Public Support for Term Limits: Another Look at Conventional Thinking Author(s): Robert M.

Stein, Martin Johnson, Stephanie Shirley Post Reviewed work(s): Source: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Aug., 2002), pp. 459-480 Published by: Comparative Legislative Research Center Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598573 . Accessed: 04/02/2012 13:44
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ROBERT STEIN M. Rice University MARTINJOHNSON Universityof California,Riverside STEPHANIE SHIRLEY POST Rice University

PublicSupportfor TermLimits: Another Lookat Conventional Thinking

Americans are enamoredwith term limits for elected officials at all levels of government. Explanationsof public support for term limits focus on partisanship, voter dissatisfaction with specific political institutions, group underrepresentation, political cynicism, and ideology. We qualifythe conventionalwisdom thattermlimits are mostly a Republican issue: Support for term limits is more a function of the incongruencebetween an individual's expressed partisanshipand the party of their the than of the individual'spartyaffiliation.Further, effect of unsatisrepresentative factory representationis strongly related to a voter's engagement with politics and willingness to monitorpolitical affairs actively.

Introduction Public support for term limits across levels and branches of government is strong and widespread. Since 1990, 21 states have adopted state legislative term limits.1 All of these states, with the exception of Utah, adoptedterm limits using the initiative and referendumprocess. Multiple national-levelsurveys indicatethat a strong majorityof respondentssupporttermlimits for membersof Congress. The 1992 AmericanNational Election Study (ANES) found 81% of respondents favored term limits. The 1994 ANES found 77% of respondentsready to limit the terms of congressionalrepresentatives. Accordingly, several states have adopted congressional term limits, by only to have them ruled unconstitutional the U.S. SupremeCourt in U.S. TermLimitsv Thornton.In addition,a majorityof states limit the numberof terms their governorsmay serve, and the presidenthas been limitedto two termssince 1951. Finally,PetraccaandJump(1992) estimatethatnearlya thirdof U.S. citieswith populations above250,000 have termlimitedtheirexecutive and legislative officials.
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Existing researchaimed at explainingan individual'ssupportfor term limits has focused on partisanship, ideology, group voter dissatisfactionwith specific political instiunderrepresentation, and political cynicism. We test the literature'smain hypothtutions, eses with data collected on public supportfor term limits for several levels and branches of government. Our findings suggest that an individual's supportfor term limits is largely relatedto partisanidentification but with a nuance that is unexpectedby much conventional wisdom on the issue. Althoughpast accountshave suggestedthe push for term limits to be a Republicanmovement, it appearsthat support for term limits is more strongly related to the incongruencebetween an individual's expressedpartisanship and his or her representative's party. Further,this incongruity appears to be more importantwith regardto legislative term limits than is supportfor limiting the terms of executives at all levels of government. Previous Assessments of Public Support for Term Limits Political Cynicism Previous researchreveals several demographic,attitudinal,and institutional explanations of contemporarysupport for term limits. Voter affect towardgovernmentis one of the strongestand most consistent correlates of voter support for term limits. Karp (1995) and Southwell (1995) find that general dissatisfactionwith the political of process, as opposed to voter affect towardthe policy performance a of specific institution,is the dominantdeterminant voter willingness to impose legislative term limits. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995, 123) demonstratea relationshipbetween negative sentiment toward Congressand supportfor congressionalterm limits. Althoughdistrust of the political process and politiciansdominatesall models of public supportfor congressionalterm limits, its impact has not been examined across levels or branchesof government.Karp(1995) uses cynicism to explainpublic supportfor statelegislativetermlimits in Florida and Wyoming. His measureof cynicism, however, reflects distrustin "government in Washington"rather than distrust of and cynicism towardthe respectivestatelegislatures.It is evidentthatmoreresearch is necessary to explain the impact of cynicism on public supportfor term limits across levels and branchesof government.

Public Supportfor Term Limits Underrepresentation

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Otherexplanationsof public supportfor term limits often focus on historically underrepresented groups as potential cells of support for term limits. In particular,many researchersexpect to find strong supportamong women and members of racial and ethnic minorities for the adoption of term limits, especially for legislative offices (Boeckelman and Corell 1996; Karp 1995). Political self-interest is the rationalegiven for this expectation.Limitingthe numberof terms an elected official can hold a particularoffice is believed to ensure a higher level of turnoverand mandate an increase in the number of open seats in any given election. This mandateshould, in principle, for enhancethe opportunities membersof out-groupsto achieve elective office. This self-interestexplanationextendsto membersand supportersof minoritypolitical partiesas well. In one-partystates, members of the out-partyare expectedto supporttermlimits as a means for theirpartyto ascend to political office (Karp 1995). Although theoretically appealing, the empirical evidence is mixed for this out-groupexplanationof supportfor term limits. We identify eight studies where race (i.e., membershipin a nonmajority, nonwhite ethnic or racial group) is significantlyrelatedto supportof term limits.2Thirteenother studies indicatethat supportfor term limits is not significantly related to race or ethnicity.3A gender-based explanationfor termlimits also performsinconsistently.Donovan and Snipp (1996) and Karp(1995) reportthatwomen are more likely than men to supportstate legislative term limits in Californiaand Florida. Southwell(1995) extendsthis findingto the U.S. Congress,using data from the 1992 American National Election Study (ANES). In contrast,Karp,using the sameANES dataanda somewhatdifferentmodel specification, finds no relationshipbetween gender and supportfor congressionaltermlimits (1995). Finally,RauschandCopeland(1996) reportthat data from a 1989 GallupPoll on supportfor congressional termlimits anda 1990 Oklahoma poll indicatethatmenaremorelikely than women to support term limits. It does not appear that race, for of ethnicity,andgenderareconsistentcorrelates support termlimits. RepublicanPartisanship Partyidentificationis one of the most stablecorrelatesof support find thatsupportfor congresfor termlimits. In 22 studies,researchers sional termlimits, state legislative termlimits, or both is positively related to Republicanpartisanpreference.4Researchersfail to confirm

