VR may also transfiguration of the body boundaries, such that the person sitting at the computer terminal can map or sense of corporeality directly onto r>"T',T"_ forms. Therefore, it is necessary to understand how both sensorial and morphological issues are implicated in embodiment in VR. Phenomenological approach is well suited to these aims.
VR may also transfiguration of the body boundaries, such that the person sitting at the computer terminal can map or sense of corporeality directly onto r>"T',T"_ forms. Therefore, it is necessary to understand how both sensorial and morphological issues are implicated in embodiment in VR. Phenomenological approach is well suited to these aims.
VR may also transfiguration of the body boundaries, such that the person sitting at the computer terminal can map or sense of corporeality directly onto r>"T',T"_ forms. Therefore, it is necessary to understand how both sensorial and morphological issues are implicated in embodiment in VR. Phenomenological approach is well suited to these aims.
ration of the body boundaries, such that the person sitting at the computer terminal can map or sense of corporeality directly onto r>"T',T""_ forms. Currently, represented virtual forms exist on a number of different levels: a disembodied virtual hand, full body repre- sentations, lobster, or animal and figures. Therefore, it is necessary to understand how both sensorial and mor- phological issues are implicated in embodiment in VR In order to achieve this, reconceptuaHzation human experience is needed that provides an understanding how embodiment in is constituted (and may be grounded in culture, race, and gender) as well as an exposition of the mal- leability of body boundaries. It is argued that phenomenological approach is well suited to these aims. Within this paper we present a brief historical development of VR This includes a consideration of predominant optical nature. The disembodied discourses of VR are presented and countered by a consid- eration of the sensorial, gendered, and cultural embodiment that grounds VR Following an exposition the sensorial phenomenol- ogy of the body in physical and virtual environments is presented. This includes a discussion of how sensory experience links into artificial repre- sentations the (anthropomorphic representations) other artifi- cial forms (polymorphic representations) in VR This implicates the importance of artificial representations in engendering a sense of virtual embodiment. What at here how is it possible relinquish a sense of being in the physical environment and replace this with a sense of sensorial and corporeal embodiment in artifiCial environments? terms of corporeal embodiment in VR, this draws on research regarding disrupted bodies (bodies whose sensations, functions, and mor- phology have been transformed through limb loss, prosthesis use, and pa- see Murphy 1987; Trieschmann to inform extent to which the corporeal boundaries of the body are malleable and can extend into virtual reality. These are also used to provide for experiences embodiment current generic VR in of the phantom and objectified body. Understanding how people come to experience real reconfigurations of their bodies gives us indications of the in our embodied experiences VR are manifested. omLOPMENT OF VIRTUAL REALITY Virtual reality denotes the use of three-dimensional computer graph- ics to generate artificial environments afford real-time in- teraction and exploration. These are intended to give the user an impression of being present or immersed in computer-generated world. The Corporeal Body in Virtual Reality. 317 While virtual environments can presented on desktop computer plays, a sense of immersion is often promoted through the use of head mounted (HMDs). can present stereo images (infre- quently) sound, combined with haptic and vestibular displays, to create a perceptually encompassing computer environment. The HMD has been in use for over 40 years, initially for telepresence to remote real environments (via cameras), later developed by Sutherland (1965) to view computer-generated imagery. For example, it is now possi- ble to navigate around Virtual environment such a computer-gener- ated cityscape (see in which people can cycle on an exercise bike wearing HMDs depicting textually based images of Amsterdam. Tracking monitor movement of a head, so as he or she physically turns, so does the point of view in the virtual environ- ment. Most VR applications are dominated by which are, primarily visual mediums. Very few systems have progressed beyond this, although peripherals exist through which touch via datagloves, tion via treadmills, and vestibular information via motion platforms can be (see Biocca Delaney 1995). Alongside increasing technological sophistication, the ways in which a user's body is represented has evolved from lack pictorial resentation, to arrow (as hand), to the hand, and finally to full-body representations, normally in the form of block figures. So, the history of VR been to eyes and then the hand, while the rest of body's sensorium and motorium has been neglected or considered periph- eral the immediate aims VR OF OPTICAL TECHNOLOGIES, VIRTUAL REAliTY, AND EMBODIMENT The reliance on visual information in the