Continuity of Navigation using GPS and SBAS Presentation for GIT/9

Daniel OLaughlin Dr. S.V. Massimini April 2006

2006 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

Continuity and Availability

The ARNFS gave extensive results on the availability of various navigation services in the Asia-Pacific Region
GPS SBAS GBAS GRAS

The ARNFS did not include information on the continuity of navigation operations
Limited capability to model continuity until recently

Objective of this briefing is to familiarize the GIT on aspects of continuity of navigation

Will use recently completed results from Alaska, USA Later efforts may include results for Asia Pacific
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2006 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

What are Continuity of Service and Availability of Service?

Time period Continuity of service is the probability that service will stay up over a given time span (given that it was up at the beginning) Often given as 1 continuity (probability that the service will fail over a given time span)

Availability is the probability that the service is up if sampled at a random time ( = ratio of up time to total time) Impact of navigation service unavailability varies with application

2006 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

More Continuity Definitions

Continuity Risk = (1 Continuity) Average Continuity Risk = the Continuity Risk at a user location averaged over 24 hours Two types of continuity risk are computed:
Predicted Continuity Risk: Continuity risk associated with predicted outages (i.e., those known beforehand) e.g., planned satellite outages for maintenance, geometric outages, etc.
For GPS receivers, predicted continuity risk can be avoided if RAIM predictions are used in flight planning (with NOTAM updates) For WAAS receivers, predicted continuity risk can be avoided by checking WAAS NOTAMs

Unpredicted Continuity Risk: Continuity risk associated with unpredicted outages e.g., satellite or ground equipment failures

Only en route continuity risk is computed for this presentation

Horizontal Alert Limit = 2 nmi Terminal, NPA, and LPV continuity risk can be computed

2006 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

ICAO Continuity Requirements

(Annex 10 Table 3.7.2.4-1)

2006 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

Assumed Receiver Types

GPS Only (e.g., TSO C129/129A and STC-based)
With and without Baro Aiding
With baro aiding, the standard deviation of pressure altitude error was assumed to be 290 m, consistent with aircraft at 10,000 ft geometric altitude (see TSO C-129A)

Avionics that assume

SA is on SA is off

Avionics capable of
Fault Detection (FD) only, Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE)

2 and 7.5 degree user mask angle

GPS with SBAS (WAAS) (e.g., TSO C145A/146A-based)

With the current WAAS architecture With the Full LPV Performance WAAS architecture (~2008)
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2006 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

Modeling Assumptions
These results are from computer models, and are dependent upon a number of assumptions
Changes in assumptions can produce different results

Changes in location can produce different results

Asia-Pacific results could be different than Alaska
But do not anticipate major differences

These results do not include any effects of alternative navigation or inertial navigation systems

2006 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

Assumed User Locations

User 1

Lat 70 70 65 60 60 57.5

Long -160 -145 -152.5 -160 -145 -135

2 3 4

5 6

5 6

2006 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

Summary of Results: GPS-Only Avionics, 2 Mask Angle

Results Shown are for the 24 GPS Martinez Constellation (Appendix B of RTCA DO-229C) with GPS IFOR Threshold Parameters (values shown are for the worst of the 6 user locations in AK)
Avionics Assumption on SA (On/Off) On On On On Off Off Off Off Average Unpredicted Continuity Risk per hour 1.1765E-04 1.1501E-04 4.1592E-06 1.1455E-06 1.1631E-04 1.1474E-04 2.6370E-06 8.4165E-07 Average Predicted Continuity Risk per hour 9.1607E-03 2.6671E-03 9.1607E-03 2.6671E-03 5.3723E-03 1.7404E-03 5.3723E-03 1.7404E-03

< 10-5 < 10-4 < 10-3 < 10-2 < 10-1

Case 1 2

FD/FDE FD FD FDE FDE FD FD FDE FDE

Baro-Aiding No-Baro Baro No-Baro Baro No-Baro Baro No-Baro Baro

Availability 9.9914E-01 9.9978E-01 9.9914E-01 9.9978E-01 9.9958E-01 9.9985E-01 9.9958E-01 9.9985E-01

Pass => Pass =>

3 4 5 6

Pass => Pass =>

7 8

2006 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

Summary of Results: GPS-Only Avionics , 2 Mask Angle

Results Shown are for the Current (Nov 2005) Constellation with No Failures (values shown are for the worst of the 6 user locations in AK)
Avionics Assumption on SA (On/Off) On On On On Off Off Off Off Average Unpredicted Continuity Risk per hour 1.2542E-04 1.2114E-04 1.3014E-05 8.1294E-06 1.2684E-04 1.1828E-04 1.4629E-05 4.8780E-06

< 10-5 < 10-4 < 10-3 < 10-2 < 10-1

Case 9 10

FD/FDE FD FD FDE FDE FD FD FDE FDE

Baro-Aiding No-Baro Baro No-Baro Baro No-Baro Baro No-Baro Baro

Availability 9.8264E-01 1.0000E+00 9.8264E-01 1.0000E+00 9.9306E-01 1.0000E+00 9.9306E-01 1.0000E+00

