Journal of Transport Geography 8 (2000) 2541

www.elsevier.com/locate/jtrangeo

Airline hubs in Southeast Asia: national economic development and nodal accessibility
John Bowen *
Department of Geography, University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, 800 Algoma Boulevard, Oshkosh, WI 54901, USA

Abstract For developing countries, integration into the international airline industry is an important prerequisite to access global ows of money, goods, people, and information. This research examines how patterns of international air transport accessibility changed in Southeast Asia over the period 19791997. Particular attention is given to the competition between the major hubs of the region. The paper argues that national governments have used a variety of tools, including airline industry liberalization and airport development, to shape the development of air transport networks. The results of these strategies are assessed using network analysis. 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Air transport; Southeast Asia; Networks; Economic development

1. Introduction The accessibility of a place within the international airline industry helps to dene its access to global ows of goods, people, information, ideas, and capital. As the economies of Southeast Asia (Fig. 1) have become increasingly international in orientation since the late 1960s (as measured by dependence on external trade and foreign investment), governments in the region have sought better accessibility within international transport systems in general, and within the international airline industry in particular. A variety of instruments have been employed to inuence the development of airline networks in the region including airline competition policy, state-owned airlines, and airport infrastructure investment. The intent of this paper is to examine how these instruments have been used since the late 1970s by dierent governments and then to assess their impact on the accessibility of Southeast Asian cities within the international airline industry. The model of the developmental state, which has been widely applied to Southeast Asia (Douglass, 1994; Leftwich, 1995), provides an instructive vantage point for evaluating state strategies towards the airline industry. The model emphasizes the singular importance of economic development as a goal of the developmental
*

Tel.: +1-920-424-4103; fax: +1-920-424-0292.

state and the exibility of the state in pursuing that goal. The Southeast Asian states posture towards the airline industry since the 1970s provides a compelling illustration of this model in practice as the industry has been carefully integrated into development policy and has been subject to a host of state-led eorts to guide its development. However, the limits on the states ability to manipulate the airline industry, especially those constraints imposed by competing states, point to the need for an elaboration of the developmental state. In Section 2, the paper rst looks at the role of the airline industry in Southeast Asian development since World War II. The industry has gained added importance as greater emphasis has been placed on exportoriented industrialization, international tourism, and international business services. Section 3 of the paper examines the liberalization of the airline industry (i.e., privatization and deregulation) in the region as well as the construction of new airports and expansion of existing ones. Liberalization and airport construction comprise two of the most important means through which Southeast Asian governments have sought to inuence, either directly or indirectly, the development of airline networks. Section 4 provides an empirical analysis of how the geography of the airline industry in Southeast Asia has changed since the late 1970s and attempts to link those changes back to the priorities and strategies of the developmental state. Finally, the paper ends with an assessment of the both the policy rami-

0966-6923/00/$ - see front matter 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 9 6 6 - 6 9 2 3 ( 9 9 ) 0 0 0 3 0 - 7

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J. Bowen / Journal of Transport Geography 8 (2000) 2541

Fig. 1. Southeast Asia.

cations and the theoretical implications of Southeast Asian airline industry development.

into the larger international economy. Three critical sectors have been heavily dependent on Southeast Asias proliferating air links to the rest of the world: manufacturing, business services, and tourism. 2.1. Air transport services and manufacturing development The remoteness of Southeast Asia from major world markets in the United States and Europe has made air transportation an important ingredient in the development of export-oriented manufacturing. For example, international air linkages play a critical role in one of the most ambitious industrial upgrading projects in the region: Malaysias Multimedia Supercorridor (MSC) (Fig. 2). The MSC promises to be ``one of the global cradles of the new Information Age'' (Multimedia Development Corporation, no date, p. 5) with the specic purpose of attracting knowledge-based manufacturing operations from leading multinational corporations in the ``multimedia'' industries (ranging from semiconductor wafer fabrication to the production of animated lms). The Supercorridor extends south from the Kuala Lumpur City Centre (site of the world's two tallest buildings) to the new Kuala Lumpur International Airport. The airport is an anchor for the MSC, highlighting the importance of international transport networks as a complement to the MSC's ``virtual network'' of very high capacity ber optic cables. Another dimension in the relationship between air transport and Southeast Asian industrialization is the aerospace industry (Hill and Pang, 1988). The expansion of national airlines and the growth of trac through and

2. Air transportation in Southeast Asian development The importance of the airline industry in Southeast Asian economic development is not new, but the articulation of the industry in development strategies has changed considerably. After World War II, airlines played an important role in national integration especially in the sprawling, insular countries of Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia (Kissling, 1989). In Indonesia, for instance, the government-owned domestic airline Merpati provided ``Pioneer Air Services'' to the remotest parts of the archipelago, serving to weave those communities into the national political and economic fabric (Leinbach, 1986). Other development functions assigned to the airline industry included creating high-paying jobs, deepening the technological sophistication of national economies, promoting tourism, facilitating international trade, contributing to national defense, and instilling a sense of national pride. Indeed, airlines played a particularly prominent, symbolic role in nation-building (Raguraman, 1997). As economic growth in the region accelerated and became more internationally oriented (evidenced, for example, by the turn from import-substitution to export promotion across the region between the 1960s and mid1980s), the role of the airline industry in development strategies narrowed. Social objectives, including national integration, have been overtaken by a much stronger emphasis on integrating the region's economies

J. Bowen / Journal of Transport Geography 8 (2000) 2541

27

Fig. 2. Malaysias multimedia supercorridor.

