Alternative Alliance

Ballistic Missile Defense and the Atlantic Alliance Author(s): David S.
Yost Reviewed work(s): Source: International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Autumn, 1982), pp. 143-174 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538436 . Accessed: 03/01/2012 03:22
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BallisticMissile Defense and the Alliance Atlantic
DavidS. Yost
The Atlantic Alliance of of may be at the threshold a new debate on the implications ballistic missiledefense(BMD) forEuropeansecurity. of Secretary DefenseCaspar and and U.S. Senators Congressmen a Weinberger several support thorough reviewof U.S. BMD options,including possiblerevision the 1972Antiof Ballistic Missile(ABM)Treaty its1974Protocol. and Although activedefense ofintercontinental missiles ballistic (ICBMs)seemsthemostlikely application defense are underconsideration. for BMD, other strategic options reportedly suchas theSS-20,SSBMD againsttheater ballistic missiles European-based as are 21, SS-22,and SS-23is beingexamined well. Such defenses knownas missiles missiles anti-tactical ballistic (ATBM)oranti-tactical (ATM).The term in "ATM" is preferred thatit impliescapability againstcruiseas well as ballistic missiles. The political issues thatBMD programs could raise within and strategic theAllianceshouldbe explored deliberately possiblebefore as as economic resides previous in Material preliminary for resources committed. are analysis on discussions Alliance deliberations BMD and in theinformal recently proin vokedin Europeby obviousU.S. interest BMD options, ATM. including The issues go to the heartof NATO's established of theory deterrence and offer opportunity fundamental an for reassessment.
This essay is based on extensive interviewsin Europe in 1980 and 1981. Despite obvious risks of over-simplification, owing to the diversityof views in each countryon most issues, I have chosen to conform standard practiceby referring the "Europeans" as a shorthandforwhat to to appear to have been and to remain dominant trendsin West European opinion. Special thanks are owed to Colin Gray, who firstencouraged me to investigate this topic, and to various observersin governmentand industry(including Benson Adams, Guy Barasch, Charles Kupperman, and Richard Nuttall) who commented on earlier drafts. The views expressed are nonethelessmine exclusively,and should not be construedto representthose of the Department of the Navy or any U.S. governmentagency. David S. Yostis an Assistant Professor theU.S. Naval Postgraduate at School, Monterey, California. He is theauthor European Securityand the SALT Process, Washington of 85 Paper,Number (Beverly Hills and London:Sage Publications, 1981) and editor NATO's StrategicOptions: Arms Control of and Defense (New York:Pergamon Press,1981).
Interniational Fall Secuirity, 1982 (Vol. 7, No. 2) 0162-2889/82/010143-32 $02.50/0 ?D1982 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology.
143
International Security144 1
Alliance BMD Deliberations, 1967-1968 The previousAlliancedeliberations BMD helpedto form on Europeanattitudes thathave becomefirmly entrenched overthe past fifteen years.The principal deliberations placeinNuclear took Planning Group(NPG) meetings from April1967through April1968.The twokeyissueswereU.S. plans for theSentinel ABM system and thepossibility BMD in Europe. of the McNamara'sSeptember 1967 speech announcing decisionto deploy the Sentinel ABM system defense theUnitedStatesagainstprojected for of Chinese strategic "createdconsiderable resentment capabilities among the allies" forseveralreasons,including convictions that"the announcement and had been made without sufficient consultation thatthe UnitedStates had failedto honourits obligations the NPG."1 The anti-Chinese to orienand tation Sentinel seenin Europeas based on "hysterical dangerous" was of American thatare thought arisefrom fears China,so that"thedangers of to BMD deployment seem to be incurred no good reason."2 for These presumeddangerswerepartly thosethoroughly articulated the by the American opponentsof BMD at approximately same time-above all, thatstrategic and detente stability prospects armscontrol and for would be needlessly endangered highly by expensive technology probably that would not be reliably effective. indeed were the Europeansof thatera who Few as because it supported U.S. BMD program in theWestEuropeaninterest a the of might promote coupling assuring continued by invulnerabilityAmericanretaliatory The offered WestEuropean forces.3 mostfrequently argument a was againstU.S. ABM deployment thatit would promote neo-isolationist America"concept,allowingWestern "Fortress Europe to stand alone and summarized Johan vulnerable. WestEuropean reaction admirably was The by affairs: statesecretary foreign for the Holst,recently Norwegian It is, on thewhole,surprising notetheextent whichEuropeanopinion to to of missile has been so unanimously to unfavorable any deployment ballistic attitude does not differentiate betweenvardefenses.The generally critical
ious alternativeU.S. BMD deploymentconfigurations.... The expectation
of the Nuclear Planning Group (Ph.D. dissertation,London School of Economics and Political Science, 1978), p. 114. Missile Defence and theAlliance,AtlanticPaper Number 1 (Bou2. Laurence W. Martin, Ballistic logne-sur-Seine,France: AtlanticInstitute,1969), p. 31. 3. An example was Elizabeth Young in Survival,Vol. 12, No. 4 (April 1970), p. 149.
in The The of ConsultationNATO,1965-1974: Experience 1. Paul EdwardButeux, Politics Nuclear
BMD andthe Atlantic Alliance 145 1
we assumea similar RussianBMD deployment, threat UnitedStates the the could mobilize partofheralliesmight on lookless impressive morethe the SovietBMD promisedto reducethe damage of any American retaliation. BMD deployment Hence, a bilateral on might balancealso be perceived as reducing validity theguarantee.4 the of Stillfurther hostile"arguments were expressedin Eu"overwhelmingly roperegarding BMD. Even ICBM defenses might lead to limited area defenses and thustovirtual of withan enhanced "decoupling" theU.S. guarantee, of war at Europe'sexpense."Superpower BMD deploy"possibility nuclear mentscould even servethe American of purposeof "elimination independentcentres nuclear in theWest,"and at theleastwould reinforce of power West Europeanfeelings political-military and of inferiority subordination. the that Finally, Europeanperception "BMD seemsto be entirely concerned withfighting wars rather thanwithdeterrence" the guaranteed concepta "chilly reception."5 European distaste theconcept BMD based in Europewas evenmore for of In BMD "would emphatic. April1968the NPG decidedthatEurope-based be too costly, and not totally armslimitation effective, might compromise 6 discussions between United the States and theSoviet Union." DenisHealey, thenBritish secretary statefor of stressed prohibitive defense, reportedly "its costand lackofeffectiveness againsta Sovietattack."7 In contrast, some reaHolst felt thatthe "technical of problem providing sonablyeffective defenseat a meaningful level in Europeis probably surmountable," owingto the slowerre-entry ballistic speed of medium-range missiles(MRBMs) (comparedto ICBMs). Holst, however,did note three in to political obstacles ABM deployment Europe:1) Sincethekillmechanism in "a wouldprobably he have to be nuclear, foresaw political problem terms ofconvincing suspicious a audienceaboutthereliability thedesignagainst of
4. JohanJ. Holst, "Missile Defense: ImplicationsforEurope," in JohanJ. Holst and WilliamJ. (New York: PerControversy ABM? PolicyIssues in theMissile Defense Schneider, Jr.,eds., Why gamon Press, 1969),pp. 190, 194. See also Theodore Sorenson, "The ABM and WesternEurope," of in Abram Chayes and JeromeB. Wiesner, eds., ABM: An Evaluation theDecisionto Deployan (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 179-83. Missile System Antiballistic pp. 29-36. Missile Defense, 5. Martin,Ballistic p. of 6. Buteux, Politics NuclearConsultation, 123. 7. Benson D. Adams, BallisticMissile Defense(New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 137-138, 179.
turn,will increase tensions between the two superpowers....
[is] thatany BMD deployment likely generate armsrace which,in is to an

If, however,
| International Security146
accidentsand abuse." 2) Disagreements about which localitieswould be defended"could have disruptive rather thanintegrating effects" the Alin liance.3) Most important the riskto detente, "dangerthata BMD was the in Western Europemight tendto perpetuate postureand atmosphere a of confrontation."8 political Such the wereprobaarguments, especially latter, blyas important thetechnical financial as and ones offered Healey. by General on European Views BMD In 1969,theNPG tookrelatively notice theU.S. decision revisethe of to little to dedicated proto anti-Chinese orientation Sentinel a Safeguard of system tection U.S. retaliatory of "thin"areadefenses forces toproviding and against in accidental smallattacks, or Sovietor Chinese.Thiscontrast NPG reactions in nuclear maybe explained partby a recognition Europeansthattheater by allied inputintoalliance weapons analyseswould be "the area of greatest nuclearpolicy,"withstrategic a force decisionsmainly U.S. responsibility.9 An additionalfactor commencement the of may have been the imminent ArmsLimitation of Talks(SALT) and theprospect negotiated Strategic constraints BMD. on The ABM Treaty 1972and its 1974Protocol werewelcomedin Western of all thereasonswhyBMD was recently Europefor opposed. The mainbenefit was seen as stabilization thearmsraceand East-West of relations generally, witha firm Ian foundation continuing for detente. Smart three more suggests reasonsfor WestEuropeanapproval:1) The continued of specific credibility and theBritish French was States insisted deterrents enhanced. TheUnited 2) thatArticle of the ABM Treaty(whichprohibits transfer ABM IX the of to would not prevent transfer offensive the of technology thirdcountries) less weaponstechnology. The UnitedStatesdid notmakeitself vulnerable 3) to ballistic thanitsAllies.10 missileattack In the intervening years,Europeanshave generally become even more sensitive detente to and has considerations, theABM Treaty assumedspecial as in of U.S. interest renegotiatimportance a surviving "keystone" detente. and potentially therefore destabilizing theABM Treaty appearsdangerous still ing to manyin Western Europe,and abrogation moreso. An important
8. Holst, "Missile Defense," pp. 200-201. pp. 9. Buteux, PoliticsofNuclearConsultation, 162-163. 10. Ian Smart, "Perspectives fromEurope," in Mason Willrichand JohnB. Rhinelander,eds., (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. 187, 191, 194. and SALT: TheMoscowAgreements Beyond
BMD andthe Atlantic Alliance 147 |
example of this view is the statement the Palme Commission, of which includessuchinfluential WestEuropean politicians EgonBahr, as Jean-Marie Daillet,GroHarlem-Bruntland, David Owen, and Joopden Uyl: mentof ABM systems buttressed illusionthatnuclearwars could be the in fought survived somemeaningful and sense,theriskoftheuse ofnuclear Each side, fearing thatthe othermight weapons would multiply. perceive advantagein a nuclearfirst-strike, be tempted act first. to The instamight bilities and dangers such a situation obvious.1" in are These well-established BMD are reinforced generalattitudes regarding by views in specific thatillustrate political the obstacleswithinthe countries BMD optionsand ATM might AlliancethatU.S. homeland face.
FRANCE
race ensued, the consequences would be severe....
If the ABM Treaty were abrogated and an unbridled offense/defense arms