presentation of virtual worlds is not surprising, given that vision has long been as finest of senses (seeing believing). Indeed, it has been argued that insights acquired by science have been built upon knowledge provided by optical technologies, such the telescope microscope (Ihde 1990), reinforcing the view that the acquisition of knowledge is primarily a visual enterprise. In VR can seen as a continuation of the Western SCientific tradition. It is these elements that contribute to the dominance of visual sense in It is a more recent recognition that vision by itself is incomplete. Jonas (1970) highlights and touch as two senses that eomplement and sight achieve its full potential. In terms of VR, the complementarity of various senses has prompted the development of peripherals to capture project body in its complexity into terminal reality (Bukatman 1993). Therefore, VR does not need to remain characterized by a disembodied 318 ETHOS gaze-that projection our into optic panorama. Flexible sensors and exoskeletal devices (re)create the body (or its parts, such as the hand) virtual environments. fiber-optic " ... ,,.AV'U familiar dataglove, adapted a fully instrumented animation of a virtual body viewable via a HMD (Ellis 1995). this sense, development reality (VR) continues to evolve to greater of psychological, and immer- sion. By virtue of the fiber-optic flexion sensors of the familiar dataglove and fully instrumented body it is possible reach beyond the limitations VISIon. "compelling" VR experience created by ing" sensory impressions from physical reality (Biocca and Levy 1995). The eyes, possibly ears, and even the body, enveloped by peripherals. Reminiscent of procedurcs associated sensory deprivation, it is, in fact, a substitution of sensory information. From the dataglove to body suit, technologies becoming all-embodying, perhaps even re-embodying. They are what Balsamo (1995:215; see also Murray 1996) calls "new technologies of corporeality." DIS-EMBODIMENT OR EMBODIMENTii discourses around virtual treat as a disembodying medium. Such discourses talk of leaving the body behind at the computer terminal, of a wandering mind cyberspace. body, the story goes, remains docked, immobile at interface, the mind wanders the pixelled delights of the computer programmers' creation. (1996), for example, contends that, recognizing transpar- ency of the virtual system feature which will be elaborated on within this paper), the "operator too" disappears, giving way to the disembodied traveler, the astral projectionist, cowboy" in nur,ar_ (1996:37). Narratives of mindlbody splits abound in VR discourse. Penny (1993) argues that "virtual reality the Cartesian duality, experiential body with a body image [the virtual body], a creation of mind ... " (1993:20). Stone (1992) cautions us to avoid the "Cartesian trick" because, argues, physicality is important in as in everyday environments. "No refigured virtual body, she warns, "no mat- ter how beautiful, will slow the death of a cyberpunk with AIDS. Even in the of technosocial subject, is lived t h T ~ h bodies" (1992:113, emphasis added). Indeed, the body deserves recognition for its primacy in the VR encounter (see Hayles 1996). Our argument in this paper is in line with Stone's, that experience of using is an experience. However, this is not unproblematic, and the nature of embodiment needs to be understood. The Corporeal Body In Virtual Reality. 319 The new technologies that constitute VR create the possibility of bod- ily immersion. As suggested earlier, there are comparisons here with stud- ies of embodiment under sensory deprivation (Seymour Fisher 1973). Fisher gives the example of a sensory deprivation study carried out by the psychiatrist John C. Lilly, who submerged himself in a tank of water, the temperature of which matched his body. As he floated in the tank, isolated from all light and sound, Lilly began to feel "merged and indistinguishable. from all that surrounded him," unable to "distinguish where his body left off and the water began ... " (1973:22). With no sensory detail (including diminished proprioceptive and kinaesthetic frames of reference), Lilly's body boundaries became ambiguous. Even the temperature of his body no longer "framed" his body against the surrounding environmental tempera- ture. While we are not arguing that immersion in VR constitutes sensory deprivation, we are arguing that the condition in VR is a (partial) substi- tution of sensory information, and that deprivation of physical reality, as articulated by Biocca and Levy (1995), is an integral part of a "compelling" VR experience. The procedures associated with sensory deprivation and virtual im- mersion may function to destabilize the experiential boundaries of a per- son's body (see Riva 1998), thus partially freeing the phenomenal body from the experiential constraints of a person's physical presence in the real world. 