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this relationshipin only 5 studies.5Most of these studies explain Republicansupportof termlimits as a functionof Republicanideology or statusin Congressandmost state legislaRepublicans'minority-party tures duringthe early 1990s. Republicansare believed to view term limits as a means to regain a legislative majorityas well as the appropriateway to rungovernment(Will 1994). Yetthe ideological explanation for Republicansupportof termlimits receives little empiricalsupport;thus it appearsthat supportamong Republicansis not a function of any particular political principle (Donovan and Snipp 1995; Karp It is more likely thatRepublicansupportof termlimits is related 1995). to the party'sdesire to regaina legislative majority. Thisout-party has explanation not been fully examinedsince most studiesof public supportfor congressionaltermlimits were conducted prior to the 1994 elections that createda Republicanmajorityin the U.S. House and most state legislatures. We suspect that Republican and supportof termlimits has waned since the 1994 election.Friedman Wittman's(1996) study of Wyomingprovidessupportfor this hypothesis. When FriedmanandWittmanconductedtheirsurveyin 1992, the in Partyheld a majority the Wyomingstatelegislature. Republican They found Wyoming Democratswere more supportiveof state legislative termlimits thantheirRepublicancounterparts. Another Look: Partisan Incongruence and Voter Awareness A consistent theme in the literature is that ideological and descriptivedifferencesbetween citizens and theirrepresentatives provide a rationale for their support for term limits. There are several potential dimensions on which voters might differ from their elected officials. Race, ethnicity, gender, and partisanshipare only a few of the most importantof these dimensions. We examine the effects of on descriptiveand ideological representation public supportfor term limits across multiple levels and branchesof government.The previous literaturetreats partisanshipas an essentially ideological predisposition regardingterm limits, whereas it treats race and gender as issues of representation thus expects underrepresented and personsto to supportterm limits. We, however, expect partisanship operatein a mannersimilarto race and gender. Out-partymembers-people who are incongruentwith the partisanaffiliation of elected executive and legislative representativesor the legislature-should be more likely to supportterm limits. Below, we offer two importantqualifications to the expected betweenout-party and for relationship membership support termlimits.

Public Supportfor Term Limits

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The first involves the questionof whetherindividualcitizens preferto be representedby members of their own party or if they prefer the institutionof government(e.g., the legislatureas a whole) to be controlled by their party. The second qualificationwe offer warns that voters may not even be aware of partisanincongruence. Individualversus InstitutionalRepresentation In theirstudyof supportfor Congress,HibbingandTheiss-Morse (1995) make a strong case for distinguishingbetween an institution and its members.Their analysis finds that differentfactors influence public supportfor the institutionof Congress than influence public In of for publicapproval theinstitution support specificmembers. addition, of Congressand its generalmembershiphas differingimpactson the public's supportfor term limits. Hibbing and Theiss-Morsefind that approvalof the institutionof Congressis significantlyand negatively related to the support for term limits, but approval of the general membershipis not significantlyrelatedto term-limitssupport(123). Previous out-partyexplanationsof supportfor term limits focus on the partisancompositionof the political institutionand the collective representation (Weissberg 1978) it provides. It is possible, howthat voters pay more attention to their own representatives' ever, partisanshipthan to the partisanbalance in the institutionin which serve. Voters may supportor oppose term limits those representatives dependingon the incongruencebetween theirown partisanidentification and that of their elected representatives. In the past, several researchers(Boeckelman and Corell 1990; Friedman and Wittman 1996;Karp1995;RauschandCopeland1990) have used such controls statestudiesof term-limitssupportin states by conductingcomparative with different majority legislative parties. Our analysis considers partisan incongruence between respondents and various political institutions,as well as partisanincongruencebetween voters and the elected officials representingthem in those institutions. Attentiveness Attentivenessto politics is expected to mediate the relationship between partisanincongruenceand supportfor term limits. The more attentionthat people pay to politics, the more likely they are to be aware of the quality of their representation. Surprisingly,the importance of attentivenessin explaining public supportfor term limits is largely ignored in the literature.Karp (1995) offers one of the few

