: 2 ::~z+ c g; .: g-z 12 m 4 c .c e--lr $2 w PC? .,5 t k Tits -c. r. iI+? 4 .rl c2 Ln b L ; i, 9 .n L r_ L $2 H-r(g 62 2 0 a)4 : 2

=: 3. g r-i cc S a 0 VI $242 ; ~~;$Ii !.1;/ i

--,-ezgq 3c w 2 j 2 qjl

LKse;;i //ja; I . ,: : $$J i/j J i 1

+ 2 ::!I( 1 (2 ; gt gi

Chart

or amenable bers under

to communist

control)

and all

mem

the F'OW administration. measures agents against spies

Take preand agents of Korea Army,

cautionary to include civil

of the Republic Christian

intcrpretars,

ministt?rs,Party religionists, reactionary with reactionary former

members ?vith security groups, elements.

bad qualities, draft

chiefs, and those

evaders,

who associate will

The above psoplc cxparienced One lender -a first

be blacklisted. be sub-

An outstanding szction chief.

member 'JJill will

be dispatched member to

to each battalion

grndc

each company and a second gr,ada member to each olstoon.

4

Their perform

status their

end mission duties is

%.ll

be secret; of the

they ail1 thoir lives

at the risk corrpromised, 0)

.and, if bc hzld plans

a tzsk

mGmbcr -,:ill Captured detailed responsible (b), documents instructions officers reveal the task

rssponsible,11 for this

sub-sxxtion; dates,

i.o., executors,

3s to th e substsncc: and supervisors (2).

of tasks,

The Organization external repcrts

and Plxning liaison and contact

or Second Szction xith guerrillas,

(Chart ren-

5) mas to maint,-in der intelligence events. It

on canrp guards,and ;Jith Liaison

cover

na:?s and xorld missions: or Third

had two sub-sections (1). External Sub-section:

th,: following

and Rcconnaissancc

llRcconnaissc.ncz cstablishxnt,
supqly

of

the United

Nxtions

military and on the

chanxls Conwct

of communication, nith the guxrillas

lines,

(1,

2)

2 sept

Special

Intelligence
1952.

Report,

H",, UMC PCN Camp 1, 1 Ott

and

gj

$i

I I / I I-

. E: SEa ; 22-2 -F. ; Wr(vld mr-lTla ! I $ 2;1 2 g ! Ej Zi2b$2$ d 1 %I050 & ;,;q j I -Pogm ; iI 4 mar-i ;a co$z ii, F: WOd !- -4 d I 1 2 g;dxy I !
1
-00 Sk-4 .:$&;s NE4: csom~o $;=;=;d S! 21 O/ p; cLmcwG+ k$ 0 -P-P-J*+~,vEng: 1 k-2 I j * wpi @I L; -Pi

- /

md 2%+!3;, 3 ;& .2. 3 -+Jocj b.00 q z-2 h +3 $22 *a) L B 2.2 Y&2 g ;2g;=g B 2 %,G$ q.. 0; &% 2.:; ::E? STJc-iD -4 ooga v2 4m $+- 2.223 g&J yt;f$i mffi D$3 WTl 2; $2 .5 ; ;: ;: 5 0 +w cmd 0 rnd+i

--, 2, ! 32; Pi G El 33 A-

c! !x Li -4 2 Ll I-J L:.. i
i

I-J g L
2 i

j, 1

# , f 2 5 : ij z .$ I i !?j $ 2r;: .A El - -2 I__ %O 524z~Z 2 mm dWW -I

g , 74.r(a -P $20 i g; qyI II4 s m l P4 4 / co&o-Pa
i f ] 2 ffi,og-gg Cd -3E-r &,x M w ;=$ as yg .P cJl~~Z-2~ w v-i hop d a

i?--- z G$ ZhDmu, ;1Zd::2 g #j.~ 1

/ / WI

7 E 3 ;1 iI.:-- 1 ig mj -l fig:- I ;i &j zg +I-%I @J I2.3 clffi chart

5

mainland Amy

and co-operate +ith

with

the North

Korean issued by mili-

in accordance in order

instructions

the party tary priate

to destroy Yhenever

the enemy's the time

cstablishmont, for an uprising

is appro-

or break, will

the members
assist

dispatched fighting occuqying b:: sw-~n~s~ !-i;: 1s m~.x-Vicn section Mil

to the outside units

the basic

to get out of the firing light posts signal

compound by and guard posts fires on the United This Nations sub-

stationary a&tack,

cz-: :wo

;vez.pons,

and destroy store houses. fromParty fighting

and armory

be organized in guerrilla those

members in China and kno-brledge in the

experiznc;d South Korea,

who have a thorough who swvcd

of enemy Il!elpons , and those North Korean

Army in engineering %mbers strict ;vill

and rcconnaisout-

sancc units. side after

be dispatched

investigation (1) to the mcmbcrs had the follorving

and examination

of their Specific _ once outside extrication, headquarters destroy they major plished will instructions of the construct petroleum acre

ability." given they

of this orders: to the sucply of this higher

group and, "After camp's arcas,and duty, than

compounds, a cartisan

base and sot storage After

fire

dump, food route.

and other completion to an officer

the transportation

get to the mainland the oartisans. dalzn, vlhile (2). "Wternal "To find platoon, service vehklos
signs

nnd rzpcrt &xtrication

and join before

or excape will or during or Fourth

be accomwaathcr.lt (2)

on work

details,

foggy

Intellignnce out the tym company, through , signs, etc.,

Sub-sationt by squad, by military marks and all Compile the on other

of enemJ- units classified signs,

command post shoulder

patches,

and appropriate 23

weapons.