1 For example, Michael Heim (1995) describes his own percep- tual nausea following his VR immersion as "an acute form of body amne- sia" (1995:67). Heim entreats us to observe someone emerging from a VR system: "Watch their first hand movements. Invariably, the user stands in place a few moments ... , takes in the surroundings, and then pats torso and buttocks with their hands-as if to secure a firm landing and return presence in the primary body" (1995:68).2 All this is not to say that the mind is freed from the body, but that the experience of VR brings its bodiment with it. It does this through sensations that are linked almost inescapably to the virtual environment. Not only are bodies bounded within the sensations they receive, but they are also located in time and space. Early human development in- cludes a process of becoming embodied. We have a corporeai history, an evolutionary and ontological development. Along with our evolutionary corporeal history, the "passage of bodily time" and its concomitant expe- riential activity molds our embodiment (Zaner 1981). Maus (1992) nized this when he argued that the body is our first and most natural technical object. clothes (think of how high heels shape "the gestalt of a walking body" [Falk 1995:96]) and techniques of the body work not only upon the body-object, but also upon the body-lived, producing our embodied experience. ETHOS Moreover, our evolutionary includes the development an upright posture. We encounter the world from the height at which our eyes are located in our bodies. By drawing on our evolutionary history, VR has .our embodied reality to map onto our embodied experiences cyberspace. As Dennis Proffitt explains, the "point of projection" in VR is standing height. perspective offered viewers their expe- rience in the world, and viewers measure objects in the virtual environ- ments as they in reality-that against their own bodies. "You turn your head and see a stool in the corner, it appears below your line of vision, making it appear shorter than you are" (Azar 1996:1, 25). SENSORIAL, GENDERED, AND CULTURAL EMBODIMENT IN VIRmAl REALITY It was suggested earlier that dominant discourses surrounding virtual reality are predicated on notion of a disembodied For example, one guru writes having "everything amputated" within VR (Barlow 1990). Indeed, this mirrors the concerns of the social sciences, which have sought to human as disembodied phe- nomena. Here the body rarely informs. our understanding of cultural and social processes. However, movement cultural theory argues strongly that the corporeal body is an integral part of human experience 1993; Scheper-Hughes Lock We cannot understand who what we are, or explicate lived experience, without reference to embodi- ment (Csordas 1990, 1994). This perspective has important implications we understand embodied experience of because that ex- perience is founded on our bodily senses, which transport us into virtual However, not just our bodies are transported, but also our history and our social and cultural context. In terms of VR, there is evidence that people their everyday, real-world understandings and social experi- ences to new virtual encounters. For instance, a recent study (Murray, Bowers et , in press) of how people navigate through virtual cityscape, in which a computer allowed them to progress anywhere, found that they remained obstacles such as ""U"-"'''I',o and trees. This indicates that people's experiences of VR are not purely cognitively oriented, but embodied. In real life, of one cannot travel through bUildings and other objects. It is possible in cyberspace, but study partiCipants took advantage of possibility. Thus, to walk roads in cyberspace is to remain within the same embodied sociocul- tural patterns that exist in the real world. is that experiencing Virtual reality is an embodied and cultural event. For instance, Csordas (1990, 1994) argues that the body is The Corporeal Body In Virtual ReaUty 321 the existential ground of culture and explicates this in his studies of relig- ious experiences. We interpret our experiences through our culturally constituted body. The very fact that VR has developed in an occular-cen- tric way might well be grounded in the fact that Western culture tends to emphasize vision above the other senses. As Howes and Classen (1991) have argued, other cultures do not always divide the sensorium in the same ways as Western cultures do. They give the example of the different sensory properties of blood. In North America the visual aspect of blood is paramount, whereas in South India the tactile dimension is emphasized, and in Japan it is the odor of the blood that takes precedence. Indeed, whereas the Western world works around a conception of five senses, themselves culturally constituted (see, for instance, Classen et a1. 