RECHTSTHEORIE 29 (1998), S.

387 - 424
Duncker & Humblot, 12165 Berlin

LAW-ORIENTED BEHAVIOUR AND THE STRUCTURE

OF LEGAL NORMS

By Athanasios Gromitsaris, Jena

I. Introduction

For a very long time légal positivists hâve theorised about thé form of
thé légal norm. As early as thé late eighteenth century, Jeremy Bentham
had developed a theory on norm individuation; it offers a means of sing-
ling out that which is to count as "a law", a légal norm. On thé one hand,
Lon Fuller challenged thé idea that individual légal norms or rules could
serve as an appropriate focus in légal philosophy. He is not interested in
what he once described as thé intramural squabbling of thé légal positiv-
ists on thé form of thé légal norm. He sees their approach as stérile, for it
is not thé products (légal norms, légal rules) of légal processes that lay
bare thé distinctive features of thé law but rather, thé processes them-
selves.1 On thé other hand, A. M. Honoré, abandoning reconstruction and
reductivism and letting thé Benthamite program f ail away, tried to turn to
what he called "real laws".2 He embarked on an enterprise constituting "a
minor pièce of descriptive sociology"3 and tried to describe "real laws", as
opposed to thé laws which thé theorist remodels in thé shape of his thé-
ories. He turned to laws and rules as they exist in professional discourse
and argument but he had no appropriate sociological theory of descrip-
tion. He remained if not chez Hart, then at least du côté de chez Hart. In
thé following it is "légal processes" and "real laws" that are in thé focus
of our analysis. We use Max Weber's theory and sociology of law which is
a combination of a textual with a contextual approach to law in order to
find out which are thé basic prerequisites of a non-positivistic description
of law-oriented behaviour.

1 Fuller, 1981, p. 243; see thé book review by Paulson, 1984.

2 Honoré, 1977.
3
Honoré, 1977, p. 99. Hart saw his theory as "an essay in descriptive sociology":
Hart, 1961, p. iv.
26 RECHTSTHEOBIE, 3 - 4/98
388 Athanasios Gromitsaris [130]
II. Three Ways of Thinking About Law
Max Weber contrasts thé sociological study of law with two other ways
of thinking about légal norms and institutions: (1) The political and
moral attitude toward law and (2) thé dogmatic jurisprudence.4
1. The Political and Moral Attitude Toward Law
This attitude is distinguished by thé fact that it employs a criterion of
an extra-légal sort in terms of which thé moral goodness of spécifie légal
norms may be assessed.5 On thé one hand thé normative force of thé eva-
luative standards does not dépend upon their being rules of law. On thé
other hand thé légal order contains within itself in certain circumstances
a requirement that its component rules be justifiable from a moral point
of view. But even if a légal order contains norms with an explicitly ethi-
cal content judges view them as evaluative standards which they must
respect solely because they are légal norms.6 From thé standpoint of
positive law, thé currently normativ ascription of légal responsibility can
be modified only within thé institutional framework of légal policy déci-
sion effecting a change in thé law, not, however, within thé institutional
framework of morality.7 As thé judge is not permitted to rely on his per-
sonal view of what is morally right and wrong, his moral judgments hâve
to be supported by a reasoning that proves thé presumed validity of thé
evaluative standard. Therefore, to describe thé judge's attitude toward
thé validity of moral judgements and thé validity of légal norms, one
needs thé distinction between légal and extra légal standards of évalua-
tion which Weber's conception of thé political and moral attitude toward
law implies.8
Furthermore, as Nicholas Rescher emphasizes, we hâve to distinguish
between moral norms and ideals. The latter "reach out beyond thé via
negativa of those 'thou shalt not' commandments, toward thé ampler
demands of a utopian order of things".9 Surely, idealization strives to
•* By using thé "paradigm of thé game scat", Weber distinguishes between (a)
"Skatjurisprudenz", (b) "Skatpolitik" or "skatsittliche Normen" and (c) "Skat-
erkenntnis" or "Skaterfahrung". Weber, 1988a, p. 337 et sequ. On this point see
Krawietz, 1993, p. 48. See further Kronman, 1983, p. 7.
5
Weber, 1988a, p. 345: "(M)an kann von ethischen Prinzipien aus seine (des
"Paragraphen") normative 'Berechtigung', () seinen Wert oder Unwert () oder seinen
'Nutzen' oder 'Schaden' fur (bestimmte) Interessen diskutieren.
6 seinem Urteil zu reden.
See Art. 6 of thé German Constitution: "Pflege und Erziehung der Kinder sind
das natùrliche Recht der Eltern und die zuvôrderst ihnen obliegende Pflicht."
7 Krawietz, 1992, p. 52.
s Kronman, 1983, p. 10.
9 Rescher, 1987, p. 122.
Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 389
outrun thé limits of practicable achievability and enables us to press
beyond thé confines of institutional practice. Ideals, regardless of their
impracticability, can yield benefits as by-products of thé idealization
process. Still, they function "as simply one component within a System"
and can be pursued only "within thé limits of thé possible in a complex
and no doubt imperfect world". Accordingly, unrealism in thé pursuit of
ideals blocks thé way to other desiderata. As far as thé connection of law
and morality is concerned, thé view, that thé "claim to correctness is a
necessary élément of thé concept of law"10 has - as Eugenio Bulygin
points out - to pay more attention to thé distinction between prescrip-
tions, directives and norms on thé one hand and descriptive statements
about norms on thé other.11
Given thé moral pluralism prevailing in modem societies, it is not thé
business of modem démocratie states to deal in suprême values. Given
that neutrality, it is not always easy to know what right and wrong are.
Any group will always argue that its own moral codes and enforcement
policies or experiments are worthy of support by thé state and thé most
bénéficiai to mankind. Even if it would be possible to establish a consen-
sus by means of a rational discourse, which in turn is understood in
terms of a non-institutionalized process of reasoned conceptualization
and argument (Habermas), nobody can tell what thé state of affairs and
thé structure of action after this consensus will be. Who will regulate thé
relation between thé validity of thé idéal discourse and thé validity of
real laws?
2. The Dogmatic Jurisprudence
Légal scholars need not take an evaluative attitude toward thé légal
norm whose correct légal meaning they are expounding.12 A légal scholar
employs thé norm as an evaluative standard by using it to assess thé
behaviour of various actors in thé légal System including thé behaviour
of those responsible for applying thé norm in question. The value judge-
ments of thé légal scholar are based upon his conception of thé correct
meaning of a légal norm which he treats as a standard for assessing thé
10 Alexy, 1989, p. 177.
11
Bulygin, 1993, p. 24: "Die Aufgabe des Richters ist, den Angeklagten entweder
zu verurteilen oder freizusprechen. Ob er dabei das Recht richtig oder falsch inter-
pretiert hat, wird aus seinem Urteil hervorgehen; es ist nient seine Sache, darilber in
12
Weber, 1988a, p. 348: "(D)ie Frage nach dem, was in concrète 'juristische Wahr-
heit' ist, d. h. gedanklich nach 'wissenschaftlichen' Grundsatzen aïs solche 'gelten'
sotte oder hàtte 'gelten' sollen, ist logisch gànzlich verschieden von der: was de facto
empirisch in einem konkreten Fall oder in einer Vielheit von Fàllen aïs kausale
'Folge' des 'Geltens' eines bestimmten 'Paragraphen' eingetreten ist."
26*
388 Athanasios Gromitsaris [130]
II. Three Ways of Thinking About Law
Max Weber contrasts thé sociological study of law with two other ways
of thinking about légal norms and institutions: (1) The political and
moral attitude toward law and (2) thé dogmatic jurisprudence.4
1. The Political and Moral Attitude Toward Law
This attitude is distinguished by thé fact that it employs a criterion of
an extra-légal sort in terms of which thé moral goodness of spécifie légal
norms may be assessed.5 On thé one hand thé normative force of thé eva-
luative standards does not dépend upon their being rules of law. On thé
other hand thé légal order contains within itself in certain circumstances
a requirement that its component rules be justifiable from a moral point
of view. But even if a légal order contains norms with an explicitly ethi-
cal content judges view them as evaluative standards which they must
respect solely because they are légal norms.6 From thé standpoint of
positive law, thé currently normativ ascription of légal responsibility can
be modified only within thé institutional framework of légal policy déci-
sion effecting a change in thé law, not, however, within thé institutional
framework of morality.7 As thé judge is not permitted to rely on his per-
sonal view of what is morally right and wrong, his moral judgments hâve
to be supported by a reasoning that proves thé presumed validity of thé
evaluative standard. Therefore, to describe thé judge's attitude toward
thé validity of moral judgements and thé validity of légal norms, one
needs thé distinction between légal and extra légal standards of évalua-
tion which Weber's conception of thé political and moral attitude toward
law implies.8
Furthermore, as Nicholas Rescher emphasizes, we hâve to distinguish
between moral norms and ideals. The latter "reach out beyond thé via
negativa of those 'thou shalt not' commandments, toward thé ampler
demands of a utopian order of things".9 Surely, idealization strives to
4 By using thé "paradigm of thé game scat", Weber distinguishes between (a)
"Skatjurisprudenz", (b) "Skatpolitik" or "skatsittliche Normen" and (c) "Skat-
erkenntnis" or "Skaterfahrung". Weber, 1988 a, p. 337 et sequ. On this point see
Krawietz, 1993, p. 48. See further Kronman, 1983, p. 7.
5
Weber, 1988a, p. 345: "(M)an kann von ethischen Prinzipien aus seine (des
"Paragraphen") normative 'Berechtigung', () seinen Wert oder Unwert () oder seinen
'Nutzen' oder 'Schaden' fur (bestimmte) Interessen diskutieren.
6 seinem Urteil zu reden.
See Art. 6 of thé German Constitution: "Pflege und Erziehung der Kinder sind
das naturliche Recht der Eltern und die zuvôrderst ihnen obliegende Pflicht."
7 Krawietz, 1992, p. 52.
s Kronman, 1983, p. 10.
9 Rescher, 1987, p. 122.
[131] Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 389
outrun thé limits of practicable achievability and enables us to press
beyond thé confines of institutional practice. Ideals, regardless of their
impracticability, can yield benefits as by-products of thé idealization
process. Still, they function "as simply one component within a System"
and can be pursued only "within thé limits of thé possible in a complex
and no doubt imperfect world". Accordingly, unrealism in thé pursuit of
ideals blocks thé way to other desiderata. As far as thé connection of law
and morality is concerned, thé view, that thé "daim to correctness is a
necessary élément of thé concept of law"10 has - as Eugenio Bulygin
points out - to pay more attention to thé distinction between prescrip-
tions, directives and norms on thé one hand and descriptive statements
about norms on thé other.11
Given thé moral pluralism prevailing in modem societies, it is not thé
business of modem démocratie states to deal in suprême values. Given
that neutrality, it is not always easy to know what right and wrong are.