within the region have spurred the growth of airframe and aircraft engine component manufacture, repair, and assembly operations especially in the hub cities. Singapore is the clearest illustration of this relationship; by 1994, over 50 aerospace rms accounted for about 1% of Singapores GDP (Low, 1995). More recently, Malaysia and Thailand have followed a similar strategy enticing aerospace manufacturing and maintenance rms to serve the global market from competitively positioned hubs (Ho, 1996; Tunsarawurth, 1996). 2.2. Air transport services and international business services development International business services comprise a second key dimension to the internationalization of Southeast Asian economies. Air transportation gures prominently as a location factor both for the administrative and auxiliary functions within a rm (i.e., headquarters operations) as well as for rms providing producer services like nance, insurance, and advertising. In Southeast Asia, business services have been an increasingly important component of economic development strategies. In 1990s, for instance, the Singaporean government began promoting the citystate as a ``total business hub'' (Perry et al., 1997). This vision was predicated in part on Singapore's position as a major airline hub. In the same fashion, Malaysia's eorts to attract the headquarters operations of multimedia corporations to the MSC, along with manufacturing facilities, are premised on the easy access provided to regional and global business centers through the adjacent airport. The eorts of these regional centers to become ``world cities'' (Dixon and Drakakis-Smith, 1997) are manifest in major new downtown complexes as well. Singapores Suntec City, the Kuala Lumpur City Center, and the

new Muang Thong Thani development outside Bangkok are among the ``urban megaprojects'' which have been built around the Pacic rim as new city spaces combining oce, retail, hotel, conference center, and often residential land uses (Olds, 1995). They are aimed at a global audience and their huge scale serves to ``reorient the international imagery of a city'' (Olds, 1995, p. 1713). A corollary to such projects is the continued expansion of international airport capacity. Importantly, the three Southeast Asian developments were built along axes linking each citys traditional downtown core and its international airport. 2.3. Air transport services and tourism development Tourism bears a particularly close relationship to the airline industry. Even in a well-developed tourist market like Manila or Bangkok, the addition of a single international ight can have a discernible impact on receipts and employment in the tourism sector, with positive spillover eects throughout the broader economy (Raguraman, 1995). Looked at from another perspective, changes in the accessibility of a place within international airline networks can either enhance or detract from its ability to attract tourists. International airline hubs enjoy a special advantage in competing for tourist trac because the concentration of transiting trac represents a tourist market to be tapped. Both Singapore and Bangkok have managed to divert a signicant number of passengers who stop in either of those cities on long-haul routes between Europe and Asia, Europe and the Southwest Pacic, and Asia and the Southwest Pacic (Kissling, 1989; Perry et al., 1997). While Thailand oers diverse tourist attractions (a signicant factor in its very selection as a transit hub by international airlines), Singapore has had

28

J. Bowen / Journal of Transport Geography 8 (2000) 2541 Table 1 Airline privatizations in Southeast Asiaa Carrier Date privatization program began 1985 1985 1992 1992 State share 1997 (%) 54 10 92 34

to be somewhat more creative. In 1970s, it began to actively market its attraction as a low-cost ``shopper's paradise'' (Singh, 1984); in 1990s, Singapore developed themeparks and positioned itself as a gateway to nearby tourist destinations in the region (Perry et al., 1997). 3. The state and air transportation As the preceding section makes clear, hub cities have important development advantages for certain types of economic activity. These advantages reect two key distinctions that hub cities share: (1) the concentration of large passenger and cargo ows and (2) the high degree of connectivity with other points in domestic and international airline networks (OConnor and Scott, 1992). The way in which these advantages intersect with economic development has been described as ``circular and cumulative'' (OConnor and Scott, 1992, p. 251) to the extent that additional air services facilitate development which in turn stimulates demand for further air services. This virtuous cycle tends to reinforce and perpetuate the privileged position that hub cities enjoy. That does not mean, however, that air trac patterns and the position of hubs within those patterns are immutable. Indeed, a number of studies of airline linkages in the AsiaPacic region show a dynamic hierarchy of hubs (Boberg and Collison, 1989; Hansen and Kanafani, 1990; OConnor and Scott, 1992). The emergence of new hubs and relative decline of older ones is partly driven by the ``underlying geography'' of transport networks (OConnor, 1995). The technological limits of commercial aircraft, local market size, and proximity to other hubs and other markets favor the success of some cities over others. The state too plays an inuential role in shaping airline networks in general, and in determining the accessibility of airline hubs more specically. National governments set airline competition policy and determine the size and quality of airport infrastructure provided at hub cities. These two factors, which directly aect the ease of access to hub airports, have been used by Southeast Asian governments either to reinforce or to overcome prevailing patterns of centrality in regional airline networks. The discussion of these instruments begins with an assessment of three major prongs of airline industry liberalization (privatization, international route liberalization, and new entrant airlines) before turning to a brief exploration of airport development in the region. 3.1. Privatization Since 1985, four of the regions ve largest airlines have been at least partially privatized (Table 1), and

Singapore Airlines Malaysia Airlines Thai Airways Intl Philippine Airlines

a

Source: Bowen (1997).

Garuda Indonesia is expected to join the list soon as part of the IMF-induced restructuring of the Indonesian economy. Nevertheless, the centrality of the airline industry in state-led development strategies and complex political constraints have limited the degree of privatization (Bowen and Leinbach, 1995). In only two cases, Malaysia Airlines (MAS) and Philippine Airlines (PAL), has more than 50% of a carriers shares been transferred to the private sector. In 1994, the Malaysian government sold a controlling share of MAS to a wealthy Malay businessman who had strong ties to the nations leaders (Bowen and Leinbach, 1995). Although privatized, MAS continued to be closely linked to the state, and the airlines aggressive expansion under its new management contributed signicantly to the governments objective of making Kuala Lumpur a major hub in the global airline industry. Malaysia Airlines network was extended to major destinations like New York as well as more secondary cities like Tehran and Zagreb, which were not served by other Southeast Asian carriers. In Philippines, conversely, privatization virtually severed the relationship between the ag carrier and the state, with damaging repercussions during 1998 Philippine economic crisis. In 1992, partial privatization left the carrier with two major shareholders: the government and tobacco and beer magnate Lucio Tan. Over the next several years, the government and Tan fought bitterly until the latter nally wrested uncontested majority ownership from the government in 1995. The government signicantly reduced its stake in the airline, both nancially as well as politically, leaving PAL the most ``private'' ag carrier in Asia (Bowen, 1997). One manifestation of this separation of interests was PALs response to the Asian nancial crisis. As Asian trac collapsed into mid-1998, PAL was forced to suspend operations altogether. In contrast, Thai International and even Garuda Indonesia continued to operate much of their pre-crisis international networks in mid1998 despite far worse economic downturns in their home markets. As a result, total international airline capacity (oered by all airlines to all gateway cities in each Southeast Asian country) fell more sharply in Philippines than in its neighbors (Table 2).