as continued develop-
Approximately fifteen yearsago, when the prospects BMD deployment for forarea defensein boththe UnitedStatesand the SovietUnion appeared serious,analysts predicted thatthe emerging French strategic nuclearforce program would be deprivedof all credibility SovietBMD; Francecould by scarcely hope to buildenoughsubmarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs)to saturate Sovietdefenses. The 1972ABM Treaty therefore provided very a welcome opportunity the for French continue expansionof theirstrategic to the nuclearforceprogram. TheFrench government couldhave reasonable confidence itsdeterrent's that politicalutility would not be renderedineffective withoutat least some advance warningthrough publicabrogation the ABM Treaty either of by superpower, through or intelligence regarding clandestine Sovietresearch and development ABM thatmightoffer Sovietsan optionof rapid in the ABM deployment. Whatwould the Frenchdo if moreextensive and effective deployments takeplace?The official position manyyearshas been thatsuch a threat for 12 is genuine, thatFranceis fully but prepared theeventuality.One ofthe for
11. The SALT Process:The Global Stakes(Vienna, Austria: Independent Commission on Disarmament and SecurityIssues, February1981), pp. 2-3. nationale, Revuede defense 12. Alain Bru and Lucien Poirier,"Dissuasion et defense anti-missiles," December 1968,p. 1828. Hugues de l'Estoile,Lucien Poirier,and Didier le Cerf,"Les implications nationale, January1968, pp. 23-33, strategiquesde l'innovationtechnologique," Revuede defense and February 1968, pp. 238-239. General Poirier, then a member of the Defense Ministry was the key author of the 1968 documents that became the foundationsof the planning staff, still-valid 1972 defense white paper.
International Security 148 1
writplanning department, DefenseMinistry's highest officials theFrench in could be abrogated explainsthatthe ABM Treaty ing undera pseudonym, or circumvented air missileupgrades)at any time: (through defense surveillance residesin the reciprocal our Nevertheless principal guarantee eachis in fact mostinterested maintain overeach other; thetwosuperpowers the in assuring willrespect ABM Treaty.... So longas ABM thattheother system[MRV] level, the multiple-warhead defensesremainat the current withthe M4 [SLBM] shouldbe able to exhaustthese thatwillbe in service of and defenseswithouttoo much difficulty to assure the penetration a missiles.Moreover, what is called the significant portionof our strategic "hardening" warheadsand missilescan make our missilesmoreinvulof But stillothersolutions nerableto the effects ABM warheadexplosions. of for whichpose difficult problems enemydefenses.13 missiles,
exist . . . [e.g.,] increasing the number of our missiles . . . [and] cruise
Colonel Guy When he was deputydirector the planningdepartment, of missiles couldalso be of Lewinadded thatthenumber warheadson existing a The director military of applicationsat the Commissariat increased.14 vehicle(RV) separation be will thatre-entry l'Energie Atomique declared has will no interceptor be able withhardening, enemy such that,in conjunction aids to destroy morethanone RV.'5Decoys and otherpenetration maybe as underconsideration well. have also been made. At the same time,expressions official of concern in 1981 "cautioned Poncet February reportedly Foreign Minister Jean-Frangois anti-ballistic missile the Reagan administration againstbuildinglarge-scale 16 in Europe." The . thatthiswould createinstability systems . . on grounds has department statedthatrevisdirector theForeign of Ministry's planning "would weakenthetechnical even forICBM defenses, ing theABM Treaty, withrespect theUSSR."17 to force of credibility our striking have been government statements theMitterrand by To date no relevant would also seemsplausibleto assume thatitsofficials made. It nonetheless of Cot, Jean-Pierre now minister oppose any revisionof the ABM Treaty.
Nationale, April1978,p. 10. Defense "L'avenir la dissuasion," de 13. Ivan Margine, Nationale, 1980,p. 18. May francaises," Defense nucl6aires des 14. GuyLewin,"L'avenir forces in francaise," misesen oeuvreparla defense "Les armeset les ripostes 15. Jacques Chevallier, Actes Colloque, 1 (Paris:Fondation du Vol. pourles Etudesde de La France auxdangers guerre: face d'Administration, des Elevesde l'EcoleNationale pourl'Association Anciens Defense Nationale 1980),pp..175-176. 26, Herald Tribune, February 1981. 16. International face dans la decennie1980,"in La France aux Gergorin, "Menaceset politiques 17. Jean-Louis p. dangers guerre, 65. de
cooperation and development, once pointedout that Soviet BMD could undermine Frenchdeterrent partof his advocacyof Frenchparticithe as 18 pationin SALT negotiations.Morever, chief staff thearmedforces, the of of in discussing decisionto construct seventh the a SSBN by 1994,added that it would not be reasonable,in view of France's "sufficiency" needs for deterrence, have morethansevenSSBNs by theend ofthecentury; to more thanseven or eightSSBNs would lead Franceaway from "sufficiency" the principle.19 Evidently this concept of sufficiency, influenced part by in France'seconomic capacity, assumesthatSovietBMD willnotbe upgraded beyondmanageable limits. It is mostimprobable France in wouldreopenthedecision announced that the 1972WhitePaper againstany French BMD program the groundsof on cost and probableineffectiveness,20 the shorttime-of-flight the given from SovietUnionto France(around10 to 12 minutes, which4 at mostwould of be usefulforinterception).21 if Francehad the resourcesto pursue Even in Sovietinterest BMD and BMD, a French decision do so couldlegitimize to In the thereby severely undermine credibility theFrench of forces. themeanas time,theFrench insist, theyhave since1967when thequestionofIRBM fixedIRBMsare protected their was vulnerability first raised,thattheir by SLBMs. An attackagainstFrenchIRBMs would be the plainestproofof In and would justify retaliation.22 Giscardd'Estaing's aggression, strategic on wordsin June1980:"Anynuclear attack French would automatically soil 23 wouldtherefore provoke strategic nuclear retaliation." TheFrench probably missiles-the antiU.S. BMD againstSoviettheater oppose Europe-based tactical to SovietBMD. Anyform missile(ATM) concept-as likely legitimize would be of U.S. homelandBMD beyondthe ABM Treaty regime'slimits of BMD programs. seenas evenmorecertain provoke expansion Soviet the to
BRITAIN
the and possibleimproved Soviet British sensitivity regarding ABM Treaty, BMD within confines, be seenin theChevaline for its can program hardened,
in 18. Jean-Pierre "Plaidoyer de Cot, pourl'interet national," La France aux dangers guerre, face p. 202. 19. General November Jeannou Lacaze,"La politique militaire," Defense Nationale, 1981, 13pp. 14. Cf.Mitterrand LeMonde, in July 26-27,1981,p. 6. 20. Livre blanc la defense sur nationale, Volume1 (June 1972),p. 18. 21. General Francois Maurin La France auxdangers guerre, 389,421. in face de pp. 22. Defense in December 1967. Minister Pierre Messmer L'Express, 11, in 23. Giscard d'Estaing LeMonde, June 1980. 28,
Security 150 | International
vehicleswithadvanced decoys and re-entry maneuvering earlyseparating has aids. The British that, because as penetration government acknowledged the the list of the GaloshABM system protecting Moscowregion, targeting British of"keyaspectsofSovietstatepower"for SLBMsmayincludetargets such as majordams outsideMoscow-citiesand "manyhighvalue targets, majorironand and waterways, majoroil refineries, majornaval shipyards, reactor establishments."24 thesetargets Since steelworks, majornuclear and are presumably go unprotected today,whydid theBritish to theexpenseof ?1 overthe 1973-1980 pethelong-secret Chevalineprogram (nearly billion themwithpenetration aids? Apriod)to hardenthe SLBM RVs and equip 1980Trident SLBM decisionassume parently both Chevalineand the July in of possible improvements Soviet BMD. Soviet construction significant This concern capabilities. BMD would require enhancedBritish penetration is expressed delicately publicBritish in documents: will keep our Polarismissilesable to Though the Chevalineprogramme missiledefencesinto the 1990s, continuing Soviet penetrate anti-ballistic in allowedby the1972ABM Treaty, effort research development, and might in timereduceour assuranceof this.... [Trident MIRV capability and I's] of insuranceagainstfurther long range give excellent margins long-term advancesin SovietABM and ASW capability....25 In otherwords,Britain's to positionon BMD is similar thatof France. while Precautionary steps have been takenin case SovietBMD improves, is preferred. Some preservation theABMTreaty's of constraints emphatically would findsuperpower ICBM defenhave speculated thatBritain observers be in ses moreacceptable thananyarea defenses. Thismight tolerable theory but forthe maintenance the credibility Britain's of of deterrent, even such ICBM defenses the of could promote deployment SovietBMD thatcouldbe and of to of centers other British oriented defense population targets potential have been expressed other thanconinterest. official British No preferences in ABM Treaty and Protocol tinuance force theexisting of provisions. in British interest BMD is even less likelythan French,given thatthe have no hardenedretaliatory to and greater financial British forces protect constraints. British officials would probably oppose the ATM conceptas
cited Commiiiiittee, in Lawrence Reportfromthe Expendituire 24. Officialevidence in the Twelfth and NuclearWeapons(London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 47. See also Freedman's Freedman, Britain useful discussion of Chevaline, pp. 48-51. of Force(London: Ministry Defense, July NuclearDeterrent Strategic 25. TheFutureUnited Kinigdom and more effective 1980), pp. 7, 20. This statementwould also apply to the even longer-range TridentII (D-5), which is to be purchased in lieu of TridentI.
Atlantic Alliance 151 | BMD andthe
likelyto endangerthe ABM Treaty. Because of Britain's close relationship with the UnitedStatesin strategic some observers nuclearmatters, have speculatedthatthe British might morelikely be thanthe Frenchto accept readily U.S. decision seekextensive a to revisions theABM Treaty in regime ifBMD came to seem overwhelmingly necessary preserve credibility to the oftheU.S. guarantee; credibility that be might seen as a higher than priority for of maintenance the ABM Treaty the sake of the penetrability British of RVs.Although sucharguments might adoptedas rationalizationsBritain be if British French and had no other distinction between choice,thisspeculative in Britain would views would almostcertainly prove unfounded practice. as as of oppose revision theABM Treaty regime firmly France. The government theFederalRepublic Germany of of (FRG)is perhapsmore that credikeenlyaware thanotherEuropeangovernments the continuing of deterrents in theinterest Western is of and bility theBritish French Europe in general.This reasonforfavoring of continuation theABM Treaty regime to for is, however, probably secondary theTreaty's perceived importance the future detente of in relations. and stability East-West conpolitical Favoring in tinuation theABM Treaty of is for regime implicit theFRG's support the arms control SALT/START continuing process,whichis deemed "of permanentimportance all political in efforts aimed at safeguarding peace and in balanceofpower."26 achieving stabilization theEast-West At a timewhen U.S. strategic armscontrol underreview, policyremains theABM Treaty appears to be one of thefewsurviving pillarsof detentea linkto the optimistic initiated 1969by the in earlyyearsof the Ostpolitik current Unilateral U.S. action alter ABMTreaty to the SPD-FDP government. than Soviet-American on regimewould be more upsetting agreement a but revision, no revisionat all seems preferred. Perhapseven more than in thatBMD is a elsewhere NATO Europe,thenegative impression prevails to than moreoriented nuclear technology war-fighting deterrence. the not Giventhesegeneral attitudes, FRG would probably welcomeU.S. interest theATM concept. WestGermany in Yet wouldbe thekeyEuropean ATM. A majorshareof the new intermediate-range allyregarding nuclear forces all (including thePershing are to be based in theFRG. Moreover, Ils) sinceBritain France, and who in any case have a specialnuclearstatus, are
and of Republic Germany theDevelopmentthe of of 26. White Paper1979:TheSecurity theFederal of Armed Forces Federal (Bonn: Federal Ministry Defence, 1979), p. 69.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
International Security 152 |
unlikely takeany initiative ATM, the restof theAllies(and the U.S. to on Congress)would awaita WestGerman decisionwiththekeenest interest. A positiveATM decisionfromthe current West Germangovernment wouldbe likely of onlyundersomecombination thefollowing conditions: 1) further obvious deterioration detente;2) a strongand consistent of U.S. kill in commitment ATM; 3) non-nuclear (NNK) mechanisms the ATM to and system; favorable 4) financing production arrangements; deployment 5) of ATM on the soil of at least two othernon-nuclear Continental members ofNATO-probablyBelgium a NATO Councilendorsement and Italy;6) of the ATM concept;and 7) howeverparadoxical, the establishment an of thatwould demonstrate armscontrol context West appropriate negotiating in and for Germany's interest thecontinuation detente preference an arms of from recent the control solution. These conditions maybe predicted history ofWestGerman in nuclear modernization participation NATO theater decisions; most,ifnot all, would probably applywitha CDU/CSU-led governmentas well.27 Some doubt thatthe ATM conceptwould be acceptedeven by a CDU/ CSU-led government, even withtheseconditions-if theycould all be fulfilled. KonradAdenauer Hans Ruihle theCDU-sponsored of Foundation has, for a the example, published view of"profound skepticism" regarding ATM nor of acceptable financial limits present, is there at any prospect an optimin ized combination strategic of defensesystems theforeseeable future."28 The Alliance difficulties U.S. BMD programs mightface become even and clearer whenbothlimited U.S. homeland options (ICBMdefenses "thin" homeland BMD are examined area defenses) extensive U.S. and potentially from Europeanperspective. a
U.S. BMD Alternatives
LIMITED U.S. HOMELAND BMD OPTIONS
option: ".
. .
this option appears neithertechnologicallypracticablewithin
ICBM defensesconstitute least controversial the optionforthreereasons.