(1,

2)

Special Intelligence Reports 1 and 2, HQ, UXC PQW Camp #l, dated 1 Ott 1952 and 2 Sept 1952.

full cal ians,

name, agc,bi.rthplace, ideals of all

address,and police, All

politicivilmembers

ROK soldiers, officials, of affairs

and government

must have a knoxledge and be able will placed

collect

in South Korea The sub-section They xi11 in order be to and of in-

to speak Znglish, members. work details military to gain affairs

have ten plain on outside newpapers, papers in order

documents, knoT;iledge for

other

ternational nation purpose. ROK, Civil, unit xi11

and internal to assist sub-saction

our inforour final units; USA,

in order This

in attaining has four

and Reconnaissance. make a chart xith

The USA sublocation kinds of troops, of meapons, and

names, formation location FXOfs, condition tions. chart

and nunbcr,

of aeapons, location

number of officers

of command posts

and billets, guard disposi-

of communications,and The ROK sub-unit xi11

make a sketch names of troops, of lwapons and-lolocation of

with

location and nwbzr,

of troops, kinds

formation cation,

nmber

of officers and billets, It xi11

and XZls,

of command posts cwmunication. of any discord the current

and conditions make a record and XCC~s and of the soldiers.

further officers

b&xcan ideas

and thinking :niill

The civilian with disposition

sub-section

xnakc a sketch police, their

chart

of the national

location, thinking,

number of officers and the loc*ation

and their

political (1)

of the ROK CIC.t'

(1)

Special Intelligence Reports 1 and 2, RQ, WC FM Camp #l, dated 1 Ott 1952 and 2 Sept 1952. 24

The reconnaissance and formulate is an example

sub-unit

'CJBSto rratch reports

from inside

the

compounds table

reconnaissance of this tyue

and charts.

The follotving

of reporting? of Enemy liYlitary Pcwzr

Movement

TIBllS 0700 on0

AR18 Carbine N-1 Carbine EC1

NO 5: 2:

NWW% OF PEOPLS Yankee Puppet (US)

E.ICVI?$GI)II?SCI'IOI; Northeast Northeast

FtZSULT Unkno:.gn Unknot

54

Soldier(P.GK)

25

(c). guard lators missions: staff

The Guard Unit members,

or Third

Section

(Chart

6) ivas to safeall vio-

documents,and Its

communications

and punish

and reactionaries.

t-20 sub-sections

had the follo>ving

(1).

Guard Unit IlOne leader

or Fifth :!ill

Sub-section: be d&snatched to each staff members years years nil1

member as a body guard. aill

Outstanding

be chosen who have more thnn five exoerience Korean plain and more than ?.rmy. three

of party

in the Iiorth control three

Each leader

mcmbcrs :aho must have served more than three

in the North years. secrets

Korean Army for

The memmbers are required of the staff

to keep the there is

members and if

any compromise, for for

the members will They will safety activity

be punished be responsible all circumevery staff regarding their

the indiscretion. the staff cemvers' submit

under

stances ten days. rooms. thz

and -:qill

reports aithin

The memocrs x5.11 sleep Constant health core should

bo exercised (wcuring strict

st?ff's food

conditions

health,

and olothcs);

ohscrvation

(1)

Svcial dated

Intelligence i&ports 1 and 2, HQ, UNC FOX Camp #l, 1 Ott 1952 and 2 Sept lY$Z. 25

I-------

---_---.----_--

._-___--___

3rd Section .----__

-.--

MILITARY ------

----

- ._- ----.I--

-+ /

Lreactionar2_e_sl-II.- ------,- __- ------ -- ._-.___----.

To guard senior staff members and guarantee the custody Guarantee the purity and of documents and communication. strengthening of the party, by punishing all violators and

,p.-..----__i
5th Sub-Section

I---Guard Unit I

--- -- 6th Sub-Section

-__--

.-.-I- --__I Activity

___-_

Special

Guard the senior staff members of standing committees. Guarantee custody of documents and comtnunicction. ?lembers must have 5 vears party experience and 3 year; service in NKPA. I

I L-Eigl -1 II]
3 Plain ~mb~s..IT--. --"-_
--.-..-.-A----

Guarantee purity and strengthening ' of party by punishing objectional, reactionary, spies and destructive elements who violate party regulations and rebel ogainst the fatherland and people. -.---- - __ - -- ---7--. --I i I_-

c Plain-Members ---

I------.----_._^_ - 5 or mcro
.I

3 ConnectingJ&&3r~, T+ I..----

.'h

of internal aries napping (2). Special should

opportunists, be maintained staff

cowards

and reactionthe kid-

to prevent (1)

of the Activity

members,'1

or Sixth

Sub-section: means e&l roand spies of party who

"To punish actionary, act

by physical destructive

or other cLmcnts

in defiance

of the advice the party

members and robe1

and -<Iho viol2ta rig'inst tion

regulations

the Fatherland chief yiill

and pdoplc.

The sub-sccmembers.

have five

or more plain

They ~611 be ssl?cted than thrdc ycnrs

from those

who have more in the Party. at the risk of

of cxoericnce their duties

They must csrform their lives and,

in ens,: sJcrcts for

are compromised

they i;'ill The ncmbzrs

be r-sponsibl; of this group

the indiscretion.

arc the executioners beat, lpeoples at and

or the strong-arm cxccutc courts'. various toon acts violators

squads r$ho punish, condemned by the courts~

Thti lp30~1:s 1~~31s.

are organized

For minor

violations, the

the pla-

3s juc?g,c :dhilc ard juc.gis fcr

company and battalion offLnscs, -the highest could result

leaders

more serious Courts rihich

and the Political -- punish all

ColxmYttcc serious offenses

in tho death A fen of the many examples activities of tho special-activity

sentncc.lt

(2)
court" actions and other Kations knobvn to the United

of I~ptioplc% units

Command folio-d>?* . On 5 June 1552, planning dcnicd to overthrorv the charge, across but the a ~~pcoplc~s courtfl the Communist after having nith accused a defsndent compound. fists, of He kicked

regime

in the

been beaten tent pole

:Jith clubs,

and struck

shoulders

he made a

(1,

2)

