Radhakrishnan 1 Sachin Radhakrishnan Theories of International Politics Miroslav Nincic/Tracy Lin 6 March 2012 Democratic Peace for the

Future: The End of a Peaceful Trend Western Europe in the 19th Century saw the rivers of industrialism connect with the ocean of democracy and cross the tides of non-democratic empires, bathing the continent in a sea of wealth and great progress. The lunge forward also brought forth rising fears of losing power as Europe and the rest of the world was thrown into a vicious cycle of constant competition and conquest. Waves of change turned turbulent as rivaling nations plunged into the First World War that saw unprecedented military destruction and devastation. The democratic victors sought to prevent further destruction but the opposing forces of Communism and Fascism grabbed the guns once more, hurtling the world into the Second World War. Alone, it stands as the deadliest conflict to date. As the end of World War II gave way to a bipolar system split between Democracy and Communism, the hostile environment that ensued fell short of a Third World War. The enmity came to a screeching halt as the Iron Curtain fell and the Berlin Wall crumbled. The dissolution of the Soviet Union heightened the democracy count in the international system and ushered the world into a new age of harmony and growth, encouraging more nations to embrace this idea. Since 1945, democratic nations have displayed a trend for peace between each other. This has prompted a resurgence of literature on the democratic peace dating back to Immanuel Kants Perpetual Peace in 1795. Recent literature explaining this phenomenon includes influential works by Zeev Maoz, Bruce Russett, John ONeal, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and several others (Sobek 2009: 86). Strong qualitative and quantitative evidence make this proposition well accepted amongst scholars. Although theorists have

Radhakrishnan 2 found a strong relationship between peace and dyadic conflict between democracies, several attest unique explanations for this occurrence, indicating disconnect on this topic. However, most theoretical frameworks comprise of two primary veins of thought; the structural and cultural/normative foundations for democracy (Russett 2006: 303-306). The basic understanding is that democracies have ingrained characteristics that prevent militarized conflict between similar entities. Literature in opposition stems from John Owen, David Spiro, Michael Doyle and Christopher Layne (Russett 1995: 164). As most of the Western countries followed a blueprint for democracy established by the United States and Western Europe, the world became distinctly split between the developed and the developing nations. With rising non-western powers embracing democracy, such as the former Eastern Bloc, India, and Japan, it is evident that the baton is now being passed between the two worlds. As the transformation takes place, democratizations in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa provide theorists a glimpse into the future application of the democratic peace. The real-world experiences of these democratic newcomers offer a mixed bag of results, which prompts the remaining question to be as open as ever; will the peaceful trend of interactions between democracies continue as more of the non-western world embraces the idea? While it is generally accepted that democracies will rarely engage in militarized conflict with each other, and considering the long period of peace since WWII correlating with the rise in democracies in the international arena, it is nonsensical to stretch this trend further and encompass democratizing non-western states for two reasons: First, it took Western countries until WWII to develop consensus on democratic norms and institutions, and in popular case studies before 1945, neither explanations for the democratic peace

Radhakrishnan 3 solely contribute to the prevention of militarized conflict as power politics play a big role. Second, even if the normative and structural explanations are a factor, non-western democracies need ample time to mature the workings and trust of democratic norms and institutions in order for peace to prevail. Just like Western democracies, this period of maturation has the propensity for high conflict. Here is a delineation of what to expect from this paper. I will first lay out the definitions for democratic norms and institutions. These definitions should provide clarity as I follow up with the existing literature for generally accepted normative and institutional arguments. To provide adequate counterbalance, I then explain the existing opposing literature. After mapping out both sides of argumentation, I then examine three events that occur between democracies in order: The Fashoda Crisis, Venezuela Crisis, and the IndiaPakistan War of 1971. Some counterarguments follow my argumentation. Existing literature has had to develop consensus on what exactly democratic norms and institutions are in order to derive theoretical explanations for peace between democracies. For this paper, democratic norms call for peaceful conflict resolution, minority and opposition rights, and an environment guaranteeing open and free competition. This leads to the normative assumption that States externalize the norms that characterize their domestic political processes (Maoz and Russett 2003: 625). Democratic institutions comprise of a system of shared power amongst different branches of government, of which its members are publicly elected. This leads to the assumption that Because democracies are characterized by complex and cumbersome decision making structures that require widespread support for the use of force and the executive branch must mobilize the support of the legislature and of public opinion, when both states in a