Any group will always argue that its own moral codes and enforcement
policies or experiments are worthy of support by thé state and thé most
bénéficiai to mankind. Even if it would be possible to establish a consen-
sus by means of a rational discourse, which in turn is understood in
terms of a non-institutionalized process of reasoned conceptualization
and argument (Habermas), nobody can tell what thé state of affairs and
thé structure of action after this consensus will be. Who will regulate thé
relation between thé validity of thé idéal discourse and thé validity of
real laws?
2. The Dogmatic Jurisprudence
Légal scholars need not take an evaluative attitude toward thé légal
norm whose correct légal meaning they are expounding.12 A légal scholar
employs thé norm as an evaluative standard by using it to assess thé
behaviour of varions actors in thé légal System including thé behaviour
of those responsible for applying thé norm in question. The value judge-
ments of thé légal scholar are based upon his conception of thé correct
meaning of a légal norm which he treats as a standard for assessing thé
10 Alexy, 1989, p. 177.
11
Bulygin, 1993, p. 24: "Die Aufgabe des Richters ist, den Angeklagten entweder
zu verurteilen oder freizusprechen. Ob er dabei das Recht richtig oder falsch inter-
pretiert hat, wird aus seinem Urteil hervorgehen; es ist nicht seine Sache, daruber in
12 Weber, 1988a, p. 348: "(D)ie Frage nach dem, was in concreto 'juristische Wahr-
heit' ist, d. h. gedanklich nach 'wissenschaftlichen' Grundsàtzen aïs solche 'gelten'
sotte oder hdtte 'gelten' sollen, ist logisch gànzlich verschieden von der: was de facto
empirisch in einem konkreten Fall oder in einer Vielheit von Fâllen aïs kausale
'Folge' des 'Geltens' eines bestimmten 'Paragraphen' eingetreten ist."
26'
390 Athanasios Gromitsaris [132]
13
correctness of thé norm's application in various cases and contexts.
This does not imply that jurists hâve to be formalists and légal positiv-
ists. On thé contrary, they are obliged to hâve a contextual approach to
thé légal norms they deal with in thé application and singularization
process. Before continuing, we should emphasize that thé doctrinal atti-
tude toward law is not restricted to légal scholars in law faculties.
Judges and légal practitioners base their arguments on légal dogmatics
as well.14 But this does not mean that thé dogmatic jurisprudence is in
possession of thé sole right to expound thé correct légal meaning of
norms, or that we should défend thé idea of a "unity of rationality" and
of a "unity of argumentation".15 Rather, we hâve to differentiate thé
rationality of thé légal institutions from thé rationality of thé sciences.16
According to Schelsky's concept of a légal institutional rationality,17
based on législation, légal administration and jurisdiction, thé corréla-
tion between légal science and juridical institutional practices cannot
bring about a rational unity of dogmatic jurisprudence and thé practical
institutions of légal life. Légal science is an institution itself that inter-
acts with ist various environments. Thus, thé falsification of thé correct
légal meaning of a norm takes place not only in thé scientific community
of thé dogmatic jurisprudence, but also in thé juridical institutions.
Furthermore, institutional practices produce their own criteria of "cor-
rectness" which are confirmed or changed in thé light of subséquent
décisions and practices.
3. The Sociology of Law
According to Max Weber, one can investigate thé légal order from a
sociological point of view without judging thé moral quality of thé law
or seeking to expound thé correct meaning of légal norms in a légal dog-
matic sensé. A sociological theory of law seeks to describe how thé behav-
iour of individuals is influenced by their own normative commitments to
13 Weber, 1976, p. 181: "(W)elcher normative Sinn einem aïs Rechtsnorm auftre-
tenden sprachlichen Gebilde logisch ricfttzgerweise zukommen sollte".
« Schelsky, 1959, p. 113, speaks of "verwissenschaftlichte Praxis".
is According to Habermas, 1981, pp. 62 - 63 and 339 - 340: "juristische Argumen-
tation (musse) in allen ihren institutionellen Auspragungen aïs Sonderfall des prak-
tischen Diskurses begriffen werden" (pp. 62 f.), and further: "die Einheit der Ratio-
nalitàt (sei) in der Mannigfaltigkeit der eigensinnig rationalisierten Wertsphàren
gesichert" (p. 339).
16 This is clearly expressed in one of Cari Schmitt's first books, Schmitt, 1969,
p. 4: "Das in der Praxis aïs geltend anzunehmende Merkmal der Richtigkeit einer
Entscheidung und das, was die juristische Verarbeitung des Rechtsstoftes aïs
'geltendes Recht' herausarbeitet, stehen sich aïs zwei Geltungen gegenuber." See
further ibid., p. 98.
" Schelsky, 1980, p. 53. On this point Krawietz, 1984 and Werner, 1995, pp. 129,
144.
Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 391
thé law and by their beliefs regarding thé similar commitments of
others.18 It gives an account of thé identification and misidentification of
thé relevant normative expectancies in légal processes and of thé consé-
quent commitment of individuals to action and law-oriented behaviour.
From this point of view illégal behaviour is a légal phenomenon, and thé
gap between thé applied and thé formai law (law which is "corrupted"
by real-world interests) disappears.19 There are countries where formai
litigation is used to perpetuate and obscure rather than résolve disputes;
jural-bureaucratic maneuvers is used to keep conflicts open but bureau-
cratically tied up until an extrajudicial, political, and politic solution
can be secured. Thus, illégal appropriation is a basic means of land
acquisition, and illegality is a common mode of social organisation. Illé-
gal résidence becomes a common and reliable way for some catégories of
people to win légal access to land and housing that would otherwise be
beyond their means. Usurpation initiâtes settlement and précipitâtes thé
légitimation of thé land claims. Executive or législative institutions of
government usually will hâve to intervene to déclare thé judicial System
checkmated, to legalize usurpation and thereby insinuate illégal and
extralegal practices into thé law.20
According to Weber's classical example, so long as a thief conceals his
activity because he believes he is violating binding légal rules, his con-
duct constitutes a légal phenomenon; efforts to break thé law and actions
undertaken because of a misunderstanding as to what thé law requires
are legally relevant as well.21 But while thé sociologist of law does not
treat thé value-commitments of law-oriented behaviour as normative cri-
teria in his own investigation, he must be able to understand thé norma-
tive commitments of those whose behaviour he is studying. His attitude
is characterized by a "combination of empathy and detachment". To be
able to know, what is accepted and valid as law, an outside observer
must understand thé behaviour of thé members of thé community. This
18 Weber, 1988 a, p. 350: "Das 'empirische Sein' des Redits aïs Maxime-bildenden
'Wissens' konkreter Menschen nannten wir hier die empirische 'Rechtsordnung'."
19 Weber, 1976, p. 17: "Zwischen Geltung und Nichtgeltung einer bestimmten
Ordnung besteht also fur die Soziologie nicht, wie fur die Jurisprudenz (nach deren
unvermeidlichem Zweck) absolute Alternative. Sondern es bestehen fltissige Ueber-
gànge zwischen beiden Fâllen, und es kônnen () einander widersprechende Ordnun-
gen nebeneinander 'gelten', jede () in einem Umfang, aïs die Chance besteht, daB das
Handeln tatsachlich an ihr orientiert wird."
20 Holston, 1991, pp. 695, 697, 702, 722. There are similar expériences in Greece
with an extrême form of "parallel economy" called "para-oikonomia". Papayanna-
kis, 1989, p. 147: "En fait, elle (thé parallel economy) comprend des activités illé-
gales et poursuivies, d'autres qui ne le sont jamais, d'autres qui tout simplement ne
sont pas déclarées illégales, d'autres enfin qui sont poursuivies sans être punies et
enfin toutes celles qui, légales ou pas, sont légalisées a posteriori et souvent con-
sidérées légitimes! "
21 Weber, 1976, p. 16.
392 Athanasios Gromitsaris [134]
understanding is always based, as Aulis Aarnio emphasizes, partially on
thé internai view, and this means that "one can never be a 'pure'
external observer".22
III. Légal Theory as a Multi-Level-Approach to Law
Légal knowledge remains highly dépendent on theory. The problem is,
what kind of theory? We cannot make out a case for a général theory of
law that is other than supported and tested by confirmed observations.
General theory of law should be regarded as an intégration of légal
theory and sociology of law which can take into account thé way légal
practitioners, légal scholars and social action in général describe and
présent themselves.23
1. The Standpoint of Légal Practitioners
Légal practitioners usually say they know more than anybody else
about thé reality of law, because they know more about their own jobs
than dogmaticians or scholars of sociology of law could ever describe.
Thus, thé best thing légal scholars and theorists should do is to help
them résolve thé practical problems of their professional routine or to
get out of their way. Of course, thé people who are closest to thé work
really do know it better; but what they don't know is how to describe it.
Because this is another type of work. Practitioners operate with only a
partial model in mind about why they are doing whatever it is they are
doing, and what causes and principles lie behind it. When they describe
their work they often leave out thé fact that their description tailors
itself to fit their professional ideology and ambitions.24 Further, this
best-practices-approach cannot address légal activities which thé practi-
tioners ignore or are not ready to acknowledge. Therefore, a sociological
theory of légal practical institutions and law-oriented behaviour tries to
cast new light on uncontroversial facts by means of exposing established
behavioural possibilities to a comparison with other functionally équiva-
lent possibilities. Under such conditions descriptions of what practi-
tioners actually do can induce a positively evaluated innovation in thé
observed behavioural structure. Légal practitioners might then - theore-
tically - make a décision with regard to thé question as to whether an
external inducement of "new" problem solving stratégies is to be consid-
ered as more of a nuisance than anything else, or as a positive new addi-
tion to and change of thé structure.
22 Aarnio, 1992, pp. 10, 11.
23
On thé concept of thé "multi-level approach" see Krawietz, 1993, pp. 102,104.