1994), other cultures have the capacity to recognize as many as 17 senses (Rivlin and Gravelle 1984). The point we want to make here is thatifVRhad been developed within a different cultural context, different aspects of our sen- sorial world might have been a more prominent feature of VR experience. Certainly, the artifacts of a culture (such as VR) embody the different sensorial emphases of its people (Howes and Classen 1991). In this sense, experience of VR is culturally constituted. We can extend this argument further by considering the gendered and ethnocentric nature of VR applications. Feminist cultural critics have writ- ten about the ways in which the body of white, Western males are in- scribed upon and within the technological apparatus and narratives of virtual environments (Balsamo 1993, 1995; Franck 1995; Hayles 1994, 1996,1997; Stone 1992). We argue here that VRis a cultural andgendered space, and because of this, the potential of the embodied sensory experi- ence within it is prescribed by the confines of the predominantly white, Western, male world. If VR worlds had developed outside of the white, Western male model, which is predominantly visually based, they might have been configured very differently. For instance, one VRdevelopment that reflects a feminist understanding of the body is that of Char Davies. Her Osmose system is a virtual reality organized around a breathing mechanism rather than hand-held peripherals. Moving within this envi- ronment (an oceanscape) involves using a variety of breathing techniques, and, as such, brings into playa different sensory experience (Davies 1995). Clearly, this VR application has very different implications for experiences of embodiment, which are instantiated through the tactile-kinesthetic body (see Sheets-Johnstone 1988), rather than the purely visual one. Similarly, Bailey (1996) has written about the way in which racial issues are also embodied issues. In his article "Virtual Skin: Articulating Race in Cyberspace" he suggests that race matters in virtual experiences: The discourse of race is, by history and by deSign, rooted in the body. Cyber-subjec- tivity promises the fantasy of disembodied communication, but it remains firmly The Corporeal Body In Virtual Reality. 325 In Heidegger's (1962) analysis of tool use, he uses the example of a hammer to propose the idea that a tool can become the means rather than the object of experience. The tool itself is also surpassed as it withdraws into the architecture of the body, forming what Ihde (1990) terms "an embodiment relation." The tool is not separate, but part of body experi- ence. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty (1970) argues that the cane for the blind person is no longer an object, but an extension of the realm of the senses. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty speaks of it as "an instrument with which he per- ceives. It is a bodily auxiliary, an extension of the bodily synthesis" (1970:152). With the cane as a "familiar instrument," touch is experi- enced at its end point ("its point has become an area of sensitivity" [Mer- leau-Ponty 1970:143], rather than at the hand. This incorporation of the tool into the body gestalt is what Leder (1990:34; see also Grosz 1994) refers to as a "phenomenological osmosis," Whereby "the body allows in- struments to melt into it" (Kujundzic and Buschert 1994:207-208). In so far as we take technologies into our experiencing by perceiving through them, the technology becomes embodied. 6 The above phenomenal examples of how the body incorporates tools into its structure have implications for how we experience peripheral de- vices ofVR technology. The separation between biological and cyber-bod- ies that Penny discusses appears invalid, providing that the virtual environments and virtual body incorporate these devices. If there is a pur- pose for having peripherals, such as the dataglove, within the narrative of the virtual environment itself, then it may be possible that the dataglove becomes transparent in the same way that Heidegger's hammer and Mer- leau-Ponty's cane do. Alongside an understanding of the phenomenology of the peripheral devices in VR, an understanding of the phenomenological experience of virtual embodiment requires the consideration of the perceptual effect that VR has on the experience of the body. It has been argued that for a sense of "presence" in virtual environments, the virtual body must closely resemble (both Visually and sensorially) the body of the user (the anthro- pomorphic argument). Sheridan (1992) asks how the "geometric map- pings" of the body within the virtual and physical environments, relative to each other, contribute to a sense of presence. For identification, and therefore telepresence to take place, it would seem that a Similarity in the visual appearance of the person and the virtual body is required (Held and Durlach 1992). However, other discourses have discussed the polymor- phous potentiality of VR (the polymorphic argument). This refers to the notion that the represented body in VR does not have to closely map the person's body in real life. In effect, it is envisaged that people could expe- rience a radically reconfigured body, say from their usual anthropoid The Corporeal Body In Virtual Reality. 