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studies to incorporateindicatorsof respondentpolitical attentiveness. He demonstrates that attentionto politics may be an importantmedifactorlinkingout-groupmembershipand supportfor termlimits. ating In his analysis, the interaction between political attentiveness and Republicanidentificationis significantly related to supportfor congressionaland state legislative termlimits. Karp'sresearchleads us to expect that attentive individualswho are representedby legislatures with their or representatives whose partisan affiliationsareincongruent own will be more supportiveof term limits. The same relationshipis expectedto operatefor membersof otherout-groups, includingwomen, blacks, and Hispanics. Karp (1995) does not hypothesize that attentivenesswill have the main effect on supportfor term limits. He reportsa negative relationship between his measure of attentiveness (i.e., education) and supportfor term limits but does not comment on the significance of this relationship.His finding, however, is not altogetherunexpected. If we view elections as opportunities individualsto choose the best for candidatefor a particularoffice (see Fearon 1999), then term limits might be seen by the most attentiveand informedvoters as unnecessary and restrictive of their opportunityto select the best person to representthem. Consequently,we would expect to observe a negative relationshipbetween attentivenessand supportfor term limits. This relationship reflects the desire of attentive and informed voters to preserve their opportunityto select a preferredcandidate from all possible choices. Hypotheses Given ourreview of the literature, identify seven hypotheses: we 1. Out-grouphypothesis Supportfor term limits is positively relatedto membershipin historicallyunderrepresented out-groups(i.e., women and racial minorities)and minoritypolitical parties. 2. Out-groupattentivenesshypothesis Supportfor term limits is positively related to attentiveness among members of historically underrepresented out-group members(i.e., minoritypolitical partymembers,women, and racial minorities).

Public Supportfor Term Limits

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3. Out-group incongruence hypothesis Supportfor term limits is negatively relatedto the incongruence between a voter's groupmemberships(gender,race, and the party)and thatof his or her representatives, majorityparty in the legislature,or both. and 4. Out-group hypothesis incongruence political attentiveness Supportfor term limits among politically attentivevoters is positively related to the incongruence between the voter's group memberships(gender, race, and party) and that of his or her representatives. 5. Attentivenesshypothesis In addition to the aforementionedinteractive effects, attentiveness will be negatively relatedto supportfor term limits. 6. Trusthypothesis Supportfor termlimits is negatively associatedwith trustin a particularpolitical institution. 7. Satisfactionhypothesis Support for term limits is negatively related to satisfaction with a particular political institution. Data and Methods To date, no national surveys and only a handful of state-level surveys of public opinion have queriedvoters about their supportfor term limits for different elective offices. The 1992 and 1994 ANES only includedquestionsregardingsupportfor congressionaltermlimits in the pre-election survey. Several researchers have reported analyses of differentstate and nationalsurveys,but none have studied public opinion aboutterm limits for a variety of elective offices using data from the same respondentscollected in a single survey. To compensatefor this lack of nationaldata,we test ourhypotheses using information froma telephonesurveyof 514 registered voters in Houston, Texas, conducted in August 1998,6 as well as from the 1994 ANES pre-electionsurvey. These surveys give us leverage over many of the hypotheses detailed above. They allow us to test the for expectationthatpartisan Republicansupport termlimits diminished

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after 1994, when the RepublicanPartyachieved majority-party status in Congressanda pluralityof the statelegislatures,includingthe Texas Senate.7 One obvious concern is the degree to which we can generalize our findingsfroma sampleof voters in Houston,Texas. An ideal study of public supportfor term limits would rely on survey data collected at the national level and including detailed questions about support for termlimits across levels and branchesof government.At this time, such data does not exist. We did, however, comparevoter responses to questionsasked in the Houstonsurveywith voter responsesto comparablequestionsin the 1994 ANES. The findingssuggestthatHouston voters are not significantly different from the ANES national voter sample. Comparingour respondentsin the 1998 Houston survey to the registered voters in the 1994 ANES sample indicates no statistical differencebetween the residentsof Houstonand the rest of the nation in their supportfor congressional term limits (x2= .74, p = .39). In otherrespects, our sample of Houstonvoters is similarto a sample of registeredvoters across the rest of the nation. The Houston sample is not distinctwith regard gender(x2= 2.23,p =. 14), ideology(x2= .00, to = .97), or attention politics(x2= 1.33,p= .51). It is, however,someto p what older (x2= 85.63, p < .00), bettereducated(x2= 81.86, p < .00), more Republican(x2= 59.68, p < .00), more congruentwith congressional representatives(x2= 69.63, p < .00), and composed of more minorityrespondents(x2= 43.24, p < .00). Nevertheless, this analysis gives us confidencethatthe implicationsof ourfindingsarenot limited to the city of Houston. DependentMeasures of TermLimitSupport Several dependentmeasures are included in our analysis. The first set of dependentvariables relies on informationfrom the 1998 Houston survey. In this survey, respondentswere asked if they supportedtermlimits in generalas well as for six differentelective offices: U.S. president, U.S. Congress, Texas governor, Texas legislature, Houstonmayor,and Houston city council. Ourdependentmeasureof supportfor termlimits is a dichotomy:1 = supportfor termlimits, and 0 = oppositionto termlimits. Undecidedvotersare includedwith those opposed to term limits.8We also use one dependentvariablefrom the 1994 ANES. Respondentswere asked, "A law has been proposedthat would limit membersof Congressto no more than 12 years of service in that office. Do you favor or oppose such a law?"9