Radhakrishnan 4 conflict must go through such a process, the time required for war-related mobilization allows them to resolve their differences through diplomacy (626). Thus, we have both the normative and structural representations for the democratic peace. The literature that downplays the democratic peace proposition can be separated into two schools of thought. The first explanation is that Democratic structures are nearly as likely to drive states to war as to restrain them from it. [Institutions] and publics were often more belligerent than the [leaders] they are supposed to constrain. The normative theory neglected to take perceptions into account. Often states which today's researchers consider democratic did not consider each other democratic. The anticipated normative prevention for war was frequently absent [from the studies] (Owen 1994: 91). The second thought is that Realism, not the democratic peace theory, provides the more compelling explanation of why war avoided. Indeed, the democratic peace theory indicators appear not to have played any discernible role in the outcome of these crises (Layne 1994: 38). This opposition contends that democratic peace literature needs much more scrutiny before making such claims for peace. Deriving from both sides of the argumentation, this paper will show how even though structural and normative explanations of the democratic peace can aid to the prevention of conflict, the former much more than the latter, there were times neither explanations existed in preventing conflict and actually provoked it because of immature perceptions of both. Also, Realism is present throughout historical disputes between democracies. In these cases, war was only averted because peace brought the greatest source of power. Power politics will continue to play a role as non-western states democratize, which makes the future of the democratic peace proposition unstable as

Radhakrishnan 5 democratic norms and institutions require time and experience to develop just like Western democracies. Beginning with the Fashoda Crisis, proponents and opponents contend separate accounts for the peace that occurred which validate the deficient nature of the normative and structural explanations. The Fashoda Crisis occurred in 1898 when both French and British forces staked claims to an area called Fashoda. The land held strategic importance for both sides in the scramble to control Africa. During six months of diplomatic deliberations, both nations were on the brink of war as military forces were already in position in Fashoda and the public opinion on both sides had the notion to fight. Though the circumstances held the prospect of war, it ended without the use of weaponry (Sobek: 88-91).Two separate explanations attest to this pacific ending: Sobek sides with the institutional explanation of the democratic peace as the strenuous decision-making caused by the separation of powers granted for diplomacy. In addition it allowed voices of peace to be heard and ultimately to influence the outcome of the crisis (91). Layne contends that the Fashoda Crisis is better explained by realism because France backed down knowing it could not defeat the mighty British forces. Britain did not compromise an inch knowing its own military prowess. Democratic peace theory fails as the public and government on both sides did not display mutual respect based on democratic norms and culture (33). Separate in that both arguments argue either in support or against the democratic peace proposition, they concur in the fact that the normative argument is explicitly absent in the contribution to peace. In actuality, the opposite occurred as both sides took actions that put the nations on the brink of war. In todays relations between France and Britain,

Radhakrishnan 6 neither side would dare organize their respective armies during diplomatic talks which would only make matters worse. This shows how norms take time to develop even amongst Western democracies. If France felt it had a chance of winning, war would have occurred. But rather, power politics served France best as it would be in their best interest to not lose a war against the British and a possible alliance in the future. This shows how, at best, the democratic peace explanation has only half a contender in the structural explanation and implies that for non-western democratic relations, if a situation arises in which both sides believe in their own military capabilities, war will occur. Although diplomacy may occur, the structural strain that should provide more time to make peace may just provide the same time to stoke the flames of conflict. It is a good thing France had the option to give up. Britains unwillingness to compromise would have pushed France into a corner with no way out but to fight. A possible counterargument in this situation is that France never had a serious intention to combat the British, knowing the vast differences in military capability, and was only hoping that the British would concede some of its possessions. Although quite possible, during this period before World War I, when Europe had already experience the Crimean War and tensions were on the rise again with competition, would France take this risk of war to achieve only minor concessions? Especially considering the harsh diplomatic battle and infighting within its institutions, such a gamble seems unlikely. Though the institutional explanation played a role alongside power politics in this case, the 1895 Venezuela Crisis shows the dominance of Realism even as democratic norms and institutions play a role.

Radhakrishnan 7 The Venezuela Crisis displays a stronger case for the normative explanation than the Fashoda Crisis, but as both sides prepared for conflict, with Britain giving in for strategic purposes, the presence of Realism overshadows both explanations for the democratic peace. In 1895, as Venezuela requested Britain for the United States play mediator through a border dispute, United States President Grover Cleveland imposed the power of the Monroe Doctrine. In an attempt to undermine the British and establish American hegemony over the Western Hemisphere, Cleveland took a stubborn stance that prompted the same from diplomats in Britain. Until an abrupt concession by the British in 1896, each side was preparing for war. Both would have had the support of their respective nations even though public opinion was pushing for peace, although the Americans were definitely more hawkish than their British counterparts. Akin to the Fashoda Crisis, the cumbersome institutional methods contributed more time for peace but in contrast the respective governments held much more radical views than its citizens. Furthermore, both governments decision-making did not factor in public opinion. (Owen: 114-119, Layne: 22-28). Layne provides the Realist explanation that the British only relented its uncompromising stance due to the fact that it could not survive militarily against the rising powers of Russia, France and Germany if it allocated more of its naval force to this dispute. The United States at this time was a formidable power and would not be defeated easily but compared to the aforementioned European powers, it did not represent an immediate threat to British interests (28). Owen counters this Realist approach by explaining the British decision to appease the United States as a beginning act of friendship between two likeminded powers. Even though the United States threatened British interests just as the