S?ccial Intelligence Reports 1 and 2, HQ, UIX POX Camp #l, dated 2 Szpt and 1 Ott 3.952. 26

F
"self-criticism," but promised
Ai

admitted future loyalty.

lack ($

of zeal

for

the Communist

cause

"people's a trial

court"

in Compound for his

85 forced perticip:tion

500 prisoners

to

attend

of a prisoner in blood against

in the rnlriting Korea (2).

of petitions
_A

returning

to North

l,OOO-man "jury" conducted

(250 men from each battalion3 of prisoners who received group which, and take

on June 6,

1952

a "self-criticism" The prisoner

and sentenced scntcnce was a

one to death.

the death it control

was

mcmbcr of an anti-Cxmaunist to kill the Communist leaders

alleged,

had plotted 85 (3).

of Compound by the communist

L prisoner and found

in Compound j,lO was interrogctcd to any Worth Korean sentenced that if

Communists orgnnizntion. (4).

not to belong

Ho was alleged Communist should control, attempt

to bc a traitor, lcadcrs stated

to death

and murdered personnel their

any United

Nations

to rescue

any anti.

Communist prisoner by them (5). a total

from

the priscrxr

would

be killed in 1951,

Frxn August prisoners wore their for

to Dticcmbcr

of 124 officer These

wcro tried

by "people's

courts"

in Compound k66. their units

officers

who either

hctd surrendered in order

or had killed of thcjr units

comm".nding officers surrender.

to gain

control their

Seventy-seven The remaining

of them confessed 47 wcrc accused

anti-Communist

sympnthics. symp2thiss did conf'css

of anti-Cxmnunist
court.

but ncvor wcrc

confessed

to the "pcoplc's

The 77 who Korea on (6).

sentenced 1951 three

to death upon return prisoners court" ahere were (7).

to North

In December, orders

stoned Tent

to death

of the communist

"paoplc's

No. 12 in (8).

Compound 71)

66 xajas used as n prison

43 men -~~sIcro detained

KOR - 308- 208 (&I}, 18 Juno, 11 June, 25 June, 17 July 1952. 9 3, 4, 5, 6$ KOR - 306 - 206 (5a), datod 11 June, 25 Juno, 3 July, 17 July, 24 July 1952. (7, 8) KOR - 308 - 208 (!?a), 3 July, 17 July, 25 July 1952.

(2

A prisoner speak bcforc on November prisoner. beat

accused the Chief 11, 1951.

of being

an anti

communist Committee

refused

to 66

of the Political All platoon

in Compound or struck pole the and

mcmbcrs kicked a section

Tv~o of them then took (I). to the above organized

of a tent

him to death In addition

enumerated

"duties",

the special antiForty-five duty (2). (Chnrt 7)

activity

units

porimetar

guards from their

to preoont control. for this

Ccmmunist prisoners men from (d). eras charged and planning sub-sections with oath battalion The ..gitation

from escaping usually

were chosen

and Propaganda

or Fourth

Section

the rcsponsibilitics toaching

of kcoping mctcrial

statistics

and documents Its two

and preparing had the followirg (1).

end propaganda.

missions: Docuncnts,and Publications or Seventh

Statistics, Sub-section: "Responsiblt plants

for

safe-keeping sections,

documtnts,

statistics, and reproduction On the will (3)

of other

I;nd copying for

of documents basis

and directives

distribution. this sub-section activities." by this

of intelligence plans for

received, new intelligence

establish An example sub-section of the directives

end documents published

distributed for

is the folloaing

sohsdule

the month of August,

(2, dated

KCY 3) A - 308 - 208 (5a), 3 July, 17 July, 25 July 1952. Special Intclligonce Reports 1 and 2, Ha, UNC POV Camp Gl, 2 Scpt and 1 Ott 1952.

*C

0 4 a $2

h 9s 2

!T 2 !22 -1 b
EL&L&~ .pg$ .$, d d SW d E da OS-2 raj okZ:F: pia; OEOd a 3x2 hd@J

i2e v.4 ci +JF r-4 :e da00 4 E & b8 a% -PC+ ?)

. 3 I

2, cc -1
1

*
I i ! 6m .d % I ,G d @ i * gls s-2 om 262 4; --I g 1s 0 ;c;: I

yg

L UT + x f?zs 5 2: 00s 0
Eu a $ 0, 0

:a $2 P s2 ;,9

$5

Chart

Schedule Main Direction: a, Strengthening the Pzrty and stirring b. Expansion

for

ths Month

of iAugust,

1952

of the task organization,

for

leadership

in order

to strengthen system,

establishing

the organization

up the lcadots and strengthening elements to throw up all

cf the Party. of the Party, in the Party. whole soul into Marxism and on With fighting against

the objectionable c. Educational Leninism--to the spirit d. A task task stir

mcmbcrs to resolve

to fight

of June 10. a stimulus to military in order spirit by instigation, the

to give

propogandrand Les~eorgonization c. In addition and date Legalization

moral education which

to strcngthcn power

is the reserve

of our party. task. (1)

and strengthening direction,

of administrative plans included periods

to the "main of meetings, responsible Education "Prepnres agitation

a these

the frequency of preparation,

subjects for

to be disollssed,

the persons (2).

preparation

and the executors. or Eighth lectures, Sub-section: indoctrination and

and Culture propagand-, data." (21

Examples followx

of the results

of the instig-tion

of the Fourth

Section

In Compound uniforms paraded

1, a group and defied

of prisoners the United in that boards

in

North

Korean ;rmy The

Nations

authorities.

demonstration North

was noteworthy

the prisoners (3)

had mcnufncturod

Korean Army shoulder Prisoners published

2nd insignia. newspaper

a clandestine. items

which

contained

distorted This

and inflamatory

designed through

to create political

incidents. lectures, (4)

news was also

disseminated

(1, 2) Special Intelligence Report, H'?, UNC PGlj Camp $1, 2 Sriptembcr 1952. from Juno to (3, 4) KOR - 308 - 208 (51 nnd .5c] scrios Kovomhcr 1952.