27. See David S. Yostand ThomasC. Glad, "WestGerman Party Politics Theater and Nuclear ForceModernization Since 1977,"Armed Forces Society, 8, No. 4 (Summer and Vol. 1982),in press. 28. Hans Riihle,"A EuropeanPerspective theU.S.-SovietStrategic-Military on Relationship," in William Schneider, etal., U.S. Strategic-Nuclear andBallistic Jr., Policy Missile Defense: 1980s The andBeyond (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute Foreign for Policy Analysis, 1980),p. 51.
First, technical the feasibility defense hardened of of ICBM launchers seems increasingly credible, especially leverage if couldbe provided through mobile and/or deceptive basing.Second,ICBM defenses wouldnotviolate longthe standing offense-dominant verities the"assureddestruction" of outlook. Prelaunchsurvivability retaliatory would be enhancedwithno degraof forces dation of theirabilityto penetrate countervalue to targets; the assumed stability mutualcounter-society of threats wouldbe unimpaired. Third, preciselybecause Sovietcitiesand other"countervalue" targets would remain undefended underthishypothetical revised ABM Treaty British and regime, French nuclear forces their to wouldretain ability penetrate their to presumed the targets. to to Nonetheless, attempt revise ABMTreaty any regime accommodateICBM defensescould becomecontroversial Europe. Fears of an in arms race destabilizing East-Westrelations would probably surpass more and reorientation ICBM detechnical concerns aboutpossibleexpansion of fensesto area defenses, and so forth. Limited would probably even morecontroversial Eube in area defenses rope. JanLodal has made probably strongest forlimited the U.S. area case defenses, partly the groundsthattheywould strengthen credibility on the ofU.S. guarantees Allies.Lodal reasonsthat to an active defense wouldeliminate Soviet incentive carry "limited" to out any even nuclearattacksagainstU.S. territory, if the UnitedStateshad used tactical nuclearweapons to stop a Sovietinvasion.The defensewould be a a capable of intercepting small-scale attack; Sovietleaderwould have to launcha largeattack (severalthousand thesedefenwarheads)to penetrate ses. A rational from Sovietleaderoughtto be deterred such an launching attack, that is realizing an assureddestruction response a muchmorecredible reaction an attack several to thousand warheadsthanto an attack a few of of
warheads.29
In Lodal's proposalforlimited area defenses, mutualSoviet-American "assureddestruction" would remain guarantors strategic the of stacapabilities in But bility. whatLodal calls "a second'firebreak' theladderofescalation" (in addition theNATO-assumed to wouldbe conventional/nuclear firebreak) nuclearweapons withless created: the UnitedStatescould use battlefield riskofcatastrophic Sovietretaliation againsttheU.S. homeland. Lodal rightly to pointsout probableEuropeanobjections such area de29. Jan M. Lodal, "Deterrence and Nuclear Strategy," Daedalus, Vol. 109, No. 4 (Fall 1980), p. 167.
fenses.Even morethanwithICBM defenses, mainEuropeanconcerns the would includefearof an armsrace undermining and for prospects detente thelegitimization Sovietarea defenses the of possibly reducing effectiveness of British Above all, limited U.S. area defenses and Frenchnuclearforces. in thata war couldbe fought Europe "would makeit relatively morelikely resultthatwould be decriedas U.S. territory-a alone, without involving decoupling."Although the ongoingdebate about the prospective deploymentofintermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) has showngreatresonance that amongEuropeanpublicsofthefalseargument theU.S. purposein INF a modernization to "confine nuclearwar to Europe,"Lodal's proposalis is Lodal judges thatimplementation of intended maximize to thatpossibility. for his proposalwould nonetheless "healthy thealliance,"becauseofthe be and thusthe reducedlikelihood increasedcredibility U.S. guarantees of of evenat theconventional anyconflict, level,in Europe:"No possiblestrategy look foran easy solution wherenone exists."30
EXTENSIVE U.S. HOMELAND BMD
can fullysatisfy European countries.... the
our European allies continue to
In rejecting suchproposals "thin"areadefenses, for ColinGray rightly points out that"small-scale are nuclearstrikes not muchin keepingwithwhat is knownaboutSovietmilitary that style."Accordingly, Graysuggests a "thick,"or truly serious,multi-level [BMD] deployment would usefully of reduceAmerican self-deterrence so enhancethe credibility the exand tended deterrent.... in the absence of substantial homelandprotection, U.S. strategic as nuclearforces lack both credibility an extendeddeterrent threat in and ability the eventof need. The SovietUnion cannotbe certain thatthisis so (even incredible but threats deterto someextent) therequired in of quality deterrence, robustness periodsofveryacutepolitical its stress, couldwellbe lacking theU.S. homeland if continues be totally nuclear to at
risk.31
Morecredible couldthusbe a by-product of extended deterrence guarantees extensive homelanddefenses. A true"damage-limiting" also includea theory posturecould, however, of "escalationdominance"oriented the towardcontrolling SovietUnion's
30. Ibid., p. 171. Herman Kahn has expressed a similarattitudetowardprobable West European objections to U.S. BMD programs: "They won't like it, of course, but they are sensible people Report, September21, 1981, p. 54). when they'reforcedto be sensible." (U.S. News and World Vol. 31. Colin S. Gray, "A New Debate on BallisticMissile Defence," Sturvival, 23, No. 2 (March/ April 1981), p. 68.
BMD and theAtlantic Alliance| 155
powerprojection advantagesin Eurasiaas well as denying Sovietsopthe of in portunities playupon theprobability self-deterrencean undefended to America. other In words,whilethe"assureddestruction" verity near-total of population vulnerability wouldbe discarded, U.S. operational capabilities for strategic nuclearwar,bothoffensive defensive, and would be improved in orderto make implausible of any Soviettheory victory. would be Stability derivedfrom U.S. ability dominate a to any escalation processby limiting damage to its population centers well as its military as assets. The United Statescouldthusextend if and honorguarantees-including, necessary, first use ofnuclear of becausethere would weapons-withlessrisk self-deterrence be less riskof homelanddamage. Because deterrence would be improved, if war would be less probable, and less catastrophic, it occurred. All the premises thiscompelling logically and of consistent strategic prescription rejectedby partisans the "assured destruction" are of model of in deterrence stability, are evenmorepredominant Western and who Europe thanin theUnitedStates.It is assumedthatreliable population defenses are in infeasible an offense-dominant and that world, anySoviet-American comin destabilize strategic the measureswould dangerously petition defensive nuclearbalance,in additionto beingself-defeating extremely and costly.32 Even morethan withlimited defenses, Europeanswould almostcertainly in deploreU.S. interest extensive area defensesas undermining, not deif structure deterrence; possiblysliding of as stroying, peace-preserving the from to of as propercontrol self-deterrencea "first-strike" posture; attempting to confine nuclearwar to Europe; and as encouraging the any future SovietUnionto construct similar defenses. Even if Europeanscould generally acceptGray'sjudgment that,in "the context U.S. BMD deployment, of SovietBMD would notbe a destabilizing extensive Sovietdefensescould make the need forcostly development,"33 in in improvements conventional battlefield and nuclear forces Europemore obvious.NATO's strategic intermediate-range nuclearforces and could not be as readily withconventional battleappliedto deterring Sovietattacks or
somewhat is "assureddestruction" admittedly and this 32. Calling modelofdeterrence stability and U.S. targeting operational to in unfair that,despitepopularperceptions the contrary, options. and counterforce counter-military has doctrine formanyyearsincludednumerous of U.S. declaratory becametheshorthand nonetheless "Assureddestruction" characterOzation merit owingto graveU.S. and West a descriptive in policy thelate 1960s,and retains certain in Europeandeficiencies activeand passive defenses.Those who believesuch deficiencies the carry forward "assureddestruction" stabilizing and unavoidable strategically technologically logicofthelate 1960s. MissileDefense,"p. 65. 33. Gray, "New Debateon Ballistic
fieldnuclearforces because Sovietdefenseswould directly counter them. an The recent political trials sustaining approximate of three percent annual real increasein defensespendingin NATO Europe suggesthow welcome new programs extensive for conventional force improvement would be. Sovietarea defenses, morethanICBM orlimited extensive area Moreover, defenses, would tend to reducethe deterrent value of the British, French, and (incidentally) forces. aside thequestionofhow Chinesenuclear Putting greatthatdeterrent value is in U.S. (or,moreimportantly, Soviet)eyes,the of forces meaningful more is continued technical credibility thesenuclear to Europeansthan those in the British and Frenchgovernments. United The nucleareffort Stateswas especially hostileto the French duringthe 1960s, of when Robert McNamarawas secretary defense.Forovera decade, howof ever,U.S. policyhas accepted,even vaguelyapproved,maintenance the French forces for (in, example, 1974NATO Ottawacommunique), the though stillnotwiththedegreeofactivecooperation accordedto theBritish. While damage-limiters could arguethatthegreater good oftheAlliancewould be derivedfrom extensive servedby theimproved deterrence U.S. area defendeterrents wouldbe less necessary, ses, and thatsmaller independent many to Europeanswould probably skeptical, say theleast. be Stillanother U.S. homeland BMD is that WestEuropeanargument against the resultant SoviethomelandBMD would undermine U.S. ability the to could executelimited strategic options.WhileU.S. penetration technology defend perhaps overcomeSoviet defenses,the Sovietscould nonetheless more readilythan againstgreater againstlimitedstrategic nuclearstrikes ones and could thus obligethe UnitedStatesto considermore extensive from less nuclear options-increasingly distinguishable general response-in theLodal argument Thisis theobverseof for orderto honortheguarantee. "thin"area defenses, itapplieswitheven greater if and force moreextensive BMD programs theUnitedStatesand theSovietUnionare envisaged. in The from UnitedStatesmaywellbe self-deterred executing limited any strategic from options.Moreover, even if the UnitedStateswere not self-deterred suchoptions, whatvalue couldthey havewhentheUnitedStates employing is defenselessagainst the virtually inevitable Soviet strategic nuclearresponses? about the arms control Finally,West Europeansremainskeptical arguBMD setforth someAmericans. Sucharguments ments U.S. homeland for by would permit both sides to presumethatSovietand U.S. BMD programs nuclear forces limit even sharply becauseICBMs or reduceoffensive strategic