Public Supportfor Term Limits Independent Measures: Testing the Seven Hypotheses

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We identifyhistoricallyunderrepresented groups.On our gender female respondentsare coded as 1 and male respondentsas measure, who 0. Our measure of race and ethnic minorities codes participants themselves as African American or Hispanic as 1 and white identify respondentsas 0. in We use two measuresof partyidentification this analysis.First, with a dummy measurewhere 1 = we identify Republicanpartisans Republicanaffiliation and 0 = Independentor Democrataffiliation.10 This measuresimultaneouslyreflects the effects of identificationwith the Republicanparty and the effects of congruence or incongruence with the majorityparty in the legislature.For the public-opiniondata collectedin 1994, we expectRepublicans support to termlimitsbecause of theirstatusas out-partisans. 1998, the Republicanshad achieved By majority status in the U.S. Congress; consequently, we expect their partisansto oppose term limits then, given their accession to House leadership. A second measureof partisanship accountsfor the incongruence a voter experiences when representedby a legislator who does not sharehis or her partyidentification.We use the partisanaffiliationof each respondent'scongressionalrepresentative Texas state legisand lator to construct a dummy measure of partisan incongruence. To determinethe partyaffiliationof each elected official, we identify the precinct or congressionaldistrict(or both) in which each respondent resided. Using local, state, and congressional directories(League of Women Voters Houston 1999; U.S. Superintendentof Documents 1994), we code the party affiliation of each respondent'srepresentatives. A respondentwhose partisanaffiliationis incongruentwith that of his or her congressional or state representativeis coded as 1; all others are coded as 0. Similarmeasuresare constructedto assess the effect of partisan incongruence on a respondent's support for term limits for DemocraticpresidentBill Clintonand Republicangovernor George W. Bush. It is not possible, however, to construct these measures for the Houston city council or mayor because these local We elections are nonpartisan.12 also constructmeasuresof genderand racial incongruencefor each respondentand the correspondingconThe gressional,statelegislative,andcity councilrepresentatives. gender and race of each elected official is identified from a canvass of city, state, and congressional directories. The racial categories include White,AfricanAmerican,and Hispanic(CongressionalBlack Caucus of 1999;Library Congress2001; U.S. House of Representatives 2001).

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We use self-reportedattentivenessto politics as our operational measureof voter attentiveness.Participants were asked, "How closely would you say you follow news aboutpolitics and government?Very closely (4), somewhat closely (3), not very closely (2), or not at all (l)." We are aware, of course, of the considerable literatureon the pitfalls of this measure (Iyengar and Simon 2001; Price and Zaller 1993) and alternative measures of knowledge, sophistication, and attentivenessto politics (Delli Carpiniand Keeter 1993; Zaller 1992). attentivenessmeasurewas the only one Nevertheless,the self-reported availablefor both the ANES and local samples.We interactattentiveness with gender, race, Republicanparty identification,and all measures of partisan,racial,and genderincongruence.The resultantinteractiontermsallow us to test the hypothesisthatmembersof these outgroups are more likely to supportterm limits when they are attentive to and knowledgeableaboutpolitics. of We measuredissatisfactionwith the performance government to evaluateeach unit of government"on a scale by askingrespondents of 1 to 10, where 1 is very unfavorableand 10 is very favorable." Voter trustis measuredby asking voters, "Whichlevel of government do you most trust to do the right thing, the federal government in Washington,stategovernment,or local governmenthere in Houston?" We constructthree dummy measuresfrom responses to this question that are positive measuresof trustfor federal,state, and local government. Participantswho answered that they trusted all three units of governmentwere coded as trustingeach level of governmentto "do the right thing." Similarly,those who answered"none"to this question were coded as not trustingfederal, state, or local governmentto "do the rightthing."Voter's ideological preferencesare includedas a controlmeasure-respondents were asked,"Whenit comes to politics, would you call yourself a liberal,moderate,or conservative?"13 Findings Table 1 reportsthe measuresof supportfor termlimits by office. Respondentswere queriedabouttheir general supportfor term limits as well as their supportfor term limits for specific federal, state, and local offices. A majority of those surveyed, 66%, said they were generally in favor of term limits. When term limits were associated with any specific office, the number of respondents favoring them exceeded this baseline supportfor term limits. Not surprisingly,support for term limits was greatestfor the office of the president(81%), which has been term limited since 1951. The next highest level of

Public Supportfor Term Limits TABLE 1 SupportFor TermLimits

(1998 Houston, Texas)

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Form of TermLimit GeneralTerm Limits CongressTerm Limits Texas State LegislatureTerm Limits Houston City Council Term Limits PresidentTerm Limits Texas GovernorTerm Limits HoustonMayor Term Limits

Yes 66% 70% 68% 74% 81% 73% 77%

No 17% 20% 20% 18% 13% 19% 17%

Don't Know/ No Answer 16% 10% 10% 8% 6% 9% 6%

supportfor term limits was for the mayor of Houston (77%). Fewer termlimits for the Texas governor(73%). Suprespondentssupported for legislativetermlimits was greatestfor the Houstoncity council port (74%), then Congress (70%), and finally the state legislature(68%). Public supportfor termlimits varies significantlyby branch,but not level, of government.An analysis of variance suggests that the proportionof respondentswho prefer limiting the terms of executive offices at all levels of government is significantly greater than the numberwho supportlegislative term limits (F = 9.39, p < 0.01). The public's sentiment for limiting the terms of elected offices does not vary significantly,however,acrossfederal,state,or local publicoffices
(F - 2.15, p < 0.116).