Prisoners (1). program Political for all

published lacturos daylight

lcaflcts

addressed

to ROK and US guards. constituted

2nd military and early platoon

training evening told

hours.

(2)
that the they must escape Subsequently, to were nearly Still Inter,

InXarch armistice

of 1952, negotiations

leaders

the prisoners

had failed Korea

and therefore

in order

to rc-ch

North

and save thcir'livss. the prisonars

the compound lccdcrs screening. completed they spread

advised

not to submit negotiations

They added that and all the prisoners allegation

the armistice would that

be repatriated. Nntions

the United into the true that other

Command wanted the

to move all other

faithful

communists that

compounds away from could bo killed.

prisoners

in order were further

Communists if Uni

The prisoners cntcrcd fire

advised could

ons soldiers not bo allowed was contrrryto to the

the compounds they weapons

not lnd would because :,ll it

their

at the prisoners

precepts trate man kill

of the Gcncva Convention. in one pl:cc one soldier and fight before

prisoners Nations

were to concensoldiers. "Each enjoined. crpturc Vf our

the United he is

subdued," to try

they were out,

Leaders any United

goaded the prisoners Nations soldiers kill

to break

and hold them,"

them DS hostages. (3)

demands are not met, "If

US

they were told. hc will xtharitics.." (4) told

any prisoner

revcnls

inforn?tion, N?tions warned, 10 ~crc "now"

be killed the

by

2nd WC will Scctionls

blame the United rsprcscntativcs in Compound

2ourth

The prisoners North

repoatcdly

that weapons

the from

Hor e?n irrny was receiving Union, including by ships

and cffoctivc and coastal (5)

the Soviet prevent

anti-aircraft and planes.

guns to

attacks

(1) ROR - 704 - 1005 (5a), 13 Nov 1952. (2, 3, 4, 5) KOR - 308 - 208 (5a and 5c) series June and July 1952. Spccifl Intelligence Reports 1 and 2, Hz, TJXC Pa? camp $1, 2 Scpt and 1 Ott 1952.

30

B.

Ililitqry 1.

Organization apparatus crcztod WRS orgnniecd, Filitnry LdminiThese units

Once the political Committees ostnblished were

strctivc committees which wore

in the various or regimental

compounds.

brig-do spokcsmnn,

hendqurrters monitor

to

the conpound attached

interpreter, 3.

and security under The next unit within the command ochclon the broken

cs shown in Chnrt brigade ahich

Thcsc wera all commander. efigbting" or four In lower

of the cssistont was the bnttalion, compound. down into organizn+ion talion, political infiltr?tcd 2.

or regixentr.1 was the basic in turn

The battalions platoons

had three Sj. nssistrnt

VJb.0 USLPlly

compvlies, units,

and squads

(Chart by the

the political of the bstCOmiSScr or

W,S roprrsantcd

commmder
W2s the

co~lp?y~ otficecc the

pls-coon, or squur\d, Othnl Leer poii:,icol

agents, (1) in connection

their

identities

secret,

echelons, importance Pcctlon cr p?:sad

Cf no 'iftls Fccrjrity from

with

the

outbreaks

was

the Politisnl orders politicni the e~~n-t.s<

of the ?Iflit?rv through this

orgcnizntion. section , it

As all controlled operntion of The orders

cil-nncls octicns

to the compound Politicnl to be t:+ken nnd policies bcttalion monitors Ind it

Committee,

compound,

to be followed. all received

compound monitors, from it. (2)

spokesnsn provided

gxxamples of ths mntoriol

to the Politics1

Connnittcc

follow: Movcmcnt of Puppet Troops (ROK)%..C;;pproximntely carrying the right 9 roll side of cable 1110 hours, passed

30 'JJug, c couple behind 606. network this It is

of puppet

soldiers through the

compound (605) supposed thnt

road of Compound to expsnd the

enemies

are going

of telcgrsphic Movement

wires." of Detaining Power?.. An unknown comrade kidby

napped from the 4th Battalion a US Major of 607." and a US Captain

of 607 on 30 ,Lug wss intcrrogsted inside the tent in front of muin gcte

51, 2) Special Intelligence Reports, 1 October 1952 and 2 September 1952

IQ UNC POif Cnmp #l

(Koje-Do)

ZbTTALiCN

Y?X-)QT~AT?9S _I

POLITICAL -t -I ---ftsS' co

PARTY 'IE!'V.?TRS

f ..- -_---_--- - ---.

1 -_
BN HQS &XT co -~COD" XfIJE 1st SSCTION OR 1st S~ULD _

,
COXPLNY :&ST cc -CO3E NW'2 5th SECTIOI'T OR 5th LAJj--4th

CCC3 N&J% 2nd SECTICIJ OR 2nd

I-SST PLT LDR SQD LDR-3 MST ---- LDR SaD -

kSST FE-Ci% 3 for place

&ST --"LT i5T --_

Note :

See Chart

GUIDSR ---&ST PLT L3R-1 &ST PLT BSST PLT LDR -&ST PLT &SST -.-_I -_I_ PLT ---LDR S;D LDR-3 LDR SQD LDR LD?? &ST SQD --LDR-3 GQmR i-SST S&D LDR __ -_-. .. --3 ASST SQE LDR -of Battalion in ccmpound politico-military organization.

