Article 55 Grounds for Legal Separation LAPUZ SY vs EUFEMIO FACTS: On 18 August 1953, Carmen O.

. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But before the trial could be completed (the respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death. ISSUE: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? HELD: An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this

jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona. A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. GANDIONCO vs PENARANDA FACTS: Private respondent, filed with RTC Misamis Oriental, and General Santos City complaints against petitioner for legal separation on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support pendente lite and payment of damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the civil action for legal separation and the incidents that follow, such as, application for support pendente lite (the action is pending), should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by the private respondent. HELD: In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others. As earlier noted this action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. BUGAYONG vs GINEZ FACTS: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to Defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with the sisters of the husband in said municipality, but before the

latter left to report back to duty, he and his wife came to an agreement that Leonila would stay with his sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to Dagupan City to study in a local college there. As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco (Plaintiffs sister-in-law) and some from anonymous writers (which were not produced at the hearing) informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife which he did not even care to mention. On cross-examination, Plaintiff admitted that his wife also informed him by letter, which he claims to have destroyed, that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications prompted him in October, 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain as to the propriety of a legal separation between him and his wife on account of the latters alleged acts of infidelity, and he was directed to consult instead the navy legal department. In August, 1952, Plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of one Mrs. Malalang, Defendants godmother. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of the Plaintiff-husband, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. Then they repaired to the Plaintiffs house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left,

which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After that and despite such belief, Plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her and failing to find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, to soothe his wounded feelings. ISSUE: Whether or not the husbands attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts. HELD: A detailed examination of the testimony of the Plaintiff-husband, especially these portions quoted above, clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery committed by Defendant-wife. All these facts (see highlighted part in the FACTS section) have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. This reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery. Article 58 Cooling-off Period PACETE vs CARRIAGA FACTS: On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on 30 April 1938 before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato, Cotabato; that they had a child

named Consuelo who was born on 11 March 1943; that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. Defendants were served with summons and filed for motions for an extension to file answer. They filed for 3rd motion after the original period given so Plaintiff filed for motion to declare Dfs in default. Court granted the motion and tried the case without observing the cooling period voiding the bigamous marriage and issuing a legal separation decree. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I, in Cotabato City, gravely abused its discretion in rendering its decision, among other things, decreed legal separation of Enrico and Concepcion and held to be null and void ab ignition the marriage of Enrico and Clarita. HELD: Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate. It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedies, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements. Article 63 Effects of Legal Separation MACADANGDANG vs CA FACTS: Private respondent Filomena Macandangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang married in 1946, after which children were begotten and business boomed, but personal marriage life became shaky and in 1965 private respondent left. Private respondent returned to Davao in 1971, and there learned of petitioners illicit affairs, for which action for legal separation was taken. In 1972, private respondent filed for appointment of administrator of conjugal partnership pending the cases termination, which petitioner opposed. In 1973, court granted petition for separation of the spouses, with petitioner ordered to pay plaintiff for support until court appoints said administrator for the absolute community. Court orders for names to be selected as administrator but petitioner opposes with prayer that he ba allowed to continue administering the conjugal properties in accordance with law, but this was

denied, the court reiterating the decree of legal separation had already become final. ISSUE: Whether or not the decree of legal separation between spouses had already become final and executory as this instant petition was filed. HELD: WE do not find merit in petitioner's submission that the questioned decision had not become final and executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains of the absolute community of property as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation. Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. This legal effect of the decree of legal separation ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of, the judgment decreeing legal separationfor the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets. Even American courts have made definite pronouncements on the aforestated legal effect of a divorce (legal separation) decree. Generally speaking, the purpose of a decree in divorce insofar as the disposition of property is concerned is to fix and make certain the property rights and interests of the parties (Mich-Westgate vs. Westgate, 288 N.W. 860, 291 Mich. 18, 300 [1] p. 354, C.J.S. Vol. 27B); and it has been held that the provisions of the decree should definitely and finally determine the property rights and interests of the parties (Wash.-Shaffer vs. Shaffer, 262 P. 2d. 763, 43 Wash. 2d 629; 300 [11 p. 354 C.J.S. Vol. 27B); and that any attempted reservation of such questions for future determination is improper and error (Mich.Karwowski vs. Karwowski, 20 N.W. 2d 851, 313 Mich.

167, 300 11] p. 354, C.J.S., Vol. 27B; emphasis supplied). Some statutes providing for the division or disposition of the property of the parties to a divorce have been held mandatory and hence to require the court to decree some division of their property rights (U.S. Pearce vs. CIR, 62 S. Ct. 154, 315 U.S. 543, 86 L. ed. 1016, construing Texas statute; 291 [1] p. 263 C.J.S. Vol. 27B). It has been held that notwithstanding the division of property between the parties, the subject matter of a divorce action remains the marital status of the parties, the settlement of the property rights being merely incidental (Wash.-State ex rel. Atkins vs. Superior Court of King Country, 97 P. 2d. 139, 1 Wash. 2d 677; 291 [1] p. 264 C.J.S., Vol. 27B; emphasis supplied). Under other authorities, by the very nature of the litigation, all property rights growing out of marital relations are settled and included in divorce proceedings (Ind.-Novak vs. Novak, 133 N.E. 2d 578, 126 Ind. App. 428) and a decree of divorce is an adjudication of all property rights connected with the marriage and precludes the parties as to all matters which might have been legitimately proved in support of charges or defenses in the action (U.S.Spreckles vs. Wakefield, C.C.A. 286 F. 465) and bars any action thereafter brought by either party to determine the question of property rights (Fla.Cooper vs. Cooper, 69 So. 2d 881; Finston vs. Finston, 37 So. 2d 423,160 Fla. 935; p. 751, C.J.S. Vol. 27A).