J. Bowen / Journal of Transport Geography 8 (2000) 2541 Table 2 Comparison of change in international airline capacity and GDPa Country Estimated change in GDP 19971998 (%) 13.7 6.8 0.5 0.3 8.0 Change in international airline capacity (%) 26.5 0.6 36.0 5.5 1.6

29

Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand

a Sources: Far Eastern Economic Review (1999), Straits Times (1999) and authors analysis of OAG (1997, 1998).

3.2. The liberalization of international routes National governments in Southeast Asia have taken an increasingly receptive stance toward international services by foreign airlines. Expanded services by foreign carriers have been welcomed because they increase the frequency and capacity of linkages to the international economy, thereby enhancing national economic competitiveness. Singapore has followed an ``Open Skies'' policy since at least the 1960s (Raguraman, 1986). Under Open Skies, foreign airlines are freely granted access to, from, and beyond Singapore in exchange for reciprocal trac rights in their own home markets. The trac rights secured for Singapore Airlines (SIA) under Singapores Open Skies strategy have been integral to that carriers emergence as one of the worlds largest airlines despite its very small domestic trac base. In 1997, SIA ranked eighth in the world in international passenger trac and fourth in international cargo trac. Most other governments in Southeast Asia have also been drawn to the benets of Open Skies, though the results have been mixed. In Philippines, where Open Skies was adopted in the 1970s to promote tourism (Tasker, 1977), PAL ocials blamed liberalization for the collapse of the airline in 1998 and asked the government to retreat from Open Skies in order to facilitate the carriers proposed resurrection in 1999 (Shipping Times, 1999). Another important direction in liberalizing international air services has been opening up more gateway cities to direct services by foreign carriers. Traditionally, each ag carrier treated its national base as a fortress market. A good example is Denpasar on the Indonesian island of Bali. Despite the fact that Bali was already an important tourist destination in late 1970s, Denpasar had very few direct links to foreign markets. As a result, almost all international trac to and from Bali went through Jakarta via Garuda Indonesia which had a monopoly on the lucrative JakartaBali route (Fig. 3). By the mid-1990s, Denpasar had nonstop links to points throughout the western Pacic rim. And in 1994, Indonesia opened a new set of secondary cities to in-

Fig. 3. International air services to Bali, 1979 and 1997.

ternational ights (Asian Aviation, 1995), including niche tourist markets like the scuba divers resort at Manado and small, increasingly internationalized business centers like the oil industry center of Pekanbaru. 3.3. New entrant airlines The nal major strand of liberalization has been the emergence of new entrant airlines in almost every nation of Southeast Asia (Table 3). Historically, each national government in the region gave its ag carrier exclusive access to international routes. However, the emergence of increasingly powerful local entrepreneurs and businessmen intent on nding new sectors for investment has pushed the state to open up more opportunities in the airline industry (Bowen and Leinbach, 1995). Across the region, the impact of new entrants on the integration of hub airports into the global airline industry has been relatively small compared to new entrants impact in other Asian markets. The networks of the Korean new entrant Asiana and the Taiwanese new entrant EVA Airways, for instance, both extend to major cities around the world. In contrast, the largest of the Southeast Asian new entrants, Silkair, operates only a small regional network extending no more than

30 Table 3 New entrant airlines in Southeast Asiaa Airline

J. Bowen / Journal of Transport Geography 8 (2000) 2541

Nationality

Year launched

Network size 1997 Domestic Intraregional 2 6 19 2 1 3 1 Interregional 2 1 3 3 2

Bangkok Airways Pelangi Air Silkair Sempati Air Pacic Airlines Grandair Air Mandalay Cebu Pacic Air Philippines Orient Thai Air Berjaya Air Air Asia Saeaga Airlines Dirgantara Pacicair
a

Thailand Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Vietnam Philippines Myanmar Philippines Philippines Thailand Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Indonesia Philippines

1986 1988 1989 1989 1992 1994 1994 1995 1995 1995 1996 1996 1996 1997 1997

6 9 1 13 4 8 5 8 11 8 2 4 7 18 6

Sources: Bowen (1997) and OAG (1997).

2000 km from Singapore (Fig. 4), including a signicant number of the new Indonesian gateways mentioned earlier. The eect of the new entrants will be further muted by the Asian economic crisis. By mid-1998, one of the largest new entrants, Indonesias Sempati Airways had stopped operating and it is probable that others new entrants will follow suit (Thomas, 1998a). The crisis exacerbates the factors which have made it dicult for new entrants to gain a foothold in the industry to begin with: small market size, dependence on private sources of capital, and discriminatory state policies that still favor ag carriers.

3.4. Infrastructure development From at least as early as the mid-1980s until the onset of the 1997 economic crisis, Asian airline markets enjoyed the fastest trac growth in the world. The rapid growth strained airport infrastructure across the region and made new airport investments a high priority for most Asian governments. More specically, new or expanded airports came to regarded as critical to the regions sustained growth, in keeping with the view that an ``airport is perhaps the most important single piece of infrastructure in the battle between cities and nations for inuence in, and the benets of,

Fig. 4. Silkair network, 1997.