PLT LDR iLSST PLT LDR .-__-__.S6/D LDR-3 i&SST S& JDR-3 .I .--L-I

PLT kST --S&D &ST ----_

LDH PLT LDR -LDR-3 &D LDR

Movement

of Other

Compounds..." were

..t

approximately assembled

1600 hours at the

on 28 JAM, 48 prisoners front order leader, structions. enemy.".r. brought belioved Information ",ccording are sending troops day, 'tilt ground to the under on account 1st Platoon

forcibly

of disobedience

to the enemies' The the inby the

to send out the platoon. of singing songs, defied

the pretext Ind then,

one out of 48 was kidnapped on tho 27th, the 3d Bnttnlion by his

1900 hours into

a Yankee 2d Lt. of 605, who is behavior." the Hospital... 25 Lug the because Koreans said Yankees

a prisoner

to be an enemy informer Obtained from Patients

Who Left dated rear

to the Yankees' the puppet

ncv'spaper to tho

troops cvcr

the puppct every that who were a week

in front surrendering

are going

to the North

thomselvos."

. ..".*. n informant

40 puppet escaping

army officers

and our KRL (NE.) caught

prisoners about

to &Torth Korea by boat were Yankees

ago by the officers prisoners

ne?r the 38th p?rallcl; suicide on the spot." by singing singing

but the puppet ..,"The songs: female however, they

committed

have been fighting from

have been prohibited enemy's Information "According (biggest fire order." Obtained to tho temple

songs since

15 hug by the

From the Yynkce Newspaper paper 1,200 dated years 4

"Stars"... In Sa by were

'Stars'

:,ug, Hae

in Korea, 50 partisans

old)

was destroyed and 12 youths to the newspaper

by about

and 20 marines;

kidnapped dated

at the

same time."...R.ccording this all year inflicted

18 Aug,

the drought products farms about

heavy

losses

on agricultural of respective D.C., to talk

over i.merica. a meeting Forty-five

The representatives in Washington, states out of is now

are now having the situation.

the 48 are badly

in need of relief.

The US Government

x2

issuing

public

bonds in order inflicted

to bridge

over

the difficult:,. but-the ranches.".. of

damege is The agricultural the qvernge

on not only will

the farms

production year on account date

be decreased drought.

by one fourth The amount of

of the

dcmsges up to this Inform-.tion

comes up to $100,000,000." Americrn strike steel celled industry by the gets a

on 14 :.ug..."The

big blow due to the general of the industry production. at least . .."This average White It to reach strike yearly for is

l-borers munitions three months

52 days lvhich said that it

hcs influenced take about

will

norm?1 production resulted

of the steel decree.se

industry." in the in the of the

in a 50 per cent This strike

production,

wris settled

House between

the Prcsidont

and representntives

laborers." 3. barracks echelons activities prisoner E-.ch compound wns orgnnized and other facilities were 9. (1). along allotted Examples militpry lines, and the militory end through

to specific follow

as shown in Chart of the Wilitnry interrogations: "In ..pril of 1952,

of plpns learned

Administrative

Committees

the

le:dors

instructed

tho men to seize

any US or RCK guards "In will the event lead of entry

who cntorcd

Compound g'77.e 1,500

(21
prisoners

by UK troops, ?nd bo led by the first platoon will line mill

communist

the attock This

compound commandant and be backed by 3,500 other

vice-commandant. prisoners

led by their prisoners

leaders. remain

The cstisnted in thoir quarters

2,500 and not from the

2nti-communist join flsnks,

in the attack. capturing

The plan woapons

is to attack

UN troops

?nd troops,

preferably

officers, made from knives,

The woepons tent flails poles,

to be utilized a piece of pipe (3)

in the attack six inches

are spears long, racks,

and clubs."

(1) 9 June 1952 2nd Special KOR - 308 - 208,(5c} Intelligence Reports Hq UhrC PC% Crunp ),.l, 1 October nnd 2 September 1952. (2, 3) KOR - 308 - 208 (52) Entire series June to Nov 1952.

g rIa , ,3 E

\ 1
r4 52 F-q I=4 p4 is iTy {

2
g

11

c
Ail

PROFkGMDf. SSCTION Shop

1 a 1 Ii

Tailor

Trng Staff!1

Key Members Billet

II
.~ e Lo 1-i) . d 5 24 * k 0 Ll>: I f g

a 2 s

I.4. is6 3: 2

?-

Physical training Tent for sick or injured

I ri LA I

sz z

>< 1

zz a * 2I

g -7 5 k 1, *iou I II w1l-u e / I ._ II 1 I:;,;!i

/ ., A /-, _ x

I&. -:: a N ii? L-2 :

, A

-++-*

;:

# >c

/C

z 2 E ,IG u ~~~ I E:pj PH :1 !z-1 ri if $2

Chart 9

".'.n official southern apparently Chiri-son."

US Army map, taken sector

during

June,

showed the whichvies Roje-do to

of Rorea marked with route

a red line,

a planned (1)

Prom UN Poll Camp 31,

"The communists of UN troops purpose "&en

had detailed

maps of Rojc-do

showing tunnels

locations for the

and weapons

and were constructing compounds." the areas, to fight (2)

of escape the UN troops with

from the

came into and clubs

the prisoners the troops

were

prepared (31

knives

(14 May 52).'

"On 30 May 1952, #62 was to 2nd Battalions "Communist entice

the

strategy

of the communists betivecn (4) for

in compound the 1st and

or decoy the UN troops surround included which them." provision

and then escape plans ropes

the prisoners around fonco

to have 10-meter poles to pull

were to be thrown surrounding

down the barbod wire vlould

the compound. on the comnmnists.'

The first barbed wire (1, 2, 3, 41

wave of prisoners

than throve themselves for Series the attacking

to form a human bridge and (5~)

KOR - 308 - 208 (Sa}

June to Nov 1952.