331 I t is important to recognize that culture and gender may influence the experience of embodiment for prosthesis users. For instance, many women in Murray and Sixsmith's (1996) study indicated that their pros- theses were central to maintaining their feminine identity, such as being able to continue wearing high heels, to go dancing and so forth. However, other women remarked on the "ugliness" of their prostheses, and how they interfered with the establishment of sexual relationships. In contrast, males in this study appeared more concerned with purely utilitarian func- tions provided by their prostheses, such as being able to continue driving a car. Interestingly, prosthetic company advertisements often depict male prosthesis users in cars, emphasizing the culturally valued link between men and driving (Kurzman 1997). Thus, the cultural context of feminine attractiveness contrasts with masculine functionality, both of which play a part in a cultural and gendered embodiment of prostheses. Race may also be an integral issue in prosthetiC embodiment. For example, prosthetic cosmetic covers, which surround the working mecha- nisms of a prostheSiS, need to be visually redolent of the color of the user's skin. While issues surrounding race do not currently appear in existing research material, there are commercial companies that speCialize in pro- viding these cosmetic covers, which therefore indicates that race is an important consideration. Until issues of race have been explored with re- spect to prosthesis use, it is problematic to attempt to explicate its role further here, aside from highlighting race as an important area of future research. When considering issues of embodiment involving people with con- genital limb absence, the phenomenon of phantom limb is less pertinent than the reconfiguration of the body through the wearing of a prosthesis. For people with congenital limb absence, prostheses are a redesign of the body. Previous research involving people with congenital limb absence has concentrated on the rejection of the artificial limbs, noting that many of these participants felt their bodies felt complete without prosthetics (Frank 1984, 1986, 1988). In Murray and Sixsmith's (1996) research however, the embodiment of people with congenital limb absence who had continued to use prosthet- ics was of interest. Here it was found that many of these participants re- ported similar phenomenological embodiments of prosthetics as amputees. For example, a female interviewee with congenital absence of her right forearm stated: " ... it's [the prosthesis] a part of me now, that's the only way I can describe it. To me it's as if, though I've not got my lower arm, it's as though I've got it and it's a part of me now. It's as though I've got two hands, two arms" (Murray and Sixsmith 1996). As well as this direct assertion, amputees and people with congenital limb absence provide rich descriptions of prosthesis use reminiscent of the The Corporeal Body In Virtual Reality. 333 the importance of "authorship of action" (Harre 1991), to be able to con- trol body, contributing an ownership identification of the with the body. Instances of disrupted embodiment, and the body images they pro- Vide, of the importance of function, and upon the selfs corporeal moorings to the body. They tell us about a process of re-embodiment-a radical metamorphosis in the architecture of the body. and people congenital absence use theses experience "the extended body," while paralytics experience "the receding body." direct relation VR, can be argued the changes sensory information that come with amputation, the embodiment of prosthetics, and paralysis take time to crystallize into a concise body psyche, where- upon sense completeness allows reliable body image once more. Similarly, it might be that the dizzying sensory changes that accompany VR likewise disorient our sense of body before, with explora- tion time, coherent body experienced. In the following section of this paper we will see how the key phenom- ena of limb experienced by the amputee) objectification of the body experienced by paralytic) manifested in applications. In addition, we will also readdress arguments for polymor- phic within VR A ROURN TO PHENOMENOLOGICAL EMBODIMENTS IN VB: THE PHANTOM, OBJECTIFIED, POLYMORPHIC BODY word ka referred to "ethereal and dense" copy the human This but material analogue" of soul "inhabited and animated" the physical body (Grosz 1994:62-63). Such cultural myth echoes the in current systems. We consider that body inhabits an ethereal one. For instance, Romanyshyn (1994) argues that it is close to the phe- nomenology cyberspace see virtual or cyberbody "haunting" virtual world. cyberbody a its interactions with its virtual environment leave no tangible marks upon its flesh" (1994:97). Similarly, Hayles (1992) the act of closing the in VR grasp an objeet. While the person sees object, often there is no kinesthetic feedback of touch. "Proprioceptive sense flows out of the body to meet artifact, but since there is no terial object, returns a feedback that acts to de-materialize body" (Hayles 1992:168). it be the physical body becomes more ethereal tangible) in virtual experience perceptually and ""V'''"'''O''""n 334. THOS the virtual body becomes more dense. Heim (1995) implies much the same when he says that immersion results from the primary body giving away priority to the cyberbody .... The user undergoes a high- powered interiorization of a virtual environment, but in the process loses self-awareness" A fictional example this is provided by the British television science-fiction comedy Red Dwarf. In one episode, Cat, one of the main characters, attempts to leave an "artificial reality console" taking the devices. After taking the glove boot, Cat's (virtual) body is rendered paralyzed along his left side, and this is his dominant bodily perception. This a question phenomenal embodiment in systems: our technological embodiment may