To test the specific hypotheses outlined above, we estimated several identicallogit models for differentlevels andbranchesof government.Employingthe causal factorsdiscussed, our model performs well for Congressand the Texas legislatureusing both the Texas and ANES samples. The same model, however, does a poor job of for explainingsupport termlimitingexecutivesandlocal-levelofficials. Not a single coefficient is statistically significant in our models for U.S. president,Texas governor,or Houston mayor. Only trustin city government is statistically significant in the model for city council members. These "nonfindings" are nevertheless substantively theoriesregarding interestingbecause they indicatethatcurrent public

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supportfor termlimits are only applicableto state and federallegislative offices. Although public supportfor term limits is consistently high, regardlessof level or branchof government,a consistentexplanation for this supportremainselusive. One possible reason for these nonfindings revolves aroundthe tenorof public discourseon termlimits across the nation.No research has been conductedon the framingeffects of the media's coverage of term limits, but we believe that the public debate on term limits and the media's coverage has focused on congressionaland state legislative termlimits.14 Fromthe heatedpartisandebateover the Republican Contractwith America duringthe 1994 election cycle to deliberation at the state and national level over a proposed constitutionalamendment restrictingcongressionalterm limits, legislatureshave been the of focus of public understandings this issue. Thus, we will limit the discussionto the models for legislativeoffices, Congress,and following the Texas state legislature.15 In the legislativemodels (Table2), we find conventionalexplanations of public supportfor term limits somewhatlacking. Trustin the federalgovernmentis negatively relatedto supportfor termlimits, but the thermostaticmeasure of supportfor the institutionis not statistia of cally significant,nor is out-groupmembership consistentpredictor supportfor termlimits. In fact, when the model producesa maineffect, it is in the opposite direction hypothesizedby the literatureand our presentstudy.Non-white respondentsare significantlyless likely than White to supportterm limits for Congress and the Texas legislature. This relationshipreverses direction, however, when we control for attentiveness to politics. The interactionbetween attentiveness and minority group membershipis positively related to supportfor term limits. Membersof racial and ethnic minority groups who are aware of their group's underrepresentation Congressand the Texas legisin laturesupporttermlimits as a means of enhancingminoritylegislative We find no relationshipbetween gender and support representation. for legislative term limits. Ideology is unrelatedto support for term limits. Other things being equal, self-identified conservatives are not significantly more likely to supportterm limits for Congress or the Texas state legislature. Republicanpartisanaffiliation is also unrelatedto supportfor eithercongressionalor state legislative termlimits. Further, attentiveness does not modify the relationship between Republicanpartymembershipand supportfor term limits: we detect no significantrelationship between supportfor legislative term limits and the interaction between attentivenessand Republicanparty identification.

Public Supportfor Term Limits TABLE 2 for TermLimits for the Congress Support and the Texas State Legislature
(1998 Houston, Texas) Variable Out-groups Gender (Female) Race (Minority) Party (Republican) Out-groupattentiveness Gender x attentiveness Race x attentiveness Party x attentiveness Out-group incongruence Gender incongruence Race incongruence Party incongruence Congress -.657 -2.32** -.040

471

(Wald) Texas Legislature (Wald) .454 4.3 .001 .203 -1.76* -.357 .044 2.95 .106

.259 1.04** .251

.392 4.7 .492

-.152 .747* .348

.130 2.76 .527

-.276 -.260 -3.58***

.079 .068 13.2

.072 -.583 -1.78**

.006 .388 3.51

Out-groupincongruenceand attentiveness Gender incongruencex attentiveness -.056 Race incongruencex attentiveness .262 1.31*** Party incongruencex attentiveness Satisfaction Trust Attentiveness Ideology (Conservative) Constant Pseudo R2 -2 log likelihood N *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. -.086 -.550 -1.80*** .103 5.65** .133 386 402

.019 .364 9.73 2.05 .328 7.38 .104 1.52

-.117 .290 .493* -.067 .241 -.829 .024 3.81** .078 371 397

.080 .481 1.43 .957 .519 2.59 .006 9.38

We now turnto the hypothesis that individualswho find themselves in disagreementwith the partisancomposition of the legislature as a whole will support term limits. In 1994, Democrats controlledthe U.S. Congress.If Republicansbristledat this partisancontrol of the institution,then we would expect the relationshipbetween Republicanidentificationand term-limitssupportto be positive and statistically significant at this time. By 1998, Republicanshad held majority status in Congress for some time. If partisandisagreement

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Stein, Johnson,and Post FIGURE 1 PartisanCongruence,Attentionto Politics, and Supportfor CongressionalTerm Limits
(1998 Texas)
1

0.9

"'M...Matches Representative

0.8 5 c
E

0.7 0.6
0.5

Incongruent

0.4 H
;

0.3
0.2

0.1
0 ,

Low Attention Moderate Low

Moderate High

High

Attention to Politics for Note: Probability changes were estimated using CLARIFY STATA (Tomz, Wittenberg,and King 2001). Solid lines representprobabilitychanges that are statistically significant (p < .05). Dashed lines representprobabilitychanges that fail to reach statistical significance.

with the collective partycomposition of the legislaturedirectlyinfluenced supportfor termlimits, then we would expect Republicanparty with termto identification have a negativeandsignificantrelationship in limitssupport thispoint.We failto findthepredicted at relationship either for the 1994 or 1998 data.These findingssuggestthatvotersupport term status of the legislature. limits is not focused on the majority-party Partisanincongruencewith individuallegislators,however, is a dominant determinant of individual support for term limits. This variableis negatively relatedto supportfor termlimits, but its interacwho tion with attentivenessindicatesthatpoliticallyawarerespondents are representedby lawmakersof a differentparty are more likely to supportlegislative term limits. This interactiveeffect is statistically significantfor ourcongressionalmodel butnot for the Texas legislative model. ForCongress,holdingall othervariablesat theirmedianvalues, we estimatethatpolitically awarerespondentswho are represented by