J. Bowen / Journal of Transport Geography 8 (2000) 2541

31

growth and development'' (OConnor and Scott, 1992, p. 241). The pace of airport investments by Southeast Asian governments accelerated during the 1990s. Most notable was the new Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) which was completed in 1998 at an estimated cost of US63.6 billion. Beyond redressing airport congestion at Malaysias main gateway, KLIA represents a bold challenge to Singapores transport primacy in the region. Throughout the 1990s, Malaysia has waged an escalating battle to divert Malaysian sea and air trac now routed through Singapore (Perry et al., 1997). The 75-kilometer distance between Kuala Lumpur and its new airport also reects the shift in emphasis towards serving national and international markets, rather than the capital alone. At the time of opening, KLIA had a capacity of 25 million passengers per year with a planned capacity of 45 million passengers per year early in the next century (Dempsey and OConnor, 1997), compared to 1997 passenger trac of 17 million (Thomas, 1998b). For similar reasons, both Thailand and Philippines announced plans for new gateway airports further from Manila and Bangkok than existing facilities. Thai plans, which were suspended during the 1997 nancial crisis, called for a new airport at Nong Ngu Hao. This location would enable the airport to straddle the emerging development corridor from Bangkok to the increasingly industrialized Eastern Seaboard (Dempsey and OConnor, 1997; Wongsuphasawat, 1997). In Philippines, the redevelopment of the former American-owned Clark Air Force Base as a new international airport has been given serious consideration since the site was returned to Philippine control (Tiglao and Tasker, 1995). Singapore has responded to these challenges by reinforcing and building upon Changi Airports distinctiveness in three dimensions: its capacity, its eciency, and its appeal to the traveling public. From a single terminal with a capacity of 12 million passengers per year at its opening in 1981, Changi Airport will expand to three terminals with a capacity of 64 million by 2003 (Dhaliwal, 1996). The steady expansion of Changi Airport is consistent with Singapores strategy of infrastructure overprovision, a strategy that serves to distinguish Singapore from most other Asian cities where infrastructure is chronically overburdened. An American journalists description of Changi captures the sense of accelerated development: ``In 1982, although the [rst] terminal showed no sign of approaching capacity, planning began on the second terminal, which opened in late 1990. And although this sprawling new terminal now looks almost empty, planners are already working on Terminal No. 3, which will open early in the next century.'' (Sesser, 1992, p. 44). The state has complemented its investments in airport capacity with a host of eciency improvements and

amenities designed to further distinguish the airport from its rivals. This concerted eort has enabled Changi Airport to win an endless stream of accolades. Government leaders are keen to highlight these awards because they give Singapore an advantage versus its regional rivals, both in the international airline industry and in the broader battle for the foreign investments upon which the citystates economy depends. 4. Changing air trac patterns in Southeast Asia Changes in airline competition policy and investments in airport infrastructure comprise a potentially powerful set of tools to inuence the articulation of national economies with the global airline industry. In some cases, their use has been guided specically by that objective. For instance, Malaysias new airport, its creation of a second ag carrier called Air Asia, and its privatization of MAS were all informed by the goal of raising Kuala Lumpurs stature in the global airline industry. Elsewhere, the link between state policies and their eects on airline geography have been more indirect; the collapse of PAL just six years after it came under private control is a spectacular example of the unintended consequences of liberalization. This section assesses the changes in the geography of the passenger airline industry in Southeast Asia since the late 1970s and attempts to link those changes back to the goals and strategies of the developmental state. The airfreight industry is not treated in the section that follows because the advent of all-freight airline operations in the region in the 1990s has caused a divergence in the structure of passenger and airfreight networks, making them dicult to analyze together. Passenger airline networks in the region were analyzed for two main time periods: 1979 and 1997. The year 1979 is used as a benchmark to capture a snapshot of the industry before: (1) the period of fastest trac growth, (2) the development of major new airports including Singapores Changi Airport, and (3) the onset of liberalization. By 1997, the liberalized airline industry reached an apex. In 1998, the widening economic crisis precipitated the collapse of several airlines in the region and emergency restructuring at others. Looking at the industry before this crisis enables a clearer assessment of the relationship between state policies, airline network changes, and economic development. The data for this analysis are drawn from OAG (1979, 1997, 1998). This publication contains complete airline schedules for virtually all airlines and as such provides the best available data on the manner in which airlines have deployed their capacity at various times. Data were extracted from OAG (1979, 1997, 1998) for every ight to any city in Southeast Asia including airline, number of services per week, and type of aircraft

32

J. Bowen / Journal of Transport Geography 8 (2000) 2541

used. To compute total capacity, typical seating capacities (e.g., 265 seats for an Airbus A340-300) were applied to the frequencies by aircraft. 4.1. The geography of the Southeast Asian airline industry, 1979 The airline industry developed in Southeast Asia over an urban system characterized by a high degree of primacy inherited from the colonial era. Indeed, Bangkok and Manila are prototypical primate cities. The development of the airline industry after World War II tended to reinforce that primacy. The rst major airports were built in the region's capital cities, and each capital city became, almost inevitably, the main hub in its respective domestic market. In 1979, each country had only one major gateway (a gateway is dened here as a city with at least one nonstop international ight per week). As discussed earlier, national airlines used the bilateral system of air trac rights to limit access to their home markets beyond the chief gateway city. In Philippines and Thailand, the primacy of each countrys major gateway was nearly 100% (Table 4). Indonesias continental breadth prevented the same degree of primacy from being attained; nevertheless, Jakartas 84% share of international airline capacity in a archipelago comprising nearly 14 000 islands stretched over 3000 miles was remarkable. In Malaysia, the distribution of international airline services in 1979 was aected by the bifurcation of the national territory between East Malaysia and Peninsular Malaysia. Within Peninsular Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur accounted for 78% of international airline capacity. This pattern of air network primacy was repeated at the broader regional level in the dominance of Southeast Asian air trac patterns by Singapore and to a lesser extent Bangkok. Singapore has long been the region's premier air transportation hub, a status derived in part from the early development of Singapores rst airport
Table 4 International hub primacy in Southeast Asia Primary hub 1979 Gateway cities Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Total B.S. Begawan Phnom Penh Jakarta Vientiane Kuala Lumpur Yangon Manila Singapore Bangkok Ho Chi Minh 1 0 6 1 5 1 2 1 4 2 23

under British colonialism. By the late 1970s, Singapore was the focal point of the intraregional airline network (Fig. 5). Singapores intraregional importance translated into a pivotal role in interregional air networks as well. In particular, the city was an important transit point on long-range intercontinental and transcontinental routes (OConnor, 1995). Bangkok similarly captured substantial transit trac. Its more northerly position within Southeast Asia made it well-positioned to handle trac between Europe and North Asia, especially to and from Hong Kong. Indeed, the route from Hong Kong to Bangkok was served by 14 airlines in 1979, oering a total of 24 000 seats per week making it the busiest route to a Southeast Asian gateway. Despite the singular importance of the BangkokHong Kong link, Singapores combination of heavy intraregional and longhaul interregional trac made it Southeast Asias busiest international hub by the late 1970s (Fig. 6). 4.2. Changes in gateway cities and hub primacy The most striking change in the industry's geography since the 1970s has been the proliferation of intraregional linkages (Fig. 7) and gateway cities. Across Southeast Asia, the total number of gateway cities jumped from 23 in 1979 to 47 in 1997. The increase in Indonesia was especially rapid with the number of gateway cities more than tripling. This was a direct manifestation of the government's policy to spread the benets of international air transport linkages. More generally, the trend towards Open Skies in most Southeast Asian countries meant new opportunities for secondary cities to tap into the international air transport system. A second factor accounting for the proliferation of gateway cities has been the emergence of new airlines. The new entrant airlines typically operated smaller aircraft that were well-suited to cross-border linkages