vacillate between the two, but two there are. This is what Simon Penny calls the "split body condition" or the "dou- body" (1994:242). VR, part of the sensorial architecture of body remains in the physical world, while another is projected into the virtual The corporeal body the physical ever present mind, while an body image weakly competes with it. When only parts of the body are absorbed by VR technology, phantom occur. The to which visual corporeality nnTn,n embodied experience influences the tangibility of our body outside the VR experience. As example of informative of atypical embodiment when applied VR, is to return to findings of Slater Usoh (1994). The range of movement offered by the virtual body in the studies was limited. Following a (in which only one arm and torso movements were represented), some participants commented their virtual body was "a dead weight," "a useless thing," and "nothing to do me" (Slater Usoh 1994: authors provide their anal- ogy of this phenomenon. They use an example of atypical embodiment, namely the loss of proprioception, to inform us about the participants' The example drawn a by enti- tled "The Disembodied Lady." The subject of the essay is a woman named Christina, who has lost all sense of her muscle, tendon, and joint positions. her Christina couldn't "feel" body. felt bodied." Only by careful (Visual) observation of her movements could Christina accomplish motor tasks. Without this close scrutiny her body was to would "lose" arms, for instance, com- ments, "I think they're one place, and I find they're another" (Sacks 1985:46). However, responses the in Slater's Usoh's studies are remarkably similar to the comments made by people with paralysis of various parts of their bodies. In both cases an objectification the (or is articulated. The that Murphy 336. ETHOS CONCLUSION Throughout this paper, we have attempted to explore the notion of embodiment of body in virtual reality. have argued that a sense of embodiment in VR is predicated upon two phenomena: the sorial architecture of the body, and the malleability of body boundaries. The more is possible to enter whole sensorium in VR, the more is possible to feel embodied within it. But equally important is the extent to which people can blur their body boundaries and extend eor- poreality into the virtual environment. This has implications for the future configurations virtual reality systems. may be to design systems to facilitate experiences of embodiment. This is particularly the case when considering peripheral For example, virtual environments can be created and perceived using specialized input/output devices, a or instrumented clothing, such a dataglove. Such devices can be used to transform the phenomenal (e.g., visuo-tactile, kinesthetic) properties of body. Proprioception and phenomenal plasticity of body boundaries can thus be accommodated synthetic dia when the body topology becomes accessible. However, the extent to which devices and/or (such as body-suit) may al- ter the sensorium of the body to redefine experiential human morphology is an open Another enigmatic aspect of embodimentin VR is whether a repre- sentation the body necessary virtual environments, and so, form it should take. Judging from the limited amount of research we have reviewed it appears that visual representation of person's is not always required to create a feeling of embodied presence. However, when visual representations are both anthropomorphic and po- lymorphic virtual bodies engender feelings of embodiment. This may largely due to malleability of experiential body boundaries. Indeed, within this paper we have proposed that instances of atypical embodiment (what we refer to as "disrupted bodies") provide us with rich examples of the malleable image indieate reeonfigured hodies are expe- rienced in VR systems. in has been explored, this paper, a matrix. The body has been understood as a cultural product, a gendered and ethnie entity. We argue that understanding of embodiment must take into account this sociocultural context of embodiment. It is apparent that the development of VR emerged white, male, Western, and scientific context. If this ethnocentric developmental context contin- ues be then women and people other ethnic backgrounds may feel alienated because their culturally constituted bodily experienees are not reeognized in VR environments. The Corporeal Body In Virtual Reality. 337 The phenomenological approach taken in this paper promotes a deeper understanding these issues enables a critical examination of the way in which the body may be instantiated within virtual reality. We are thus allowed to challenge disembodied Cartesian accounts of the body at the while the is cyberspace. We have ducted an exploration of embodiment in VR from this phenomenological perspective. This appears to be a promising route to understanding peo- ple's own experiences embodiment VR systems, Phenomenological analysis of experience is critical to an understanding of embodiment per se, and of embodiment in virtual reality in particular, It is through such a perspective considerations of sensorium, sentation, ethnicity, and gender have implications for future development of VR Therefore, we advocate phenomenological approach in future ex- aminations elaboration embodiment in virtual reality. CRAIG D. MURRAY is a Lecturer in Psychology in the Department of Psychology, Liverpool Hope University United Kingdom. JUDITH SIXSMITH Senior Lecturer in of Psychology and Manchester Metropolitan University, United Kingdnm. NOTES Ackrwwledgments. The authors like thank Frank her constructive tique of an earlier draft of this paper. Craig Murray would also like to thank Joanne Wynne for her continual support, and to acknowledge the support of the European Communities' ESPRIT (European Strategic Programme for Research Development Information Technologies) eSCAPE: Electronic Landscapes. 