Public Supportfor Term Limits TABLE 3 for CongressionalTermLimits Support

(1994 AmericanNationalElection Study) Variable Out-groups Gender(Female) Race (Minority) Party (Republican) Out-groupattentiveness Genderx attentiveness Race x attentiveness Partyx attentiveness Coefficient Wald

473

.193 -.716* .339 -.106 .440** .066

.115 3.3 .836 .167 4.3 .154 .387 .002 .154 1.6 .254 3.9 3.4 .203 13.5 2.5 30.7

Out-groupincongruence Gender incongruence -.354 Race incongruence .022 .066 Party incongruence Out-groupincongruenceand attentiveness .326 Genderincongruencex attentiveness .109 Race incongruencex attentiveness .276* Partyincongruencex attentiveness Satisfaction Trust Attentiveness Ideology (Conservative) Constant Pseudo R2 -2 log likelihood N
*p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01.

-.129* -.071 -.547*** .242 2.09*** .23 1,538 1,549

lawmakersof a differentparty have a 5% higher probabilityof supportingterm limits than do voters who sharethe partisanshipof their associatedwith each representatives.16 The changein meanprobability in the interactionbetween attentivenessand partisanincongrustep ence is graphedin Figure 1. Table 3 reportsthe logit estimates for supportof congressional term limits from the 1994 ANES. The findings closely match those reported in Table 2 for the Houston voter sample. Race (i.e., nonwhite), voter attentivenessto politics, affect toward Congress (both trust and approval),and the interactionof race and attentivenessare

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all significantlyrelatedto supportfor congressionaltermlimits andare signed in the expected direction. Moreover, the magnitude of these estimatesis comparableto those reportedin datacolumn 1 of Table 2, of suggesting that the determinants public supportfor term limits are between our sample of Houstonvoters and ANES's indistinguishable national sample of voters. Most important,however, is the fact that the interactionof partisanincongruenceand voter attentivenessis significantly and positively related to support for congressional term limits. Holding all othervariablesat theirmedianvalues, we estimate that politically awarerespondentswho are representedby lawmakers of a differentpartyhave a 14%higher probabilityof supportingterm limits than do voters who share the partisanshipof their representatives. The change in mean probabilityassociatedwith each step in the interaction betweenattentivenessandpartisan incongruenceis graphed in Figure 2. The coefficient for attentivenessis statistically significant and term-limit that models,indicating informed negativein bothcongressional voters are reluctantto constraintheir choices when choosing candidates for public office. The same relationshipholds for the Texas state legislaturebut does not reachconventionallevels of statisticalsignificance. We interpretthe statistically significant and positively signed between attentivenessandpartisanincongruenceas meaninteractions ing that voters who are attentiveto politics are more conscious of the conflict between their partisanpreferencesand that of their representatives. It is their knowledge of partisanincongruencethat positively influencestheirsupportfor termlimits. In a sense, these findings turnour hypothesis aboutthe relationship among partisan incongruence, attentiveness, and term-limits supporton its head. We find that partisanincongruencemediates the effect of political awareness on support for term limits ratherthan vice versa. Examining Figures 1 and 2, we see that individualswho match their representatives'partisanidentificationsare dramatically less likely to supporttermlimits as theirattentionto politics increases. In contrast,individualswho identify with a differentpartythan their elected representatives remainconsistentin theirhigh level of support for termlimits, differinglevels of political attentivenessnotwithstanding. Although our findings offer a somewhat unexpected result, that result remains consistent with our original expectation that respondentsrepresented lawmakersof an opposingpoliticalpartyaremore by supportiveof term limits than other participants.This finding holds true for both Democrats and Republicans.Consequently,term limits can no longer be considereda Republicanissue.

Public Supportfor Term Limits FIGURE2 PartisanCongruence,Attentionto Politics, and Supportfor CongressionalTerm Limits
(1994 ANES)
1
-_

475

0.9 0.8
m

.--. .

... Incongruent -

0.7 =?~"~
0.6 0.5-

MatchesRepresentative

0.4 E2
;

0.3 0.2 0.1

0

LowAttention Moderate Low Moderate High Awareness

High

Note: Probability changes were estimated using CLARIFY STATA for (Tomz, Wittenberg,and King 2001). Solid lines representprobabilitychanges that are statistically significant (p < .05).

It is noteworthythat we do not detect a significant relationship between supportfor termlimits and eithersatisfactionwith legislative performanceor cynicism. The latter finding is particularlyunusual given the strong supportthis explanationhas garneredin previous research (Karp 1995; Southwell 1995). When we omit partisanincongruence from our models, the coefficients for satisfactionwith legislative performance cynicism are statisticallysignificantandsigned and in the predicteddirection. This fact would tentatively suggest that a voter's evaluationof Congress and the Texas state legislatureand his or her trustof each level of governmentis overshadowedby partisan incongruence with elected representatives. Voter satisfaction with Congress and trust of the federal governmentare both negatively related to partisanincongruence.The same relationshipfor the Texas legislature and Texas state governmentis negatively signed but not statistically significant.