1997 Primary hub share 100.0 0.0 83.6 100.0 67.1 100.0 99.4 100.0 98.6 74.3 Gateway cities 1 1 19 1 13 1 3 1 5 2 47 Primary hub share 100.0 100.0 61.5 100.0 78.0 100.0 94.6 100.0 95.6 75.8

J. Bowen / Journal of Transport Geography 8 (2000) 2541

33

Fig. 5. Southeast Asian intraregional air service linkages, 1979.

Fig. 6. Total international airline capacity to Southeast Asian hubs, 1979.

between secondary cities. For example, Pelangi, a small Malaysian airline, operated many ights between Peninsular Malaysia and the nearby Indonesian island of Sumatra. What is noteworthy, however, is that despite the increase in the number of gateway cities, the share of international airline capacity bound for each country's primate city remained at a high level. The primacy of Bangkok and Manila has been exacerbated as the Thai

and Philippine economies have become more internationally oriented (Douglass, 1995; Ocampo, 1995). International business services and export-oriented manufacturing are concentrated in the Bangkok and Manila extended metropolitan regions to take advantage of the available labor, expertise, infrastructure and international linkages including dense air transport linkages to points around the globe. Airlines have used their greater freedom under liberalization to further strengthen the connections between these cities and the rest of the global economy. And national governments have reinforced these two cities advantages by continuing to build up their infrastructure relative to other gateways in Thailand and Philippines. Despite high level commitments to decentralization, governments in both countries have been compelled to focus infrastructure investment in the capital city regions in order to sustain the pivotal role those gateways have played in national economic development. An observer in Thailand, for instance, has noted that state investments are funneled to places ``where industrial facilities are already developed, because it is economically more ecient to improve and make use of extant facilities than to build up new structures in the middle of nowhere'' (Wongsuphasawat, 1997, p. 215). In Indonesia, on the other hand, liberalization has encouraged airlines to build up international capacity at secondary cities, many of which have beneted from airport improvement projects. Accordingly, Jakartas share of Indonesias international airline capacity fell from 84% in 1979 to 62% in 1997. Two cities, in particular, have gained a signicant share of Indonesias international airline capacity: Denpasar in Bali and Surabaya in Eastern Java. The attraction of Bali as an

34

J. Bowen / Journal of Transport Geography 8 (2000) 2541

Fig. 7. Southeast Asian intraregional air service linkages, 1997.

international tourist destination is clear. Surabayas entry onto the international stage has been driven more by foreign direct investments in export-oriented manufacturing and with those investments have come nonstop air linkages to Taipei, Kaohsiung, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Finally, despite the proliferation of new international gateways in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur now accounts for a greater share of international airline capacity in Malaysia. The increased internationalization of Malaysias economy has bolstered Kuala Lumpurs gateway role in the countrys urban system (Lee, 1995), a trend that the government has reinforced through its eorts to make Kuala Lumpur a more important hub in the global airline industry. In summary, the changes in the primacy of the capital cities in these four large Southeast Asian countries show a variety of outcomes. That variety is attributable in part to the dierent spatial strategies of each state. In Thailand and Philippines, the state has recognized the development advantages of Bangkok and Manila and has sought to harness those advantages to propel national growth more generally. In Indonesia, on the other hand, the state has tried to spread development away from Jakarta. Finally, in Malaysia, the state has pursued an aggressive strategy to redene Kuala Lumpurs role in the global airline industry. 4.3. Changes in the intraregional nodal accessibility of Southeast Asian hubs Although the primate cities of Southeast Asia face few domestic rivals, their relative accessibility at the international level is threatened by the possibility that international airlines can substitute one hub for another.

The international accessibility of Southeast Asian hubs can be evaluated at two dierent levels: within the region and at a broader global level. To examine intraregional accessibility, Shimbel indices (Werner, 1968; Taae et al., 1996) were computed by measuring the number of network segments necessary to connect every international gateway in Southeast Asia (e.g., any city with any international ights) with each of the ve major regional hubs. Each nonstop ight was counted as one network segment, and the total number of segments required to connect each hub to every international gateway in the region was compared to the minimum possible (i.e., if all the cities were connected by nonstop ights). The results were indexed so that a value of 1 represents a perfectly connected hub with nonstop links to every other point in the network. Linkages between hub cities and other gateways in the same country (e.g., ManilaCebu in Philippines) were not included in this analysis (Table 5). By this measure, Singapore's centrality within Southeast Asia has increased markedly since the 1970s and is substantially higher than that of its two main rivals (Table 6). Singapore's advantage within Southeast Asia has been reinforced by liberalization in neighboring markets. As noted earlier, for instance, Silkair has taken advantage of Indonesia's new openness to extend many new routes to secondary destinations throughout Indonesia, drawing more trac feed into the Singapore hub. It is clear from this perspective why the state in Singapore was an early and ardent adherent to Open Skies. Conversely, Bangkok's centrality has fallen because it is poorly integrated with the many secondary gateway cities that have opened up in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines. Bangkok has sought to position itself as a gateway to a ``growth square'' incorporating Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Chinas Yunnan prov-

J. Bowen / Journal of Transport Geography 8 (2000) 2541 Table 5 Calculating intraregional Shimbel indices Bangkok Balikpapan Banda Aceh Bandung Bangkok Banjarmasin Brunei Cebu FFF FFF Vientiane n j1 dij hi 2 3 2 2 1 2 Jakarta 2 1 1 2 Kuala Lumpur 2 2 1 2 1 2 Manila 2 3 2 1 2 1 Singapore 1 2 1 1 2 1 1