CCFKZLUSIONS

1. Communist Convention including captared hurt

From the Koje-do high comriand,

outbreak undeterred

came the confirmation by the provisions nould of its

that

the

of the Geneva use every personnel actions would i and an active means,

or any other murder,

tG

humane considerations, its hold on those

maintain side

by the other

and to expend them in whatever A Communist prisoner

or weaken the enemy.

of war< therefore, in need of care as still dictated. that they and enter out if they more could

h?d to be rsrtarded vrotection until

not as a pa-c .,.,ive he could to fight be returned

human being to his

hcme but

enemy determined 2. possess into could to fire succeed

on in whatever Drisoners

way hi8

leaders

This warfare

through

did not require their

arms in enough strength military the nearest imaginations doing high it. Military

to overwhelm

guards to break

large-scale and join their in

operations. irregulars, than with

They were but this

they were told that they

any expectation

objectives if guards which

-uould be served they created

no less, which them, to peoples of the

the Communist would make it

command thought, for their

incidents against

necessary

to use force could

resulting in both "brutality"

in deaths Conniunist

and injuries and free

be represented evidence

countries

as convincing Sations lives

and "inhumrnity" States.

of the United of Communist

CopflAnd and especially -as many hundreds price

of the United

The loss

or even thousands to pay for first, gainin? free

of them as might propaganda world

be necessary

-- +vas a small

n?terial

to accomplish the United

two purposes, States and thereby and

tc turn its and,

opinion

against

to weaken elsewhere against 3. the effect

leadership second,

in the resistance to unify cause, public

to Cormzunism in Korea in Communist, lands

opinion,

the United Ever

Eations

the years,

the Copamsts of reports,

had become very whether true

familiar or false,

with of

on public

o?inion

inhumane

treatment

of human beings. about for they it,

Though by no means moved, by disclosures the dignity of their

except

to be even more secretive spread and flagrant

own wide-

disregard of his life,

cf the human individual and again the horrified

and the sanctity reaction

countries.

had seen time own fi5ends

to them of even many of their Because against of their effectiveness,

in noncommunist of similar own propa-

the leveling practice

charges ganda.

opponents

became a standard concrete as they

in their

Wen they had nothing something,

on which

to peg such propaganda, hoax against propaganda peg

they manufactured the United of this kind Nations

did in the germ-warfare To provide a better

Command in Korea. required attached

was the mission

of the Communist to it that

prisoners

on Kojewere

do, and such was the importance spared of-war to build cornFounds. Enlightened to block by this Communist up a fantastically

no efforts

elaborate

organization

in the prisoner-

h.
swiftly Prisoners to return easily built

knowledge, warfare

the United

Nations

Command moved

through

the Koje-do as indicated into

prisoners. by their smaller readiness and more

who were confirmed to Communist groups territory,

Communists,

were dispersed and nearby

hsndled for

on Koje-do

islands.

Compounds were and separated compounds. by camp for contrathe

an average

of 500 to 600 men; these averaging

were wired eight

by corridors, A much stricter authorities band,

in enclosures regimen

not more than

was instituted. including

Compound inspections thorough searches

were more frequent, forces were

Security for

strengthened, activities, systems

In .some places, a curfew

to reduce

op-ortunity

clandestine Intelligence

was enforced to give

from 1900 inforto

to 0500 hours. motion identify 5.

were expanded

fuller

about what was gaing anad segregate TO make it

on in the comsounds leaders. for

and especially

subversive

more difficult

the Co.mmunist prisoners command in North Korea,

to receive a native ageents,

and send messages village and isolated

from and to the high civilian

homas, .tJhich formerly

shaltered

._

were moved out of the camp area the carrying surrendered internal of oral instructions

on Koje-do. by agents

Steps were taken disguised

to prevent who as the

as soldiers hospitals

at the front. communications

Use of the prisoner-of-war cente r for was broken transmission

of messages between of a

compounds and enclosures substitute 6. ibla center L&spite

up, end the establishment

was made next these measures,

to impossible. however, it or any other that measures permissPOM

under

the Geneva Convention, their fanatical

was apparent

the Communist still against were the with

leaders organized, United

retain,zd

devotion

to Communism, their -flarfare

and -7ere capabie Con~snd:

of continuing

X2- ,925

The timring

of outbreaks

to synchronize

developments Caped

i 7 the Armistice

negotiations

or elsewhere

would be handi-

by the loss

of communications, with

but leaders

among the prisoners of the party incidents might can be the fanaticthey dominate.

were dell

enough acquainted

the purpcses further Constant

and methods that

and army command to know without at any time deprive cculd be exploited.

instructions and close

surveillance but thers prevant

thz ?risonors that

of the advantage measures

of surprise, will

no guarantee al Communist

control

now in force away the livps

lsaders

from throwing

of those

Immx 1 SPF,CI:L JBTPLL3GWCE R'G'ORT 1:O 7 . RNCOCW~GCE?KTTO < ALL P'BTY M?:!BERS Interim violence consolidation of the December Imperialists for

UNC Fai C;aP MO. 1 KOJE-DO

14 Fight slaughtering

exposing

the

of the ,mericnn to all

PM, and ento be the party).

couragement

X members.

(X is a code believed

Dear Party Dear nizations! ?ie hereby Dee 14 Fight stcff

!&embers: members and fighting comrades of the respective orga-

oncourage as folloiNs:

you upon reviev:ing

the

significance

of the

Cvcn though us by the party deed who sacrificed cation of the

we have not gone through and fatherland, themsolves we hareby for

with pray

the task for

imposed

upon

the bliss the party,

of the unifi-

the revolution,

fatherland

and peace. ventured a coercive crushing break-up to cover up their

The enemy finally political, moral

and military for

defeat

sustained

in the 1Zs.y 7 the P~'v to lcws and into

and June 10 Fights rebel morality. small against

slaughtering

of Pir in order of all

to rearm

the fatherland (Coercive brcnk

in dcfirnce refers each).

international of prisoners

to the dispfrscl

compounds of 500 men 31 party members: the cccrcive

%vcn aftor us to rebel

i'ic,

brcck-up,

the enemy has continued

to force

rgainst

our fathorlynd. could not pass over horrible the violoncc in silcncc blood and tried Throughand the the crimss

however,

to thrust

easy the enemys

policvwith

end death.

out tho world offensive ?nd the being

the enemy is now knvwn as the (SIC!) toplrd nations

enemy of human beings of the norld bytho against

by the democratic slnughtcring policy

P.i committed

oncmy is now

briskly

doveloped. for nnnihil?tion. is Especidly, attached during

The enemy is now destined the change of presidents great

importance

to the P.9 question.