1. A case can be made for envisaging a dissolution between social and bodily space, or at least for seeing that this distinction is ambiguous or problematic. Straus (1966) argues that social space is expansion of the "body scheme." It belongs to body, but not pletely: "it is not an indisputable property, but a variable possession." This "intervening space is a medium between me and the world," and that is its social significance (Straus Ihde (1990) notes that we as our "real" or "naked space" is transformed optical such the microscope eyeglasses. VR a predominantly optical technology has the same and additional properties as those of tradi- tionallens technologies; Along with the ability to move forever forward (magnify) and back- ward in relation to image, VR naked space transformed, particularly when we do not have a virtual body (re)presentation. 2. The reassuring pats on the buttocks and torso that Heim observes in emerging VR users reminiscent of behavior observed in schIzophrenics and psychotics who press reason for caressing, or banging various parts the as a wish to "regain a clear picture of the dimensionality of their bodies, which had become vague or 'deadened'" (Fisher 1973:23-24). 3. all the sense organs," argues Anzieu, "[the is the most vital: one can live without sight, hearing, taste or smell, but it to survIve if the greater part of 338. ETHOS one's skin is not intact. The skin ... occupies a greater surface ( ... 18,000 [square centime- ters] in the adult) than any other sense organ" (1989:14). . 4. Merleau-Ponty tells us that "my body for me is not an assemblage of organs juxtaposed in space. I am in undivided possession of it and know where each of my limbs is through a body image in which all are included" (1970:98). To illustrate the immediacy of the body image extended in space ("a spatiality of situation"), he continues, "If I stand in front of my desk and lean on it with both hands, only my hands are stressed and the whole of my body trails behind them like the tail of a comet. It is not that I am unaware of my shoulders or back, but these are simply swallowed up in the position of my hands, and my whole posture can be read, so to speak, in the pressure they exert on the table" (Merleau-Ponty 1970:100). 5. However, there Is also a sense whereby donning HMDs, gloves, and body suits becomes a ritual. In order to enter the virtual world, these devices must be worn, both literally and symbolically. For example, consider a study by Slater et al. (1994) where a more intense sense of presence was induced by having participants simulate the process of entering the virtual environment while already immersed in a virtual environment. This simulation in- cluded repetition of donning a virtual HMD to enter different virtual environments. 6. This is not to say that we can't become aware of them. Perception takes place through the peripherals, but as a fringe phenoinenon we can become aware of. For instance, we feel the light pressure of eyeglasses on the bridge of the nose, but the focal phenomenon is achieved by the perceptual transparency of the peripherals. This is what Ihde (1990) refers to as a "ratio" between the objectness of the technology and its transparency in use. At the extreme height of embodiment, background presence of the technology may be detected. However, this does not imply that a "dislocation" will inevitably be experienced between the corporeal and the virtual body. 7. The supporting role of the whole body in any perceptual activity is elaborated on by Leder (1990): "When I gaze at a landscape I dwell most fully in the eyes. Yet this is only possible because my back muscles hold my spine erect, my neck muscles adjust my head into the proper position for viewing .... My whole body proVides the background that sup- ports and enables the point of corporeal focus. As such, the body itseli is not a point but an organized field In which certain organs and abilities come to prominence while others re- cede." 8. This can be compared with the experiences of prosthetic breast implants for some women. The contribution a phantom can make to the acceptance of prosthetic breast im- plants is evidenced by one women who, a year and a half alter her mastectomy, was still experiencing phantom breast sensations and immediately experienced the implants as being her own breasts (Goin and Goin 1981:185). REfERENCES CITED Anthony, E. James 1968 The Child's Discovery of His Body. PhYSical Therapy Practice 48:1103-1114. Anzieu, Didier 1989 The Skin Ego. C. Turner, trans. London: New Haven Press. 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