35

1 77

2 50

2 56

2 84

1 55

Table 6 Intraregional Shimbel indices, 1979 and 1997 Bangkok 1979 (1) Regional Gateways (2) Domestic (excluded) D(min) [3 12] D(i) [4] Shimbel index [3/4] 1997 (1) Regional gateways (2) Domestic (excluded) D(min) [3 12] D(i) [4] Shimbel index [3/4]
a

Jakarta 23 6 17 30 0.57 47 19 28 50 0.56

Kuala Lumpur 23 5 18 32 0.56 47 13 34 56 0.61

Manila 23 2 21 37 0.57 47 3 44 84 0.52

Singapore 23 1 22 34 0.65 47 2a 45 55 0.82

23 4 19 30 0.63 47 5 42 77 0.55

Johor Bahru, Malaysia was also excluded from the analysis for Singapore because the proximity of the two cities made air services improbable.

ince (Rimmer, 1994), but slower development in most of these markets has meant weak regional trac. By 1997, Kuala Lumpur had eclipsed Bangkok in terms of regional centrality. Kuala Lumpur is well connected to secondary destinations throughout Indonesia and Thailand, in particular. These new connections testify to Kuala Lumpurs growing stature as a business and transport center for Southeast Asia. Conversely, Manilas connections to the region have weakened, at least in a relative sense. Instead, Manila was increasingly well integrated with Northeast Asia. In part, this orientation reects Manilas position at the margin of Southeast Asia, but the high volume of trac on routes to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan (including secondary destinations in these countries) also testies to the increasing importance of trade and investment from Northeast Asia in the Philippine economy. It should be noted that Manila and Bangkok lie at peripheral locations within this papers denition of Southeast Asia. Conversely, Singapore lies at its center, and that physical centrality may exaggerate its functional centrality. To test this proposition, the regional

centrality indices for Manila and Bangkok were recalculated using a new hub-specic region for each city (Fig. 8). Each new region was dened as the area contained within a radius of 1600 miles (2575 km) a distance similar to that which denes the extent of Southeast Asia from Singapore. A complete set of 1997 gateway cities for each new region was determined and Shimbel indices were computed. The results indicate that redening the region of each hub did produce a slight increase in the centrality of Bangkok, Jakarta, and Manila but Singapore continued to have a much higher level of intraregional centrality than its rivals (Table 7). 4.4. Changes in the interregional nodal accessibility of Southeast Asian hubs The proliferation of linkages in the international economy implies that an eective hub will have nonstop connections to dozens of cities around the world. Accordingly, the interregional centrality of the ve Southeast Asian hubs was measured using a rst order (i.e., nonstop) adjacency matrix examining the linkages

36

J. Bowen / Journal of Transport Geography 8 (2000) 2541

Fig. 8. Alternative hub regions for major Southeast Asian hubs (each point represents one gateway city).

Table 7 Recalculated intraregional Shimbel indices, 1997 Bangkok 1997 (redened regions) (1) Regional gateways (2) Domestic (excluded) D(min) [3 12] D(i) [4] Shimbel index [3/4] 1997 (10 country Southeast Asia) (1) Regional gateways (2) Domestic (excluded) D(min) [3 12] D(i) [4] Shimbel index [3/4]
a

Jakarta 43 19 24 44 0.65 47 19 28 50 0.56

Kuala Lumpur 47 13 34 52 0.55 47 13 34 56 0.61

Manila 56 3 53 89 0.60 47 3 44 84 0.52

Singapore 49 2a 47 58 0.81 47 2a 45 55 0.82

59 5 54 85 0.64 47 5 42 77 0.55

Johor Bahru, Malaysia was also excluded from the analysis for Singapore because the proximity of the two cities made air services improbable.

between (1) the ve main hubs of the region and (2) a selection of 48 important business destinations within the nonstop range of at least one Southeast Asian hub in 1997 (Table 8). For each Southeast Asian hub, the list was narrowed to include only those destinations within the range of the Boeing 747-400 in 1997 and the Boeing 747-200 in 1979 the two longest-range aircraft in widespread use in each time period. For example, London lay outside the range of all ve hubs in 1979 and outside the range of Jakarta in 1997. An adjacency matrix for each of the two time periods was constructed in which the matrix elements indicate whether a nonstop connection was present (value of 1) or not (value of 0). The elements of the two matrices were then summed for each of the ve hubs, producing an index of centrality, which was standardized by comparing the sum to the maximum possible (Table 9).

By this measure, all ve Southeast Asian hubs enjoyed an improvement in interregional accessibility between 1979 and 1997 (Table 10). This nding is in keeping with the heightened integration between the region and the rest of the international economy. The only change in the ranking of the ve hubs was Bangkoks eclipse of Singapore as the best-connected global hub by 1997. Both cities, however, enjoyed wide and widening advantages over their nearest rival Kuala Lumpur. Their advantage over Manila grew even faster as that city continued its long-term decline as an Asian hub. Finally, Jakarta experienced a sharp increase in international accessibility, though from a low base. The advantage of Bangkok and Singapore becomes even starker if the density of connections from these cities is considered. Kuala Lumpur has secured many new links to points outside Southeast Asia in the 1990s,

J. Bowen / Journal of Transport Geography 8 (2000) 2541 Table 8 Sample international destinations Amman, Jordan Amsterdam, The Netherlands Athens, Greece Auckland, New Zealand Beijing, China Bombay, India Brussels, Belgium Cairo, Egypt Calcutta, India Colombo, Sri Lanka Copenhagen, Denmark New Delhi, India Dhahran, Saudi Arabia Dhaka, Bangladesh Dubai, United Arab Emirates Frankfurt, Germany
a b

37

Fukuoka, Japan Guangzhou, China Hong Konga Istanbul, Turkey Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Johannesburg, South Africa Kaohsiung, Taiwan Karachi, Pakistan Kunming, China Kuwait, Kuwait London, UK Madras, India Melbourne, Australia Moscowb Munich, Germany Nagoya, Japan

Osaka, Japan Paris, France Perth, Australia Rome, Italy San Francisco, USA Seoul, South Korea Shanghai, China Stockholm, Sweden Sydney, Australia Taipei, Taiwan Tel Aviv, Israel Tokyo, Japan Vancouver, Canada Vienna, Austria Xiamen, China Zurich, Switzerland

Hong Kong was a British colony in 1979 and a Special Administrative Region in China in 1997. Moscow was the capital of the Soviet Union in 1979 and the capital of the Russian Federation in 1997.