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Nearly a decade has passed since the first state adoptedlegislative term limits. During this period, evidence has accumulatedthat suggests a seriousgap between the promiseandthe experienceof term limits. Severalscholarshave foundlittle evidence thattermlimits have reducedgovernmentspendingand increasedminorityrepresentation, wasteful pork-barrel politics, or reducedthe influence of special interests in government(Cain and Levin 1999). This discovery raises an intriguingquestion. If term limits do not achieve their touted goals and insteadbecome firmly linked with otherproblemsof governance, will voters then be motivatedto repeal restrictionson the numberof terms elected officials can hold office? Ourfindings suggest that contemporarysupportfor term limits has little to do with conventional groups,cyniexplanations.Membersof historicallyunderrepresented cal voters, and those citizens dissatisfiedwith theirinstitutionsare not clamoring either for or against term limits. Only politically aware membersof these groups supportterm limits. influenced a voter'spartisan for by Support termlimitsis significantly self-interestandwillingness to pay attentionto politics. Moreover,the as objectof partisanself-interestis not institutional, in the partisancona attentive trolof Congressorstatelegislatures. Rather, politically person's is with his or herelectedrepresentatives an imporincongruence partisan tantfactorin shapingthatvoter'spreferencesfor legislativetermlimits. affiliationsdo not match whose partisan Politicallyattentiveindividuals are those of theirrepresentatives more likely to supportterm limits. to Finally,it is important notethatourfindingsonly explainsupport for legislative term limits. The same models failed to explain support for executive termlimits at any level of government.OurHoustondata offer one of the first tests of conventionalexplanationsof term-limits supportacross levels and branchesof government.The nonfindings regardingexecutive offices suggest thatmore researchthatthinkspast these traditional public support explanationsis necessaryto understand for term limits across levels and branchesof government. RobertM Stein is the Lena GohlmanFox Professorof Political Science and Dean, School of Social Sciences, Rice University, Houston, Texas 77005-1892. MartinJohnson is Assistant Professor Hall, University of California, Riverof Political Science, Watkins 92521. Stephanie Shirley Post is a Post side, Riverside, California Doctoral Fellow in the School of Social Sciences and Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Rice University.

Public Supportfor Term Limits NOTES

477

1. State legislative term limits have been rejectedby courts in three of these states (Cain and Levin 1999). 2. Boeckelmanand Corell (1996) reportsuch findingsin the following states: California,Wyoming,Arkansas,Montana,North Dakota, and Ohio (state legislature, state executive, and Congress). The directionof the significantrelationshipbetween race and supportfor termlimits is not consistent,however. In some cases, it is positive (i.e., California,Ohio, and Montana,Wyoming),but in others,negative (i.e., Arkansas and North Dakota). 3. These studiesincludeDonovanandSnipp1994,whichresearched California, and Southwell 1995, which relied on the ANES. In addition,Boeckelmanand Corell (1996) reportsupportingfindings in the following states:Arizona,Colorado,Florida, Michigan, Missouri (state legislature and Congress), Nebraska,Oklahoma,Oregon, South Dakota,and Washington. 4. Southwell (1995) and Karp (1995) use the ANES. Hibbing and TheissMorse (1995) rely on their own nationalsample. Friedmanand Wittman(1996) and Donovan and Snipp(1994) use Californiadata.Rauschand Copeland(1990) augment the literature with examinations of California, Colorado, and Oklahoma, as do Boeckelman and Corell (1996), who report similar findings in the following states: Arizona,Arkansas,California,Florida,Michigan,Missouri(statelegislatureand Congress), North Dakota, Ohio (state legislature,state executive, and Congress),Oregon, South Dakota,and Wyoming. 5. Karp(1995) fails to confirmin FloridaandWyoming,as do Boeckelmanand Corell (1990) in Montana,Washington, Wyoming. and 6. Interviewswere conductedby the Universityof HoustonCenterfor Public Policy Survey ResearchCenter,August 7-14, 1998. The responseratewas 66%, and
the survey has a +/- 4.5% margin of error.

7. Book of the States (Council of State Governments1994, 1997) reportsthat in 1994, Democratscontrolled34 state house legislatures,Republicanscontrolled 14 state house legislatures, 1 state house was divided evenly, and Nebraskawas nonpartisan. By 1996, Democrats controlled 23 state house legislatures, Republicans controlled24 state house legislatures,and 2 state houses were divided evenly, while Nebraskaremainednonpartisan. 8. The analysis was replicatedwith a dependentmeasurethat excluded undecided from the analysis and with a trichotomyin which 1 = supportof term limits, 0 = undecided,and-1 = oppose termlimits. The substantive resultsof our analysisare not sensitive to how we operationalized supportfor termlimits using the responses the to this question. 9. It is important note that the questionis worded differentlyfor the 1998 to Houstonsurveyandthe 1994 ANES. We recognizethatthis disparitymay accountfor some of the variationin our findings. The similarityin estimates in each model will indicatethe extent of this problem. 10. Republicans (Democrats) are those voters who identified themselves as either strong Republicans (Democrats), not strong Republicans (Democrats), or Independent-leaning Republicans(Democrats).