Atlantic Alliance 157 | BMD andthe
of or would be defended.Abrogation revision the ABM and othertargets homeland BMD could superpower but Treaty wouldbe necessary, extensive of the stability minimizing effects by theoretically promotestrategic also by forcelevels and, more importantly, offensive cheatingon negotiated of strike plans. as enhancing uncertainty to thecostand feasibility offensive in force by Crisisstability couldbe improved reductions retaliatory vulneralaunch under real or interceptor bility, and by "allowingfornonnuclear their judgment thatsuperderivefrom Europeandoubts apparent attack."34 or in power BMD would in practicenot resultin limitations reductions instability through intensified promote offensive and forces, would probably instead. competition U.S. Interest ATM in the did Harold Brownapparently not even consider feaDefenseSecretary new intermediate-range nuclear sibility ATM defensesforthe planned of Ils cruisemissiles forces (GLCMs)and Pershing (INF)-the ground-launched in (P-11s) scheduledto begindeployment 1983-whenhe made thefollowing assessment: in survivable they IfTNF are to provide credible a deterrent, mustbe highly or nuclearattack.To a at the aggregate, least againstconventional limited depends on mobility againstthese threats large extent, forcesurvivability Given the and concealment from WarsawPact target systems. acquisition and short systems deployment forNATO land-based area relatively limited absolutesurvivability largetimeofflight Sovietballistic against missiles, for and nuclearattacksis probably infeasible certainly scale, bolt-out-of-the-blue
excessively costly.35
[Emphasis added]
viewexpressed RAFMarshall Thisviewis similar thegeneral by European to missile SirNeil Cameron:"We can, ofcourse,do nothing againsta ballistic attack dig deep. ..."36 but
LA-8632 (Los Initiative, A Arms-Control Missile Defense: Potential 34. G.E. Barasch et al., Ballistic
Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington,D.C.: U.S. AnnualReport of 35. Harold Brown, Department Defense
1981),p. 23. Whilethisstudy January Laboratory, Los AlamosNational Alamos,New Mexico: ideas about BMD's similar versionof such arguments, perhapsthe mostcomplete presents Kahn,James by have stability been expressed Herman for effects strategic beneficial potentially and R. Schlesinger, others. 1980),p. 146. Office, Printing Government Vol. Scene," RUSI Journal, 25, No. 1 (March "Defenseand the Changing 36. Neil Cameron, see ofEurope, Lodal,"Deterrence viewon theindefensibility American p. 1980), 26.Fora similar p. Strategy," 171. and Nuclear
| International Security 158
In contrast, Principal Deputy Undersecretaryof Defense Research and EngineeringJamesWade has made the followingevaluation: The question of active defense fortheaternuclear forcesis being looked at quite carefully.... it is reasonably clear that such a course could have merit.... both the GLCM and P-II are designed to achieve survivability against a number of threatsthroughcovertfield deployment,frequentrelocation in the field, and the reduction of signatures associated with field deployment. This mode of operation assumes enough warning to disperse An to covertfieldsites priorto an attack.37 ATM could reduce the importance of warning time....38 Since Wade's statements,it has been reportedin more specifictermsthat armingthe Patriotmissile with a nuclear warhead fordefense against Soviet theater missiles is under consideration. "A separate study contractis expected fromthe Armyfordevelopmentof a non-nuclearwarhead fortheater BMD to avoid the problemof obtainingrelease authority Patriotis equipped if with a nuclear warhead."39 This report is consistentwith other unofficial Americandiscussions oftheaterATM capable ofneutralizing threatposed the by the SS-20 and other Soviet theatermissiles, which could have conventional, nuclear, or chemical warheads. It is not yet clear whetherreportedresearch activitieswill result in actual ATM programs. No plans currently exist to replace or supplement the nuclear-armed Nike-Hercules air defense system with new nuclear-warhead or active defenses,40 with conventional-warheadsystems capable of theater ATM defenses. If ATM programs were pursued, they could face serious opposition in Western Europe, given established views on BMD in general and special factorsin Britain,France, and the FRG. Six problematicissues could inhibitor even frustrate U.S. initiative favorof ATM: technological in a Soviet countermeasures,Alliance cohesion, militaryrationales, credibility, implementationof INF modernization,and arms control issues (including INF negotiationsas well as SALT-re-named START by the United States in November 1981-and the ABM Treaty).
37. Wade in U.S., Senate, Armed Services Committee,Department Defense of Authorization for Appropriations Fiscal Year 1981, Hearings, Part 5, Research and Development, March 13, 1980 for (Washington,D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice,1980), pp. 3013-3014. 38. Wade cited in "ProtectionforEurope-Based Nuclear Missiles," Flight Internlational, October 18, 1980, p. 1496. 39. AviationWeekand Space Technology, June22, 1981, p. 89. 40. TheFY 1983 Department Defense of Program Research, for and Developmenit, Acquiisitioni, Statement by the Honorable Richard D. DeLauer, Under Secretaryof Defense Research and Engineering to the 97th Congress, March 2, 1982, pp. VII-14.
| Alliance 159 Atlantic BMD andthe
Technological Credibility ofATM Europeanexperts, say nothing politicians the general to of and public,will not be easilyconvincedof the technical feasibility ATM defenses.The of tendency to assume thatthe infeasibility reliableBMD was long ago is of established theintercontinental and thatshorter at level, distances, shorter BMD evenmoredifficult. maketheater warning times, lowertrajectories and in BMD technology in fact has advanced,particularly suchareas as discrimination, computerization, processing, data radar,and other-i.e., opticaldetection systems.Moreover, because the distanceand durationof their theater ballistic missiles(especially boost flight phases are relatively short, slowerre-entry the SS-21and SS-23)have significantly speeds thanSLBMs, missiles liketheSS-22and theSSICBMs,and longer-range theater ballistic 20. Shorterflight-times tend to aggravate(or, as BMD specialistssay, whileslower the "stress") intercept problem, re-entry speedstendto simplify it. in on idea ofusingPatriot an has Skepticism focused initially thereported ATM role.WhenthePatriot study program (thencalledSAM-D)was started in the mid-1960s, ATM role was envisaged,in additionto a capacity an againsthigh-performance aircraft highand low altitudes. at U.S. policy(as reflected theNPG deliberations) favored in then consideration ATM. Howof was laterdroppedbecause of costs and the ever, the ATM requirement in challengesof defending againstheavy nuclearattacks, additionto the to is BMD. Patriot now intended Alliancerecommendation againsttheater air serveas a replacement theHawk and Nike-Hercules defense for systems. anti-aircraft Even Patriot radars presumably are designed onlyfor operations. ifequippedwithradarsand data processing ATM-capable for discrimination and accurate and responsiveness, not Patriot might be prompt enoughfor an ATM role unless a nuclearwarheadwere used as the killmechanism. Even thensome observers would have gravedoubts,especially concerning the higher Sovietmissiles(e.g., the SS-20 re-entry speeds of longer-range and the SS-22). Developinga low-performance rangeATM (on thebasis of the Patriot, in the Sovietcase, the SA-10)capable of intercepting cruise or, missiles theSS-21and SS-23) missiles slower, or ballistic shorter-range (e.g., wouldbe less challenging thandeveloping new high-performance a missile. ATM Probably onlyan entirely new high-performance missile,ifequipped witheffective for sensingand homing devices,could avoid therequirement nuclear warheads. whichwould pose thepolitThe potential necessity nuclear for warheads,
in new nuclearweapons systems Western Euical problem introducing of kill rope, underlines manyadvantagesof non-nuclear (NNK) mechathe nisms.These advantageswould includereducedmanpower requirements; and and communications; simplified logistics, security, command, control, nuclear minimized to allies;no self-inflicted risk effects-i.e., electromagnetic no pulse (EMP) orblackout-hindering radars and communications systems; and requirement nuclearweapon materials; for simplified releaseauthority; inin is confidence system reliability, because totalsystem testing feasible, warheads.Even thoughNNK warof cludingdestruction incoming target near direct heads, designedforeither impactor highexplosivedetonation the RV, are cheaperthan nuclearwarheads,skepticism about NNK costwill untilresearch effectiveness reliability persist and (including operations conclusions thepublication authorand of research) leads to moredefinitive itative assessments. some observers, deem ATM "the onlyeffecAlthough perhapscorrectly, tive option" for"a reasonabledegree of survivability" NATO theater for one recent official of nuclearforces, including INF,41 discussion ATM techin nologynotedtheneed to consider costsand effectiveness thecontext its ofalternatives ATM: to The technology required defendagainstan IRBMattack to includes:Acquisitionand tracking an radarcapable of picking and tracking incoming up to an warhead;rapid,sophisticated signalprocessing equipment allowfiring interceptor withina few seconds; a high-speed, high acceleration missile whichcan reachtheincoming warheadin timeto killitat a sufficient range to precludedamageto thedefended and target; adequateterminal homing; an interceptor the warheadcapableofdestroying incoming reentry body.In addition,if a systemis to be used to defenda mobiletargetsuch as a all and must Pershing launcher, of the interceptors supporting equipment have mobility withthatof the target be defended.This techto consistent our ABM development nologyis attainable; much of it existsfrom work, between defending fixed targetsagainst althoughthere are differences ICBMs, and defending mobileones againstIRBMs.Whatwillbe at issue is in thedegreeto whichATM hardware contributes survivability theaggreto can active and passivemeasures enhancesurvivability, arms gate,whatother and control cost consideration, of ATM alternatives, the best technical approach should we elect to field such a system....
41. Wayne R. Winton, "Applications of BMD Other Than ICBM Defense," in U.S. ArmsControl Proceedings of a Symposium held at the for Missile Defense, and Objectives theImplications Ballistic Harvard University,November 1-2, 1979 (CamCenter for Science and InternationalAffairs, bridge, Mass.: PuritanPress, 1980), p. 96. Cf. Carnes Lord, "The ABM Question," Commentary, Vol. 69, No. 5 (May 1980), p. 38.
have the answers to all these questions.... be substantial....42
We are not farenoughalong in our examination thiscomplex of issue to