Table 9 Calculating interregional centrality indices Bangkok Amman Amsterdam Athens Auckland Beijing Bombay FFF FFF Zurich j1 ij gi 1 1 1 1 1 1 43 Jakarta 1 14 Kuala Lumpur 1 1 1 1 30 Manila 18 Singapore 1 1 1 1 1 1 39

Table 10 Interregional centrality indices, 1979 and 1997 Bangkok 1979 C(i) C(max) C(i)/C(max) 1997 C(i) C(max) C(i)/C(max) 16 38 0.42 43 46 0.93 Jakarta 2 31 0.06 14 42 0.33 Kuala Lumpur 11 34 0.32 30 46 0.65 Manila 9 30 0.30 18 48 0.38 Singapore 14 34 0.41 39 46 0.85

but most of those links are characterized by low service frequency (Table 11). As a result of this disparity, the hub at Singapore, in particular, continues to handle a signicant volume of connecting trac between Malaysia and the rest of the world. A similar observation could be made about other global markets and their links to Southeast Asia.

It is because Singapore has the advantage of network density that it continues to draw trac feed from Malaysia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia even when alternate national hubs are directly connected to a passengers or shipments nal destination. The perceived superior quality and reliability of air services available through Changi Airport reinforce Singapores dominant

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J. Bowen / Journal of Transport Geography 8 (2000) 2541

Table 11 Weekly airline service density to three Southeast Asian hubs, 1997 Nonstop origin Singapore Flights London Frankfurt Sydney Hong Kong Taipei Tokyo 33 21 29 78 41 41 Seats 13 530 8455 10 130 28 125 12 600 15 580 Bangkok Flights 24 27 22 97 55 43 Seats 9480 9895 8940 31 915 17 705 15 360 Kuala Lumpur Flights 17 7 6 33 17 11 Seats 6970 2690 1790 10 210 5130 3710

Table 12 Top intraregional routes in Southeast Asia, 1997 Total capacitya (seats/week) SingaporeJakarta vv SingaporeKuala Lumpur vv SingaporeBangkok vv SingaporeManila vv SingaporePenang vv BangkokKuala Lumpur vv BangkokManila vv SingaporeDenpasar vv Kuala LumpurJakarta vv BangkokPhnom Penh vv
a b

Flightsb 343 362 234 62 105 57 47 66 71 78

80 930 68 750 67 765 17 840 16 905 15 435 15 420 15 240 14 850 13 100

Total of capacity each way. Total of ights each way.

position. The plaudits won both by the airport and by SIA bolster a reputation for excellence that enhances Singapores ability to draw trac from throughout the region. Indeed, Singapore dominates the list of the most densely served intraregional routes (Table 12), the top three of which rank among the twenty busiest international routes in the world. For both cargo and passengers, intraregional trac and interregional trac fuel each others growth at their interface at Singapore, entrenching that citys advantage as a global airline hub. Bangkoks primacy at the interregional level continues to be based more on its strategic position between Europe and Northeast Asia. Bangkok is better connected than Singapore to European cities, while Singapore has a broader variety of interregional connections.
Table 13 Change in international airline capacity Average annual growth (%) 19791989 Singapore Bangkok Kuala Lumpur Manila Jakarta 6.7 6.7 7.0 4.2 3.3

The advantages enjoyed by Singapore and Bangkok do not mean, however, that opportunities are foreclosed to other hubs in the region. Indeed, among the ve major hub cities of Southeast Asia, Kuala Lumpur had the strongest growth in international airline capacity (as opposed to centrality) during the 1990s (Table 13). Developments in the region point therefore towards a multihub system, in which several large hubs vie for intraregional and long haul trac a situation akin to the competition among Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul in Northeast Asia. Within this system Singapore is predominant, enjoying a commanding lead over both Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok in terms of international airline capacity (Fig. 9). An increasingly complex web of airline alliances overlies this hierarchy of hubs. All of the major airlines

Average annual growth (%) 19891997 5.8 5.0 8.9 6.0 9.5

Scheduled airline seats/week 1997 359 355 266 580 128 770 101 315 85 970

J. Bowen / Journal of Transport Geography 8 (2000) 2541

39

Such alliances are likely to further strengthen the position of dominant hubs since the carriers operating from those hubs are more likely to be chosen for linkages with other strong airlines and strong hubs. 5. Conclusion Discussions of the rapid economic development of Southeast Asia often refer to air transportation as an ``enabling mechanism'', an exogenous factor that has lowered communication costs and permitted these countries to achieve a high level of access to global markets and foreign investment. What this study has sought to do is to highlight the role of the state in the relationship between air transportation and national economic development in Southeast Asia. The ways in which national economies are integrated into this global transport network are inuenced powerfully by state policies and strategies. And those strategies vary from state to state. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, for instance, each have dierent strategies with respect to international airline services despite the fact that all three share a similar reliance on export-oriented growth and are dependent on the international linkages that that model entails. Singapore has relied on Open Skies to bolster its position as the premier hub of Southeast Asia. Indonesia has used a somewhat dierent Open Skies policy to spread development to points beyond Jakarta. And Malaysia has pursued massive infrastructure spending and aggressive promotion of Malaysia Airlines to try to raise Kuala Lumpur's prole in the international airline industry. Each of these examples points to the critical role of the state in the development of the airline industry's geography. Of course, the states inuence is pivotal in any regional context. What is distinctive in Southeast Asia, perhaps, is the extent to which the states attempted orchestration of the airline industry is guided explicitly by developmental priorities (as opposed to freer competition for its benets to consumers, for instance). The state has determined the extent of privatization, the scope for competition by foreign and domestic airlines, and the size and positioning of new airport infrastructure all with a view towards accelerating economic development. Yet while conrming the centrality of the state in Southeast Asian development, the story of the airline industry also points to the boundedness of the developmental state. Although relative autonomy is commonly cited as a dening feature of the developmental state (Leftwich, 1995), there are signicant constraints on the states latitude. In the case of the airline industry, those constraints include not just domestic political considerations (which have limited privatization for in-

Fig. 9. Total international airline capacity to Southeast Asian hubs, 1997.