24 Schelsky, 1959, p. 137.
1 1 :t!i| Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 393
2. The Epistemological Status of thé Sociological Theory of Law
When empirical research focuses on thé applicability of socially recog-
nized sanctions in thé event of disappointment of normative expecta-
tions, or when it turns out to be a sociology of thé légal professions and
of thé possibilities of access to law, instead of setting its sights on thé
expectation-governed character of human behaviour independently of
state intervention and coercion, it limits itself to thé sectional study of
thé pathology of légal expectations, ignoring thé actual ongoing regulat-
ing and problem-solving activities. Systems theory seeks to résolve this
problem by obtaining an access to law as it présents itself. This is an
approach that takes profit of empirical research but can also go beyond
its restricted possibilities.25
Nevertheless, thé question - what's a légal System? - cannot be
answered with a single concept: autopoiesis. The answer lies in a séries
of conceptual distinctions produced in thé processes of a second order
feedback that characterize thé relations between général Systems theory
and middle range théories.28 On thé other hand, général Systems theory
may take advantage of thé plurality of middle range théories; it may use
their results in order to establish a plurality of conflicting generaliza-
tions that may subsequently be capable of respecification by means of
middle range théories. This seems to be a reasonable "empirical" way of
finding out what thé boundaries and structural constraints of légal com-
munication are. The indeterminacy of thé theory with respect to explic-
able facts does not necessarily imply a useless redundancy within thé
theory itself. It rather implies a kind of theoretic multiplicity. The multi-
plicity of théories explaining thé "same facts" does not reduce their
explanatory value. Différence between théories hinges on what they
cannot describe rather than on what they consider to be their common
object of observation.27
Systems theory présents itself in thé rôle of thé external observer, who
reveals and construes thé paradoxes that block and entangle thé self-
description of thé légal System. Systems theory is an observer, and it
doesn't claim for itself an exceptional position, with priviledged access
to law-oriented behaviour. It does not introduce a différence between
25
See on this point Intzessiloglou, 1993, p. 255 et sequ. who - unlike Luhmann -
regards thé "model-system of Law merely (as) a concept, an analytical instrument
that thé () theoretician of Law can use in order to ascertain thé absence or thé pré-
sence and thé degree of constitution, intégration, compétition and complementarity
of légal Systems coexisting within thé same social environment".
26 Opp/Hummell, 1973, pp. 13 - 26.
27 Atlan, 1991, p. 140: Every theory "est capable de construire un monde qui est le
même - celui des faits que nous observons - mais qui est différent en ce qui concerne
ce que nous n'observons pas".
394 Athanasios Gromitsaris [136]
analytical and real facts. It refers - throught its constructs - directly to
what is reality for it.28 Science meets itself rather than thé outside
world.29 The position of «an observer at ail initiated» - to use a phrase
of Henry James (The Awkward Age) - is abandoned in favour of thé
restricted point of view. Surely, Systems theory is not to be confirmed in
thé classical way. We hâve been taught that a hypothesis is scientific to
thé extend to which it entails empirically testable conséquences. But
whether it passes thé test of observation or of experiment in thé market
of scientific réfutations is essential in order to détermine not its scienti-
fic character but its truth value. A hypothesis may be false yet scientific,
or true yet unscientific; it may be logically impossible yet empirically
possible. Whether an observer makes a mistake or not has nothing to do
with thé reality of his opérations; it simply présupposes thé existence of
a second observer evaluating thé methods and skills of thé first. On thé
level of perception thé distinction between reality and illusion is not pos-
sible. Neither thé content nor thé validity sources of knowledge stem
from individual consciousness. Truth is based on external sélection30 and
is not relative: to put an end to a disagreement about thé meaning of a
word, somebody has to look it up in a dictionary. Truth tolérâtes no rela-
tivity despite thé variety of opinions. The truth value of an assertion
does not dépend on thé will or thé interest of any participant. Such a
thing would mean that every observer's relative truth would be cancel-
ling out everybody else's.
Furthermore, we hâve been conditioned to accept that a theory is scien-
tific if it entails empirically testable conséquences. The main difficulty is
determining what is to be meant by "testable". It has been equated with
confirmable, or having possible examples, and with refutable, or having
possible counter examples. Systems theory is so général as to be unable to
yield any prédictions, not even when enriched with empirical data. There
is a "sous-détermination de la théorie par les faits".31 Systems theory
décides about and conditions its own applicability. Consequently thé con-
cepts of degrees of confirmation and testability are pointless with regard
to this theory.32 Any real System that happens to conform to thé theory
28 Luhmann, 1990, pp. 92, 698 et sequ.; on this point see Nassehi, 1992.
29 "Nous n'avons aucune communication à l'estre" Montaigne writes in his Apolo-
gie de Raimond Sebond, 1985, p. 586.
so Luhmann /De Giorgi, 1993, p. 123: "Si parla di verità solo quando la selezione
dell'informazione non viene imputata a nessuno dei partecipanti () ciô non tocca il
fatto che nei sistemi psichici le opinioni necessariamente si differenzino." Atlan,
1991, p. speaks of "dédoublement du jugement": "Le jugement de vérité implique
toujours une procédure de vérification () un jugement sur le caractère vrai ou faux
du jugement."
si Atlan, 1991, p. 130 et sequ.
32 On this point and on what follows Bunge, 1977, pp. 33, 35 et sequ.
li.r/l Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 395
will qualify as a real System. And those concrète System that do not fit thé
description just do not qualify. Despite this, Systems theory is corrigible,
if not exactly refutable in thé light of empirical research.
The application of Systems theory to spécifie situations requires some
spécifie, substantive knowledge of thé latter; only this can provide a suit-
able interprétation and sélection of an équivalent form of thé theory in
question. The complexity of thé observed System cannot be reduced to a
homogeneous corpus of empirical data. Without concrète items of spé-
cifie information one would be unable to pose thé problem, and hence to
solve it. The point is that concrète items of spécifie information are
unobtainable without thé help of observations supported by spécifie thé-
ories. That means that every application of Systems theory calls for thé
formation of new théories or thé use of already existing various spécifie
théories, which contribute to thé formation of a spécifie model of thé
System of interest. The model is of course to be built with thé concepts of
thé Systems theory, if it is to be coupled to thé latter.33 In other words,
Systems theory becomes a spécifie theory of thé standard type when
enriched with spécifie information concerning thé System to which it is
to be applied. And this spécifie theory is subject to thé canons of empiri-
cal testability, that is to say, it is corrigible if we can find possible coun-
ter examples. Systems theory is confirmable in a sui generis way. It is
confirmed by fitting whole familles of théories and by helping in thé for-
mation of spécifie middle range théories that are testable in thé classical
way. That means that several points of view could be combined with sev-
eral perceptions of thé self-présentation of thé object. Consequently Sys-
tems theory is scientific if it is compatible with thé bulk of scientific
knowledge and if - jointly with subsidiary hypothèses and observer-
dependent empirical data - it entails middle range théories that in turn
entail corrigible and testable conséquences.34 Middle range théories hâve
a scientific character because they can be falsified by other research.
Systems theory is scientific if, enriched with suitable subsidiary assump-
tions "it becomes empirically testable either directly or vicariously, i.e.
through some (spécifie) theory".35 This resuit is of décisive importance
for thé formation of a général theory of law.
At thé level of thé binary code: légal/illégal, no sélection, décision or
définition are ever possible. Without spécial programs and criteria of
sélection, such as norms, régulations, value-commitments, directives and
contracts, thé rigid disjunction between légal and illégal behaviour
33 Bunge, ibid.; Marin, 1990: "La pensée complexe ne résoud pas d'elle même les
problèmes, mais elle constitue une aide à la stratégie qui peut les résoudre."
34 See Merton, 1957, pp. 5 - 10; Bunge, 1977, p. 35 et sequ.
35 Bunge, 1977, p. 35.
 Athanasios Gromitsaris [138]
remains a blind distinction. It has thé meaning that in thé modem func-
tionally differentiated society science, religion, politics, morality or éco-
nomies cannot replace légal decision-making. But it says nothing about
thé institutionalization and boundary maintenance of thé processes that
produce, change and reproduce normative expectational structures at thé
level of programs. The need for an intégration of middle range théories
into thé systems-theory-approach to law results from thé necessity to
describe how law-oriented behaviour can be identified in concrète insti-
tutional settings. As law is, primarily, not thé product of thé décisions of
a state légal staff but is a System of human expérience, actions and
norms, it is activities and opérations that actualize and modify institu-
tionally established expectational structures that should be thé object of
légal theory and sociology of law. Interprétation of behaviour by means
of thé code légal/illégal always takes place within a "frame" of institu-
tionalized expectations. We hâve to turn to a sociological understanding
of norms and activities not only at thé level of Systems theory but also at
thé level of middle range théories. The latter can help détermine and
reconstruct thé meaning that actors (decision-making units, corporate
groups or individuals) assign to their action and expérience.36
This leads us to thé conclusion that thé access to légal order can only
be obtained by a multi-level-approach to law-oriented behaviour. In this
sensé Systems theory is only a part of thé général theory of law (légal
theory) which comprises ail thé théories that describe or explain thé
social realities and thé normative meaning of thé légal phenomena.
Accordingly, thé sociology of organizations, thé institutional theory of
law, thé cost-benefit analysis of law or risk analysis are part of a socio-
logical conception of law that is able to investigate thé relations between
thé textual and contextual understanding of thé social dimension of law.
VI. From 'Real Laws' to 'Real Rules'
Max Weber rejects thé view that defines légal norms as norms that are
sanctioned in a particular way.37 The sanctions that accompany légal
norms can be physical, psychological or économie in character. He also
rejects thé view that defines law in terms of thé types of conduct it seeks
to regulate, because ail aspects of human behaviour can become object of
légal régulation.38 He finally rejects a third way of defining law in terms
of thé procédure by which légal norms are established. The existence of
36
"The meaning thé subjects assign to thé situation they are in and thé behavior
they are carrying out plays a greater rôle in determining thé generalizability of an
experiment's outcome than does thé sample's démographie representativeness or thé
setting's surface realism": Berkowitz /Donnerstein, 1982, p. 249.
37 Weber, 1976, p. 18.
IKlill Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 397
.1 scparate, spocijjli/.i'd enforcement staff has thé meaning that normative
standards for thé évaluation of conduct can be accompanied by rules
(Hart's secondary rules) regulating thé sanctioning process by which
Infractions of first-order rules applying directly to conduct are identified
.•mil punished. The existence of binding norms at thé sanctioning level
ilr.iinr.uishes thé law from other normative orders.39
However, thé significance of second-order rules should not be over-
omphasized. The 'foundations' of Weber's theory of law are not found in
"Kconomy and Society" and therefore, not in his "Sociology of Law"
oither. Rather, thé foundations are found in his critique of Stammaler's
logal theory, published in 1907 and in his essay about thé catégories of
thé interprétative sociology, published in 1913. There Weber establishes
his sociological theory of norms and an expectational approach to law
and social action in général.40 It is thé simultaneous diversification of
différent mechanisms for thé formation, innovation and institutionaliza-
tion of behavioural expectations rather than thé potential for collective,
organized reaction in thé form of sanction that is of primary importance
for thé légal ordering of life. According to Weber's concept of "Einver-
stândnis" (common understanding),41 social communication opérâtes on
thé basis of expectational structures, not by any prior establishment of
rules, even if rules can be inferred from thé way people speak and act.
