CALIPHS AND THE CALIPHATE

as viewed by the Shi of Persia. ites

CALIPHS AND THE CALIPHATE, as viewed by the Shi of Persia. ites Shiite attitudes in rejection of the legitimacy of the first three caliphs, as well as the caliphs of the Omayyad and Abbasid dynasties, first entered Persia toward the end of the Omayyad period with the establishment there of the earliest Shiite communities. During the period of Buyid supremacy in Baghdad, the various rites performed by the Shiite community of that city in commemoration of the imams and condemnation of the caliphs were presumably imitated by Shiites living in the Persian portions of the Buyid domains, but there is no record of this. We know, however, that in the Saljuq period singers and poets known as manqeb would publicly recite verses that often had as their corollary abuse of the ns caliphs (Ketb al-naq, quoted by Bausani, p. 293). This was, in a sense, inevitable, since tawall(proclamation of loyalty to the imams) has its complement in tabarr(proclamation of dissociation from their enemies). The recitation of such material continued throughout the Mongol period. Although Sunnites, especially Sufis among them, displayed increasing respect for the Twelve Imams of Shiite belief, there was no reciprocal grant of esteem by Shiites toward the first three caliphs. Indeed, when the Safavids imposed Shiite beliefs on Iran at the beginning of the 10th/16th century, the ritual cursing of the first three caliphs (as well as wife of the Prophet, ea, and many other of his companions) became both a hallmark of Safavid rule and a means for eliciting consent to the change in religious direction. On the first Friday after his conquest of Tabrz in 907/1501, Shah Esml assembled the people of the city in the Masjed-e Jme and instructed them to curse the first three caliphs. One third of those assembled did so willingly enough, lustily shouting, may it (the cursing) be more, not less (b bd o kam mabd), a phrase that was to become the conventional response to the rite of cursing. The remaining two-thirds of the congregation joined in only from fear of the heavily armed Qezelb and a special officer of the shah called tabarrwho patrolled the mosque carrying a battle-axe ( lamr-ye afaw, pp. 63-65). Similar scenes were enacted elsewhere in Persia, and every major provincial city had its own tabarr. A temporary reversal of policy took place under Shah Esml II (r. 984-85/1576-78), who posted guards in the mosques of Qazvn to prevent the caliphs from being vilified and rewarded inhabitants of the city who could prove they had never engaged in the practice (Hinz, pp. 78-79). Before long, however, the cursing of the caliphs and the sentiments it

implied became absorbed into the religious culture of the masses, being sustained not only by the official tabarrs but also by wandering dervishes who perpetuated the traditions of the manqebns. The Safavid interpretation of tabarr as sabb (vilification) or lan (cursing) appears to have been an innovation, derivedlike much else in early Safavid religionfrom the traditions of olt (extremist) Shiism rather than those of Twelver Shiite belief. Certainly the emphasis placed on it was new. Shaikh Al Karak found it necessary, in 917/1511, to write a treatise demonstrating the obligatory nature of cursing (atnbd, p. 448). A century and a half later, Moammad-Bqer Majles devoted substantial portions of his books in Persian to the vilification of the first three caliphs, including a vast amount of fantastic and defamatory material not found in earlier Shiite sources (see, e.g., pp. 154-219). The ritual cursing of the first three caliphs was a lasting irritant in the relations of Persia with its Sunnite neighbors, especially the Ottoman empire. Sabb and lanfigured prominently in the Ottoman polemical writings (some penned by Sunnite refugees from Persia) that were directed against the Safavids, and on several occasionsnotably the Treaty of Amasya (q.v.) in 963/1555the Ottomans insisted on Persian abandonment of the practice as a condition for concluding peace (Eberhard, pp. 104-07). It was not until the time of Nder Shah (114860/1736-47) that a sustained attempt was made from within Persia, independently of Ottoman pressure, to ban the cursing of the first three caliphs. Motivated by a variety of political considerations, Nder Shah demanded at his coronation in 1148/1736 that the ritual vilification of the first three caliphs should cease and even that the Shiite olam of Persia should recognize the legitimacy of their rule (Astarbd, p. 270; Marv, III, pp. 97888). His command was obeyed, by way oftaqya (dissimulation), but the practices of sabb and lan were resumed after his death in 1160/1747. One measure of the penetration of popular culture by hostility to the caliphs was a festival in commemoration of the assassination of the Caliph Omar by Ab Lolo (q.v.), to whom a shrine was dedicated on the outskirts of Kn (Narq, pp. 186-88). This festival, known as Omar-kon (killing Omar), is said varyingly to have been celebrated on 26 ul-ejja and 9 or 10 Rab I. Effigies of Omar stuffed with straw would be beaten and then burnt to the accompaniment of ribald and abusive poetry, as well as entertainments of an entirely secular nature (Mass, I, pp. 166-69; Rezvani, pp. 105-07). The festival of Omar-kon formed a burlesque counterpart of the taza (q.v.), the dramatic commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam osayn. Although the principal target of execration in the taza was always the Omayyad caliph Yazd and his associates, material hostile to the first three caliphs was sometimes incorporated into the taza.

In the Qajar period, peace was finally established with the Ottomans, and religiously inspired hostility came to be redirected against the European powers that were encroaching on Persian independence. There was therefore a gradual discarding of ritually expressed hostility to the first three caliphs. Elements offensive to Sunnite sentiment were purged from the tazas performed at the court takya in Tehran; the cursing of the caliphs after the call to prayer was prohibited during the reign of Ner-al-Dn Shah (1264-1313/1848-96); and by the early twentieth century the festival of Omar-kon ceased to be observed in the chief cities of Persia, although it probably persisted in the countryside for considerably longer. By 1319/1902, attitudes had changed sufficiently to permit some of the Shiite olam to regard the Ottoman sultan-caliph as the potential political leader of all Muslims (Algar, p. 231). The rise of Islamic activism in Persia after World War II with its concern for panIslamic solidarity hastened the demise of old habits of the tongue and the mind, and by 1349 ./1970 Ayatollah omeyn (p. 56) was able to refer to Ab Bakr and Omar as men who had adhered to the example of the Prophet in the outer conduct of their personal lives. Derogatory references to the caliphs are now scrupulously avoided at all levels of official and semi-official discourse in the Islamic Republic. (Hamid Algar) Originally Published: December 15, 1990 Last Updated: December 15, 1990 This article is available in print. Vol. IV, Fasc. 7, pp. 677-679