While we are not yet prepared
to estimate whatsuch a system might cost,I am certain thatthecostwould
include Alternatives ATMwouldpresumably to improved dispersal planning and mobility, and deception, redundancy, signature reductions. The ABM development workthatmaybe ofgreatest relevance ATM is to thaton theLow Altitude DefenseSystem (LoADs), whichconsists small of radarsand interceptors withthe designedforpossiblemobiledeployment MX ICBM. In conjunction withemerging for technology endoatmospheric be to NNK, LoADs development might directly applicable ATM.43 Nonetheless disagreement thetechnical as tothefeasibility within community persists of reasonably and operational effective BMD, owingto technical problems, the including challenge reliable of NNK.4 Uncertainties would persist,even withreliableNNK. Endoatmospheric warheads Soviets interception NNK ofthechemical with the havereportedly missilescould be less thansatisfactory, ballistic since deployedon theater such an interception over Alliedterritory could spread the chemicals, deand pendingon the altitudeof the interception otherfactors. Prompter better solutions interceptions might therefore provide against Sovietchemical warheadsoverthelongterm. over could also represent a NNK interceptions Alliedterritory High-level if warheadswiththemechanism "salof problem theSovietsdesignedtheir RVs might detonated the impactof be vage-fusing," whereby incoming by Whiletheobviousadvantage intercepting theinterceptor's mechanism. of kill the Sovietwarheadseveralmilesaway from intended its would retarget could interfere subsequent with nuclearexplosion main,a "salvage-fusing" on Allieddefenses because ofitseffects radarand communications systems. Howeverimprobable "salvage-fusing" the possibility seems-owing to its failure-itcould serveas a and greatcostand difficulty, riskofcatastrophic
42. Wade, in DoD Authorization FY 1981, p. 3014. ... 43. Winton, "Applications of BMD"; JonathanE. Medalia, Antiballistic Missiles, Issue Brief, Number IB81003 (Washington,D.C.: Congressional Research Service,September1, 1981), p. 15. assessments of BMD technology,see the Los Alamos study cited 44. For somewhat contrasting A Missile Defense: Quick-Look in note 34; Guy Barasch, Nikki Cooper, and Ray Pollock, Ballistic June1980); Chapter 3 (on BMD) Laboratory, Assessment, LA-UR-80-1578 (Los Alamos Scientific of U.S., Congress, Officeof TechnologyAssessment,MX MissileBasing(Washington,D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice,1981); and the articlesby William A. Davis, Jr.,Deputy Ballistic 1979 and December Missile Defense Project Manager, in NationalDefense,September/October 1981.
basis forEuropeantechnical Such uncertainties the technical as skepticism. of ATM ofall detereffectiveness NNK ATM would notnecessarily deprive rentvalue. Resultant Soviet uncertainties to the effectiveness their as of to offensive strikes could still helpful deterrence. be
SovietATM Countermeasures
for Sovietresponsesto a U.S. ATM program NATO could be offensive, defensive, political. and Offensive responseswould be systems designedto destroy, overwhelm, or circumvent of WesternATM systems.Given the deficiencies NATO's air current defenses,the Sovietscould attackthe ATM radarsand other withair-breathing components systems. Improvedair defensesand ATM in defenses wouldtherefore be required a serious effort both damage-limiting by NATO. ATM systems could also be saturated the Sovietsat specific by pointsof interest, costs partly at dependent upon the sophistication number and of Sovietpenetration as opposed to the ATM's discrimination aids capability and cost-effectiveness. without Even of penetration aids, the numbers RVs on Soviettheater ballistic missiles veryhigh: are The number NATO military of installations whichthe Sovietsmight target withnuclear three The Soviets weaponsis, at most,approximately hundred. and presently have tendelivery for systems each target, whentheSS-20has in been fully fielded theywillhave tenweapons foreach target thissystem
alone....
in them destroy to installation NATO tentimes every military over,continues to be a mystery theWest.45 in
The Soviet motivationfor this tremendous capability,enabling
The Sovietcapability seems excessive,even allowingforredundancy to compensate reliability for uncertainties thehypothetical and of contingencies Western and or pre-emption intra-war attrition, to coveran even moreambitioustarget in Western set have offered Europe. Some Western analysts in that deceptively reassuring explanations speculating extra-rational factors (e.g., bureaucratic politicsor cultural tradition) may accountforthe high numbers Sovietdeployments. Soviets of The mayalso be deploying militarily
45. Francis X. Kane, "Safeguards fromSALT: U.S. Technological Strategyin an Era of Arms Ends and ShadesofSALT (New York: Crane, Russak Control," in Paul H. Nitze et al., TheFateful and Co., 1979), p. 116.
redundant INF fornegotiating purposes,i.e., no loss of requiredtarget coverage,even if negotiations resultin reductions. Whatever explanathe tions,the seemingly redundant warheadsin effect constitute double insurance againstpotential future ATM capabilities-animpressive capacity to overwhelm ATM, whichin turn worksto discourage NATO from pursuing such systems. an ATM wereto castdoubton theeffectiveness systems If of such as the SS-22 or SS-20, the Sovietswould probably use it as a new rationale deployevenmorenumerous effective thiswould make to and INF; technical and cost-effectiveness for for arguments ATM even moredifficult Western proponents. in Although Sovietredundancy theater missilenumbers ballistic makesit improbable, another Sovietoffensive countermeasure couldbe attacking tarATM withSLBMs and ICBMs. Knowlgets defendedby European-based assume thatapproximately of the SS-11ICBMs, as edgeableobservers 120 well as some SS-19ICBMs,mayhave targets Europe.46 in Thismeansthata an to credible ATM would require ability intercept very the fully rapidICBM and SLBM RVs,whilethelatter comefrom direction. might any (ICBM RVs couldalso comefrom direction theSovietsused theFractional if Orbital any but these delivery Bombardment System[FOBS], or orbited missiles; techin niquesseemimprobable concerns as targets Europe.)An imperfect ability to defendagainstcertain typesof Sovietintermediate-range missiles would in nonetheless constitute improvement thecurrent an over situation, which no defenseexistsagainstSovietICBMs, SLBMs, or intermediate-range missiles. DefensiveSovietcountermeasures would consistof expandedBMD systems.Since the ABM Treaty was signed,SovietBMD research and develthanthatof the UnitedStates.Moreover, opmenthas been moreintensive in contrast the UnitedStates,the SovietsretainactiveBMD capabilities to aroundMoscow,permitted theABMTreaty itsProtocol, continue and and by to perfect radars and air defenseinterceptor missilesforpossible future in the an to upgrading BMD roles.Whether UnitedStatesretains advantage thekeyareasofBMD technology no longer is clear;at theleast,comparative U.S. advantagesin certain areas have probably been reducedsince 1972, levels of investment effort under the ABM Treaty given the contrasting an the regime. Although UnitedStatesperhapsretains edge in some areas,
46. Lawrence Freedman, "The Dilemma of Theatre Nuclear Arms Control," Survival,Vol. 23, No. 1 (January/February 1981), p. 5.
forexample, battle management discrimination and technologies exoatand mospheric kill it nonnuclear mechanisms, is reasonableto suspectthatthe dimensions the U.S. lead in ABM technology of have been significantly reduced.The Sovietsmaybe better placedthantheU.S. to deployeffective BMD in a timely fashion.47 Even ifnew BMD programs could be restricted Soviet-American through negotiations capabilities to againsttheater ballistic missiles, SovietATM,like U.S. ATM, could be virtually in indistinguishable practicefromsystems capable of intercepting ICBM and SLBM RVs. For fulltechnical credibility, ATM systems would almosthave to be capable of such interceptions. Geographical asymmetry would favor USSR, in thata SovietATM, whether the capableofICBM and SLBM RV interceptions not,could defend homeor the land as well as Allies. U.S. ATM in Western Europe would defendAllies alone, notthe U.S. homeland.Some analysts speculate thattherecent conof solidation the SovietTroopsof NationalAir Defense(PVO Strany) with thetroopsofAirDefenseoftheGroundForces(PVO SV) maybe related to new problems posed by overlapping and BMD challenges, strategic theater thoughthe centralization air defensescould also be explainedby other of managerial aims.48 there remains possibility Soviettesting the Moreover, that of air defensesystems an ABM mode, possibly violation the ABM in in of Treaty, includesdevelopment an ATM.49 of On the otherhand, one wondershow to interpret repeatedSoviet the II complaints Pershing wouldallowthemonly6 to8 minutes warning that of time.(The Sovietsnaturally neverindicatehow muchwarning timeEuroof peans couldexpect to INF prior theimpact their RVs,orindeedhow much timeU.S. coastal,or WestEuropean, couldhave prior the to warning targets
to 47. Indeed, the Sovietsmay surprise manyWestern observers choosingthemselves by with proposerevisions theABMTreaty in regime to end it.Thisessayis concerned or primarily current Allianceissues posed by prospective U.S. BMD decisions, and therefore reflects the willbe reacting U.S. and NATO decisions, widespread Western assumption theSoviets that to climate of not vice versa. SovietdecisionsforBMD could substantially changethe current opinionregarding BMD in the UnitedStatesand Western Europe. Sovietincentives (e.g., protecting assetsfrom U.S. secondstrike) disincentives key a and (e.g., prospective alleviation from the ofU.S. ICBM vulnerability) BMD deployments for constitute largesubject a distinct on purposes thisessay.See theDoD assessment SovietBMD in U.S., Senate,Committee of of 1981(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981),p. 466. F. Bradsher Washington July 1981, in 48. William and Harriet Scott Fast citedbyHenry Star, 16, of 49. Winton, of "Applications BMD," pp. 96-97;cf. Senator JakeGarn,"SovietViolations SALT I," Policy Review, Number (Summer 9 1979),pp. 24-28.
p. 10. Appropriations,Department Defense of Appropriations Fiscal Year 1982, Hearings, Part 5, June for
impactof SovietSLBM RVs.) If sincere, complaints the could imply lack of confidence their in ATM upgradecapability. SovietATM research The and II development program againstPershing has been described "aggresas II sive";50 the UnitedStatesofficially but attributes Pershing "a highassurance of penetrating future Soviet defenses,"'51 partly because the GLCMII Pershing combination stresses Sovietdefenses and bothhave potential for penetrability measuresupgrade.52 Sovietcomplaints The II about Pershing could, moreover, also be partof the Sovietpolitical strategy portraying of NATO INF modernization "aggressive." as The Sovietpolitical responseto ATM would be an extension the barof gaining posture Sovietshave already the assumed.U.S. interest an actual in ATM program would be seized and exploited a variety mediathemes: for of theunmasking thetruly of aggressive "war-fighting" intentions theWest, of thethreat strategic to stability worldpeace in violating ABM Treaty and the withATM, the initiation a new "arms race" by the capitalist of militaryindustrial complex, and so forth. More importantly,U.S. ATM initiative a couldbe perceived theSovietsas an opportunity promote by to antagonism betweentheUnitedStatesand Western Europe. Alliance Cohesion ATM and The Sovietopportunity promote to would residein the potenantagonism WestEuropeanappreciations the utility any of of tially U.S. and divergent BMD programs, ATM. WhileBritain Francewould have their and including that own national alter ABMTreaty the reasonsfor opposinganything might in thesereasonswould be endorsed others Western regime, by Europeand BMD as destabilizing likely and reinforced thegeneral to to by tendency see an "armsrace" thatcould end in war. If the promote expensiveand futile UnitedStates determined and thatATM could be cost-effective militarily ATM could provide useful,and should be pursuedas an activeprogram, in viewsthat another of example thebroaddichotomy U.S.-NATO European was notedby Robert Komer,when President W. Carter's of undersecretary are defense policy:"Indeed, we Americans increasingly for askingwhether