This is a crucial aspect not only of markets and languages but also of
law-oriented behaviour.
1. Action-Norms and Reaction-Norms
In defining law as he does, Weber views law-oriented behaviour as a
social action, oriented not simply to thé anticipated conduct of others
but also to thé probability that violation of some particular norms will
bring about a social situation in which crédit and discrédit or rights and
duties will hâve to be attributed ex post according to already established
binding norms that tolerate no ambiguity. In other words, law oriented
38 For example, thé internai affairs of thé household or religious behaviour: Weber,
1976, pp. 212 - 233. Even thé main légal distinction between is and ought seems to
be thé resuit of seemingly extra-légal divination practices: Weber, 1976, pp. 262, 317.
39 Weber, 1976, p. 18. On this point Kronman, 1983, pp. 30 - 31; see further thé
distinction between "gesellschaftsbezogenes" and "gesellschaftsgeregeltes Han-
deln" Weber, 1988b, pp. 445, 447.
40 On this point Krawietz, 1989. According to Krawietz, Weber's expectational
approach lies entirely within thé intellectual tradition of German theory and sociol-
ogy of law ranging over Ihering and Theodor Geiger to Helmut Schelsky and Luh-
mann. On thé development and methodological shifts of German public law tradi-
tion which has had a significant influence - at least via Georg Jellinek - upon
Weber's work, see Pauly, 1993.
« Weber, 1988b, p. 456.
 [140]
398
Athanasios Gromitsaris
behaviour forces a system of social action to achieve reflexion and expli-
citly confirm or modify its expectational structure. According to a legal-
istic view, disputes require access to a forum external to thé original
social setting of thé dispute in order to become legally relevant, Accord-
ing to Weber's concept of law, as defined above, individual parties find a
variety of solutions out of or away from thé governance structures of thé
state. Weber's view of law includes a 'légal order' that falls outside "thé
province of thé state".42 We hâve to deny that law only exists when and
where légal coercion is guaranteed by thé political authority. Most dis-
putes that under current state rules could be brought to a court are
resolved by avoidance and selfhelp away from thé auspices of thé légal
centralism by devising private orderings. Nevertheless, thèse solutions
acquire a légal character when found at thé level of reflexive regulated
processes determining ex post compliance, violation and violated rules.
This doesn't exclude an additional access to state decision-making
bureaucracy which then attributes right and wrong anew, in accordance
with state law. Therefore, in accordance with Max Weber and Theodor
Geiger, we think it appropriate to distinguish between action norms and
reaction norms and between norm-sentences and rules.
As Theodor Geiger puts it, "action norms" and "reaction norms" (or
primary and secondary norms) may, but need not be, coupled with one
another.43 A purely state concept of law is customarily understood to
reflect thé view that only behavioural expectations expressed tay thé bu-
raucratic décision units or somehow derived therefrom are worthy of
légal character. Légal norms are thus considered to be a médium of poli-
tical action. But thé légal order is not inextricably interwoven with thé
state. We can conceive of law as consisting primarily of clusters of nor-
mative expectations, by means of which persons order their conduct and
only secondarily of norms for state décision making developed by thé
courts and législation. The formai structures of thé state such as thé
judiciary, thé législature, thé executive and thé administrative agency
produce and enforce only a part of thé bulk of valid légal expectations.
They claim to hâve a jurisdiction extending to ail thé inhabitants of thé
territory of a politically organized régional society.
2. Norm-Sentences and Expectations of Conduct
We follow Weber and Geiger in resisting thé tendency to identify
norm-sentence and rule. Norm-sentences are "linguistically formulated
42 Krawietz, 1994, p. 48. Evan, 1976, p. 171. Evan bases his distinction between
public and private légal Systems on Weber and Ehrlich.
43 Geiger, 1987, p. 105.
Ml Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 399
norms" (verbal norms, norms expressed in words) that sustain a
"demand expectation", an "expectation of conduct" specified for a cer-
tain situation and, by way of support from thé respective system-bearing
group, directed to thé "conduct" of thé respective norm addressees.44 By
contrast, a rule is thé actual process of selecting norm-oriented behaviour
and of confirming or innovating thé normative expectational structure
used to sélect norm-oriented behaviour. Rules are thé continuous corréla-
tion between structure and process, they are not substantive structures
with a built-in determinacy. They are a good remedy for complexity,45 but
their reproduction is based on a built-in indeterminacy. No reproduction
of normative expectations is possible without an amount of intrinsic
uncertainty: information "cannot be obtained unless there exists uncer-
tainty about thé outcome of an event prior to thé event"; that is to say that
thé amount of information obtained from any event "is a function of what
could hâve happened but didn't"; it is determined "by thé amount by
which thé uncertainty has been reduced".46 According to research into thé
precommitment and discrétion of monetary authorities (central banks),
credibility can be used as substitute of lacking information. But credibility
is itself a scarce resource. It is defined as thé speed with which an observer
(for instance, thé public) realises that a shift in préférences has occured.47
Credibility is an institutional product. It can replace information about
valid rules only in a context where systematic behaviour of particular
agents is possible. This is for example not thé case in an international con-
text where governments change frequently and thé game-theoretic condi-
tions which govern their behaviour lack more than short-term stability.48
Anyway, observer-dependent descriptive or prescriptive représentations of
that which is to count as relevant rule, are to be regarded as semantic arte-
facts which contribute to thé use, confirmation, spécification or generali-
zation of normative expectations.49
Black letter law represents an "unorganized textbook knowledge"50 in
a network that associâtes concepts to other concepts and prescriptions to
other prescriptions. At thé level of valid norm-sentences thé function of
légal dogmatics lies, on thé one hand, in operating as an "inheritance
mechanism" in thé network, so that more spécifie concepts or prescrip-
44 Geiger, 1987, p. 23 et sequ., 34 et sequ.
45 Von Hayek, 1969, p. 171: "Regeln beschrànken immer den Bereich der in
Betracht zu ziehenden Umstânde auf einen Teil der môglicherweise bedeutsamen,
um so eine Entscheidung praktisch môglich zu machen."
46 Garner, 1975, pp. 3, 7; see further Mathiesen, 1960 and Atlan, 1983.
47 Blackburn, 1992, p. 171.
« Epstein I Gintis, 1992, p. 175.
49 Weber, 1988, p. 355 speaks of thé "'Regel' - Charakter der 'empirischen
Rechtsordnung' ".
50 Elio I Scharf, 1990, p. 591.

Athanasios Gromitsaris [142]
400
tions can inherit features of more général concept classes. On thé other
hand, doctrinal commentaries rest on an interpretational argument that
cannot be properly conceived of "in simply bivalent true-or-false ternis"
but has to enter "thé realms of thé better-or-worse, thé arguable, thé
préférable, thé more or less persuasive".51 Thus, it has to view norm-sen-
tences as being open ended.
Now, thé représentation of légal problems contained in textbook
knowledge is not to be identified with problem représentation at thé
level of thé playing rules. The efficient récognition and application of
relevant knowledge about cognitive and normative expectations to thé
problem at hand is always domain-specific. Appropriate domain spécifie
knowledge and problem-type schémas émerge with expérience in social
institutions which functionally organize and represent related domain-
specific expectations, inferences, and methods for solving problems. The
shift in problem prototypes and stratégies is a by-product of thé per-
ceived différence between previous and new expériences. Therefore, as
one solves a problem, thé problem's représentation becomes "enhanced"5
with social domain spécifie inference rules, facts, and solution méthodol-
ogies. Social institutions modify thé textbook problem description by
variablizing or constraining thé values on descriptors or by introducing
new descriptors into thé sphère of activity. "Enhanced problem représen-
tation" means that a problem's descriptors are determined by thé prob-
lem-solving process in thé respective social institutions and not by thé
problem statement's original textbook form.
According to this view, administration, and bureaucratie organizations
in général, seem to deal with information in a différent way from that
anticipated from a simple reading of thé theory of décision making. Most
organizational décision processes are found to be "solution centered".53
Much of thé textbook-knowledge and thé information gathered and com-
municated by individuals and organizations before thé décision hâve
little décision relevance. Much of thé information that is used to justify a
décision is collected and interpreted after thé décision has been made.
There seems to be rather a prior calculation of needed information than
a kind of thermostatic linkage between observations and actions. The
information phenomena noted in organizations provide reasons for
decoupling information from décisions.54 The idea of intelligent choice
and thé systematic application of information to décision seem to be
values belonging to thé core of western ideology. They symbolize that
51 MacCormick, 1994, p. 139.
52 Elio / Scharf, 1990, p. 588 et sequ.
53 Nutt, 1984, p. 447.
54 Feldman / March, 1981, pp. 171 - 186.
Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 401
processes are legitimate, décisions good and organisations well managed.
What information is satisfactory for décision making is negotiated
umong participating organizations. The resuit is "a negotiated informa-
i n n i order"55 that détermines what information will be used in décision
m . i k i n g and which organizations "pay" for collecting and using new
Information. The negotiated information order is an interorganizational
itructure that helps détermine when an administration unit will "opti-
IMI/.C and when it will satisfice". Information needs to be socially suffi-
ciciit and technically sufficient, but thé two are to some degree indepen-
dent, so as socially sufficient information need not be technically suffi-
rit-nt and vice versa. A negotiated information order is established when
a System of criteria for thé social sufficiency of information is worked
out which in turn bring about an ordering of organizational specializa-
tion in thé application of décision criteria. This theory would apply on
thé environmental impact statements of environmental administrative
agencies. When agencies - and environmental groups - hâve thé formai
right to review thé environmental impact statements of other agencies, a
renégociation of thé information order can occur.56
3. Law-Oriented Behaviour
By comparing thé rules of a game to légal rules, using thé paradigm of
thé game scat, Weber shows that thé rules of a game, like thé rules of thé
law, form a System of orientational points of view, imposing constraints
on thé players' sphère of activity.57 Playing rules permit one to make
better guesses about thé moves of thé other players than one could make
without thé rules, for playing rules are supposed to be considered bind-
ing by other players too. The décisive function of playing rules lies in thé
fact that they restrict thé field of possibilities at hand, and thus, they
clarify relevant expectations, so that every player can orient his own
action to thé normative commitments of thé other players.