Average Predicted Continuity Risk per hour 8.0246E-02 1.4286E-05 8.0246E-02 1.4286E-05 8.0248E-02 8.5726E-06 8.0248E-02 8.5726E-06

Pass => Pass =>

11 12 13 14

Pass => Pass =>

15 16

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2006 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

Summary of Results: GPS-Only Avionics , 7.5 Mask Angle

Results Shown are for the 24 GPS Martinez Constellation (Appendix B of RTCA DO-229C) with GPS IFOR Threshold Parameters (values shown are for the worst of the 6 user locations in AK)
Avionics Assumption on SA (On/Off) On On On On Off Off Off Off Average Unpredicted Continuity Risk per hour 1.5010E-04 1.2922E-04 4.1132E-05 1.7337E-05 1.4455E-04 1.2546E-04 3.4805E-05 1.3053E-05

< 10-5 < 10-4 < 10-3 < 10-2 < 10-1

Case 1 2

FD/FDE FD FD FDE FDE FD FD FDE FDE

Baro-Aiding No-Baro Baro No-Baro Baro No-Baro Baro No-Baro Baro

Availability 9.8742E-01 9.9684E-01 9.8742E-01 9.9684E-01 9.9434E-01 9.9765E-01 9.9434E-01 9.9765E-01

Average Predicted Continuity Risk per hour 7.3740E-02 4.9706E-02 7.3740E-02 4.9706E-02 6.3118E-02 1.3339E-02 6.3118E-02 1.3339E-02

Pass => Pass =>

3 4 5 6

Pass => Pass =>

7 8

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2006 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

Summary of Results: GPS-Only Avionics , 7.5 Mask Angle

Results Shown are for the Current (Nov 2005) Constellation with No Failures (values shown are for the worst of the 6 user locations in AK)
Avionics Assumption on SA (On/Off) On On On On Off Off Off Off Average Unpredicted Continuity Risk per hour 1.6105E-04 1.3304E-04 5.3607E-05 2.1692E-05 1.5494E-04 1.2586E-04 4.6642E-05 1.3509E-05

< 10-5 < 10-4 < 10-3 < 10-2 < 10-1

Case 1 2

FD/FDE FD FD FDE FDE FD FD FDE FDE

Baro-Aiding No-Baro Baro No-Baro Baro No-Baro Baro No-Baro Baro

Availability 9.6181E-01 9.9306E-01 9.6181E-01 9.9306E-01 9.7917E-01 9.9306E-01 9.7917E-01 9.9306E-01

Average Predicted Continuity Risk per hour 1.5407E-01 4.1269E-02 1.5407E-01 4.1269E-02 1.1875E-01 4.1255E-02 1.1875E-01 4.1255E-02

Pass => Pass =>

3 4 5 6

Pass => Pass =>

7 8

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2006 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

Summary of Results: WAAS Avionics

< 10-5 < 10-4 < 10-3 < 10-2 < 10-1

Case

WAAS Architecture Current FLP Current FLP

GPS Constellation 24 Martinez 24 Martinez 28 Current 28 Current

Availability 9.9914E-01 9.9993E-01 9.9942E-01 9.9985E-01

Average Unpredicted Continuity Risk per hour 5.1937E-05 7.7215E-06 3.7977E-05 9.5395E-06

Average Predicted Continuity Risk per hour 3.1815E-03 5.1555E-04 7.0105E-03 1.7573E-03

Pass => Pass => Pass => Pass =>

1 2 3 4

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2006 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

Observations (1 of 2)
Predicted continuity risk
With a Pre-flight check (GPS-only avionics) or checking WAAS NOTAMs (WAAS avionics)
User would be subjected to only predicted continuity losses

Without a Pre-flight check (GPS avionics) or check of WAAS NOTAMs

User would be subjected to predicted and unpredicted losses

GPS-only avionics generally have higher rates of predicted continuity risk (~10-1 - 10-2 per hour) than WAAS avionics (~10-3 - 10-4 per hour)

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2006 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

Observations (2 of 2)
Unpredicted continuity risk
For GPS-only avionics, unpredicted continuity risk is lower for avionics that perform FDE (~10-5 per hour) than those that do not (>~10-4 per hour) For WAAS avionics, unpredicted continuity loss is ~10-5 to ~10-6 per hour

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2006 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.

Conclusions
GPS avionics without FDE do not meet ICAO en-route continuity requirements
Note that GPS with other navigation aids may be OK This is why GPS alone is considered supplemental

GPS avionics with FDE meet ICAO en-route continuity requirements

Pre-flight RAIM check must be accomplished May not be able to depart if RAIM check is not satisfactory
US currently authorizes GPS with FDE as primary means navigation in remote areas (with preflight RAIM check)

WAAS avionics meet ICAO en-route continuity requirements

WAAS NOTAMs must be checked
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US currently authorizes WAAS as primary means navigation (with preflight NOTAM check)

2006 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.