Radhakrishnan 8 Germans did in Africa, the British chose to ally with the America on grounds of liberalism and trust (118-119). The aversion of war in the Venezuela Crisis is mostly due to the Realist argument accounted by Christopher Layne. While true that democratic norms were prevalent in both nations citizenry and the institutions garnered more time for the diplomatic process, the heavy disconnect between the government and its people show decisions made for reasons of strategic sorts, aligning more with Realism. Again the normative argument is a wash considering naval forces on both sides were mobilized expecting war. Furthermore, even though both sides saw the dangers for war in their headstrong diplomatic tactics, neither party budged until the immediate decision in Britain. Even though Owen points out the pacific decision as a friendly move between democracies that would only spark a growing friendship, his flaw in questioning the Realist argument by proposing Britain ally with Germany is that Germany posed a greater threat than America. The United States only wanted to hold control over its own relative area and had no passion to actively pursue British possessions like the Germans were doing. The implications one can draw from this case is that peace was chosen over a greater risk of losing power which would have resulted if war had broken out. Western democracies in this instance again play the game of power politics even though both parties felt the democratic kinship. Both democratic norms and institutions between the two nations were in stages of infancy, but as Owen points out, these would grow stronger with time and experience. Just like these democracies experienced, non-western democracies will have to go through a period of maturation where the vulnerability for militarized conflict exists because it is seen as a viable option. Furthermore, democracy does not erase power politics. So when more non-western

Radhakrishnan 9 democracies come into disputes without fully developed institutions and norms for compromise, and when fighting a war is seen as a feasible means for achieving the goal of power, the option for violence will be taken. It just so happens for Britain, that the violent option meant worse consequences. As both authors point out, Britains inability to have an expansive geopolitical reach contributed to its decision to placate hostility. Its quite possible that Britain recognized this growing weakness akin to the falling Roman Empire, which prompts this counterargument: Because Britain knowing full well it would not allow such a small conflict lead to war, attempted to milk the situation for whatever concessions possible without conflict would be taken. Similar to the counterargument in the previous case, it still seems absurd that any nation would consider such a tactic as military forces were mobilized. Even though a last-ditch effort to maintain ones geopolitical reach contains no real consequences if war is averted, I doubt Britain would risk the possibility of losing its other possessions by fighting over Venezuela. Because this conflict represents a dispute over a large expanse of area this calls into the question the propensity of conflict between countries vying for power within the same vicinity. Pakistans tumultuous rise and shaky foundations for democracy illustrate a vivid trend for what to expect from recently democratized non-western nations, as its interpretations of democratic norms and institutions were far from practice. But even with incomplete norms and institutions playing a large role, power politics also factored into pushing Pakistan and India past the brink of war in 1971. Transitioning from a militant leader and an Eastern-discriminatory West Pakistan majority, the nation held elections that reflected the will of its majority. As East Pakistan

Radhakrishnan 10 picked up a majority representation in government, the previous West Pakistan majority aimed to modify the transition to better suit its own interests. By not participating in the political institutions and using its the military to suppress East Pakistans rightful path to power, the West fueled already vehement sentiment for secession. In a continued struggle that saw more international involvement and gradually increasing support for East Pakistans desire to form Bangladesh, the United Nations stepped in to negotiate between the two sides. Neither East nor West budged on their respective stances. Every last-minute attempt by both sides to put an end to the conflict failed as fighting fatefully ensued. As the skirmishes came closer to Indian soil, India was compelled to fight the West alongside the East. With Indias superior military resources, Pakistan surrendered and East Pakistan had successfully achieved autonomy. Towards the end of the conflict, Pakistan at several points had the opportunity to concede to the East before defeat, but by then the fighting had gotten out of control and any attempt to stop it would be futile (Jackson 1975: 30-112). David Sobek summarizes the reasons for the conflict between the non-western democracies as follows: The war was related to the inability of democratic Pakistan to incorporate Bengali East Pakistan into a unified state. The political tension between East and West led to the collapse of democracy in the nation. Furthermore, Indias response failed to reflect the will of its own people, which sought immediate action. Clearly the norms of democracy had not yet developed far enough in India to encourage contingent consent (104). Although both nations held responsibility for the war in 1971, it was Pakistans demonstration of its inability to peacefully transfer power after a fair election that led India to take military action against Pakistan. At that point, Indias democratic norms and