As Weber emphasizes, this 'sociological' attitude toward légal rules is
not restricted to social scientists, but is an attitude that is equally
adopted by social actors as well as those performing certain rôles within
thé légal order, such as a practicing attorney who, preparing a case for a
trial or advising a client, must act like a "scat player" in a stratégie
environment, and try to predict how thé behaviour of judges, administra-
tive agencies and clients will be influenced by his own interprétation of
thé légal norms and normative commitments to thé law.58 To a certain
55 On this concept and on what follows, see Heimer, 1985, pp. 395, 397.
56 Heimer, 1985, p. 414.
57 Weber, 1988a, p. 338.
58 Weber, 1988a, p. 338 et sequ.; Kronman, 1983, p. 13.
402 Athanasios Gromitsaris [144|
extent, social actors and légal practitioners must be a kind of sociologist
of law, because they are in need of information about norms and institu-
tional facts in oder to use them as a means to a practical-professional
end - promoting a client's interests or predicting particular outcomes.
Thus, sociological understanding of law-oriented behaviour is to be con-
sidered a décisive prerequisite for being a successful légal practitioner.
Successful lawyers are distinguished by their légal skills not only in
responding to problems and causes of action once begun but also by
their ability to anticipate that problems might arise. "Préventive lawyer-
ing" seeks to ensure that client behaviour takes a course with least
potential légal hazard.59 Further, it is taken to include attempts to influ-
ence law création or reform. Lawyer's capacity to influence practical
business behaviour consists in scanning thé environment in order to
identify emerging légal issues on thé one hand and in staying in touch
with developments in thé business (which has to run as a business and is
not there for lawyers) on thé other. The successful integrated lawyer (in-
house business lawyer) hat to be a translater that can move out of his
own language System and put things in a way managers can understand.
Given thé fact that problems are observer-dependent, problem représen-
tations hâve to be translated,60 and as we ail know, every translation is
bound to betray thé original: traduttore, traditore! Learning to be an
effective translater61 contains a number of skills basic to professional
practice: a common language between business management and légal
management has to be developed which makes it possible for thé lawyer
to shift between self-referencing and other-referencing; légal judgement
has to take into considération commercial judgement, and vice versa.
This close relationship to thé business world led légal practitioners62 to
abandon thé conceptualist utopia (not thé conceptual constructions) of
thé Pandectists and dévote their attention to developing légal instru-
ments that could advance thé purposes of corporate economy and help
law expand into new areas of social life.63
59 Mackie, 1989, p. 74 et sequ.
eo Deleuze / Guattari, 1991, p. 32 are aware of this problem, and they even see it as
thé main problem of philosophera: "on se fait parfois de la philosophie l'idée d'une
perpétuelle discussion comme 'rationalité communicationelle" ou comme 'conver-
sation démocratique universelle'. Rien n'est moins exact () Les interlocuteurs ne
parlent jamais de la même chose."
61 Mackie, 1989, p. 94 et sequ., 102 et sequ.
62 Osiel, 1990, p. 2058: "It is thé skill in practical reason and complex judgement
that thé practicing bar and bench most esteem in their peers."
63 According to Dezalay, 1992, p. 118 et sequ., 131 et sequ., thé foreign offices of
thé "Big Eight" accounting firms and Wall Street law firms hâve seized virtually thé
entire european market for advice concerning thé law of corporate and public
finance partly because european lawyers are not trained and experienced as "légal
entrepreneurs".
ll-ll.l Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 403
'Sociological' understanding of légal norms is equally indispensable in
Miicinl areas beyond thé professional activities of légal practitioners. In
f n r t , social actors are met with thé difficulty to identify and harmonize
rimlïicting normative expectations as they go about their business. As
nppmpriate expectations are embedded in institutional settings that eut
llmuigh thé usual distinctions between state and society, formai and
informai behaviour, or markets and hiérarchies, thé problem is to find
«ml. how access to thé appropriate institutional setting and problem défi-
n i lion becomes possible. From a normativist point of view, thé difficulty
lies with thé récognition of thé appropriate rules. But this is actually an
aspect of thé wider problem of meaning. Meaning arises for Weber in
multiple settings and can be looked at differently depending on its rela-
I ionship to various observers. We can distinguish64 at least: a) thé actor's
mlonted meaning b) meaning to thé other participants c) meaning on
.•ivorage d) meaning in terms of a dogmatic System e) meaning in ideal-
l.ypical terms f) meaning as discovered by social scientists or historians
H) meaning to self and h) institutional meaning. In addition, there are thé
possibilités of corrélation, feed-back and second-order observation or
double hermeneutic.65 Thus, thé self-description of law-oriented behav-
lour is described by thé sociologist or evaluated by thé légal scholar, but
i h c i r concepts are in turn reinterpreted or incorporated into features of
law-oriented behaviour.
However, it is not clear how a person becomes aware of rules. We
rarely hear a subject announce a rule in recognizable form while acting.
The fact that persons seldom mention a rule in abstract form seems to be
consistent with thé hypothesis that ail knowledge is encoded in highly
instantiated, episodic form, called cases. Rule violation is easier to be
detected. But how does an actor become aware of a rule? Would she or
ne pause for a while then mumble "l'd better not do that again", or
would she carry on without interrupting her activity?66 In most cases, at
thé level of action norms thé process will go on without visible pauses.
Contrarily, thé firings of secondary rules always manifest themselves as
interruptions of normal processing in thé actions System. This is due to
thé fact that action has, now, to take place at a new level, that of reflex-
ive processes.
Still, while we explain much of people's behaviour in terms of rule-
making, rule-breaking or rule-following, we cannot explain ail of it in
this way. Compliance does not always occur because of extrême risk
aversion, that is to say, because individuals overweight low probability
64
See on this systematization Albrow, 1990, p. 211.
65 Ibid.,p. 279etsequ.
66 See VanLehn, 1991, p. 3.
27 RECHTSTHEOHIE, 3 - 4/98
404 Athanasios Gromitsaris 1146]
events - for instance thé low probability of audit, combined with high
penalty on detected tax évasion. Compliance also occurs when there is
no chance of détection or thé expected value of thé rule-breaking (say,
thé tax évasion gamble) is négative. Furthermore, compliance does not
necessarily occur from a belief by individuals that rule-breaking (éva-
sion) is wrong, "since their behaviour is unchanged by either (morally)
loaded or neutral instructions".67 Therefore, compliance can be
explained neither by thé probability of sanctions nor by thé distinction
between légal and illégal or right and wrong. Besides, we should not
loose sight of how much external perceptions really matter. If thé
amount of ambiguity is too high, outsiders (external perceptions) may
demand a formalization of what people already do into norm-sentences
setting out thé way in which people behave. The System has thus to
demonstrate to thé outside world that there really are rules, and put in
place some visible policing mechanisms.68
The available évidence indicates that an individual's normative beliefs
are not consistent with his behaviour and that norms can change rapidly
and without intensive resocialization. Rules do not merely refer to "shared
beliefs about ranking norms, membership norms, and reality assump-
tions".69 They also affect behaviour by specifying thé actions and attri-
butes that will validate particular identities. The behaviour of individ-
uals tends to be consistent with thé norms of older colleagues, insofar
as their professional identity is controlled by thèse colleagues. Ail this
suggests that lacking direct information about thé subjects' norm-
oriented behaviour and rule acquisition practices, one must use thé sub-
jects' overt behaviour and - especially - thé respective situation context
to inf er normative-commitments or changes in attitude and problem-solv-
ing rules. Thus, we can conclude: We can learn a lot about appropriate
'situation-expectations fits' by studying misfits,70 but we may not identify
norm- and law-oriented behaviour with thé probability of sanctions.
4. Globalization and Formalization of Law-Oriented Behaviour
Law-oriented behaviour takes place in a world, in which local and
global modes of coordination and guidance are intertwinned. Global
economy requires formalized communication networks. Large companies
are likely to hâve workers, supplier s, shareholders and customers from
différent value Systems. Normative commitments dépend less on shared,
67 Alm, étal., 1992, p. 36.
68 This point has been very important for thé formalization of thé rules of thé City
Code on Takeovers and Mergers, see Hobson, 1990, pp. 168, 252.
es On this point and what follows, see Cancian, 1976, pp. 355, 362 - 363.
'0 See Hochschild, 1980, p. 568.
Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 405
iiiis|i(ikcii customs and values and more on laws and formai statements
< > f cl lues. Obligations to friends, family, and countrymen are not of thé
une nature as obligations to Etrangers in thé sphère of non-intimate
n u l distant social relations.71 The internationalization of thé economy
i un:, |>;ii allol with thé process of producing normative commitments that
i i i r v.-ilid everywhere. Nevertheless, familial and national amoralism as
\ v r l l as corruption in thé political, judiciary, and civil service continue to
c - i r a i ! - barriers to entry into local business. The growing sensé of légal
. u n i inoral responsibility to Etrangers doesn't replace thé informai net-
wni'ks based on local personal connections or money relationships. Inde-
liriulcncies and interdependencies go hand in hand. On thé one hand, as
institutions like church, family, éducation, and thé state are less effective
al shaping shared values and norms in citizens, global organizations and
international business hâve to create formalized norms to guide employ-
t'cs, shareholders and other stakeholders, while at thé same time tolerat-
iiii; a variety of local and individual values.
On thé other hand, participating in thé international System leads to
.iilupUng outward oriented policies, and accepting thé respective interna-
i n mal norms and assumptions about states and their management as well
OH ubout contractual and other légal commitments.72 For instance, it has
bccn proved that state interests in Africa are not determined solely by a
patrimonial or patronage-oriented political logic. The world community of
states and thé international System of political, économie and légal com-
munication develop not only broadly accepted patterns of action and
norms but they also institutionalize new rôles for traditional and new
actors.73 As a resuit, changes and international predictability are induced
in local settings. Thus, investment codes hâve been rewritten in many
countries so as to favour thé foreign investment.74 Further, inclusion in thé
international System can be used as a resource of legitimacy for an estab-
lished local authority. Lacking an anti-colonial struggle to refer to, a gov-
ernment can tie thé legitimacy of its authority to thé inclusion of thé state
in thé international System, "to a new économie deal for thé people".75 The
highly developed set of international institutions for finance renders busi-
ness indépendant of thé patrimonial features of states and local patron-
client networks.
n On this point and on what follows, see Ciulla, 1991, pp. 75,77, 83.
72 Fischer, 1990, p. 58; Huntington, 1996, p. 524 et sequ. overlooks this argu-
ment laying .stress upon «shared values».
73 For example thé institutionalization of thé kin State's rôle in protecting eth-
nie minorities, Varsanyi, 1989, p. 133. On thé rôle of other participants in thé
international légal order (besides thé states) see Attar, 1994, p. 56 et sequ. who
speaks of "les intervenants" or "sujets dérivés", parcellaires, fragmentaires.