. 50. Senator John Warner DoD Authorization.. FY 1981, p. 3013. in 51. Caspar W. Weinberger,Department Defense of Annual Report Fiscal Year 1983 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982),pp. III-72. in 52. William Perry, J. thenUnderSecretary DefenseforResearch of and Engineering, DoD Authorization. . FY 1981, p. 3018. .
Security 166 | International
as States, perceives or in Europeis as interested itsown defense is theUnited In viewtheAmerican concerns might Europeans thesamethreat."53 contrast, as immoderate. could ariseifATM programs were Alliancecohesionproblems Secondary whatsystems couldconcern Intra-Alliance disputes accepted theAlliance. by to whileATM protection and localities would be entitled ATM protection, localities forspecific or purposes. couldbe opposed forspecific
Rationales ATM Military for
clarified. servehaveyettobe fully purposesATM might The precise military comments Wade citedabove (one ofthefewofficial The statement James by the stresses prospective for on ATM's potential gain in survivability utility) NATO's new INF ifone did nothave to counton theSovietscooperatively in the timeto NATO before engaging strikes against INF. providing warning threat assured,theINF deterrent were IfINF survivability morethoroughly deterrence and, pre-war to theSovietUnionwouldbe moreformidable-for endurance potential, of depending the thickness the defensesand their on deterrence well. WhileINF survivability be adequately as forintra-war may would and fixed targets time,mobility, dispersal, assuredthrough warning nuclear weaponsstorage If targets suchas airfields, remain vulnerable. fixed were and (C3) control, communications centers sites,and certain command, might capabilities also equipped withATM defenses,the damage-limiting as increaseSoviet uncertainty to the prospectsof successful significantly in obstruct probableSoviet attackagainstNATO. ATM might, particular, strikes theater nuclear weaponstargets nuclear against plansfor pre-emptive in Western Europe. whichone might "theater call for damage-limiting defense This concept, if and and deterrence," would be mostpractical convincing used in defense DefenseofC3 centers ofhardened INF and fixed centers. C3 sites,especially whileallowing C3 current have a "force effect, multiplier" couldin particular the to opportunity simply offers Sovietsa lucrative vulnerabilities persist to The of degradethe effectiveness all typesof forces.54 Sovietscould overif to the whelmalmostanydefenses, determined do so, yetobliging Soviets the of couldbe seen as raising probability attack to increase scale oftheir the
March 3, 1980, p. 57. and Space Technology, 53. RobertKomer cited in AviationWeek 54. William R. Graham, "Reducing the Vulnerabilityof RetaliatoryForces and Command, Controland Communications:A Question of Balance," in David S. Yost, ed., NATO's Strategic (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), pp. 170-178. and Defense ArmsControl Options:
nuclear bringing aboutretaliation U.S. strategic by forces againsttheSoviet Union. a and ATM could thusbe considered non-provocative defensive meansof the denying Sovietsany opportunity might they wrongly perceiveof relatheater selective nuclearstrikes. tively low-cost victory through Deterrence the Sovietsto use far and stability would be enhanced,because obliging morenuclearwarheadswould raise the risksto the SovietUnion. If truly ATM the "thick"and cost-effective defensescould be constructed, Soviet blackmail Western be potential nuclear for against Europemight so severely of nuclearguarerodedthatdoubtsabout the credibility the U.S. strategic concern. anteewould becomean almostsecondary Another possiblemilitary rationale ATM might escalation for be control. At present, is assumedthatNATO would receive it warning timesufficient timewould have to be fordispersalof the new INF, and thatthe warning it used to assure the survival the INF. In a crisissituation, seems likely of thatsome Western politicians would arguethatactualdispersalof the INF the and makewar more wouldbe provocative, likely aggravate crisis to i.e., unavoidable; and yetfailure dispersecould equal the destruction the to of INF. If ATM defenseswere available,warning timeand prompt dispersal wouldbe less necessary. Political control overescalation processesmight be enhanced there if wereless military incentive engagein seemto operational ingly provocative behavior. is rationales likelyto have much appeal in None of the above military the Western war" concept Europe. Such rationales-especially "protracted of"enduring" toward actualwarsurvivability-would appearmoreoriented WestEuropeansgenerally unwilling than are to fighting towarddeterrence. accept the Soviet view (increasingly respectedin the United States) that are effective deterrent capabilities a productof operationally war-fighting tend to capabilities. Instead,WestEuropeans(even morethanAmericans) based on threatening nuclear favor "deterrence-only" a perspective strategic retaliation againstSoviet society.The U.S. threatto retaliate againstthe is Soviethomeland enough,they generally to deter feel, anySovietinvasion. In Ian Smart's leadersand their words,"WestEuropeanpolitical electorates if have rarely, ever,been willing devoteseriousattention whatwould to to of of happen if the deterrence initialattackby threat intolerable penalty shouldfail."55 in The favorable reception West Europeancirclesof McGeorgeBundy's
55. Smart,"Perspectives From Europe," p. 186.
International Security168 |
keynote address to the 1979 Conference the International of Institute for Strategic Studiesis a bitofanecdotal evidence thesamepoint.Aboveall, for West Europeansdrew comfort from Bundy'sinsistence thatdeterrence of anySovietattack well assured: is ... no one knows a majorengagement Europewould escalateto the that in strategic nuclearlevel. But the essentialpointis the opposite;no one can possibly knowthatit would not.56 Bundy's was affirmation to thegenuine as possibility escalation reassuring of a to Europeans because theyprefer concept deterrence of without intra-war in is escalation deterrence often boundaries.WestEuropeanfaith strategic thatmorecredible theater associatedwiththe assumption cawar-fighting deterrence. threat punish The pabilities nuclear to wouldundermine strategic in Sovietsociety the bedrockof deterrence their is to view, not an ability defeat Sovietoffensive a againstWestern Europe. The possiblemilitary rationales ATM outlined for above would,however, WestEuropeans; notonlysoundintolerably bellicose many to suchrationales could also seem subtlydesigned to decouple the U.S. guaranteeand to the confine war to Europe. Protecting new INF couldbe seen as creating a distinct the "Eurostrategic" level of potential conflict, something December 1979 NATO decision on INF was intendedto avoid. Given the abiding concernsof West Europeans,many would suspect the United States of in improving conditions successful for war-fightingEuropeout ofa desireto confine war to thatregion.What one mightcall the "incalculability a of in if escalation" couldbe undermined Europeanperceptions ATM promised to increase to level. prospects holding for conflict thetheater Using ATM to avoid premature dispersalof INF in orderto enhance be politicalcontrolover the escalationprocess would not necessarily an in the appealingargument Western Europebecause it would underline potential BecauseATM defenses of could vulnerability theINF to Sovietattack. be seen as guaranteeing to intensive Sovietstrikes intended overwhelm them and destroy INF, WestEuropeanofficials likely prefer stress the are to to the that will probability deterrence notfailand theadequacyofdispersal through and timeas meansof survivability theINF. The riskof for mobility warning the appearing "provocative" dispersing INF wouldhave to be setagainst by 1) the risk of appearingtoo frightened vulnerable do so; 2) the and to and to for contrasting messageoffirmness readiness act-constructive "crisis
Vol. 21, No. 6 (November/ Deterrence,"Survival, 56. McGeorge Bundy, "The Futureof Strategic December, 1979), p. 271.
and management"-that dispersal might usefully transmit; 3) theriskofthe in peacetime INF beingdestroyed their basingareas. ATM couldalso be derived Strategic rationale arguments against from the it "flexible response"doctrine NATO. First, couldbe argued,at present of nascentATM capability Sovietshave is the NATO assumes thatwhatever II. inadequatefordefense againstthePershing However,iftheSoviets built within the "flexible up their own ATM capabilities, option response"ofwhat limitedescalation"would be undermined mightbe called "deliberate by Sovietdefenses. wouldhave tobe moreextensive achieve to NATO's strikes similar whichmight seen as harmful escalation be to a control. effects, fact A secondstrategic ATM wouldapplyifthekill rationale argument against mechanism were nuclear.An ATM system would be used as necessary to If defendedtargets. the killmechanism RVs threatening destroy incoming were nuclear,thiswould amountto NATO's usingnuclearweapons reacThissituation wouldcontradict West the an tively against "accidental" target. use controlled European preference, deliberately for political ofnuclear weapons if nuclearweapons ever have to be used. It is stillassumed (despite evidenceof the nuclearorientation Soviettheater of mounting forces) that, witha pre-emptive unlesstheSovietsinitiate their nuclear aggression strike, NATO would precede the Sovietsin makingdecisionson initialuse of nuclearweapons, and thatthe initial use shouldbe plannedprimarily for effects secondary effect withtheresultant of political military importance. A thirdstrategic rationale(as well as an Alliancecohesion)argument directly follows.A nuclearwarheadATM could not be effective unless it RVs automatically. would require agreeThis couldrespondto incoming an in ment advanceamongtheAlliesto use theweapons,witha pre-delegation interofreleaseauthority, unlesstheUnitedStateswereto insiston a strict of pretation the 1962 Athensguidelineson consultation only "time and It circumstances permitting." would be politically veryawkwardforthe UnitedStatesto so insist.It would be no less difficult theUnitedStates for the Even if it to obtainadvance approvalof nuclearreleasefrom Allies.57
to the Nike-Hercules defense air system be virtually consider nuclear-armed 57. Someobservers in the and between Nike-Hercules thePatriot that is unusable thesereasons.There a linkage for and an to the is NNK Patriot airdefense scheduled replace Nike-Hercules, in that ATMwith for in as Europeifpresented a be accepted Western might morereadily a nuclear mechanism kill It for system. has been reported yearsthatWestEuropeans successor the Nike-Hercules to that represents, anti-air capability Nike-Hercules the high-altitude wouldliketo retain nuclear be with ATMpotential successor might acceptable. system and for thisreasonat leasta nuclear Week and Space Post, 1, (Cf. Walter Pincus in The Washington November 1981;and Aviation Technology, August29, 1977,pp. 47-48.)