Radhakrishnan 11 institutions are vastly mature compared to its neighbor, but West Pakistans use of military force on its own people to suppress their political rights prompted Indias intervention. Although Sobek argues that India too was an immature democracy without adequate norms to provide contingent consent, I disagree. India had the maturity to allow Pakistan its rightful sovereignty to deal with this situation on its own and only stepped in to provide East Pakistan help as West Pakistan used military force to resolve matters, an obvious sign of autocracy. Even though India observed this, it still allowed West Pakistan the chance at democratically resolving the issue through diplomacy with the United Nations. Although its own Bengali hawks pushed for war with Pakistan, Indias norms had developed far enough to understand its need to reflect the will of its people but also respect Pakistani autonomy, doing both adequately. It could not openly assist Bangladesh militarily, but economic and diplomatic assistance reflected the will of its Bengali population. Militant leader Yahya undermined peaceful attempts through force but also gave diplomacy a chance when India openly pushed for support of the east. To be fair, West Pakistans few attempts at peaceful reconciliation bore no fruit only because East Pakistans one-track mind was for secession. From the beginning of the political standoff, their leader Sheikh Mujib pushed for full independence. Akin to the South in the US Civil War, if diplomatic intervention held no hope for keeping a nation together, then the military would have to be brought in. Even when Yahya agreed to UN intervention, the Easts stance was headstrong and even Indias attempts did not modify it. There was no winning option in West Pakistans view, and quite simply, even through diplomatic talks, Bangladesh made it clear that they wanted war through military action against the government. From a Realist perspective, even though West Pakistan held no meaningful perception democratic norms

Radhakrishnan 12 and institutions, the choice it had to achieve the most power was to fight. If they had kept pushing for diplomacy, they would have to concede the eastern half or be forced into military conflict. With the chance to actually gain something (keep the status quo) through fighting, the government took the chance and experienced what would have occurred anyway. In this sense, one can see how a nation, even with democratic options, will choose violence if the prospects are good. All in all, both West and East Pakistan displayed erratic forms of democratic norms and institutions, which forced all parties involved to undertake non-democratic means of dealing with the situation at hand. As more non-western states democratize and fail to grasp the required norms and institutions to live in a peaceful world, it prompts power politics to take the course of violence much easier because there are simply no other alternatives. A simple counterargument to erase the notion of power politics being used in this case is that Pakistans best option to maintain power was to concede Bangladesh in the beginning. If this was there best option, then the fighting was done purely out of irrational, autocratic thinking, considering his knowledge of Indias involvement. Militant leader Yahya out of pure spite just wanted to suppress East Pakistan for attempting to wrest his position of power, which Jackson does point out to be a factor. Although this a viable option, it still seems likely that Yahya would have expected India to not fully support Bangladesh, and that his army would have a chance to defeat Bangladesh and reunite Pakistan. In conclusion, throughout the many cases displayed, both between Western democracies and non-western democracies, the presence of power politics undeniably makes it a factor in decisions that both prevent conflict and promote it. Even though

Radhakrishnan 13 conflict was averted in several situations between democracies, it was only averted because going to war would have achieved a worse-off situation. This shows the fallacy behind the normative and structural explanations for the democratic peace because first, the normative explanation is virtually inexistent, while the structural aspects that should promote peace only provide time to evaluate priorities. This same period of time can lead to war if a country believes conflict will bring about positive change in ones power. The future implications for using either explanation for the democratic peace are highly dangerous because the cases where war was avoided were very close. For both Western and nonwestern democracies alike, there are other aspects that link nations together which can promote peace. Things such as linked economies and open borders between nations should reduce the propensity for conflict because such relations already create an environment of indebtedness. Although the democratic peace proposition does hold some value as democracies mature, it is tough to know when that maturation point has been reached and impossible to know if two mature countries can ever revert back to immature ways. Thus, there is hope that the spread of democracy will stimulate harmony throughout the globe but it must be used alongside other factors to really strengthen ties and prevent war.

Works Cited 1. Jackson, Robert. 1975. South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh: A Political and Historical Analysis of the 1971 War. New York: Praeger Publishers: 30-112.

Radhakrishnan 14 2. Layne, Christopher. 1994. Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace. International Security 19(2): 5-49. 3. Maoz, Zeev and Russett, Bruce. 1993. Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986. American Political Science Review 87: 624-48. 4. Owen, John M. 1994. How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace. International Security 19(2): 91-119. 5. Russett, Bruce, Starr, Harvey, and Kinsella, Starr. 2006. World Politics. Boston. Wadsworth Press: 303-306. 6. Russett, Bruce, Layne, Christopher, Spiro David, and Doyle, Michael. 1995. "The Democratic Peace." International Security 19(4): 164. 7. Sobek, David. 2009. The Causes of War. New Hampshire: Polity Press: 86-104.