74 Ngwasiri, 1989, p. 200.
75 Fearon, 1988, pp. 136, 137.
 Athanasios Gromitsaris [148]
406
5. International Communication and National Laws
Law-oriented behaviour of global players (mostly large organizations)
is characterized by thé simultaneous orientation toward différent
national and international légal Systems. Organizations hâve an informa-
tional or a resource perspective on their societal environment and other
organizations in it.76 According to thé first perspective, environment
is conceived as information-uncertainty, and power dépends on control
over uncertainty. From thé resource perspective thé environment is a
source of scarce resources, which are sought after by a population of
organizations that competes for as well as shares them. Accounting stand-
ards and financial régulation are thé main tools used by thé national laws
to regulate thé way organizations manage both their information uncer-
tainty and resource dependence. Dependence and uncertainty may vary
independently of each other but it is their joint effect that explains thé
interrelation of money, uncertainty and authority in interorganizational
networks. An appropriate explanation of such joint effects is conditional
upon thé description of thé existent institutipnal environments77 of global
organizations. We hâve to emphasize that institutions are not to be identi-
fied with organizations. Institutionalization processes eut through thé
boundaries of organizations and function Systems. Therefore, to give an
example, thé "Geldmarktabhangigkeit des deutschen Kapitalmarktes"78 is
to count as an institution although it cannot be adequately described in
ternis of interorganizational networks.
In what follows, we give an example of how a Systems theory approach
can incorporate an institutional approach to law. The institutional con-
straints of international law-oriented behaviour cannot be distilled from
thé plurality of national blackletter laws. Whith thé help of Systems
theory we focus our attention on law-oriented behaviour as a type of
social communication that occurs under thé auspices of thé distinction
légal/illégal. National laws are programs that détermine thé use of this
distinction by constraining thé values on its two descriptors. By means
of thé institution theory we concentrate on rulegoverned behaviour as it
présents itself in relation to a spécifie issue, combining thus, a textual
and contextual norm-theoretic approach.
As thé flow of information around thé world has increased greatly,
investors hâve begun looking abroad for better returns on their portfo-
lios, and companies hâve seeked access to thé international capital mar-
76
For a discussion of thé distinction and an extended bibliography, see:
Aldrich / Mindlin, 1978.
77 Tolbert, 1985, pp. 2, 3.
78 Fuchs, 1989.
I I i ''I Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 407
kets. Conversely, thé securities industry, facing increasing compétition
for business from electronic, régional and international exchange,
i M i r i ' . l r i l to attract listings from foreign companies whereas thé regula-
I I I I N bodies for securities markets had to reach compromises on disclo-
rules with thé foreign companies. Regulators had to relax their
IQI "imting requirements in order not to de ter foreigners from thé local
l ' M - k exchange, while foreign listing companies had to provide an infor-
mation bridge for local investors.79 Globally minded international com-
punies who obtained a full listing for their shares on several stock
c«xchanges around thé world had access to various capital pools, but they
hud to deal with thé diversity of international accounting and auditing
practice and thé indeterminacy of "true and fair view".80 They had to
exercise in restating their accounts according to différent standards.81 It
lurncd out that thé main influence on disclosure was based on thé pat-
Ici-ii of ownership, thé scope of companies' opérations and thé distinction
Ix'tween market oriented and bank oriented financial Systems.82
Companies of thé bank oriented type83 (Germany, Japan) tend to under-
roport earnings and book values because of accelerated dépréciation poli-
cics and unrestricted provisions ("hidden reserves"). Bank oriented finan-
n.il Systems hâve normaly a less developed market for risk capital, so that
savings are primarily transformed in thé form of crédits through banks.
Shareholdings are less dispersed and commercial banks ("Hausbank"-
rnncept) hâve very often large shareholdings in individual firms.84 Thus,
rnntrolling blocs of shares are relatively seldom transacted and hostile
l.ikrover bids ar not common. In Germany private companies (GmbH) are
mon; important relative to public ones. For a second or third génération
(iwner of a Mittelstand company, loyalty to his company, to thé community
in which it is based and to thé workforce is likely to be more important
lhan thé shorttermism of a purchaser of thé market oriented type. Com-
mrivial banks use financial distress or insolvency to reorganize problem
l i i i n s . 8 5 They act as reorganization specialists, whereas - in market
ni icnted Systems - this rôle is normally played by an external group of
Hhareholders. Access to international capital markets and exposure to thé
disclosure and control demands of foreign institutional investors could
iiow bring this ownership structure under a higher amount of stock
7" See Moran, 1991.
"<> From a german point of view, see Grofifeld, 1986, p. 196 et sequ.
»i See Kirchner, 1978.
»2 CIFAR 1993.
":l On thé distinction between bank-oriented and market-oriented financial sys-
l.cins, see Berglôf, 1990 and further Roe, 1991.
11/1
Adams, 1994; Bundesverband deutscher Banken, 1994.
85 Zimmerer, 1993; Hess/Fechner, 1991.
408 Athanasios Gromitsaris [150]
market pressure and cause some changes in thé cross-holdings, voting
strength of préférence chares and takeover prévention devices of thé com-
panies of thé bank oriented type.
As thé two main types of financial Systems are fundamentally différ-
ent, global players find themselves in différent stratégie environments86
To identify thé officiai and 'invisible' barriers for foreign actors as well
as thé institutionalized forms of légal, political and économie con-
straints, they hâve to develop their own 'sociology of law', which in turn
has to be taken into account by thé scientific analysis of their law-
oriented behaviour.
V. Social Intégration Through Law-Oriented Behaviour?
1. Contracts
Max Weber has associated thé growing importance of contracts in
modem society as a source of légal rights and obligations with thé
expansion of thé market as a form of économie organization and thé rôle
played by money. The contractual character of modem society allows a
decentralization of thé law-making process. Modem contracts are purpo-
sive contracts. Unlike status contracts, which effect a total change in thé
personalities of thé individuals involved and create an ail-inclusive fra-
ternal relationship, purposive contracts are delimited in thé sensé that
they neither affect thé status of thé parties nor give rise to new qualifies
and obligations of comradeship and brotherliness but aim solely at some
spécifie performance, commodity or resuit.87 Modem individuals find
themselves - as légal persons - at thé centre of a web of contractual asso-
ciations; their identity is irreducible to thé séries of relationships created
by thé contracts themselves, because they can always enter an additional
contract without acquiring a new or losing their identity. Contract law
has its foundation in thé ancient dualism of légal relations within thé
kinship group and between différent kindship groups. It begins where
thé self-sufficient houshold community ends and régulâtes thé imper-
sonal relationships of formai économie exchange with outsiders within
thé market community.88 The contract itself, as an institution, has thé
ability to transform social relationships, thé two crucial effects being (a)
thé convergence of 'kinsmen' and 'strangers' that générâtes migrant
labour groups and extra-familial labour89 and (b) thé independence of
(international) business of (local) personal relationships.90 Nevertheless,
se Diïser, 1990, p. 117 et sequ., 122 et sequ.
87 Weber, 1976, p. 401; Kronman, 1983, p. 100 et sequ.
88 Weber, 1976, p. 402.
Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 409
r m i t i .11-1 nal l'reedom produces both inclusion and exclusion: on thé one
i i n u l , rvery légal person can enter a contract, but on thé other hand,
' "iitracts create law only for thé parties. Further, thé effect of contrac-
I M i l aurccments on thé rights of third parties is a spécial problem, which
K i lu I » ' solved from an external point of view in thé various institu-
i ii mal settings in which contracts are embedded. The behaviour of non-
|. H i ii i|i;mts, although of gréât importance to thé parties, cannot be
iilmlnistered by thé contractual order. The rest of society becomes rele-
vfiut. «nly in ternis of a réservoir of extra-contractual prerequisites of thé
r n n l i .H I
2. Organizations
A r i - o n l i i i g to Weber, thé development and continuai spread of thé
dern form of thé organization of corporate groups in ail fields of
..M i . i l ad.ivity is besides purposive contracts thé most crucial phenom-
riioii of modem society. On thé one hand bureaucratie organization is
cnmpli'tely indispensable for thé needs of mass administration today. On
I h c ot.her hand there are clusters of normative expectations which hâve
I h c i r l'ocus on formai or informai organizations relatively independent of
i l i c 1 bureaucratie exercise of state control on thé basis of technical
Knowledge. The validity of thèse normative expectations and thé possibil-
it.ii-s l'or their enforcement extend only to thé members of thé organisa-
I ion or organizations-set. This means that thé inner-directedness of organ-
i/.;it,ions doesn't affect thé behaviour of non-members which is subject to
ni lier mechanisms of guidance and control, such as market coordination,
l>i)lit.ical power, public opinion, formai légal authority, or generalized
média of social communication. The question of what constitutes a part
ni an organization or a member of interorganizational relationships is, if
poscd in isolation, a spurious one.91 A formalistic définition that
u n - I n d e s or excludes ex ante clients, suppliers, independent organiza-
i i i m s , departments or merely temporary commitees is due to thé concep-
t i o n of organization as an organism and implies a reification of interor-
i'..nii/.,-iUonal sets.
'Tins becomes obvious in thé cases of failure in network organizations
Ih.-il. seek to use an 'internai market' as an alternative to hierarchy as a
modo of internai coordination within thé firm. Hère organizational units
buy and sell goods and services among themselves at priées established
and verified in thé open market. The most common mistep in such inter-
8» On thé corrélation between migrant labour, money contract and freedom, see
Weber, 1988e, pp. 489, 506.
90 Roitman, 1990, p. 686.
91 Negandhi, 1975. p. 251 et sequ.
410 Athanasios Gromitsaris [152]
nal networks turned out to be corporate intervention in resource flows or
in thé détermination of transaction priées. Corporate décision making
inclines to rather dictate priées and processes than simply manage inter-
nai economy. This means that bureaucracy turns thé essential relation-
ships among autonomous network's components into relationships
among included organisation-members: they can no longer be external -
and thus highly visible to ail parties - and they can no longer reflect
voluntary and explicit commitments. Hierarchical politics, power and
influence rather than performance are guiding members behaviour.92 At
thé level of network intégration thé concept of membership refers to
firms and to thé network's ability to efficiently allocate member firms,
uncoupling and recoupling them with minimum cost and minimum loss
of operating time as well as of visibility and explicitness in thé essential
normative relationships among components. Therefore, we hâve to con-
clude that thé concept of membership in organizations does not stand for
a général principle of social intégration; rather, it is a symbol of inter-
dependence and independence, of inclusion and exclusion at thé same
time.93 But a général principle of social intégration should perhaps be
sought at a completely différent level, that of thé inclusion of individuals
in thé légal order as a totality representing thé whole of society.