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11. We do not attemptto operationalizeseparatelythe variablesof individual party identificationand congruence with the majorityparty of the legislature.This omissionis dueto the factthatthese measureswouldbe virtuallyidentical.Forexample, when an individualidentifies with the Republicanpartyin 1994, this voter is simultaneously a Republicanand identified with the minority party in the U.S. Congress. Consequently,the additionof a separatemeasure for congruencewith the majority party in the legislature in our model would simply duplicate information already included on the right-handside of the equation.Also note that this same condition holds for the interaction individualpartyidentificationand attentivenessto politics. of 12. Ourmeasureof partisanincongruenceis targetedto specific legislative and executive offices, yet it is possible that voters are influenced by incongruencewith several elective offices simultaneously.We constructeda categoricalmeasureof partisan incongruencebased on the partisanaffiliationof a respondent'sstaterepresentative, state senator,U.S. representative, governor,andpresident.This measureof partisan incongruencefailed to produce estimates that were significantly different from those producedwith a measurebased solely on the partisanincongruencefor the specific office studied. Two other measures of partisanincongruencewere constructed for state(i.e., staterepresentative, state senator,and governor)and federal(U.S. representativeandpresident)elective offices. Again, these measuresproducedindistinguishableresults.Wehave chosento use the office-specificmeasuresof partisan incongruence because our questions about term limits were office specific. We can provide these additionalanalyses upon request. 13. We conductedseveral tests of multicollinearitybetween partisanshipand variablesbiases ideology. We foundno evidencethatthe inclusionof both independent our estimatesof supportfor term limits. 14. Recent work on racial attitudesand public opinion about welfare (Gilens 1993; Kellstedt 2000) shows that public opinion is significantly influenced by how the nationalmedia framestheir coverage of welfare policy. 15. We will providethe findingsfornonlegislativeandlocal offices uponrequest. 16. We calculatedthe probabilitychanges using the CLARIFYsupplementto the STATA statisticalsoftwarepackage (Tomz, Wittenberg,and King 1999).

REFERENCES
Boeckelman, Keith, and Gina L. Corell. 1996. "An Analysis of Term Limitation Elections."In LegislativeTermLimits:Public ChoicePerspectives,ed. Bernard Grofman.Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Cain, Bruce E., and MarcA. Levin. 1999. "TermLimits."AnnualReview of Political Science 2:163-88. CongressionalBlack Caucus. 1999. http://www.sas.upenn.edu/africanstudies/goven/ Website accessed 1/10/99. political/cbc.guide.html. Council of State Governments.1994. Book of the States, 1994-95. Lexington, KY: American LegislatorsAssociation. Council of State Governments.1997. Book of the States, 1996-97. Lexington, KY: American LegislatorsAssociation.

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Political Knowledge: Delli Carpini,Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1993. "Measuring American Journalof Political Science37:1179-1206. PuttingFirstThingsFirst." Donovan, Todd, and Joseph R. Snipp. 1994. "Supportfor Legislative Term Limitaand CampaignInfortions in California:Group Representation, Partisanship, mation."Journal of Politics 56:492-501. Fearon, James D. 1999. "ElectoralAccountability and the Control of Politicians: In Selecting Good Types versus SanctioningPoor Performance." Control of Politicians, ed. Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan S. Stokes. Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversity Press. Friedman,Daniel, and Donald Wittman. 1996. "TermLimits as Political Redistribution." In Legislative TermLimits: Public Choice Perspectives, ed. Bernard Grofman.Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers Gilens, Martin. 1993. Race and Poverty in America:Public Misperceptionsand the AmericanNews Media. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Hibbing,John, and ElizabethTheiss-Morse. 1995. Congressas Public Enemy.Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversityPress. Karp,JefferyA. 1995. "ExplainingPublic Supportfor TermLimits."Public Opinion Quarterly59:373-91. Kellstedt,Paul M. 2000. "MediaFramingand the Dynamics of Racial Policy Preferences." AmericanJournal of Political Science 44:245-60. Leagueof WomenVotersHouston."1999 VotersKey."<http://www.neosoft.com/lwv/ Websiteaccessed 2/03/99. VotersKey/vkframe.htm>. Libraryof Congress. "Hispanic Americans in Congress." <http://lcweb.loc.gov/rr/ Websiteaccessed 5/05/98. hispanic/congress/contents.html>. Petracca,Marc, and Darci Jump. 1992. "FromCoast to Coast: The Term Limitation Express."National Civic Review 81:352-65. Price, Vincent, and JohnZaller. 1993. "WhoGets the News? AlternativeMeasuresof News Reception and Their Implications for Research." Research Opinion Quarterly57:133-64. Rausch,David, Jr.,and GaryCopeland.1996. "TermLimits in Oklahoma,California, and Colorado in 1990." In Legislative TermLimits:Public Choice Perspectives, ed. BernardGrofman.Boston, MA: KluwerAcademic Publishers. the Southwell,Patricia.1995. "'Throwing RascalsOut'versus'Throwingin the Towel': Alienation, Support for Term Limits, and Congressional Voting Behavior." Social Science Quarterly76:741-48. Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg,and Gary King. 2001. CLARIFY: Softwarefor Interpretingand Presenting StatisticalResults. Version 2.0. Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity. U.S. House of Representatives. Directoryof the United StatesCongress: "Biographical Womenin Congress." <http://bioguide.congress.gov/congresswomen/state.asp>. Website accessed 3/01/98. DC: of U.S. Superintendent Documents. 1994. CongressionalDirectory.Washington, U.S. Government PrintingOffice. U.S. TermLimitsv Thornton.1995. 115 S. Ct. 1842. Weissberg, Herbert. 1978. "Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress." AmericanPolitical Science Review 72:535-47.

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Limitsand theRecoveryof DeliberaWill, George. 1994. Restoration.Congress,Term tive Democracy.New York:RandomHouse. Zaller, John. 1992. TheNature and Origins of Mass Opinion.New York: Cambridge University Press.