werea case ofdefending againstincoming SS-20RVs,manyWestEuropean officials might arguethatwarning malfunctions system couldlead to a rapid and unnecessary escalationof a crisisif any nuclearexplosiontookplace. The advantages reliable NNK would offer againapparent. are and INF Modernization ATM have on the ongoingINF The impactan actual U.S. ATM program might but are modernization program indeterminate, some Europeanofficials is in a number ways.IftheATM concerned theimpact that couldbe harmful of required nuclearwarhead,it would constitute new nuclearsystem a a for possibleintroduction Western into Europe,and hencea new focusof cona troversy. Moreover, whether nuclearor NNK, ATM would represent sufficiently dramatic development "overload"the WestEuropeandecisionto are making process.Europeangovernments reluctant see any new drato matic radiation battlefield issuesraised(suchas enhanced weapons,chemical weapons,new mid-range nuclear missiles, etc.)thatmight makeimplementation theDecember of and 1979decisions INF armscontrol modernization on even moredifficult. see SomeWestEuropeansmight ATM as a justification notproceeding for withtheINF modernization evenifATM werepresented a longas decision, termnecessity defenseof the new INF. Variousarguments for mightbe made to thiseffect: not -Given the ATM possibility, shouldthe INF decisionand its rationale mix be re-examined orderto find moreoptimal ofsystems basing in a and ATM defenses? for at new offensive -Why introduce systems all ifthe problem posed by the SS-20and otherSoviettheater ballistic missilescan be solved effectively and directly thatwould not pose a threat defensive the through systems Sovietsmight as perceive "aggressive"? thatthe Sovietswould try overwhelm ATM, -Given the likelihood to any shouldany land-based be systems deployedat all? A numberof influential West Europeansare alreadyconcerned thatlandbased INF would constitute in attractive targets Sovieteyes, and an ATM program mighttend to underlinethat probability. the words of Carl In Friedrich Weiszacker, case ofa crisis, "In von theseweaponswouldnaturally
be thetargets a Russianfirst of strike. The necessity avoidingsuch crises of would makeEuropemorevulnerable blackmail."58 to ATM andArms Control is The the WouldATM violatetheABM Treaty? ATM concept distinct from whichdefines ABM system "a system an as purposeoftheABM Treaty, to in missilesor their elements flight counter strategic ballistic trajectory" (ArticleII). Some observers therefore arguethatATM couldbe developedand withtheABM Treaty. After thepurposeofan deployed whilecomplying all, theater assets.59 ATM would be to protect military IX statesthat"each Party On the otherhand, Article of the ABM Treaty undertakes not to transfer otherStates,and not to deploy outsideits to ABM limited thisTreaty." national territory, systems their or components by This provision the Treaty could be used by the Sovietsand by Western of European(and American) opponents ATM to arguethatATM represents of an attempt circumvent ABM Treaty. couldrapidly It to the becomeapparent excludeATM,politically that, even iftheTreaty languagedoes notexplicitly and in terms publicperceptions, ATM is coveredby the Treaty's limitaof tions. Even if the UnitedStateswere to pointout thatthe ATM would not be U.S.-based assets, the Sovietswould recapable of protecting continental spondthatthisprovesthatU.S. "forward-based systems" (FBS) in Europebe aircraft-must limited arms control measures.FBS are more mostly by the threatening the Soviets,if moresurvivable; Sovietswould therefore to that insisteven moreemphatically FBS be includedin theINF negotiations. The ABM Treaty issue couldraise"armsrace"and "destabilization" specters in thatmight almost be to circles impossible exorcise thesocialdemocratic of Western an Europe,even withan NNK ATM. The moreeffective ATM is, themoreitwilllooklikean ABM,evenifincapable defense of againstSLBM the and ICBM RVs. Ironically, the therefore, less effective ATM, the easier itmight to deployin terms publicrelations. WhiletheidealATM would be of also be capableofintercepting SLBM and ICBM RVs, even an ATM capable
58. Carl-Friedrich von Weiszacker, "Can a Third World War Be Prevented?" Internationial Security, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Summer 1980), p. 204. 59. See, forexample, Winton, "Applications of BMD," p. 97. Cf. Medalia, Antiballistic Missiles, p. 17.
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onlyofintercepting SovietINF couldbe partofa setofmeasures enhancing in deterrence security Europe. and General armscontrol detente and issuesfollow directly from situation. this TheSoviets might very wellproposeinclusion ATMintheINF negotiations of or in some other armscontrol and forum, thesuggestion would probably be heartily approvedby manysectors WestEuropeanopinion.It would be of hard forthe United States to extricate itselffromsuch an arms control ATM's inclunegotiation offer without beingportrayed a "warmonger." as an would tendto protract already and sionin theINF negotiations complex even less likely. difficult of negotiations, could makeusefulresults set and These negotiations alreadypromise disappoint to manyin Western Europe withunrealistic and to strain about armscontrol, further the expectations fabric theAlliance.60 of Conclusion The sensitivity West European governments publicsregarding and all of willhavetoconsider itexamines as the types BMD is a factor United of States of or be optionsthatmight requirerevision the ABM Treaty thatmight so BMD options thelong-dormant homeland nor perceived (i.e., ATM). Neither ATM questionhave been raisedexplicitly the UnitedStateswithWest by It Europeangovernments. is possiblethat,when and ifa BMD questionis will raisedofficially, and technical circumstances have changedsigpolitical BMD technology nificantly fromthe current situation. Highlyconvincing for of Sovietthreat, (especially NNK), perceptions an increased heightened of feelings dependenceon U.S. military power,favorable (i.e., U.S.) financing arrangements, and/or otherfactors could combineto persuade West a to Europeans accept,however begrudgingly,new U.S. and NATO strategy of damage-limiting defenseand deterrence-i.e.,an ability deny the for to Sovietsvictory defending selectedmilitary by targets. No reassessment NATO's generalstrategic outlook couldbe morefunof At damental. present, is NATO's deterrent strategy based on theassumption
60. Someobservers havesuggested an ATM couldalso be employed a surface-to-surface that as missile,in whichcase an armscontrol problem might posed in terms "changing be of the numbers" systems might of that target Soviet the Union.ThePatriot used ina surface-to-surface role would not, however,have the rangeto threaten SovietUnion. Nor does it seem the probable thatanyATM system now likely be developedwouldhave a rangeencompassing to Sovietterritory.
thatany East-West conflict could rapidly lead to an escalation processultinuclearstrikes matelyincluding U.S. strategic againstSoviet society.The U.S., WesternEurope, and NATO military forcesare almostcompletely vulnerable Sovietnuclear for air to threats, except limited and civildefenses in to and, above all, thethreat severely punishSovietsociety retaliation. reliance a threat killmillions Bothaspectsoftheposture-theultimate on to absenceofeffective and defensesofSovietcitizens, thevirtually complete in of couldprovemostunsatisfactory guarantees security war. Iftechnically feasible could deny the Soand cost-effective, damage-limiting capabilities the vietspartof their ability threaten UnitedStatesand Western to Europe, harm Sovietsociety. to and makeitless necessary theAlliance threaten for to An ability physically to deny the Sovietstheir plausiblemilitary objectives to couldbecomea yardstick Alliancestrategy for superior theambiguities of "flexible response."Since the mostplausibleSovietmilitary objectives are not citiesbut military targets thatcould be relatively (thoughimperfectly) well defended, nuclearwar-fighting victory and could Sovietstrategies for be thwarted, and deterrence strengthened, damage-limiting by capabilities thatincrease Sovietuncertainties aboutprospects successful for pre-emptive attack. in The lackofdamage-limiting Alliance capabilities theWesttendsto drive The convenient into strategy embracing politically ambiguities. ambiguities meanoperationally partly are intended aboutwhat"flexible response"might sensible to concealthescarcity militarily of retaliatory options (giventhelack the of damage-limiting means) from Sovietsand Western publics."Flexible to restsheavilyon the threat unleasha conflict response"thus ultimately and Eurasia. thatcould lead to the destruction muchof NorthAmerica of Damage-limiting could assist NATO in becomingless dependenton this can All threat. thatAlliancestrategists hope forat presentis thatmutual in nuclear restraint a "crisismanagement" processwill be able to control no to for conflict, the Westhas virtually ability enforce damagelimitations defenses.61 active(non-counterforce) through is longoverdue, change and themerits damage-limiting Reassessment of of
are a of 61. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities hereassumedto constitute form counterforce, opposedto active as defenses that couldintercept ballistic missile RVsor air-breathing in that systems flight. Even ifone hypothesizes Western ASW could neutralize SovietSSBNs pre-emptivelyhighly (a improbable forseveralreasons, feat including fact the thatland-based ASW communications detection and means would be at riskin war), the threat Western to society from Sovietair-breathing systems land-based and ballistic missiles wouldremain dire.
witha deceptive-basing may be imminent. BMD, perhapsin conjunction MX system, one ofthree is concepts long-term basingunderconsideration for in by theReaganadministration. Congress, theFiscalYear 1982Appropriaa tions Act,has mandated reportingfinal selection an MX-basing of modeby Whilethescheduled July 1983,and decisionsmaybe made by April1983.62 reviewoftheABM Treaty 1982secondfive-year October maytherefore pass the either U.S. or Sovietproposalsforrevision, UnitedStatesmay without electto propose amendments later,perhapsas a resultof the MX-basing and Amendments theABM Treaty to decision. maybe proposedat anytime; withsix months'notice,if it judges that"exeither partymay withdraw, have "jeopardized matter traordinary events"related theTreaty's to subject itssupreme interests." of On theother hand,doubtsaboutthematurity BMD technology persist that in some political and technical circles. The possibility the Sovietshave a superior ABM Treaty "break-out" investpotential owingto their greater in ments BMD (and airdefense) research maybe another argument U.S. for cautionin proposing Extensive majorchangesin theABM Treaty. research ATM willbecomean immediate (particularly NNK) seems likely on before in and option.The BMD technology costswill be key factors determining whether shift a the of awayfrom West'sprevailing theory deterrence (societal elementsof damage-limiting is punishment) one partaking greater to of thenconsider feasible. One might whether, givenpossibleSovietcounterat a measures, damage-limiting strategy-or leastimproved damage-limiting and for capabilities, especially defenseof selectedstrategic theater military be targets-would sensible. determine rejection the Technological opportunity not,however, may or choiceof damage-limiting measuresas muchas established reconvictions BMD and its political, and financial costs. Less costly garding diplomatic, BMD technology mightreduce the financial burden,but the questionof will overthelongterm would political to pursuedamage-limiting programs remain.Without merits domestic Allianceconsensuson the strategic or of the damage-limiting, UnitedStateswould findit hard to sustainBMD deployment decisions. Moreover, U.S. political to pursueanalysisofBMD will in and to reassessAlliancestrategy the lightof potential optionsseriously is damage-limiting opportunities notlikely be stiffened encouragement to by from Alliesin Western the Europe.
April 5, 1982, p. 23. and Space Technology, Week 62. Aviation