3. Citizenship
The distinction between inclusion and exlusion in thé légal System
illuminâtes a problem that premodern societies solved by creating and
separating various "spécial law communities".94 In those social segments
(religious, ethnie groups or politically autonomous clans and cities)
which were politically integrated by a common suprême authority, like
thé Roman empire or thé islamic states, thé body of laws to be applied
by thé judicial officers differed in accordance with thé characteristics of
thé component groups. Thus, an individual had thé right to be treated as
thé member of a spécial law community and to demand that thé norms
of that légal order be applied to his dealings with other members and
sometimes even with outsiders. An individual's cognizable légal identity
and total légal status were determined by his membership in thé law
community to which he belonged. This meant that relations with stran-
gers were beyond thé law.95 According to Weber, despite thé émergence
of thé political community, spécial law is a widespread phenomenon in
92 See Miles/Snow, 1992, pp. 55, 65 et sequ.
93 See Luhmann/De Giorgi, 1993, p. 327 et sequ.
94 "Sonderrechte": Weber, 1976, p. 410; Kronman, 1983, p. 108.
95 "Der Einzelne tràgt (seine) Rechtskonfession mit sich herum": Weber, 1976,
p. 418.
Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 411
M i o i l c ' i n society as well. Modem law has created anew a gréât mass of
i i r i l p ii I icularisms but, as Weber points out, it has done so upon a dif-
i. 1 1 n i liasis, which refers to économie or technical qualities.96
Wlini cconomic contacts between strangers became necessary an inde-
i" i n l c n l body of norms had to be developped. Thèse norms were con-
- i l lïom thé beginning as norms of thé market or as norms of a wider
I H I | I | M - . I | community, distinct from thé légal orders of thé various groups
in \ \ l n r l i différent individuals belonged. They regulated thé relationships
"i i i . n i ^ c r s in law.97 The modem, western concept of thé state (and
n . i l mil state) is based on thé émergence of thé political community as
w r l l ;is !ho notions of citizenship and legal-rational authority; it suggests
n i un i l y of political and légal sovereignty.98 An individual's membership
in i l i r pohUcal community - his citizenship - came to be conceived in thé
iinr .-ik'ilr.-ict terms as thé légal personality of thé parties to a modem,
kct-oriented contract.
Thr significance of thé fact that membership in thé political commu-
n i i v r i n i l d be treated as a légal construction for which personal charac-
i. 1 1 h.'s were ultimately irrelevant, becomes clearer if we take into con-
ii li i i l ion thé ability of thé colonial state to create new catégories of
Ubjei is. In thé libéral tradition in thé West, thé theorisation of rights is
• il i u n i l'rom an inévitable opposition between thé state and thé individ-
H i l This aspect has tended to be reproduced in thé colonial setting: ail
r p identities and idéologies were regarded as nothing but a "carry-
i i v r i of 'tradition'".99 The colonial practice in relation to group iden-
n i i r s tended to exhibit a sharp duality. On thé one hand, déniai of thé
l i r.iiiinacy of any identity apart from that statutorily defined by thé
i î l e ; on thé other, a statutory récognition of "frozen identities" as thé
i . ri.s of community (résidence), or work (job réservation and rémunéra-
t i o n ) , or provision of services (schools, hospitals), or political processes
i i ! • . lions, constituencies). This duality reflects thé tension between thé
br.inry of state formation (thé political history of countries) and that of
"' i . i l transformation (thé social history of peoples). A comparison of thé
I.M i l K H I of thé sub-categories of colonial subjects with that of metropoli-
i n i i i l i/.ens100 shows that new distinctions were used to treat ail colonial
i i l > | i r t s (natives and non-natives) "as a resource to be managed by thé
i oloniul state for thé saké of 'économie development'". Finally, thé end
11(1
Wtber, 1976, pp. 410, 503 - 504; Kronman, 1983, pp. 109 - 112.
»'' Weber, 1976, p. 503.
11
: .!•!• on this point Pauly. 1995; on Weber's concept of thé state and thé correla-
l i m i between bureaucracy, democracy and nationality see Anter, 1995, p. 83 et
Ncqu., 131 et sequ.
H" On this point and on what follows, see Mamdani, 1990, pp. 372 - 373.
i»« On this point, see Sack, 1993, p. 429.
 Athanasios Gromitsaris [154]
412
of colonialism didn't mean thé end of thé state in thé colonies. It is with
thé 'independence' that entire communities became 'non-citizens' in for-
eign territories, and thé significance of cross-border migrant labour - in
Africa, a traditional institution feeding thé labour needs of commodity
agriculture - became enormous.101 Moreover, a host of secessionist move-
ments brought about thé invevitable balkanisation.
In thé West, thé notion of citizenship disjoins thé concept of member-
ship in a political community from thé identity of thé person. Ideally,
while nationality, religion and state are delinked, political unity fuses
with légal unity.102 On thé other hand, participation in thé welfare
state doesn't encompass political participation.103 The voting rights of
immigrants is thé most famous example. As immigrants hâve mostly no
access to thé central104 aspects of thé realm and order of symbols, of
values and beliefs which govern thé host country, they implicitly culti-
vate thé myth of repatriation and social intégration "at home". They
tacitly establish an instrumental, monofunctional106 relation to thé host
country. On thé one side - according to Weber's concept of closure10'
System boundaries are maintained against outsiders and procédures are
developed to maintain distinctions of honour and prestige within thé
System. On thé other side, immigrants show thé tendency to be a '"non-
political' speech community".107 Being parasitical as well as oppositional
in nature, their vocabulary of politics stands both against and in need of
thé dominant political vocabulary and culture. Thus, it confirms a domi-
nant/subordinate cultural relationship and is not likely to work for thé
cause of thé "Verfassungspatriotismus".108 Rather, it restricts thé discur-
sive reproduction of thé immigrants' political culture in its ability to
promote interests and needs effectively. The immigrants' political dis-
course shares thèse characteristics with other "nonpolitical" speech com-
munities such as workers.109 But nationality supplies 'nonpolitical',
101 Mamdani, 1990, P. 367.
102 See thé example of thé citizenship of thé "Volksdeutschen" Seeler, 1960.
i°3 Alpa, 1992, p. 32: "la cittadinanza si trasforma in 'appartenenza' a una cate-
goria sociale () un significato più pregnante di quelle ancora corrente che désigna
il vincolo tra un soggetto e uno stato".
104
On thé distinction between center and periphery see Eisenstadt, 1968,
pp. XXX, XXXIII.
105 On this point, see Weber, 1972, p. 27: "Denn daB die blofie Tatsache des Hei-
matwechsels bei der Arbeit zu den mâchtigsten Mitteln ihrer Intensivierung
gehôrt, steht durchaus fest." According to Weber, a "polish girl" or a "migratory
italian laborer" get transformed as if by miracle into virtuous workers when
placed in an industrial setting in a capitalist country.
106 Weber, 1976, p. 23.
107 Huspek/Kendall, 1991, p. 15.
i°8 On this concept, see Habermas, 1992, p. 642.
109 Ibid., p. 14.
Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 413
n.M H n i , - i l speech communities with symbolic resources for voicing critical
ini'Ti'sts in hard times of social and économie exclusion.
I n ;i functionally differentiated society, thé nation as 'community' may,
l i n l need not play thé rôle of a symbolic substitute for thé non existent
Norlrl.iil représentation and intégration.110 The view of thé nation as
n illonal community, endowed with thé attributes of independence, con-
I l i i n a n e e for thé future and sovereignty, may, but need not be thé focus of
i" ople's sensé of belonging and identification as well as a major compo-
i i r n i of their personal identities. However, even under thé régime of func-
h o n . i l diffcrentiation and globalization, thé symbolic resources of thé
mil ion as community to which "we" belong, "our" forfathers belonged
iind "our" descendants will belong, are significant.111 The national com-
n i i i i i i l y supplies thé function Systems of society with semantic artefacts
I H h ;is national éducation, national law, national literature, national
paiiics or national church. Nations still put limits to thé multinatio-
n . i l i / a l ion of shareholdings in thé parent companies of global enterprise
r i o u p s . On thé other hand, although thé global company is exposed to
n i . i i i v nirisdictions, and even though its management and workforce are
i n i i l i in.ilional, it usually has a home government and a home tax author-
>\\ i h . M matters to it more than others.112
Hi Miles, in certain religious environments, for example Eastern Ortho-
i l i n i v , nationality fuses with religion and thus,'diverges markedly from
U n 1 Western secular notion of thé nationstate. In this case, those of
.nu il lier religion, even if citizens of thé nation-state, are not viewed as
I I . I M H J ; a national identity. This is due to thé "millet System"1 3 of thé
i il l o i n,-in empire which replaced Byzantium and enhanced thé Orthodox
l ' I n i r e l i ' s power as ruler over thé Orthodox community within thé con-
MiniInl.N of Ottoman rule by delegating to it administrative and civil
M i i l i o r i l . y , and merging religious and political functions. As a resuit, thé
.1 nietion of thé national identity incorporated religion as a crucial
iponent of thé personal identity. Under thé rule of thé newly con-
I M M led nation-state, this led (and leads) to restrictions on thé exercise
..I i e h | > i o i i s freedom which violate thé European Convention on Human
Idr.lii. 1 . and thé underlying values of thé European Community.114 As a
H" l'uni n, 1995, p. 54 et sequ.
n i / / i / , 1992, p. 124.
H ' !.. pp. 114, 117.
II
' Tins means that thé question of ethnie minorities could only be addressed
h mu ,-i western point of view and in western catégories. To this problem: Afshar,
r i ' M . | > . 132.
I I I
l'ollis, 1993, pp. 347, 349-350; see further Makrides, 1994, p. 76. Charges
hnvc been brought against Greece before thé European Commission and thé
K u i n p e a n Court of Human Rights; see EuGRZ 1993, p. 228.
 Athanasios Gromitsaris [156]
414
resuit, we conclude that citizenship implies a partial inclusion. It does
not run parallel with participation in thé welfare state, in thé national
community or in thé central aspects of thé symbolic and institutional
order.
4. Individual Rights
In a functionally differentiated society religions righteousness, finan-
cial distress and légal assertions are subject to différent mechanisms of
sélection. For instance, economists see law as a "giant pricing
machine".115 Their problem is that before policies - introduced by rule-
making - become economically effective, they "suffer thé ravages" of thé
political and légal Systems.116 On thé other hand, jurists base their work
and their reality assumptions on thé distinction between norms and
facts, taking, thus, thé risk of intervening in an institutionally irrelevant
reality.
The constitutional protection of civil and political rights on thé one
side, of social, économie and cultural ones, on thé other side, symbolizes
thé multi-inclusion of persons in thé functionally differentiated society.