However,

Eisenhorjer

has not made clear Korea

his

stendpoint

towr_rd the Korean tho people of

war even though &nerioa in order

he visited

ns hc had promised During his trip

to be elected.

to Korea he received cs a Christmas of' the people present of Korea

a bomb-attack which

by 15 MICs of the People's showed the strong Republic.

Republic solidcrity

satisfactcrilg

and the power of the Pcople$s In such an important of the whole world up, overcoming

moment,

the pnrty

people

2nd all

peoccabls

peop NlC

are now appenling

to the KF:.. Ph and CFV PA to spring of the brutal people are A+..erical for Lnperirevenge of the F%. dcveloped

the slaughtering

violence

alists.

Sverywhere

in the whole world ths is ths slaughtering significance

shouting

on the onsmy against The follc%ing last time: ZI clcss fight.

and unlawful and the rim

reassignment of our fight

To cause the enemy to be annihilated, and moral crushing defeat upen the i,moricen

by inflicting Imperialists

a political and estranging the

them from the paocesble slaughtering 2. policy S righteous

people, of the whole world Impsrinlists

upon exposing toward the Ri.

of the American fight.

To receive (SIC1) return 3. powers

the ccoper?ticn and peaceable take

and encocr?gemcnt pcoplr of the whale as faithful

from the democratic world so that vie may

and cg".in ;,fter

cur places

citizens

of the fatherland. the subjective fight

due considerntion conditions planned to the ensrny the Pongam

and examination this

of both fight

and objective which

2nd the situation, and improved bo being riot

-?II?S a legal to givo a

was properly defeat (Literally,

the opportunity the vanguard

crushing (PVi).

of 100,000 for

members Plds

was -n exemple

the other

to follow.) A11 comrades: Ltt the us appeal to all violence comrades in this righteous Imporinlists fight by exposing CA-n

slaughtering oode). The merits

of the _,merican

at XXXXX.

wGcmowc

snd defects

produood

in this

brttolion

during

the last

fight

are

a6 foLlr~~s~ 2

1. sacrificing (SICII), able

The fighters spirit the

hzve satisfactorily and patriotism

displayed

heroism,

selfcf dsmocr-oy

in the fight

as the knights

sons of the XXX of Korea, of the Great Stalin

of the fntherlcnd 10~1

and the honcrto their party and the as

fighters

by romaining

a result decisions 2.

of realizing

the signifioanoe of XXEiX.

and aim of the fight,

and instructions Tho staff

members and workers

of the respective their

organizations duties power, disespecially the forleague members, the at the

have cxhaustod playing heroism,

711 possible self-sncrificing

means in discharging spirit

and croativo

the comrades mation

cf the 4th, of their

9th and 10th platoons lives.

.plho pr,qtccted

at the risk

Oh XX and PLOXX, both task

accomplished enemy's risk heavy

the intclligoncc fire. lives,

and reccnnnissanoe comrades

oven under

The medical swiftly

of the rrscuo-pcrty, trontmcnt

of their

g?vc first-aid

to the wounded qtm?spherc the

comrades. comrades into were during

Furthermore, who wore filled

oven under with

such a difficult carried

friardship

the wounded comrades

the hospital brave

voluntarily.

Suh X N-,m, Huh X Sot rnd Leo X Dung comrades by keeping their positions

in stirring

up the other and also

the operation

Song X Chang, a party in the individual the dcublo barbed

member, and Lee X fight wire. ngeinst Such fight. the

San, a league

member, were

se brave into

ememy even after meritorious 3.

the break-up will

activities Many heros

be our pattern during

in the future the fight; "Democrrtic sinking

wore produced

such r.s Ji Nyong Hi, People's Republio

Kim Ki Eon and Lee Kwang Lnk who shouted of Korea forever!" and "Long live

the PI&:"

to the ground

Such shameful

activities will

will

be swept away and will

not be tolerated

and the formation L-11 Comrades! Even under the heroic than results fight

be strengthened

more than befcre.

such poor :qhich

conditions

and ctmosphcre

WC have carried and more

out

caused

14 comrades
i.11

t? be sacrificed
EheVer,

30 comrades

to shed blood. bl?odshcd rofcrs

comrades!

the successful sacrificed 85, 113

of tbr, srid

are as foflo~s: mcmbcrs.