in Southeast Asia have formed partnerships with airlines from other world regions. Thai International, for example, is tied into the globe-encircling nine-airline Star Alliance (the other members are Air Canada, Air New Zealand, All Nippons Airway, Ansett Australia, Lufthansa, SAS, United, and VARIG). Malaysia Airlines is linked to Virgin Atlantic. SIA, though not a member of the Star Alliance, has far-reaching alliances with several of its members including Ansett Australia, Air New Zealand, and Lufthansa. Through mid-1999, no airline from Southeast Asia had joined one-world, the largest rival to the Star Alliance. Hong Kong-based Cathay Pacic is a member, however, along with American Airlines, British Airways, Canadian Airlines, and Qantas. One eect of these alliances is to channel trac feed through the hubs where the alliance airlines networks mesh. Malaysia Airlines arrangement with Virgin Atlantic, for example, signicantly increases the number of services between Kuala Lumpur and London and feeds trac from Virgin Atlantic into Malaysia Airlines expanding network to Australia. Similarly, seven members of the Star Alliance feed trac into Thais Bangkok hub. Accordingly, an airline that is more successful in forming alliances will draw more trac feed from around the world to its primary hub. Furthermore, participation in an alliance limits the ease with which an airline can substitute one hub for another. Members of the Star Alliance, for instance, cannot easily forsake their relationship with Thai International and Bangkok.

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J. Bowen / Journal of Transport Geography 8 (2000) 2541 Hansen, M., Kanafani, A., 1990. Airline hubbing and airport economics in the Pacic market. Transportation Research 24A (3), 217230. Hill, H., Pang, E.F., 1988. The state and industrial restructuring: a comparison of the aerospace industry in Indonesia and Singapore. ASEAN Economic Bulletin 4, 152168. Ho, W.F., 1996. Produce aerospace parts in KL. Anwar. Straits Times (Singapore) 6, 27. Kissling, C.C., 1989. ASEAN air transport. In: Leinbach, T.R., Chia, L.S. (Eds.), Southeast Asian Transport: Issues in Development. Oxford University Press, Singapore. Lee, B.T., 1995. Challenges of superinduced development: the megaurban region of Kuala LumpurKlang valley. In: Robinson, I.M., McGee, T.G. (Eds.), The Mega-urban Regions of Southeast Asia. UBC Press, Vancouver. Leftwich, A., 1995. Bringing politics back. Towards a model of the developmental state. The Journal of Development Studies 31 (5), 400427. Leinbach, T.R., 1986. Transport development in Indonesia: progress, problems, and policies under the new order. In: McAndrews, C. (Ed.), Central Government and Local Development in Indonesia. Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur. Low, R., 1995. Singapores aerospace industry. ASEAN/Singapore Brieng, No. 9, DBS Bank, Singapore. Multimedia Development Corporation (no date). Unlocking the full potential of the information age. Received upon request from MDC (info@mdc.com.my). Ocampo, R.B., 1995. The metro Manila mega-region. In: Robinson, I.M., McGee, T.G. (Eds.), The Mega-urban Regions of Southeast Asia. UBC press, Vancouver. OConnor, K., 1995. Airport development in Southeast Asia. Journal of Transport Geography 3 (4), 269279. OConnor, K., Scott, A., 1992. Airline services and metropolitan areas in the AsiaPacic region 19701990. Review of Urban and Regional Development Studies 4, 240253. OAG, Ocial Airline Guide, 1979. Worldwide Edition. October issue. OAG, Oak Brook, Illinois. OAG, Ocial Airline Guide, 1997. Worldwide edition. November issue. Reed Travel Group, Oak Brook, Illinois. OAG, Ocial Airline Guide, 1998. Worldwide Edition. November issue. Reed Travel Group, Oak Brook, Illinois. Olds, K., 1995. Globalization and the production of new urban spaces: Pacic Rim megaprojects in the late 20th century. Environment and Planning A 27, 17131743. Perry, M., Kong, L., Yeoh, B., 1997. Singapore: a developmental city state. Wiley, Chichester, UK. Raguraman, K., 1986. Capacity and route regulation in international scheduled air transportation: a case study of Singapore. Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 7 (1), 5367. Raguraman, K., 1995. The role of air transportation in tourism development: a case study of Philippines and Thailand. Transportation Quarterly 49 (4), 113124. Raguraman, K., 1997. Airlines as instruments for nation building and national identity: case study of Malaysia and Singapore. Journal of Transport Geography 5 (4), 239256. Rimmer, P.J., 1994. Regional economic integration in Pacic Asia. Environment and Planning A 26, 17311759. Sesser, S., 1992. A nation of contradictions. New Yorker 13, 3768. Shipping Times (Singapore), 1999. Philippines seeks more ights to Thailand for PAL, 15 June, p. 14. Singh, K., 1984. Successful strategies the story of Singapore Airlines (SIA). Long Range Planning 17 (5), 1722. Straits Times (Singapore), 1999. Economy grew by only 0.3% last year. 15 July, p. 1. Taae, E.J., Gauthier, H.L., O'Kelly, M.E., 1996. Geography of Transportation, Second edition. Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey.

stance) but also the boundaries imposed by the development strategies of neighboring states. The latter category is particularly relevant given the externally oriented posture of Southeast Asian development efforts. The jockeying for regional hub status, for example, illustrates the interplay of dierent states airport infrastructure investments. In particular, Malaysias efforts to develop Kuala Lumpur as a global hub are complicated by the comparative ease with which Singapore and Thailand can maintain their hubs already established status in the global airline industry. The Asian economic crisis could push the regional hub rivalry in a dierent direction. The priority of airline industry development had dimmed considerably in the regions most hard-pressed economies. Indeed, a danger in the Asian economic crisis is that the eorts of the regions poorer governments to strengthen linkages with the international airline industry (through new airport development and easier entry for new competitors) will be slowed or reversed. As mentioned earlier, Bangkoks new airport has been put on hold, some of the regions new entrant airlines have stopped operating, and (at least in Malaysia) stronger economic nationalism has been manifest in eorts to reserve national trac for national carriers. If sustained over a longer period of time, these trends would jeopardize, to some degree, the access of these economies to the international airline industry and the resources that circulate in it. References
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