From a normative point of view, under thé influence of thé doctrine of
indivisibility of human rights, thé idea of a global approach - which no
longer distinguishes between thé two catégories of rights - is gaining
some ground.117 Nevertheless, although thé multi-inclusion of persons in
sub-systems is legally protected, it can only partly be prescribed and
enforced, let alone coordinated. Légal décisions and enforcement
processes can neither replace thé opérations of thé other societal sub-
systems nor totally neutralize thé informai rules of inclusion adminis-
tered within patron-client networks.118 Therein lies thé difficulty of thé
so-called state intervention. Every effort in designing général rules of
inclusion seems to be met with thé fact that "every good regulator of a
System must be a model of that System".119 The protection of inclusion
cannot replace inclusion because direct control of sub-systems by law is
not attainable. The légal enforcement of inclusion would hâve to ade-
quately represent thé internai complexity of thé controlled sub-system.
This either leads to over-simplification by de-differentiation or to ungo-
vernability because of hypercomplexity. Nevertheless, thé mère existence
of formai rules of inclusion which are valid for everybody, for nationals
H5 Veljanovski, 1990, p. 15.
ne Ibid., p. 85.
H' Trindade, 1990.
118
On thé conflict between 'statalismo" and "Catena clientelare", sçe Zincone,
1992, p. 156 et sequ.
us Canant/Ashby, 1970.
Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 11!)
i - l l ;is l'or allons, has an at least symbolic integrative effect.120 Ac-
inclusion occurs at thé level of "intermediate" institutions: Local
ii.ni|',«' and trading Systems, community planning and socially respon-
i M c mvrstment, community associations, neighbourhood partnerships,
m n i i i | > l n y m < > n t action centres, resource and support centres, religious
mmnities and urban or community studies and technical aid centres,
H" \ . i l l play a very important rôle in determining thé conditions of
I Iniion,121
i l " - légal construction of thé political membership and thé inclusion in
U n |")lit,ical System do not détermine thé multi-inclusion of thé person in
l i n "Hier sub-systems. The multi-inclusion is guaranteed by means of
I h r mdividual rights provisions of thé modem constitutions, but thé con-
i i i n l m n a l protection of rights doesn't explicitly address thé question of
h" lias thé ability and compétence to define thé content of thé individ-
H i l i i/'.hts. 122 Distinctions such as libertarianism and légal paternalism
"i i r|'.iilat,ory state and social selfregulation are partly due to thé contin-
n..M l'ffort to answer this question. Libertarians place gréât emphasis
ni vnluntariness: a person gives shape to her or his rights by means of
M i i i i i ; voluntarily. The state has no right to legislate what people should
' I " i long as their actions harm no one else. On thé contrary, according
i" l'r.'il p.it.ernalism, thé state law and légal institutions may thwart a
i 's own goals if it is for thé person's own good. But there's thé rub,
I l l i r i larians reply: thé state goals for a person do not coincide with his
ils l'or himself.123 The solution seems to lie with a compromise, an
i | i | > i ï > . - i r h that privilèges neither thé action and self-détermination of thé
m i l i v i i l t i a l nor thé demands of thé institutional totality.124
5. Constitutions and Issue Avoidance
No matter how thé content of human rights is defined, thé rights pro-
i i i i i - d by a constitution are not subject to political revision. For thosé
wli" believe that there is a conflict between constitutionalism and
i l ' in'icracy, thé tension stems from thé fact that constitutions remove cer-
1
" Viola, 1992, p. 68: "Per vivere insieme qualche cosa deve essere commune,
ftiNN'mirhe solo le regole formali"; Zincone, 1992, p. 243: "Per integrazione inten-
i l i . i i n i ) la capacità di fare accetare ai vecchi e ai nuovi membri di una comniunità
i l i - ' nmmuni di convivenza civile."
i:n Sec IFP "Lokale Ôkonomie", 1994.
1
' ' I.iensee, 1980; Badura, 1989, p. 43.
1
••' < Hospers, 1980, p. 265.
12* On thé définition of matrimony, see Friauf, 1986, p. 2600: "Art. 6 I GG aïs
Frciheitsrecht und personal geprâgte Institutsgarantie"; further Louven, 1993,
p. 13: "Die Beurteilung der Gleichgeschlechtlichkeit mag sich verândern. Das
Kochtsinstitut Ehe darf darunter nicht leiden."
 Athanasios Gromitsaris [158]
416
tain topics from collective délibération and public review: Paradoxically,
it is thé removal of subjects from thé public sphère that is regarded as a
means of ensuring thé proper functioning of thé démocratie process and
social intégration. The removal is also supposed to divert resources from
unresolvable problems to soluble ones.125 The distinction between thé
universal suppression of a thème and thé mère transferral of that thème
to a différent institutional context makes clear that everything dépends
on thé agenda to which forbidden décisions are transferred. To exclude a
topic (for instance, voting rights of immigrants)126 from thé national lég-
islative agenda may be to place it on thé local agenda and to subject it to
thé control of local majorities. On thé other hand, a décision may be
withdrawn from thé jurisdiction of ail branches and levels of govern-
ment and consigned to private individuals.127 The classical example is
thé exclusion of religion from politics: religious disputation might factio-
nalize thé System and pose a threat to inclusive political citizenship.
"Neutral territory" or "institutional neutrality"128 hâve played an essen-
tial rôle in unifying multidenominational societies, whereas religious
indoctrinators remained free to practice their arts outside school walls
and public institutions.129 By imposing "gag rules" on themselves, both
thé political and thé légal System avoid issues that might threaten inté-
gration and democracy. But privatization of issues like abortion, redistri-
bution of property, thé rôle of women in society or thé rights of racial
and ethnie minorities and homosexuals through constitutional law
immunizes them from public scrutiny.130 In addition, if resolution
through political and légal processes is unavailable, people may lose
faith in thé system and resort to extralegal means. The distinction
between issues that produce conflict and issues that do not, is thus
inadéquate to décide which issues to remove from law-making and
normal politics. This brings up thé main difficulty - thé problem of iden-
tification of thé issues that should be justifiably privatized on thé
grounds of thé fear of factionalization and draining of public resources
to insoluble problems.131 A sélection criterion is viewed in thé question
whether thé issue sought to be privatized by constitutional law can be
considered a right. Rights provisions are designed to fence off certain
areas from majoritarian control. But as thé category of interests that can
125 Holmes, 1988, pp. 24, 26.
126 From thé point of view of german constitutional law thé définition of
"Staatsvolk" coïncides with thé one of "Gemeindevolk", therefore an issue
removal is not possible.
127 Holmes, 1988, p. 41.
128 Schlaich, 1972, p. 129.
129 Ibid., p. 44.
iso Sunstein, 1988, p. 340.
13l Ibid., pp. 340 - 342.
Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 417
ic(|uiic I l i c status of a right is relatively small, thé removal of issues
h c i n i i h c public sphère remains limited. AU this suggests that "issue-
i lance" and "stratégie self-censorship" cannot bring about social
m i e l ' i . i h n n ; they will sometimes promote thé proper functioning of thé
i ci i l •! i i - :.|)here, but sometimes they will not.
VI. Conclusions
i c i ; . i l norms are symbolized by norm-sentences which should not be
i c i . ni il'u-d with thé norms as such. They are thé product of processes
« l i n h Imt.h regulate behaviour and confirm or modify thé normative
i . i i n l . i n l usrd to regulate behaviour. In this sensé légal norms are 'rules'
i n . I ( I r p r i i t l on thé formation of social expectations of a normative char-
ic in in private and public institutions. The concept of rule is a token of
U n i-nrrrl.-il.ion between normative expectational structures and thé on
l ' . m i i ' M-IccUon of anticipated or unanticipated events. Déviation and
| i h . n i c c make sensé only in thé light of existing normative expecta-
-. w l i i i - h , in turn, are modified or confirmed by déviation and compli-
i .t % nal décisions seem to be premissed on normative information
n, i i i u n ml l»t> distilled from textbooks or précédents. On thé contrary, it
I n - lirought into connection with them, ex post. Therefore, instead of
. H . I I I I I I : l'or "real laws" (A. M. Honoré) we should search for "real
Mil.
W i n l i - I I if command or imperative theory of légal norms départs from
i l H i n . i h i n of a state monopoly in thé powers of law making, thé recogni-
i n u i ihi-ory sees thé légal character of thé norm depending not on thé
i » > i l n i i l y of state intervention, but on a discource deciding about thé
I . H i whH.her thé norm is reasonably acceptable or worthy of recogni-
i n in Arrurding to Max Weber it is thé simultaneous diversification of
i h l l i M ni mrchanisms for thé formation, innovation and institutionaliza-
I I . . M "I c-xpt'ctations rather than coercion as such that is of primary
i n i p i i i i.nicc for thé légal ordering of action. Law-oriented behaviour
i ' i INCS u vast range of actions. A social action is law-oriented if (a) a
n i . i h v r standard for thé évaluation of conduct and (b) thé possibility
. i l i r l l r r i i i i ) ' , on compliance and déviation are among thé background
. . M n M u n i s of thé action itself.
l i n - , implies a shift from a legalistic perspective to a more sociologi-
c n l l y Ncnsitive one which is bare of prefabricated reality assumptions
il i Hit 1 rôle of thé state, modernization and functional differentiation.
Tlion'fore, describing law-oriented behaviour as it understands and pre-
. n i i l self, is an enterprise that présupposes thé successful intégration
ni l'T,al theory and sociology of law. It has to entail middle range thé-
 Ml
Athanasios Gromitsaris
418
ories that in turn entail corrigible hypothèses and observer-dependent
data about law-oriented behaviour in various institutional settings.
At thé level of thé distinction between légal and illégal behaviour,
modem légal Systems are ail-inclusive. They include every single social
action which can be evaluated as legally right or legally wrong. The for-
malization of normative expectations makes exchange relations between
légal and moral strangers more predictable but cannot replace informai
rules and décisions about inclusion and exclusion. At thé level of con-
tracts and organizations légal Systems produce both inclusion and exclu-
sion. While contracts produce légal norms that are not binding for non-
parties, organizations cannot regulate non-member behaviour. Extracon-
tractual binding effects and prerequisites hâve to be administered by
other institutions (for instance, organizations or thé state). Similarly,
extra-organizational binding effects can only be brought about by extra-
organizational institutions such as thé market or thé generalized média
of communication. Besides, although constitutions prescribe thé societal
multi-inclusion of persons by means of instituting civil, social, political
and économie rights, thé légal protection and enforcement of individual
rights remain internai opérations of thé légal System which cannot
replace thé opérations of other sub-systems. Finally, deleting divisive
and/or unanswerable questions from thé political agenda by constitu-
tional law will sometimes decrease and sometimes increase factional
struggle.
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