(14 comrsdes T-tnl killod

and 30 shed bleed hospitalized). 1. slaughtering peaceable democratic Imperialist, and moral Nakedly

to party

were

exposed

the inhumnnitqrian,

brutal,

connibnlistic which caused the and all

violence people (SICK) the defeat a.

of the lanericnn

Imperinlists the fatherland,

r.f the whole world, nations to shout for

the party

revenge rnd this

against

the American political

enemy of human beings to the enemy.

gave a crushing

On 15 Dee 1952,

the s+cn.lled

UN Far East

Command had no cf 14 Dee 1952

other

alternntive without b. After

but to broadcast concealment, laying of Kojo

the Pongam-Do incident world.

by radio,

to the whole

violent

hands upon us the directly Major

scoundrel led his General

of a troops "Kay", dison

commanding 14 December. general torting after

officer

CLenp, in crnfusinn, a scoundrel,

The next

day (15,Dec)

commander and ring-leader their faces, were confused a large

of the murderers, in making military

with

trembling

an inspecti-rn
force.

of P Compound

surrounding c.

us with

No socner

was the slaughtering the press

violence

exposed world

tc the their

whole

world

on 16 Dee 1952,

oL the whole r

devoted

Rttention

to Compound "Fn and th e investigation d, The invaders, nations martial in fear

of the incident. the

of the power of our fatherland, of the whole world,

democratic the so-called

(SIC!) court

and the people on this

established

Pongnm-DC and called and questioned of legalizing them, their

cur repre"T&o will violent con-

sentatives take duct?" the

end comrades responsibility

in to testify for the purpose

e. wns exposed the democratic Emevcr, exposed 2. capacity be returned tion,

There since

is no materinl

cvidcncc

whatsoever

that

the enemy

we have n+ nations th?t

received

cncouragomcnt people

from the fatherland, of the whole world. already

(SIC:)

nnd the peaceable the violence by this fact. wcrld

we feel

confident

2f the cnemywas

and WC art? encourcged *IO have demonstrated and capacity for unity

to the whole

the inflexible for

fighting to

of the EPA&Pqu unified

the fight

to the fatherland.

The enemy WCS amazed at this hasten the time defeat. sacrificing of rejcining

demonstra-

and we, by ourselves, the a*

the fatherland

upon giving

enemy a crushing

Satisfactorily fatherland troops, strength

we showed iur heroism, find justice, bay-nets and strongly vdill

ourselves that to make

for

the party,

demonstrated not be able

even a million cur fighting b. people against ? I( * strong all

or the ;-bmb

yield. t, the whcle world that KPiL PG fighters that they sprung and the up and

110 exposed

<If Korea ware

so strrngly

bonded together def'c-ted into

the enemy nho are now being to return themselves

in this

fatherland, cf the fatherland

that
as

F%9ui desire

the breast

soon ps possible. c. powerful The iAmerican fight Imperialists who wore confused in 9r*er by such a to quell down

by the PLu, hc.d to reinforce trcops are hate with short their us. at the front. commanders The invading

US, even though the among the ROKA troops troops

In o:i'diticn

tc this,

enemy, the troops rcther sympathize cbout trcops

and some conscientious army Fnd the Puppet By

arc hustling the Puppet that d.

shifting

resppnsibility this

upon each other. place.

sr, doing, is evidence

were moved out -f sustrincd and proper

Such a result defeat.

the enemy military '~11s so fair that this revenge

n crushing and the

Our fight

crime

committed

by the enemy was so big any measures enemywanted

*. SO

the enemy have not :s get incident. directly Accordingly, against us,

cvcn established the to do

to settle to take

oven though they ?xe unr,ble

because Tn the

of our strong struggle the

solid-rity. failed to sing songs, especially since

psrtgnombers singing

during
. . . . ..c .

the fight;

of songs is basic
5

in our struggle

our mein purpcse oru&ing defeat. fight.

is to develcp

a class

Fight:

to give its

the

enemy a only up

The dlass fight (C ommunists

can attain
use singing

aim and succeed tc build

in the final courage

and chanting

and mass hypnotism}. we goin c successful denth result in the last fight fight? the enemy a

Didn't Le died crushing

Q glorious

in the greet

giving

defeat, we sustained it heavy casualties tc die our fighting death. comrade8 Are not the for a glorious

Even though already L I expected

and determined and brothers

a glorious

comrades-in-arms final death victory

parents and for

cf the fatherland of the fatherland,

fighting dying

the unification

even at this Is the death

moment? and blood a crushing which defeat was shod in the fight, valueless? death How soi' of the comrades rnd the will crimes be committed world which caused the

enemy to sustain

This was our fight brilliant in history

and the noble

of the war cf the fatherlend be exposed to all peaceable

by the enemy will without All a doubt. Comrades?

people

.)f the whole

The party against

and the fatherland

will

never

desert

us in our fight and stick out

the enemy if before

we keep our loyalty the blood-stained

to the utmost

our bronsts Imperialists, the party, into their Xl

bayonets

of the brute1 against

American and

and as long as we do not rebel we will breasts, comrades! and the tanks spirit not only reccivc help from

our fatherland

them but resolve

ourselves

The conscience
l

cf the party gas.

mill

never

be destroyed be brilliant The flame

by the flame forever.

throwers,

or the poison it will

It will

;ribatever will

may happen,

be universally

valid.

of our fight

not bo put 'out by such suppressian violent hands upon us the stronger of the party

by the enemy but the we will defend lot's go the

more the enemy lays political and military

policies

and by so doing

forward

tcwqrd

the base nf liber?ticn

upholding

the fleg

?f revenge.

Desr

Comrades! nqthinr, but their shameful victory. result Qgr.inst of the maSnificcnt the enemy for intc tree, the party the hwrts by fire lives in the fight 2nd those

FWs lost wore for

liboroti?n

fin? gl?rixzs

l;c rll effort

congratulate

the successful of charging stab the

supyxtiq

the signs1 so ns t-

and the f&herl?nd

spear

of the: enemy iuhcn they cn this 1. fcrovor. 2. Labor Keop the honor rt the risk dosth little

destroyed

everything,

of revon&right P oven c. little

Pong,Evr,-Do 2nd Koje-Do. is pcerlcssly orgpnizcd for vi&Try r,nd prcsperity

Our grrup

nnci resp-nsibility sf life!

rs n member of the Korean

Party 3.

Give

?^nd rev<~ng;e tc the manslzqhtcrinq

Aoricnn

Imperinlism! 4. Leading Bless the patriotic fighters who arc: unitod LeTding nrwnr! Committee). the General

XXX (q code bolicvad

to bc Goncrol