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Ballistic Missile Defense and the Atlantic Alliance Author(s): David S.

BallisticMissile Defense and the Alliance Atlantic

in The The of ConsultationNATO,1965-1974: Experience 1. Paul EdwardButeux, Politics Nuclear

BMD andthe Atlantic Alliance 145 1

turn,will increase tensions between the two superpowers....

[is] thatany BMD deployment likely generate armsrace which,in is to an

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race ensued, the consequences would be severe....

If the ABM Treaty were abrogated and an unbridled offense/defense arms

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BMD andthe Atlantic Alliance 149 |

Security 150 | International

Atlantic Alliance 151 | BMD andthe

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this option appears neithertechnologicallypracticablewithin

ICBM defensesconstitute least controversial the optionforthreereasons.

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can fullysatisfy European countries.... the

our European allies continue to

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Atlantic Alliance 157 | BMD andthe

| International Security 158

| Alliance 159 Atlantic BMD andthe

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have the answers to all these questions.... be substantial....42

We are not farenoughalong in our examination thiscomplex of issue to

to estimate whatsuch a system might cost,I am certain thatthecostwould

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The Soviet motivationfor this tremendous capability,enabling

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BMD andthe Atlantic Alliance 165 |

Security 166 | International

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BMD and theAtlantic Alliance| 169

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BMD andthe Atlantic Alliance 171 |

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